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REIGN OF REALISM  
IN  
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

By  
R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

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## PREFACE

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In his stimulating volume entitled "Beyond the Mexique Bay", Aldous Huxley has pointed out certain inaccuracies bordering on howlers detected by him in the latest edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. That came to me as a shock as I had been taught to regard the *Encyclopaedia* as the most authoritative reference-source. Turning to the article on "Indian Philosophy" found in the 12th Volume of the 14th Edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, I realised that the comments of Aldous Huxley were by no means overdone or exaggerated. The article contains many inaccuracies, and the most astonishing phenomenon is that about ten lines are devoted to the system of Madhvacharya, which forms the subject-matter of this volume.

Notwithstanding the efforts, and achievements of Indian and foreign scholars, Indian philosophical systems have not been properly understood and appreciated in the West. At the present time, Indian misrepresentations of Indian philosophy are working greater havoc in the thought-world than foreign misrepresentations. Indian misrepresentations of Indian thought circulated by certain prize-boys are advertised for public consumption by certain publishers and journals in the West. There is an organised attempt to glorify outrageous misrepresentations of Indian Philosophy into profound truths. The truths of Indian philosophy traditionally transmitted and embodied in the Sanskrit classics are obscured by the showy style, egregious epigrams, and the trickish terminology of the prize-boys of philosophic imperialism.

The Theistic system of Madhva (Anandatirtha) is practically unknown in the West, though brief references have been made to it, and short essays written on it. In India, knowledge of the details of the system is a monopoly of the Pandits, as the works of Madhva are written in terse terminology, and as commentaries on them are technical and voluminous. That is why no systematic exposition of the works of Madhva and his commentators has been attempted by Indian philosophers who are in the habit of writing for the benefit of international audiences, and for the purpose of pushing Indian philosophy within the focus of International Awareness.

My ambitions and aspirations are limited. I write hoping to elicit a response from all students of philosophy, and the lay public as well, possessing the scholar's outlook and desire to know the details of hitherto little known system of philosophy. It seems pointless to ask whether European and American, or even Indian critics for the matter of that, would accord a welcome to a Theistic system, when the predominant modern tendency appears to be towards *Monism*, and *Absolutism*. If research in philosophy is to be genuine, it should throw light on new systems, new in the sense hitherto not properly and systematically presented. I have, therefore, attempted an exposition of the ten important works of Madhva which reveal systematic evolution of his system.

The *ten* works (Dasa-Prakarana) exhibit an internal harmony. They satisfy all the requirements of philosophic speculation or system-building, some of them being devoted to destructive critical examination of Monism or Absolutism, and others to constructive elaboration of the Theistic truths. The chapters are arranged in an ascending order of philosophic import, or metaphysical significance, through which may easily be discerned the gradual evolution or unfoldment of THEISM, REALISM AND PLURALISM. The style of Madhva being terse, it becomes necessary to study the commentaries of Jaya-Tirtha. I have endeavoured my utmost to express in simple philosophic terms with standardised connotation every step taken and every argument used by that celebrated commentator to elucidate the significance of the language of Madhva. While proceeding through the task of exposition, I felt that certain stock-illustrations, and leading topics, had been repeated, but, I did not drop them as on each new occasion, it seemed some new lines of significance had been drawn.

I consider it philosophically most reprehensible to read into ancient Sanskrit classics occidental notions, and administer occidental orientation to Indian systems of thought with a view to making them acceptable in the West. I have endeavoured in my exposition to present the system of Madhva as it is found embodied in the original texts, and *not emphatically as what Indian and Western critics require it to be.*

I have heard it said that a system of theism like that of Madhva will not make any appeal to modern nations and communities. If this is true, so much the worse for those nations and communities. Theism is a challenge to human Thought. If international harmony is at all to be secured, it must be on a theistic basis or against a theistic background. "Am I my brother's keeper" sums up the world-situation to-day. Spain, and Abyssinia amply illustrate the total absence of control of secular behaviourism by higher philosophic thought, and by cultural agencies associated with ethical inhibition, and sublimation. Madhva's theism has a place in the sun.

I should now acknowledge obligations. My obligations, right through the exposition are to master-minds, the authors of constructive and controversial classics to Madhva, Jayatirtha, Vyasaraja, Vijayindra, Raghavendra and others in that line. There being nothing up till now published by anybody on the *ten* works in English, my obligations do not lie that way. His Holiness Sri-Satyadhyana-Tirtha, head of the Uttaradi Mutt, a celebrated champion of the system of Madhva, has evinced a lively interest in my work.

To Miss Elizabeth George, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, Women's Christian College, Madras, I owe the Index of Authors and Topics of European Philosophy. I acknowledge with thanks her great help.

My deepest debt is to the Proprietors of "The Hindu"—India's leading Nationalist Daily—Messrs. K. Srinivasan and K. Gopalan, to whose generous and unstinted help, I owe the printing of my work. Formal expressions of acknowledgment must indeed be too feeble to do adequate justice to their continued interest in my publication.

I recall with amusement that sometime ago the Indian Philosophic world was convulsed by allegations and counter-allegations etc. of plagiarism hurled at one another by two philosophers. *My exposition, such as it is, is absolutely my own*, with its beauties, if any, with blemishes of many of which I am quite conscious. Appreciation of Indian philosophy at Geneva is to my mind a miserably minor matter. If Geneva has failed politically, it cannot succeed philosophically. Requirements of the correct historical approach demand just a faithful exposition of the doctrines of a system and the details of argument urged in support. I claim my exposition of the *Dvaita Vedanta* of Madhva to be such. I place it before the public now for what it may be worth. In the words of Lord Haldane, I do not stop to consider if it will be well received or received at all. Someone had got to write an exposition of this type. As a humble follower of the school of Dvaita of Madhva, I feel some undoubted satisfaction that it fell to my lot to have attempted it.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA.

Madras, January 1937.

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## PREFACE

(Preface to Partial Print, 1932.)

1. The constructive exposition here attempted of the ten treatises of Madhva known as "Dasa-Prakarana" is *entirely and absolutely my own*.

2. It was originally projected to be published in the ninth volume of the "Encyclopaedic History of Indian Philosophy" planned by the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, Poona, but, as there seems to be some unavoidable delay in the publication of the Cyclopaedic history, I am submitting the work to the University.

3. I have had the peculiar good fortune of having studied the original Sanskrit works on Indian Philosophy under distinguished Pandits owing allegiance to Sankara, Ramanuja, and Madhva and under my father Pandit Bharatasimham Vidyabhushana Ramachandracharya. I undertook this exposition with a view to removing certain totally erroneous notions which prevail in and outside India about the philosophy of Madhva. Diacritical marks have been dropped, for obvious reasons.

4. Pandit T. R. Krishnacharya—my father-in-law—Proprietor of the "Madhva Vilas Book Depot, Kumbakonam," has published most of the important works relating to the Dvaita Vedanta, and throughout the present exposition, references have been made to Vol. I of the Sarvamuula. (Texts only of Madhva's works.)

5. I have deliberately refrained from drawing lines of comparison and contrast between the philosophy of Madhva and that of Western Realists and Pluralists, as it was suggested to me that all that is required is a faithful exposition of some of the leading works of Madhva in modern terminology, and that readers can then form their own judgments of comparison and contrast in the light of the exposition.

6. I am a pioneer in the matter of this exposition. Messrs. S. Subba Rao, C. M. Padmanabhacharya, Krishnaswami Aiyar, C. R. Krishna Rao, Grierson and others have written about Madhva and his works, but, the *Prakaranas* have been only slightly used by them, or not at all.

7. Works like "Tarangini-Saurabha" of Vanamali Misra, his "Chandamarutha", and those of Vijayindra Tirtha like "Pramanapaddhati-Bhava-Vivarana", "Upasamhara Vijaya", "Kantakoddhara", "Nyayamauktikamala", etc., which are all in the manuscript stage—no one can predict when they will be transferred to print—had to be secured with great difficulty. References are to pages of manuscripts in my possession.

8. A very unfair and unjust estimate of Madhva's philosophy occurring in "Indian Philosophy", Vol. II—George Allen and Unwin—London—made me expedite the present exposition.

9. I have endeavoured to keep as close as possible to the letter and spirit of the works of Madhva and those of his commentators and champions, but, certain turns, and twists in terminology had to be resorted to in my anxiety to be faithful to the original texts. For instance, to denote "Abhedha-Sruti" I have used the expression "Identity-text" instead of a "text that proclaims identity" or some such that may naturally be expected to have been used. The turns and twists may seem to do violence to King's English but they seem to be necessary to me in the interests of a faithful exposition of the philosophy of Madhva. The difficulty of finding exact, precise, and canno-denotatively commensurate terms in English which would bring out the correct import of the terse language of Madhva is obvious, but, I believe, I have been able to overcome it.

10. I could not submit the entire thesis in print as estimates for printing it even at a concession rate reached a figure somewhere in the neighbourhood of a couple of thousand rupees! The first chapter appeared in the inaugural number of the "Review of Philosophy and Religion"—Poona. The eleventh chapter on "Controversial Literature" and the twelfth and concluding chapter on "General Estimate and Reply to Critics" have here been printed for the first time. Other chapters are in type-script. Though the typist did his best, typographical errors have crept in, as he had to manage about a thousand pages single-handed.

11. It is my hope that the present exposition will be an addition to the stock of knowledge on Indian Philosophy and that it will be useful in however small a measure. Certain published criticisms of Madhva's philosophy have also been answered.

12. I am deeply obliged to the Proprietors of "The Hindu" for their great help in printing the eleventh and the twelfth chapters.

13. I submit my thesis as an humble tribute to the memory of Madhva and in fulfilment of a dutiful wish to secure and make sure Madhva's place in the sun. In submitting this thesis I have the satisfaction that I have endeavoured to discharge an obvious duty I owe to the Madras University—my Alma Mater.

R. N. S.

Kumbakonam, Nov., 1932.

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## CONTENTS

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Chapter.	Pages.
I. Introductory .. ..	1—12
II. Pramanas .. ..	13—43
III. Katha-Lakshana .. ..	44—83
IV. Mithyatvanumana-khandana .. ..	84—114
V. Upadhi-khandana .. ..	115—148
VI. Mayavada-khandana .. ..	149—165
VII. Tatva-Samkhyana .. ..	166—178
VIII. Tatvodyota .. ..	179—234
IX. Vishnu-Tatva-Vinirnaya .. ..	235—521
X. Karma-Nirnaya .. ..	522—544
XI. Controversial Literature .. ..	545—558
XII. General Estimate and Reply to Critics .. ..	559—680

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## CHAPTER I

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### INTRODUCTORY

#### I

The Philosophy of Dualism brought into prominence by Madhva constitutes a forgotten chapter in the history of Indian speculation, as narrated by European scholars and some of the English-educated Indian writers. Traditional thought assigns a marked place for it. Realism and Pluralism have a place in the sun even as Idealism and Monism. As Heracleitus so appropriately asserted, Strife is the Law of Life. In the field of metaphysical speculation, the hard-won victory secured after a strenuous fight is its own reward. The progress of Indian thought commencing from the crude and uncritical Naturalism of the Rigvedic hymns and culminating in the exalted Idealism of the Upanishads, has not been quite a smooth one, even as in the case of European Speculation. Idealism could not be, and was not accepted on its face value. There has never been any real divorce between Religion and Philosophy in the early stages of speculation. Intermingled in a chaotic mass with the hopes and fears of the early Vedic Nature-worshipper, lie the germs of a deeper philosophy of life based on the genuine needs of the heart and the head, of Faith and Reason, free from the deadening routine of rigorous ritualism. The philosophy of the Upanishads which culminated in Absolute Idealism could not attain the solitary grandeur and position from which it could be said to have been 'monarch of all it surveyed.' Idealism could not keep its position long. Monism shared a similar fate. Absolute Idealism and Monism were for a time holding unquestioned sway in the post-Gaudapada, Sankarite, and post-Sankarite epochs. A reaction set in. Ramanuja appeared as the antagonist of Sankara's Monism (Advaita). Later still, in the history of Indian Philosophy Madhva figured as an uncompromising opponent of Advaita and as a champion of Dualism and Realism as against the forces of Monism and Idealism. That a Realistic reaction against the Idealistic excesses of the previous age was a natural outcome in the fitness of things needs no very elaborate proof. European Philosophy furnishes ample evidence in support. The Idealism of Kant and Hegel was not the last word on Philosophy. Realistic and Pluralistic movements did spring up and did find no mean champions and adherents. Modern experimental psychology gave a stimulus to Pluralism and Realism. The successful advocacy by James of Pluralism is well-known. Russel and others are fighting for the supremacy of Realism. It would be a palpable mistake to suppose that all metaphysical speculation comes to a standstill when

a Realistic system has been worked out, or for the matter of that, an Idealistic one. Yet as a matter of fact, such a mistake was committed when it was sought to be maintained that other than the Absolute Idealism of Sankara, Indian speculation had no contribution to make to the world's metaphysical stock, and that with it Indian thought itself ceased to be fruitful and creative. European Philosophy has all along been a vast attempt periodically to miss, forget, discover and rediscover the post-Socratic systems of Idealism and Realism. History of European Philosophy is supposed to end with Hegel. Others would not admit it. Similarly, some would hold that Madhva was the last constructive thinker and that post-Madhva thought is concerned more with a discussion of controversial issues than with throwing any additional light on original problems.

All philosophy is bound to be naturalistic in the commencement. The outlook of primitive man was essentially objective. Striking phenomena in the surrounding environment have the foremost claim on man's attention. The subjective outlook appears later as the result of reflection. The Philosophy of Concept had a chequered career in Indian speculation. In the heyday of Buddhism the existence of the Universal was denied. The evanescent sensation of the moment was the only reality. There occurred subsequently a reaction. The Universal was apotheosized at the expense of the Particular. The Absolute of Advaitism was regarded then as the only reality. The particulars were deemed to be illusory and relegated to the realm of Maya. Yet they could not be totally ignored. They could not be thought out of existence. Though illusory or possessing only a lesser degree of reality, they persisted and had to be accounted for. Just as ancient Greek thought blossomed into the Idealism of Plato, Indian Philosophy developed into the Absolutism of the Advaita Vedanta. The exaggerated idealism of Plato required to be supplemented by the Aristotelian Realism, and even counteracted. Throughout the history of European Philosophy, the conflict between Idealism and Realism has been a permanent feature. At one time Idealism seemed to be the most potent philosophy of life that would satisfy the deepest demands of Religion, Ethics, and Metaphysics. It was championed by popular writers and metaphysical system-builders. Subsequently there resulted some poignant and acute dissatisfaction with Idealism. In that congenial atmosphere of dissatisfaction, Realism began to thrive. That the conflict between Idealism and Realism has been occurring persistently needs no elaborate proof. The origin of the Realistic and neo-Realistic movements and schools of the West is sufficient evidence. Realism may be crude or enlightened, dull or brilliant, old or new. It is as a reaction against Idealism it has found its *raison d'être*. Such conflicts need not be deplored at all. They are unmistakable signs of a vigorous and virile type of metaphysical mentality, which far from shirking any conflicts, busies itself with abstract speculation and a thinking consideration of

things of the spirit, without expectation of any material gain or reward.

In a marked sense, no stagnation is ever possible in philosophic thinking. The pleasant illusion may sometimes be fondly hugged that the depths of philosophy have been fathomed. It may even be seriously believed that all philosophy can be summed up in a few copy-book maxims concerning God, Freedom, and Immortality. Such is altogether a wrong attitude. A real live Philosophy is meaningless without contradictions and conflicts. Personal conviction that has the driving force of a dynamic philosophy of life can never grow and take root in men's minds without serious and rational deliberation. Resting content with repeating a few doctrines or dogmatisms handed down from predecessors is a positive hindrance to constructive thought. The past can never be a clog in the wheel of progress. The protest is only against a blind idolatry of the past. Complete severance and freedom from its influence are impossible. Nor are they desirable. It is a truism the past is a stimulus to the present. Or more accurately the past yields the data on which the present and the future are fashioned.

Germens of idealistic and realistic speculation, dimly discernible even in the unsystematized metaphysical attempts of the ancients, have been responsible for subsequent conflicts and complications. In Indian Philosophy we find the conflict to be sustained and dignified, though it has been denounced as a symbol of philosophical barrenness. In the absence of creative effort, attention is directed to hair-splitting conflicts and verbal wrangles. Such is the judgment of some English-educated scholars not acquainted with the traditional history and development of the conflict. The Creative spirit and effort had never been absent at all. It was doubtless not directed to the creation of systems of thought *de novo* as the traditional Vedanta does not contemplate it. The traditional view would be sketched in full later on.

Looked at from another angle of vision, Indian Philosophy presents as well a conflict between the forces of Absolutism or Singularism (such "isms" have monistic implications as their life-breath) and Pluralism. A conflict was inevitable in the nature of things. The exaggerated Absolutism which was emphasised by Sankara and his school of the Vedanta—partly as a sort of concession to the claims of Buddhism, as a sort of recognition of the hold and fascination exercised by Buddhism on the minds of his contemporaries and partly as a protest against it—broke under its own weight. A Pluralistic and Realistic reaction was the natural outcome. The importance of Madhva in Indian Philosophy mainly relates to the part played by him as the stalwart champion of the Pluralistic and Realistic reaction against Absolutism. The reaction can never be repudiated or condemned as an intellectual or speculative luxury. It represents and marks a genuinely felt need.

Ward writes: "But the recoil from Absolutism still persists; and accordingly, the twentieth century opens with the attempt to work out the idealistic interpretation not in the old way, as essentially a devolution of the One, but rather—as far as possible—to represent it as an evolution of the Many. In England, in America, in France, and even in Germany, once the stronghold of Absolutism, systems of Pluralism more or less pronounced are rife."

The attempts of the orientalists have so far been confined and restricted to a study of the Absolutism of Sankara with the result that not merely the historical continuity of the development of speculation has been missed, but an erroneous impression created that post-Sankarite speculation contains nothing worth study or investigation. When the doctrines of Madhva are sketched in detail, it will be seen they display a wealth of metaphysical insight and logical consistency which no genuine historian of philosophy can afford lightly to ignore. It is true that Ramanuja, Madhva's predecessor, led a reaction against the Absolutism of Sankara, but it does not render Madhva's subsequent protest any way superfluous and needless, as the latter reveals different lines of approach to a criticism of Absolutism. As Heracleitus pointed out long ago, Strife is the Law of Life. A too ready acquiescence in a system of thought or body of doctrine is a mark of degenerate mentality and if Sankara was obliged strenuously to fight in order to dislodge Buddhism from its position of eminence, Madhva was obliged likewise to fight against and dislodge Absolutism which had been so to say raised by metaphysical merit to bad eminence. Madhva's philosophy has a destructive as well as a constructive side. Indian philosophical tradition does not tolerate or countenance merely destructive tactics and efforts. A criticism of the opponent's school of thought should be immediately followed up with a constructive statement of one's own doctrines or system. It is proposed in the following pages briefly to narrate and sketch the philosophical doctrines of Madhva with an eye to the strictest conformity with his own writings and those of his commentators and interpreters.

## II.

### AGE AND ANTECEDENTS.

Madhva belonged to a very humble Brahmin family (Tulu-speaking) of Udupi, in the district of South Kanara. Some doubt attaches to the exact date of the Acharya's birth. In the History of Indian Philosophy chronology is perhaps the Achilles' heel. If internal evidence is to be preferred there is a stanza in one of the Acharya's own works which indicates his birth to have occurred 4,300—(four-thousand and three-hundred) years after the commencement of the Kali-Yuga. According to an Almanac calculated and published from Tanjore, one largely followed by the Madhvas

of South India, 5,029 years have now elapsed since the commencement of Kali, (i.e. in 1928 A. D.). The Acharya's birth then should have occurred 729 years ago, sometime in 1199 A. D. External evidence in the shape of inscriptions and records preserved in the Mutts is scanty and a detailed discussion of the date of the Acharya's birth is a matter of speculation. Something in the nature of research has been done in the past, and the future may reveal additional facts. After all, chronological discussion is subordinate to a doctrinal account of the Acharya's system of philosophy.

The antecedents of the Acharya are obscure. His father had the surname or appellation *Bhatta*. It is not quite clear how long they had settled in the district of South Kanara. The inference may perhaps be permissible that the appellation *Bhatta* indicates attachment of the family to *Purvameemamsa* and a leaning and partiality in favour of the practice of ritualism. It is conjectural when and under what circumstances the Bhattas came to be domiciled near Udipi. Madhva's father *Madhyageha-Bhatta* (evidently meaning one of the central-house clan) was surely a mediocre. He was not a deep thinker or scholar, not certainly an acute metaphysician. He was professionally engaged in expounding the stories of national Gods and Heroes embodied in the epics chiefly the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* to the people that used to gather round him. Leaders of striking schools of thought who have created revolutions in the habitual modes of speculation have, all the world over, been placed providentially perhaps, in humble and obscure surroundings so that the light of the masters of thought might shine with added brilliance, and their family environment has never been encouraging or promising.

### III.

#### CONTEMPORARY TENDENCIES.

The Buddhist condemnation of Vedic ritualism was unpromising. While it engendered in the minds of its adherents a sense of freedom and relief from the rigorous bondage of apparently meaningless rituals and the tyranny of priestcraft, it offered no substitute other than an abstract and empty ethical idealism, the ascetic requirements of which were too rigorous to have had offered any attraction to a temptation-ridden world. Kumarila's denunciation of Buddhism was perhaps a well-merited and just revenge. The *Bhatta's* advocacy of ritualism was opposed by the *Vedantins*. *Advaita Vedanta* was at once a criticism of Buddhism and ritualism. Such criticisms and condemnations were largely of an academic nature, and on the analogy of the conditions of existence obtaining to-day, it is possible to maintain that the various antagonistic schools of philosophy were flourishing side by side, so that a person with discriminating discernment may owe and express allegiance to one or another of them. Elements of Buddhism, Ritualism, and Vedantism of the *Advaita* type were existing in a



state of perpetual conflict and struggle. Sankara's task had been achieved. The nihilistic doctrines of the Buddhists had been overthrown and their hollowness exposed. But the Advaita which was offered as a substitute could not satisfy the spiritual and metaphysical craving. In Madhva's time a tendency to reaction against Advaita Vedanta should have been manifest. Evidently Advaita was still prominent then, notwithstanding the criticisms of it by Ramanuja who had preceded Madhva. That is an *ex post facto* surmise. It may or may not be of any great value. In the absence of a regular history of Philosophy based on proper chronology, such a surmise is permissible. Whether the revolution in thought created by Sankara was appreciated by the masses is difficult to say as the latter were quite content with a conventional and traditional adherence to a school of philosophy without ever feeling the need for any critical scrutiny of a particular system of speculation and the transference of allegiance to another believed to have been a substitute. The metaphysically-minded *intelligentzia* that had at one time embraced the tenets of Buddhism became dissatisfied with them, and it can be supposed with good reason that a similar fate overtook the Advaita Vedanta after centuries of unquestioned sway and prosperity. Whether or not such a conclusion is relished, there has always been a clearly-marked and well-defined cleavage between the thought needs of the masses and those of the *intelligentzia*, all the world over, and if a guess can be hazarded, it is often the case, that before a body of doctrines gets filtered down to the people, a standard of revolt against it is raised with the result that an earnest enquirer finds his path lost amidst a maze of conflicting and contradictory views and opinions. The revolt is led by the few who constitute the brain of the movement, and the many are simply there to follow. A revolt does not signify any complete stamping out of the opposed system or systems. Notwithstanding the Advaita Vedanta, its spread and popularity, votaries and adherents of Buddhism throughout the civilized world are legion. When the Advaita Vedanta itself was subjected to severe criticism by Ramanuja and Madhva it did not cease to be a living and dynamic force, and the contemporary Hindu society presents the spectacle of the followers of the schools of the three Acharyas living side by side in perfect harmony. Such social harmony is not incompatible with a tenacious clinging to antagonistic philosophical doctrines and theories. The truth of this may not exactly be realized by Western scholars. Conditions in European Philosophy are different. Religion in Europe is divorced from Philosophy and we do not hear communities owing allegiance to Plato or Aristotle, Kant or Hegel. There is plenty of critical discussion in books and periodicals and if an enthusiastic admirer upholds the supremacy of Plato, another writes in praise of Aristotle. Admiration for a particular Philosopher has no religious colouring whatever in Europe, while in India intellectual apprehension and sympathy towards the doctrines of a philosopher do and must generally connote religious worship of the founder of the system—the Acharya.

In its triumphant onward march, the Advaita Vedanta was opposed by Ramanuja who had preceded Madhva. The Visishtadvaita represents the first wave of opposition. The Dvaita marks the second. It is often asked whether in the light of the work achieved by Ramanuja as critic of the Advaita Vedanta, the part played by Madhva was either insignificant or superfluous. True, Ramanuja had written extensively in criticism of the Advaita Vada, but it is possible to explain that a criticism of the school can be attempted from different angles of vision, and that Madhva has indicated newer and fresher lines of approach to the overthrowing of the Advaita. Or, the explanation can be ventured that in the gap or the interval that lay between the period of Ramanuja and Madhva, there had occurred a revival of Advaitism sufficiently striking, refutation of which should have appeared to be of significance to Madhva, though historical evidence in support of such a revival may not be sufficient or even convincing. No elaborate justification need be attempted for Madhva's developing system in opposition to Sankara's, as obviously it is possible to maintain that a discontent was felt with the extreme Absolutism of the latter. The discontent might have been engendered not merely by the methods pursued by Absolute Idealists but also by the conclusions reached. Faint echoes of the method in question are heard in Bergson's advocacy of violence being done to Intellect. The inexhaustible richness and wealth of Reality and its interminable Creative Vitality can never be adequately expressed in terms of dead intellectual categories, and the very refusal of Reality to permit itself to be stuffed into and squeezed into Intellectual and Conceptual moulds, must point in the direction of a new method to which prominence should be given in all future metaphysical attempts. Granting this method of Intellect to be defective what is the substitute? Sankara speaks of a method of steady and patient practice in psychic advancement which is vouchsafed to lead to the most intimately spiritual contact and even identity with Reality. It will not be an exaggeration to assert that the average philosophically inclined commonalty could not have had any patience with a method—abstract, abstruse, and defyingly difficult to practise—and the promise of an ultimate Identity with Reality as the goal of metaphysical endeavour should have proved to be tantalizing and elusive, until a reaction set in against the view that any such Identity was practical politics at all. While a very adroit and robust mentality is necessary to reconcile oneself to the position, that the gap between the Human and the Divine, the Finite and the Infinite can easily be bridged and the Finite *can* realise its own Identity, with the Infinite, it is so easy and natural that weak Humanity always considers it to be an unpardonable sacrilege even to dream of an Identity with the Absolute and the Infinite, which must for ever remain out of its grasp and reach. The nervousness of Humanity is great and perfectly justified especially when the God or Deity of Religion comes to be identified with the Absolute of Metaphysics. The God of Religion is the fountain-head of love, mercy and compassion. To

forgive is divine. Erring man lifts his hands to Him in ecstatic prayer and submission and implores His pardon and forgiveness. A life dedicated to His worship and prayer is the best morally lived. How can such a religious soul ever dream of an Identity of itself with the Deity? The central doctrine of the Advaita Vedanta should have appeared to be a fantastic one and too chimerical for practical realization and guidance in life.

The doctrine of the illusory nature of the universe propounded by the Advaita should have failed to make a ready appeal to the minds of the people. It would be nothing short of downright metaphysical pedantry to tell a person working and toiling for his scanty daily bread in the sweat of the brow that the universe is illusory, and that at the dawn of genuine spiritual illumination or insight, the nothingness and emptiness of the world will be realized. The employment of a special psychical method and the goal to which it is believed to lead owe their importance to and derive their significance from the illusory and unreal character of the universe. The two doctrines are closely dependent on one another. Granted the unreality and the illusoriness of the world, it follows that freedom from the world is the only goal. A special method leads to its realization. Into the inherent correctness of the two central doctrines of Advaita, or their erroneousness, it is not necessary to inquire at this stage, but suffice it to observe that the unpracticality of them and their empty abstraction led to a protest and reaction in course of time which became pronounced at the time of Ramanuja, was less in evidence for some years, and once more had risen into sufficiently assertive popularity during the age of Madhva, who should have directed his attention to a refutation of the unpractical Advaitic doctrines.

#### IV.

At the time when Madhva commenced writing his philosophy there was no doubt Ramanuja's earlier criticism of the Advaita available. Ramanuja claimed that his interpretation of the metaphysical aphorisms of Badarayana—The Vedanta Sstras—was in accordance with another written by Bodhayana. He had evidently opposed the doctrines of Advaita and attempted to show that the Sstras could not be interpreted in the light of the Advaita. Ramanuja derived his inspiration from the earlier commentary of Bodhayana on the Vedanta Sstras and in his Sri Bhasya attempted an elaborate criticism and refutation of Advaitism. If so, was not Madhva's work entirely superfluous? Why should the Acharya have thought it necessary to turn his attention to a criticism of the Advaita when Ramanuja had already accomplished the task? Two reasons have been urged. In the first place, despite Ramanuja's work, it is possible to surmise that clamorous endeavours might have been made to revive the Advaita into prominence as of yore, and restore it to its former eminence and position. Such endeavours

met with success. There was a revival of Advaita. In view of that revival Madhva's attempt at its refutation and overthrow may be justified. Trite as it may seem, it is a fact that all metaphysical thinkers of repute and system-builders, have offered their philosophy of life as satisfying the speculative needs of the day and in opposition to the works of their predecessors. Bergson has propounded his Philosophy of Intuition in opposition to that of his predecessors and so too did Plato and Aristotle. Advaita was not the only system of thought which Madhva thought it essential to oppose. There were others as well. Orthodox Madhvas acquainted with the tradition claim that *twenty-one* Bhashyas—commentaries on the Vedanta Sutas—were prominent in the Age of Madhva. They were all contrary to the genuine spirit of the Upanishads and the Vedanta-sutas. Madhva's Commentary-Bhashya contains or embodies an implicit criticism of all the twenty-one systems of thought. A writer suffering from a downright bias against Madhva has made the sneering remark that of those twenty-one schools, *twenty* required little or no trouble to refute and Advaita was the only hard nut to crack. He has not said however, that even Advaita could have been easily disposed of, on account of Ramanuja's earlier criticism of it, and that Madhva had no place under the sun at all. Only ignorance of the historical evolution of systems of philosophy can be held to have been responsible for such wild statements. The numerical strength of the systems attempted to be overthrown by Madhva is of little import.

Secondly, tradition urges that Madhva was not quite satisfied with Ramanuja's criticism of Advaita. The latter claims his interpretation to have been modelled on that of Bodhayana, and Madhva as a pupil of the author of the Vedanta Sutas themselves claims that his elucidation of them is likely to be more after his master's heart than any other. Dvaita and Visishtadvaita differ in the views they hold about the nature of the Ultimate State of Realisation and the qualitative intensity of the ecstatic spiritual joy and blessedness experienced. The points of difference will be dealt with in the proper place. Critical scholarship and research need not have attached any value to extravagant claims either of the one Acharya or the other relating to his own interpretation of the Sutas, but, we need not look askance at such a thing if any writer urges that a justification should be found for his own constructive interpretation of the Sutas in the fact of its having been the outcome of a personal discussion with and learning at the feet of the Master himself—Badarayana.

There was a circumambient atmosphere of discontent with the tenets of the Advaita engendered by the cult of Bhakti, presumably promulgated by Ramanuja. Madhva laid specially great emphasis on it. It was further developed by the Chaitanya School still flourishing in Bengal. A full and complete surrender of the entire Finite Personality to the Infinite surrender of everything held near and dear

with all its defects and imperfections, perfections and excellences cannot but appear to be an exceedingly fascinating doctrine. Such a surrender constitutes the purest act of sacrifice. The individual effectively realizes his helplessness and impotence even in the comparatively minor concerns of life and existence. More acute and poignant is the sense of his helplessness in spiritual matters. He feels he must lean on some firm support, one which is itself not in need of further or other support. Only the Infinite can be such a perennial and unfailing guide and source of succour. It cannot, however, be anything identical with the Absolute of Metaphysics—towards which all paths lead and from which nought proceeds! To a devout heart oppressed with a heaviness of the Evil and Misery in the world, the Absolute of Metaphysics invariably appears to be a comprehensive Non-entity or Omnipenetrative Nullity. It could not afford any solace to the afflicted heart nor any enlightenment to the baffled and confused reason. A successful grappling with the Absolute were as hopeless as the childish attempt to crush the rising circles of smoke between the palms! A Deity that would sympathise with the afflicted individual, chasten, chastise, and yet release him from the bondage and the “Phantasmagoria of metempsychosis” should be enthroned and the Absolute deposed. A devoted and complete surrender of the personality in penitent penance is the only heart-felt and sincere tribute to the Deity. The relationship between the Infinite and the Finite with love, grace, and sympathy on the part of the former, and realization of helplessness and complete surrender of personality and obedience to divine will on that of the latter is termed Bhakti. The seeds of the doctrine had been sown perhaps long ago. Madhva saw that Bhakti blossomed forth and fructified. The contemporary tendency to follow the path of love, devotion, and self-surrender implied in Bhakti, was in the early stages a blind-felt impulse, and it was converted by Madhva into a rational living, spiritual motive force which on account of its characteristic element of entering into an intimate personal relationship with the Deity appeared undoubtedly more promising and attractive than the tendency to reaction associated with the empty Absolute of the Advaita lack of content, moral and religious, of which repulsed the advances of the aspirants. Such then were the contemporary tendencies prevalent at the time of Madhva and they must have contributed not a little to the development of his system of philosophy. They were potential and had not become kinetic. Even where they were pronounced and somewhat deep-rooted, they were scattered and were waiting to be synthesized and co-ordinated by a master mind so that they might function as effective metaphysical and spiritual stimuli. Ramanuja had not brought the scattered tendencies together. He had assigned predominance to the emotional element and not to the rational in the relationship of Bhakti or devotional surrender to the Infinite.

## V

Madhva accomplished the task with conspicuous and striking success. The keen logical bent of his mentality was of immense help to him. Sankara's anxiety to fall within the fold of the faithful and true interpreters of the Vedic culture and Upanishadic tradition is too palpable. He had achieved phenomenal success in overthrowing the tenets of Buddhism which had gone astray and wandered far away from the orthodox Vedic tradition. Sankara had a lively and right apprehension that his reputation can safely be built upon the shattered fabrics of Buddhism, or varying the figure slightly, Sankara hoped his Absolutism would spring up Phoenix-like out of the ashes of Buddhism. He was not disappointed. Contemporary tendencies were strongly in favour of the maintenance intact of and adherence to the Vedic and the Upanishadic tradition. Sankara's refutation of Buddhism and the resurrection, if such indeed it was, of the Vedic tradition, would appear to have left no scope whatever for the exercise of the constructive imagination of a new philosopher. But, Ramanuja sought to justify his own interpretation of the Vedanta Sutras in the light of its conformity with an earlier orthodox one of Bodhayana. Such an earnest concern or anxiety to claim for his interpretation the support and authority of an earlier traditional one adequately reflects the contemporary tendency even at the time of Ramanuja against the existing interpretation. Madhva went a step further. He claimed that the previous interpretations of the Sutras (21 in Number) not being in accord with the real and the genuine spirit of the teachings of the Master Badarayana, there was sufficient need to justify his own attempt at a correct interpretation. He sought to maintain that Sankara's refutation of Buddhism could be accepted only *cum grano salis*. The so-called refutation was really no refutation at all. Inherent identity between the essential doctrines of Buddhism and Advaitism could be easily detected and established. A detailed discussion of Madhva's equation of Buddhism and Advaitism must be postponed to a subsequent section. It is difficult to say with any amount of certainty or confidence at this distance of time, what could have been the psychological motive which impelled Madhva to advocate and support the equation, but time and impartial research alone can show whether personal malice or any bias was or was not responsible for it. It will, however, not appear too wild or baseless a conjecture if it is suggested that contemporary antipathy towards Buddhism was evidently pronounced to have given rise to the impression that any system of thought possessing or exhibiting doctrinal identity or resemblance with it should likewise share its opprobrium in the eyes of the intelligentia and the masses. It might well have been the case that the doctrinal identity between Advaitism and Buddhism seemed sufficient enough justification for the easy and even *prima facie* rejection of the former as the latter had been discredited with a rather imposing paraphernalia of debate and controversy. Bitter and relentless controversy has sprung up around Madhva's equation of Advaitism

with Buddhism, and after all the leading doctrines of Madhva have been chronicled and contrasted with those of Advaita, it would be time critically to examine the validity of the equation. Meanwhile the suggestion is quite probable that coming as he did in his time, under the irresistible spell of anti-Buddhistic virus, Madhva might have well hit upon the plan, a rather novel one, of making his criticism of Advaitism more effective and touching by pointing out doctrinal identity between Buddhism and its professed opposite and focussing public prejudice against the latter. Summing up, the following were the marked contemporary tendencies that exercised an effective influence on the formation of the Philosophical System of Madhva :—(1) The continuance of the anti-Buddhistic feelings engendered prominently in the Age of Sankara ; (2) Dissatisfaction with the Absolutism of Sankara in general and with the doctrine of the Identity of the Finite Individual with the Infinite in particular ; (3) The cult of Bhakti with its alluring implication of the possibility and practicality of a deep and intimate personal relationship with the Deity ; (4) Discontent with the sweeping Cosmopolitanism of Ramanuja ; and (5) the increasing popularity of Logic, technical methods, canons of debate, and controversy. It is easy to see while some of the tendencies were calculated to lead to destructive results, others paved the way for systematic constructive thinking and system-building.

#### SUMMARY.

1. In the history of Indian Philosophy Madhva appeared as an opponent of Monism and upholder of Pluralism as an antagonist of Absolute Idealism and a champion of Radical Realism.

2. The failure of European historians of Indian Philosophy to pay any attention to Madhva's system of thought can by itself be no proof of the inherent unworthiness of the system or of its lacking in metaphysical merit, though such a perverted estimate is so common that non-recognition by European writers is deemed an indictment of Madhva's philosophy, and the scant attention paid to it by European and Indian writers, ancient and modern, has made it a forgotten chapter of the Vedanta. Realism and Pluralism in Indian Philosophy are as alive and dynamic as Idealism and Monism, and the former continue to exist, as they have ever done, in a state of vital and violent conflict and antagonism with the latter.

3. In the evolution of philosophical systems and theories all the world over the opposing tendencies of Monism and Pluralism, Idealism and Realism have held their respective sway at different times.

4. Discontent with the doctrines of Advaita and the rising influence of the cult of Bhakti were among the important forces that moulded and systematised Madhva's speculation.

## CHAPTER II

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### PRAMANAS

Esotericism and secrecy in metaphysical quest and procedure have always been repugnant to Indian Philosophers. Honest, open and straightforward procedure is their pride. A readiness to acquiesce in the logical conclusions however unpleasant and unpalatable without in any way yielding to the emotionalism of religion, characterises their metaphysical speculation. The Rank Materialist—The Charvaka—does not hesitate to a vow that all the “Gods are dead” and man should make merry eating and drinking the cup of life to the very lease, and such conclusions are shown to follow rigorously from accepted premises according to the laws of thought. The premises can doubtless be challenged by opponents belonging to other persuasions, but an enthusiastic adherent of a particular school of thought would try to maintain that it is *ultra vires* so to challenge his premises and postulates. What is the foundation or the basis on which the self-confidence of the system-builders rests? Persons unacquainted with the Indian traditions may contend that self-confidence of that type is misplaced and unwarranted. It is however based on what are technically termed *Pramanas*. The stand-point of the Indian Philosopher is one of enlightened and rational Empiricism in the sense that all philosophy should take its stand on the hard and irrefutable facts of experience. The Ego or the self is the central pivot around which all experience clusters and crystallises. It is a truism—none the less valuable—that the depth and intimacy which are the marks of personal experience or realisation are something unique. Experience *QUA* personal realisation (in the intuitive stage) is something that defies all attempts at conceptual analysis though it may lend itself to some sort of description. The experiences of an individual are distinctively and characteristically his own. Points of similarity and contrast are doubtless detected between the experiences of myself and those of another. The one, however, is incapable of being reduced to another. Each individual type must retain its individuality. Nothing that negates or repudiates experience can rise to the level of philosophy. The agent or the Knowing, Feeling, and willing, Ego is the main centre of interest. He is described as the *Pramata* the Knower. The emotional and the volitional aspects are dependent on the cognitive in a significant degree. The knower—or the sentient experiencing agent, lives, moves and has his being in an environment to which he has to adjust himself. Effective and successful adjustment is



conditional on correct cognition. The entire range of phenomenal existence with objects, physical and psychical an accurate apprehension of which is indispensable for successful conduct in life is termed *Prameya*. It literally means that which is to be known or deserves to be known. It is used in its widest and most extensive Denotation. There is nothing that is not a *Prameya*. Some time or other, all objects of the universe that range between the "Starry Heavens above and the moral Law within" might become objects of cognition. Degrees of truth and error are admitted. (1) There are cognitions of a higher and a lower order—clear and distinct cognitions. There are also confused and obscure ones. Some yield reliable and accurate information about the environment while others only the vaguest of notions. The *Summum Genus* of a classificatory series is as much an object of knowledge, a *prameya*, as the *Infima Species*. Knowledge is the relationship into which the knower and the known, the *Pramata* and the *Prameya*, enter. *QUA*,—unknown the object is ignored and has no relationship whatever with the subject. For purposes of a sound theory of knowledge, it is better to regard it as *sui generis*, and attempts that seek to explain it in terms of something else alien and foreign to its nature are bound to prove vain and futile. Indian Philosophers characterise knowledge as *Pramana*. The English equivalent is *not* means of knowledge, though such a wrong translation is often employed by writers. The question of means of knowledge is quite different. The constituent elements that enter into the peculiar relationship of knowledge should be discriminated, and the discrimination points to *three* distinct and different elements—The *Pramata*—The *Prameya* and the *Pramana*.

Objects exist to be known, and the Subjects to know. *QUA* known, they determine vaguely or pronouncedly according to the depth of knowledge, the nature and character of the response of the organism to the multitudinous stimuli that assail it from the environment. The absolutely unknown has no fascination for the subject. Nor has the perfectly known and familiar any. Knowledge is a measure of the things that are capable of entering into the relationship called forth by the exigencies of the situation between the Subject and the Object. An object known and understood becomes *pro tanto* measured. The figure of speech is bound to break down beyond its obvious limits. Not mere casual acquaintance, but intimate knowledge furnishes the Subject with all the necessary and relevant particulars relative to the objects as constituted in time, space and environmental relationship. Madhva has done the fullest justice to the psychological standpoint which emphasises knowledge

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(1) Degrees of Truth and error are not meant in the sense adopted by Absolutists. A lesser degree *qua* lesser does not thereby become *un-real*. It is as real as a higher degree. It is necessary carefully to note that the term "degree" in an exposition of Madhva's doctrines is not used in the sense familiarly associated with it in Bradley's works.

as the only effective means or weapon of adjustment to the environment. In its widest connotation, Knowledge is the subject-object relationship. The knower or the subject is shut within the panorama of his experience and ideas. Escape from this encircling panorama is impossible. Each individual considers the objects of the universe from his own standpoint which is unique. His interest of a life time or of the passing moment will colour his vision. The interests of one individual are not identical with those of the others. Where societies, communities and nations are concerned, the common kinship and common interest which bind and hold the members together become a live motive-force *only* in so far as they are brought home to the individual. The purpose and interest of the subject will determine difference in knowledge. The Relativity of interest and purpose is responsible for relativity in knowledge. If the interest and purpose relate to the satisfaction of the immediate need of the subject, the knowledge sought is meagre and superficial. If they are allied to deeper needs and more vital concerns, knowledge sought is comprehensive and deeper. Degrees of depth and intensity in knowledge are thus inevitable. They are due to the volition-and-interest bent of the individual. They are equally inevitable when viewed from the side of the objects known. Variety and diversity are what meet the eye everywhere. Objects belong to different orders of existence and are capable of entering into different relationships with one another. They lend themselves to different uses by the Subject. Some are self-evident and simple, while others are complex, defy our intellect and are enveloped in an atmosphere of mystery. The differing characteristics of objects cause degrees of difference in the intensity and intimacy of knowledge.

What is the Upper limit? The admission of degrees must logically point to an upper and a lower limit. Knowledge that is capable of embracing in one sweeping universal grasp all the facts of life and solving the mystery of Existence—omniscience—a type in which there exists the deepest conceivable intimacy between the knower and the known—marks the Upper limit. It is the most perfect and accurate type of knowledge not within the reach of finite, imperfect humanity. It is unique and singular in its Denotative and Connotative aspects. It apprehends an infinite number of aspects and features of an infinity of objects. About this type—Divine Omniscience—there is absolute exhaustiveness and nought is excluded from its pale. The logical lower limit evidently corresponds to the Leibnitzian *Petites Perception*. Between the two infinite Degrees lie. Knowledge is thus represented as a hierarchy. The upper limit in its divine orientation knows no error whatever, no illusion. The lower limit is a zero. It is perhaps full of error and confusion. Knowledge is termed *Pramana* as it is the only effective unit of the intellectual measurement (that is non-spatial and spiritual). Modern experimental Psychology which seeks to equate life with a series of stimuli, and

responses will amply support the view that without knowledge, whatever it may turn out to be in the last analysis, no responses can be executed by the organism. Knowledge is the spring of all action, of all responses. It is the only unifying and synthesising agency. The interpretative activity of the mind which is called judgment by the Western writers is termed *Jnyana* by the Indian thinkers, which is the *pramana*. It is a single unitary act of thought. Within its comprehensive fold of unity it is possible to distinguish the Subject from the Object, the *Pramata* from the *Prameya*. What then is the *Pramana*? Combined with the characteristic hatred of secrecy and esotericism, the Indian thinker has in him strongly implanted a deep love and reverence for authority and evidence, and an anxiety to proclaim and avow the source of his doctrines and theories. Nothing is to be accepted on trust. Unless attempts are made to carry conviction to the mind of the enquirer by letting him perceive the unimpeachable character of the authority and its compelling nature, Good-bye to metaphysics and philosophy. The Kantian Transcendental Unity of Apperception is such a precious *pramana*. It has to reveal, systematise and unify and so to say manufacture an intelligible object out of the sense-multiplicity presented. It is important to note that the Unity is not conferred *de novo* on the sense manifold *ex cathedra* by the interpretative and synthesising activity of the mind. If the Unity were not there in the objects of the world themselves in the narrow individualising sense and in the cosmos generally regarded as the System of systems, the mind or the interpretative activity or knowledge would find none whatever. A *pramana* thus becomes a valuable guarantee, a vital link that establishes a relationship between the knower and the known. It does not create or bring into existence the Universe and the objects which it knows and understands. The permanent and vexed question whether knowledge confers being need not here be discussed. Madhva's pre-eminently psychological standpoint precludes any such discussion. *Esse* must be distinguished and differentiated from *percipi*. Knowledge effects no changes whatever in the objects and things known. *Qua* known the objects of the Universe come to possess a value and status which they do not *qua* unknown. That is all. Should this acquisition of value and status as a result of an object's admission into the relationship known as knowledge be regarded as a change or difference in the object? Certainly not. A *Pramana* simply brings together the agent and the environment into a particularly significant and intimate relationship known as knowledge, such relationship, being indispensable for successful and effective conduct in life.

Though the logical value of *Pramana* is not belittled, in the ordinary course of life, it is best appreciated only when an aspirant commences to pursue the metaphysical quest. The facts of life are quite plain. A rationalised Hedonism is consciously or unconsciously embraced by all-philosophers and laymen, though the

former may sanctimoniously protest against the offensive odour of the term. Happiness, whatever its connotation, here and hereafter, is the goal. The orthodox Indian Philosopher does not deem it necessary that the continuity of the present life into future existence after the destruction of its material and bodily vestige should be made the subject matter of elaborate proof, particularly laboratory proof to the satisfaction of a fastidious scientific conscience. Life hereafter is a postulate. Others have attempted something like a proof which need not at present be discussed. The standing inequalities and differences in the cosmos and the generalisation or the Law of Karma inductively formulated on their basis render the admission of the existence of a hereafter imperative. The happiness of the moment is no doubt tempting and alluring enough. Pursuit of it to the detriment of the happiness of a life-time or a hereafter is irrational Hedonism. Enlightened Hedonism will counsel the abandonment of the perishing present, and advocate an active pursuit of the permanent peace of the hereafter. Unalloyed eternal happiness can be enjoyed only after the attainment of the state technically termed Moksha or Mukti. It cannot be attained without Divine Grace, notwithstanding the putting forth of the best of effort of the best of persons. Divine Grace is impossible of achievement without the requisite spiritual studentship and apprenticeship under a reliable preceptor—Sad Guru—continued concentration, meditation, and devotional worship of the Deity in strict conformity with the methods indicated and taught by him. How is one to understand all this, all the information relating to the goal of a person's spiritual endeavour and the methods of realisation? Is such knowledge intuitive? Is it innate? Or does any inner sense yield such information? How is an aspirant to proceed when he is bewildered by conflicting schools of speculation, crazy creeds and fluctuating standards of morality, when his vision is clouded by the smoky atmosphere of passion and prejudice? He should resort to the *Pramanas* and turn to them for light and guidance. A precise settlement of the nature of the *Pramanas* and a study of their characteristics are insisted upon by Madhva as an indispensable prolegomena to all metaphysical attempts. From another point of view, a preliminary examination of the *Pramanas* is something like a Critique of Reason and Knowledge with a view to the determination of their lures and limitations.

Madhva has entered on an elaborate discussion of the *Pramanas* and in some important and vital respects his views differ from those of the other systems of thought. After having defined and classified the *Pramanas*, Madhva has given a searching and exhaustive Criticism of the notions about them entertained by others.

Madhva proceeds to define *Pramana* as YATHARTHAM. That which apprehends an object as it is is *Pramana*. The reliability and authenticity of experience will depend upon the accuracy and

correctness of the apprehension. What is accurate apprehension? Apprehension of an object *as it is*. The definition at the very outset seeks to repudiate the difference between an object or thing *as it is in itself* and an object or thing *as it appears to an understanding*. The familiar contrast between Phenomena and the thing-in-itself is denied. All apprehension, cognition or perception is surely of an ordered systematic world of objects *as it is and as it is constituted*. When once we begin to suspect whether or not our understanding yields us knowledge of objects *as they are*, there is no end to such suspicion, and total darkness in the intellectual realm and complete chaos in the moral are bound to result. Suspicions die hard. No suspicion ordinarily attaches to rational cognition and perception. The term YATHARTHA is inserted to exclude SAMSAYA and VIPARYAYA. The former signifies Doubt and the latter perfect misapprehension or erroneous cognition. Neither the one nor the other yields knowledge of an object *as it is*. So far they agree. They however differ in as much as in the former there exists only a state of vacillation and indecision, but in the latter a decision has been taken, may be mistaken altogether. As Doubt and total misapprehension do not yield knowledge of objects *as they are*, they can never be regarded as *Pramanas*. They are not in a position to guarantee anything, nor can they inspire a person with any confidence. They do not produce any intelligent and successful responses. The organism is either thrown into a state of excitement, or exists in a state of suspended animation. If there should be a response prompted by a total misapprehension of the situation, it results in the inhibition of the conative tendencies of the organism and their arrest which means some injury to it. If there is just a doubt involving a mental See-saw, the agent will fail to react effectively to the situation. Perceptual and Ideational illusions fall under the category of VIPARYAYA. A detailed consideration of Madhva's Psychological theory of illusions has to be postponed. The familiar example is the perception of silver in the mother-of-pearl. Silver by itself *QUA* metal is a reality. So is mother-of-pearl, *Qua* distinct recognisable object. It is the perceptual conjunction of the two that constitutes an illusion. The real significance of the term YATHARTHAM will be apparent when a contrast is instituted between knowledge of an object *as it is* and illusions. Bereft of all technicalities, the position amounts to this. In all knowledge that is claimed to be *Pramana*, reliable guide to efficient action and motor response, there is perfect commensurability between knowledge and its object. The former never overreaches the latter. The commensurability does not mean completion and exhaustiveness. There exist other points of view not contemplated and left out of account owing to lack of interest in them. An act of perception at some future date may well relate to them as newer and fresher situations present themselves. The only point of significance is that at each time and on each such

occasion, never mind how numerous they may be, there exists perfect commensurability between knowledge and its object. In other words, the commensurability so to say, rounds off the situational interest of the moment. It suffices for an adjustment. It satisfies a need. It cannot be a well-executed response. The satisfaction of the volitional interest of the moment would be impossible if there was lack of commensurability between knowledge and object, which alone imprints the stamp of validity on an act of perception or cognition.

Madhva's definition of YATHARTHAM has both a positive and a negative aspect. According to the latter, the object of knowledge can never hide its true and real nature and characteristics, and knowledge itself can never overreach the object. According to the former perfect commensurability between knowledge and object is the true mark of true and reliable knowledge which determines successful conduct in life. There is so to say perfect intellectual Rapport between knowledge and the object known. The former exhibits ordinarily no tendency to fly at a tangent. The current of knowledge does not turn awry. The in-alienable right or the essential characteristic of knowledge is to make the objects of the world known. In cases of doubt, illusion or totally erroneous knowledge, we come across a striking lack of commensurability between knowledge and its object. In other words the intellectual Rapport between the two is absent.

Doubt is not identical with total ignorance which is often bliss. It gives rise to uneasy feelings. It inhibits action or motor response which alone can restore the equilibrium of the organism and relieve it of the state of tension into which Doubt has cast it. Doubt partakes of the characteristics of Disjunction in which we are unable to make a choice and proceed with the onward advancement of the conative tendencies. Doubt prevents the choice of one alternative to the exclusion of the rest. A Psychological analysis reveals the following facts :—There is in any given situation, the knower or the agent. There is some vague, ill-defined and partly known object. Its characteristics are not fully known. The meaning and the significance of the situation have not yet been adequately apprehended so that the subject finds it difficult to adjust himself to it. S May be P, Q or anything else. The entire predicate side is uncertain and indeterminate. The alternatives may be specially enumerated and spread before one's view, but so long as a choice cannot be made owing to lack of definite knowledge, the state of doubt must be regarded to exist. In such cases Knowledge overreaches the object. If several alternatives regarding the nature and the characteristics of an object are suggested with an almost endless possibility of the inclusion of mere alternatives, there being no chance of an immediate decision being effected by the choice of one from amidst a series of disjunctively formulated alternatives, and the rejection of the rest, as far as the then state

of knowledge could warrant, the mind is obliged to wander from predicate to predicate, in a state of nervous suspense and irritation, unable to fix upon one and so long as each alternative appears to be equally fitting with the subject, and hence equally alluring and tempting, there can be no commensurability and no Rapport between the knowledge and the object known (or waiting to be known). Granting that all the relevant alternatives have been enumerated in a disjunctive series, there may be the conviction that one of them is bound to fit in with the subject, but such a conviction is devoid of all utility so long as it is insufficient to determine what that one favoured alternative is. Such a conviction can never be a *Pramana*, never a determinant of an adequate motor response. The nebulous satisfaction that some indeterminate predicate might attach itself to a subject can never guarantee the fitness of any particular alternative, to function as a determinant of an adequate re-action. It may be the entire system of disjunction with the alternatives as constituent elements that is associated with a state of doubt and indecision, might have to be overthrown and a fresh one substituted. Then knowledge and the object are not commensurate and commensurable. There is no Rapport between the Two. Knowledge has overreached the object in that the subject finds himself lost in a labyrinth of alternatives. Madhva thus marks off the conceptual boundaries of a *Pramana*, the reliable, the guarantee, that piece or type of knowledge which enables a subject to apprehend the object as it is and renders possible as a result of this apprehension an effective adjustment to a difficult and puzzling situation, from those of an *Apramana* the unreliable and misleading type of knowledge which does not yield knowledge of an object as it is, and which therefore becomes the prolific parent of miscalculated and clumsy responses to the environmental demands. The term YATHARTHAM is particularly and strikingly significant. It connotes true and reliable knowledge. Knowledge and its object resemble one another in an intimate sense. (2) Existence as distinct element in an act of apprehension is the essence of this resemblance. This is not mere correspondence though there has not been so far urged anything fatal to that type of theory of truth. The object known or waiting to be known is *Artha*. Knowledge is *Jnyana*. *Yatha* stands for resemblance. The knowledge and the object resemble one another in an intimate sense. Resemblance is just an accurate portraiture by knowledge of the characteristics of the object. That is to say the object should be known as it is. Knowledge and its object enter into a given situation as real existent entities and neither the one nor the other

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(2) See commentary on "TARKATANDAVA" P. 3. "Upadikhanda Mandaramanjari." The criterion of valid knowledge of reality as it is, is "resemblance between knowledge and object *qua* existent in a spatio-temporal point" (*Artha-Jnyanayoh-Sattaya-Sadrisya*.) In illusions, this criterion breaks down. The object is not an existent in illusions. *Nacha-bhrame-ativyaptih-..... Jnyanasya-satvat-arthasya-asatvat-artha-jnyanayoh-sattaya-sadrisyabhavat.* Knowledge alone being existent, and object non-existent, there is no resemblance between knowledge and object *qua* existents.

can lay claim to more reality or a greater degree thereof. What is this existence? Existence as a member of a well-ordered system, or as a distinct entity. Neither existence, nor the individual member, nor the system is negated by a later or subsequent act of perception or inference. It would be exceedingly interesting to inquire why the resemblance or intimacy between knowledge and object *QUA* existent elements is insisted upon. Just contrast knowledge that is true and reliable with that which is not, say with an illusion. The object simply *does not exist there*. Violence is done to the requisite resemblance or intimacy of relationship between knowledge and its object. Analyse the classical example of the illusory perception of silver in the mother-of-pearl or of snake in a rope. Neither the snake nor the silver exists there though its knowledge does. The acute poignancy of illusory experience will be fully realised by all who might have been its victims by the execution of clumsy and miscalculated responses to situations. Here the resemblance and intimacy disappear. Whereas knowledge of silver and snake exists the objects themselves *do not*. There is thus no similarity or resemblance between knowledge and object but only dissimilarity or contrast. The contrast is vital. Knowledge exists. Whereas object *does not*. That the latter might exist somewhere, in some shape, is a vain assertion. Only existence under particular situational surroundings and conditions is at stake. In the present experience knowledge exists and the object *does not*. That is why illusions are *Apramana*, unreliable type of knowledge. In experiences where *both* knowledge and object exist there is perfect rapprochement or intimacy or commensurability between the two. The latter is *Pramana* while the former *Apramana*. The *Pramana* advances and furthers the conative tendencies of the Subject, while the *A-Pramana* thwarts them. Whether any piece of knowledge is to be regarded as *Pramana* or *Apramana*, reliable or unreliable, can be determined only in reference to its ability further to advance or impede the conative tendencies of the organism. That is why knowledge as contrasted with illusion is *Pramana*. The kernel of the contrast lies in the existence of knowledge and object in the former and the absence of the object from the latter. Madhva's view is in perfect agreement with the Psychological facts presented and theories advanced by modern writers. An illusion gets analysed thus. There is nothing amiss in the numerous sensory stimuli that assail the organism from the external reality—nothing wrong with the sensory mechanism and the afferent and the efferent nervous tracts, but the incoming stimuli are wrongly *interpreted*. The error lies in the interpretation, this is—a snake. This is a piece of silver! etc. Neither the silver nor the snake, exists, and this non-existence while knowledge exists renders the latter *apramana*, unreliable. Should an agent proceed to act on the basis of such illusory knowledge, disappointment will be his inevitable lot. In the stimulus—response Psychology, it will be stated that a response determined and regulated, and prompted by an illusion will be an



injurious reaction, not beneficial. Stimuli and response adequately fit in with one another only when knowledge fits in with facts and perception enables us to understand and apprehend objects as they are.

After this analysis of illusion and correct perception Madhva proceeds to take the next step and exhibits the inward connection between *Pramana* (Reliable knowledge) and *Prameya*. (The real objects to be known) Knowledge—whatever it is in ultimate analysis—is necessary and indispensable to get on in life. Adjustment to environment is impossible without it. It goes without saying that the manipulation of the environment and its subjugation to our will would be much more so without it. A satisfaction of our interest and volitions can be secured only by means of knowledge. This is however only a lesser ideal. The satisfaction of the Conative tendencies, adjustment, etc., do not exhaust the values of spiritual world and a higher life. The goal of man's noblest spiritual endeavours is the realisation of Brahman, the Infinite. It is the *Summum Bonum*. Realisation of it is impossible without an adequate knowledge of Brahman, and only a preliminary investigation of the *Pramanas* can create an assurance of the pursuit of the right path. A discussion of the *Pramanas* is thus a necessary Prolegomena to all metaphysical speculation or system-building. That knowledge alone is *pramana*, reliable, in which the object apprehended has a concrete and undeniable existence as a member of a systematic world constructed and sustained with the co-operation of the mind's creative activity and an independently existing and persisting external world of reality. A *Pramana* is thus a revealer or exhibitor of the real and true characteristics of the objects of the world as they are, and a thing can enter into relationship with the agent or the Self or the Subject, only through its instrumentality. In the matter of fundamentals, commonsense and philosophy are obliged to agree, and Madhva never countenanced any attempts to exalt the latter and place it on an unapproachable eminence. The contention that this existence—aspect of knowledge and object is too plain and simple has no point as the simplicity does not in any way detract from its position, the position of knowledge as the fundamental weapon of adjustment. Whether the problem to be solved is the one relating to childish addition in elementary arithmetic or it is that of winning bread for the day or is the one relating to the solution of a profound philosophical problem, knowledge is the only weapon through the instrumentality of which it can be approached and studied. Knowledge is basic and foundational. It is futile to attempt to penetrate further deep in our analysis as the foundational concept is bound to baffle it. Should however an analysis be attempted at all for purposes of methodological exposition or dialectics, we find two prominent and unmistakable elements in knowledge. (1) While retaining their independence intact, knowledge and object are brought into an intimate relationship which is the only one needed

for the assignment and appraisal of certain values to the environment amidst which the knower's lot is cast, and which alone reveals from the point of view individualised, particularised (or even circumscribed) by subjective interest and punctilious purposiveness, the characteristics of it as it exists and *not* as it appears to be to a vision jaundiced and distorted. (2) There is perfect agreement or Rapport (intellectual) between knowledge and the known *QUA* existing elements in an ordered world of reality—an agreement which by the process of contrast with doubts, illusions, etc., indicates a definition of knowledge. The characteristics have been mentioned as they are the essential ones and as they are found uniformly to exist in all the imaginable, relatively graded types of knowledge, graded in accordance with their clearness and distinctness and their comprehensiveness. They derive their validity from their universality. Germs of the characteristics might with some care be detected even in the humble and the obscure beginnings of children awareness or confused apprehension, and there is nothing against the view that the embryonic characteristics become adequately developed and attain their complete expression in the fulness of time. *Pramanya* is thus the inalienable birth-right of all knowledge in all the stages of its evolution. Madhva is anxious to formulate a definition which would cover all the relevant instances. Lest it should suffer from narrowness, he is particular to see that no type of knowledge is left out of account. He is unwilling to cast a reflection or aspersion on the integrity and validity of the ordinary knowledge which maintains an unbroken continuity with the highest type of it between which and the former only difference in degree and nought in kind exists. (3) Such a course is necessitated by Madhva's realism. The Absolutists are driven to the confession of a definite cleavage, not mere relativity which involves only a difference in degree, between intellect and intuition or between ordinary knowledge and the final incandescent act of apprehension of the Absolute, which *A La Bergson* they would assert is the means to put it clumsily, of attaining identity with the *Elan* or the Absolute, but Madhva maintains a relatively graded system of knowledge in which the lesser type possessing a lesser degree of clearness exactness and a comprehensiveness, *is as much real as the most perfect type*. An error is committed the moment *unreality* is sought to be foisted on the lesser type, or degree. Madhva is uncompromising on this point. The difference between his and the view-point of the Sankaraite Absolutists is radical and fundamental and cannot at all tolerate any artificial make-believe Pact. It is not a temperamental difference or disagreement born of prejudice or sentiment. The difference is necessitated by the laws of thought and by the psychological standpoint adopted. There is no need or warrant to foul one's own nest even for the sake of the exalted metaphysical quest, and

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(3) Here also the term "degree" is used not in the Absolutistic sense. There is no difference in kind because *qua* grasping the nature of reality as it is knowledge finite and infinite resemble one another.

our own knowledge is sufficient and quite efficient to grasp the import and significance of Reality. It is a reliable guide. It is true. It prompts, determines, and regulates healthy reactions to the environment so long as it is allowed to function properly and so long as its operations are not hampered or inhibited by counteracting forces. Human beings, animals, and even plants, are endowed with a mechanism for arresting and intercepting the stimuli esoteric and exoteric, that are every moment assailing them, and knowledge is just the interpretative activity which renders possible the execution of the relevant and the fitting responses. There is in knowledge nothing inherent or acquired which would ever make it a treacherous and unreliable guide. No suspicion ever attaches to it. There is, on the other hand, plainly discernible on it the imprint of *prima facie* truth and reliability. *Ergo*, it is *Pramana*.

If this position is to be doubted and disproved the *Onus Probandi* lies on the Doubting Thomases. They are the Buddhists. According to them Knowledge is an extremely untrustworthy and treacherous guide. It always misleads, but never leads. Knowledge is stamped with the imprint of *prima facie* untruth, unreality and unreliability. Even such an ordinary and simple perception as S is P. This is a Pillar, is unreal. It has just the status of a dream-experience, that is unreal and unsubstantial-airy nullity. This is the Buddhists' theory of knowledge based on their Nihilistic Metaphysics, and yet in utter repudiation of it all they manage to pose as the champions of ethical Idealism, while the implications of their Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics are such as would lead only to a rabid and barren Nihilism, if logically and consistently worked out.

Sankara assigned and conceded a greater degree of reality to knowledge and yet to him also as for the Buddhist it was misleading in as much as it was obscuring the essential Identity of the Finite Soul with the Infinite Brahman, and exhibiting the world as composed of desperate objects and entities. Ordinary knowledge was given a bad name. It was condemned as being finite. It had to be sublated and nullified by a higher type of knowledge which however is not the crowning point in a progressive series of different grades of complexity, clearness, distinctness and comprehensiveness, but which is held to mark a definite break or cleavage as it is a sudden flash of illumination which on account of the very suddenness and the goal it is believed to lead to is unique, in as much as it installs the aspirant at the very source and fountain-head of Reality and enables him to realise his identity with the Infinite. If the modern World is reconciled to the Bergsonian intuition of Duration and is quite clear as to what it is and how it is to be achieved, it is not difficult to realise, that ancient Indian Absolutists became readily reconciled to Sankara's doctrines.

Neither the Buddhistic nor the Sankaraite view could commend itself to Madhva. He would have nothing to do with the Buddhistic Nihilism, nor could he lend any countenance to Sankara's prima-facie Illusionism—Theory of the unreality of the Universe. His was a vindication of the Realism of the Universe and of the validity and reliability of knowledge. He could do justice to his metaphysics only by holding that knowledge considered as a weapon of adjustment *Par Excellence*, is in its own right, *prima-facie*, true, reliable, valid and dependable. It is its essential nature so to be. In short it is *Pramana*. It is its inherent right and characteristic to reveal the nature of the objects as they are. Knowledge is foundational and the basic factor of all experience. It is however *not* infallible. It has to work and function under certain well-known limitations. In some instances it is not able to reveal the characteristics and features of objects as they are. It yields misleading information and leads to illusions and perversions of perception. Knowledge fails to do its functions properly only in certain exceptional cases which can all be satisfactorily explained. Madhva's explanation is thus elaborated. Error and illusion are the results of Two sets of factors. No doubt the general nature of knowledge is to reveal the characteristics of objects as they are, not to obscure and cloud them. If sometimes, they appear to be a sealed book, the natural inference is that counteracting forces are at work. They are collectively known as *DOSHA*, counteracting conditions and circumstances that render nugatory the ordinary function of knowledge. When knowledge is confronted with them, it leads to and terminates in blind alleys. The conditions may relate to or inhere in the percipient subject, or in the perceived object. Introspective analysis supplemented by experiments lays bare the following circumstances which can be termed subjective, by a convenient modern terminological device—Blind bias, prejudice, preconceived notions, congenital propensity for misreading and misinterpreting any situation, a falling back upon and resort to the wrong and the irrelevant item in the apperceptive mass for the elucidation of the meaning of a present pressing problem. These together with a defective sensory Apparatus which distorts the incoming stimuli, are the factors relating to the percipient subject that contribute to the appearance of error, and the rise of illusions. The obscurity of the objects themselves due to inconveniently small or huge dimensions, distance, separation or isolation, situation at a peculiar position which does not admit of any study or analysis, in short, unsuitability or unsusceptibility to any sort of observational or experimental treatment,—these are the factors that relate to or inhere in the objects perceived. Where such counteracting factors are operative, error and illusion result. At the dawn of correct cognition, the clouds of counteracting circumstances are scattered. Error and illusion are the exception and not the rule in Madhva's Realistic theory of knowledge. Madhva is thus at the Antinodes of the Buddhistic view according to which

error and illusion are the rule and correct cognition, if any, the exception. (4)

This account leads us on to a discussion of the much debated and vexed question whether *Pramanya* is *Svatah* or *paratah*. If it is conceded that error and illusion are the outcome of counteracting conditions and circumstances that prevent the proper and legitimate function of knowledge being discharged, it logically follows that knowledge when its operations are not so counteracted must reveal the characteristic of the objects as they are, and the inherent ability and capacity which it possesses so to reveal them, constitute its *Pramanya*, validity, reliability for guidance, etc. Is this validity derived or dependent on extraneous conditions and considerations? It cannot be. In the very act of understanding and in the very act of knowledge, the meaning, import and significance of the objects and things are grasped and apprehended as they are, and there is no need to look to anything else for the reliability and validity other than knowledge itself. It is out of the question that the validity and reliability may be viewed as conferred upon an act of knowing by a veracity-loving Deity! Knowledge and the validity and reliability attaching to it are *Sui Generis* and exist in their own right. It is a futile question why knowledge is reliable. An appeal can be made only to experience. Validity and reliability attach to knowledge in its own right. They are un-derived. They are foundational and basic as knowledge itself. One can question: what are the objects or facts in reference to which the validity and reliability function? Experience is always the experience of some subject of an object. So is knowledge. A knower, known, and knowledge can always be distinguished. Knowledge determines and guides the behaviour, the responses of the percipient agent or the subject to the world of reality around him. Except in the light of a determinant, knowledge does not come home to us. Whether it has other parts to play or other functions to fulfil and discharge, is a metaphysical question which need not be opened here. Knowledge works essentially in the service of action, in the service of the satisfaction of the conative tendencies, and the perfection of the latter depends on the clearness and distinctness, and accuracy of the former. It is an initial blunder to make the basic and foundational factor of all experience depend upon extraneous circumstances and conditions for its validity and reliability as the only guide in our metaphysical quest. Validity and reliability are the essence of knowledge which is self-supporting and self-sustaining. There is no evidence, empirical, speculative or otherwise to the contrary. The reliability of experience, the validity of knowledge and its inherent characteristic of

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(4) Buddhists maintain that "A-pramanya" is "svatah". All knowledge is misleading and unreliable. "Stambhadipratyayo-Mithya-Pratyayatvat-tatahah-yah-pratyayah-sa-mrisha-drishtah-svapnadipratyayo-yatha." See *Nyayamrita*. P. 49. Vyasa-raja observes that while the Buddhist is to a certain extent justified in maintaining the unreliability of knowledge, the Absolutist is not as he admits the doctrine of "svatah-pramanya." It would not be possible to attempt any reconciliation between "Svatah-pramanya" and "Adhyasa".

being able to reveal the nature of objects as they are, cannot be made conditional and dependent on Divine Veracity or any such extraneous factor, but should be considered to be quite fit to stand on their own legs and possess sufficient self-guarantee. So far the points of view of the layman and the Philosopher agree. There is nothing strange or derogatory in that sort of agreement. Philosophy is no negation or repudiation of the layman's experiences and point of view, but it only systematises and co-ordinates them in such a wise that their genuine significance may be realised. Madhva is very particular in his emphasis on this aspect. No compromise or concession is logically possible. Things are what they are, and they will never be what they are not. Knowledge gives us an insight into the nature and characteristics of things and objects as they are and enables us to understand them as parts of an inter-related system to which adjustment is inevitable. If metaphysics is finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct, the reasons whatever they are, need not be rendered worse by the adoption of a standpoint which is radically erroneous and revolutionary in its uncritical and dogmatic assumption of the unreality of the objects of experience and of the inability and incapacity of knowledge to enlighten him and convey to the mind of the percipient agent or subject, their essential features and characteristics! A rational Realism is the only safe guide in philosophy as well as everyday experience. Human experience is the central point from which theories and speculations radiate. In any scheme of values we may construct, it would be pedantry to deny that it is our own experience that counts primarily and from the behaviour of those similarly circumstanced and situate as we are, we no doubt inferentially realise that other peoples' experience is similar to our own. It is altogether a false philosophy which begins by doubting the validity,—the reliability—and reality of experience. Such a doubt is spurious and insincere and even the Cartesian type of doubt would not be much better if it was not immediately followed by a reconstruction of the concepts overthrown by doubt. All our reactions to the environmental stimuli *do* persist and continue to be executed notwithstanding the impotent doubt which curiously enough achieves nothing more than casting aspersion on experience and creating against it some suspicion without offering anything constructive by way of a substitute. Experience however takes its stand on the solid Rock of Ages. In Philosophy and commonsense alike, *Pramanya* cannot but attach to the facts of experience. The *Pramanya* is therefore *Svatah* underived existing and persisting till the end of eternity. (5)

The question of *Pramanya* has agitated the minds of all thinkers orthodox and heterodox alike. The Sankhya view is fundamentally and radically realistic. It holds that *Pramanya* and *A-Pramanya*

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(5) "Tarkatandava" P. 17. "Jnyanapramanyam-svatograhya-parato-agrihyamanatvesati-grihyamanatvat-etc., etc.

reliability and unreliability, truth and error, are not derivative, but primary, inherent and intrinsic. This entails the admission of a plurality of objects and percipients to whom all is not correct cognition and all is not error. Things have on them the stamp and imprint of serviceability and truth and knowledge just apprehends their real nature. The very act of cognition or perception grasps also reliability or unreliability. |

The view of the Logicians, the Naiyyayikas, is quite the reverse. Both reliability and unreliability are due to other conditions and circumstances than the act of cognition or perception itself. They are derivative. Knowledge has the potential ability to reveal the nature and characteristics of objects. The latter possess the potential ability to be known and apprehend by knowledge. Similarly, there is the potentiality for mischief as well. Knowledge sometimes does obscure the nature of objects, and the latter refuse to be correctly apprehended and understood as it were. This is their potentiality for obscurity. The potentiality both to be known and unknown inherent in the world of objects, and the potentiality both to apprehend and not apprehend inherent in knowledge require favourable agencies for their manifestation and actualisation. The favourable agency is called *Guna*, that is a collocation of circumstances such as a normal sense organ, healthy condition of the organism, the position of the object or objects to be known in the proper place, and so on and so forth, which renders correct apprehension possible. In the absence of this particular concatenation of circumstances, the potentiality remains exactly where it was and is never actualised with a view to effective action. Similarly we have also an unfavourable collocation. It is called *DOSHA*. The collocation includes, disease of the sense organ, unhealthy condition of the organism in general or any obscurities inherent in the objects to be known, and their position beyond the reach of sense-organs, etc. In the event of the presence of this latter collocation incorrect cognition or erroneous perception is the result. The Nyaya view takes the position that the potentiality of objects to be known and apprehended and that of knowledge to reveal their real characteristics and features *QUA* unmanifest are perfectly devoid of utility and that their actualisation can be brought about only by the active presence of respective collocations or concatenations of circumstances from which alone correct as well as incorrect cognitions proceed. It is not quite possible to give any clear-cut account of the collocations as they are subject to dynamic variation according to the interests and purposes of the individual on the one hand, and the inherent characteristic nature of the given collocation itself. If an argument on analogy is being constructed, the collocation will relate itself to resemblances that are relevant: If we are dealing with an inference the collocation will relate to an Universal Principle which mediates between the Minor and the Major Terms and renders inference valid. Such is the nature of that collocation. The Naiyyayika has ever in mind the principle of Fidelity to Fact

and Loyalty to the law of relevancy without which Methodical scientific procedure would be impossible. Values are imposed on the objects of the world according to the exigencies of the situation and the interests and purposes of the subject. If the volitional interest be satisfied by an act of cognition it is said to be valid and reliable and if it should be thwarted, the act of cognition or the piece of knowledge responsible for the thwarting is PRO TANTO unreliable and unavailing and hence invalid. It is not quite practicable to keep the formal considerations of consistency and those of material validity apart from one another by a stroke of the pen or a flight of imagination: Without reference to a cognising, criticising subject, evaluation of knowledge is meaningless. The Naiyyayika is keenly aware of this. He contends that the view—any piece of knowledge can be reliable or unreliable considered in itself—is a myth. He admits a colourless specimen to begin with. It is neither fish, flesh nor good-red-herring. Later on it enters more deeply and intimately into the complex and complicated network of experience. It acquires greater serviceability and nicer adaptability as it is bound to in the actual stress of progressive experience. It becomes a *Pramana*, a typical or model response, true reliable and calculated to advance the conative tendencies of the organism. Otherwise it verily becomes an *Apramana*, a clumsy response with potentialities for thwarting the conative tendencies of the subject. Some such will be the modern reading or interpretation of the Naiyyayika position. The fallibility of knowledge is due to positive hindrances and obstructions which constitute themselves into so many effective barriers against right and correct apprehension. If from adult knowledge are abstrated all the influences due to concatenation or collocation of circumstances favourable and unfavourable, that is *Guna* and *Dosha*, we will be left with just a colourless and insipid residuum. *Guna* and *Dosha* are on a par, as contributing to the development of this colourless embryonic mass into adult experience. An analogy from the Physical world might be cited with the well-known reservation that analogies do not run on all fours. Energy is generally potential. It so remains unless and until it is compelled and forced by favourable conditions to become kinetic. The arrest of energy is likewise by a set of blocking and inhibitory circumstances. Similar is the case with knowledge. The concatenation of conditions and circumstances favourable for rendering kinetic the potential ability of knowledge to lead to effective and serviceable responses is characterised *GUNA*, and *DOSHA* is just the concatenation or collocation which renders manifest or kinetic the potentiality for mischief and for responses unserviceable and injurious to the organism. As the Two are the determinants of *Pramana* and *Apramana*, the reliable and the unreliable, respectively, reliability and its reverse are derivative. The Naiyyayika would differentiate Two aspects. The coming-into-being-aspect and the aspect-of-knowledge, or the origination-aspect and the knowledge-aspect. Both



are derivative. That is, some factors and conditions yield knowledge alone. They are not adequate to enable the subject to apprehend the validity and the reliability of that particular act of knowledge. Similarly, reliability accrues to a piece of knowledge through the instrumentality of factors other than those that either give rise to the knowledge itself or in some way contribute to its manifestation. The position needs statement in a more popular way. Knowledge is one thing. Its *Pramanya* or reliability or its essential characteristic of making known or revealing the features of objects as they are is another. The latter is said to be *Paratah*, derived or derivative. Derived from what? Derived from conditions and circumstances other than those that are operative in connection with knowledge. Knowledge S is P in one thing. That it is reliable is another. The same factors and conditions that give rise to the former do not confer any reliability on it. The latter is derived and apprehended by other factors. So the rise of evaluation, or the assignment of the value styled reliability to an act of knowledge and the apprehension of such value as calculated to lead to a satisfaction of the conative tendencies of the subject are *not* brought about by the same factors that give rise to the act of knowledge itself. All this applies equally well to the case of unreliability. The favourable collocation of circumstances which gives rise to *Pramanya* is *GUNA* and the unfavourable one which gives rise to *Apramanya* is *DOSH*A, as already pointed out. In sense perception the favourable collocation is just a normally constituted sense organ, an object free from obscurity, a subject, and judgment or the interpretative activity of the mind functioning normally. An unfavourable collocation would be: defective sensory machinery, obscurity in the nature of the object; a disturbed functioning of the interpretative activity of the mind.

Madhva controverts the Naiyyayika position. The admission that reliability or *Pramanya* is apprehended purely inferentially and not in the very act of knowledge itself leads to a two-fold *Regress Ad infinitum*. "This knowledge is reliable. Because it has furthered my conative tendencies." Some such will be the Naiyyayika argument. If so, what about the apprehension of the conative tendencies themselves? Is that apprehension reliable? or not? The *regress* will never end. If the reliability is sought to be established on the basis of coherence with the general system of knowledge, even then the regress cannot be avoided so long as each part will have to rely for its reliability on the abstract something called coherence the reliability of which again may have to be established only on the ground of the reliability of another coherent system and so on and so forth. So reliability is apprehended in the very act of knowledge itself however rudimentary this latter might be, or it can never be apprehended at all. Knowledge and reliability progress and evolve *pari passu* and a divorce between the two is impossible.

There is yet another regress. Assuming that the favourable collocation whatever it is is responsible for the imprint of reliability, then what are the factors that render the collocation itself possible? and so on. Madhva would maintain that the entire procedure is false and illogical which starts with a doubt about the capacity or ability of knowledge to reveal the characteristics of the objects as they are. To escape from that sort of two-fold regress Madhva would urge that all knowledge ordinarily should be assumed to be reliable and quite capable of revealing the essential features of the objects as they are.

Madhva's position is quite consistent and intelligible from the standpoint of Realistic Theory of Knowledge. If at any time a gulf is created between the Subject that knows and the object that is known and understood it is never possible to bridge it as *ex-hypothesi* the subject is shut up in the Panorama of his mental states, etc., and escape from it seems to be impossible and unaccountable. Unless it is admitted that the objects of external reality are always and in their own nature capable of entering into that relationship known as *knowledge* and unless it is further admitted that knowledge is ordinarily reliable and reveals the essential nature and characteristics of the objects as they are, it is difficult to see how a satisfactory theory of knowledge can be formulated at all which would cover all the facts of experience and would do justice to them. When you throw mud it sticks and stick it must. When once the Machinery of Doubt is set in motion it can never be set at rest. For the Doubt affects the fundamentals. If one does not stand committed to solipsism, then a realistic theory of knowledge like that of Madhva is the only alternative. The registration and interception of the sensory stimuli by the organism and their interpretation are the essential characteristics of normal life. What is there to suggest that such interpretation is false erroneous and unreliable? Of course there occasionally arise illusions. The in-coming sensory stimuli are wrongly and erroneously interpreted. The illusions form the exception. They can never invalidate the general nature of knowledge which is to reveal the characteristics of objects as they are. The exceptions only prove the general rule. They do not disprove it. The position then becomes quite intelligible. *Pramanya* is *svatah*. Knowledge is reliable. Such reliability belongs to knowledge in its own right. It is not derivative. It is not accidental. It is essential and inherent. If in some cases, as in illusions, knowledge turns out to be unreliable in the light of subsequent action, or motor response, the unreliability is due to the wrong interpretation put upon the sensory stimuli by the mind.

This discussion has a direct, intimate and vital bearing on another topic—namely the authority or reliability of the Scriptures. The vedantic doctrine is that Sruti, or scripture is the ultimate source of knowledge of the nature of the Absolute. Such a source should certainly be unsullied. Its reliability should never for a

moment be doubted. If it is doubted scripture will lose all sanctity. Sruti therefore is *Svatah Pramana* reliable Par Excellence. It alone can reveal the true and real nature of the Absolute. It must be reliable. It must be authoritative in its verdicts and pronouncements. Its reliability and authority should not be made conditional and contingent on those of any other text, or utterance. The Sruti further cannot be traced or ascribed to any author. It is *Apaurusheya*. It is revealed. It is eternal. The same text has been delivered unto humanity existing intact from time immemorial. The vedantin is not willing to accept that Sruti was composed—as pieces of literary composition—Why? Supposing Sruti was composed, it should have been brought into existence by some great scholar or God himself. Sruti cannot be ascribed or traced to any known agency as its author. In anything like the chronological investigations of the modern critical scholars and researchers the ancients were simply *not* interested. The famous founders or the popularisers of the Three live systems of the Vedanta agree in maintaining that the Sruti cannot be ascribed to any known agency as its author. It exists as an embodiment of some important truths, eternal verities, of grave spiritual significance and import understanding and realisation of which are essential. If the author could be supposed to have been one of finite, imperfect mentality, an ordinary human being however efficiently endowed, no binding authority or sanctity could attach to his words. Just to escape from this conclusion, it should be assumed that a perfect Being, with perfect knowledge, etc., should have been responsible for the composition of Sruti. Can the authorship of Sruti be ascribed to an Omniscient Being? His infallibility Omniscience, Veracity, etc., should then be taken for granted. For from such omniscience and infallibility alone can the authority, the sanctity and the binding mandatory nature of Sruti be derived. Even then the objection of the Atheist should be answered namely that the Perfect Being might not exactly be honest and that He might deliberately mislead humanity by embodying all sorts of statements in the Sruti: His honesty, veracity, love for humanity should all be taken for granted, or postulated. Something analogous to the Cartesian faith in Divine veracity should be assumed which on account of its characteristically dubious nature is incapable of strict scientific proof. Instead of making a series of unproved and unprovable assumptions, it is by far better to make a single admission that the Sruti cannot be traced or ascribed to any known agency as its author and effectively cut the Gordian knot. The vedantin is guided in all debates and discussions by considerations of *Laghava* or *Gaurava* i.e. Economy in thought and language, or needless circumlocution or tortuous procedure and elaborate procedure, respectively. In view of the large number of initial admissions and assumptions entailed by the suggestion that a Perfect Being might be regarded as the author of the Sruti, Madhva holds that Sruti is *Apaurusheya*, incapable of being ascribed or traced to any agency as its author.

There is also another rub. The body of literature of Sruti as an eternal immutable something will have to be set against the Creator as a rival absolute! So the Vedantin would not admit that God or a Perfect Omniscient Being is the author of the Sruti.

There is yet another argument. Sruti alone has to reveal the fundamental and essential nature of Brahman or the Absolute. It is *pramana*. It is reliable authority in spiritual matters authority par Excellence. It is obviously fallacious to hold that Brahman whose essential and fundamental nature has to be revealed only by Sruti and has to be learnt only from the Sruti is Himself the author of the latter. All the old questions persistently recur!! The Perfect Being's own assertions regarding Himself can have no weight with spiritual aspirants unless it is assumed (proof is impossible) that He is a good Fellow and believed (in the language of old Khayyam) that all would be well. It is in order to do away with all such discussions and silence all opposition that the Vedantin feels obliged to make the initial grand assumption or admission of a comprehensive character that the Sruti is *Apaurusheya*, not ascribable to any known agency as its author, an admission which has to him all the significance of a methodological postulate of metaphysics. Madhva's position regarding the question of *Pramanya* or the reliability of knowledge can thus be conveniently summarised. (1) *Pramanya*, or reliability of knowledge, or its capacity and fitness to reveal the essential features and characteristics of objects as they are with a view to efficient action in whatever realm or the satisfaction of the conative tendencies of the organism based on it is *SVATAH*, is inherent in knowledge itself and not derived from anything else external to it. The very act of cognition has upon it the indelible stamp of reliability. Should it be otherwise life would be impossible. Knowledge in a word is *Sui Generis*. Any attempt to explain it in terms of alien and unsuitable categories is bound to be futile. (2) *Apramanaya* or unreliability is *PARATAH*, derived and traceable to extraneous circumstances or collocations as its cause. The alien or extraneous factors collectively constitute and act as Obscuring agencies. They hide the essential features and characteristics of objects. Such misleading factors make the mind misunderstand and misinterpret the meaning of the sensory stimuli. (3) All knowledge having on it the imprimatur of *prima facie* Reliability, knowledge gained from the Sruti is reliable. The Sruti cannot be assigned to any known agency as having been its author. The perfect Being Himself could not have been the author as such authorship entails admissions of far-reaching character which are from their very nature incapable of proof or demonstration.

## II

Madhva then proceeds to describe several types of knowledge which differ in Extent, Range, Intensity, Clearness, and distinctness and penetrativeness. The several types of knowledge have been arranged by him in something like a descending order commencing

from the Most perfect Divine Knowledge, and ending with or culminating in the imperfect Human Knowledge. The Higher levels are super-human. The First and Foremost is *Iswara Jnyana*, Knowledge possessed by the Almighty, or the Most Perfect Divine Being. Such knowledge has the clearness, the distinctness and the immediacy of the everlasting Present together with a comprehensiveness such as can never be even imagined by imperfect, finite human intelligence. Such knowledge again is not a progressive mental construction, by no means a growth. It is to the finite intellect incomprehensible, and by it immeasurable and unfathomable. It is never clouded, never obscured. It knows no hesitancy, no deliberation whatever. Madhva defines it thus—**ANALOCHANE SARVA VISHAYAKAM JNYANAM**. Divine knowledge embraces the entire range of objects, it is *Sarvavishayaka*. There is nothing which is not its object and which is not comprehended by it fully. There is no value in contrast between actuality and potentiality. All the objects are as a matter of fact and actually the objects of Divine Knowledge. It knows further no weighing of the Pros and Cons. It is free from all doubt and obscurity. It comprehends all in an eternal electric flash of the everlasting present. Some very orthodox and implacable pandits would hold that even the inherently irrational and the contradictory such as a **ROUND SQUARE** and the **MARE'S NEST SOMEHOW** figure as real objects in **DIVINE** knowledge. The **SOMEHOW** has to be abandoned as hopeless and beyond the reach of Finite Human Knowledge. It is just a *Bradleyan Somehow*. Others consider this an unjustifiable and illogical extreme. They would maintain that even for Perfect Divine Knowledge the *Laws* of thought as we understand them in the finite level cannot but hold good and that the inconsistent, the radically irrational, and the contradictory are to be acknowledged as inconceivable even for Divine intellect. The Divine knowledge further does not admit of any creation, origin in time-growth-progress and decay. Even as the possessor or owner of such a type of exalted knowledge the latter itself is *Svatantra*, self-determined, self-created and self-controlled. It is eternal. It is indestructible. That Divine knowledge is of such characteristics as ascertained by *Sruti* and this ascertainment is further strengthened inferentially. The *Sruti* is emphatic about the Divine Omniscience, etc. Starting from the data supplied and furnished by our own finite experience and intellect we conclude that there might exist some exalted type of knowledge which might be free from all imperfections and untainted by them. There is no other way. In such matters *Sruti* is the authority in its own right. A deeply religious soul would never for a moment think of challenging the authority of *Sruti*. But it is well wherever possible to corroborate the facts revealed by the *Sruti* by independent testimony such as inference. The corroboration is resorted to only for the satisfaction of a nervous conscience or for argumentative purposes. Madhva's account of *Iswarajnyana* is obviously painted with a Religious Brush and in mythological colours. It could not have been

otherwise. The Theory of Relativity of Ubiquitous applicability will settle the question to some advantage. Madhva's establishment of Divine knowledge on a sound acceptable basis is at any rate much better and more logical than the Cartesian one of Divine veracity and omniscience. In a progressive series of knowledge one can inferentially stop with something corresponding to a Summum Genus of a classificatory series, even though the latter may not exactly be comprehensible in all its details to a finite intellect. Such is *Iswara-Jnyana*. (6) *Sruti* explicitly makes mention of it as incomprehensible to the finite intelligence and beyond its reach. For purposes of metaphysical discussion it is futile to attempt to proceed further or probe deeper still. EX-HYPOTHESI, the perfect must for ever remain unknown to the Imperfect—the Divine to the Human.

Madhva also explains that *Lakshmi-Jnyana*, the knowledge possessed by *Iswara's* Consort has all the characteristics of Divinity and perfection mentioned above. It is eternal, imperishable, uncaused and uncontrolled by external factors and agency. But there is a fundamental and radical difference. The Knowledge possessed by *Iswara's* Consort, though it is perfect from the standpoint of view of other beings and independent of everything else, is yet under the control and guidance of *Iswara*—the Supreme and unrivalled controller of the evolution of the Cosmos. If co-ordinate independence be granted to the knowledge possessed by the Consort as well, then, *Iswara-Jnyana*, knowledge possessed by the Overlord of the Universe QUA tolerating a rival and a co-ordinate type of knowledge, will suffer in its intrinsic value and status. So an arrangement should be arrived at. As far as the other objects of the cosmos and beings are concerned, they are apprehended so fully and completely with all the fullness and completion of Divine by *Iswara* and *Lakshmi* alike. The knowledge possessed by both is perfect—in extent and intensity. But the latter's knowledge is guided and controlled by the former. Persons acquainted with the orthodox tradition put the matter thus. Supposing *Lakshmi* *Iswara's* consort—To Madhva, *Iswara* is VISHNU and no other deity—desires to anticipate what particular course of action in a given situation her Consort would adopt she will have to resort to deep deliberation (*Alochana*) without which her anticipatory apprehension of her Consort's projected course of action would be impossible. In regard however to the entire Cosmos Minus *Iswara*, *Lakshmi-Jnyana* (knowledge possessed by her) can instantaneously and without any deliberation apprehend all about it. Others more bigoted would add that A correct Characterisation of *Iswara-Jnyana* in conceptual or linguistic terms employed by finite intellect of man, is strictly impossible: Others maintain that even *Lakshmi*, though she is infinitely and incomparably better placed and situated than all gods and men in having realised the

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(6) Vijayindra Tirtha has formulated interesting definitions of Divine Omniscience-*Iswara-Jnyana*. They are discussed by the present writer elsewhere.

real Mahima—the power and greatness of the Lord of the Universe, cannot hope fully to understand all about the Absolute—Her own Lord.

In sum, the following characteristics are emphasised. (1) Lakshmi-Jnyana is inferior only to Iswara-Jnyana and such inferiority is by no means a mark of imperfection as Iswara's Consort is superior to all the Deities in the hierarchy except of course Iswara. (2) Madhva is obliged to maintain the relative inferiority of Lakshmi-Jnyana to safeguard the interests of his exalted type of Mono-Theism (Not Monism).

### III

As lower in order Madhva then refers to the type of knowledge possessed by Yogis, knowledge acquired from the prolonged performance of disciplinary spiritual practices. It is beginningless inasmuch as the origin of the type cannot be located in a time-series (individual yogis may come and go but the type goes on for ever) and it is eternal. Such is the knowledge possessed by Rijus (a special class of souls eligible for the office of Brahma at some appointed future date). In qualitative excellence and attentive extent or compass, this type of knowledge is distinctly superior to that possessed by less advanced and less favoured souls. Provided there is due deliberation it can comprehend all except of course the nature and characteristics of Iswara. By the sustained practice of Yoga, their knowledge admits of progressive clarification until the attainment of final liberation when all progress defies conceptual analysis and description. It never knows or suffers any diminution, quantitative or qualitative.

*Tatvika-Yogi-Jnyana* stands next in the descending order. It is subject to the vicissitudes of fall, decrease, diminution, etc., one may deliberate ever so acutely and carefully. This type cannot successfully comprehend all. Perhaps a warning is intended to be conveyed. Success in the practice of Yoga can never be so simple and within universal reach. Only a blessed few can attain it. As consistent adherence to the practice of Yoga notwithstanding numerous pitfalls is so difficult, it is suggested that excepting in certain very special instances, knowledge gained by such practice is bound to diminish in extent and suffer qualitative loss. Yoga practised even under the most efficient and organised auspices is bound to be imperfect and incomplete.

*A-Tatvika-Yogi-Jnyana* stands still lower in the scale. Evidently this type is the outcome of a not very efficient and successful yogic practice !

The lowest and the bottom-most in the scale is the *A-Yogi-Jnyana*. That simply is the type of knowledge possessed by Finite beings. However eminent he or she might be, the Finite person has only an imperfect type of knowledge. Finite knowledge is

qualitatively obscure, confused and quantitatively confined to a limited range of objects and circumscribed. It is fallible. It has a definite beginning and an end. Meagreness, finitude, and fallibility are the characteristic features of the type of knowledge possessed by those who are styled A-Yogis—Non-Yogis or those who are just ordinary mortals.

Madhva then gives an exposition of the *Anu-Pramanas* which are able to yield for the benefit of the Subject knowledge of objective Reality. The *Anu-pramanas* are contrasted with the *Kevala-Pramana*. The latter is believed to give rise to direct, intuitive apprehension. The former on the other hand can give rise to knowledge of an external Reality only indirectly. The *Anu-Pramanas* or the *Pramanas* relating to the indirect rise of the apprehension of external reality are three in number. 1. *Pratyaksha*. 2. *Anumana* and 3. *Agama*. Knowledge itself is *Kevala Pramana*. The means of correct cognition or knowledge are styled *Anu-Pramanas*. The order or enumeration which appears to assign some priority to *Pratyaksha* is based on the following grounds. *Pratyaksha* is sense perception. *Anumana* is inference or inferential knowledge, (or the process of explication of the universal lying embedded implicitly amidst a mass of data collected under the stimulus of scientific urge). *Agama* is revelation or more accurately it is the collective scriptural tradition as embodied in sacred writings that are being transmitted accurately from generation to generation by word of mouth (subsequently committed to writing after the advent of the script) or it even means the word of a reliable person, whose reliability is a sufficient incentive to the subject embarking on a course of action for the satisfaction of his conative tendencies as the modern Psychologist would put it,—*Apta Vakya*. Who then is an *Apta*? *Apta* is *Yathartha-Vakta*—*Apta* is a person who speaks the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The three constitute the *Anu-Pramana*.

The grounds are these which from a particular angle of vision would justify the order of enumeration with priority to *pratyaksha*. 1. Generally senses are the gateways of knowledge in a significant sense. When the sensory apparatus is intact and when the objects are situated at a reasonable distance from the percipient in space, and when too they are not hidden or obscured by intervening obstacles to perception, and when the objects are directly present as occupying a prominent part of the presentation-continuum, and lastly when a fraction of reality is for the nonce selected and marked off from the totality by the exercise of dynamic purposive attention, perception is accurate and reliable. Such conditions are fully realised more or less even in the early stages of mental development and there attaches a certain concreteness to all perception in virtue of which it is the earliest to appear on the evolutionary scene. 2. The stage of inference is more abstract and conceptual. The arms of inference like those of an Ogre could



reach far and wide. The inferential process could encompass objects far away situate, the past and the future, notwithstanding any obstacles spatial and temporal. The explicit drawing out of the Universal from amidst a mass of the particular data is a mark of the advanced stage of conceptual thought and even supposing that some crude and germinal type of inferential thought must exist even in children, savages, and the animals, it cannot be gainsaid that the inferential process as full fledged, self-conscious and conscious of its own sustaining grounds, appears only at a comparatively advanced stage of mental evolution. Inference Deductive or Inductive owes an unmistakable allegiance to sense-perception. When the real and genuine relationship between the Universal and the particular is apprehended it will be clear how inferential knowledge while it seeks to bring to the surface the Universal law or the general principle lying hidden or imbedded amidst a mass of particulars which form the data supplied by experience, connects as well the generalisation and the individual instances or more accurately makes the subject aware of the inseparability of the two. All this cannot but be regarded as a mark of advanced mental evolution. The Universal and systematic connection through the instrumentality of which alone inference is rendered possible is technically styled VYAPTI. 3. The AGAMA is generally explained as revealed knowledge. Such information as is believed to be contained in the scriptural texts and sacred writings cannot be secured from any other sources and by the adoption of any other means. What is the nature of the authority attaching to the AGAMA has already been discussed in the context of an explanation of the Pramanas, earlier in the chapter. The simplest popular instance may be mentioned. The sacred text declares that if a person desires to have a seat reserved for him in Heaven, he should perform the sacrifice called JYOTISHTOMA. The connection between the performance of the said sacrifice and the attainment of some other-worldly happiness can never be brought home to the individual unless he is made aware of the particular text. No amount of speculation *in vacuo* inferential or otherwise would be of any avail in the perception of any connection between the performance of the sacrifice and the attainment of heavenly bliss. It is irrelevant to enter into a discussion of the authenticity of the texts or to challenge from the rationalistic or the ultra-critical standpoint the accuracy and the sanity even of the texts! The authority of the Agama is accepted without the slightest hesitation by the orthodox metaphysical investigator. In fine AGAMA is held to reveal objects of a certain specific and particularised patent or brand (spiritualistic or ritualistic) which could not be so revealed or made known with the help of any other agency.

*Pratyaksha* is the only *Pramana* recognised by the Charvakas. the materialistic-hedonists Par Excellence of Indian Philosophy—who might be regarded as roughly answering to the Epicureans of Ancient Greece—The Charvaka view is quickly brushed aside by

Madhva. Sense perception alone is never adequate for the securing of any really useful knowledge. If we are always at the mercy of the passing series of sensations and if we are kept in the thralldom and perpetual slavery to sense perception we would not be in any way better than animal creation. The Logicians who owe allegiance to Kanada and the Buddhists recognise the validity of sense-perception as well as of inference—*Pratyaksha* and *Anumana*. The Logician is not prepared to admit the validity of any scripture. The Buddhist openly scoffs at it. Madhva maintains that both of them are at a distinct disadvantage in the matter of the ascertainment of anything relating to the other-world. Proceeding mainly on a perceptual and inferential basis it is perfectly possible to argue quite consistently that one might devote himself to the pursuit of a career of unmitigated crime and iniquity provided he somehow manages to avoid the clutches of the policeman and the law of the land and an ethical system based and constructed mainly on the perceptual and inferential foundations on the side of the *Pramanas*, and on foundations of utility and material advancement must according to Madhva stand self-condemned. The alliance between Ethics and Metaphysics is the safest guarantee of the ultimate triumph of truth and justice—ultimate because in the actual concerns and affairs of life one often comes across glaring instances of virtue being compelled to obey *vice*—and such a guarantee can be brought home to the spiritual aspirant only through the instrumentality of the *Agama*. No amount of the clearest and the most distinct perception and inferential jugglery would be sufficient or adequate to exhibit the metaphysical warrant for morality as grounded in the infallible evolution and workings of the Divine Laws. *AGAMA* is the only *Pramana* which is capable of revealing certain ritualistic duties (in its narrow and circumscribed application) and the ultimate guarantee of the triumph of virtue-truth, and justice (in its widest and most comprehensive connotation) notwithstanding apparent aberrations. The difference between Madhva and the Buddhists in this matter is fundamental and irreconcilable.

This is not the occasion for undertaking a detailed discussion of the summary rejection by Buddhists of the *AGAMA* as a *Pramana* or a reliable guide in matters philosophical and spiritual and whatever the reasons, the point of Madhva's contention is quite clear and just to the effect that the claim of a particular social or a brotherhood order that it alone could supply the necessary and sufficient motive force for the pursuit of a sort of denominational morality is highly doubtful and debatable, if not altogether irrational and unconvincing. That is why the ultimate guarantee of the success of virtue lies in an alliance between Ethics and Metaphysics and anything about this alliance can be properly known only from a reference to the *AGAMA*. Such in brief is Madhva's vindication of the status of *AGAMA* as an independent *Pramana*.

Madhva defines **SERIATIM**, **Pratyaksha-Anumana** and **Agama**. **Pratyaksha** is thus defined: **NIRDOSHENDRIYARTHA SANNIKARSHAH**. The terms *Nirdosha-Artha-Indriya* and *Sannikarsha* are peculiarly suggestive and significant. The epithet *nirdosha* means devoid of and free from all faults, defects, and drawbacks, and structural and functional disorders and imperfections. It is intended to qualify both the terms, *Artha* and *Indriya*. Any structural or functional disability of a sense-organ is the *Dosha* and for correct cognition and valid perception the *Dosha* must be got rid of. Similarly the *Dosha* might relate to the object instead of the sense-organ. The essential or congenital obscurity of the object too much proximity, distance, etc., constitute the *Dosha* from the side of the objects. These too must be got rid of. In Madhva's definition are heard faint echoes of the doctrine of the adequate stimulus. In a very general sense the *Nirdoshārtha* is simply the appropriate object presented under the normal conditions of perception minus all the obstructing or the counteracting circumstances. Each sense organ is so designed as to intercept some only of the stimuli that are perpetually impinging on the organism. Perhaps the question of the lady who first took to a study of psychology "why the eye does not hear and the ear does not see" can never be satisfactorily answered in popular terms. One can talk of the specialisation of structure and function in the course of the evolution of the human species, the interception of certain types of stimuli by certain specialised sense-organs, adequate stimuli—(McDougall) and of inadequate or inappropriate stimuli as well, and so on. All this is vaguely implied in the epithet *Nirdosha*. *Artha* is or means the object to be known. *Indriya* is the sense-organ. *Nirdosha* is free from the aforesaid defects, normally constituted, conditional and presented. *Sannikarsha* is the relationship between the object and the sense-organ. The Nervous mechanism should be in the proper working order. Its normal functioning should be directed by the attentive interest and purposive dynamism of the Subject or the agent or the percipient.

*Anumana* is inference. *Nirdosha-Upapatti*. Knowledge of casual relationship is established on the basis of observed sequences and co-existences. The invariable and unconditional antecedent is the cause. The universal principle that is lying hidden amidst a loose and apparently confused mass of particulars is explicitly brought out. Inference is just the process can afford to discard all reference to sense-perception. Inference has to rest on perceptual data. This is all the story of the relationship between the Universal and the Particular over again. The exact formulation of the Universal Law or the general principle as scientifically demonstrated hypothesis is a mark of the later or the advanced stages of logical theorising, though of course, the universal is all along lying submerged amidst the particulars. It is the latter that are more striking and inevitably they form the starting point of all inductive investigation. In this sense the individual instances or the particulars form the substantial foundations on which the inferential process rests.

*Agama* is defined as NIRDOSHAH-SABDAH. The eternal and the imperishable *Agama* is the *Veda*. The non-eternal is the mass of epics-Smritis, etc. As explained already the significance of the *Agama* lies in its ability to proclaim certain facts of spiritual life and existence which are otherwise inaccessible. The orthodox vedantin maintains that the *Veda* cannot be held to have been composed by any agency as a piece of literary exercise. The precise import of the *Veda* being regarded as *Apaurusheya*, not composed by any known agency, nor attributable to any such, has been explained elsewhere. (7) These are the only Anu-Pramanas. Others that might be suggested to be pramanas are capable of being subsumed under these. To this task Madhva then addresses himself.

There is a curious type of inference in which the object concerned is perceptually lying beyond the pale of actual realisation or experience and is deliberately kept hidden in the esoteric region! The familiar stock illustration is this. X is quite strong, hale and healthy even though he does not take any food or nourishment during the day-time! The obvious inference is that he should be swallowing food stealthily at nights! The clandestine taking in of nourishment cannot be successfully denied at all as such denial is perfectly incompatible with the visible health and strength of the individual which are marks of an undoubted assimilation of nutrition. The denial of clandestine nocturnal assimilation of food is ERGO illogical. Such an inference is termed ARTHAPATTHI. To Madhva Arthapatthi does not deserve any independent status. It can be subsumed under Anumana. Analogical reasoning is likewise subsumed under Anumana, as it also does not deserve any independent status.

Negation is not assigned the status of an independent pramana. Negation is always translated in terms of the subject's disappointment at not finding the expected if the object so expected should be pleasurable, and in terms of gratification and satisfaction if the object expected should be a real obstruction or stumbling block preventing or thwarting the onward progress of the conative tendencies of the subject. The non-existence of the object may be perceptual or inferential. If when you enter your room expecting to find the Big Ben on the table, your vision is greeted with an empty table, the non-existence is perceptual. From the groping movements of a person, we infer he is blind notwithstanding the apparent normal appearance and look of his visual apparatus. The non-existence of the power of vision is inferentially arrived at. Madhva maintains that Negation, Non-existence, etc., can be subsumed either under perception or Inference as there is absolutely no methodological need or significance in formulating and accepting an independent pramana in Negation.

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(7) See "Tarkatandava" Apaurusheya-Vada. PP. 100-126. For all topics discussed in this work, see also "Pramanapaddhati" by Jayatirtha.

Instances of that *fortiori* arguments which proceed from the ascertained and apprehended nature of a whole or systematic totality to that of its parts and disjunctive reasoning proceeding from the affirmation or negation of a given alternative to the negation and affirmation of the rest of them, are shown to be subsumed under inference.

Similarly the interpretative factors, canons and the principles of exegetics so scrupulously emphasised by the Purva-meemamsakas, in the matter of the ascertainment of the precise import and significance of a vedic passage, a context, and a ritual, are subsumed under inference. The reason is obvious. Madhva does not require a needless and otiose multiplication of the pramanas, and the intuitive sense or the impartial spectator is nothing but *pratyaksha* and no fetish need be made of it. It is just *Sakshi*.

Madhva next proceeds to give an account of the essential characteristics of the inferential process, its outward linguistic expression (corresponding to Judgment and the proposition and Inference and the syllogism) and the fallacies relating to it.

Memory and representation of objects established on the basis of previous perceptions are also instrumental in the rise of correct cognition. That the representation can never do duty for the original presentation in all its pristine purity and intensity is brushed aside as a trivial objection, as concrete experience to which alone an appeal lies primarily, vouches for the accuracy and the serviceability of the memory process and representation or the ideational revival. It is common experience one has often to fall back on the resources lying dormant in the sub-conscious Zone (at best only rough and even misleading figures of speech) and effective recall of the relevant items of the past would alone enable the organism efficiently to adjust itself to a troublesome situation. Memory is *therefore* a pramana. It is regarded as a *kevala-pramana* having a similar status to that of *Yathartha-Jnyana*. The Two besetting fallacies (under which again all the other suggested ones are subsumed) namely, the VIRODHA and ASANGATHI are then explained, which generally vitiate the inferential process, and it is further explained that the two fallacies can be easily detected in the Syllogism coined by the Advaitins, the Monistic Absolutists or the Absolutist Monists words—words—words!!! to establish the illusoriness of the universe.

Madhva then devotes the concluding portion of the work to a refutation of the definitions of *Pramana* advanced by other schools of thinkers such as the *Prabhakaras* and the *Naiyyayikas*. The definition *Prama-sadhana* i.e., means of correct cognition is overthrown on the ground that not means, but the cognition or knowledge itself is a pramana!! The prabhakaras maintain that Anubhuti (what it is except the subjectivist experience is not known) is the only

*pramana* and such a view is not only betimes likely to be confronted by the Nemesis of Solipsism, but is in flagrant contradiction with actual and concrete experience. The possible retort of the Prabhakaras that everything in the world can be brought home to the individual only in terms of his experience, has no point in it as the experience is often misleading and inaccurate. The Naiyya-yika's definition is also found defective as it also seeks to lay undue and even exclusive emphasis on the means and not knowledge itself.

### SUMMARY

1. In his work entitled "Pramana Lakshana" characterised with thought-provoking and provocatively irritating brevity—a formidable stumbling-block in the path of those not fully acquainted with the original texts—Madhva has explained what he regards the fundamental Pramanas—i.e., means, sources, and guarantors of validity and reliability of knowledge for successful conduct in life without an apprehension of the significance of which methodical metaphysical speculation and system-building are impossible of achievement. He recognises only three fundamental Pramanas.

2. Iswara is the Eternal, Impartial, and Disinterested Witness of all types, grades and "degrees" of knowledge as also of the Cosmic show-panoramic "Phantasmagoria of metempsychosis" of the various and countless Jivas-finite souls.

3. "Prameya" is anything capable of entering into the relationship known as knowledge. The environment—material and spiritual, physical and psychical—in which individuals are obliged to live, move, and have their being is "Prameya"—a hard and stubborn reality—a correct understanding of the nature of which is indispensable for effective adjustment and successful life.

4. The Prameya of Prameyas is Iswara Himself—the most supremely precious object of the spiritual aspirants' quest.

5. A preliminary settlement of the number and nature of the Pramanas is insisted upon to suit the conditions of metaphysical controversy or debate and the purposes of dialectics as the opponent's case is sought to be overthrown and invalidated by means of an exhibition of fallacies which are instances of breaches of the Pramanas.

6. The ultimate goal of the Pramanas is to yield and guarantee knowledge of Brahman and therein lies their *raison d'etre*.

### LITERATURE (Advanced)

1. Pramana-Paddhati—By Jayatirtha.
2. Nyaya-Sutras with Bhashya.
3. Pramanya-Vada of Gadadhara.
4. Tarka-Tandava—By Vyasaraja-Swamy.

## CHAPTER III

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### KATHA-LAKSHANA

(Rules and Regulations of Orthodox Vedantic Debate).

According to the traditions of Indian Philosophy eristic debates, discussions, and disputes form an important feature of cultural existence. A system-builder or leader of any mighty movement in philosophy is obliged to argue constructively a body of doctrines formulated to explain the relation between God, man, and the world. A thinking consideration of things involves constructive system-building as well as destructive criticism of rival schools of thought. Champions are always partisan. There is however the *intelligentsia* which would take interest in philosophical discussions, arrange for and watch the debates and disputes between two champions, so that a decision may be arrived at regarding the significance of a system of thought. The debates have to be conducted on the basis of certain Rules and Regulations to an exposition of which Madhva has devoted a short work known as "KATHA LAKSHANA."

It cannot be contended that a discussion of the nature of Discussion itself is either unprofitable or superfluous. Discussion is closely linked to Rational Reflection on the nature of God, Man, and the Universe. Freedom from the recurring cycle of births and deaths is the goal of man's spiritual effort and endeavour. The said Freedom can be secured only through the Grace of the Almighty Lord. His Grace can be obtained only by means of uninterrupted devotion. Devotional worship is the result of understanding the greatness of the Lord. The Vedanta or the Brahma Meemamsa Sastra is devoted to a discussion of the nature of Brahman, means of realisation and the nature of the goal, etc.

Discussion necessarily implies at least two parties. Of course a person can discuss matters within himself, with his own inner self as it were, making appeals from Philip drunk to Philip sober, but, a discussion *par excellence* signifies parties or disputants. It may be that there is an obedient, eager, and earnest, enthusiastic pupil taught by a master. The former expresses his doubts and difficulties in the shape of queries or questions, and the latter removes them by giving suitable and convincing answers. (2) Or a discussion may be carried on by parties who criticise one another's doctrines, state their own respective cases, meet objections, reconstruct or rehabilitate their systems of thoughts and doctrines.

Discussions between a teacher and his pupil, on the one hand, and on the other, between rival champions supporting their claims are necessary auxiliaries to the Vedanta, and the orthodox justification of the intellectual and spiritual need that there is for the latter being undertaken by genuine spiritual aspirants, would also be justification for the inquiry into nature of the former being undertaken.)

There is *Adhikari*—or a genuine aspirant to undertake disputations, debates, and discussion. There is the nature of Brahman to be discussed. (*Vishaya*). The ends to be achieved are knowledge of the real relation between the finite and the infinite (*Jiva* and *Brahman*) and ultimate freedom from the bonds of samsara-finite, evil-ridden existence. If materialistically-minded men condemn such discussions as unintelligible wrangles they are quite welcome to their sport, but, a minute-a-dollar life is not the last word on matters of the spirit, on the destiny of the individual or on his career hereafter. Philosophical discussions have their own *raison d'etre*, and they satisfy genuine thought-needs of eager and earnest inquirers and investigators.

What is a KATHA? Madhva's commentator defines it in the following terms—"Anekavidvat-kartrika-vichara-gochara-vakya-prabandha-Katha." The terms give expression to the characteristic quintessential elements of KATHA—i.e. the concept to be defined. A "*Prabandha*" is a treatise or a connected account of a subject. The entire subject matter is an organic totality or unity. Its parts or bits are held together as it were by the string of interest, purpose and value. Should there be a discussion of the problems of philosophy, of here and hereafter, the discussion may or may not be reduced to writing. There is however an undoubted evanescence about mere oral discussions. The written word remains. Treatises in writing have indeed a long life, notwithstanding the destructive activities which in history have made short work of inconvenient and unwanted books, and certainly a longer life than speeches and oral discussions. "Katha" thus essentially and fundamentally stands for a written treatise (*Prabandha*) i.e. in which a central theme is developed and argued out consistently and systematically. The reduction of discussions to writing serves more than one purpose. While, in the absence of a written account of the debates and discussions with which the parties to a controversy can be confronted when tendencies to prevarication or hoodwinking may be discernible, loud protestations and denials will ensue, flights from post to pillar, changes of premises, etc., would be easily restored to, tricks cannot be played if the parties to a debate are brought face to face with their utterances and statements in cold print or solid script. Narrow individualism and parochial personalism have never gained any influence among Indian Philosophers, and the truths and conclusions of philosophy are by no means a monopoly or private property of any sect, community, or class, or an individual however



eminent and however popularly revered. Treatises gain a rapid circulation among the people and spread while personal discussion cannot gain such a popularity and circulation. Treatises are not written for personal gain or reward in the shape of royalty, but, only for the sake of disseminating correct and genuine knowledge among the people. The term "*Prabandha*" therefore means a consistent treatise arguing a thesis or dealing with a theme the parts of which coalesce into a central doctrinal Unity.

Who are the participants? Madhva's commentator states that several scholars and philosophers participate. It is a mistake to suppose that several scholars simultaneously participate in the discussion and create an unintelligible babel, with which one may be familiar in some of the modernest democratic gatherings and assemblies. "One at a time" is the rule that is strictly adhered to. X-champion of a particular school say, *Monism*, challenges Y belonging to the opposite school of *Dualism* for a Debate. Or if he writes a book, he anticipates all the relevant objections that can be urged by a Dualist against Monism, and after a controversial refutation of the arguments advanced by the opponent, states constructively his own philosophy of life grounding it on the usual sources and guarantors of valid knowledge—the *Pramanas*. In this manner those that are qualified to participate in a discussion or write a treatise are many. Each owes allegiance to a particular school of thought. He finds fault with the doctrines of the rival schools one by one, and then elucidates the principles of his own system of philosophy. Several pandits, savants, qualified persons, *Vidvans*—participate in discussions and several devote their time and energies to writing treatises, embodying the discussions of the problems of philosophy from their own standpoints. A reasoned philosophical discussion is a "*Katha*". A treatise embodying the said discussion is also a "*Katha*." The participants are those who are endowed with a genuine philosophic insight and whose mental make-up is such as to enable them to soar high in an abstract atmosphere.

The second fundamental characteristic feature of a "*Katha*" is that it should concern itself with a weighing of the relative strength and weakness of the opposed systems of thought the champions of which enter the meta-physical arena as contestants. "*Vichara*" means an enquiry or careful consideration of the relative strength and weakness of a stated position and its critique. The view of the opponent is always "*Purvapaksha*". One's own view is "*Uttarapaksha*" or "*Siddhanta*". A careful and searching analysis of the claims of rival schools, weighing of their relative strength and weakness, are the essential features of a philosophic enquiry or investigation. (*Vichara*.) Such a well-planned and carefully executed investigation or inquiry is the subject matter of a treatise. Discussion proceeds on the lines of a statement of a position first and its criticism afterwards. In writing out a treatise the procedure adopted in orthodox cases is to anticipate

and state the arguments of one's opponent fairly and adequately and then answer them *seriatim*. If a work merely contains dogmatisms and oracular utterances, it will have no value. It should proceed on the lines of discussion. It should be a fair and reasoned discussion. It should relate to carefully planned and well-executed investigation. The spirit of impartial inquiry should be evident and unmistakable. There should be ever the readiness to abandon a position in the event of its being demonstrated to be untenable. An untenable doctrine has to be abandoned and a fresh investigation undertaken. The adventuresome spirit of genuine investigation is what is wanted. It is indispensable. It should be kept ever blazing brilliantly.

A "Katha" is "*Vakya-prabandha*." It is a controversial treatise with proper style and expression, plan and procedure, gradual and consistent evolution of a theme, in the interests of which the subordinate parts of the composition coalesce. It is also to be noted that the participants in the discussions should have risen to a high level of proficiency in debate and in reducing debates to writing for the sake of permanence and for the edification of their disciples or humanity at large.

It is not mere scholarship or control over a load of information secured by pathetic plodding that is meant by the term 'vidvan,' but, the pandithood should be such as to enable a person to maintain to the very last a central doctrinal theme, which is the total, unitary import of the discussion or the treatise. Mere book-worms and swell-heads, philosophic tub-thumpers and chatter-boxes have no place in a serious metaphysical debate conducted with a view to the ascertainment of the truth of existence and the meaning of life. A debater should be calm and of unruffled and equable temper. (*Svastha*). He should be endowed with the fullest presence of mind. He should not use harsh words, cruel terms but should employ inoffensive, pleasing, and captivating language. He should be one in whom people at large, the unsophisticated spectators of the game of philosophic debate, have confidence. (*Sarva-jana-pratyayavalambi*). He should be endowed with care, caution and circumspection. (*Savadhana*). He should not be of a quarrelsome temperament and too ready to see red, grow red and flare up for nothing. He should be perfectly peace-loving and sportsmanlike, whatever the outcome of the debate. (*a-kalahakara*). He should, further, be able to grasp the arguments advanced in the course of a debate, accurately restate them, if need be, without commissions and omissions, and should not be defective in the exercise of his sensory, intellectual and other functions. He should be physically and intellectually sound. Participants in a debate should be endowed with the characteristic mentioned and those not endowed with them or endowed with opposite characteristics should be excluded from serious debates. As the debates are to be conducted by *Pandits*, *Vidwans* with a view to the determination of the truth of existence, meaning significance, origin, and destiny of life,

quarrels and wrangles, vituperative wordy duels are not philosophical discussions in the right sense of the term. (Katha). As the spirit of investigation and inquiry is a significant constituent element in the definition of "Katha"—philosophical discussion—pleasure debates among Pandits and similar ventures are not genuine philosophical discussions. (Katha).

Having in a general manner stated the definition of "Katha" (Philosophical discussion) Madhva proceeds to mention the species which the Genus—Katha—admits of. Madhva's view is said to be in the strictest accord with a work named "Brahma Tarka" and intended to refute the following rival or opposed theories. The Buddhists maintain that there is only one type of Katha—(philosophical discussion) the essential characteristic of which is destructive criticism of rival doctrines and constructive statement of one's own. That is the inevitable feature of all debates, and why should one worry himself about any further classification at all ? (2) In the opinion of Sri Harsha, there are two varieties of philosophical discussions, *Vada* and *Vitanda*. (The terms will be explained subsequently). (3) According to the arrangement proposed by the "Gauda-Nayayikas", there are four species of "Katha" (philosophical discussion), namely, *Vada*, *Jalpa*, *Vada-Vitanda*, and *Jalpa-Vitanda*. The theory advocated by Madhva that there are only three types of "Katha", to wit, *Vada*, *Jalpa*, and *Vitanda*, in conformity with the "Brahma-Tarka" is intended to refute the three rival opinions mentioned above. The terms can thus be roughly rendered into English pending a full and exhaustive account of the three species contained in the work. "*Vada*" means philosophical discussion the objective of which is the determination or the ascertainment of truth. (2) "*Jalpa*" is a discussion undertaken for the sake of dialectical victory, and renown as a debator and envy is the motive. (3) "*Vitanda*" stands for a discussion the aim of which is the silencing of clamorous opponents, or destructive criticism of their view *without* any constructive statement of one's own position. "*Vitanda*" is thus a purely pugilistic weapon used against a stubborn opponent who does not deserve to learn the truth of the matter at all. The moment he puts forward a theory or hypothesis it is criticised and torn to pieces. The critic is under no obligation to formulate his own constructive theory. Madhva then proceeds to define the nature and function, use and characteristics of *Vada*, *Jalpa*, and *Vitanda* *seriatim*. (1)

## I

What is *Vada* ? In a pithy and short stanza, Madhva defines "*Vada*" thus—"Tatva - Nirnayamuddisya - Kevalam - Gurusishyayoh -Katha -anyeshamapisatam -Vado -Va -Samitessubha". Madhva's commentator observes that the definition of *Vada* can be stated

(1) Madhva accepts the view of the Nyaya—as embodied in the Sutra though he differs from that of Gauda-Nayayikas who want four species of "Katha". The Nyaya Sutra mentions *Vada*, *Jalpa*, and *Vitanda*. (Opening Sutra.)

in two ways. (1) In the first place, Vada is a discussion undertaken by truth-seekers, the sole and exclusive objective of which is the ascertainment or the determination of truth. The commentator writes—"Kevalam—Tatvanirnayamuddisya—Katha—Vada ityekam lakshanam". *Tatva* means truth or something which has been proved or demonstrated to be true by means of *Pramanas*, the sources and the guarantors of valid knowledge. *Nirnaya* means knowing or knowledge of something hitherto or till then unknown. The riddance of all doubts, of false and inaccurate notions, and making assurance of right knowledge and correct information doubly sure, are also included in the term "Nirnaya."

The term "Uddisya" in the definition has been inserted to exclude the variety of philosophical discussion known as "*Jalpa*" from it. Suppose, for the sake of fame, and dialectical victory X and Y argue out their cases criticising the point of view of their opponent and constructively stating their own position. The arguments for and against a body of doctrine are quite sound, straightforward and sincere. There is nothing to indicate that deliberately perverted arguments are made use of. Generally it may be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the parties would use only sincere, sound, and straightforward arguments, but, if straight arguments do not rapidly flow, and if the parties feel that defeat is imminent, then, they may readily employ crooked and perverted arguments and face a partial defeat. Anyhow such debates do contribute their share to a determination of the truths of philosophy. On this interpretation, the essayed definition of Vada would apply to "*Jalpa*" as well. In order to meet this possible objection, the term "Uddisya" has been put in. A dialectical victory is the goal of "*Jalpa*." Though it may be contributory to a determination of truth, it is not the avowed objective. On the other hand, the avowed objective of "*Vada*" is determination or the ascertainment of truths of philosophy. Thus, the insertion of the term "Uddisya" renders the connotation of the term "*Vada*" specific (and excludes the term "*Jalpa*") by focusing the definition on it.

Why is the term "Kevalam" used? Suppose there is a philosopher who has discussed matters fully and satisfied himself about the tenability and sanity of a particular system of thought. He has also a deep-rooted conviction that other systems of thought are spurious and untrustworthy. He engages himself in debates with the authors of the spurious schools of philosophy and silences their so-called arguments full of fury and sound, signifying nothing. His participation in controversial encounters with the authors of fancy—philosophies and imitation—metaphysics is prompted by a genuine desire to be of some use to his less fortunate fellowmen. The best manner of silencing pinchbeck philosophers is to refute their arguments without a constructive statement of one's own position. Mere destructive criticism of the views of an opponent

is technically termed "Vitanda". It also aids the determination of truth. The definition of "Vada" becomes too wide and would cover "Vitanda" as well. To rid the definition of this contingency, the term "Kevalam" has been put in. It means "Sakshat" directly. The point is this. The type of controversy known as "Vitanda" never directly contributes to the determination of Truth. Its contribution is only indirect through defeat of an adversary. Truth determination may be a concomitant of adversary's defeat. But it is the latter that is directly aimed at. The former is but indirectly indicated in "Vitanda."

The definition of "Vada" would be this. It is a type of controversy or philosophical discussion directly contributing to the determination of truth which is the sole and exclusive objective of the said discussion.

(2) The second definition is this:—"Satam-Katha-Vadah." The surface meaning of the term "Satam" cannot be taken. It means the good. If "Katha" be a discussion between two good persons, surely, the definition is too wide and it will include "Jalpa" as well, as two persons perfectly good can yet wrangle for victory over one another. To fix down the boundaries of the definition, Madhva is careful to explain who are the persons denoted by the term "Satam". They are teacher and pupil (Guru and Shishya), friends, fellow-students, etc. (Sakhisa-Brahmacharyadināmpi). The following are, generally speaking, the characteristics of the said participants in the debate known as "Vada". The participants should be free from passion and prejudice, jealousy and envy and similar unhealthy sentiments and emotions (Adushtamanasah). 2. They should speak only of relevant matter. They should not indulge in the usual interminable claptrap to bamboozle the unwary and the uninitiated (Prakritoktikah). 3. They should have nothing to do with brow-beating or practising deception on the Judges and the spectators (a-vipralambhakah). 4. They should be ready-witted, equipped with the power of repartee, and should have replies and arguments at their fingers' ends. They should not betray any doubts, hesitancy, and nervousness. (Yatha-Kala-sphurtikah). 5. They should not care for any material reward, in the shape of money, limelight and so forth, and the only reward they are legitimately entitled to expect and which, as a matter of fact, they do expect is the determination or ascertainment of Truth. (Anapekshakah). 6. They should give expression to things, truths and theories demonstrated by *Pramanas* and be bound by them, when they are pressed into service by opponents. They should not break away from the moorings of facts demonstrated by *Pramanas*, the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge (pramana-Siddha-Sampratrayinah) 7 And above all they should be eager to learn, understand, and welcome truth wherever it may be found. As these characteristics are absent from those who embark on debates and discussions with a view to personal gain, name, fame and so forth, the definition

of "Vada" as a discussion between two or among honest truth-seekers (Satham-katha) is not wide enough to include "Jalpa" also in its scope.

The objective of philosophical discussion is the determination of truth, and who is it that wants the said determination? Suppose two persons who have drunk deep at the fountain of philosophy have arrived at what they consider to be the truth of the cosmic scheme and who are endowed with the characteristics mentioned above carry on a discussion, at the request of others who may evince a desire to witness the game of philosophical discussion. Is that discussion "Vada" or not? If it is said that it is "Vada" the first definition that it is a discussion the objective of which is Truth will not apply as the debaters are *ex-hypothesi* those who have already ascertained the truth of Existence. It is surely absurd that they should again waste their time and energy in a fresh discussion at the request of others and for the delectation of the latter. If, on the other hand, it is contended that such a discussion is not "Vada", the second definition of it that it is a discussion between two honest truth-seekers whose characteristics have been defined in the previous paragraph, would apply to it equally well and be thus wide including within its scope a type of controversy which is *ex-hypothesi* decided to be not "Vada". When we consider, therefore, the type of metaphysical controversy between two honest and pure-minded truth-seekers (possessing the characteristics that are expected in them) who after the determination and the ascertainment of the Truth of Existence for themselves engage themselves in a debate, at the request of others we are driven to the conclusion that either the first definition attempted, namely, that "Vada" is a type of controversy the direct, sole, and exclusive objective of which is the determination of Truth (Tatvanirnaya-muddisya Katha Vadah) is too narrow, or the second definition, namely, that Vada is a species of controversy between two pure-minded honest truth-seekers with specific and identifiable characteristics, (Satam Vadah) is too wide. Out of this dilemma, there appears to be no escape.

Madhva replies that the dilemma is merely an imaginary one. A little calm reflection will convince impatient critics, that the determination of Truth, which is the sole objective in the discussion, cannot be restricted to any two given debaters, and such a restriction in fact is quite unwarranted and arbitrary. When Teacher and Pupil enter the arena of debate, Truth is slowly and progressively arrived at and discovered by the Pupil. If on the other hand, a number of friends and class-mates conduct a debate, then the discovery of truth is effected by all. If, finally, two champions who being past masters in philosophy know the truth enter a debate at the request of the public or a section of the common metaphysically unsophisticated run of humanity then the latter profit by the discussion, and learn the truth. In a general definition of the type

of controversy known as "Vada" one is not bound to incorporate the specific party which may arrive at a determination of Truth after the debate. It may be any party according to the context, and in accordance with a given situation. The pupils, friends and class-mates, and a small section of inquirers may arrive at the truth. In a class concept or a general definition which is intended to cover all cases of the given form of debate, without an exception, it would be quite adequate if the general essential characteristics are brought together and mentally consolidated (into a definition). Madhva's commentator makes it perfectly clear that the general definition attempted answers all logical requirements. "Vada" is best defined as a type or species of philosophical controversy the sole, exclusive, and direct objective of which is the determination or ascertainment of Truth. It is illogical to object that if a specification be introduced in the definition to the effect that Truth-determination is arrived at say by X, then, it becomes too narrow as excluding the truth-determinations arrived at by others!! The safest way out of the so-called dilemma is to drop all reference from the attempted definition to the party which discovers Truth. In almost all definitions of general concepts and classes, a similar procedure is in evidence. Unless reference to individual idiosyncrasies and singularities is ruled out, it is impossible to arrive at a definition. For instance, Pramana is defined as "Prama-karana", i.e., Pramana is means or instrument of valid knowledge. It is absurd to contend that the instrument of valid knowledge operative in X does not produce valid knowledge in Y. Whoever said it would? If at any given moment, the visual apparatus of X be stimulated, it is X who will experience visual sensations, trite as it may seem. Not Y. On the latter account, it is preposterous to say that the stimulation of the said apparatus does not produce the characteristic sensations!! A generalised notion of vision, or a definition of visual sensation must necessarily exclude all reference to the particular vision of X or Y. The definition by Madhva of "Vada" mentioned above is thus quite valid.

## II

Madhva then defines the second species of metaphysical debate, known as "Jalpa." "Khyatyadyartham-spardhayava-satam-jalpa-iteeryate". In this type of controversy as well, the participants are honest, straightforward truth-seekers. Those anxious to create confusion and uproar, chaos and conflict have no place in this species of metaphysical debate as in the previous one. But the objective is different. Love of lime-light, fascination for fame, and an appetite for applause are generally the motives and lime-light fame and applause are the objectives aimed at by the participants in this type of discussion. Or envy and jealousy may be motives and the objective will then be defeat or vanquishment of an adversary or opponent. The differentia of this type of controversy lie in the objectives, namely, fame for oneself and defeat for an adversary. The

participants are worthy of philosophical companionship. They are good folk. An inquirer asks—"Are fame, gain, reward, honour and defeat of an adversary collectively or distributively objectives of this type of debate?" Not the former. Definitions of "Jalpa" with all of them mentioned as the objective, would be too narrow as omitting the relevant instances of the debate in which the objective is any one of them separately. Not the latter. Definitions of the controversy of the "Jalpa" type with one of them mentioned as the objective would be too narrow as excluding the other objectives. Madhva's commentator replies that an easy way to get over the foregoing and similar objections would be to incorporate into the definition an all-inclusive characteristic of "Jalpa" which is essential and fundamental. *Tatvanirnaya* the determination or the ascertaining of Truth is not the direct objective of this species of controversy. So, the definition should essentially exclude reference to Truth-determination. Fame, Name, Renown, Material Reward and Gain, are included under the common *negative* term "other than Truth-determination". "Jalpa" is thus a type of controversy in which the Phala or fruit or outcome is something other than Truth-determination. It does not however mean, that untruth is rampant. The point is that truth has been determined as far as the parties are concerned. Dialectical victory is the objective. It is just like a cock-fight or a bull-fight. If truth-determination happens to be concomitant with the objective of defeat of an adversary, by all means let it. Irrespective of any other consideration truth is to be welcomed ever and by all. Whether fame, name, etc., are to be considered distributively or collectively objectives of the debate is a matter of unconcern. The objection urged above does not stand. Name, fame, etc., one by one distributively and all of them collectively are included in the expression "other than Truth-determination". The specific objectives of name, fame, etc., are included with a view to excluding "Vada." As even in the "Vada" type, name, fame, etc., may be discerned as minor concomitants, the latter are specifically mentioned to be direct objectives and not minor concomitants. That the debate is between good folk is mentioned to have the "Vitanda" type of controversy excluded from the scope of the definition.

(2) Thus defined "Jalpa" finds its *raison d'être* as a distinct and independent type of controversy. The Buddhists are mistaken when they affirm that "Vada" is the only type of controversy and give reasons for their refusal to recognise "Jalpa" and "Vitanda" as

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(2) See "Khandana-Khanda-Khadya" for Harsha's view that "Jalpa" is not an independent species. He writes—"Jalpastveka-katha-na-sambhavatyeva-Vitandadvayasareerat-tvat." Vol. 1, Chowkhamba Sanskrit series.

Madhva's view is however supported by "Jayanta's" "NYAYA-MANJARI" "Ittyudahritamidam-kathatrayam-yatparaspara-vivikta-lakshanam—Sthulamapyanaivalokya-kathyate-vada-eka-iti-sakyasishyakaih". P. 596. "Nyayamanjari." Vijayanagaram Sanskrit series. This stanza confirms and reinforces Madhva's criticisms of the views held by Harsha and the Buddhists.



distinct types or species. Similarly Sri Harsha refuses to accept Jalpa as a distinct species of debate, and is satisfied with two—namely, “Vada” and Vitanda”. The argument of those who are against assignment of independent status to “Jalpa” appears to be in brief that “Jalpa” is just a compound of two “Vitandas”. Madhva and his commentator have made it abundantly clear that this compounding will not do, as the definition and status of “Vitanda” itself are hanging in the balance and then wherever one finds the fundamental and essential characteristic of irreducibility, he is entitled to discern an independent type or species. In his commentary on “Brihadaranyaka”, Madhva has cited appropriate passages from “Brahma Tarka” which prove that attempts to reduce “Jalpa” to a compound of “Vitanda” are fruitless, as the fate of the latter itself is unsettled and precarious.

### III

The third type or the species of metaphysical controversy is known as “Vitanda”. Madhva defines it thus—“Vitanda-tu-satam-anyaih-tatvameshu-nigooहितam.” One party to the controversy is good, straightforward, honest, eager and entitled to know the Truth. The other party is a wicked wrangler, not entitled or deserving to know the truth intellectual swine, before which, priceless pearls of philosophical Truths should not be cast. The vexed question to be discussed in this connection is—who is to determine eligibility to know the Truths of Philosophy? The decision cannot be left to the subjective judgment coloured by *amour propre* of the parties to the controversy. Each party is bound to consider itself deserving and eligible to know the Truth, human nature being what it is. Each party is sure to claim to be good, honest, straightforward and so on. There will be no “Vitanda” type of debate at all as each party according to its claim will be good, honest, straightforward, eligible to know the Truth and so on, and as the condition of the possibility of the debate in question that one of the parties is bad, evil-minded wrangler is not fulfilled. If the decision on the other hand be based on objective grounds, say, of scholarship, conduct, reputation, and so forth, even then there is bound to be an indecision. Aggrieved parties will not be bound by any adverse decisions. The definition of the “Vitanda” type of controversy itself is impossible.

No. There is no such danger. The Umpires or Judges will be the best persons qualified to determine who are “SAT” and who “ASAT” who the “SADHUS” and who the “ASADHUS”. They will easily be able to pronounce an opinion on the type of controversy and on the eligibility or otherwise of the participants to know the Truths of Philosophy. There are well-known criteria by the application of which the Judges or the Umpires will be able to isolate the “SAT” from the “ASAT,” the “SADHUS” from the “ASADHUS”, those that are good from evil-minded, and those that

are straightforward from those that are perverted and dishonest. The parties to the debate will have to be bound by the decision of the Umpires or the Judges who are without exception persons of exemplary character and spotless conduct in their dealings with others, and God-fearing in private life. The attempt therefore to blot the "Vitanda" type of controversy out of existence on the alleged ground of indecision regarding the honest and the dishonest mentality of the participants, is bound to be a failure. The Judges or the Umpires will look to the decision, and their verdict is final.

What is the characteristic difference between "Jalpa" and "Vitanda"? A difference cannot be grounded on the difference in outcome or the result of the debates. Name, fame, renown, etc., can be the outcome of "Jalpa" as well as of "Vitanda". If it is urged that in some cases, Truth is determined by repudiation of the arguments of a perverted opponent in "Vitanda" and that a difference can thus be established between the two, such a Truth determination which is not universal still leaves room for the objection that in some cases, difference between the two types of controversy (Jalpa and Vitanda) is not intelligible. So long as the distinctive features characteristic of "Vitanda" its differentia are not pointed out, it is impossible to prove its independent status in a scheme of controversies. As it is it appears to be merged in "Jalpa". Nor will it be in order to urge a difference between the two types on the basis of the ("Adhikaris") eligibles for the debate. The decision of eligibility of the participants is itself grounded on the characteristic difference between the two types. When the latter is challenged and thrown into a state of doubt, a decision regarding the eligibles cannot be taken. If difference between the two types is established, difference between eligibles can be. If difference between eligibles can be established, then the difference between the two types can be. Decision regarding the eligibles and decision regarding the independence of the two types in questions are involved in a vicious reciprocity. Without a previous settlement of the nature of the types of controversy, one is not entitled to proclaim the definition that "Vitanda" is a species of controversy in which the participants are good and bad folk respectively. If it is said that "Vitanda" is a type of debate conducted by good and bad folk, multiplicity of types will ensue as there are any number and grades of good and bad folk.

The foregoing is only a surface-objection. If a little attention is paid to the actual procedural performance adopted by the parties concerned, the differentia of "Vitanda" can be isolated. In the "Jalpa" type of controversy, A and B, Vadi and the Prativadi, the initiator of Debate and his opponent, proceed destructively by criticising the arguments of their adversaries and constructively maintaining their own doctrines. The destructive and constructive procedure should be adopted by both the participants. That is the "Jalpa" type of controversy.

In the "Vitanda" type of discussion, on the other hand, the ("Prativadi") opponent merely goes on destructively criticising the arguments of the "Vadi"—let us say, the initiator of the debate. The former never constructively states and proves his position. The characteristic that of the two, one party never attempts a constructive statement and proof of his own position but is content with a destructive criticism of the views of the other party, is prominent and not likely to be confused with others. This prominent characteristic guarantees and assures the independence of "Vitanda" as a type of controversy. The mentioning of eligibles is just a concomitant which necessarily accompanies the prominent characteristic. A good participant never casts pearls before swine. He just criticises and exposes the unsoundness of the arguments of the bad and evil-minded participants. There is no harm in mentioning the nature of the eligibles who can participate in "Vitanda" which is a necessary concomitant of the prominent characteristic of the procedural performance of the debaters.

A critic objects that the characteristic of Jalpa mentioned above—namely, that *both* the parties should adopt the constructive and the destructive procedures—does not seem to be there at all. Suppose X and Y engage themselves in the "Jalpa" type of controversy. X advances an argument. Y criticises it. If the criticism is valid and sound, Y wins and X is defeated. The debate is closed. If, on the other hand, the criticism is unsound and unsustainable, Y is vanquished. X wins, and the curtain falls on the debate. Where is then the occasion for both parties to criticise one another's arguments and constructively state and prove their own systems, or doctrines? If one can argue still though vanquished no useful purpose will be served by any debates.

Such a criticism is really baseless. The "Jalpa" type is intended to gauge the wrestling abilities and prowess of the debaters. The determination of the debating skill and superiority cannot be possible unless *both* the parties follow to the end both the destructive and the constructive procedures. The mere warding off of the blow from an opponent is not a sign of sure or full victory. The warding off should be followed immediately by an active blow aimed at the opponent. On the other hand, a wreckless flying at the throat of the enemy or an opponent merely will not guarantee victory. While administering blows to your opponents, you should also scrupulously guard your own person.

It is thus indispensable that *both* parties to the debate should adopt destructive and constructive procedures in the "Jalpa" type of controversy. A decisive, conclusive and complete victory can be had only when *both* adopt *both* the destructive and constructive procedures.

If so, how is it that in the "Vitanda" type of debate, victory is determined even when one of the parties monopolizes destructive criticism of the arguments of the other? The Judges or the Umpires will look to the matter. They will award the palm to the deserving party. Of course the victory here, will not be complete, in the popular sense of the term. It may have the air of being one-sided as one of the parties monopolizes pure destructive criticism without an attempt to state his own position constructively and prove it. Madhva's commentator gives the following analogy. Imagine a fight at night between a Crow and an Owl. Notwithstanding the undoubted advantages Nature gives an Owl at nights, in the shape of clear vision, it may be defeated by a powerful Crow. The latter being rather at a disadvantage during nights, may yet, without concentrating energies on protection of its person, concentrate them on delivering a vehement onslaught on the former. A bold and daring attack on a powerful enemy may fetch victory even in the absence of a conscious protection of one's person. Even so, in the "Vitanda" type of controversy, victory is declared by the Judges or the Umpires to belong to that party which, without an attempt at constructive statement and proof of its own position, exclusively concentrates its attention on a destructive criticism of the arguments advanced by its opponent.

The point is this. In the "Vitanda" type of controversy one of the parties is professedly wicked and admittedly evil-minded and as such not entitled to know real Philosophical Truths. What can the other party do? It has to vanquish the wicked and evil-minded party by means of destructive criticism of its arguments. If the position of the destructive critic were to be constructively established, the undeserving party would know the Truths of Philosophy. The undeserving, wicked and evil-minded party should be kept ignorant of real and genuine truths of Philosophy. Pearls should not be cast before swine. Truths of Philosophy should be hidden from the wicked. A constructive demonstration of them before the unholy and irreverent gaze of the wicked should not be attempted. Victory in the "Vitanda" type of controversy will be judged on the basis of effective silencing of the other party. The Umpires or the Judges will declare the winner after satisfying themselves that Philosophic truth has been obscured from the eyes of the wicked, and that the arguments advanced by the latter have been destructively made mince-meat of. As the obscuration of Truths of Philosophy from the wicked is obligatory and as it is equally obligatory that their arguments should be destructively criticised, there can only be an indirect or second-rate victory in the "Vitanda" species of debate. On the other hand, obscuration of truths of metaphysics not being obligatory in the "Jalpa" species of debate, as both the parties are good, honest folk entitled to

know the said Truths, there can be a direct, decisive, and first-rate victory in it. Having thus defined the three species of metaphysical controversy, namely *Vada*, *Jalpa*, and *Vitanda*, Madhva proceeds to criticise the notions on this matter entertained by Nyaya-Vaisheshikas.

#### IV

Some maintain that Umpires or Judges should be chosen even to superintend the conduct and progress of the debate known as "*Vada*" in which the participants are good, honest, God-fearing and so forth, and the sole and exclusive objective of which is the determination of Truth. Madhva maintains that there is no need for Umpires in a debate of that type. Usually Umpires are to deal with, 1. Topics of the controversy and framing of the issues as it were, 2. Determination of the type of the debate to be conducted with an eye on the qualifications and controversial skill of the participants, 3. Opening of the debate and the reply to it, 4. Determination of fairplay and foulplay, 5. Giving the verdict that one of the contestants is defeated, 6. Disposal of the monetary bet, should there be any, and so on. Where the participants are unable to deal with them blinded by prejudice and presupposition and desire for dialectical victory, for instance in the "*Jalpa*" and "*Vitanda*" types of controversy, there is need for the appointment or selection of an Umpire or Umpires, a Judge or Judges. In the conduct of the "*Vada*" type of debate the participants are eager only to arrive at Truth. Dialectical victory is to be spurned aside. They are free from passions and prejudice. In such cases, there is absolutely no need for the smooth and harmonious progress of the debate to be subjected to any superintendence by Umpires, whose presence will be simply a superfluity since their functions will be fulfilled by the contestants themselves.

Very well. If so, are Umpires to be altogether excluded from the *Vada* type of controversy? They are not chosen deliberately and even in their absence, the debate between two truth-seekers not caring for dialectical victory will go on. But if, at the time of the progress of the debate, two or three qualified pandits by chance happen to reach the place of debate, they may be requested to be Umpires, just for the sake of courtesy and as a mark of recognition of their status and merits, or to have the assurance of a correct conduct of the debate rendered doubly sure. Even then, these Umpire-guests do not participate actively in passing judgment on the outcome of the debate.

"SABHAPATI" or a president is not required at all in the "*Vada*" type of controversy. Punishment of those that indulge in foul-play, rewarding or awarding the palm to the winners in the debate and putting a black mark on those that are vanquished, are the duties of the "SABHAPATI" president. There is absolutely no occasion for the president to play his part at all, as in the "*Vada*"

type of controversy the contestants are friendly and victory is not aimed at. Even if a little criticism or mild chastisement of a participant be necessary, it can easily be managed by the more vocal and aggressive debater, and anyway, a "SABHAPATI" is not wanted. In the management of the "Jalpa" and "Vitanda" types of controversy, enthusiastic and qualified spectators (sabhyaas), a president (sabhapati) and Umpires (prasnikaas) are indispensable, as the motive force for such debates is dialectical victory, the legitimacy of which cannot be left to the decision of the contestants themselves.

## V.

Who are fit to be chosen as Umpires or Judges (Prasnikaas)? Madhva mentions the following characteristics of Umpires. They should be free from passions, prejudices, prepossessions, and predilections. They should not be secretly inclined to favour one party as against the other. They should not give a deliberately perverted verdict on personal grounds. If they are in favour of a party, they will decide an absurd argument advanced by that party to be quite sound. Even so, if they are esoterically against a party, they will decide a sound argument urged by it, to be invalid and unsustainable. There should not be even the slightest occasion for any miscarriage of justice. The justice of the verdict and fairness will depend on the character of the Umpires. They should be perfectly efficient in the particular branch of knowledge in which debates are conducted and in addition to the technical proficiency conversant with general intellectual disciplines like Grammar. Suppose a debate is conducted in "Nyaya". The Umpires should be experts in that branch of knowledge not merely but the ancillaries as well. Character and conduct, independence, unsusceptibility to private influences, fearlessness, general and technical proficiency, in short an all-round efficiency are the criteria of Umpire ship. All this is summed up by Madhva in the following verse—"Ragadvesha—viheenastu—sarvavidya—visaradah—prasnikaah" etc.

What is the numerical strength of the Umpires? Seven or five Umpires may be chosen. Madhva wants an odd number anyhow. Should there be a difference of opinion among them, a decision may be recorded in conformity with the majority verdict. If an even number of Umpires be chosen, they may be equally divided and a decision would be impossible.

After all, the matter of the actual numerical strength of the Umpires is a minor one. A mutual check on one another among the Umpires themselves, a majority verdict and all this would signify a fall from ideal conditions. A towering personality, a super-man in fact, who is in a position to dispel the doubts and remove the difficulties of all, who is himself free from all doubts and hesitancy, who is endowed with a keen, acute and penetrating intellect, and who above all is free from passions, prejudices,

predilections and prepossessions, can well be chosen as Umpire when one such is available and when the disputants have confidence in him as they are bound to have should they come across him. Madhva sums up these characteristics thus—"Asesha-samsaya-cchetta-nissamsayah-udaradheeh—sarva doshavivarjitah."

But the most important characteristic of an Umpire is devotion to Vishnu. (Vishnu-Bhakti). It is easy to see that Madhva mentions "Vishnu-Bhakti" as the foremost characteristic of an Umpire as in his system of Mono-Theism, Sri Narayana—Vishnu, is the Highest Reality. Others have emphasized Lord Siva, in their Theological works as the Supremest Reality and Lord of the Universe. In the present context, Theological controversies do not matter. The Umpires should not be irreligious and godless. In philosophical disputes, and debates, frequent references to God, sacred literature, revealed texts and so on are inevitable and if the Umpires commence shrugging their shoulders and knitting their brows at the merest mention of God, Religion, Devotion, etc., the disputants cannot expect a fair and impartial verdict. If the game is one of Football or Tennis, you may make an atheist Umpire and nothing would be lost. In the game of Philosophy, however, Umpires should be religious, God-fearing, not God-intoxicated, though. Madhva is definitely and emphatically of opinion that a God-fearing nature and Devotion to God are easily identifiable and unfailing characteristics of good, honest, and straightforward and spiritual persons. An unbiassed and impartial verdict cannot be had from godless and materialistically minded persons in philosophical debates. Godlessness of their philosophy would make them impatient of the proceedings and they may not be able to discriminate between the good and the bad contestants (Sat and the Asat) in the "Vitanda" type of debate. If materialistically minded free-lances are appointed Umpires, there is every danger of the destructive iconoclast, the anti-social metaphysical free-booter, and participants of that category being declared winners, and *pro tanto*, the cause of truth will suffer, as every declaration of victory of an unbeliever is a fresh stimulus to his irreligious activity calculated to obscure, if not to destroy, the truths of philosophy. Madhva utters a warning that there should not be a hasty or thoughtless choice of Umpires. Provided a God-fearing nature is guaranteed, you may have either a single Umpire, or Umpires should more turn up at the time of the debate. If, however, a careless choice of Umpires is made, Truth-determination is bound to suffer. Madhva is quite positive and emphatic about that.

## VI

What is the real difference between the two types of controversy "Vada" and "Jalpa"? In both, the participants or the contestants are good, honest, and straightforward truth-seekers and desire for fame in the latter and the spirit of inquiry after Truth

in the former may quite co-exist. The differentia of each would seem not to have been isolated and discriminated. There is no difference in procedure either. It will be remembered that difference between "Jalpa" and "Vitanda" was grounded on the procedure adopted in both, namely, that in the former, each participant is required to maintain his position constructively and destructively criticise that of the opponent, and that in the latter, on the other hand, one of the contestants confines himself just to a destructive refutation of the arguments advanced by the opponent. No such procedural difference is noticeable in respect of "Vada" and "Jalpa". Procedure in both is the same involving criticism of the position of the opponent and constructive statement and establishing of one's own.

In order to meet this objection, Madhva makes it clear that there is a procedural difference on which a legitimate and real difference between "Vada" and Jalpa" can be grounded. Whereas in the Vada type of controversy, the participants make use of "Pramana" and "Tarka", i.e. the legitimate *Pramanas*, the sources, authorities or the guarantors of valid knowledge and straightforward argument. In the "Jalpa" type on the other hand, in addition to straightforward arguments, browbeating arguments are also employed as the contestants are eager to obtain dialectical victory over one another. There is thus a procedural difference between the two types,—"Vada and Jalpa" inasmuch as the former is restricted to *Pramanas* and straightforward argumentation, while in the latter the parties employ crooked and browbeating ones for the sake of dialectical victory. Madhva makes it clear next in what manner the "Vada" type of controversy is to be conducted and carried out.

Suppose X is the Vadi. Y is the Prativadi. The latter demands convincing authority in support of the matter to be discussed and established. The former should immediately cite the relevant scriptural testimony. He should not browbeat the opponent and contend that the question itself is irrelevant and illegitimate and so forth. Inference should not be attempted, and arguments involving inference should not be employed. Nor should scripture of any kind be cited. There are Scriptures and scriptures. The scripture should be that body of texts to which the parties would not demur. There is hardly any place for jugglery in the "Vada" type. The objective is pure and unalloyed determination of Truth. To secure the achievement of that end, sacred texts should be cited. They are the Supreme *Pramanas*. The authority possessed by them is unquestioned and unchallenged as they cannot be ascribed to the authorship of any known agency.

Then why should a party not mention inference and arguments involving inference as the latter too would contribute to the determination of truth? The answer is obvious. If decision be left to the



pure caprice of reason, there may not be a decision at all. Truth will recede like the horizon. There are well-known and very obvious limits to reason, and ratiocination. Genuine Metaphysical Truth cannot be arrived at by means of reason unaided by scripture. If dialectical victory be the objective, the participants can play the game of riotous reason. Truth and not victory is the objective in "Vada". Truth should be taught and brought home to those that desire it without circumlocution and beating about the bush and Truth is aimed at as the objective and not personal dialectical victory. The sacred text is the only authority that is calculated best to contribute to the determination of Truth. It is definitely laid down in the Sruti that mere Tarka, ratiocination or argumentation is not sufficient to lead one on to the goal of Truth.

When the "Vadi" has cited a scriptural passage in support of his position, what is the "Prati-Vadi" to do? The term "Vadi" refers to one party who maintains a thesis, and the Prati-Vadi is the party who maintains the counter-thesis. The Prati-Vadi should try to criticise the scriptural authority cited by the Vadi. In the absence of any such criticism Truth-determination will be impossible. Since it is perfectly practicable to cite scriptural passage in support of the thesis as well as the counter-thesis, the controversialists do not manage to rise above the plane of indecision, hesitancy and doubt. The establishing of the counter-thesis ~~cannot~~ be achieved without a previous criticism of the scriptural authority cited by the Champion of the thesis in question.

The champion of the counter-thesis should undertake an interpretational investigation. In the matter of scriptural passages, two lines of criticism are open. The champion of the counter-thesis may maintain that the passage from scripture cited is altogether absurd. Or he may give a different interpretation to the passage in the light of which, the original thesis may have to be abandoned and the counter-thesis espoused. The former procedure is not open in the "Vada" type of controversy dealing with sacred texts. *Prima facie*, the texts are sacred. The parties are bound by orthodox traditions and opinions. The sacrosanctity of scriptural texts is never challenged or doubted. When the controversialists are thus committed to respecting the authority of the sacred texts, the champion of the counter-thesis cannot maintain that the texts cited by the supporter of the thesis are all absurd. No portion of the sacred text is absurd and meaningless. All that can be done is criticism consistent with the undoubted and unchallenged sacrosanctity of the texts. The criticism will have to be in the shape of re-interpretation of the texts cited by the Vadi. Madhva is quite emphatic about this. He writes "Anyartha-eva-agamasya-vaktavyah-prativadina-". The re-interpretation will have to proceed according to the canons accepted by both the parties. Elsewhere it has been argued at length that the sacred texts cannot be ascribed to human authorship or any known or ascertainable authorship and

as such they are all free from blemishes. Re-interpretation is the only alternative. Condemnation of the sacred texts *in toto* is unthinkable.

What are the sacred texts? Rik, Yajus, Sama, Atharva, Bharata, Pancharatra, Moola-Ramayana, and others that are in conformity with the teachings contained in the former, are to be regarded as "SADAGAMAH"—good and reliable sacred texts. There are however other Agamas like the "Saiva, Pasupatha", etc. These are not to be cited at all in orthodox debates. The authority of the un-recognised agamas is repudiated by Madhva. So, nowhere in the orthodox debate of the type under discussion is there any chance of a total repudiation of the sacred texts that are enumerated. Others if cited will have to be repudiated, but they should not be cited at all, as they will not support the conclusions of honest truth-seekers.

The task of the "Prati-Vadi", the champion of the counter-thesis, is by no means confined to a mere criticism in the shape of re-interpretation of the sacred texts cited by the "Vadi". The suggested re-interpretation should be immediately followed by a statement of the scriptural passage or passages on which the champion of the counter-thesis himself relies. "Sva-paksha-agamas-chaiva-vaktavyah-prativadina". Whether one champions the thesis or the counter-thesis, only scriptural texts have to be cited.

When the champion of the counter-thesis had stated the scriptural passages on which he relies for support, the advocate of the thesis should take up cudgels in defence of his position. He has to achieve two objects. In the first place, he has to give a convincing re-interpretation of the passages cited by the upholder of the counter-thesis. Secondly, he should refute the re-interpretation of his own authorities attempted by the advocate of the counter-thesis. Cosmos, chaos, chaos cosmos, once again the sickening game. When the "Vadi" and the "Prati-Vadi" are debating on the lines suggested above, it is inevitable that at a particular stage of the progress of the debate, each party will commence contending that the interpretation advanced by it of the sacred texts cited in support of its position is the natural, valid, and unstrained one. Each will argue *con amore*. How is a decision to be arrived at? There are two interpretations and two re-interpretations attempted by the parties. Which is the way out?

Though each party may clamour for victory, the supporter of the thesis will have to compel a decision as it were in his favour by grounding his interpretation on the well-known canons standardised by the *Purva-Meemamsa* school of thought. The canons are technically known as "Tatparya-lingas" sign-posts for correct interpretation. They are summed up in a stanza which

runs thus.—“Upakraopasamharavabhyasopuuvata-phalam-arthavadopapatteecha-lingam-tatparyanirnaye.” (3). The Agama or the sacred text does not mean a particular odd succession of words, sounds and terms, arranged in a particular manner, but a text or a passage falling within the interpretational grip and obeying the laws of interpretation. The context will have to be noted. The commencement and the conclusion of a text or a passage regulated by context have to be determined. (“Upakraomopasamhara.”). If a term is frequently repeated the meaning signified by it has greater chances of acceptance. (Abhyasa). If there is an element of novelty, it gains precedence. (Apurvata). Of two given texts, if one proclaims the existence of some definite fruit or outcome allied inseparably to or connected with the performance of a particular rite or a sacrificial act, it gains precedence over the other which has no such reference. (Phala). A given doctrine is entitled to acceptance if its praise is sung in a context. Similarly if in the performance of a sacrificial rite, there is a doubt as to which substance is to be chosen that substance is to be chosen the praise of which is sung by a scriptural text relating to that ritual. (Artha-vada). Above all, the interpretation essayed will have to be in the strictest conformity with the requirements of reason. (Upa patti).

If each party would persist in maintaining that the interpretation attempted by it is the correct one, decision is to be taken after an examination of the passage or text with a view to ascertaining whether the foregoing six canons of interpretation are satisfied. If not, the interpretation so far is defective.

When with the help of the canons, the natural, valid and unstrained interpretation of the texts cited by the “Vadi” is decided, he should also point out that the interpretation attempted by his opponent is devoid of the support of the canons. We have now reached the following stage in the controversy. The “Vadi” or the champion of a given thesis has established his own by means of the six canons of interpretation, has pointed out that the position of his opponent lacks the support of the canons, and has shown how it is possible to re-interpret the texts of the latter. Does it mean now that the controversy is at an end? No, something else remains to be accomplished. It is not sufficient if the passages cited by the opponent are re-interpreted, and as the debate of the “Vada” type is undertaken essentially and fundamentally for the determination of Truth it is obligatory to settle the interpretation of the texts cited by the “Prati-Vadi” (the champion of the counter-thesis) in a *friendly* manner. Dialectical victory being ruled out, the parties would have naturally to settle down to a fixation of the interpretation in a friendly manner mainly in the

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(3) Madhva maintains “Upasamhara-Prabalya”. See Chapter Eleven—“Controversial Literature” for Vijayindra’s controversial work “Upasamhara-vijaya.”

interests of truth. By pursuing in a scientific spirit of investigation the trend of the controversy, harmonization of the significance and import of the two sets of texts should be secured. It has already been observed that the texts are sacrosanct. They cannot be dismissed as being absurd or as of no intelligible import. When the champion of the thesis (Vadi) has established his own position, he should co-operate with the champion of the counter-thesis in the determination of the real import of the texts cited by the latter. That will of course be in conformity with the interpretation championed by the upholder of the thesis. (Vadi). When the interpretational harmony has been secured between two sets of passages Truth will be finally determined in a satisfactory manner compelling assent, and sacrosanctity of the texts will be respected. Such a harmonization becomes inevitable. In the first phase of controversy as it were only the texts cited by the "Vadi" are prominently discussed. The texts cited by the opponent come in for re-interpretation. It should further be shown that harmonization can be secured in fact by the two being brought under an interpretational synthesis. An occasion for doubt is ever present so long as the two sets of texts are permitted to claim importance and until, they are subsumed under an interpretational synthesis, doubt will not be set at rest. In the first wave of the debate, the texts of the supporter of the thesis were not actively made use of in the determination of the import of those cited by the opponent. In the next wave, each set is brought under the interpretational unity.

An illustration will make the procedure clear. Suppose X is championing the thesis that the Universe is real. Y upholds the unreality of the universe. They enter into a debate eschewing all considerations of a dialectical victory, and making truth the only objective. Let A stand for the body of sacred texts cited by X and B that quoted by Y. Commencing the investigation Y asks X to cite the relevant texts. He cites A. Immediately Y maintains that the set of texts A is capable of different interpretation. In support of his own counter-thesis, he will have to cite the set of texts B. Thereupon, X should establish that texts Y cited in support of the counter-thesis are intended to convey an altogether different interpretation. Further the said X should repudiate the different interpretation of his texts A—by Y. All along the canons of interpretation should be very strictly and scrupulously observed. After thus settling the import of the said texts—A, parties X and Y in a spirit of friendliness and intellectual co-operation should settle the import of the set of texts cited by Y, i.e. B. In this manner the two sets of texts A and B originally cited by the respective champions X and Y as supporting the thesis and the counter-thesis are harmonized and brought under an interpretational synthesis, and the Truth of the matter settled. This illustration is to show that the thesis has been established. "Mutatis Mutandis" it would apply to the establishment of the counter-thesis as well which may.

be the Truth of the matter. For, there is no such guarantee that in any given debate, only the thesis is established. Interpretational harmony can be secured making either the thesis pivotal or the counter-thesis. At the time of the final acceptance of the Truth, and at the termination of the controversy, it may be a synthesis has been effected emphasising the Thesis or the Counter-thesis. It is absurd to imagine that the synthesis is something totally different from the thesis and the counter-thesis. Synthesis consists in a prominent championing of one position rendering the other less prominent. In the matter of the texts, one set is always made to surrender its apparent *prima facie* interpretation and dovetailed into the interpretational harmony or the synthesis. This, in brief, is the procedure that is to be adopted by the contestants in what is known as the "Vada" type of controversy.

## VII

There are objects that are exclusively known by means of the sensory channels of communication, and there are items that are known only intimately to the subject or subjects concerned to the "Sakshi" the witness or the self in each rational, sentient organism. If, in respect of such objects, one is asked to cite evidence and offer testimony, is he to keep quiet or is he to cite sense-awareness itself as his support? If he is to keep silent, his position will not be established. If he is to cite sense-awareness as support, the rule laid down earlier in the work and intended to govern the "Vada" type of controversy that only the sacred text should be cited is violated.

Madhva replies that a fetish need not and should not be made of the sacred texts. The rule emphasizing the importance of the sacred texts is intended only to apply to such objects the existence of which cannot be apprehended except by means of them. In obvious instances of objects that are apprehended by the sensory channels of communication, it would be preposterous to cite sacred texts. In the case of conclusions which can be established only by means of sense-awareness, it has to be cited as the authority. If a discussion should centre round subjective entities like affective states, or emotive experiences, an appeal is to be made to the "Sakshi" the witness or the self. Similarly if a conclusion can be established only by means of inference, the latter has to be unhesitatingly cited as the authority.

The point is this. Inferential argumentation, mere reason, can have free play almost anywhere, and there is obvious danger in making substantiation of important philosophical truths rest on ratiocinative jugglery. Wherever sense-awareness, and sacred texts have to be cited in the natural course of things, there they have undisputed right of preference. Inference and ratiocination will have their turn of preference if considerations of relevancy require

it. Madhva desires to emphasize the truth that a too ready embarkation on the raft of ratiocination is bound to lead to a sure shipwreck.

"Agama" or the sacred text thus retains its pre-eminence as authority. It is however confined to objects on which light cannot be thrown except by such a text. It never trespasses into forbidden ground. Sense testimony retains next, its pre-eminence. To a Radical Realist like Madhva, senses are never deceptive. In the normal life of an organism, the sensory channels of communication with external reality lead on the subject to an accurate knowledge of the objects as they are. Of course, sometimes, in cases of abnormality when the rapprochement between the sensory apparatus and objects is disturbed, illusions result, but, such exceptions only prove the general rule. If truth-interest and validity-interest require the sensory process as evidence, and above all if the nature of the objects sought to be known is such as to be apprehended only by sense-awareness, the latter has to be pointed to as evidence. Inference too will have its turn. The object of Madhva's statement that Inference should not be mentioned first and at the outset as authority is simply to utter a warning that philosophical disputants should not yield to the too ready temptation of bamboozling their opponents with inferential and ratiocinative constructions. Inference *per se* is not condemned. It has its own usefulness. In any situation putting the data together, and reacting to them in the shape of inferences, would appear to be inevitable, and excluding such instances, Madhva maintains that inference should be kept in its proper place and should not be resorted to, if a given thesis or a point can be substantiated by "Agama", and "Pratyaksha"—(sacred text and sense-awareness).

### VIII

Now there are some truths to be known like these—there are five fruits on the bank of the river. X lost a bundle of currency notes while returning from the Metropolitan Bank. Yesterday fire consumed a number of buildings and so on. These statements are not to be classed among the utterances of the sacred texts. They are ordinary human linguistic constructions. They are (verbal) reaction patterns. The parties understand the significance of the language-reaction-patterns. If in support of the truths contained in such propositions, one is asked to cite authorities, are verbal propositional patterns to be cited? They are not the Agama—sacred texts. There seems to be no other authority. If the disputants (well equipped and trusting one another) have to cite authorities to substantiate the existence of objects, or the truth of events, they have to cite propositions the truth of which has been brought home to them or could be brought home easily, in cases of doubt and disagreement. If the validity and reliability of such propositions cannot be substantiated, the best thing is to keep quiet. Silence is truly golden. If a substantiation is practical politics, propositions should be cited in support of a given truth and substantiation would quickly follow,

In the transaction of the concerns of a class-room, if the truth of a statement like "Henry the VIII had so many wives" is challenged at this distance of time, all that could be done is to take that person to a history book or bring the book to him and show him the statement that "Henry the VIII had so many wives." The parties here agree to treat a volume on history as a reliable authority and when the required authority is cited curiosity genuine or mischievous and spurious would have to be satisfied. If a particular writer is objected to, another's volume is always ready. The pragmatic interest is immediately satisfied, and the parties are pleased. Though the term "Agama" (on the basis of an age-long tradition and deep-rooted convention), is confined to sacred texts, any text or a proposition which on being cited satisfies the curiosity of an Inquirer, and silences the mischievous interrogations of a spurious investigator, is entitled to be regarded as "Agama" if its connotation is a bit rendered elastic. The sacred texts are cited because they satisfy the demands of legitimate inquiry and are considered to be more reliable than any other authority as being free from all chances of error, fraud and prevarication. Satisfaction of the pragmatic interest is the main concern. If it is brought about in respect of a disputed point, by the citation of a written or spoken proposition the latter would be entitled to be described "Agama". After all what is there in a name? The pragmatic satisfaction of the interest, the fulfilment of the thought-needs of the moment, and the execution of appropriate responses are the only criteria and they will enable a decision being arrived at by the parties regarding the reliability of a statement taken at random like—"We felt an earthquake shock of great intensity yesterday." The truth of the statement may be challenged subsequently. Historical truths or truths of history like the "Black-Hole of Calcutta" may be and have been challenged. Textual and propositional testimony is the only one that can be had or even the spoken word of an old veteran. If the interrogator is satisfied with the reply that there did occur a historical event like that, there is an end of it. If he is one who interrogates for the sake of interrogation or for the sake of annoying others, he can never be satisfied. He is to be ignored. The satisfaction of the intellectual curiosity or the riddance of a *bona-fide* doubt of a truth-seeker is possible only if the parties have faith and confidence in one another. Statements emanating from those who have a reputation for veracity and in whom the interrogator has faith are to be regarded as "Agama" in virtue of the satisfaction they create. The pragmatic criterion is the only one that can be applied in cases of the kind suggested. The truth-interest and the utility-interest merge in one another.

There is however a rub. Learning that Y has an unshakable faith in X, the latter utters a lie which the former believes to be true. His intellectual curiosity is satisfied. He has been spooned on a lie. Is there determination of truth or "Tatvanirnaya" in such

cases? The reply is obvious. Of course, Truth-interest has suffered. But the contingency anticipated is really one that will never occur in concrete life at all. It is essential to remember that in the "Vada" type of controversy the parties are honest and straightforward folk and there is no likelihood that one of them would deliberately deceive the other by giving him altogether false and untrustworthy information, when truth-determination is the only goal and not victory. If the latter were the goal, then surely one party will endeavour to hoodwink or browbeat the other by uttering any number of lies. In the "Vada" type, therefore, deliberate lies and prevarications do not rear their ugly heads.

The problem is this. Apart from the sacred text, what is the status of the statements made in regard to facts of life, historical Truths and others not specially metaphysical in import? The answer is that any statement of fact, historical truth, an assertion based on a long-current and uncontradicted tradition, are all contributory to the satisfaction of the intellectual curiosity of a truth-seeker or honest questioner, and *qua* satisfying that need they are to be considered on a par with "Agama". Giving pleasure by means of the satisfaction of a need on the pragmatic platform or plane as it were, elevates statements of facts and historical truths to the rank of "AGAMA".

Thus the controversialists, having entered the lists as honest truth-seekers and investigators, should continue the "Vada" type of discussion till the truth of the matter is determined, in respect of a given universe of discourse. If, in the exchange of arguments and counter-arguments, there occurs a temporary standstill on account of one of the parties being unable readily to summon his wit's aid, the debate does not terminate thereby. Dialectical victory under such circumstances is a poor reward. Determination of Truth is what is wanted. The defeated party may rethink the position and feel able to advance new arguments which will have to be answered by the victor for the nonce. The victor may be the vanquished in the next turn of the debate. The legitimate doubts of the vanquished will have to be duly considered and removed. Not merely that. If the victor is to be declared a champion of Truth-determination, he will have to set at rest the doubts of the vanquished not merely, but those of the spectators of the game of discussion as well. It does not matter if one "Vadi" (champion of a view) is confronted with a number of opponents (*prativaldis*). There will reign perfect harmony, order, decorum and decency and the unity of the debate will be scrupulously maintained under the pervading grip of Truth-determination, whatever be the number of participants in the debate, who will advance their arguments in an orderly manner without giving even the slightest occasion for confusion or pell-mell talk.

When will the debate terminate? It is merely as an extreme case that Madhva has cited riddance by the "Vadi" (champion of a



given thesis) of the *bona-fide* and legitimate doubts of not merely the "Prati-Vadi" (the supporter or the advocate of the counter-thesis), but also of truth-seeking inquirers like spectators. There is no inevitability about the appearance of the latter at all. It is only the "Vadi" and the "Prati-Vadi" whose existence is indispensable for the origin and progress of the discussion of the type we are here considering. Nor is there any certitude that questions will continue to be asked and doubts expressed *ad infinitum*. Their number is bound to be limited and when the champion has dealt with them all and satisfied the thought-needs of the inquirers, the debate will naturally terminate. Even supposing that all the possible doubts and difficulties in the maintenance of a particular thesis or a dialectical demonstration of a metaphysical hypothesis or doctrine, are anticipated, discussed, and removed, there will only be some delay for the end of the debate. The debate itself will not be an interminable one! Nothing is lost by any such delay. We are all aware that "time" is no consideration with some spirits. Time is spent in all sorts of activities and amusements many of which have no significance for higher life. Time spent in philosophical discussions is well spent. If the time of the modern civilised man is crowded with pleasure-hunting *puerilities* from morn to eve, from sun-rise to sun-set and from sun-set to sun-rise again in night clubs and dance halls, there is absolutely no justification for not devoting some time to philosophical discussions and thoughts about the life to come.

In the "Jalpa" type of the debate, on the other hand, the parties will have to keep the pot of metaphysical argumentation boiling till one of them is finally vanquished and silenced as far as that particular debate is concerned. When the president of the assembly of Pandits, Umpire, Disputants, writers (i.e., those that reduce the debates to writing for the sake of permanence; for in the absence of such a record, the parties may endeavour to deny their own statements made in haste or thoughtlessness, etc.) have been duly chosen, and when by a common understanding, the topics for discussions are isolated out of the matrix of general metaphysics, the champion of the thesis (Vadi) will commence citing his authorities, which will be challenged and re-interpreted by the champion of the counter-thesis (Prati-Vadi). Detection of formal and material fallacies or mistakes technically known as "Nigrahasthanas" may be pressed into service to secure the vanquishment of the opponent. If the grounds of an easy rejection of the thesis or the counter-thesis be not available to the party concerned, each has to embark on an interpretational attack on the authorities cited. The authority cited should be carefully analysed and the interpretation urged by the opponent should be shown to be incompatible with the canons of orthodox elucidation. In addition to the destructive criticism of the position of the "Vadi," the "Prati-Vadi" should cite his own authorities. The "Vadi" now entering on a defence of his

own thesis should exhibit that the criticisms urged by his opponent against the authorities cited are unsustainable and then he should show that the authorities cited by the opponent are not capable of supporting the position for the maintenance of which they happen to have been cited. The defensive and offensive arguments should all be based on the usual orthodox *Pramanas* (or on the nearest approaches to them). Otherwise, the debate will degenerate into a mere verbal wrangle. But, as the "Jalpa" type of discussion is carried on essentially with an eye on dialectical victory, arguments in conformity with the *Pramanas* will be advanced as far as possible, and should an emergency arise when the acutely felt absence of ready-witted arguments heralds a sure defeat, crooked arguments, verbal dodges, etc., will have to be employed to have the opponent brow-beaten and make him crest-fallen. The clever debater will immediately haul him over the coals for having made use of crooked arguments, but a detection of that nature means only a partial defeat, while silence in the absence of straightforward arguments means complete and stunning defeat. The sheer instinct of self-preservation would dictate a procedure the end of which is but a partial defeat. Arguments will thus be kept within bounds of the orthodox *Pramanas*, torture of expression, squeezing of sense, twisting and circumlocution being resorted to in times of emergency. The "Jalpa" type of debate will go on till a decisive victory is announced by the Umpire or Umpires in favour of one of the disputants. Dialectical victory is the essential and fundamental objective of it. Unlike in the "Vada" variety, there is no obligation on the victor to co-operate with the vanquished in the fixation of the correct import of the texts and passages cited by the latter. Such an intellectual co-operation has no place in a controversy the objective of which is a dialectical victory peradventure of the Socratic type.

It will be recalled that Madhva's adherence to the three types of "Vada," "Jalpa," and "Vitanda" is based on a sacred text "Brahma-Tarka" and is intended to exhibit the illogic of rival schemes. The Buddhist maintains that there is only one type of controversy, namely "Vada," of which dialectical victory is the goal. How does the Buddhist establish the oneness of the type? Mere assertion that all controversies are only of one type will not establish a thesis. There is always the counter-assertion that the types are more than one. It is obvious that persistent assertion or denial will never advance one even an inch towards the goal of metaphysical truth.

Happily, there are criteria which demonstrate the correctness of Madhva's scheme. Reduction of the species of controversy to a single type should be based on the well-known principle of economy of thought. Nature abhors waste. Thought abhors waste even more keenly. Reduction, however, does not and cannot mean an

annihilation of the relevant types by means of a fiat. The types of controversy are entitled to an independent status and independent existence. There are criteria that easily establish their independence. A passion for a cheap Monism has blinded the Buddhist to the irreducible characteristics of the three independent species of controversy. In extremes, a passion for Monism leads to a reckless writing off, of entities, types and species, which luckily persist in their independence and individuality notwithstanding Monistic Magic Wands. The criteria that establish the independence of the types are the following:—1. *Adhikaris* (persons fit to be participants in the debate); 2. *Angus* (the inevitable concomitants and the motives that impel the participants to debate); 3. *Pravritti-Prakara* (*modus operandi* or mode of procedure adopted); and 4. *Phala* (the fruit—the goal, or the objective of the controversy). If an application of the criteria would establish the independence of the three species of debate, the Monistic attempt to reduce them all to one type is foredoomed to failure. For instance, in the “Vada” type, primarily teacher and pupil are participants, in “Jalpa,” honest truth-seekers, and in “Vitanda,” one a truth-seeker and the other a quarrelsome wrangler or a villainous fighter.

Desire to arrive at the truth, passion for fame, and silencing the opponent and breaking up of his philosophical fortifications as it were, are respectively the motive forces which render active the debating instincts of the participants. Restriction to scriptural authorities, urged straightforwardly, criticism of the position of the opponent and constructive statement of one's own, and mere destruction or demolition of the arguments of the opponent without an attempt at constructive statement of one's own are the procedures adopted in “Vada,” “Jalpa”, and “Vitanda” respectively. There is marked and irreducible difference in the fruits gained or the goal of the debates. Determination of Truth without the creation of bad blood, dialectical victory and renown as a keen debator, and brow-beating and vanquishment of one's opponent are respectively the fruits gained by using the three types. In the face of the criteria thus pointed out, namely, difference in the matter of the participants, essential concomitants, procedure and outcome, how is it possible for the Buddhist or for anybody else to maintain that there is only one type of debate, unless it be that the passion for a cheap Monism has rendered him oblivious of facts? The difference pointed out cannot be argued out of existence or into non-existence even by the cleverest of debaters.

Nor is Sri Harsha justified in clinging only to two types of debate — “Vada” and “Vitanda.” Does he mean that “Jalpa” has no independent status of its own and no identifiable characteristic features? The essential and fundamental form of debate cannot be denied. In the foregoing paragraphs, its characteristic features have been definitely shown. Still, if the “Jalpa”

type is to be denied independent status just by the fiat a controversialist, why, other types can be argumentatively denied their independence notwithstanding the criteria cited above. Evidence more satisfactory than an individual fiat should be forthcoming if the independence of "Jalpa" is to be denied. The contentions based on an individual fiat, however eminent that individual may be, do not contribute to truth-determination.

Does Sri Harsha mean that the "Jalpa" type is capable of being subsumed under "Vada" or "Vitanda" so completely and fully that after the merger, it would lose its individuality and independence? That cannot be. Is it to be merged in "Vada"? No. Nor can it be merged "Vitanda". The attempted merger is doomed to failure as criteria which guarantee its independence have been exhibited. When there is such a clear and distinct difference among the types of debates in regard to the eligible participants, 2. Essential concomitants and motive forces, 3. procedure, and 4. the fruits obtained, how is it possible to reduce the "Jalpa" species either to "Vada" or "Vitanda"? Should anyone deem it necessary to attempt a reduction or subsumption of one or more of the three types, the "*onus probandi*" lies on him. As far as Madhva is concerned, he has made it perfectly clear that his adherence to independence of the three types is grounded on the criteria exhibited by him.

The Guada-Nayyayika school, which wants "Vada," "Jalpa," "Vada-Vitanda" and "Jalpa-Vitanda" types is equally mistaken. A little calm reflection is sufficient to convince impartial and disinterested minds that, while there is justification for "Vada" and "Jalpa" being viewed as independent species, there is hardly any for the independence granted to "Vada-Vitanda" and "Jalpa-Vitanda" which are undoubted hybrids of metaphysical debate. Madhva's commentator proceeds to show that the "Vada-Vitanda" type is quite capable of being subsumed under one of those admitted by Madhva. Granting for the sake of argument that there can be a combination-type like the "Vada-Vitanda," three questions are inevitable. In the first place, is the type used for the sake of determination of Truth? (Tatva Nirṇaya). Secondly, is it employed for the sake of dialectical victory? Thirdly, is it commenced with a view to securing some other advantage?

If it is maintained that Truth-determination is the goal or the objective of the "Vada-Vitanda" type, and that the procedure adopted be criticism of the arguments of the opponent and his position and a constructive statement of one's own, then the type is directly subsumed under the "Vada" species from which it is indistinguishable. If the parties deviate from the path of rectitude leading to truth-determination, and reveal a tendency to cast wistful eyes on vanquishment of the opponent, there cannot be any scope for Truth-determination which is included as an important

element in the definition of this type of "Vada-Vitanda". If, in the matter of procedure, the parties confine themselves to one of the two, namely, destructive criticism of the position of the opponent and constructive statement of one's own, Truth-determination is bound to suffer. Neither the one nor the other is sufficient singly to establish Truth. Mere destructive criticism of the view or system of your opponent is hardly sufficient to establish the truth of the matter. Nor is mere affirmation of one's own position. The two should work in the manner of complementary processes to establish truth. Constructive formulation of one's own doctrines should be preceded by a destructive criticism of those of the opponent. Even so, destructive criticism of the views of the opponent should be immediately followed by a constructive statement of one's own. It is only a correct functioning of the two complementary processes of destructive criticism of the doctrines of the opponent and constructive presentation of one's own that can establish metaphysical Truth on an unassailable basis. The "Gauda-Nayyayikas" are thus mistaken in mentioning "Vada-Vitanda" as an independent species of controversy. It is not. It is, as shown above, subsumed under "Vada" or the Truth-objective is altogether lost which means a failure of the definition of the so-called independent species. (4).

If the second alternative is chosen, and if it is contended that dialectical victory is the objective of this so-called independent type, it can readily be subsumed under the "Jalpa" or "Vitanda" type, according as the procedure adopted involves both constructive and destructive elements (in which case it is subsumed under the former type) or the latter alone (in which case it is subsumed under the second type, to wit Vitanda). The incorporation of possession of desire to know the truth in the definition by the "Gauda-Nayyayikas" has then no sense whatever. *Ex-hypothesi* the objective of this type is said to be dialectical victory which has to be secured even at the sacrifice of truth, and in some cases, only at the cost of Truth.

The third alternative does not hold water either. If the independence of that hybrid or cross-breed controversial species is to be maintained, an attempt can be made if the criteria of a distinct end or objective to be gained, existence of eligible participants, and characteristic mode of procedure can be successfully applied and only then. No proof is required that the independence cannot be maintained unless the criteria are shown to apply. The alleged criteria have no better status than snakes in iceland. Given a controversy, the objectives are either Truth-determination or vanquishment of the adversary and dialectical victory. No other objective is even imaginable. There are no eligible participants

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(4) If anything is contended to be an independent species of a genus, it should admit of a commensurate, independent, definition. In the absence of such a definition, the independence of the species cannot be logically established.

other than those who desire to arrive at truth, and those who thirst for dialectical victory. Nor is there any distinct and characteristic mode of procedure in virtue of which one may vindicate the independent status of "Vada Vitanda" *a la* the "Gauda-Nayyayikas". Destructive-cum-Constructive procedure, and the choice of one of them, mostly the former, are the only procedures known and as argued in the previous paragraphs, the adoption of the said procedures would be seen to be inevitable concomitants of the types mentioned by Madhva. That is to say, no distinct procedure is discernible which would guarantee the independence of the so-called fourth type. The procedure when analysed with a little care, overlaps with that adopted in one of the recognised three types. This overlapping leads to a subsumption of the so-called independent fourth type in one of them. Independence of the "Vada Vitanda" species is thus the merest mare's nest. How is it possible to establish its independence when not even a single criterion is forthcoming that is vital to its being?

The line of argument sketched in the foregoing paragraphs would easily apply to the other so-called independent type, namely, "Jalpa Vitanda" spoken of by the "Gauda-Nayyayikas" which would be seen on analysis to be readily subsumable under the relevant one of the three types.

## IX

It was observed before that the "Vada" type of controversy would terminate when one of the parties becomes silenced in the absence of new arguments to be advanced and new lines of inquiry corroborative of the original. The objective of this particular species of controversy is the determination of Truth. (Tatva-Nirnaya). It is perfectly in order that anything calculated to hinder the determination of metaphysical truth will contribute to the defeat of the party making use of it. Giving deliberately circumlocutory and perverted replies, interpretational or connotational quibbling, these and similar controversial tricks will naturally hinder the determination of Truth. Use of fallacious arguments is also a contributory factor.

Conduct of the disputants intended to disturb the smooth progress of the debate is also contributory to the defeat of the party that adopts such obstructionistic tactics. Be it remembered that though in some instances of the "Vada" debate, there are no Umpires or judges, yet, in other instances, the said functionaries are there, and they will be ready to proclaim victory or defeat according to the tactics adopted by the disputants. Obstructionistic tactics calculated to bring about an abrupt termination of the proceedings of the discussion, when adopted will be detected by the Umpires who will proclaim that the party which adopts them has lost the debate. Those who shun such ugly tactics have the debate declared in their favour. If a generic concept be wanted, it would be safest to state

that all arguments, and tactics that hinder the progress of the debate towards the cherished goal of Truth-determination are the causal factors that bring about a defeat in the "Vada" species of controversy. There is after all no virtue in beating about the bush and going in quest of factors causing defeat in "Vada". Gripping the problem right at heart as it were, it is seen that Truth-determination being the sole and exclusive objective of this type, anything that makes the said Truth-Determination recede like the horizon, should be put down as causally connected with the defeat of the party concerned. The generic concept is just antagonism to Truth-determination. (Tatva-nirnaya-vailomya-. "Viloma" means that which is antagonistic. "Vailomya" is antagonism. If the party that is vanquished is intellectually honest enough to admit defeat and the unsoundness of the arguments advanced by it, so far the party deserves praise and commendation at the hands of the judges or the Umpires. Unless a person happens to have risen to a high intellectual and cultural level, he will not readily admit defeat. If the disputants are indeed honest enough to admit defeat, it means they are sportsmanlike. Every defeat is a stepping stone to victory in the case of genuinely sportsmanlike persons. The other party which is victorious and which should have contributed most to Truth-determination deserves praise *a fortiori*. But the point of Madhva's observation is that vanquishment may be taken in a laughing sportsmanlike manner or sullen and defiant sneaky manner. If the former be the case, the vanquished disputant who indulges in a good-humoured laugh over his defeat and admits in a sportsmanlike manner that the arguments advanced by the victorious opponent have been sound indeed, is to be complimented by the Umpires. If, on the other hand, the vanquished disputant refuses to admit the validity of the arguments of the victorious opponent and begins indulging in braggadocio, he should be censured merely if the braggadocio is a "brutem fulmen" and meted out some suitable punishment settled by the judges, if the same is too aggressive and intolerable.

"The Jalpa" type of controversy will proceed until one of the parties obtains a decisive victory over the other. The victory of the one and the vanquishment of the other should be decisive and clear. There are six grounds on which Umpires are to proclaim defeat. "Virodha" (contradiction or self-contradiction). 2. "Asangathi" (irrelevance). 3. "Nyooana," (contextual inadequacy or failure to mention that which is most appropriate in the given context). 4. "Tooshneembhava" (silence). 5. "Samvada" (admission of a fallacy detected), and 6. "Adhikya," (jumbling up of matter not required in the given context, or a contextual superfluity—these are technically known as "Nigrahasthanas"—grounds for overthrowing an adversary, and viewed from a different angle of vision, they will serve as criteria to enable the Umpires to proclaim defeat and victory to the parties concerned. Vanquishment of the opponent is the goal in "Jalpa". All is fair

in love and war. Any weapon may be employed to secure victory. While in the Vada type, the parties are anxious to arrive at Truth—in the “Jalpa” type there is no such anxiety. Absence of anxiety to secure Truth determination emboldens the parties. They do not scruple to use freely any weapons they like. Victory of one over the other, is the goal. Victory or vanquishment, Truth-determination is rendered secondarily important and subordinated to dialectical victory. The Umpires are to keep alert. They may have a comparatively easy time in arriving at decisions in the “Vada” type, but in the “Jalpa” type, they will have to be lynx-eyed. The parties are anxious to browbeat one another. They may under cover of honest debate, advance all sorts and conditions of arguments. The Umpires should be alert and follow the arguments accurately through all their labyrinthian windings. Then only will they be able to proclaim victory and defeat and their verdict will have due weight. The Umpires will have to see if any of the SIX grounds would apply to the debate pursued and the moment they detect one, they will announce victory and defeat. Of course, one or more of them may be detected in a line of argument and the greater the numerical strength of the grounds, the greater the weight attached to the verdict of the Umpires.

Granting the arguments had proceeded on the lines suggested, what is to be the disposal of the refractory party? If the party be intellectually honest and amenable enough to admit the validity of the arguments advanced by the opponent and if he be fairminded enough to admit that a particular fallacy or error detected in his arguments is really fatal to his position, then, he should be let off scot free, as the defeat sustained by him in the debate itself would be sufficient punishment of an intellectual kind which is more poignant than any physical or corporal one. If, infuriated by the progress of events leading on to his vanquishment, he should refuse to admit the fallacies are in order and should continue in a perverted manner to bolster up his own arguments and pooh-pooh those of his opponent, he should be suitably punished by the Judges. There are degrees in doggedness and perversity. If the vanquished party be moderate in its perversity and indulge only in a small amount of bravado or braggadocio, mere censure by the president (sabhapathi) or the Umpires “Prasnikas” will quite suffice. If the manifestations of perversity and braggadocio are aggressive and intolerable, the punishment should be correspondingly increased. The entire matter is in the hands of the Judges. They can easily determine by observing the general conduct, demeanour, attitude, exhibitions of emotions, and similar responses of the parties to Debate, if the party vanquished maintains social and gentlemanly relations with those concerned, notwithstanding vanquishment, or gets out of control and becomes aggressive in consequence of vanquishment. The quality of the punishment will depend on the post-vanquishment conduct of the party concerned.



Some contend that the "Prasnikas"—Umpires—have some duties to fulfil, namely, repeating the arguments advanced by both the parties for purposes of clarification (*Anuvada*) and informing them when they feel confused and muddleheaded, which is a correct argument and which a fallacy (*Apratibuddha-bodhana*), etc. and they too are to blame in the event of non-fulfilment of the said duties. X advances a series of arguments and stops at a convenient context. The spectators feel wonder-struck. For their benefit and for the benefit of the other party to the debate Y himself, the Umpires should repeat and recapitulate the arguments and similarly, they will have to recapitulate and repeat the arguments advanced by Y as well. This is "*Anuvada*." Pushing into the focus of attention of the parties concerned a really sound piece of argument and a fallacy, especially when they feel confused and puzzled under the storm and stress of the debate, is also a duty of the Umpires. This is known as "*Apratibuddha-bodhana*." Are the Umpires to blame if they fail to discharge the two duties properly ?

Madhva answers that the Umpires are not above criticism. In any game, philosophic or non-philosophic, the verdict of Umpires is final, but, they are not omniscient and infallible. Failure to recapitulate the arguments of the parties and failure to draw their attention to correct arguments and fallacies, when they feel confused, would not be interpreted as dereliction of the duty of the Umpires. Those who are anxious to haul up the Umpires for dereliction of the said duties do scant justice to the attainments of the participants in the "*Jalpa*" type. They are expert dialecticians. They are well posted up with information in the respective systems of philosophy they intend to champion. They are not likely to be easily caught napping. Where is the necessity for recapitulation of arguments and where is the need for attention of the disputants to be drawn to fallacies and correct arguments by the Umpires ? There is neither the need felt nor the necessity and those that are anxious to blame the Umpires for failure to do their duty do not understand even the fundamentals of philosophical controversies. On the other hand, the Umpires have clearly defined duties which have been explained in an earlier context of the present work by Madhva. Their duties relate to the fixation of the topics for discussion, determination of the merits and demerits of the debaters, etc., and if they fail in discharging them, they may be blamed and a different set of Umpires chosen. A rough analogy perhaps may be detected in the empanelling of a jury. Generally the honesty and integrity of the Jurors are not questioned. In extraordinary cases one or more than one of the jurors may be challenged and if a jury proves to have given a perverse verdict, it is dismissed and a fresh one empanelled. Even so, the Umpires are good and honest folk. If they fail however, in some extreme cases to do their work properly, they may be sent away and new ones chosen. Madhva is quite certain that the two duties fixed upon by some as essential are not indeed so, and failure to discharge them will not entail any

unpleasant consequences to Umpires. They have other clearly defined and settled duties. If they fail in discharging them, it would be then time enough to criticise them. It is well to remember that occasions for the Umpires to be criticised and challenged will be few and far between.

It should not be supposed that for the determination of the vanquishment of a party, a debate should be actually gone through with all the necessary paraphernalia. If the Umpires and judges connected with the verdict are shrewd enough, they can give their decision prior to the initiation of the debate itself. It may come about like this. It was observed before that one of the duties of the Umpires. (Prasnikas) is the fixation of the topics of the debate. Suppose the Umpires want the parties to debate the issue—Is Monism the truth of the matter or Pluralism? By means of a preliminary talk, or by reliable information, or from some *prima facie* absurd remark let fall inadvertently by one of the disputants, the shrewd Umpires can easily find out the intellectual status of the contestants. If they are satisfied that one of them is distinctly and decidedly inferior to the other, what is the use of a debate at all between unequally matched persons? An unequal fight has no place in a philosophic scheme. The Umpires will then straightway declare that one of them is defeated, and put a stop to the debate itself. Every body concerned will heave a sigh of relief and would be saved a great deal of trouble if the debate is thus nipped in the bud.

How can the Umpires be sure of the decided inferiority of one the disputants? Inferiority or superiority can be determined only if the parties are watched during the progress of a debate. How then can a verdict be given before the commencement of a debate? The answer is simple. They will have to be conduct a preliminary examination of the equipment of the disputants before they are declared (for the "Jalpa" and the "Vitanda" types of controversy,) eligible at all. The preliminary examination is of the less sensational "Vada" type. When the parties argue in the "Vada" form just to determine truth, without any consideration of victory or vanquishment their real and genuine equipment can be measured by any shrewd observer. By being made to participate in the "Vada" type, they are put to a preliminary intelligence test as it were, and if they stand it well, they are then declared eligible for the more sensational warfare of the "Jalpa" and the "Vitanda" types. The preliminary Intellectual test (Vidyapariksha) will surely eliminate a number of contestants who may have given their names as willing to enter the lists in fun, spirit of bravado, or sheer fool-hardiness. Proficiency in Grammar, Logic, Meemamsa, should be of a very high order indeed, if the contestants desire to try their strength in the "Jalpa" type. Absence of the required proficiency means *prima facie* defeat. Ineligibility of the contestants for the said debate is itself defeat.

Madhva is quite careful and considerate enough to explain that slips of the tongue, confused expression brought about by fits like the catalytic, and similar interruptions of or failures in arguments cannot be held contributory or leading to vanquishment of the party concerned. Such slips are the effects of conditions over which conscious control is impossible. If any party betrays them, it is not thereby vanquished. Vanquishment to be considered legitimate, conclusive, and genuine should be due to sheer inability to continue arguments further or to utterances flatly contradictory to Truth and antagonistic to the determination of it. No undue advantage should be taken of defects like stammering, or nervousness. It is a common spectacle that experts are sometimes nervous when confronted with a critical audience. Nervousness and confused or illogical utterances due to it cannot so easily be pressed into service to get the Umpires pronounce defeat for the party in question. Madhva wants throughout a perfectly honest and clean fight. Foul play of any kind is to be strictly shunned.

In the Nyaya Sutras, other "Nigrahasthanas" are mentioned. They have been considered in some detail in the "Pramana Pad-jhati" and "Pramana Lakshana" works written respectively by Jaya Tirtha and Madhva, and the latter maintains the view that in conformity with the conclusions indicated in the treatise "Brahma-Tarka"—"Nigrahasthanas"—sets of conditions, or circumstances in a debate that lead on a party to vanquishment are just the SIX mentioned by him earlier in the work. Others enumerated elsewhere are quite capable of being subsumed under the SIX which are irreducible. The SIX are required in the interests of debate. Others are not. It is worth while to remember that there is no special merit or significance in having a long list of "Nigrahasthanas". The longer the list the greater are the chances for redundancy, re-duplication and in short waste of intellectual energy. All intellectual waste is to be deplored and deprecated. It should be prevented and wherever possible a minimum number of circumstances leading to defeat may be insisted upon. (5).

The facts so far mentioned about the progress of the debate of the "Jalpa" species, conditions for proclaiming defeat and victory *et hoc* apply to the other species of philosophical controversy known as "Vitanda". Madhva writes—"Vitandayam-Nyayo Jalpavadeeritah." The conditions and circumstances that govern decisions of victory and vanquishment in the former apply to latter as well. The reasons are not far to seek. Vanquishment of the opponent is the goal aimed at both in "Jalpa" and "Vitanda." Whereas in the actual conduct of the former, both participants criticise the views of their opponents and state their own, in the management of the latter, there are only destructive criticism and demolition

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(5) Nyayasutra —5—2—1. enumerates the "Nigrahasthanas." Madhva maintains that Six mentioned by him would quite suffice.

of the position of the adversary. Debate will continue whether it will be of the "Vitanda" or the "Jalpa" type till the final breakdown of the opponent. Criteria for the declaration of defeat or victory are the same in respect of both. Thus in order to simplify the treatment of the subject, Madhva says that his explanation of the essential aspects of the "Jalpa" type would be sufficient *mutatis mutandis* to give an idea of the "Vitanda" type as well.

Madhva is quite emphatic in his insistence on the economy of thought and expression. Too much thought need not be spent on trifles and trivialities. If thought is so wasted, one would become unfit to think of things of higher ethical and spiritual value. Concentration of thought on the essential is thus indispensable. There is obviously no sacrosanctity attaching to any fixed and rigid numerical strength of the conditions or sets of conditions that bring about vanquishment of an opponent. Economy of thought, and absence of reduplication and overlapping are essential. The six *Nigrahasthanas* enumerated by Madhva satisfy all the legitimate and relevant demands of metaphysical controversy. Madhva concludes the work with an emphasis on the fact that the account of the three types of metaphysical debate given by him is free from all fallacy and error as it is in accordance with the work "Brahma Tarka".

It should not be supposed that this treatise by Madhva has no genuine philosophic significance. Ignorant critics may be of such a mental make up as would naturally blind them to the real significance of Madhva's work. Madhva maintains that nothing need be taken on trust. Unless a system of philosophy or body of doctrine is demonstrated to be in the strictest accord with reason, it cannot compel the allegiance of rational aspirants. It should be noted that free thought and free controversy contribute to a correct determination of Truth. It may just be a friendly controversy between Truth-seekers, teacher and pupil, friends or members of a literary association. One should be permitted to have his or her fullest say in matters philosophical. Stifling of thought and smothering of expression are the bane of philosophy.

Truth-determination is the ideal. The nature of Brahman is the Supreme Truth. An aspirant should clearly understand the nature of the Supreme Isvara and then concentrate his devotional attention on Him. Cheerfully undergoing the strictest spiritual discipline, an aspirant in the fullness of time comes face to face with the Almighty. Philosophical debates have their own value in the scheme of things, intellectual and cultural.

Though Truth-determination is the goal, incidentally dialectical victory is also gained. But the victor is not regardless of the interests of the vanquished. He helps the latter to see the Truth of the matter. But there are occasions, when the parties

will have to stop with victory for one side, and leaving the assimilation of truth to time, concentrate on vanquishment of the opponent.

When certain other exigencies are operative, pearls should never be cast before swine. If doctrinal truths are revealed to them, they will only scoff at them and at him who reveals them. If you teach Caliban language, he will only abuse you. If refractory perverts are taken into one's philosophical confidence and if precious philosophical truths are revealed to them, they will only scoff at them and repudiate them. The best way to deal with such perverts is to silence them by means of a destructive criticism of their doctrines and a repudiation of their philosophy may in the long run bring them back to sanity and sane philosophising.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, it will be seen that Madhva has done a real service to students of Indian philosophy by drawing their attention to the types of metaphysical controversy, describing the characteristics of the eligible participants, Umpires, *et hoc*. If philosophical debates are conducted on the lines chalked out by the Acharya, there will absolutely be no occasion whatever for the manifestation of any bad blood, and truth will be reached, in due course.

Emphasis on metaphysical debates and Eristic disputations shows only a virile intellect that is out to effect discoveries in the realm of thought and spirit. Madhva and his champions are not pugilists!! They are all committed to supreme non-violence in thought, word, and deed. But, then, in matters of philosophy and religion, silence based on an absolute spirit of non-violence is sure to be mistaken for weakness. Hence there is the indispensable necessity for debates and controversies. When it is borne in mind that metaphysical controversies and contests are intended primarily for the determination of Truth and only secondarily for dialectical victory, and when it is further understood that discussions are intended for a revelation of the nature of the Supreme Being, Overlord of the Universe, which would enable genuine aspirants to concentrate attention on Him in worshipful and devotional meditation and ultimately come face to face with Him, Madhva's exposition of the three types of metaphysical debate, "VADA", "JALPA" and "VITANDA", in his work KATHA LAKSHANA will be seen to be strikingly helpful to earnest inquirers, who are pilgrims wending their way towards the Kingdom of God.

### SUMMARY

1. Philosophical discussions and debates are necessary for Truth-determination.
2. Three species of debate "Vada" "Jalpa" and "Vitanda" are emphasised.

3. Madhva expresses disagreement with the treatment of the topic by some of the Nayyayikas, Sri Harsha, and the Buddhists.
4. The characteristics of debaters, Umpires, President, etc., are described in some detail.
5. Philosophical disputations are intended as necessary preliminaries to God-realisation.

## REFERENCES.

1. KATHA-LAKSHANA By Madhva.
2. COMMENTARY ON (1) By Jaya Thirtha.
3. Do. (2) By Raghavendra Swamin.
4. Do. By Vedesa Tirtha.



## CHAPTER IV

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### MITHYATVANUMANA-KHANDANA

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{ Experience is at once the source of all philosophy and is as well the final tribunal or court of appeal to which disputed problems have to be referred for decision and disposal. Even the most exalted and rarefied types of mystic experience are *yet* experience in terms of which alone spiritual truth as also secular could be brought home to the individual. Experience *qua* based on sense-perception is the most reliable and convincing. } The grand edifice of conceptual thought has to be constructed only on the solid and substantial foundations of sense-perceptions and sense-experiences. That the senses sometimes mislead us and give rise to illusory experiences is no reason why they should be permanently distrusted. Either there is something wrong or defective in the sensory-apparatus concerned, or the object apprehended or the mind's interpretative activity altogether misjudges the sense-impressions. Granted the existence of a normally constituted and healthily functioning sensory apparatus and the normal interpretative activity of the mind, there is no denying that our knowledge of the External world or reality obtained by means of sense-organs is true, reliable and valid.

! The Indian Monists, the Advaitins, have developed an adroit central thesis that the world of organised and unorganised matter and spirit is illusory or *Mithya*. The illusory character of the world is sought to be established dialectically on the basis of all the three *Pramanas* examined and explained in the previous chapter. Madhva has pointed out equally emphatically that the stubborn, undeniable and indisputable reality in the fullest and richest connotation of the term, of the universe, (in all its complexity and in all its stages of origin, growth, and decay and degeneration) is grounded on the basis of the three *pramanas* ! } That I suppose is the game of philosophy which is being played almost eternally, a game that has rendered possible all the world over the phenomenon of the opposed and contending parties appealing to the same data for the grounding of their positions mutually exclusive and positively antagonistic! Parmenides mistrusted the senses because he felt that they were responsible for the creation of the illusion of movement, growth, progress, etc., and Heracleitus mistrusted them as he believed the illusion of static phenomena and a static universe,

was engendered by them! Yet we have the sense organs only as the means of knowing aught of the external reality in reference to which alone our overt conduct has to be every moment of existence determined and executed.

Let me explain in the course of the present chapter Madhva's criticism of the Syllogism coined by the Monists to maintain the illusory character of the Universe, a syllogism which is almost a classical current coin in Indian Metaphysics. Commentators and interpreters of Madhva have explained—no doubt for dialectical purposes and exigencies, that the issue should be narrowed down to an examination of the Syllogism in question, for the following reason. The Orthodox Monists maintain that the thesis of the illusory character of the Universe can be supported on the basis of all the three pramanas. Pratyaksha, 2 Anumana and 3 Agama. As a matter of fact however, the thesis is in flagrant contradiction with the pramana of sense-presentation or perception. It would mark the acme of metaphysical pedantry to tell a person toiling for his daily bread shedding a profusion of sweating that the world is illusory and the existence of illusions and hallucinatory phenomena is never a sufficient justification for the generalisation that illusoriness is the characteristic of the world at large. *Exceptio probat regulam*. If the senses turn out to be deceptive occasionally the obvious implication is that ordinarily they yield knowledge of the external reality useful and helpful for practical conduct and guidance in the concerns of life. A wholesale condemnation of the senses and sense-knowledge is bad enough theory of knowledge and worse psychology! Perhaps too it will lead only to the worst form of metaphysics.

Even the most cursory study of the evolution of philosophical theories in the West, is sufficient to convince a truth-seeker that the alleged illusory character of the Universe is the rock on which every variety of Monistic Metaphysics has been shipwrecked. The Eleatic Monism was a miserable failure. Parmenides condemned the senses, yet he found it necessary or at least expedient to account for the origin of the world plaintively remarking that truth's discourse was at an end and that what followed was only mortal opinion! (P. 17 Schwegler). Plato did not succeed in completely repudiating the real and the actual in his anxiety to exalt the ideal. Nor did Spinoza. Kant achieved no better success. His Refutation of Idealism is a monumental puzzle to critics and interpreters. And what then of the Critique of practical reason? What was so strenuously and stoutly denied in the earlier portions of the poem of Parmenides, was subsequently affirmed in the later part! What the Critique of pure Reason maintained was repudiated by the Critique of practical Reason! Bradley, Bosanquet, Bergson and others have not succeeded in demonstrating the illusoriness of the Universe to the satisfaction of the scientific conscience or that of the layman. A philosophical theory which



does violence to the obvious facts of experience can never adequately explain and harmonise the antagonistic claims of science and religion. The world can never be dismissed as illusory, unreal and waiting merely by some one's courtesy for eventual stultification! Such a summary dismissal did not help Parmenides-Plato-Kant-Bradley-Bergson-Bosanquet. It did not help Sankara either.

| Pratyaksha will not suit as a *pramana* for the establishment of the illusoriness of the world. Nor can *Agama*. Scriptural statements being very mobile, volatile and couched in hazy and nebulous terminology can by a slight torture of expressions be made to mean anything so as to serve polemical purposes and fit in with the prejudices and predilections of the disputants. If the Upanishads contain passages which cast a doubt on the reality of the Universe, they also contain other passages which unequivocally affirm its reality, stubborn reality! The benefit of the doubt might well be claimed by either party. Yet consistent system-building and orthodox methodological procedure require that a given philosophical hypothesis should be shown to be based on *all the three pramanas*. The work of the opponent would then be to exhibit his own theory as based on them and expose or exhibit that of his adversary as devoid of *all* support from *any* of the *pramanas*. Such a dialectical device has been adopted in later polemical literature. But Madhva would believe that inference is the essential process as *Pratyaksha* and *Agama* are riddled with inconsistencies which can be multiplied by human ingenuity relative to interpretations of passages and the requirements of real or even artificial exegetics. It is the only process that can compel intellectual assent, the dogged withholding of which would be construed either as an unmistakable index of non-rationality or wilful and deliberate perversity. Influenced by some such considerations as these, Madhva has devoted one of his work MITHYATVANUMANA-KHANDANA specially and exclusively to a refutation of the Syllogism coined by the Absolutists to establish the illusory character of the world. The syllogism runs thus: VIMATAM-MITHYA-DRISYATVAT. This is expressed in the form of an enthymeme as could easily be seen. The Minor term or the subject of the conclusion is the denotation of VIMATAM. That in reference to which a predicate is sought to be established is VIMATAM. It is MITHYA, i.e., illusory. Because it is DRISYA, i.e., it would be stultified or negated or sublated at the dawn of genuine knowledge of Brahman. Though in later controversial literature, *three* grounds for the generalisation (1) that the Universe is illusory are mentioned, Madhva has referred to only one as being evidently the most prominent and striking one i.e., DRISYATVAT. Supplying the missing premises (submerged ones) the full blown syllogism would run thus: 'All that is negated

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(1) If one should adhere to the terms used in Syllogistic logic, *hetu* will indicate the middle term. But the fundamental outlook of Indian Logic is inductive, and hence *hetu* is treated as a ground of generalisation.

at the dawn of and by the attainment of, knowledge of Brahman is illusory. This i.e., the Universe is so stultified. ERGO this is illusory.

Rules of debate or dialectical controversy require that a criticism of inference (Anumana) should be directed first against PRATIJNYA or the preliminary statement of what is sought to be established in reference to a subject; (2) then against the HETU or the ground on which the Universal or the generalisation is founded and then against (3) DRISHTANTA or the reinforcing illustrative particular which exhibits clearly the Universal law or principle embodied within itself, and sought to be demonstrated in a given context.

Accordingly Madhva proceeds to the defects attaching to the *Pratijnya*—the preliminary or opening statement of that which is sought inferentially to be established. If it is maintained that the Universe (VIMATAM) is *Mithya*—illusory, the minor term is hanging in the air without prop and without a support or basis on Terra Firma. With such a precarious status, it simply cannot enter into any intelligible relationship with the predicate at all with which it is sought to be forced into an alliance! On the ground of a sky-lake-born Lotus being also a Lotus just in name (a fantastic instance of reproductive imagination like a thousand legged animal) no inference could lie that QUA being entitled to the name Lotus it should also be regarded as sweet-smelling! The reply is obvious. Such a sky-born Lotus could not be an existential entity with a definite place in a time-space continuum, and hence it cannot have any predicates attached to it other than that of non-existence in a time-space continuum. Similar is the fate of the Universe as well. Another familiar illustration mentioned by the writers is the instance of the son of a barren Lady. It is absurd to infer he is mortal as all men are mortal! The fallacy is obvious. Real and concrete existence of the minor term as an unstultifiable entity (unstultifiable under normal circumstances) in a spatio-temporal series is more or less a postulate and in the absence of such a status, the minor term is simply unfit to enter into any intelligible relationship with the predicate at all. But the opponent is not willing to admit the validity of this fallacy or objection at all. The Universe, he contends is certainly not on a par with the issue of a barren woman, or a sky-lake-born lotus! By the term *Mithya* what is meant is ANIRVACHANIYA, i.e., incapable of description by means of the ordinarily accepted conceptual categories. Madhva would rejoin that there is nothing under the sun which is so ridiculously and unthinkably beyond the pale of conceptual handling. After all experience is conserved and crystallised in conceptual categories. There is no use fighting shy of the inevitable. Without conceptual analysis and description life and experience would be impossible. The *Anirvachaniya* should be regarded as nothing better than a mere shadow and a delusion. The employment of the

term might hoodwink the unwary. Disinterested spirit of inquiry requires that nothing should be surrendered as being incapable of being known and expressed in conceptual terms. The *Anirvachaniya* can at best serve as a convenient cloak or mask for conceding intellectual indolence. To resort to it at any stage of metaphysical investigation is decidedly a suicidally false step. (Faux-pas) A false step once taken can never lead to the real destination should it be followed by another which is perhaps worse.

Madhva's commentators have given two interpretations of the term JAGATHOBHAVAT—splitting up the combination first (1) as JAGATHAH-ABHAVAT and then (2) as JAGATHAH-BHAVAT. According to the first resolving of the terms, the meaning is that on account of the non-existence of the universe in a spatio-temporal series, the minor term is left hanging in VACUO! According to the second the charge levelled is that the opponent stands convicted out of his own mouth by being driven to the admission of a position that radically contradicts his cherished cardinal doctrines! How? BHAVAT has been admitted by the opponents to mean ASAD-VILAKSHANATVAT. *Asat* is the absolutely contradictory and unthinkable in the nature of things. The mare's nest it is. The universe is surely standing on a different footing from that of the mare's nest! If now in the face of such a doctrine held tenaciously, it is said that the Universe is *Mithya* i.e. *Asat*, the assertion amounts to this:—Something which is admittedly different from *Asat* is *Asat*! The same subject cannot at the same time be *Asat* as well as *Asadvilakshana*!

Incapability of conceptual description needs some further comments. The given inference has a pointed inductive reference. At the moment of arriving at the inference that the Universe is *Anirvachaniya*—incapable of description—had it been established on the basis of prior induction or inductions that there exists such a mysterious entity as the *Anirvachaniya*? If it had been, it would have been possible to have made the universal so arrived at, serve as the ground for future or further generalisation and inference. When however the fate of the concept of the *Indescribable* the *Anirvachaniya* itself is hanging in the balance, what justification can be urged for magnifying it into a ground of further inference and generalisations? If the opponent driven from post to pillar should yet contend that *somehow* the concept had already been placed on a secure and substantial foundation, Madhva's obvious reply would be that rational experience nowhere affords any trace of evidence for the existence of anything that lies so confessedly beyond the zone of conceptual description, and yet which is so persistently intruding on the attention of the metaphysicians! Why not leave the recalcitrant category of the *Anirvachaniya*, severely alone and try to focus discussion on issues which could be formulated with the consent and intellectual assent of the disputants or

the debating parties? That has got to be done sooner or later in the progress of metaphysical investigation.

A deeper analysis of the strange and curious halfway house suggested by the Absolutists would disclose the slippery logical ground on which the structure has been erected. No compromise is possible no *tertium quid* and no half-way house between *Sat* and *Asat*. The Law of excluded middle must apply here as elsewhere. Whatever is not *Sat* should be *Asat*. The disjunction is complete. It is exclusive and exhaustive. A non-descript and dubious *tertium quid*, such as the *Sadasadvilakshana* different alike from *Sat* and *Asat*—patently is, could never be magnified into a central doctrine.

*Siddha-Sadhana* or the laborious establishing of that already established is an obvious logical fallacy. If it is sought to be established that the Universe is *Asadvilakshana*—not *Asat*—that is Loves Labour Lost! Madhva and his school admit it. It is tautological to establish it again. Madhva anticipates a possible objection. If mere contrast from the *Asat* is to be established tautology might be alleged, but such a contrast QUA qualified by difference from *Sat* as well, is really what is aimed at. Thus the Universe would gain its phenomenal existence. It is neither *Sat* nor *Asat*. The reply is obvious. A proposition previously established or the difference or contrast from the *Asat* previously established, would never lose its status by being artificially coupled with something not yet established! No two objects are alike. An object X—which is *Sat* is different from Y which is equally *Sat*. Each existent is a *Sat* in its own right and on its own merits. A deprivation of this inalienable right of existence by a stroke of imagination is impossible. So all *Asadvilakshana* must be *Sat*. The Universe is admitted to be such by Madhva and his school. Tautology is therefore unavoidable. (2).

The evolution of the aforesaid Advaita doctrine and its elaborate criticisms in subsequent controversial literature throw a flood of lurid light on the Monistic and Absolutistic bias which by a convenient recourse to degrees of reality seeks to perpetuate an untenable position! The Absolutist in India even as his compeer elsewhere feels bound to do violence to commonsense, science, and to the psychological stand-point (so courageously championed by William James), in his attempts to assign the Universe only a dubious status. The Universe exists persists, endures, evolves and decays, according to ascertained and ascertainable laws of physical

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(2) The Non-descript—the *Anirvachaniya*—is rejected by Madhva. Madhva does not miss even a single opportunity to criticise the concept of "*Sadasadvilakshana-Anirvachaniya*," as it is the foundation of Absolutism. See also chapters on "*Tatavodyota*" and "*Tatvanirnaya*" for criticisms of "*Anirvachaniya*."

and mental sciences, and involves inevitable spatio-temporality. Why not admit that it is perfectly real—*Asadvilakshana*? That is the admission of the scientist and the man of commonsense unsophisticated by absolutist metaphysics. All essence, all reality, all existence, has been monopolised by the Absolute. It is all reign of Being. Becoming should be content with a lesser degree of reality so long as it is tolerated at all, and at the dawn of real insight or the intuition of Brahman, it should be stultified.

A great deal of needless controversy could have been easily avoided if the disputants had agreed to a preliminary settlement of the issue. "What exactly do they mean by the term Reality?" So long as everyone, philosopher or layman, is obliged to come into contact and conflict with the hard and tubbort facts of life and existence, there is not the slightest doubt that the universe, the finite individuals, their effort and endeavour—all should be regarded as perfectly real in whatever sense one might use the term. The moment however the presupposition commences to sway the minds of interested disputants, that nothing but Being, or Brahman could have any reality, the finite universe has to be relegated to a lower status, and is described as possessing only a lesser degree of reality! It will easily be realised that the standpoint from which such an estimate is expressed, is that of the Absolute or the Being—so remote and so removed from the actual realisation and concrete experience of the individual. It is strange how the very existence of the duality of standpoints and its admission do not undermine the very monism and the absolutism in the name of which several acts of omission and commission are performed! If it is easy to admit a duality of stand-points, why not a plurality or multiplicity of stand-points as well about which there is nothing radically inconsistent or illogical? The Advaitin of the East, and the Monist or the Absolutist of the West fight shy of such an admission. (3).

That is the reason why there occurs a persistent refusal to admit what is not ASAT is SAT. The entire trouble can be traced to the point of view of the Absolute Being. The existence and reality of the Universe are patent, and yet the Absolute haunts your vision. Some sort of existence might be granted to the Universe. Reality cannot be. It is the property nay, the monopoly of the Absolute. Only a lesser degree of reality can be assigned to the finite. The universe is neither SAT nor ASAT. It will now be clear why instead of at once choosing one of the alternatives of the disjunction by rejecting the other, the Monist introduces the category of SADASADVILAKSHANA which is

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(3) Two standpoints would surely destroy Monism or Absolutism so long as the pairs—*Paranarthika* and *Vyavaharika*, sense and understanding, pure reason and practical reason, Ideal and the real, sub-specie alternitatis and sub-specie temporis, remain in philosophical parlance, Absolutism or Monism should be bidden adieu.

neither fish flesh nor good red herring! The legitimacy and even the logic of pronouncing a judgment upon the reality of the Universe from a point of view which for ever eludes the grasp of the finite in a tantalising manner, should be challenged. There is something rotten in the metaphysical state of Denmark.

So far then as practical politics are concerned, the Absolute—point—of view lies beyond the reach of the finite. The other view point however is within the reach of all. The adoption of the psychological point of view would ensure the reality of the subject and of the objective universe. What is not *ASAT* would be *SAT*. There would then be no *tertium quid* artificially brought into existence and nervously bolstered up. The assent to the reality of the Universe is inhibited only by the presupposition relating to the exclusive reality of the Absolute Being and not otherwise! When once the mind is freed from the incubus of this presupposition, the ridiculousness of the *tertium quid* would be apparent.

Madhva contends that dialectical rules require consistent adherence throughout the progress of the debate to a particular well-defined point of view so that a constant fluctuation or fluctuation from one view point to another might not render criticisms futile and ineffective. If a criticism be urged from the standpoint of rational experience and the widely accepted laws of consistent thinking, that what is not *Asat*, should be regarded as *Sat*, it is no answer that from some other point of view the Universe is neither *Sat* nor *Asat*! If it be contended that judgments pronounced from the standpoint of identification with the *Elan Vital* or the Intuition of Duration—or the Immersion into the Absolute, would not in any way contribute to the stultification of the reality of the Universe, it would be no answer that it is the only real view point! Science and commonsense would consent to the adoption of the rational, empirical standpoint from which all judgments of logical, ethical and other values have to be pronounced. Placing oneself at the very fountainhead or centre of Duration or the mystic merging into the Absolute might all pass as picturesque phraseology but the interests neither of the practical man in the street nor of the metaphysician could be advanced even a bit by the adoption of the standpoint suggested by Bergson, Bradley, Bosanquet and others, in the West and by Sankara in the East. It is a trite, nonetheless true observation, that the scientist, the philosopher and the commonsense pragmatic man should all have their feet on **TERRA FIRMA** of facts of rational experience.

Judged thus, the concept of *Sadasadvilakshana* itself becomes contradictory. Metaphysical motives should not count! Presuppositions and prejudices should not interfere with the laws of logic. What is not *Asat* would then be seen to be *Sat*. The illusory would be the *Asat*—or more accurately the objectively—non-existent like

the mare's nest—though it could be assigned a sort of mental existence:—would be the *Asat*. The universe then not being *Asat*, would be *Sat*. Such would be the conclusion necessitated by the laws of logic and consistent thinking. But as we have already seen Sankara and the absolutists would have none of it. The reason why violence is done to a conclusion so naturally arrived at and why the consequences of consistent thinking are repudiated is not far to seek. The Absolutistic predilection supplies the reason. The Absolute is the only reality. It is the only *Sat*! It is the only really existent. The universe should *ergo* be characterised with the help of a dubious category—the *Sadasadvilakshana*. It might fascinate a few on account of its outlandish originality. It will not stand the test of logic. The contention that life is more than logic is too jejune. The life or the fullness of life which we all would share someday with or as the Absolute, might be more or less than logic!, but as far as the life of the finite is concerned it has to conform to the requirements of logic as it does as a matter of fact characteristically and spontaneously. Supposing the absolutistic bias is shaken off one would then admit the Universe is as much real as the Absolute.

The compound *Sadasadvilakshana* can be split up into three ways each of which has a different connotation. Madhva has rejected all the three. The term *Vilakshana* means different. *Vilakshanatva* would then be characteristic of being different.

(1) If the compound is made to mean difference from the existent and the real and difference from the non-existent and the unreal, the establishment of the latter laboriously would be superfluous and tautological as the latter difference is admitted by the Madhva school. (2) If it is contended that TWO differences are not sought to be established, but along with the difference of the Universe from the Be-ent, the existent and the real, difference from the Non-be-ent, the non-existent and the unreal as well is to be established, the reply is that the latter being established and admitted long before the birth of the discussion of the present issue, would never forfeit or lose its status QUA established and admitted propositionally embodied, etc., simply by being artificially coupled with the former which has not yet been established as a well grounded and demonstrated universal. Such an arbitrary linkage between what is a proved generalisation and admitted as such, and a provisional suggestion is as illegitimate as it is artificial. (3) If something like a conceptual compound be the goal, so that difference from the non-be-ent, etc., as qualified and interpenetrated even by the difference from the be-ent, etc., might be established, even then tautology dogs the footsteps of the argument. Any given *Sat*—entity—object or existent, etc., is admittedly different from any other SAT QUA entity—existent, etc! the difference is admitted by the Madhva school. Take the universe as it is. It is different from the Non-be-ent. It is also different from the be-ent. How?

There are so many be-ents—existents—or entities each of which is different from the rest. So the syllogistic establishment of this curious conceptual compound i.e., difference from the *Asat qua* qualified and interpenetrated by difference from the *Sat*—Would just amount to a tautology! Madhva's point is this. The realist takes a *prima facie* view of the entities of the universe. They are there—persisting—enduring and progressing. No evidence has been forthcoming for an exclusive restriction of the application of the term *Sat*—the be-ent, etc., to the Absolute. In the absence of such evidence there are as many be-ents as you please. Each be-ent is different from the neighbouring be-ent. There is also the difference of the be-ent from the non-be-ent which requires no very elaborate proof or demonstration. This alternative should be carefully distinguished from the rest. It is a difference—compound so to say! The elements that enter into it having been shown to be nothing new, tautology cannot be avoided. (4) The fourth alternative is to regard the *Vailakshanya* or the difference *not* as a quality of the universe so much, but to regard it as something on which the difference rests but to which it does not belong! The position would then mean a difference between tweedledum and tweedledee !!

( The net result of the discussion would amount to this: One may examine the concept of *Sadasadvilakshana* from any angle of vision—from any point of view—It is inherently and radically self-contradictory. What is not be-ent should be the non-being, and if anything is not non-be-ent, it has to be the be-ent! There is no other go. No artificial half way house or *tertium quid* between the two is logically possible. The absolutistic contention is based on the metaphysical presupposition that only the Absolute is the be-ent, and the universe cannot be regarded as be-ent, though it has to be assigned some be-entness on account of its persistence and stubborn reality. It is the presupposition that is responsible for violence being so willingly done to the logical principle of excluded middle—a law of thought. When once the mind of an enquirer is freed from the incubus of the Absolute alone being the only be-ent, it would be easily realised that one is forced to accept the reality of the Universe, as it is very different from the *Asat*—the non-existent. The *Sadasadvilakshana*—the curious conglomerated concept of “different-from-the-Sat-as-well-as-from-the-Asat” from the be-ent and from the non-be-ent—would then stand revealed in all its patent nakedness of illogicality.

Another outcome of the discussion is hardly less important or significant. It relates to the peculiar point of view from which the illusoriness of the Universe is sought to be established by the Absolutist! That is the viewpoint which considers everything in the blessed cosmos SUB SPECIE AETERNITATIS and pronounces all unreal and illusory. Madhva contends that judgments passed



on the reality of the Universe from a standpoint that it confessedly so remote and hypothetical, could never deprive the Universe of its reality to which it has a natural and inalienable right. The adoption of the view point is so much imagination—ridden that it cannot serve to furnish any reliable or valid criteria by the application of which the reality of the Universe can be effectively overthrown. Nothing is said deprecatory of the view-point as such. It might have to be adopted after all. It might be all (and more) claimed to be by the Absolutists. The objection to its adoption is from the system-builders' concern for the maintenance consistently of a definite methodological procedure. It is obvious such a methodological procedure nowhere involves the adoption of the stand-point of placing oneself at the very centre and the fountainhead of Duration—or identifying oneself with the Absolute! If, after all, the identity with the Absolute is the ultimate goal of all rational speculation, it should be demonstrated and proved even as any other proposition in the thought-realm. To accept its validity *ex-hypothesi*, is a vicious procedure. The opponent might well deny the absolutistic—view-point altogether. There can be no useful discussion about postulates and initial assumptions. But the *onus probandi* obviously rests on those who for whatever reason feel that such assumptions as are indispensable for further system-building—should be tacitly made. In that case too the absolutistic hypothesis of Monism (or the Absolute being the only be-cent) is as good or as bad as the pluralistic and realistic hypothesis of there being many be-ents! Both are generalisations from the data collected from experience. Postulates would prove nothing. Provisional hypotheses are all on the same level of logical validity. One of them is as worthy of acceptance as another. Only demonstration is wanting. The concept of *Sadasadvilakshana* has not yet been proved or demonstrated according to the principles of logic. It is contradictory. It has an inherent element of irrationality. Fall it must on account of its being weighted down. The be-cent view-point has been attached to it like a dead weight!! Sink it must within the sea of inconsistencies and contradictions. No artificial buoy would be of any avail.

So far the question of *Pratijnya*—or the preliminary statement of the proposition to be established was considered. The main discussion has centred round the concept of *Sadasadvilakshana*. Lines of developing other or similar arguments against it can be easily imagined. Madhva firmly protests against the reality of the universe being characterised only as *Vyavaharika*—*Satta*—reality assigned to the Universe for securing an explanation of the ordinary and metaphysically uninitiated man's point of view. It is well to note that ordinarily the question of EXISTENCE QUA relating to a point of time and position in space (existence shared by illusions and hallucinations and all) should be kept apart from

that of REALITY. (4) There are thus TWO terms in use. One is SATTA—which means existence. The other is SATYATA—which means reality. The latter is based on the former. But sometimes the two terms are also indifferently used to signify reality which is the bone of contention. Madhva's protest throughout the discussion is directed against the assignment of a dubious reality to the universe. The question of assigning reality does not arise. Reality belongs to the Universe as of right. Reality is the inalienable birthright of the universe. It is not the monopoly of the absolute. To satisfy the nervous mentality of the man in the street, says the Absolutist, some sort of reality has been assigned to the Universe. By whom? Kant comes to the rescue. By the man himself. Time and space are the forms of perception. The mind confers reality says the Absolutist on the Universe! Madhva would have none of all this. The Universe does not need to be assigned in a condescending manner by any obliging agency only a concessional reality. The Reality of the Universe to be assigned is not a concession to human weakness. Reality is its inalienable birthright. It is as real as the Absolute. Reality does not filter down from the Absolute—the Spinozistic Substance—or the Kantian Ding-an-Sich to the Universe. Such is Madhva's firm conviction expressed in several of his works and subsequently re-affirmed and reinforced by his commentators and followers.

## II

(B) Madhva next proceeds to an enumeration of the fallacies that vitiate the HETU—or the ground of generalisation, or the submerged universal or the system which according to Bosanquet is the ultimate condition of all inference. It is the middle term of the formal Logic. The Absolutist-Monist has mentioned DRISYATVA as the ground of generalisation. In plain and non-technical language the term DRISYA can be rendered into that which appears in obvious contrast with what actually is. It is thus a distinction between appearance and reality is sought esoterically and surreptitiously to be introduced by the Absolutist. He illustrates the idea with reference to the stock example—appearance of silver in the mother-of-pearl; How is one to describe the characteristic of that silver? It is potent enough to make a person anxiously and eagerly bend down to pick it up!! The silver there is characterised as DRISYA. On the ground of its being *Drisyā*, it is maintained to be *Mithya*. All that glitters is not gold. Neither is it silver! It merely appears to exist while as a matter of fact it has no existence. It is therefore illusory. In later controversial literature as well as in the works of Madhva's commentators there occurs a very elabo-

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(4) For a different view, see 'Pramanalakshana.' Objects in illusory knowledge have no existence. "Artha-jnyanayohsattaya-sadrisya-Abhavad-bhrame-arthasyaabhavat," etc. Mandaramanjari quoted in Raghavendra Tirtha's commentary on "Tarkatandaya."

rate and exhaustive examination of the several possible connotations or interpretations of the term DRISYA which need not be considered in the present context. Suffice it to note that throughout the various verbally different garbs there lies the common concept of appearance as contrasted with reality.

It is noteworthy that the psychological aspect of the phenomena of illusions has been fully considered and grasped by the ancient thinkers. An analysis of such experiences would reveal that there is nothing radically or inherently wrong with the sensory stimulus or team of stimuli. Nor is there anything defective in the constitution of sense-organs themselves. Illusions owe their origin to a wrong and erroneous interpretation of the sensory stimuli. The subsequent act of correct cognition or right perception which is bound to ensue when a more intimate contact with the situation results, would stultify the original experience and the illusion would then be dispelled.

Rules of correct and clean debate require an exact determination of the status of the concept of DRISYA. Is this appearance—nature of the Universe itself an *appearance* or a *reality*? There is no use retorting that the question is irreverent or irrelevant. If the concept to be also appearance, one among the many appearances to which we are obliged to fall a prey willy-nilly, (for the minor piecemeal appearances are just the fragments of the huge cosmic appearance) there is very little metaphysical advantage or gain in swearing by it. If on the other hand it can be asserted to be reality—then the Absolutism of the Absolute which is the only reality and the receptacle of all reality—would be seriously jeopardised. The dilemma is quite genuine. Either the conventional concept of DRISYA is phenomenal or real, appearance or reality. If the former, the ground of generalisation itself becomes illusory and unreal. A generalisation based on an illusory ground can never be real. The abandonment of the ground of generalisation would therefore render impossible the inference itself—that the Universe is MITHYA!—phenomenal! (2) If it should be admitted that the concept is real and would serve quite well as a valid ground of inference or generalisation, the Absolutism would be compromised. It will not do to talk self-complacently and glibly of its being only of a lesser degree of reality while the Absolute alone has the fullest and undisputed monopoly of all reality. The admission of the reality of the concept in question would entail the stultification of the central thesis of the Absolutists—that the Absolute alone is real and has the monopoly of all reality! The sharing of reality along with the Absolute by anything else would degrade the absolute down to the level of the finite and cannot hence be countenanced.

The opponent will not so easily concede the genuineness of the dilemma. He has always a ready resource. He would endeavour to wriggle out of the uncomfortable dilemmatic situation by

asserting that the DRISYATVA or the appearance-character of the Universe is ANIRVACHANIYA—indescribable. It has been already pointed out in the earlier portions of this work, how Madhva has carefully discussed the category or concept of this INDESCRIBABLENESS and dismissed it as logically contradictory and pragmatically futile and unworkable. The concept, as the Absolutists would have us understand it, continually recedes from the intellectual grasp and eludes it permanently. An appeal or resort to it at any time for support is bound to be positively disappointing.

Madhva explains that the fallacy is technically known as ASIDDHA. The *hetu* or the ground of generalisation can be neither appearance nor reality. It cannot be brought under the convenient all-absorbent the INDESCRIBABLE—the ANIRVACHANIYA. It is left in the lurch. It is undetermined and unestablished and cannot serve as a ground of generalisation or the basis of inference, Whether one considers the inference arrived at by the Absolutists to be Inductive or Deductive, Madhva's objection holds good. If it be viewed in the light of syllogistic inference the objection would amount to the absence of the middle term itself! No doubt there is the suggestion that something has been offered as the middle term! i.e. DRISYA. It has been shown to be non-existent, and if somehow existent, shown to be undetermined. If it is persistently argued that there is some middle term, Madhva retorts that it is too dubious and ambiguous to serve as the basis of valid inference. The ambiguity makes the present instance a case of QUATERNIO TERMINORUM. If the inference be inductively viewed, the alleged cause does not have anything to do with the effect; It does not transpire it is the genuine cause at all.

(5) The causal relationship can be stultified and rendered nugatory by any of the following concatenation of circumstances. In inductive logic we are familiar with the positive and the negative test-instances. In the former we find the co-presence of the cause and the effect. In the latter is discerned the co-absence of cause and the effect. If a suggested cause should be present in the negative instance from which its absence would be naturally expected, the causal relationship should then be pronounced to be invalid and fallacious. The presence of the suggested cause in the negative instance is technically known as the fallacy of VIRUDDHA. Or sometimes a different interpretation is put on it. HETU is the cause. It is first suggested as a provisional hypothesis. It is subsequently verified and demonstrated through the instrumentality of corroboratory instances involving the co-presence of cause and effect. Madhva's contention is that the corroboratory positive

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(5) While fallacies of illicit Major and Illicit Minor are mentioned in Western Logic, Madhva would like to concentrate attention on an exposition of the fallacies relating to the Middle term as it is the very life of a syllogism. The terms positive-test instance and negative-test instance are freely used as they serve to render clear the nature of the fallacies pointed out by Madhva.

instance can nowhere be found as a knockout blow has been administered on the head of the concept of ANIRVACHANIYA or the Indescribable. If the category of *Anirvachaniya* itself has been left undetermined and indeterminable, how is it possible to find instances in which there would be the co-presence of cause and effect—the Universal and the particular-relationship? Never mind the absence of the corroboratory instances. Let the contention be waived. Still there is a more formidable objection. The Atman is as much DRISYA as anything else. The elasticity of the term is pressed into service by Madhva. Its meaning is “being capable of admission into the relationship termed knowledge or the cognitive subject-object relationship.” By no feat would it ever be possible to exclude the Atman from such an inevitable relationship. The Atman is one. It is the only reality. It is the only be-ent. If the ground of generalisation is found to exist in the *Vipaksha*, (i.e., in those objects to which the major term of the syllogism or the predicate sought to be established could not attach itself) the inference is clearly invalidated. In the terminology of Inductive Logic, it would be seen that the ground of generalisation corresponding to the suggested cause, exists in the *Vipaksha*—corresponding to the negative instance, and thus renders the inference fallacious. The presence of the ground of generalisation in instances not having anything to do with the proposition to be established results in the fallacy technically termed ANAIKANTIKA or VYABHICHARA—overstepping the legitimate bounds of the reciprocity ideal of causation or the ideal of universality or generalisation that is valid under the known conditions of knowledge and thought for all time and for all rational persons.

Madhva advances another argument, and further points out a fallacy that vitiates the ground of generalisation. The Universe which is the minor term of the syllogism in reference to which the conclusion is sought to be established, must itself be considered to be non-existent according to the central doctrine of the Advaitin—the Absolutist-Monist. There can obviously be no rational inference concerning something which is admittedly non-existent! All that is plain to philosophers is the Universe is non-existent. Why then worry about any inference regarding it? That is on a par with engaging in a discussion relative to the validity of an inference drawn to the effect that the king of the castle in the air would soon be crowned! Because he is a king! This sort of a *reductio ad absurdum* would be too much for the opponent. He is sure to protest that the Universe is by no means a castle in the air—The Universe in which we live, move, and have our being! Madhva easily anticipates a protest like that. But the protest is of no logical validity or significance as it is insincere and calculated only to provide a sort of concession to the popular man's viewpoint as the absolutist condescendingly would style it! The Absolute is the only be-ent. To that position the Monist-Absolutist stands committed. There could be no retracing of the footsteps

from it. All reality is the property and the monopoly of the Absolute. So existence as well. All the universe can lay claim to would be reality and existence that belong to the silver in the mother-of-pearl. When so much of metaphysical theory is dinned into the ears of an inquirer, he would certainly feel puzzled as to why any elaborate inference should be drawn and an ornamental syllogism constructed relative to something which does not exist. All philosophy commences with wonder. Evidently it ends with it as well! One might go on wondering till the end of eternity. The Absolutist has no rational explanation to offer. Even supposing the justification urged by the absolutist for assigning a sort of quasi-reality and existence to the Universe is logical, the procedure of the absolutist and his conclusion are quite sufficient to create acute suspicion in the minds of investigators who have not been sophisticated by the harbouring of non-rational and non-empirical considerations and who have not got their own metaphysical axe to grind. The suspicion is merely a prolegomena. It is not a doubt which would partake of a disjunction prior to the actual arriving at a conclusion. The technical fallacy—ANADHYAVALOKANA—arrests the inference altogether. As we have already seen it would be no effective answer to urge that from a higher and more exalted point of view the Universe will have to be regarded as illusory and non-existent. The rejoinder would be clear that no one has any clear and distinct notions about that point of view at all. It would be time enough when one has actually succeeded in installing one-self at the very centre and fountainhead of Duration and at the point of view of the Identity of the absolute and the finite existence, to talk of the non-existence and illusory character of the Universe. Till then there need not be even the slightest hesitation to acquiesce in the reality of the Universe for all purposes, metaphysical ones not excepted! The "TILL THEN" is only a result of the readiness of Madhva and his school to admit the possible justice—if not the justification—of the opponent's point of view.

The Three fallacies pointed out in the foregoing paragraphs relate to the common end achieved by all fallacies. They prevent and arrest the inference. There are however degrees in the matter of efficiency of such arrest and obstruction. Madhva's commentator Sri Vyasaraja explains in the illuminating work—MANDARAJAN—that fault and fallacy would attach to (1) failure to accomplish what has to be accomplished, i.e., in the present instance the establishment of the inference and (2) the accomplishment of quite the reverse and the contrary of what has to be inferentially established, i.e., the inference in a universe of discourse chosen and apprehended as such. In the present instance, the MITHYATVA—or the illusory character of the universe—is to be brought home to the opponent engaged in the debate. The VIRUDDHA is the worst sinner. It was explained that the absence of the confirmatory positive instance (on the employment of the termino-

logy of Inductive reasoning) makes the inference invalid. The obligation to secure and point out such a confirmatory positive instance cannot be repudiated by the absolutist. He can never produce any. If he could the instance in question can be only ANIRVACHANIYA—the indescribable, or the conceptually inaccessible! The category of the Anirvachaniya itself was explained to be the merest mare's nest: Under such circumstances the search for the confirmatory positive instance can be no better than a wild-goose chase or a search after the mare's nest!

The next fallacy explained was ANAIKANTIKA. The very ground of generalisation was challenged. It was given out by the Absolutist as DRISYA. In whatever manner it is sought to be explained, it can with equal propriety and justice be held to apply to the ATMAN as well. ATMAN is precisely the one and the only reality. It is not MITHYA or illusory. That is the position of the Absolutist. When therefore the ground of generalisation is seen to exist in or more accurately when the characteristic (i.e., that which is capable of admission into the relationship termed knowledge) which is considered to be the ground of generalisation is found to inhere in or belong to the ATMAN which affords a clear illustration of the negative instance from which both the ground of generalisation and the Sadhya—the major term to be established QUA related to the minor—are absent, only a tantalising doubt can result. Of the vehement denial by the opponent of the position that the Atman as well is DRISYA, there need be no doubt. But Madhva's criticism amounts to the assertion that the DRISYA—or the ground of generalisation—has not been demonstrated to be the *differentiam* only of the Universe and not of the Atman. So long as no such proof or demonstration is forthcoming Madhva's contention is perfectly valid that as the boundaries of the concept DRISYA have not been marked off its application can quite logically extend to the Atman as well thus rendering the inference liable to grave doubts. In the state of doubt a mental see-saw might be imagined to exist. Should it be conceded that the Atman also is Drisya—it would amount to laying the axe at the very root of Absolutism. Such an admission or concession is fatal, and suicidal. The critics of Absolutism have definitely interrogated why the Atman—the be-ent should not be regarded as *Drisya*. The entire difficulty centres round the concept of *Drisya* itself. The concept can never be defined in such a way as to secure the exclusion of the Atman from the inevitable application of the term. In a metaphysical discussion or dialectical dispute, it would not be possible to advance further than a state of doubt which means arrest of the inference. Some might even prefer a state of doubt. But there is a position worse than that. Driven from post to pillar the Absolutist sooner or later would have to knock his head against it.

Such a line of argument would lead us on to the third fallacy—the ANADHYAVASITA. In a state of doubt at least, several

alternatives would have to be considered, but in the position to which the Absolutist stands committed that the Universe has no real and genuine existence whatever, no inference and no knowledge could be possible. The very foundations having been undermined, the superstructure could have only one well-known fate! In this instance also the contention that the Universe has been assigned a quasi-reality and existence would be strictly and logically unavailing as the concept of ANIRVACHANIYATVA which alone is the last and the first refuge of the Absolutist, has been carefully analysed and shown by Madhva to be (the merest mare's nest) imagination—bred, inconsistent and self-contradictory.

The ground of generalisation—or the HETU—has been shown to be vitiated by three besetting fallacies which have been according to commentators arranged in a descending order of fallaciousness. The *Viruddha*, reaching as it does definitely to the negative instance (or the *Vipaksha*—instances or class of them not only not germane to the establishment of the present conclusion but positively against it), easily tops the list as the most fatal fallacy! (2) The *Anaikantika* is less fatal as it brings about in the inquirers only a state of suspense and doubt. So long as one revolves in his mind several possible and relevant alternatives each of which appears to be equally valid and logical, and so long too as no definitely false and fatal step has been taken, hesitancy is indubitably preferable to decidedly and admittedly erroneous inference. (3) The *Anadhyavasita* yields no pragmatically useful knowledge whatever which would be a determinant of conduct! The Psychological state corresponding to it would be one of blank vacancy and void. There would be no knowledge at all. There is no definitely wrong or erroneous inference. Neither is there correct inference. Neither is there a state of doubt as there are no alternatives equally valid and attention-worthy contending for choice and supremacy. The *Anadhyavasita* stage is significative of just absence of inference. The Absolutist asserts that the Universe is illusory. Madhva contends that as the category of *Anirvachaniyatva* is left indeterminate and undetermined, the only one under which the universe can be brought by the Absolutist—no real and genuine existence worth the name belongs to the Universe and that is why no inference can lie in relation to something not existing. (If at all anything can be predicated of it, it is that it does not exist or it merely appears to be). That is to say other than non-existence on existential import no intelligible predication can lie. This is evidently the least mischievous of the lot of three fallacious vitiating the ground of generalisation.

### III

After the foregoing detailed examination of the *Hetu* or the ground of generalisation, Madhva mentions more fallacies that mili-



tate against the syllogism as a whole. A syllogism can be invalidated and rejected on TWO grounds. (a) If a syllogism happens to be in contravention of or at variance with all the *Pramanas*—guarantors or the authorities—or sources of knowledge or means of correct cognition—it is to be rejected as invalid. (b) Its validity would again suffer if it is possible to construct a counter-syllogism. In the latter case again, a counter-syllogism can be constructed relying (seemingly paradoxically though) on the same ground of generalisation as the original or on a different one. Madhva deals with the fallacies *seriatim*.

However deep metaphysical speculation, and however pure the philosophising, the strictly scientific and methodological procedure would require that the objects or things denoted by the Minor term of the Syllogism, should have been apprehended as members of a *real* spatio-temporal series or order, through the instrumentality of the *Pramanas* discussed in an earlier chapter. How is the minor term at all to be got at? The term and the objects or system of objects denoted by it can be got at only with the help of the *Pramanas*. Sense perception, inference and scriptural knowledge are the *Pramanas* or the sources of correct cognition. These individually or collectively (should such re-inforcement be considered indispensable either for purposes of debate or carrying conviction to the mind of an earnest inquirer), yield knowledge about external reality. It is this external (6) reality which is sought to be proved to be illusory, by the Absolutist. Its existence and reality have been guaranteed by all the *Pramanas*. The standpoint cannot but be psychological. Illusions there might and do occur occasionally when the mind wrongly interprets sensory *stimuli*. Such a wrong interpretation and the illusory experience engendered by it are only the exception and not the general rule of perceptual life and existence. EXCEPTIO PROBAT REGULAM. An exception is not an unfavourable negative instance. It only proves the rule. Perceptual errors prove that normal perception is perfectly valid and true. When once the psychological explanation of illusions and perceptual errors is correctly grasped, it would easily be realised that external reality is genuinely and truly revealed in perception. The experience is not at all illusory. Similar is the case with *Anumana* or inference. The existence of occasional fallacies of erroneous and hasty generalisations only proves the general validity and trustworthiness of inference as a source or means of correct knowledge or of unravelling the hidden Universal. The birth-right of inference as a process of disimplication of the Universal cannot be artificially challenged by any amount of vain and idle metaphysical speculation. The *Vakya* or the *Agama* similarly reveals the nature and characteristics of things which could not otherwise be known.

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(6) Reality is external, exists, persists, endures, irrespective of and independently of the knowing, feeling, and willing subject. Reality for Madhva is not a mental construction.

Supposing in the course of a metaphysical debate it is sought to be maintained that the Universe is illusory, How do they get at the minor term of the syllogism at all? The existence of something which is an ordered whole, a systematic totality, can be demonstrated only by means of the *Pramanas*. PRIMA FACIE the *Pramanas* would convince any one that the spatio-temporal system which the man in the street calls the world is perfectly and stubbornly real. Its reality is no arbitrary imposition from any external agency. Its acceptance is not forced on an unwilling agent by a bureaucratic fiat. The reality is there ever as a birthright. It cannot be denied or challenged by anybody. It is the absolutist who desires to perform the impossible feat of denying the reality of the Universe.

The minor term of the syllogism i.e., the world or systematically connected external reality, has been proved to be real by the *Pramanas*. It is the self-same world that the Absolutist contends is unreal and illusory! How is then an earnest truth-seeker untrammelled by philosophical predilections and unsophisticated by metaphysical pre-suppositions to find his way? No cause has been and could be shown why the *Pramanas* and the help afforded by them should be so summarily rejected in favour of the unreality of the Universe which runs counter to the collective and corroborated testimony of commonsense, science, and the *Pramanas* or the means or sources of correct knowledge. The variance from or conflict with the corroborated testimony of the *pramanas* is a technical fallacy which is termed KALATYAYAPADISHTA. Rendered in less technical and more popular phraseology, the fallacy amounts to this. The predicate of unreality or illusoriness cannot validly attach itself to the Universe. The latter is real. Its reality has been established on the basis of all the *pramanas*. Sense-perception proves the reality of the universe. Inference adds its own testimony. Agama plays the same part.

Madhva anticipates and answers a possible objection. The absolutist might query "What is this reality which is said to belong to the Universe on the authority of the *Pramanas*?" By endeavouring to shift the *onus probandi* on to the shoulders of the Realist, the absolutist might hope to silence his opponent. That is a vain hope. Madhva's commentator emphatically asserts that the reality predicated of the Universe is the same kind of reality predicated by the Absolutist of the one all-swallowing be-ent. The question of degrees is *ultra vires* if not altogether irrelevant. The point of the Realist's or pluralist's rejoinder is quite plain, nonetheless incisive and convincing. Whatever is described to be the nature of the reality possessed by Brahman—the Absolute—the same reality (according to some similar reality) is the inalienable birth-right of the Universe as well. Such a position is supported by all the *pramanas* and considerably reinforced.

A counter syllogism can be constructed with the same *hetu* or the ground of generalisation or with a different one. Madhva gives priority to the former as it shows and exhibits the absolutistic syllogism in all its illogic and hideousness! He who runs may read if the ground of generalisation be so slippery as to make one tumble down indifferently either on the reality of the Universe or on its illusoriness, it should be got rid of at the earliest opportunity. In the present instance the ground of generalisation—DRISYA—is dubious and uncertain. The fairest and the most natural and unprejudiced meaning that could attach to it makes indifferently both Atman and Brahman equally DRISYA! Its restriction or limitation to a narrower field would make it an empty concept. The issue of appearance *versus* reality could not be made to turn round the pivot of the concept of DRISYA. The term cannot be arbitrarily restricted in its application. It can only mean capable of being admitted to the relationship termed knowledge. It is capability to be apprehended by a purposive and purposeful agent or subject. Such a capability is shared alike by Brahman and the Universe. No reasons have ever been assigned why the latter alone is made to share the capability while the former is excluded from it and placed on a sacred pedestal of aloofism. In religion and philosophy, spiritual theory and practice, Brahman is as much intimate *qua* entering into the relationship of knowledge as the Universe. The intimate contact with the Absolute need not be postponed to the stage of mysticism. It is as immediately apprehended and realised as the Universe and its objects in ordinary knowledge—the subject—object relationship. The absolute or Brahman is DRISYA.

The counter syllogism would run thus. *Vimatam*—the Universe (the minor term) *satyam*. *Drisyatvat Atmavat*. The Universe is real. Because it is *Drisya*. The illustrative confirmatory instance is the Atman. This argument would then assume the following form. The familiar illustration of the glittering silver in the mother-of-pearl can be considered. A careful psychological analysis would reveal the following constituent elements that enter into the situation to which the organism is to respond. (1) There is the subject or the percipient agent or the sentient organism that lives the life of a series of adjustments to the environment. (2) There is a total situation to which the organism has to respond and there is a stimulus or a team of stimuli which prominently and strikingly assails the organism. (3) There is the response itself which relieves the organism of the state of suspense and tension and brings about an effective adjustment between the subject and the environment. The response in the illustrative instance is the perception of glittering silver coupled with a greedy subject's stooping down to pick it up. Disillusionment awaits the subject in the next moment. The appearance of glittering silver is due to the erroneous interpretation put on the stimuli by the agent or the subject. So far as the mother-of-pearl is concerned there is nothing wrong

with the perception whatever. If therefore the exceptional circumstances engendering an erroneous interpretation be laid aside, normal perception of the mother-of-pearl is valid and yields knowledge of the thing as it is. Even as the perception of the rope is real, normal, and correct, so is that of the mother-of-pearl. The perception of silver or of the snake is due to the erroneous interpretation of the sensory stimuli. Even supposing it is easy to admit for the sake of argument that the connotation of the term *DRISYA* can be narrowed down and specialised so to make it conform to pre-conceived predilections it must mean an appearance the analysis of which would reveal a perfectly correct set of stimuli and a wrong and erroneous interpretation of them. There is nothing to invalidate the perception as far as the stimuli—aspect is concerned. The erroneous interpretation is an exception which only contributes to prove the general rule of the validity of normal perception. Perception would thus be understood to reveal the characteristics of objects as they are. A system of external reality is undoubtedly the object of perception at every moment of conscious waking life which is a judgment in the magnificently striking language of Bosanquet. *Drisyā* would then be interpreted as meaning that which is capable of appearing in perception or which so appears actually. Normal perception being perfectly valid and its validity implying the reality of the percipient subject, and of the object or external reality, (—a system of objects and things and persons, which persists, progresses and perishes independently of the conscious agent, and the perceptual process—) the *hetu* or the ground of generalisation i.e., *Drisyā* can be pressed into service to establish the counter-syllogism that the Universe is real as it is *Drisyā* i.e., as it is entering into live relationship as an indispensable and inevitable constituent factor with the perceptual process and perception. The construction or offering of the counter-syllogism is technically known as *PRAKARANASAMAH*. Divested of the garb of technical terminology the significance of the counter-syllogism is that as the ground of generalisation is indifferently used (with equal force and validity) to establish reality as well as the illusoriness of the Universe, inference cannot but be arrested.

} A counter-syllogism can be constructed with a different *hetu*—the middle term or the ground of generalisation. The *hetu* is *PRAMANADRISHTATVA* i.e., known and apprehended by means of the *Pramanas*, and guaranteed by their force. The *Pramanas* have already been explained. They reveal new and unknown characteristics of objects or new relationships. The *pramanas* do not lend any support to or countenance the unreality and illusoriness of the universe. If anything were misleading and if it led to false knowledge, it would not be entitled to be regarded as a *pramana* at all. To characterise something as a *Pramana* and assert in the next breath that it is leading or misleading persons only to false and incorrect knowledge, would amount to an unmitigated contradiction in terms. The three leading *Pramanas*

admitted by the Pluralists and Monists alike reveal only the characteristics of external reality as it is constituted and do not victimise the subject by imprisoning him eternally within a panorama of illusory experience. The testimony of the *pramanas* considered individually or collectively can establish only one conclusion that the Universe is perfectly and stubbornly real. If metaphysical inquiry is undertaken by maintaining *ex-hypothesi* that the *Pramanas* are treacherous, there would be no rational justification for embarking on such an admittedly hopeless pursuit of will-o'-the-wisp. The Absolutist must needs admit that no such initial assumptions can be entertained without serious injury to the quest after Brahman. The disputants and dialecticians, monists and pluralists, realists and idealists, metaphysicians and men in the street should all conduct their deliberations in the strictest conformity with the *Pramanas*. It is certainly ridiculous to forswear them. They are unanimous in demonstrating the reality of the Universe. The unreality and illusoriness are sought to be established by the Absolutist from a point of view of which he himself does not possess any clear and distinct notions. If that exalted view-point is kept in the background, (for its use and methodological significance are highly doubtful if not altogether nothing), the *pramanas* would establish only the reality of the universe and not its illusoriness. A counter-syllogism can thus be constructed in support of the reality of the Universe—the middle term being PRAMANADRISHTATVAT. Anything that is revealed and guaranteed by the *Pramanas*, should be pronounced to be real. With the construction of this counter-syllogism Madhva's criticism of the *hetu* or the middle term of the syllogism of the Absolutists establishing the unreality and illusoriness of the Universe, comes to an end.

#### IV

The DRISHTANTA or the confirmatory illustrative instance is next taken up for criticism. What is the illustrative instance? SUKTIRAJATA—The silver glittering in mother-of-pearl. TWO objections can be urged against the illustrative instance. It can be urged that the illustrative instance has been divorced from the *hetu* or the ground of generalisation. (2) Or the illustrative instance can be shown to have nothing whatever to do with the SADHYA—the predicate to be established in relationship with the minor term of the syllogism. In a word, the major term (indicated feature) is divorced from the illustrative instance.

Madhva considers the latter case first. What is the characteristic of the glittering silver? The Absolutist would be driven to the admission that it is as usual ANIRVACHANIYA, i.e., the indescribable. Neither *Sat*, nor *Asat*. It has already been proved that the concept of ANIRVACHANIYA itself is illogical and riddled with contradictions. The instance on the other hand is capable of a correct

description and analysis. It is not indescribable. The illustrative instance, far from supporting the conclusion of the unreality and illusoriness of the universe, would only establish quite the reverse of it! That is the inevitable nemesis of the absolutist. An artificial and verbal repudiation of the nemesis would not save the Absolutist from the illogical and contradictory situation in which he finds himself. He thought that any case of ordinary perceptual illusion would suffice as a peg on which the pet theory of the illusoriness of the universe could be hung. It will not do. Resort to perceptual illusions with a charming naivete—albeit metaphysical—would not mend matters. The mother-of-pearl is perfectly real. The awareness of the glittering silver is due to an erroneous interpretation of the sensory impressions or stimuli. It would be the height of philosophical pedantry to maintain that the awareness of an external reality ordered and systematic, enduring and persisting, progressing and perishing independently of the percipient agent is due to an erroneous interpretation of the sensory stimuli. If it is still doggedly sought to be maintained that the awareness of the cosmos is the outcome of wrong and erroneous interpretation of the sensory stimuli, the only effective answer is that the alleged wrong interpretation is never subsequently stultified in the light of corrected perception. It would be idle to contend that the stultification is bound to occur the moment intuition of Brahman or the Absolute bursts forth into incandescent mysticism, or mystic effulgence. The realist would rejoin that nothing so far is yet known about the intuition of the Absolute and the resultant stultification of the wrong interpretation of empirical and sensory data to which the cosmic show can be traced. The stultification therefore has to be abandoned as lying beyond the pale of practical politics. Madhva's conclusion is this. The *Drishtanta* or the illustrative instance is divorced from the *Sadhya* or the predicate to be established in relation to the subject of the conclusion of the syllogism—the minor term. The divorce, undermining as it does the value and position of the illustrative instance, affects the syllogism adversely. (7)

Similarly Madhva shows that the illustrative instance is divorced from the *hetu* or the *Sadhana* or the ground of generalisation. The *suktirajata*—the silver in the mother-of-pearl—is not *drisya* in the sense required by the Absolutist. The silver as a matter of fact is nowhere! Or from another angle of vision, it is in the shop of the silver-smith! It has no real concrete existence in the experience cited in the illustrative instance. Only the piece of mother-of-pearl is directly present to the sense-organ, i.e., vision. Only the visual impression is wrongly interpreted by the mind working under the influence of misleading resemblance. The silver ergo as a real entity does not figure as a constituent element in that type of experience. It is not *DRISYA*. The fallacy is technically

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(7) The fallacy indirectly affects syllogistic inference because, it has been stated in terms of inductive inquiry.

termed SADHANAVIKALATVA. The *Drishtanta* i.e., the illustrative instance is described to be the *Sadhanavikala* i.e., bereft of or divorced from the *sadhana* i.e., the ground of generalisation. This and the previous criticisms have been urged by Madhva in strict conformity with the dialectical convention. Unlike its Western confrere Indian logic is never confined within the narrow and artificial limits of formal syllogistic treatment. Neither prominence nor importance is assigned to a formal treatment of the subject. That is why it is obligatory on the part of the disputants to show that the inference they draw should be supported and reinforced by material instances and particulars. No inference will be accepted unless it is shown to be supported by an illustrative instance. The *Drishtanta* is thus made to occupy a significant place in the establishment and demonstration of a generalisation. *Drish-tantasiddhi*, the absence of illustrative confirmatory instance, is a serious fallacy.

Madhva has shown that the *Drishtanta* alleged by the Absolutists would fail of its purpose. It would not be competent to establish the validity and trustworthiness of inference. Two reasons have been advanced as explained in the foregoing paragraphs. (1) In the first place, the illustrative instance is divorced from the major term. (2) Secondly, it is further divorced from the *Sadhana*. That constitutes a sufficiently striking *reductio ad absurdum*. If the illustrative instance itself has been shown to be divorced both from the *Sadhya* and the *Sadhana*, it can never establish the validity of the inference of the absolutist that the universe is illusory. In a word, the confirmatory instance chosen proves to be just a random particular haphazardly pitched upon, but not (as the conditions and requirements of scientific procedure would demand) selected after careful analysis.

In Indian Logic the fallacy termed UPADHI is believed to be the most fatal. The stock illustration is usually described thus. The natural inference is drawn wherever is smoke there is fire. Suppose the inference is drawn there is smoke wherever is fire. Exceptions are immediately springing to one's mind. The generalisation regarding the presence of smoke universally as a concomitant of fire is vitiated as the smoke is generated by wet fuel! ARDRENDHANA SAMYOGA IS SAID TO BE THE UPADHI. The presence of wet fuel is the cause of smoke and as it cannot be universalised, the inference becomes invalid. The presence of smoke being conditional on the occurrence of a special concatenation of circumstances i.e., the contact with wet fuel, no universal generalisation can be drawn that wherever there is fire, there is smoke too! The existence of a special and narrow concatenation of circumstances which brings about a particular effect which might have a semblance of universality, cannot be ignored and a general inference cannot be drawn as if no concatenation of special circumstances existed. When an adequate analysis of the instance in question has convinced that

the smoke is the result of the presence of wet fuel, no valid inference would lie covering up and extending to those instances as well which have nothing to do with the special concatenation i.e., wet fuel! The *vyapti*, or the universality of connection is frustrated and vitiated, when it is shown that the *hetu* is not universally operative at all. There might be instances in which fire indicates the presence of smoke. They fall under the category of special concatenation. The causal universal has really flown at a tangent. Instead of helping on the establishment of a universal and permanent connection between fire and smoke, the connection rather is established between smoke and contact of wet fuel with fire! That is the net result achieved by the Upadhi. In other words, the point is this. The moment thought is deflected from the ordinary channel and is made to centre round a special concatenation, it is the latter that occupies for the nonce the focus of logical consciousness. The special concatenation might point (as it is bound to) the way to a new generalisation. In the present instance, the new generalisation reached would be wherever wet fuel is brought into contact with fire smoke results. Fire-cum-wet fuel and smoke have a sort of universality or universal relationship between them. But what of the original inference itself? It was 'smoke because fire!'. The advent of wet fuel has clean cut through the alleged universal relationship between the two. Fire, ergo smoke involves a palpable *non-sequitur*! The wet fuel is the apple of discord. It is the disruptive agency. It has proved the original inference to be fallacious. While therefore the existence of a special concatenation of circumstances would explain the invariable concomitance of two phenomena, the said concomitance would not hold good if it is extended beyond the limits of the said concatenation. Such an illegitimate inference is a very common outcome of the innate tendency to hasty generalisation.

Madhva explains that the syllogism of the absolutist, VIMATAM-MTHYA-DRISYATVAT. (The subject of debate i.e., the Universe is illusory—because, it is stultifiable appearance) is vitiated by the Upadhi, PRAMANA-VIRUDDHATVAM. The universal connection (or the generalisation) sought to be established between the universe and illusoriness is a fallacious one as it can be exhibited to be due to a narrow and special grouping or concatenation of circumstances. The term *Pramanaviruddhatvam* means contradictory or opposed to the *pramanas* the sources, means and guarantors of valid and correct cognition. The logical value and validity of a generalisation should suffer in proportion when the latter is made or shown to be dependent on special circumstances and concatenations which could not be (in the nature of things,) expected to be universally present. It has already been pointed out that the mischief is everywhere due to an erroneous interpretation put by the mind on sensory stimuli which is neither as a matter of fact universal nor capable of artificial universalisation. In the next moment and on a closer and careful



analysis of the situation to which the subject reacts or responds, disillusionment is bound to dawn. The *Viparita-pramana* would block the inference. What is the *Viparita-pramana*? What is the special concatenation which a *la wet-fuel-cum-fire* combination arrests the assertion of universal connection between two phenomena? Smoke is actually generated only when wet fuel is in contact with fire. So the universalisation that wherever is fire, smoke also is, becomes wrong, and fallacious as the special concatenation of wet-fuel-contact cannot be universalised. In the present instance, Madhva carefully explains with penetrating insight that *pramanaviruddhatvam* is the special concatenation which would invalidate *in toto* the inference relative to the illusoriness of the universe. Liability to enter into an illusory piece of knowledge as constituent element and liability to subsequent stultification after the dawn of disillusionment—would be the nearest approach in English to Madhva's *pramanaviruddhatva*. Madhva's contention amounts to this: No universally valid inference can be drawn that whatever is appearance is illusory. The appearance-aspect of it is in respect of the silver of the mother-of-pearl. The silver-appearance is due to erroneous interpretation put by the mind on the stimuli from external reality. Sooner or later disappointment is bound to arise with the inadequacy and unsatisfyingness (as James would say) of the situation. A need for deeper analysis would be keenly felt. Thoroughgoing analysis would reveal that the silver is mere appearance. The mother-of-pearl is the reality. The latter is the knowledge which stultified the original that there is silver. The stultifying knowledge is technically termed by Madhva the *VIPARITAPRAMANA*. The special concatenation of the wrong interpretation of the sensory stimuli, justifies the characterisation of the silver in the mother-of-pearl as illusory. But the concatenation cannot be universalised. Brahman is not subject to be drawn into any such knowledge as a constituent element. In Brahman one notes the feature of being subject to non-stultified knowledge. That is the characteristic of the be-ent. The operation of the fallacy is usually described in the following terms (in terms of definition):—Upadhi is said to be 1. *Sadhya-vyapaka* and 2. *Sadhana-A-Vyapaka*. It is present wherever *Sadhya* is present and absent from the instances in which *Sadhana* is present. Illusoriness of the world or *mithyatva* is the *Sadhya*. *Pramana-viruddhatva* is present wherever you have *mithyatva* i.e., false and erroneous interpretation of the sensory stimuli followed by a subsequent re-interpretation of the erroneous knowledge and the dawn of correct apprehension. The former is the first—*pramana*, and the second the *viruddhapramana*. 'This is silver' is subsequently stultified by 'this is not silver.' The *pramanaviruddhatva* is absent from the instances which are *drisya*, like Brahman. The be-ent, unlike the silver in the mother-of-pearl, is the object of a single type of non-stultifiable and non-stultified knowledge. It is *drisya*. But it is not *pramanaviruddha*. Nobody first mistakes the be-ent and then affirms the real be-ent once misapprehended

has now been correctly cognised ! The illusoriness therefore wherever it exists has its *raison d'etre*, only in the liability of certain sensory stimuli to be interpreted erroneously for known reasons. Such liability would mean the occurrence of special phenomena under a special concatenation of circumstances. Even at the risk of repetition, it is worth pointing out that conditions of psychological illusions and perceptual errors are not capable of arbitrary extension to all phenomena indifferently. One must perforce fall back upon scientific analysis. The perceptual errors would then appear as the outcome of wrong interpretation of the stimuli. The moment it is realised that the wrong interpretation is responsible for the illusory experience, the real significance of the experience and the situation would be clear. It is a hard nut to crack doubtless. But a little philosophical and psychological reflection would suffice to induce conviction. Once this is realised the reality of the universe would follow. Reality is the general rule. Every phenomenon of the universe (the external reality) is to be considered real in its own right and on its own merits. There is no use of the quibbling whether the external reality appears to be something which it really is not. Knowledge is capable of apprehending and grasping the characteristics of the external reality *as it is*, and the nervous feeling is unjustifiable that after all one is subject to a huge cosmic victimisation and that what is apprehended by knowledge is merely a faint and inaccurate copy of something—some *Noumenon*—which must for ever elude the grasp of finite human intelligence.

The *upadhi* is really the clinching argument against the acceptance of the absolutistic theory of the illusoriness of the universe.

Madhva's commentator puts the matter in a nut-shell. Experience is not merely the starting point but also the final court of appeal in all cases of doubts and difficulties that assail inquiring minds, laymen as well as philosophers. How is a decision to be arrived at in cases of doubt whether a piece of experience and the objects that enter into it as constituent elements are or are not real ? The criterion will have to be entirely pragmatic. The Indian pragmatism may not exhibit any point for point correspondence with the European, but in essentials they are not so alien and different from one another. Man is not a measure of all things so much as man's experience. In the determination of the reality or the illusoriness of a thing, the subject's experience is the only valid criterion as the absolutist also swears by the experience he has at heart of a sudden onrush of spiritual energy and intuition of duration. Experience exhibits instances of wrong and erroneous interpretation of sensory stimuli. The error is not permanent. It would be removed and got rid of at the earliest opportunity. The test is pragmatic. The illusory experience acting as a stimulus would prompt a particular line of activity in pursuit of which the subject's volitional forces are mobilised. What is the result ? The

subject is greeted with bitter disappointment in all instances of illusion. A rope is mistaken for a snake! Subsequent experience makes the subject disappointed. Disappointment is used to denote technically the state of mind of one confronted with divergence between anticipation and achievement, between expectation and realisation. A fragment of mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver. One stoops to pick it up! Disappointment is keen. When would the subsequent disillusionment exactly dawn is a question to which a ready and offhand answer cannot be returned. The time-factor involved is uncertain. In Pathological instances, the disillusionment might be indefinitely procrastinated! Normally it will follow quickly the illusory experience after some analysis of the situation. The analysis would achieve a twofold purpose or object. It will establish the illusoriness of the silver. It likewise establishes the reality of the fragment of the mother-of-pearl. An appearance due to a wrong interpretation of sensory stimuli, when the sensory apparatus remains functionally intact or out of order as the case may be, and the subsequent realisation that a maladjustment to the situation was due to a wrong interpretation of the sensory stimuli, are the criteria of illusory experience. Judged in their light, the universe cannot be characterised as illusory at all. At no time is the experience of universe stultified. The non-stultification by subsequent experience is the only valid criterion of reality. It is easy at this stage to anticipate the absolutist's contention that at the dawn of knowledge of Brahman the universe is stultified. Madhva's answer is that there is not an iota of evidence in support of such a view. The universe is never stultified. In the fitness of things, no one says that the perception of the universe is due to a wrong and erroneous interpretation of sensory stimuli, or any stimuli. Such an experience is beyond the rational ken. Neither introspective nor experimental testimony would support the view of the absolutist that the universe is illusory. The issue is therefore between stultification and non-stultification. The realist maintains that at no time is the experience of universe stultified and rejected as illusory. That something mysterious happens at the dawn of knowledge of Brahman or the Absolute and that such knowledge is of a uniquely potent nature and capable of producing the stultification of the universe (what exactly is the stultification has never been explained by the absolutist) could not be regarded as sufficient justification, as such stultification, even granting its possibility for the sake of argument, accords neither with sound psychological theory nor with rational reflection.

The Cartesian criteria of clearness and distinctness of perception have never been repudiated nor superseded. Times without number Madhva and his commentators have explained that the existence of perceptual errors and illusions is not sufficient to invalidate correct normal perception and reality of the objects of external world severally and external world as an organised system of men

and things, of relations and concepts, etc. All the three *pramanas* support the reality of the universe. It is deplorable philosophic pedantry to maintain that what the *pramanas* reveal is only a cosmic fraud !

The *Upadhi* pointed out by Madhva would effectively silence all opposition. Suppose there arises a doubt regarding the reality of a system of men and things—of the universe in general. If an experience is subsequently stultified the stultification is sufficient evidence of its illusoriness. (The silver in the mother-of-pearl fragment.) Non-stultification, persistence, and endurance as a common source of reference to all creation and as a common environment amidst which sentient existence has to be, are the criteria of reality. The universe is never stultified. Just as at the dawn of knowledge after a careful analysis of the instance, the silver is stultified as embodied in the reflection and judgment. "This is *not* silver" one might expect a stultification of the universe itself. But the expectation is foredoomed to non-realisation. It is based on false or unsound analogy. No amount of abstract analysis or concrete procedure or incandescent intuition would ever stultify the universe as a whole or systematic totality. That the universe is never subjected to a *viparita-pramana* is the solid and substantial groundwork on which all Realism is firmly grounded and established.

Madhva concludes the work under discussion with the presentation to his readers of something like a glossary so that there might not be any confusion about the connotation of the terms used. The terms should all be used and understood in the same connotation throughout the discussion lest any change or shifting to suit the controversial exigencies of the parties should render all debate and discussion futile.

**PAKSHA**—It is *Sadhya-dharma-visishta*...It is the minor term of the syllogism in reference to which a predicate is sought to be established. By a methodological generalisation the *paksha* can be considered to be the pivotal point round which all inference centres.

**SAPAKSHA**—It is *Sadhya-samanadharma-visishta*. It is an instance confirmatory of the inference. In inductive-logic-terminology, it is the confirmatory positive test-instance.

**VIPAKSHA**—It is *Sadhya-viparitadharma-visishta*. It is an instance about which the contradictory of the original major term has been predicated. In the terminology of inductive logic it would be the confirmatory negative test-instance.

**PRATIJNYA**—It is *Paksha-vachanam*. It is a preliminary statement that a particular predicate is going to be established in reference to the minor term.

**HETU**—It is *Lingam-Vyaptibalena-arthagamakam*. It is the ground of generalisation. By right of and in virtue of invariable and unconditional concomitance it helps the formulation of a general principle, or a universal law. It is the syllogistic middle term.

**DRISHTANTA**—It is *Nidarsanam*. It is the instance in which the given universal can be shown to be concretised. It is the illustrative instance. The difference between the *sapaksha* and *drish-tanta* is obvious.

#### SUMMARY.

1. The syllogism used by the absolutist to establish the illusory character of the universe is faulty in various respects.
2. The minor term of the syllogism itself is a castle in the air.
3. The futility and the impossibility of the concept of *Anirva-chaniya*—the indescribable—the mysterious Mrs. Harris of the absolutist—invalidates the ground of generalisation.
4. The illustrative instance is faulty and does not serve its purpose.

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## CHAPTER V

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### UPADHI KHANDANA

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The absolutist all the world over is an ingenious person. He is ready. He is resourceful. It becomes incumbent upon him to explain how the Absolute ever became degraded into finite existence. It is all a matter of words. One might protest it is illogical to talk aught of the degradation of the Absolute. Another might contend it is positively irreverent. No play of sentiment should have sway. Strict metaphysical speculation alone should be the determinant. Bergson was faced with the same difficulty. The ELAN, he said, somehow was interrupted in its onward progressive march, and such interruption is the creation of matter, of all finite existence. Who can forget his delightful definition of matter as the "EXTENSION OF THE DETENTION OF THE TENSION"? The talk of values relative to the all-consuming and all-absorbing Absolute, must cease. Whether the Absolute is degraded or interrupted, or its smooth progress arrested and obstructed, it is clear that something must happen to it before it could interpenetrate all reality as the only substance. Unless an admission is made to that effect, it cannot be maintained that the Absolute is the only reality. One standing external reality there is in the sense of an environment to which the subject has to adjust himself. There are realities in the sense of various objects and things existing and persisting independently of the knower and the process of knowledge. In the face of it all how is it possible to assert that the Absolute is the only reality? A subterfuge is the only remedy. The Western philosophers talk of degrees of reality. The absolute is the only reality. Others are real only in a lesser degree. That is the fad or the ipse dixit of the absolutist. (1) Is this based on a difference in degree or kind? The answer should be (as the very expression degrees of reality suggests), it is only a difference in degree. Should there be no difference in kind, how is one to explain all discrepancy, contradiction and discord in the world to the satisfaction of rational speculative consciousness? It stands to reason that finite existence should not have sustained such a severe and deplorable fall from the eminence which according to the absolutist is its birthright in virtue of its identity with the Absolute. The fall

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(1) Degrees of reality are believed to exist on metaphysical instinct and, only bad reasons have so far been assigned in support of them. To Madhva however, every degree of reality is as real as the Absolute Itself.

should be explained adequately. The identity is not practical politics. It is a pious wish or a fond hope. Yet if the identity be the pivotal doctrinal point of the absolutist, empirical consciousness (that is the only one known to us) could not perceive such glaring difference between the Absolute and the finite on the one hand and among the members of the finite realm itself on the other. The difference, the disparity and the discrepancy, cannot be so unceremoniously and summarily rejected as illusory and unreal when cant, conflict and contradiction in the lay as well as the philosophical realm can be traced to them without fail.

One need not wait for the critic to supply the necessary stimulus for clear and consistent thinking. No one is more keenly alive to the difficulty of explaining the finite existence and yet maintaining intact and unsullied the exclusive reality of the Absolute than the absolutist himself. The Indian Absolutist in his own way has endeavoured to account for finite existence. The problem was left rather vague by the Western thinkers. Where an answer has been advanced it is not quite consistent and satisfactory. Parmenides spoke of finite existence and universe, etc., as a concession to popular opinion. (It has never been fully and convincingly explained why the philosophers should evince such anxiety to conform to popular opinion as a sort of concession, instead of severely leaving it alone in case they had the courage of conviction that popular opinion would never grasp metaphysical problems and their significance.) In the earlier portion of his POEM, he spoke of philosophy and in the later he said that truth's discourse was at an end and that he would speak of the popular notions, ideas and things. Heraclitus did not succeed in establishing the absolutism of becoming and relegating all being to the realm of the illusory. Plato achieved no better success. He left unbridged the permanent gulf he created in his system of speculation between the ideal world and the real. In modern philosophy the Spinozistic attempt to hark back to the Eleatic Being which appeared re-christened as the Substance fared no better. The reduction of all finite existence to the modes of the substance was an impossible feat. Kant found the greatest difficulty in reconciling the opposition and antagonism between the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds!! "EMPIRICALLY REAL" and "TRANSCENDENTALLY IDEAL" were doubtless stunning expressions with a great deal of metaphysical sound and fury but harsh as such comment might seem, they signified nothing! Bergson again encountered a like difficulty. The *Elan* had to be interrupted so that *Elan* and matter might co-operate for the creation of the cosmos!! Who or what would so obligingly interrupt it? Bradley and Bosanquet have always sworn by the Absolute. Notwithstanding the efforts of such acute and mighty intellects to rehabilitate it, the Absolute has been crumbling out of man's understanding.

The Indian Absolutist is no exception to the general rule. The central doctrine of his system is **AIKYAM**, or the essential and

fundamental oneness and identity between the soul and the Universal Spirit. The identity and oneness are not easy to demonstrate. Experience points quite in the opposite direction. The finite and the Infinite, the individual and the Supreme or the Universal soul, are so radically opposed to one another. They are at the very antipodes of one another. The individual is finite, imperfect, unhappy, ignorant; while the Universal Spirit is infinite, perfect, happy and omniscient. The texts of the *sruti* on which unlike his European comrade, the Indian absolutist relies proclaim in no unmistakable terms the omniscience, omnipotence and the omnipresence of the Universal Spirit. The individual on the other hand is quite the reverse. How is it possible to conceive of any fundamental identity between the two? The Indian absolutist, to whom oneness of the individual and the Universal is the chief plank, is hard put to it to explain such oneness or identity. The misery, failure, pain and evil and all the concomitants of finiteness are perfectly incompatible with the oneness of the individual and Brahman to whose essential nature the concomitant marks of finitude are so foreign and alien. How then is any identity to be thought of and methodologically established between the two?

The position of the Indian Absolutist is thus summed up by Madhva's commentator in the work under elucidation—the *Upadhi-Khandana*. There is nothing wrong or illogical or inconceivable about the identity or the oneness between the individual and Brahman. There is only one reality—only one Substance. The finite soul is Brahman. On account, however, of the ignorance of the real nature of this oneness or identity the individual becomes subject to pain, misery, suffering and all the concomitants of finitude and imperfection. The moment ignorance is removed by an incandescent intuition of Brahman or the Absolute, the individual would have realised his identity with the Absolute. The realisation is the goal of life. It would lay the axe direct to the root of sickening recurrent cycle of births and deaths. With a view to securing such a realisation, an earnest quest after the nature of Brahman should be undertaken by spiritual aspirants. The quest after the Absolute is technically termed *Brahma-jignyasa*. A study of the Vedanta is undertaken in order to achieve the realisation. Evil (henceforth that is the term used for all concomitants of finitude) is the result of ignorance. We are fallen angels. We were identical with the Absolute. Why WERE? We even now are. The individuals suffer from a sense of isolation, separation and disparateness which is due to ignorance. Life is a preparation. It is a magnificent harnessing of the spiritual resources of the individual with a view to realising the identity between Brahman and itself. A study of the Vedanta would reveal the root cause of the disparity and difference. It is ignorance. Ignorance should be got rid of. The incandescent intuition would reveal the identity between Brahman and the Jiva. A study of the Vedanta leads to positive as well as negative results. The riddance of ignorance would fall under the later. The dawn



of the incandescent intuition and the realisation of the identity between Brahman and the Jiva would come under the former. A study of the vedanta is thus obligatorily enjoined on all aspirants.

The crux of the problem is the oblivescence of the individual in the matter of the identity between Brahman and himself. The oblivescence is the outcome of enveloping ignorance. The ignorance is rendered possible by UPADHI. Madhva has devoted a separate *prakarana*—an independent minor treatise—to a detailed discussion of UPADHI and its repudiation. The work is called UPADHIKHANDANA which forms the title of the present chapter.

The Indian Vedantin is always strictly guided by considerations of rational and enlightened pragmatism. If a body of textual literature is to be regarded as sacred, and its sacrosanctity preserved, it should be capable of imparting the highest type of knowledge. Such a body of doctrine need not be studied at all if a study of it were to prove a mere race after will-'o-the-wisp. Similar is the case with metaphysical speculation. Why should it be undertaken at all? Who wants it? For whose benefit is it intended? What is the gain that is expected of it? Unless some satisfactory answers are forthcoming, there would be little or no stimulus for any one to undertake metaphysical investigation at all. Of course, the professional metaphysician or a professional teacher of text book philosophy or a University Professor—even as the professional politician—writes about god, freedom and immortality when he sees contemporary markets can find a demand for his books! He is not the real and genuine Vedantic ADHIKARI. A real and genuine *adhikari* has nothing to do with a professional book-maker who might write on metaphysical investigation. On the other hand a genuine *adhikari* is one who feels inwardly the call to undertake metaphysical quest, and who has fully realised the futility of the *vanitas vanitatum* of life and its material enjoyments and possessions. The Vedantic *Adhikari* is born and not made. Everyone is not and cannot aspire to be one. As the result of cumulative effects of the good and virtuous deeds done in countless past lives, one becomes a genuine *Adhikari*. James was to a certain extent right when he said that a particular temperament is responsible for making one a philosopher! *Adhikara* or fitness or eligibility to undertake the duties and responsibilities of spiritual existence and a higher life, is not a matter of temperament pure and simple. If it were, it would be the easiest thing in the world to manufacture as many *adhikaris* as possible by proper conditioning, by the introduction of favourable environments for different temperaments to thrive in. (2) The indifference and the studied, deliberate cold neglect with

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(2) In his NEW BEHAVIORISM Dr. J. B. Watson gives expression to the view that by proper conditioning a plastic subject can be made to develop into anything the laboratory investigator pleases. Whether a genuine Vedantic *Adhikari* can be conditioned into being like that is extremely doubtful.

which philosophy is greeted everywhere, by the majority of persons are evidence which proves that the genuine Vedantic *adhikari* cannot be had for the merest asking. The *adhikari* thus becomes a very important personage in metaphysical concerns in reference to whom alone sundry injunctions, methods of spiritual discipline, and courses of practice et hoc become significant and purposive.

Supposing there is an *adhikari* available, what is it on which he concentrates his attention? The entire universe of discourse would then be styled VISHAYA. The philosophical quest or the *Vedanta-sastravichara* or the metaphysical investigation would fall within the general scope of a body of literature and textual material, and human ignorance, misery, evil and kindred subjects would be the topics for discussion. If there should be nothing the nature of which has not been clearly and distinctly apprehended, and which does not cause any doubts or difficulties in enquiring minds, there need not be any such science as metaphysics at all. Trite as it might seem, it is yet a profound truth that metaphysics as a science is rendered possible by and finds its *raison d'etre* in the existence of some objects which provoke enquiry and act as stimuli to investigation. If no difficulty is felt there need be no effort put forth at all. Greater efficiency in the adaptive mechanism of the organism, and greater nicety in the responses are the result of newer complications arising in the environment and newer problems presenting themselves for solution. The *Vishaya* represents a dynamic source of inspiration for metaphysical enquiry and philosophical investigation. Its dynamism is live and pragmatic. The *vishaya* is not in a perpetual Heraclitean flux rendering all determination impossible. Nor is it entirely static even as the familiar block-universe. It is static yet dynamic. It is something like an identity in difference. A systematic exposition of the doctrines of the Vedanta requires that the *vishaya* or the object or objects collectively that figure prominently in the discussion should first be settled and clearly pointed out prior to the embarking on the investigation itself.

¶ QUI BONO? is a persistent query. What is the good of it all? Why should metaphysical investigation be undertaken at all? What is the use? What is the *PRAYOJANA*? That is to say, what is the benefit that would accrue to the *adhikari* by the pursuit of philosophical investigations? There are obviously no implications of any utilitarian considerations weighing with the *adhikari* at all. The *prayojana* is the pragmatic fruit of the enquiry. Its definite ascertainment is obligatory in order to rescue philosophical quest from the accusation of its being only a glorified wild-goose chase! If it should be barren and fruitless, philosophical quest need not be undertaken at all. It is however not fruitless. It should therefore be undertaken by the aspirants.

The inter-relation among the *adhikari*, *vishaya* and *prayojana* is technically known as *Sambandha*, i.e. the connection. It can

easily be illustrated. The knower and the known, the quest and its object, the qualified person and his qualification, and other analogous relations are to be determined and explained as part of the construction of a metaphysical system.

The absolutist has endeavoured to explain elaborately the foregoing as otherwise his system-building would be condemned as defective. Madhva has devoted the treatise under discussion—*Uphadhi Khandana*—to a criticism of the position of the absolutist in this matter in general and with special reference to the concept of *Upadhi*.

The absolutist states that even though the identity or oneness between the finite and the Infinite is the one goal of metaphysical enquiry, empirical evidence is against it. The identity is not experienced. It has not been realised. Something stands in the way of the realisation. It blocks the path of an aspirant. What is the interrupting or the obstructing agency? It is ignorance.<sup>1</sup> An ignorant person might be considered to be the *adhikari*. The unknown is the *vishaya* or the object of investigation. The removal or the riddance of ignorance is the fruit of enquiry, i.e. the *prayojana*. Ignorance is thus the pivotal point around which the discussion would naturally revolve. If the possibilities and the operative potency of ignorance could be demonstrated, a full-dress vedantic debate could also be shown to be possible with all the insistent and indispensable paraphernalia of *adhikari-vishaya-prayojana* and *sambandha*. If on the other hand, the concept of ignorance itself should prove to be a veritable mud horse to which no one would willingly trust himself in his attempts to cross the deep torrent of metaphysics, the absolutist's position would become absolutely untenable.

Madhva commences his onslaught on the absolutistic doctrine in the following terms. How is it possible to explain the rationality of the concept of ignorance at all in the system of the *advaitins*? They proclaim absolute identity or oneness between Brahman and Jiva—the Absolute and the finite soul. The identity is the very vital breath of the system. It is the only reality. Brahman and Atman could not in any way differ. The former is the only reality. It is omniscient. The Absolute is the source and the fountain head of all reality and knowledge, etc. How is omniscience compatible with ignorance? It is useless to endeavour to wriggle out of the situation by contending that omniscience has been clouded. That is a fatal admission. It would seriously militate against the absoluteness of the Absolute! If at any time omniscience became clouded like that, it would cease to be omniscience. Either the identity doctrine should be surrendered or it should be admitted that ignorance can never be compatible with omniscience.

The absolutist contends that there are three possible interpretations of the term *omniscient*, and they all presuppose ignorance. The term *Sarvajñya* means one who knows all. 1. One might know all (the longest rope being given in the matter of marking off the connotation and denotation of the term ALL) *QUA* reality. This represents progressively and laboriously acquired knowledge. 2. Or one might be said to know *all* on account of a foolhardy self-complacent illusion or self-delusion. ) Life is full of such instances of flagrantly foolhardy intellectual arrogance which while it really blinds one to many objects and things and relations, creates an artificial air of light and enlightenment; A perpetual obsession that one is omniscient is an invariable concomitant of that auto-delusion. 3. Or again, one might be considered to be omniscient by virtue of knowledge which is neither misleading nor laboriously acquired, but which constitutes the very essence of the self. It is intellectual self-luminosity. It is at once and at the same time self-illumination as well as other—illumination. While it is not itself in need of or dependent upon some other agency for its own illumination, it illuminates the entire world so to say. That is omniscience which in a way transcends all limitations of time and space. It relates to the everlasting present. Nothing is obscure to such omniscience, and nothing is beyond its sweeping and comprehensive grasp. All the relevant possibilities have to be exhaustively imagined. Such omniscience has a grasp of several possibilities. How many of them would concretise into actualities? If so under what conditions and circumstances? What would be the fate of such concretisations? The omniscience would see all such and similar points and aspects in one comprehensive sweep, leaving nothing and excluding nothing.

Not one of the aforesaid alternatives could hold good in the case of the Absolute without the prior admission of some kind or type of ignorance. Just see. *Prima facie*, the acquisition of omniscience by a slow gradual, progressive process with the help of intellect and the ordinary channels of communication between the subject and external reality, can never be possible without the admission of the existence of some ignorance in the subject relative to the objects which are later described as *known*, and similarly as *purusha* is held by the *Sruti* passages to be *Asanga* devoid of all contact and relationship—even knowledge which is supposed to be the essential nature of the subject, must presuppose some ignorance. The second alternative obviously must involve ignorance as the omniscience alleged is the outcome of self-delusion. *ERGO* some sort of ignorance should be admitted to interfere with omniscience.

Madhva maintains that the first and second alternatives should be discarded. Divine omniscience cannot tolerate advance step by step unlike finite consciousness or finite self. If it did, it would commit suicide and cease to be divine omniscience.

Nor could divine omniscience be ever compatible with error or delusion of any kind or description. If it did, again, it would cease to be divine. So divine omniscience has to be explained only as the characteristic and essential feature of the Infinite. If identity between the finite and the Infinite be asserted, the identity would necessitate the admission of omniscience to maintain the infinity of the Infinite intact, an admission which would entail the repudiation of all tinge of ignorance *in toto* in respect of it. The repudiation of ignorance would logically be inevitable. If so absence of ignorance would dispense with all metaphysical quest and investigation.

Madhva's argument would assume the following form. A full-dress metaphysical debate and investigation would be possible only when there is ignorance first, and only when there is something to be known and investigated on account of the prior existence of ignorance relative to that something. Without ignorance, the necessary concatenation of quadruple concomitants of *adhi-kari*, *Vishaya*, *prayojana* and *sambanda* explained earlier can never exist. That means no metaphysical inquiry—Brahma-Jignyasa—need ever be undertaken at all. The absolutist stands committed to an identity or oneness between the finite self and the Absolute. The identity would logically entail the admission of omniscience. The admission of omniscience is incompatible with any type of ignorance, and any degree of any type even! There being thus no ignorance the need for metaphysical investigation having vanished for good, philosophy as a science would also cease to exist. If the absolutist should rejoin that as a matter of fact the subject is ignorant of so many things in the empirical and practical concerns of daily life, routine and conduct, and that in view of that palpable ignorance, Madhva is wrong in urging the impossibility of ignorance to prove the futility of all metaphysics and philosophy, the latter would easily retort that such ignorance would permanently render impossible the much vaunted identity between the finite and the Infinite. The surrender of the identity would toll the death-knell of absolutism. It can never be surrendered. The identity should be affirmed and asserted somehow. That must mean omniscience. It would never tolerate ignorance. There would be nothing to be known, discussed and ascertained. Metaphysics would be a futile game, a mere weariness of the flesh.

## II

It is at this juncture the absolutist introduces the concept of *Upadhi*. It is a metaphysical *open sesame*. It is the magic wand! A single waving of the wand is sufficient to silence and hypnotise all critics. No doubt the indefatigable efforts of the absolutist have provided him with a ready subterfuge. It is possible consistently to explain ignorance without in any manner compromising omniscience. True, identity between the

finite and the Infinite is the truth, the central doctrine of the absolutist. But the identity can tolerate difference as well. It is not abstract bare identity. It is concrete identity. It is identity in and through difference. How is the difference to be accounted for? The difference is due to *Upadhi*. The moment difference is shown to exist, ignorance also would follow. The difference means Fall from Paradise. Fall from omniscience is ignorance. There is the well-known analogy. Look at the original and the image. There is the mirror. The original is reflected therein. The original is called *Bimba*. The image is *Pratibimba*. The mirror or the reflecting agency is *Upadhi*.

The identity between the finite and the Infinite is maintained alongside of difference. Brahman or the infinite is *Sarvajnya*—i.e. omniscient. Yet the omniscience does not attach itself in any contagious manner to the finite self, *Jiva*. The latter has been alienated from the Absolute by the separatistic mischief of the *Upadhi*. Extend the analogy a bit further. The original or the face might be quite beautiful and even entrancingly charming. Suppose some dust particles have accumulated on the surface of the looking-glass. The dustiness would be then transferred to the image. Even so, Brahman is omniscient *sarvajnya*. But *Jiva* or the finite self having come under the influence of the *Upadhi* has only ignorance and none of omniscience. Ignorance would thus stand or fall with the *Upadhi*. It somehow separates the finite from the Infinite and having brought about this divorce envelopes the finite in ignorance. Grant the existence and the operation of the *Upadhi*. Difference of the finite from the Absolute would follow. The difference would be in all relevant and significant respects. Otherwise the *Upadhi* would have been summoned to account for trivialities which cannot be. The difference would lead to the conclusion that while Brahman is omniscient *Jiva* or the finite is ignorant. Try he must for the riddance of the ignorance. He should try and understand the real nature of Brahman and Atman if he is to get rid of his ignorance. He should undertake metaphysical quest. Metaphysics would thus find its proper and adequate justification. This in brief is the doctrine of the *Upadhi*.

What is Madhva's criticism of it? If it could uncritically be conceded that there exists some mysterious agency or force, or entity, or limiting principle, or fissiparous concept or notion, called *Upadhi*, it might follow that the finite selves become alienated from the Absolute and suffer in ignorance. Analogies do not run on all fours. But the function of analogies is to suggest some reliable hypothesis. The mirror-analogy is perfectly and positively misleading. What hypothesis would it suggest? The mirror is there. 2. There is the object, the original or *Bimba* which is reflected. Light rays proceed from the object, are reflected by the mirror, act as visual stimuli, and 3 an image of the object is perceived. The analogy must break down when it is extended to

explain the relationship between the Absolute and the finite selves. The mirror or the reflecting agency is as perfectly real as the original. The process of stimulating the visual organs and the visual area in the brain is real. The image too is real. But the entire trouble is the *Upadhi* can never be admitted to be as real as the original. If it is, absolutism is clean thrown overboard. When it is passionately asserted that the *Upadhi* is so potent as to alienate the finite from the absolute, it should be admitted to be as real as anything else. A non-existent or illusory mirror would not produce any image! The mirror must be a reality. But then is the *Upadhi* a reality? What is its nature? Is the *Upadhi* a reality or is it held (to maintain absolutism intact) to belong to the realm of the illusory? The alternatives are examined in turn by Madhva.

1. If the *Upadhi* is a reality with as much reality as that of the Absolute itself—for no quibbling can be permitted about pet degrees of reality—then absolutism is gone, and Dualism would be the only rational philosophy of life. There would be the Absolute. There would be the limiting or the alienating principle—the *Upadhi*. Absolutism and Monism would then be the merest empty terms. The same criticism applies with equal force to the European system of absolutism, developed and championed by thinkers like Bradley and Bosanquet. A system-builder is under a methodological obligation to explain how he is able to derive the entire cosmos from his central principle. The absolutist is no exception to the rule—How is the world of organised and unorganised matter and spirit to be derived from the Absolute which alone is the only reality? One is not entitled to introduce the concept of *the other* surreptitiously. It cannot be so quietly smuggled into the bargain. The *Upadhi* the other, or the limiting agency should like Caesar's wife be above all suspicion. Its nature requires the fullest elucidation. It is powerful enough to interfere with the Absolute and somehow bring about the projection of the cosmic show! The question should be raised "Is the *Upadhi* real or not, real in the same sense in which the absolute is"? It cannot be. If it is, advaitism or absolutism would be gone. There would be dualism instead. Two principles would have then been admitted. The absolutist would have none of dualism. The *Upadhi* cannot thus be admitted to be as real as the Absolute. How is it that an entity of such dubiousness and indeterminateness is held to be responsible for the degradation of the Absolute into the multifarious men and things of the cosmos? (which are described with a charming metaphysical naivete as manifestations of the Absolute!)

2. The second alternative is equally risky and illogical. The *Upadhi* itself might be viewed not as a reality, but as owing its origin to ignorance or *Ajnyana*. The term used in the text is *hetu*. The *Upadhi* which is credited with the power to produce Ignorance is now itself regarded as the product or outcome of

ignorance! This casual ignorance would itself be the effect of a preceding *Upadhi*. The *Upadhi* again would be in need (for its own existence) of a previous ignorance which would be its cause! There would ensue a *regress ad infinitum*! The regress is technically known as *Anavastha*.

Escape from the clutches of the regress is sought to be secured by the absolutist by the adoption of the following line of argument. No plurality is admitted of ignorance, of the *Upadhi* and the countless instances of the operation of ignorance and the *Upadhi*. There is only *one Upadhi*, and there is only *one Ajnyana*.

The argument is clearly fallacious. The fallacy is technically known as *Anyonyasraya*—i.e. vicious reciprocity of causality. It is impossible to make sure whether *Ajnyana* is responsible for the *Upadhi* or the *Upadhi* for *Ajnyana*. There is reciprocity. The *Upadhi* leads to *Ajnyana*. *Ajnyana* leads to the *Upadhi*. The causal connection is left undetermined and indeterminate. In his anxiety to escape from the clutches of infinite regress, the absolutist has been led into a false and vicious reciprocity.

The withers of the absolutist are unwrung. Let the galled jade wince. He would go on. He contends the reciprocity breaks down. No doubt it is easy to admit that *Ajnyana* or ignorance is responsible for the *Upadhi*. But there is no reciprocity. The *Upadhi* does not lead to or bring about ignorance or *Ajnyana*. It merely acts as an alienating agency creating a gulf between Brahman or the Absolute and Jiva or the finite. It is the difference or the alienation that leads to ignorance.

Is there really a breakdown of the reciprocity as claimed by the absolutist? No. Reciprocity still persists. Only *Bheda* or difference is interposed as a *tertium quid*. *Ajnyana* leads to the *Upadhi*. The *Upadhi* leads to *Ajnyana* via *Bheda* or difference. Reciprocity still persists. Even granting for the sake of argument and for the sake of giving satisfaction even to a perverted opponent, that reciprocity has disappeared, yet there would result vicious circular reasoning. There are three distinct things to reckon with. There is ignorance. There is the *Upadhi*. There is difference. And difference again leads to ignorance. There would result an eternal vicious circle from which no escape is possible. Ignorance leads to the *Upadhi*. The *Upadhi* leads to *Bheda* or difference or alienation from the Absolute. The alienation again leads to ignorance. Once more the sickening game commences! The fallacy is technically termed CHAKRAKA or CHAKRAKAM.

An attempt is made by the absolutist so to restate his position as to save it from the circle vicious. If something other than *Ajnyana* or ignorance is admitted to be the *Upadhi* (such as the *Antah-kharana*, *indriyas*, *manas*, etc.), vicious circle or reciprocity might



be urged against the admission. But that need not be. *Ajnyana* or ignorance itself is admitted to be the *Upadhi*, or the alienating agency. The analogy of the mirror would then apply with striking force. The mirror being placed in a convenient set of circumstances relative to the face, the original produces the image. Even so the *Upadhi* of ignorance or *avidya* being placed in a convenient set of circumstances relative to the Absolute, produces not only difference between the Absolute and the finite but difference among the innumerable finite selves as well. In the event of the surface of the mirror being soiled by accumulation of dirt, the original is not in any way adversely affected. It is only the image which suffers. Even so any distortion in the *Upadhi* does not affect the original at all. It is the image that must suffer. Ignorance would not affect the Absolute. It would only affect the finite selves. It will be seen that the kernel of this position lies in the identification of *Ajnyana* and the *Upadhi* with one another.

Madhva urges in reply that the identification would *not* serve any useful purpose. What is the status of *Ajnyana* which has been just identified with the *Upadhi*? It cannot be a reality. If it were, absolutism would be jeopardised. If not it would itself be in need of ignorance. It would have to be viewed as *sui generis*. It cannot be. If *Ajnyana* or *ignorance* is to be effective and potent enough to project the cosmic show, it cannot be *sui generis*!! It would culminate in an amusing *reductio ad absurdum*. It would know only itself. It would only originate out of itself. It would concretise and become potent and significant for itself!! Curiously enough, somehow the ignorance and alienation from the Absolute have to be linked with one another. Such linkage would be illogical if the exact status of ignorance could not be defined. As it is no exact definition or even determination is possible. It cannot be a reality. Nor can it be *sui generis*!

The analogy of the mirror must break down. What the absolutist seeks to establish is identity between the finite and the Absolute. Such identity is not supported by the analogy of the mirror. There is no sort of identity whatever between the original and the image. They are two different things altogether. Neither science nor lay experience would ever lend countenance to the identity. The identity is a figment of imagination. The false identity cannot be urged in support of that between Brahman and the finite. Madhva and his commentators are aware that analogies do not run on all fours and that their application should not be pressed too far, but the criticism would amount merely to pointing out that the analogy is a false analogy and would not do to help the establishment of the identity between Brahman and Atman as the non-material nature of the objects in question would render all image-formation of whatever kind utterly impossible.

No two things can be *sui generis* in the philosophy of absolutism. If so, absolutism would be compromised. Only the Absolute is *sui generis*. The ignorance which was identified with the *Upadhi* for argumental and controversial purposes, would have to be regarded as *sui generis* too. There is no other go. Absolutism must then needs be surrendered. The *Utpatti*, or the origin of a thing or substance or concept has to be accounted for. How does it become known or how does it enter into the relationship with the subject which is called knowledge? What is the agency that sets it in motion for the fulfilment of some appointed purpose? Questions like these will be shirked or surreptitiously shelved by the pronouncement of the ominous magic spell "*SUIGENERIS*". Secondly, the analogy of the mirror must break down.

### III

So far Madhva mentioned his objections against the theory of the absolutists which while regarding the alienating agency, i.e., the *Upadhi* and the difference caused by it unreal and illusory, seeks to maintain intact the identity or oneness between Brahman and Jiva. Another sub-sect or variety of absolutism contends that without prejudice to the central thesis or doctrine of oneness, it is perfectly logical to profess the doctrine of a real *Upadhi* producing *real* difference and alienation. The oneness is *somehow* guaranteed and secured because the difference is only due to the *Upadhi* or the alienating agency and *not* to the inherent and radical nature of the Absolute and the finite existence. When the *Upadhi* vanishes at the dawn of true insight, the difference would vanish too along with it and there would remain only oneness. It is easy to see that the *Upadhi* and the difference are admitted to be real in a grudging and hesitancy-ridden manner, in order to evade the difficulties pointed out by Madhva to the effect that if the *Upadhi* and the difference are to be considered unreal and illusory as indeed they must be if absolutism is to be logically maintained, they can't achieve cosmic finitisation, or pluralisation.

(The present variety of absolutism states the following.—The difference (which is patent to empirical consciousness) between the Absolute and the finite is not radical or inherent i.e. not due to *SVABHAVA* or their essential nature. It is due to the alienating and disruptive activity or contact of the *Upadhi*. The *Upadhi* and the difference caused by it are admitted to be real. The *Upadhi* is not the creation of *Ajnyana* or ignorance. The assignment of some sort of quasi-independence and reality to the *Upadhi*, along with the latter alone to the difference caused by it, is expected to absolve the absolutist from all obligation to find adequate justification for the limiting or the alienating agency, and system-building would then *pro tanto* become an easy job. The *Upadhi* is *satya* or real. *Bheda* or difference caused by the *Upadhi* is again *Satya* or real. *SATYA-UPADHIKRITA-SATYABHEDA* is the watchword of

this sub-sect of absolutism. Advaita vada is left intact as the difference is due to the contaminating touch of the *Upadhi*. Oneness or *Aikya* is not in any manner compromised or neutralised. )

Madhva easily disposes of the curious doctrine thus enunciated *SATYOPADHIKRITA - SATYABHEDAVISISHTA ADVAITA VADA*. The doctrine of oneness between Brahman and Jiva which admits a real *Upadhi* and a real difference as responsible for all finite phenomena, is utterly untenable. Those who boldly and adroitly resort to the *Maya-vada* have at least consistently denied all reality to anything other than Brahman, being thus enabled to adhere to one Being, and account for the finite phenomena as being illusory and unreal—as due to the non-be-ent. But those who assert the reality of the *Upadhi* and of *Bheda* or difference caused by it, have not even the consolation of consistency though the latter is a hobgoblin of little minds. The metaphysical value of a theory like that is deplorably little. Reality is granted to the *Upadhi*. Reality is granted to the difference caused by it. Yet the difference is brushed aside as not being *SVABHAVIKA* inherent or essential. What is a *Svabhavika* difference and what is *Aupadhika*? This has nowhere been explained by the absolutist. What are the criteria? If it could be possible to determine some criteria by the application of which one could differentiate the essential from the accidental difference—criteria too that would reveal a difference which while accounting for the disparateness of the finite and Brahman on one hand and disparateness of the finite objects amongst themselves on the other, then with a show of plausibility at least one might urge some justification for the curious doctrine. But criteria are not forthcoming. Till then the inconsistency that palpably lies in the admission of real difference and oneness somehow cannot but vitiate the theory. The difference is everywhere staring one in the face. Disparateness is the order of things. How, if reality be granted to all this, can the oneness, or identity between the Absolute and the finite be maintained? )

✓ Apart from this illogical and inconsistent clinging to oneness or identity notwithstanding difference admitted to be real and caused by the presence and interference of a real *Upadhi*, there is a serious drawback which cannot but discredit this species of absolutism. What does the *Upadhi* accomplish after all? Does it actually create or bring into existence difference where there was none? Else, does it merely reveal or make manifest some difference which is already there implicitly? By the distortion of visual stimuli, and by the stimulation of the non-corresponding points one would be able to see two moons! It is because there is already the difference among the non-corresponding points, normal vision becomes distorted by their stimulation. The passage of a light ray is interrupted by a prism placed across it. The white light becomes split into coloured. The spectral analysis would exhibit a difference not created *de novo*. It only makes clear and explicit what

was already obscure and implicit. The prism is the *Upadhi*. White light is a synthesis of the coloured; the *Upadhi* analyses it. The analysis reveals the difference. The prism does not manufacture or create *de novo* the coloured out of the white light. Or another illustration might be employed. Electrolysis of water results in an analysis of the substance into hydrogen (two parts) and oxygen (one part). The passage of an electric current across the fluid is the *Upadhi*. It does not create *de novo* any difference. It only reveals a difference already existing. If water were not a compound electrolysis would never reveal two different elements combining to produce it. The difference and the different substances are there. They are not created *de novo* by the *Upadhi*. The passage of an electric current only reveals difference already existing. Had it not been for the fact that the retina represents a complicated system of local signs, normal visual perception with all its complexities and angles of difference etc., would be impossible. If the operation of some *Upadhi* be brought into the bargain by the stimulation of the non-corresponding points one sees two moons! The *Upadhi* only reveals some difference lying somewhere. It does not create any *de novo* at all.

Even so is the case in the matter of space. It is infinite. It is capable of accommodating an infinite number of objects and systems of objects. The remark applies to all space, from the limited to the inter-stellar! It is yet possible to speak of difference in space or parts thereof, or limitations. The familiar illustration of the jar is mentioned. The space occupied by a jar is part of space *QUA* separated by jar which is a spatial entity and which occupies some space. Jar is the *Upadhi*. But does it create any difference in space *de novo*? The *Upadhi* does not split space into parts with boundaries clearly marked off. Space has infinite capacity to contain within it infinite number of objects. The capacity can be explained and brought home to the minds of the layman and the scientists alike only in terms of the objects with clearly marked off dimensions of their own. The space thus occupied by each object may be considered as part of space. So many parts can be imagined which are all different from one another. The difference however is not created *de novo* by the objects that occupy space. That is the point worth emphasising even at the risk of some repetition. Its infinity is compatible with the conception of space as divisible into parts. If space were everywhere and throughout empty the difference and parts would not be perceived at all. But we have to deal only with filled space. It is plenum, and not vacuum. Each object occupying space can be *pro tanto* regarded as dividing space. There are as many parts of space as there are objects occupying it. If each object be considered as an *Upadhi* as it should be, it would be seen that the *Upadhi* only reveals or makes explicit the difference already implicit in space.

The explanation would apply to time as well *mutatis mutandis*. Any unit of time is an *Upadhi*. Watches, clocks, dials

and hourglasses are so many *Upadhis*. We talk of a part of time or a fraction of time even as part of space. The *Upadhi* does not create *de novo* any difference in time. It merely reveals a difference already lying implicitly.

Madhva's argument amounts to this. Analogies drawn from the physical world and physical phenomena point to the conclusion that the *Upadhi* only makes manifest or reveals some difference already existing, but does not create any *de novo*. In the case of Brahman or the Absolute the same is bound to be the case. The *Upadhi* will reveal only difference which is already there. Difference in life will be accounted for after the fashion of the *Sankhyas* who maintain the existence of a plurality of souls. The absolutism of the Absolute would then have been willy-nilly cast to the four winds. The *Upadhi* would be an agency manifesting difference lying implicitly. The Absolute cannot escape from the taint of difference. Difference would lie implicitly in the Absolute. The *Upadhi* would reveal it. Absolutism would have been surrendered. To say therefore as the absolutist does that the *Upadhi* creates some difference which does not in any serious or effective manner interfere with the oneness or the identity between the Absolute and the finite, but which suffices just to account for the difference in the phenomenal world and its plurality and multiplicity, is flagrantly contradictory. The application of the analogy would necessitate the admission of several objects which are all equally real. No speciality would attach to the Absolute. Nor is there any special reason or circumstance why this particular analogy should be differently interpreted from the rest. The admission of several objects, such as the reflector and the reflected object, which are equally real (without the importation of the needless question of degrees) would have dealt a death-blow to absolutism. If the admission be logically waived, the analogy would have no meaning or significance.

#### IV

What is the harm after all? Why should it not somehow be held that the *Upadhi* does create *de novo* some significant difference? To the layman and the scientist, space is one and infinite. The objects occupy space in common parlance. Space accommodates them. Each object occupying space might be regarded as splitting it up into so many parts. The objects would then be so many splitting agencies. Have we not here got an instance in which the *Upadhi* creates a difference *de novo*? This possible objection is anticipated by Madhva, and he easily answers it in the following way. How does this so called splitting up or differentiation of space into parts or divisions occur? The *Upadhi* should itself be a spatial entity. The absolutist as well as his opponent is obliged to agree on that head. The *Upadhi* does not exist and function in vacuo! Granting for the sake of argument that somehow the *Upadhi* creates difference of parts in space, the

*Upadhi* can operate only in contact with *space*. Thus, the *Upadhi* out of touch and contact with *space* is at once ruled out. There are only two alternatives possible. 1. The *Upadhi* should create difference being itself somewhere in touch with and contact with some *part of space*. or 2. It should have contact with the *totality* of *space*. Both *space* and the *Upadhi* would be co-extensive. Madhva rejects both the alternatives.

Before the *Upadhi* comes into contact with *space* somewhere, and commences its disruptive activity, is there or is there not division or differentiation into parts? There is undoubtedly a division. The *Upadhi* is said to come into contact *not* with *space* as a totality, but only with a part or a fraction thereof. So prior to the commencement of the disruptive activity of the alleged *Upadhi*, there must have been some division into parts. Otherwise the statement that the *Upadhi* comes into contact only with a part of *space* would be absurd. Without the prior activity of the *Upadhi* there would be no parts with which a subsequent *Upadhi* can come into contact! There would ensue an infinite regress. Suppose a given *Upadhi* (any spatial entity or object) commences its work of dividing *space* into parts. Where does the work commence? In a part of *space*!! The latter would be in need of a prior *Upadhi*! and so on, and an infinite regress would ensue. If (in order to avoid it,) it be argued that the *Upadhi* is *one*, it would be *sui generis*, and the fallacies enunciated in a previous context would recur. The alternative therefore that the *Upadhi* commences its disruptive activity by first being in contact with a part of *space* cannot be accepted.

Nor is the second alternative any the more logical. *Space* and the *Upadhi* are assumed to be co-extensive. One is as ubiquitous as the other. If so the *Upadhi* will never be able to create any difference in something with which it is itself co-extensive. It would then never do as a differentiating or disrupting agency. If this alternative be yet doggedly pressed, the questions arise, how is it possible to explain when both are co-extensive, that the *Upadhi* introduces difference in *space*? How is this difference perceived at all if both be co-extensive? Is there not some *space* intervening? The absolutist has no answer to such questions.

If the contact of the *Upadhi* with *space* either at some fraction thereof or with totality be rejected it disjunctively follows that the *Upadhi* cannot create *de novo* any difference where there exists none. It would only serve to reveal or make manifest some difference already existing in the nature and fitness of things. Difference in the nature of things, would strike an effective blow on all forms and varieties of absolutism. Such difference would also mean essential and fundamental difference amongst the objects of the universe, and notably difference between Brahman or the Absolute and *Jiva* or the finite soul.

To question the reality of space is irrelevant. Space is infinite. It is capable of accommodating countless objects. The latter are as real as the former. Both are different from one another. There is little in the matter of christening space as a form of perception.

Form and matter are both real. One cannot be assigned a greater degree of reality. Even so, Brahman or the Absolute is infinite. Jivas or the finite souls *somehow* are dependent on the Infinite for their existence.

It is thus settled what exactly the *Upadhi* is able to achieve after all. It is unable to create any difference *de novo* where there exists none. It can only render manifest and exoteric what is implicit and esoteric. It reveals difference already existing implicitly. In the light of the function of the *Upadhi* the position of the second variety of absolutists, who side by side with the oneness or identity of Brahman or the Absolute with the finite admit a real *Upadhi* producing real difference which accounts for the apparent diversity and plurality in experience, is easily overthrown. The *Upadhi* cannot create any real difference. It can only render explicit what is already implicit. The genuine and the only function of the *Upadhi* being thus ascertained to be the explication of the difference lying implicit, difference between the Absolute and the finite would be the only rational philosophic view.

The difference which is essential and fundamental would also guarantee the difference between omniscience, ignorance, etc. There would be the aspirant partially aware of the nature and characteristics of Brahman, and anxious to advance his knowledge. Spiritual quest would then commence, and a search after the Ultimate Reality inaugurated. The removal of partial ignorance and revelation of the real nature of the Absolute which is at once transcendent and immanent would be the goal of the spiritual aspirant. A method of inquiry would be found too. Philosophy as a distinct and independent branch of science would have its status duly and amply vindicated. On the view of the absolutist on the other hand, it is hardly possible to urge any cogent and logical justification for philosophy or *Brahma-Jignyasa* as we have already seen.

## V

There is yet another difficulty in the acceptance of the position of those who cling to the doctrine of *real* difference caused by *real* upadhi. Pleasure and pain, ambitions and aspirations, gratifications and disappointments, are all realised with a subjectivity and intimacy by each individual which for ever must render the identity between the finite and the Absolute the merest mare's nest! The subjective realisation which is individual's own and incapable of transference confers on the individual an independence which is unique. The uniqueness can never be surrendered as

illusory and unreal. The vicissitudes of the Absolute should be shared by the finite individuals as well if identity between them were a fact. Similarly, the Absolute would be obliged willy-nilly to share those of the finite individuals. We nowhere possess even the slightest shred of evidence that it is so. It will not do dogmatically to contend that the difference between the finite and the Absolute is merely due to the *Upadhi*. It is real and radical. What is the criterion? That each individual is an independent centre of experience which is unique and irreducible to that of another and which is not transferable, is the only valid criterion. Experience is brought home to an individual *Qua* his own. The cognitive, the emotional and the volitional psychoses of each individual are unique. They are inaccessible to another. The experience of one might and does resemble that of another. But the two experiences are not identical. The independent psychoses thus constitute a sufficiently strong vindication of the independence of the individual. The independence would not in any manner be compromised by the individual's possession of different *upadhis*—his sense organs—channels of communication with external reality. The most important thing is ANUSANDHANA, i.e., the realisation by each individual of his experience as his own. The ANUSANDHANA of each individual is his own with a uniqueness which firmly defies all attempts at neutralisation or stultification. If the identity between the Absolute and the finite individuals were a fact, the ANUSANDHANA of the two is bound to be identical. The pain of the finite would be realised as that of the Absolute. The joys and sorrows of the latter would be realised as those of the former. There is no such realisation. The finite at any rate does not possess any such ANUSANDHANA or realisation. An individual, whether he is a philosopher or a layman, has no realisation that he is participating in the joys and sorrows of the Absolute. He realises on the other hand poignantly and keenly his own impotence and finiteness at every turn of events, and at every step of his progress. If this impotence were admitted to be that of the Absolute, then an eternal good-bye to all philosophy. An imperfect and impotent Absolute is as good or as bad as the finite individual himself and the finite creation itself. Why exalt it as the only reality? The Absolute should be something distinctly superior to the finite in *all* respects. Otherwise it would cease to be the Absolute. Is this superiority realised by the finite? Never. There is on the other hand the realisation—the ANUSANDHANA—that the finite is ignorant and impotent and handicapped at every turn of its mundane and ultra-mundane career!

When the absolutist contends that the difference in the *Upadhi* would suffice to account adequately for finite creation, it should be pointed out that even in the presence of difference due to the *Upadhi*, there is ANUSANDHANA, when the individual realises various sense-experiences, as his *own and unique*. That the difference is due to the *Upadhi* is immaterial. It is neither a criterion



nor a fact. Difference on the other hand should be made ascertainable only by means of difference in realisation or ANUSANDHANA. Where there exists radical difference between any two individuals there exists difference in ANUSANDHANA as well. Conversely, one is entitled to draw the inference that wherever there is difference in ANUSANDHANA, there is difference real, radical between individuals. The ANUSANDHANA is thus the rock on which absolutism would doubtless be split. There is marked and irreducible difference in the *Anusandhana* of individuals. Your *Anusandhana* is not mine. *Mine is not yours*. They might resemble one another and do so resemble. Resemblance is not identity. The objection that the Absolute would be obliged to share the fortunes and vicissitudes of the finite if there were identity between the two has never been satisfactorily answered by the absolutists. In fact even the use of the term SHARE is inaccurate, from the standpoint of the orthodox absolutist. The fortunes and the vicissitudes of the Absolute are indeed those of the finite and vice versa. If oneness or identity were the foundational fact that must be so. The uniqueness of experience is conditional on and determined by the presence of a persisting and enduring something which is called self or soul, and it is the consciousness or awareness of personal identity which unifies the multiplicity of experience and synthesizes it *QUA* belonging to a particular subject. The persisting personal identity is termed SWARUPAIKYA. There is no *swarupaikya* between the Absolute and the finite. The *swarupa* of the latter is radically different from that of the former. That is why there is such a striking difference between the two. The Absolute is infinite omniscient, etc., while the finite is limited ignorant, etc. Such would not be the condition of affairs obtaining if there were *Swarupaikya* or fundamental oneness between the Absolute and the finite. If somehow the oneness be hugged to the bosom it must for ever be impossible to explain the difference and multiplicity of the universe.

It is therefore nothing better than camouflage to assert that there is some *real* difference caused by *real* upadhi, and that the difference while it some how suffices to account for the difference and multiplicity in the universe is yet not potent enough to interfere with the oneness or identity between the Absolute and the finite. If the *upadhis* be real, if the difference caused by them be likewise real, then oneness must be surrendered. What determines oneness is *anusandhana*. The *upadhis* turn out on analysis to be merely auxiliary or contributory factors. Difference among them is compatible with one unitary self-conscious, centre of experience. Each independent centre of experience with consciousness of personal identity crude or developed is determined by *anusandhana* i. e. the unique realisation of experience as belonging to one's own in the most subjective and intimate sense. Very often the finite individual is not able to realise sympathetically

the situation of his neighbour. *A fortiori*, he would never be able to realise as his own the experiences of the Absolute. The *anusanandhana* of the finite and the *anusanandhana* of the Absolute must for ever part company from one another. Identity or oneness between the Absolute and the finite is the merest myth.

( Even at the risk of some repetition, it is worth while to sum up the position. *Anusanandhana* is the only reliable and valid criterion. Pleasure and pain, ambitions and aspirations, depressions and elations are all experienced and realised QUA individual's own with an intimacy and subjectiveness which are unique. No individual ever realises the experiences of the Absolute QUA his own. Why not? He should if identity between himself and the Absolute were a fact. The assertion that such a realisation is arrested or blocked or rendered impossible by the alienation caused by the influence of the *upadhis*, is futile. Difference in the *Upadhis*, i.e., the sensory channels of communication with external reality does not prevent the realisation that various sensory experiences are the individual's own. On the analogy of the individual's experience, the difference in the *upadhis* would not stand in the way of realisation of experiences, etc., as one's own. Why? Because, the self persists, and consciousness of personal identity makes the realisation possible that one is enjoying or having all these different experiences. The *Swarupa* is the same. Sameness of *Swarupa* explains experience notwithstanding the difference caused by the *upadhis*. In the present instance, the *swarupa* of an individual is not the *swarupa* of the Absolute. ERGO the *anusanandhana* of the former is not the *anusanandhana* of the latter. The difference of the *upadhis* would only tend to aggravate or display in the boldest outlines the difference between the finite and the Absolute which is real, radical and unstultifiable. Difference is not AUPADHIKA. It is SVABHAVIKA. Difference is not due to the *upadhis*, but it is ingrained and deeply rooted in the essential and fundamental nature of the Absolute and the finite. In the absence of the foundational and basic fact of radical difference between the finite and the Absolute, the rich variety and complexity of the Universe would never find any proper and adequate justification and explanation. In a word, difference in *upadhis* being never a bar to the realisation of disparate experiences as unified and belonging to a single subject, the experiences of the Absolute should be realised as those of the finite and vice versa!! if identity were a fact. That however is not the case. There is radical difference in the *Anusanandhana* i.e., or realisation. That is due to SVABHAVIKA-BHEDA i.e., radical, essential and fundamental difference between the finite individuals and the Absolute. )

[ Madhva substantiates the aforesaid position in reference to the life and achievements of Yogis. A Yogi-X-passes through countless lives while retaining intact consciousness of personal

identity and memory of the lives previously lived. The various lives are so many *upadhis* difference caused by which is no bar to the retention of memory of previous existences and consciousness of personal identity intact. What boots it there is difference caused by the *upadhis*? Even so, if the absolutistic identity were true, notwithstanding any number of *upadhis* and the difference caused by them, there would be the realisation or the *anusandhana* of the Absolute's experience as the experience of the finite's own—a realisation rendered possible by the *SVARUPAIKYA*—i.e., the oneness in the fundamental nature. Experience however tells a different story. The *anusandhana* of the finite is its own. It is **never** that of the Absolute and the *anusandhana* of the Absolute is never that of the finite. That the *anusandhana* would have to be one is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the theory of the absolutist. As it is, the difference in *anusandhana*, realisation of each individual's experiences as one's own guarantees and explains not only the difference among the countless individuals which are independent centres of experience but also the fundamental and radical differences between the finite and the Absolute. (3)

The absolutist would not hesitate to clutch at a straw if it could save him from philosophical drowning! He asks: "Why should it not be assumed that Yogis do pass through countless lives without *anusandhana* or realisation that it is one and the same individual who has so passed from life to life?" The question is absurd. No speciality would then attach to the Yogi and his supernatural powers. A Yogi would be an ordinary individual. According to the absolutists, it is one and the same Absolute which has taken so many different forms and names. So many bodies there are. So many individuals and so many different objects and things. The speciality of a Yogi lies in his realisation that he has passed through countless lives with a view to exhausting the stock of his *prarabdha-Karma*. The realisation or the *anusandhana* is possible because there is *Swarupaikya* i.e., persisting consciousness of personal identity. Should however there be any *swarupaikya* between the Absolute and the finite, the experiences of the one would be realised as those of the other. Such non-realisation is evidence which proves that there is no identity (*swarupaikya*) be-

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(3) "Anusandhana" awareness of one's states and experiences cognitive, emotive, and volitional is the crux of the matter. It is the rock on which Absolutism must be sooner or later wrecked. If identity between the Infinite and the finite be factual and foundational, the latter must feel the exhilarating effects of Omniscience of the former. Absence of that feeling is irrefutable evidence which supports difference between the two. In his "Kantakoddhara" Vijayindra Tirtha emphatically observes—"Jiva-Brahmanoraikiye-Brahmabhoganam-jivenusanadhanam-syadeva . . . . Sarvada-sarva-vishyaka - jnyanena - apratihatasaktikena - ananyadheenena - Brahmanai-katam-gatasya-jeevasya-tadgatabhoganusanadhana-avasyambhavat." etc. P. 70. Manuscript with the present writer. If identity between the finite and the Infinite were a true tale, the latter should have to feel the depressing finiteness of the former and the former, would have to feel the exhilarating effects of Omniscience. No amount of quibbling about higher and lower degrees of reality about an illusory "Upadhi" limiting or finitising agency would be of any avail.

tween the two. The idealists and Realists, Monists and pluralists are all agreed that a Yogi is a special specimen of humanity with special spiritual powers and special attainments. That is why Madhva has mentioned the case of a Yogi as an illustrative instance in support of his contention that if there were *swarupaikyā* or essential and fundamental identity between the Absolute and the finite, the realisation (*anusandhana*) that each is experiencing his pleasure and pain, ambitions and aspirations, entirely independently of others would be as absurd as unaccountable.

There is yet another minor objection that can be urged by the absolutist. The entire question is sought to be needlessly complicated by the introduction of the factor of KARMA. It is (at this stage of speculation) not possible to get on without resorting to the magic SOMEHOW! In spite of essential oneness notwithstanding fundamental identity between one another, SOMEHOW, the Karma of each individual is responsible for the creation of his own individual *Upadhis*, which SOMEHOW do not overlap with those of others, and the upadhis in their turn produce difference, disparity and alienation among the individuals!! Where however there is such a free resort to the mysterious Bradleyan SOMEHOW, it can easily be taken for granted that there is a full stop to all metaphysical speculation, and all constructive logical system-building, comes to an end. Madhva answers that resort to the concept of *Karma* would not render matters even a bit clearer. *Karma* of the individual is responsible for the *Upadhi*. What is it that causes difference in the *Karma* of each individual? The Karmic difference should have been produced by difference in the prior existing *upadhis*! and so on. There would be illogical reciprocity. One should hark back to the experience of the unsophisticated man in the street, and say that difference in the *Upadhis*, in *Karma* and among the individuals and objects of the Universe is there, and that is exactly the royal road to Pluralism and Realism. Each individual is an independent centre of experience. Each individual's experiences are his own. They are unique. They cannot be realised in their uniqueness by anybody else. Such unique realisation by an individual of his unique experiences—a realisation which is intimate and subjective—is founded upon the essential and fundamental difference among the individuals themselves. The radical difference is termed by Madhva—SWARUPA BHEDA. *Swarupa bheda* leads invariably and inevitably to different *Anusandhana* i.e. different and unique realisation. If indeed there were any identity between the individuals, and the Absolute, the experiences of each would have to be transferred to the other. Such not being the case, absolutism must fall to the ground. These are the steps in the development of Madhva's argument.

## VI

So far Madhva's criticisms were directed against TWO varieties of Absolutism. (1) the one which while maintaining oneness of

identity between the Absolute and the finite—Brahman and Jiva—believes that the difference and diversity in the universe are due to the alienating and disruptive activity and influence of the *Upadhi* (or upadhis) and that both the *upadhi* and its effects are illusory. (2) the other which while adhering to the central doctrine of oneness or identity between the Absolute and the finite, believes in a *real* Upadhi causing *real* difference and diversity. Madhva now adopts a more general line of argument and directs his attention to a constructive programme of explaining his own doctrine of difference among the individuals on the one hand and difference between the finite and the Supreme on the other.

{All the *Pramanas* establish only difference among the individuals and not identity. By no means the least important of them is *Pratyaksha*—sense perception. The standpoint of Madhva is definitely psychological. Nowadays when so much is made of ethics, logic and general metaphysics being psychologically mediated it is significant Madhva adopted the psychological standpoint several centuries ago. A study of genetic and comparative psychology shows that quite early in its evolution the organism behaves in such a way as to convince onlookers it is an independent centre of experience. Self-consciousness, responsibility, awareness of personal identity, etc., characterise the more advanced forms of life. An individual notes he is surrounded by many organisms full of life and activity. He comes into contact or conflict with them as the case may be. He influences them. He is influenced by them. Some sort of mutual influence prevails. He finds others actuated and impelled by motives, aspirations and ambitions similar to his own. The independence of others is painfully realised when ever they manage successfully to thwart his plans and procedure. He notes in them what Madhva calls *CHESHTA* i.e., varied activity. The activity serves as the basis of inference. An individual infers that his neighbour also is a knowing, feeling and willing organism even as he himself is. Differentiation and discrimination progress rapidly in the advancement of evolution. Evolution indicates a passage from homogeneity to heterogeneity. Progressive differentiation in structure and function along with specialisation are the marks of evolution. The individual differentiates and discriminates the various parts and organs of his own nervous system from one another. He likewise differentiates and discriminates between individuals and objects that form his environment. There is no need long to linger on the progressive discrimination of the various objects in the environment of the individual. The animate is distinguished from the inanimate. Sometimes an individual has easy and smooth sailing. Otherwise and at other times he is obliged to voyage in rough seas agitated by adverse winds. He now puts forth some little effort to achieve a particular object of his desire or to pursue a line of activity, and at other times he has to put forth very great effort and yet be prepared for disappointment and discomfort. The clash and conflict of interests and motives would

soon convince an individual that he has to deal with countless other individuals who are all independent centres of activities. He does realise that he must adequately reckon with them if he is to progress and live. Difference in equipment and endowment, in intelligence and initiative, in plans and procedure, in succumbing to or sliding over the environmental difficulties—in fact in all vital matters and concerns of life among the individuals—is realised painfully and poignantly by all, and there is no reason why in the face of such plain and palpable difference and disparity should it be assumed that *somehow* there is only identity between the finite and the Absolute and that somehow the one Absolute has been obliged to manifest itself as the world of diversity and multiplicity. No escape, no getting out of this position is possible. That all diversity, the rich variety and complexity of life and experience and external reality are due to cosmic ignorance while the nature of that cosmic and all-enveloping ignorance itself is kept in the dark cannot be maintained as a serious metaphysical tenet even for a second. Diversity, difference, and disparity are the order of things. They are in the fitness of things. Reality is firmly and unshakably rooted amidst such disparity, difference and diversity. An artificial oneness is not possible if desirable, and not desirable if possible. It is utterly impossible at one adroit metaphysical stroke to annul and annihilate all the difference in which reality is so firmly grounded. Difference is the foundational fact. It is twofold. (4.) In the first place each individual realises that he is an independent centre of activity and analogy helps the understanding that there are countless other similar centres of experience. Secondly there is yet another more important and striking difference.)

{ It is the difference between the finite and the Absolute, i.e., difference between Brahman and Jiva. The difference is brought home to an individual in various ways. Early enough in the progress of his mundane career he realises the difference. AJNYATA i.e. ignorance is the most striking characteristic of finite individuals. Ignorance at every step hinders his progress and advancement. His best calculated and most carefully planned actions are thwarted. He has countless troubles due to his inefficiency and ignorance. The knowledge which he possesses and which enables him to execute effective adjustments to the environment is after all limited in range and incomplete and finite qualitatively. Miscalculation, inability to apprehend the meaning and significance of several situations, and inability likewise to respond to them, are the essential characteristics of finite individuals. Even the most perfect knowledge possessed by the most efficient and best of men and women is after all incomplete and limited. It cannot stand a moment's comparison with

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(4) Difference is strictly five-fold. (Pancha-bheda.) But in the present context emphasis is laid on difference of the finite from the infinite and (2) difference between one finite and another finite.

omniscience. Ignorance permanently dogs the footsteps of the finite creation.:

ALPASAKTITVA is the next characteristic of the finite. The physical and the psychical power and ability possessed by finite individuals are notoriously small and ineffective when contrasted with those of the Supreme Overlord of the Universe. Using the biological terminology, it would be seen that the factors entering into the concept of POTENCY are contributory to the determination of the responses of the organism to its environment, or the general behaviour of the organism when confronted with a set or team of stimuli emanating from external reality. Success in the matter of effective adjustment is a mark and unfailing index of the power and potency of the organism. The *Jiva*—an individual—realises that he is inefficient and impotent in the matter of adjusting himself to several situations in life to which he would fain have an adjustment at any cost! Such failures are the unmistakable reminders of the finiteness of an individual and of his utter insignificance in contrast with the Supreme Being. Considering that sometimes even the most beneficent and moral activity is thwarted for no fault of the agent, he would not be foolish enough to arrogate to himself the possession of superhuman powers and abilities. He might do so if he were a metaphysical megalomaniac. Hedged in all through and all sides by countless drawbacks and handicaps, hemmed in by the pressure and force of adverse and counteracting circumstances, leading a life cribbed, cabined, and confined, a finite individual would be the first to realise his own impotency and inability. Needless to assert that in those moments of doubt and despair, he would think of some Superior Agency which moulds and shapes the destiny of creation.

DUKKHITVA is the characteristic which is *par excellence* the birthright of the finite. One might talk of favoured and blessed individuals being born which the proverbial silver spoon in their mouths and wallowing in all the luxuries of mundane existence, never knowing what unhappiness and grief are, yet it is none too difficult the next moment to realise, that all the happiness and glory are not permanent and long-standing. DUKKHA—pain, or sorrow seems to be the lot of the finite individual. It is certain that such is the lot on account of his ignorance and lack of power and ability to have his own way and secure what is best calculated to promote his happiness and pleasure. Sorrow is the outcome of ignorance and impotency. The finite individual does not possess either the knowledge or the power and ability necessary to anticipate the course of events intelligently and ward off the evil and the unpleasant. He suffers therefore. Suffering and sorrow would seem to be his birthright. If individuals would calmly compare notes, they would see that the sorrow and suffering shared by them might and do differ in degree, but the finite *qua* finite can never boast *at life free from all sorrow and suffering*. One might indeed be

self-possessed in the face of suffering. He might have excellent fortitude to bear in a resigned mood all his sorrow and suffering. Yet suffering and sorrow are there. The problem of evil, of pain, sorrow and suffering has been as old as the cosmos! It is insistent. It is imperious. Its solution is imperative for the integrity of every system of philosophy. Yet only vague and nebulous answers and hazy solutions have been offered by the absolutists all the world over. To them to be sure, the problem can have no meaning whatever. In an absolutistic and Monistic Universe there can be no place for evil and suffering. Nothing is gained by the dogmatisation that sorrow and suffering are illusory. They are real to the sufferer. Only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches. To the pluralist and the realist, the problem of evil has supreme and tremendous significance. Suffering and sorrow mark off the finite from the infinite. It would be the duty of a genuine philosopher to indicate to the spiritual aspirants how pain and sorrow and suffering are to be got rid of and bliss eternal secured. A philosopher would possess absolutely no *locus standi* in a world altogether free from evil and suffering, or in which they are assumed to be unreal and illusory.

**SVALPAKARTRITA**—or limited volitional individuality is a further characteristic of the finite. The finite is finite for all that. Modern civilisation and modern science can boast of and glory over conquest of the forces of nature, and new and original invention and notwithstanding all such and more achievements, finite willed activity is limited in its extent to a remarkable degree. There is the egotistic conviction that the individual is free to pursue whatever line of activity he pleases. But no. The conviction cannot in several instances be translated into practical politics. Various are the counteracting factors and circumstances. The volitional individuality of the finite is limited. Taking stock of the best achievements of the best of men and women, the **KARTRITVA** or the free agency of the finite is terribly limited and circumscribed. (5)

Whereas the Supreme Being is found to be endowed with (by Itself no doubt) **SARVAJNYATVA**, **SARVASAKTIMATVA**, **NITYASUKHITVA** AND **SVATANTRA KARTRITVA**, characteristic features which are uniquely possessed only by the Supreme Being and by nobody else. Each of the aforesaid terms deserves a brief explanation.

**SARVAJNYATVA** means omniscience. The Supreme Being sees and knows everything. It knows all in an everlasting present. The Supreme Being is not subject to any error or illusion. He is never deceived and never victimised by environmental circumstances. In every system of theistic speculation which talks of a Supreme Deity, omniscience is one of Its characteristics.

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(5) The controversy between champions of freewill and predestination found in some Western texts may be imagined. But, according to Madhva, the volitional individuality of finite is limited.



SARVASAKTIMATVA connotes Omnipotence. The Supreme Being is all powerful. Its power knows no arrest or obstruction, no thwarting and no counteraction. It is sometimes absurdly asked whether divine omnipotence would also include within its fold the power to create the absolutely contradictory and incompatible couplings such as a round-square, or a mare's nest etc., and the obvious answer is either we as finite cannot understand the manifestations of divine omnipotence or that even divine omnipotence would not do violence to the canons of thinking and laws of thought as finite humanity understands them! For argumentative purposes and dialectical exigencies, it is as well the same query might with equal force be addressed to the absolutist as he is under obligations to explain the omnipotence of the Absolute. (6)

NITYASUKHITVA indicates eternal and unalloyed happiness and bliss. Any happiness that is alloyed or adulterated by an admixture of pain and grief can never be eternal. Unalloyedness or purity and eternity go together. This is in obvious contrast with the happiness enjoyed by the finite. The latter is neither eternal nor unalloyed. The former is both.

SVATANTRA KARTRITVA signifies a free agent whose activity is under no circumstances restricted or counteracted by anything. The volitional individuality of the Supreme Being is self-determined, self-regulated. The Supreme Being is the only free and independent agent. The so-called freedom of will and independence possessed by the finite creation, are only restrictions and dependence seen through coloured spectacles or through a wrong angle of vision altogether. The finite creation is PARATANTRA i.e. dependent on the Supreme Being. The dependence is nothing *infra dig*.

Such is the contrast between the finite individual and the Supreme Being- a contrast that is radical, fundamental and all-round. A realisation of the contrast which is being forced on the attention of the individual every moment of his existence would compel him to realise how different he is from the Supreme Being. If there were identity why should there be such an acute and striking difference between the two? If the identity were a fact, either the Absolute would be a blundering metaphysical bureaucrat, or the finite individual would be an omniscient power lifted out of all his misery, sorrow and suffering amidst which he struggles hopelessly. The only legitimate conclusion that can be under the circumstances necessitated by the marked contrast between the finite individual and the Supreme Being, (drawn without violence

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(6) Divine Omnipotence conforms to the laws of thought prevailing in the world. Vijayindra Tirtha observes in his "Kantakoddhara." "Bhagavad-aisvaryamapi-lokamaryadanurodheetyangeekarat." (P. 75. Manuscript.) Divine Omnipotence does not create a mare's nest or a round-square though theoretically able to achieve all.

being done to life and logic) is that the *Jiva* and Brahman, the finite and the Supreme Being are fundamentally and radically different from one another.

At this stage the absolutist intervenes and interrogates from what source is it ascertained that the Supreme Being is omniscient etc. The source should be properly explained as the difference between the Absolute and the finite is based on the contrast of the characteristics possessed by them. Madhva answers that the *Sruti* is the only source which finally proclaims the omniscience, etc., of the Supreme Being—Vishnu. It is possible inferentially to establish the existence of the Supreme Being and His characteristics, but it is admitted on all hands that the authority of the *Sruti* is unchallenged and final. The conclusions indicated by the *Sruti* can be reinforced or corroborated by subsequent debates, inferences, and discussions. It is laid down in the *Sruti* texts that the Supreme Being—Vishnu—is Sarvajnya—Omniscient, Sarvasakti etc. Anyone perusing the text would understand that there exists a Supreme Being which is Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent etc., which creates, protects for a time, and then destroys all creation. The finite individual too would realise that he possesses none of the characteristic features and qualities described in the *Srutis* to be those of the Supreme Being. The individual would also easily realise that he is so different from the Supreme Being and identity would then appear as positively absurd and impossible of achievement under any circumstances.

What is the guarantee or compulsion that what is explained and described in the *Srutis* should be implicitly taken for granted? Why not hold that the description of the Supreme Being contained in the *Sruti* as also the definition inaccurate and misleading? A perverted objection like that cannot stand a moment's scrutiny. It has already been explained in the course of an earlier chapter that the *Sruti* is a *Pramana* on its own merits and in its own right. It is *Svatahpramana*. There is no assignable or known author to whom blame or praise could be apportioned for the collection or composition of the *Sruti*! The statements contained in the *Sruti* are all valid and true. They are not misleading utterances. The passages which explain that the Supreme Being is omniscient etc., should be all taken to be quite accurate, true, and faithful. The absolutist cannot have the cheek to advance such an objection at all questioning the authority and correctness of the *Sruti* as he too is obliged to resort to the identical body of texts for support of his position. The objection can be taken only to indicate despair brought about by certainty of the conviction of defeat and untenability of one's own doctrines. If there were any point or force in the objection, *Sruti* should be clean thrown overboard and then appeal to the other Two *pramanas* of *pratyaksha* and *anumana* i.e., sense-perception and inference, would establish only difference between the finite and the Absolute, but never identity. The cant of the

absolutist notwithstanding, we are empirical individuals—philosophers and laymen and all—We never have so far realised any identity between the finite and the Absolute. To say that we have so done is philosophic pedantry. It would be a self-complacent observation or admission too suspiciously subjective to be of any objective validity. One man's intuition and introspection are as good as those of another. There is no reason why those of a particular individual should be given any credence to, while those of another are rejected as misleading and untrustworthy. Several things are done under cover of mysticism and personal intuition. All that has no objective binding validity. If intuition and mysticism are frequently appealed to in order to establish something like identity between the finite and the Absolute which has so far remained out of range of practical politics, and which is so to say mocking the aspirant by defiant aloofism and receding horizon-like with every attempt at a near approach made by the aspirant, there is no reason why the intuition and introspection of another person cannot likewise be appealed to in support of difference between the finite and the Absolute. The introspective experience and testimony would rather converge in the direction of the non-identity and disparity between the finite and the Supreme Being. Taking therefore the text of the *Sruti* as it is, it is obvious there are scores of passages which emphasise the greatness of the Supreme Being, and the insignificance of the finite individual. Should it be contended for argumentative and dialectical exigencies, that the *Sruti* passages are not reliable the *onus probandi* must lie on the party which so objects. It has been decided that the *Sruti* is *svatah-Pramana* or authority on its own merits and in its own right which is unchallengeable and unimpeachable. Should there be apparently conflicting passages in the *Sruti*, it is the duty of the student to try and harmonise them according to the canons of reconciliation and interpretation laid down in the works on *Purva Meemamsa*. There is no valid reason why the passages which emphasise the greatness of the Supreme Being and His Omniscience etc., should be ignored or lightheartedly brushed aside. The fullest significance should be attached to them. When a person peruses passages like those, he would clearly understand that he is a finite individual helpless, ignorant and impotent. He would understand what a tremendous and deep contrast lies between himself and the Supreme Being on whom he is obliged to lean and rely for help, illumination, light and guidance. Either the absolutist would have to admit that the passages in the *Sruti* which appear to lend support to his position are unreliable and misleading even as those which lend countenance to the doctrines of the realist and the pluralist, in which case intellectual chaos and anarchy would be the only inevitable outcome, or he has to concede the undoubted authority of the *Sruti* texts as a whole in which case the significance of them ascertained according to the interpretational canons advocated in the works on the *Purvamimamsa*, would have to weigh with the parties to the controversy. There is not the

slightest doubt that the passages in the *Sruti* like SATYASSO ASYA MAHIMA etc., speak of the greatness of the Supreme Being. The greatness cannot be shared by finite creation. Otherwise the Supremacy of the supreme Being would be jeopardised. The finite individual does realise his own incapacity and helplessness, his ignorance and impotency. His is the lot to struggle and suffer. Ignorance, pain and misery fall to his lot. It must pass one's comprehension how in the face of such a marked contrast between the Supreme Being and the finite individual, identity is asserted to exist between the two. The identity is not clung to merely as a logical possibility. The identity is made the central pivotal point not merely in metaphysical theorising, but in practical philosophy as well. The identity should be experienced and realised. No sufficient justification has been urged for the non-realisation of it by the finite individual constituted as he is at present.

Madhva would therefore urge that if the identity between the Absolute and the finite were clung to so tenaciously, there could not be anyone who is ignorant. There could be none steeped in metaphysical darkness and slumber. There could be none in need of light, enlightenment and illumination. There would be no Adhikari—no fit person ready and willing to undergo metaphysical discipline. The Sastra—or the metaphysical science would then have no *locus standi*. A science or discipline presupposes persons interested in its pursuit and intelligent study and presupposes those who are likely to profit by its study or adherence to it. If identity were a fact, there would be none ignorant and likely to profit by undertaking metaphysical study and research. There would similarly be nothing un-known. Omniscience is the characteristic of the Absolute. It is the only reality. The finite and the Absolute are identical with one another. The omniscience of the Absolute would be shared by the finite as well. The finite even as the Absolute would perceive every thing in a sudden flash of illumination or more accurately in an eternal flash of illumination and there would remain nothing unknown—nothing obscure. An eternally clear and distinct perception would be the result of the identity between the finite and the Absolute. In the absence of the Adhikari—the deserving aspirant ready to embark on the metaphysical quest—the Vishaya—or the object of the quest would vanish too as there is nothing which is unknown and obscure. Similarly there would be no *prajojana*—or the *Phala*. CUI BONO would be the insistent query. Who would say what is the benefit that would accrue? None. Metaphysics would then be fun for leisure or idle hours. It would cease to be regarded as a serious discipline worthy of pursuit by the intellectual aristocracy! There would be no aspirant. There would be nothing unknown or obscure. Only omniscience would reign supreme as the result of identity basic and factual between the finite and the Absolute. There would prevail the reign of an eternal flash of illumination or light perennial. There would

be ergo no-fruit—no *phala*—and aimless would be the metaphysical pursuit. Lastly the appropriate relationship among the *Adhikari*—the aspirant—the *Vishaya*—the object of metaphysical quest—and *Prayojana*—the fruit—would not subsist at all. The impossibility of them all would mean the impossibility of the metaphysics of absolutism.

According to the Non-identity—or difference that is between the Supreme Being and the finite individual, it is easy to explain that the spiritual aspirant with the necessary equipment who is vaguely aware of the nature and characteristics of the Supreme Being and who is ignorant of the rest and who is not in possession of any deep insight, would be the *Adhikari* or the fittest person to undertake metaphysical quest. The partial knowledge in his possession would act as the needed incentive, the requisite stimulus for metaphysical speculation and philosophical search after the Supreme. The partially known, yet fully unknown, Brahman or the Supreme Being would be the *Vishaya* or the object of metaphysical investigation. An enthusiastic quest after the Supreme would be undertaken by the properly equipped and temperamentally trained spiritual aspirant. His labours would then be amply rewarded. Granted the necessary training and an earnest pursuit of the metaphysical discipline in strictest conformity with the methods and instructions taught by a sympathetic and condescending GURU or ACHARYA—there need not be the slightest nervousness or apprehension that the quest undertaken by the spiritual aspirant would turn out in the long run to be a silly and unprofitable wild-goose chase or pursuit of will O' the Wisp. Sincere labour would be appropriately rewarded. There would be the proper *prayojana*—or the fruit—i.e. the realisation of the Greatness of Brahman— and standing face to face with the Supreme Being. }

Madhva quotes the appropriate *Sruti* in support of his doctrine of *Bheda* or difference between the Absolute and the finite. PARO MATRAYA TANVAVRIDHANA NATE MAHITVAMANVA-SNUVANTI. The *Sruti* lays down that Vishnu is the owner of infinite number of infinite attributes. The finite is not. The difference between the finite and the Supreme Brahma is alluded to in the following *sruti* passage. JUSHTAM YADA PASATANYA-MISAMASYA MAHIMANAMITI VITA SOKAH. The Jiva or the finite individual by the studious practice of processes of spiritual discipline reaches the state of Mukti—ultimate bliss or liberation from the Phantasmagoria of metempsychosis—by the grace of the Supreme Being whom the finite individual resembles in so far as such resemblance could be without in any manner trespassing into the realm of the Supreme Being. The individual in the final state becomes a free spirit rid of the bondage of death and birth—the cycle of transmigration—but by no means identical with the Absolute itself! The *Sruti* text quoted is this;—YADA PASYAH PASYATE RUKMAVARNAM KARTARAMISAM PURUSHAM

BRAHMA YONIM. TADA VIDVAN PUNYAPAPE VIDHUYA NIRANJANAH PARAMAM SAMYAMUPAITI. The final stage of liberation is beyond good and evil. Its attainment means resemblance between the Supreme Being and the Finite Individual.

Madhva deals with the perverted argument of some opponents to the effect that the very impossibility of AVIDYA constitutes its irresistible fascination and attraction. If a system of philosophy is sought to be constructed on logically untenable and impossible concepts and doctrines, it is as well one made the honest admission that Philosophy is nothing but the merest weariness of flesh. If an impossible and contradiction—ridden concept be so tenaciously clung to and hugged to the bosom, there is no reason why the opponent should not urge that the Atman itself might be regarded as Avidya—ridden so that it would permanently and eternally remain obscured and enveloped by irremovable ignorance. The absolutist cannot protest against such a *reductio ad absurdum* of his position, as he himself has so far gone on the track of perverted argumentation as to claim that the very impossibility of the concept of Avidya, constitutes its irresistible attraction. That is also the inevitable fate of the Bradleyan SOMEHOW! If somehow everything would be right in the end, for HE is a good Fellow, in the language of Old Khayyam—why should one not somehow maintain that Realistic Pluralism or Pluralistic Realism is the goal of all speculation and not Monistic or Absolute Idealism or Absolutism? Any existing contradictions and inconsistencies would be solved or brushed aside the moment one waves the magic wand of *Somehow*. Eternal damnation in hell might SOMEHOW be the fate of spiritual aspirants! and eternal sorrow and suffering might as well be considered as veritable ornaments: That is the obvious nonetheless inevitable *reductio* of the absolutist clinging to the impossible concept of Avidya claiming that the very logical impossibility of it constitutes its fascination.

If the absolutist feels that a protest should be emphatically lodged against the *reductio* he should explain in clearer terms and more logically how in view of the central doctrine of identity between the finite and the Absolute, can ignorance attach itself to an aspirant and how metaphysical system-building is to be satisfactorily accounted for, in reference to *Adhikari*, *Vishaya*, *Prayojana* and *Sambhanda*. The *reductio* would stand seeing that no satisfactory explanation has been yet attempted by the absolutist. Whereas, in the light of Madhva's doctrine of difference or Non-identity between the Supreme Being and the Finite individual, the spiritual aspirant would be the *Adhikari*, Brahman (partially known yet fully unknown) would be the *Vishaya* or object of metaphysical quest, and realisation by the finite of the real nature of Brahman and freedom from the bondage of metempsychosis that is the concomitant of realisation, would be the *prayojana* or goal or fruit of the endeavour spiritual. There would then be the appropriate relationship between them—termed *Sambandha*. Metaphysics as

an independent science and spiritual discipline would have been established and its status vindicated. The final fruition of metaphysical investigation would take the finite individual to an advanced stage of evolution in which he would resemble the Supreme Being, but would never be identical with Him.

### SUMMARY

1. According to the Advaita-Vada (absolutism) which affirms identity between the finite and the Absolute, no ignorance can attach to the attributeless Absolute and *ergo* to the finite individual who is identical with the former.

2. No one is thus ignorant regarding the nature of the Absolute.

3. There would be nothing unknown, and no fit subject matter for speculation.

4. Metaphysics, under such circumstances, if undertaken, on hand as serious study or discipline would be a fruitless pursuit after Will O' the Wisp.

5. In a word there would not be *Adhikari-Vishaya Proyojana*-and *Sambandha* which alone would constitute the requisite justification for metaphysics. According to the Bheda vada or the Dwaita Vada, the school of Madhva that holds the doctrine of difference between the Supreme Being and the finite, metaphysics would have been amply justified.

6. The Spiritual aspirant (not identical with the Supreme Being) knowing something of Brahman and eager and enthusiastic to know more, would be the *adhikari*—the person fit to undergo metaphysical discipline.

7. The Supreme Being would be the object of philosophical investigation—the *Vishaya*.

8. The *Prayojana* would be Moksha—final liberation and nearest approach to the Supreme Being of the Finite. The Finite would gradually evolve into Divinity, but would never become identical with the Absolute Itself.

### REFERENCES :

1. Upadhi Khandana—By Madhva and the Commentary on it by Jayatirtha.
2. Commentary of Sri Vyasaraja—entitled *Mandara-Manjari*.
3. Commentary by Srinivasa Tirtha.

## CHAPTER VI

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### MAYAVADA—KHANDANA

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Notwithstanding the admitted superiority of the Sruti, or revealed scripture, due weight should be attached to *Pratyaksha* or sense-perception and *Anumana* or inference for purposes of philosophical controversy and debate. The absolutist parades a syllogism before the investigators, and Madhva pointed out the fallacies that vitiate the validity of the syllogism in question or the inference relating to illusoriness in general in case the syllogistic form was considered to be veiled. The *Mithyatvanumana*—or the inference which sought to support and establish the illusoriness of the Universe, was shown to be fallacious. The *Upadhi*—or the alienating agency contact with which was responsible for the degradation of the Absolute into the finite cosmic show—was proved to be a concept riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies. The negative or the destructive work accomplished by Madhva so far was mainly directed particularly against the inference relating to the illusoriness of the universe, and to the notion of *Upadhi*. A more general line of attack and criticism was considered necessary. Not this or that particular theory or doctrinal detail, but the Mayavada as a whole, the entire system of absolutism should be shown to be illogical and grounded on but sandy foundations! To this task Madhva has addressed himself in a work of very short compass entitled *Mayavada-Khandana*, which forms the headline of the present chapter.

Madhva's commentator states at the very commencement of his work why the Acharya has undertaken the present controversial treatise. Life is full of inequalities and contradictions, diversities and differences. Experience presents the individual with an admixture of good and evil, joy and sorrow, virtue and vice. Somehow the predominance of pain and sorrow over pleasure and joy strikes the earnest inquirer or the seeker after truth, and the result of the poignant awareness is to produce in the mind of the individual *Vairagya*—absence of fondness and attachment for the material objects and values which he finds in his environment—physical and psychical. The Non-attachment and unconcern for the material values would enable the individual to practise disciplined control of the various sensory channels of communication



with external reality and of the mind. The vagaries of the mind are manifold. It sways the subject to and fro. Its passions should be nipped in the bud sufficiently betimes. The sense organs are to a degree treacherous. They place countless objects of temptation in the view of the aspirant and try to counteract and obstruct his spiritual progress and advancement. The subject should possess the most perfect control over the sense organs the reins of which he should tightly hold. Any relaxation would spell to him irreparable diaster, and irretrievable loss. The individual possessing the perfectest control over his mind and the sensory channels of communication with external reality is the *Adhikari* the *Mumukshu*—the person who is desirous of securing release and freedom from the bonds of *Samsara* the cycle of births and deaths. What does the aspirant the *adhikari*—the person fit to enter the realm of metaphysics—want to secure? Pain, misery and evil should be completely eradicated. He should enjoy unalloyed bliss. By the Grace of the Supreme Being alone is it possible for any one to enjoy eternal and unalloyed bliss. How is His Grace to be secured? The Supreme Being should be devoutly worshipped and prayed to. No deep, genuine and real worship is possible, and no sincere and earnest prayers can be addressed unless we know the exact nature and characteristics of Brahman or the Supreme Being. He is the Overlord of the Universe of organised and unorganised matter—of sentient and non-sentient existence. He is radically and fundamentally different from the finite existence. He is different from the animate and the inanimate. If there were no difference but only identity as contended by the absolutist, then there would be no overlordship of the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being is the possessor of infinite number of infinite attributes all free even from the slightest contamination by evil and finitude. The Supreme Being is further free from all evil, pain and misery sin and suffering concomitants and characteristics of finite existence. It is in order to proclaim and make known to the aspirant the real nature of the Supreme Being, that revealed texts of the *Sruti*, and the *Smritis*, and metaphysics in the sense of a rational and systematic enquiry into the nature of the Brahman—*Brahma-Jignyasa*—have sprung up. The aim of the texts is the revelation of the nature of Brahman. A study of the texts and inquiry into the nature of Brahman, are enjoined on the spiritual aspirant as obligatory—and not optional. A right apprehension of the meaning and significance of the texts, would place the aspirant in possession of the golden key which would not fail to unlock the doors opening into eternity.

The absolutist on the other hand contends that there is neither radical nor fundamental difference between Brahman or the Supreme Being—and Jiva—or the Finite individual but only identity. Brahman is Jiva. The Supreme Being is the finite soul. The identity which is radical and fundamental is somehow obscured by deep-rooted ignorance. That is why the individual

experiences sorrow, pain and grief, notwithstanding the identity between Brahman and himself. The ignorance should be eradicated. The identity between the Supreme Being, and the finite should be proclaimed and brought home to the mind of the spiritual aspirant. When he realises the oneness or identity with the Supreme Being or the Absolute—all misery, pain—sorrow and suffering would vanish. The pure absolute spirit would shine in all its pristine glory, splendour and lustre. The texts—sruti and smriti—and inquiry into the nature of Brahman find their justification as they help on the eradication of the cosmic ignorance which is the root cause of the woes of the finite, and the dawn of real and genuine philosophic illumination. The finite individual is himself the Absolute. The identity stands obscured. The moment genuine spiritual insight dawns and identity is realised, the so-called finite individual would realise his status *Qua* identical with that of the Absolute. That is the goal of all spiritual endeavour, metaphysical effort and philosophical striving.

Madhva has undertaken the composition of the present treatise with a view to showing the unsatisfactoriness of the position taken up by the Absolutist and proving that his own is the only interpretation which would do adequate justice to the claims of science, religion morality and general metaphysics and to the requirements of logical and consistent speculation.

The discussion is opened with the question—"Is it necessary that SASTRA—in the sense of a study and investigation of the Texts for the purpose of the accurately ascertaining the real nature of the Supreme Being or the Absolute—should be commenced at all"? An off-hand answer cannot be returned. Madhva develops the argument, namely, if the fundamental and central doctrine of the absolutist were strictly and logically adhered to without attempts at camouflage and shifting of the ground to suit artificial and unreal polemics—it would naturally follow that metaphysics—or Sastra—need not be given any prominence in life and need not be undertaken as a serious study at all. Why? A general ground for rejecting the absolutistic position root and branch is that it conveys to the minds of earnest inquirers and unsophisticated aspirants, an entirely false and erroneous view of the real state of affairs. If this could be really proved, the proof would constitute sufficient condemnation of the absolutistic system of speculation. The identity between the Supreme Being and the Finite is *not* a fact at all. Neither *Pratyaksha* nor *inference* nor *Agama* or scripture supports the identity. The *Pramanas* all unmistakably point to a difference between the Two. Never mind the *Pramanas*. What is the status of this identity? Is it *absolutely* real even as the *Absolute*? Is the doctrine of degrees of reality going to be summoned to one's aid in this instance as well? AIKYAM—

in which the Absolute is said to be—or not. The disjunction as it stands is completely exhaustive, and the alternatives are mutually exclusive. No *tertium quid* is thinkable. The standpoint of the oneness or identity should either be real—real in the same sense empirical individual will not do. It never reveals any identity between the finite and the Absolute. It reveals only striking difference and disparity. Let the longest rope be given. Let any standpoint be adopted. It is all the same. Is the Oneness or AIKYAM real or not? It cannot be real at all. If it were, the absolutism would have vanished. The absolute is the only reality. In the same breath it is impossible to assert that the *oneness* or AIKYAM is also another reality. The oneness should also come under the all-enveloping fold of the doctrine of degrees of reality. That a particular thing or concept belongs to a lesser degree of reality is a convenient camouflage. So long as things or entities other than the Absolute can never be styled realities—it is mockery to maintain that others have a lesser degree of reality. The AIKYAM—or oneness should ERGO be regarded as AYATHARTHA—or unreal. If the texts should proclaim something which *ex hypothesi* has to be relegated to the realm of the illusory and the unreal, there is sufficient admission that something is rotten in the metaphysical state of Denmark! Reality is the exclusive monopoly of the Absolute. AIKYAM or oneness is not and cannot be a reality. If the texts speak of the oneness, they speak of something which is unreal and illusory. The conclusion is irresistible. It is no answer that the oneness might be assigned a lower degree of reality. A procedure like that is as illogical as it is arbitrary. There is nothing like X—Y or Z *assigning* reality to an object. Reality is the inalienable property of all creation—somatic — psychical — conceptual — moral — aesthetic etc. The oneness should be as real as the Absolute. If that is admitted Absolutism must be surrendered. Objects of the world and the countless relations in which they are capable of entering with the subject or a percipient agent, would be so many realities, and no arbitrary FIAT would annul their reality. The conclusion would point in the direction of a pluralistic realism. The absolutism would have none of it to be sure. If on the other hand, the AIKYAM or oneness is relegated to a lower degree of reality—in order to maintain the integrity of the Absolute intact, the opponent has the right to contend that oneness is unreal and illusory, and the texts which proclaim and advocate it are all misleading and untrustworthy. The SASTRA would be AYATHARTHA-PRATI PADAKA. The Sastra would state and advocate something which is not real, but which is only unreal and illusory. The first argument of Madhva amounts to this—As AIKYAM or oneness cannot be admitted by the Absolutist to be a reality, in accordance with the cardinal doctrine that the Absolute is the only reality, it will have to be considered only as illusory or unreal and that the texts which proclaim and advocate an oneness which is admittedly

and *ex hypothesi* unreal and illusory would be misleading and untrustworthy. If reality be the property of the oneness even as that of the Absolute, absolutism would vanish.

## II

The Monist—Absolutist—argues that *somehow* the oneness has to be admitted to be real. This can be done without compromising the Monism or the absolutism. The oneness or Aikyam—is as much related to the finite as to the Absolute. Bare identity is a figment of the imagination. It is all identity in difference. To cite the familiar illustration, X who has undergone at different times, wildly different experiences continues to be one and the same person. There is then identity in difference. Two totally different objects belonging to different orders of existence can never be identical with one another. Difference only can be predicated of them. Trite as it might seem, the square can never be identical with the circle. Difference from one another can be predicated of them. How is absolutism maintained? The same absolute—the one absolute—continues to retain its identity amidst difference and diversity. If the principle of identity in difference be applied, all the differences should be regarded as real as the identity. The doctrine of degrees of reality will not find any valid application. Suppose, there is the Absolute. There is the so-called real finite creation. There is identity between them. What is this identity? It is a way or a manner or a relation in which a certain object is apprehended by a subject. The identity is *not* the object, but is a relationship or a predicate attaching to an object. It is philosophic pedantry and psychological barbarism to characterise the object as real and the identity as unreal and illusory. The difference at least between the object and the predicate should be maintained. It can never be annihilated. The SVARUPA—or the nature of the Absolute, can alone be real. If identity is the same as the nature of the Absolute—no assertion can be made about it other than that it exists! If it is something different, dualism would be inevitable. Anticipating all this, the absolutist contends that *somehow*, the identity, though it is different from the nature of the Absolute, is to be considered real.

Madhva's criticism is direct and incisive. If the oneness is to be regarded different from the Absolute, then Advaitam or Monism has gone for good. It would be possible only to make a dull and meaningless tautological assertion that the absolute exists! It would be just like A is A! If identity amidst difference be aimed at, the differences would all be real. In that case too, Monism would have to be surrendered. No one outside the Lunatic Asylum would ever think of making an assertion that the Absolute is identical with itself! If it maintains its identity amidst difference, the latter are as real as the former. Difference does not and cannot connote unreality. Difference will have to be admitted to be real.

Identity in certain respects there will be. There would be a percipient subject. He would live, move, and have his being in a physical and psychical environment. All this would be real with equal degree of reality. If therefore the identity is something different from the Absolute, and if it is real as it should be, Monism would have been cast to the four winds!

Madhva next considers the other alternative. If oneness is not different from the Absolute, it should somehow be the nature of the Absolute itself. AIKYAM is the SVARUPA of BRAHMAN. Oneness is the essential nature of Brahman. If this is be admitted then the Sastras would have no legitimate and useful function to fulfil. There would be nothing for them to teach the yearning soul of the aspirant. The Oneness or identity would be the same as the *Svarupa* or the essential nature of the Absolute or the pure being—whatever it is. It is SIDDHA—already established and known QUA pure being. What is there for the Sastras to teach? If they presume to teach anything at all, it can be nothing new and unknown, but only what is known and already established. The Atman exists as a self-luminous spiritual entity. That is pure Being. Oneness is its nature. Nought else exists. If the Sastras or the sacred scriptural texts would proclaim only the oneness, they would certainly be carrying coals to Newcastle. The oneness is nothing strange or new—nothing to be known and understood. It is already known and established. The Atman is SVAPRAKASA — self-luminous. It is pure being or existence which is not, for its own existence, in need of the existence of anything else—or any other agency foreign or alien to it. The term *Svaprapakasa* has been variously interpreted. It means self-luminous, implying independent existence. To the absolutist, the more important and significant interpretation is, that SVAPRAKASATVA is AVEDYATVA. The nearest English approach is 'unknowable'. Somehow what exists is the pure Being. Nothing else does. It is unknowable. The moment it is sought to be squeezed into the strait-jackets of conceptual categories, it must cease to be the Absolute. So the Sastras would describe nothing of importance—nothing of use. If the pure Being which is the only reality be *ex hypothesi* something which is incapable of description and which is UNKNOWABLE—AVEDYA—what then is the function of the Sastras? They become functionless. They do not possess any *locus standi* in metaphysical realm. It would indeed be a foolhardy attempt for any one or any body of texts, to undertake to make known something, which by its very nature and constitution is unknowable. It is passing strange that people should undertake the study of a mass of texts the avowed object of which is to render known what by nature, *ex hypothesi*, is unknowable. The scriptural texts would stand discredited. Never mind which of the interpretations of the term SVAPRAKASA we choose: If self-luminosity be adhered to, the Sastras or texts would proclaim and teach nothing new and a study of

them would be weariness of flesh or waste of time and energy. The Atman is already SIDDHA—established and known by a process of ratiocination. If the term is interpreted to mean AVEDYA or unknowable, the Sastras would be futile and stand discredited in view of the confession that would inevitably have to be made that they have as their object the rendering plain or clear or known something which is unknowable. The absolute is unknowable. The Pure Being is unknowable. There is no other reality. There is nothing else to be known. The only reality is unknowable paradoxically enough. What then are the texts for? They would be needless intellectual encumbrances. The Westerner unacquainted with the traditions of Indian Philosophy might exclaim—what if? What harm is there if the body of scriptural texts is in any manner discredited? The absolutist would not. The Indian thinker—whether he is a Monist or a pluralist—whether a realist or idealist—takes his stand (He must do so if his system is to command acceptance) on the authority of the scriptural texts, and that is why Madhva has directed his criticism in such a way, as to indicate that the logical implications of the absolutist's position would point in the direction of rendering the body of scriptural texts on which the parties to the controversy should take their stand superfluous encumbrances.

The absolutist rejoins that in all theory of knowledge progress from the partially known to the fully known, should be admitted. Progressive discrimination of attributes and features is a mark of advanced conceptual development. The early stages are marked only with a vague awareness or apprehension. Brahman no doubt exists as a luminous object or spiritual entity. That Pure Being exists is only a vague apprehension—a confused and beclouded awareness. Greater discrimination would have to be exercised. The oneness or identity between the Pure Being and the finite should be brought home to the mind of the latter as personal—intimate and private intuition. That is not the work of a day. Its realisation would take countless and innumerable lives of advanced and systematic spiritual discipline. The gradual realisation is spread over so to say a temporal series. There exists a real and genuine intellectual need. The existence of the pure Being and the identity of the finite with it should have to be translated into practical politics. The *Sastras* step in to satisfy the need which the individual feels for more light and for surer and greater enlightenment. They would find ample justification. They would explain in clear terms what exactly are the implications of the oneness or the identity between the Absolute and the finite. The aspirant has to understand them all and respond to the situation successfully and efficiently. The *Sastras* are there to render possible better and more efficient adaptation. They would point the right way, for a fuller and completer practical realisation of the oneness which in the absence of them, would remain on the comparatively lower level of mere vague awareness. The familiar illustration of

the Jar is mentioned. One might be vaguely aware of a Jar say by means of tactual sensation. The visual experiences might be lacking. Later on, given the appropriate concatenation of circumstances, greater discrimination would be exercised and the shape, size, etc., of the Jar known as the result, of deeper and more intimate acquaintance with the object. Even so, deeper awareness of the Absolute can be possible as a result of greater discrimination. The *Sastras* have it as their function.

Madhva replies that the analogy of the Jar is misleading and will not mend matters. The Jar has got various specific qualities some of which can be apprehended by the subject quite early while the others can be only after a deeper acquaintance. No such specification of qualities and attributes can be thought of in connection with the pure being. In the case of the jar, there are different qualities. The sense-quality is irreducible. There are in the subject specialised sense-organs specifically adapted for the interception of particular stimuli emanating from external reality. Given the proper sensory set and accommodation, knowledge can be guaranteed. Specialised sensory apparatus and specific and irreducible difference in sense-quality render a progressively intimate knowledge of the object possible. What is there in the Absolute so to be known and progressively realised? Nothing. It is Pure Being. If at all, only existence can be predicated of it. It has no feature or quality or attribute that is knowable. No special adjustments of the sensory apparatus are necessary. There is nothing that can legitimately belong to the Absolute. It is an empty abstraction. No genuine predicates could ever attach to it. It cannot tolerate even the slightest tinge of becoming. If one should attempt a justification of the *Sastras* or texts, on the ground of their proclaiming the existence of a pure being which for ever must remain beyond the intellectual horizon of the finite, the attempt would hardly be worthy as the texts in question would proclaim only a stale and jejune fact. The study of the texts enjoined on the spiritual aspirant, would be no better than an idle and fruitless undertaking. The issue is plain and obvious. Where there is scope for progressive advancement of knowledge from the partially known to the fully known, the object should be capable of progressively revealing its characteristics and features to a discerning subject as his intellectual needs get defined and acute. If on the other hand the object is one devoid of all attributes and specialities, it is illogical to speak of any advancement in knowledge about it or any clarification relative to its attributes and qualities. At each and every stage of investigation, and intellectual evolution, only one statement can consistently be made—namely—that the Pure Being or the Absolute exists! No other statement can logically be permitted. A needless encumbrance would be the *Sastras*, and idle and fruitless the study of them by the spiritual aspirant.

The point of the objection put forward by Madhva is this : In the very first act of cognition in which the object is the Absolute or the Pure Being all about it becomes and must become known—so far as it is capable of being known at all. It is NIRVISESHA. It is devoid of specialities and special features,, qualities or characteristics. When all about the Absolute has thus become known what is the use of the *Sastras* or the sacred texts which can find a justification only as revealing the nature of the Absolute. If it cannot do it, as indeed it cannot, there being nothing about the Absolute which is to be known, the body of sacred texts would have to be summarily rejected and abandoned as useless, and unprofitable would be a study of it if undertaken for some sentimental reason or another ! It would therefore be impossible to rescue the texts from the condition of utter inutility into which they are bound to lapse in accordance with the central doctrine of the absolutists that Pure Being is the only reality and that there are no characteristics or features or attributes which are to be revealed by the sacred texts of the Pure Being which is attributeless.

The absolutist puts forward another contention. The objection urged in the foregoing paragraphs that the sacred texts repeat only what is known about the Absolute and fail to reveal anything, new, can possess some degree of plausibility, if they *directly* and *pointedly* undertook to proclaim and reveal oneness or identity with the Absolute of the finite. However there is no such direct and pointed statement contemplated at all. Oneness or identity is sought to be proved and established only indirectly. There is a cosmic veil so to say. It is an all-enveloping ignorance. The moment the veil is lifted or torn asunder, the oneness or identity would shine forth in its natural light and effulgence. The part played by the texts or *Sastra* consists in bringing about the destruction of the veil of ignorance. Indeed a great deal of value must assuredly attach to the negative work of the destruction of the veil. The oneness or identity would shine forth in its own natural and pristine purity, splendour and effulgence, only after the destruction of the obstructing veil. No one would have the temerity to deny the significant value of the negative work of the destruction of the veil of ignorance. The *Sastras* or the sacred texts, would find the fullest justification, then and in view of the importance of the negative work, they would be seen not to be repeating parrot-like jejune and known truths understood and apprehended by every Tom, Dick and Harry.<sup>1</sup>

Madhva replies that the aforesaid plea cannot stand a moment's scrutiny. One can with some show of sense speak of a veil, only when there is something so sacred as to be hidden for whatever reason from the vulgar gaze of the finite individual. What is there thus to be hidden and screened from the defiling and the contaminating view of the finite individual ? When we speak of something



being hidden and obscured, it can only be either the essential nature of an object itself or some special or specific attribute thereof. The *Svarupa* or the essential and fundamental nature of the object itself might be unknown. Such ignorance would mean that the object in question cannot be distinguished from other members of the same genus and from its general and special environment. Or if there is some vague and nebulous notion of the object, its specialities might remain unknown and obscured. Neither the one nor the other alternative can apply in the case of the Absolute or the pure being. The veil of ignorance cannot successfully hide at all or obscure the essential and fundamental characteristic of the Absolute. It is there as pure being. It is *svaprakasa*. It shines forth on its wonderful merits and in its own right. It is self-luminous. It is not in need—not in the least—of the help of any other external agency. QUA pure being its nature is unobscurable by anything. Then ignorance would be futile. It would hide nothing. As a matter of fact there is nothing which can be hidden.

Pure being again is devoid of all qualities, attributes and specialities. If its essential nature QUA pure being cannot be obscured or hidden, what else is there which can be? If the Absolute had any speciality it can be assumed that the speciality can be obscured by ignorance, by the cosmic veil. Pure being has no speciality. If at all, it is anything it is existence. It can never be obscured by anything. Its existence defies and challenges everything. It itself remains undefined and unchallenged by anyone and by anything. What then is to be hidden or obscured by ignorance?

It will thus be easily realised that in order to find some justification for the body of sacred texts, it is assumed the Sastras achieved the negative work of destroying the ignorance which obscures the Nature of the Absolute. Such an assumption is illogical and deserves at once to be knocked on the head. The cosmic veil of ignorance is incapable of hiding or obscuring anything relative to the Absolute or the pure being. The nature of the pure being cannot be obscured. It is eternally shining. It has no speciality or specific qualities or attributes which can be obscured by ignorance. For the Absolute is devoid of them all. The pure being can never tolerate any contaminating touch of attributes or qualities. It is attribute-less. It is quality-less. True as it might seem, it can be a sound enough position to take up in justification of the possibility of ignorance obscuring something, if it can be assumed that the Absolute has qualities and attributes which are capable of being known by specialised and advanced conceptual thinking. No such assumptions can be entertained relative to the Absolute. Ignorance would hide nothing, for the best of all possible reasons that there is nothing to be hidden. Sastras would then achieve nothing too, as the so-called function they would fulfil is nil. The objection of Madhva must therefore stand intact to the effect that on any interpretation of the position of the

absolutist, the Sastras or the sacred texts would be a functionless mass, a conclusion which is bound to be unpalatable to the absolutist.

Greater and acuter poignancy attaches to Madhva's objection, in view of the definition of the term *Pramana* assented to by the absolutist. There is a saying VYAVAHARE-BHATTANAYAH i.e. in matters of controversy and debate, allegiance is owed to the canons laid down by Bhatta. What is Bhatta's definition of *Pramana*? It is ANADHIGATARTHAGANTRI PRAMANAM. (1). *Pramana* is that which reveals or renders known something which has not been made plain by anything else, or under any other auspices. In Western theory of inference, there is a discussion whether novelty or necessity is the chief and fundamental characteristic feature of inference. The feature of novelty is brushed aside as unimportant. Necessity is the only requirement. Not so in the present context. A *Pramana* should reveal something which is new and unknown. Otherwise, why should any one resort to any *Pramana* at all? It is because a *pramana* would reveal something new and build up constructively and progressively the structure of knowledge. The definition of *Pramana* has been assented to by the absolutists.

The Sastras or the sacred texts are *Pramana*—par excellence. If so they should be in a position to proclaim and render known something which must have remained unknown prior to their advent. As it is, what is the unknown characteristic (or what are the characteristics unknown) which is expected (which are expected) by the Sastras to be rendered clearly known and apprehended? There seems to be nothing. The Absolute is pure being. Its nature is known to all. It is the self-sufficient and self-luminous spiritual entity. Its nature is thus not a matter for the sastras to explain. Nor are there any specialities or specific characteristics of the Absolute which can be hoped to be made known by the Sastras. The Pure Being is attributeless and quality-less. The Sastras would be thus obliged to make no important contribution or any contribution at all, in the matter of elucidating and making known something new and unknown. The failure to make such a contribution would mean that the sastras would lose their status and significance as *pramana*.

Not merely that. The Sastras cannot be tolerated as fulfilling some minor function even. If they cannot be regarded as *Pramana*

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(1) In European Logic the issue novelty *vs.* necessity is well known. For Vijayindra Tirtha's definition of *Pramana* and his wonderful definition of Definition (Lakshana-Lakshana-) see his commentary on "Pramana-paddhati" Madhva contends that the Attributeless Absolute must for ever remain beyond the pale of *Pramanas*-guarantors of valid knowledge. Metaphysics as an intellectual discipline will have no status if the Attributeless Absolute is the only Reality. Vijayindra maintains that the difference between *Saguna*, and *Nirguna Brahman* is yet to be established. See "Kantakoddhara", significant observations of Vijayindra are referred to in the concluding chapter.

because they have nothing new to reveal and proclaim, they would be considered to be *Apramana*—not reliable at all for purposes of metaphysical debate and controversy.

### III.

So far Madhva argued against the doctrines of absolutists, the main contention being that a discussion of the sastras need not be undertaken as they would have nothing new to reveal and as they would if forced to, reveal something which is unreliable and misleading in view of the dubious reality of the oneness or identity between the Absolute and the finite, and the Acharya next directs his attention to a refutation of them from another standpoint. The pivotal point in this latter discussion is **IGNORANCE**, along with its reality as compared with that of the Absolute. The Absolute, the pure being can have nothing to do with ignorance. Pure being is the only reality. It is identical with the finite. The ignorance of the finite will have to be as much the ignorance of the Absolute as well on account of the identity between the two. No wriggling out, or quibbling out of the position is possible. Can ignorance in any particular attach to or affect the Absolute? It cannot. It again cannot attach to the finite as well. The latter is identical with the former. The possibility or otherwise of ignorance will determine the fate of the entire position of the absolutist and his status in the metaphysical universe! Only the possibility of ignorance can justify a metaphysical theory, system-building, and putting forth of spiritual effort and endeavour for the practical realisation of philosophical principles. Ignorance would involve radical and fundamental difference between the Absolute and the finite. The latter would strive, would consider itself to be under an eternal and perpetual surveillance of the former. An apprehension like that would be the best incentive to all moral endeavour and spiritual effort. We *QUA* finite are not in a position to know all about the Supreme Being which creates, protects and destroys the Universe. We must know all. We must ascertain as many of the excellent features, characteristics and attributes of the Supreme Being. Ascertainment of them would enable the individual to concentrate his devotional attention on the Supreme Ruler of the Universe and to worship Him in a spirit of utter humility who is the giver of all. No identity between the two is thinkable. His Grace would dawn upon the individual some day when he has undergone the necessary course of spiritual discipline. Possibility of a preliminary or prolegomena of ignorance is thus the one factor of foremost importance which would guarantee moral life, metaphysical speculation, and logical system-building. Nothing would be valid if one should seek to deny the preliminary ignorance. If identity between the finite and the Absolute be affirmed, denial of ignorance would be the only logical culmination. The Finite would be the Absolute. The Absolute on all accounts and according to all school

of speculation is most perfect and omniscient. If anything is identical with it, it should share in the omniscience as well. Else, the identity would be the merest mockery. The absolutist holds tenaciously to the doctrine of identity between the finite and the Absolute. That means, the omniscience of the Absolute is the omniscience of the finite as well. There would be no ignorance at all. Either the omniscience of the Absolute or the possibility of ignorance has to be surrendered. If the former is the case, the Absolute would cease to be the Absolute. It would be just one among the countless objects of the Universe. If the latter be the case, metaphysics, morality, etc., mental and moral sciences would be devoid of proper justification and their pursuit would be futile and illogical.

Madhva emphatically sums up his criticism and puts the matter in a nut-shell thus: AJNYANASAMBHAVADEVA TANMATA-MAKHILAM APAKRITAM i.e., the entire position after the heart of the absolutist has been overthrown and repudiated on account of the impossibility of ignorance, when once an identity has been affirmed to exist between the omniscient Absolute and the finite. The impossibility of ignorance instantaneously deprives metaphysics of its legitimate object or VISHAYA. There is no ignorance about anything. There is nothing to be known. Why then undertake the dry-as-dust metaphysical investigation? Absolutism must culminate willy-nilly in a repudiation of all philosophy and metaphysics. ,

Madhva asks a further question. "Is the Aikyam or the oneness or the identity between the Absolute and the finite real (satyam) or not". If the former, absolutism would have committed suicide as has already been pointed out. If the latter, the *Agama* or the scripture would proclaim and teach something which is unreal and illusory. The conclusion though unpalatable of course is forced upon the absolutist. He can regard the Absolute only as the sole reality. *Aikyam* or oneness cannot be a reality. It would be Non-reality whatever the specific connotation sought to be put upon the indefinite term non-reality. The texts would teach oneness which is unreal. There can be no worse condemnation of them. The moment they are understood to proclaim oneness which is non-real the texts would have written themselves down as a body of untrustworthy conglomeration of statements. If to save the texts, it is proposed that the *Aikyam* or the oneness is real, absolutism must commit *felo de se*!!

There is yet another implication which is most fatal to the absolutist. *Aikyam* or oneness is illusory at any rate non-real. If oneness were non-real, what would be the logical status of the difference or *Bheda*? The Law of contradiction would supply the requisite reply. Of the contradictories if one is rejected as non-real, the other will *ipso facto* be affirmed as real. Madhva urges

that the terms AIKYAM and Bheda (oneness and difference) are contradictories. Contradictory opposition is the most perfect, commensurate and symmetrical opposition. If therefore oneness be non-real, *Bheda* or difference should be real. Reality of difference is fatal to the absolutist. The concept of oneness thus becomes involved in countless inconsistencies and contradictions.

Madhva's criticisms amount to this. *Aikyam* or oneness will have to be considered either different from the Absolute or not. If the former, i.e. if it is considered different from the Absolute, the question is legitimate, if it is real or not. If it is real, absolutism would commit suicide. If it is not real, the scripture would teach misleading things and stand discredited. If oneness were unreal, *bheda* or difference would be real. Reality of difference (or *bheda*) between the finite and the Absolute is fatal to absolutism. If on the other hand, the oneness is considered to be the same as the nature of the Absolute itself, or not different from the Absolute, it would be well-known as a self-subsisting, and self-luminous spiritual entity, and no metaphysical investigation need be undertaken for the ascertainment of that which is plainly known to all. Futility of metaphysics would be the only outcome. These are the only two alternatives possible logically and both of them are and must be unacceptable to the absolutist!! No third alternative has yet presented itself. Nor is it likely to appear in future. The concept of oneness or *aikyam* is therefore riddled with contradictions, impossibilities and inconsistencies. Metaphysics would be a futile venture as there is no object or VISHAYA that deserves or is in need of any investigation.

The futility of metaphysics would likewise appear more stunning and arresting on account of the absence of any use or utility. The test is rigidly pragmatic. MOKSHA or final liberation from the sickening cycle of births and deaths might be the goal in other systems of thought. To the absolutist such a liberation is meaningless. In his view there is only identity between the Absolute and the finite. The oneness is the only reality. It is already there. It is not something to be secured laboriously. On the absolutistic hypothesis any realisation of the oneness is meaningless, as the oneness is the only reality, about which nothing can be logically predicated, but existence. The absence of utility therefore must render the futility of metaphysics pitifully poignant.

The persistent and standing contention of the absolutist that the oneness or identity can *somehow* be realised though it is incapable of conceptual description and definition is easily disposed of by Madhva. There is no use of swearing by SOMEHOW. It is obligatory to explain how. Reality as the layman and the philosopher understand it attaches to the objects and things of the universe. Oneness cannot be a reality like that as the Absolute is the only reality according to the absolutist. The mare's nest is the

unreality—the non-existent. Oneness cannot be a non-existent like that. If the objects are to be described as members of a spatio-temporal order, as they should be in all concerns of life, existence in one place, and in a particular moment would involve the non-existence of them, elsewhere and so forth. Oneness, being admitted to be the fundamental nature of the Absolute itself—which is inaccessible to spatio-temporal categories, cannot be brought under any of the aforesaid logical alternative terms of description. It is therefore a mysterious Mrs. Harris in the name of which several theories are sought to be bolstered up by the absolutist.

The futility of metaphysics is further exposed by the absence of an *Adhikari*—a person fit to philosophise and willing to undergo spiritual discipline. The Absolute is the only reality. It shines forth in its eternal effulgence. The finite is identical with it. There is nothing relative to it to be known and understood by the aspirant who again is identical with the Absolute! There is no fit and proper object to be investigated and no use of any such investigation at all. The *Adhikari* has no place either. Metaphysics is futile.

As was explained in an earlier chapter, absence of *Adhikari*—a person willing to undergo spiritual discipline and undertake metaphysical investigation—of *Vishaya*—the object of investigation—and of *Prayojana* or the fruit or use of any such investigation—involves the absence also of any rational or systematic inter-relationship among the three—which is known as *Sambandha*.

#### IV

In the concluding section of the present work, Madhva establishes, that VISHNU—is the Supreme Being, the creator, preserver and destroyer of the Universe, and that He is entirely different from and superior to finite creation which is all His own playful work, by reference to three authorities of unimpeachable sanctity—The Bhagavad-Gita—The Kathaka-Upanishad—and the Brahma-Sutras. (2)

The Bhagavad-Gita speaks of Two Purushas—the *kshahara* and the *Akshara*. Importing modern terminology it is so easy to see that the principle of movement, growth and progress in a word the principle of difference and becoming is styled as *Kshara-purusha*. The other represents the principle of identity or of being—the *Akshara-purusha*. Identity-in-difference is the law of nature. Neither bare identity nor difference is a logical category. Identity would be continually in a process of splitting up into difference, and

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(2) Monism or Absolutism can never be the doctrine of the "Vedantā Sūtras." See *Anuvyakhyana*. 1—1—1.

the latter so split up would again be systematically synthesised in identity. The *Uttamapurusha* or the Supreme Being is *different* from both of them. He is the Paramatma. He interpenetrates and rules all creation. He must needs be different from finite creation over which He holds sway. The Lord says that because He is different from and superior to both *Kshara* and *Akshara* He is described as *Purushottama*—The Supreme Being. He it is who interpenetrates the three—worlds (the Universe) which he protects. A person who realises this truth and worships the Lord accordingly would attain the bliss of final liberation.

†A passage from the Katha Upanishad is the next authority considered. It describes a hierarchy at the top of which is the Supreme Being. *Indriya* or the sense organ is so to say the lowest rung of the ladder. The objects of external reality—*ARTHA*—are superior to sense organs. Superior to *ARTHA* is *Manah*—the mind. (sentient principle) *Buddhi*—intellect or the principle of intellectual discrimination—analysis and synthesis—is superior to *Manah*. The *Mahan—Atma*—the Soul is superior to intellectual discrimination. The *Avyakta* is superior to the soul. And *purusha* is superior to *Avyakta*. Not merely that. He is the “*ne plus ultra*.” He is the only and final resort of the aspirant. (3)

The Brahma-Sutra (3-3-59) lays down that of all the infinite number of infinite attributes of the Supreme Being, the attribute called *BHUMA*—establishes the unquestioned superiority of its Owner. It is the attribute of being eternally full. *Bumatva* means eternal fullness. Only the Supreme Being can possess that attribute. The finite can never aspire for its possession. The finite is never full. The Supreme Being ever is. *Narayana* is the Supreme Lord. There is no one like Him. In view of the unquestioned and undoubted superiority of the Lord, identity between Him and the finite is absurd and ridiculous. The identity clung to so tenaciously by the absolutist is riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions. Only if difference between the finite and the Supreme Being is maintained can Metaphysics be possible at all. Only on that view can the status of metaphysics as an independent science be vindicated.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. The concept of oneness or identity between the finite and the Absolute is riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies.
2. It is either different from the nature of the Absolute or not. In either case absolutism is illogical.

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(3) See Bhashya. P. 59. Vol.-1. Sarvamuula.

Vedanta Sutra “Prithagupadesat” (2—3—28.) establishes difference between the finite and the Infinite. See Bhashya. P. 36. Anuvyakhyana. P. 195. Sarvamuula. Vol.-1.

3. The oneness is either real or not. In either case absolutism is untenable.

4. The impossibility of ignorance forced on the absolutist in view of the identity between the finite and the absolute, renders metaphysics futile. There would be no Adhikari—none fit to philosophise and willing to undergo spiritual discipline. No--vishaya—object either which deserves to be investigated there is according to the absolutist. There is no use at all in undertaking metaphysical enquiry.

5. Lord Vishnu is the Supreme Overlord of the Universe.

6. The identity between the finite and the supreme is illogical and should be abandoned.

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## CHAPTER VII

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### TATVASAMKHYANA

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(Reality Rooted in Difference.)

The three *Khandanas* the substance of which was reproduced in the earlier chapters were devoted by Madhva to the destructive task of exposing the fallaciousness of the leading and central doctrines held by the absolutist. Destructive work is just preliminary. It represents the necessary clearing of the ground. Trite as it might appear, no constructive work is possible without previous destructive work. The former would be appreciated only if the latter is executed with logical vigour. Madhva has written *four* works in which he has set forth clearly and succinctly a realistic and pluralistic view of the universe. It is time the substance of the works in question was stated keeping close to the Acharya's own words and to the elucidation given by the commentators. TATVASAMKHYANA is as it were the groundwork of the Acharya's system of philosophy.

Sooner or later a spiritual aspirant would realise that the world's joy and happiness are but transient and evanescent. The best of the world's attractions are temporary. Lasting peace of the soul cannot be had in this imperfect world. The nature of the Supreme Being should be known and ascertained and such knowledge would lead to the worship of the Supreme. The worship and devotional attachment to the Supreme would free an individual from the bondage of the cycle of births and deaths. The Supreme Being should be known and worshipped as the author of the existence and destruction of the Universe. The authorship is incompatible with any Monistic or Pantheistic world-view. Only a rigorously theistic view can do justice to the facts and experiences respectively of science and religion. Reality is rooted amidst difference and inequality. | Manifold and multifarious are the phases of existence. The universe reveals objects animate and inanimate no two of which could be regarded as equally endowed and equipped. The Universe reveals characteristics which are as diverse as they are interesting. An aspirant should endeavour first to acquire a clear and accurate knowledge of the different and differently constituted objects of the Universe. He should realise that the rich variety and complexity of the particulars revealed by the Universe are due to the Omnipotence of the Supreme Being. Impressed deeply

with the immensity of divine omnipotence he should concentrate his attention in devotional worship on the Supreme Being. Gradual worship would bring an aspirant face to face with the Supreme Being. Man can see God and yet live most happily. That is the supreme goal of life in the instance of blessed individuals. Madhva has undertaken his explanation of the nature of the universe so that an aspirant might know exactly how differently constituted and endowed he is from the Supreme Being who is the author of the existence and decay of the Universe. An aspirant would realise then that the talk of identity between the finite and the Absolute which is the pivotal doctrine of Monistic Idealism or Absolutism has to be disregarded as futile and unavailing. Pluralism and Theism would have been indirectly established when once the structure of absolutism has been demolished and raced to the ground. The Prakarana—or elementary treatise entitled TATVA-SAMKHYANA—has been commenced directly to explain the difference between the Supreme Being and the individual and indirectly to establish the illogicality and unsuitability of absolute idealism which insists on the oneness between the finite and the Absolute.

How does Madhva establish that reality is rooted amidst difference? In his opinion the category of independence is the most striking. Dependence on a thing or person other than one-self is a mark of inferiority, helplessness, and finitude. A member of a social order often feels that the so-called freedom of action and choice about which writers on ethical theory so grandiloquently excogitate and wax eloquent is the merest myth as his actions are conditioned, determined and counteracted by countless circumstances and forces over which he clearly does not and possibly cannot possess any control. It would be the idlest of speculation to dismiss those forces and circumstances as unreal and illusory. That is only pushing the question one step further. Why does that illusion arise and so persist causing such serious harm to the much vaunted freedom of the individual? Freedom therefore must appeal to finite consciousness as the most precious possession and unfailing index of Infinite and the Omnipotent. Madhva finds that the Supreme Being—Vishnu—is the only independent agent in the truest and completest connotation of the term. The rest of the sentient creation in relation to which alone can we speak of any freedom of movement, choice and action has to depend on the Supreme Being for its very existence. Madhva would divide all creation into SVATANTRA AND ASVATANTRA. The term used is TATVA. TATVA means truth or reality. It is sometimes rendered into substance or category. There are TWO TATVAS or realities in the world. The *Svatantra* is one. The other is the *Asvatantra*. TATVAM-ANAROPITAM. *Aropita* means the superimposed. It is the outcome of an erroneous interpretational stroke. Tatvam means the reality. It is apprehended as it is. No contrast is intended between a thing as it is and as it appears. The *Tatva* is known and apprehended as it is.

VISHNU—The SUPREME BEING is the Svatantra Tatva. HE is an independent reality. The rest is Asvatantra—the dependent. Madhava believes that in this dichotomous division of Tatva into the Svatantra and Asvatantra everything knowable has been included. The object is plain. Only the Supreme Being is independent. The rest is dependent. The contrast is vital. There is not the slightest evidence which would prove identity between the two. The independent can never be identical with the dependent. Difference radical, fundamental and substantial is established between the Supreme Being and the rest of creation—sentient and non-sentient—on the basis of dependence of the latter on the former.

The *Sankhyas* who have constructed with eminent success a realistic and pluralistic system of metaphysics also talk of a dependent and an independent reality. They consider the *Pradhana* as independent. That comes into conflict with Madhva's system. He desires once for all to establish that only the Supreme Being—Vishnu—has independence. The rest of reality is dependent on HIM. The dependence finds easy explanation. Finite reality derives its very being from the Supreme Vishnu. He preserves the finite souls and objects. He creates the necessary favourable environment—physical and psychical—moral etc., for the gradual evolution of the former to higher life and realisation of the Infinite. He it is who periodically destroys all creation. In fact, dependence for creation, preservation and destruction cannot but be complete. Madhva desires it clearly and finally to be understood that no one else is Svatantra. Only Vishnu is. In this manner is the overlordship of the universe possessed by Vishnu proved and vindicated. The *reductio ad absurdum* of the absolutistic position is clear. If there were any identity between the Absolute and finite, why not the latter share the independence of the former as well? It has already been explained in *Upadhi-Khandana* that the absence of any realisation of the identity in the present state of existence by the finite cannot be attributed to the operations of the alienating agency designated Upadhi. The dependence, painfully or joyfully felt by the finite, and the independence of the Supreme—Vishnu—once for all establish radical and fundamental difference between the two. If the difference is attempted to be brushed aside in a cavalier-like fashion, by a megalomaniacal fiat of metaphysicians, the onus probandi must surely lie on the latter—and frantic and vain appeals to an obliging cosmic ignorance must cease and be silenced for ever.

The *Asvatantra* Tatva is then taken up for further treatment. The positive and the negative suggest themselves. The latter is dependent on the former. Denial is preceded by an affirmation of something somewhere. BHAVA and ABHAVA would encompass in one sweep, all, dependent reality or the *Asvatantratatva*. That which impresses itself on a percipient agent even in the hypothetical first act of perception or apprehension, QUA EXISTENT is

termed *Bhava*. That which impresses itself as non-existent is *Abhava*. Suffice it to note that significant negation is throughout intended. An assertion is double-edged. Every affirmation denies. Every denial affirms. Should there be this sort of reciprocity, when are the terms positive and negative to be applied to characterise apprehended situations and the circumstances that enter into it? That is why Madhva asserts that the positive is that which impresses itself on the mind of an agent in the first act of perception *QUA* existent. Subsequently, the existent and the positive would be understood as pointing in the direction of the non-existent and the negative, when greater discrimination is exercised and deeper analysis employed.

When for instance it is ascertained that for childish awareness in its first act of apprehension, the world appears as a big booming and buzzing confusion, it is a reality which impresses itself on the subject *QUA* something existent. That would give the lie direct to the statement of the absolutist the universe is illusory and unreal.

A minor objection is easily disposed of. The opponent asks why the *Svatantratatva*—the independent reality—has not been included as one among the positive—the *Bhavas*,—as obviously the Supreme Being cannot be non-existent and negative reality!! By a variation of the fundamenta any number of divisions can be imagined and constructed in order to suit the exigencies of the investigator, and not all of them need be exhaustively dealt with in a particular context. Reality can be divided into positive and negative. The positive again into dependent and independent and so on and so forth. But Madhva would leave all such divisions to be drawn up by the readers as intellectual exercises. His main concern is to explain that the only independent reality is the Supreme Being. The rest of the creation is dependent on the Supreme. There is thus a radical and substantial difference between the two. Prominence should be assigned to the *Svatantratatva* i.e., the independent reality—the Supreme Being. It is on account of that reason, the division of reality into dependent and independent finds prominent and foremost mention. Of course, both of them are positive. There is no need to confuse issues and bring about a clash between overlapping fundamenta. The division can be managed with perfect freedom by each writer and individual according to the purpose he has in view. The most important ground for maintaining in his system of speculation such a fundamental and radical difference between the finite and the Supreme, Being the dependence of the former on the latter, Madhva has taken care to mention at the very commencement the division of all reality into DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT.

The *Abhava* (non-existence or negation) admits of a three membered division. One is *Pragabhava*. The second is *Pradhvam-sabbhava* and the third is *Sadabhava*. The object or the *Pratityogi*,

in reference to which predicate of non-existence or negation can be employed, is the central fact. Prior to the object coming into existence, it might be regarded to lie in a state of potentiality. The actualisation is a matter of time. If it has been arrested on account of the operation of counteracting circumstances, its occurrence will depend on the riddance of them. Potentiality is as much existence as non-existence or as much the latter as the former. The emphasis would naturally fall on the non-existence aspect in the state of potentiality. That is called *Pragabhava*. The terms that enter into the compound are PRAK and ABHAVA. *Prak* means before. *Abhava* means non-existence. The centre of reference is the object itself. The potentiality in the incubation stage is non-existence of the object. That non-existence is called *Pragabhava*. It would cease the moment the *pratiyogi* or the object is launched into being. The full-blown appearance of the object in question as a spatio-temporal entity marks also the cessation of its *Pragabhava*—the (antecedent) prior non-existence. A person experiencing a general state of vacancy or emptiness encounters only the state of *Pragabhava*. Everything lies in a condition of potentiality which is non-existence, or more accurately prior or antecedent non-existence. There is a discussion of a rather abstruse and hair-splitting character regarding the number of such prior non-existences as there are innumerable objects in the universe, and each would have a prior non-existence! The outcome is the discussion is unprofitable. In a state of affairs, too vague and ill-defined, for instance the state that must have confronted the Demiurgus when the cosmic clay was being fashioned—there would be an all-enveloping prior non-existence. It is pedantry to talk of as many prior non-existences as there are objects and concepts, and relationships etc.

*Pradhvamsaabhava*, is posterior non-existence. It prevails after the destruction of the object itself but under no circumstances before. When the object itself is present it would be contradictory to talk of its non-existence. One can talk of it after it has been smashed on the floor as in the case of a mud jar! The jar has been smashed. It is no more. We have only the *Pradhvamsaabhava* of the Jar. It is easy to see that temporal transition is responsible for this division of non-existence. X a given object is a centre or co-ordinate of reference. Two states have to be recognised, in which the object is *not* present. There is the past when the object did *not* come into existence as a concrete entity. Non-existence then of the object is styled PRAGABHAVA. There is the state subsequent to the destruction of the object. There should be such a state sooner or later is plain. For the object is *not* eternal. The non-existence of the object in that state is called PRADHVAMSAABHAVA.

The prior and subsequent non-existences have their respective jurisdiction. The one reigns supreme prior to the actual coming

into being of the given object. The other holds sway after the destruction of the object. The object itself occupies an allotted span. Should however an object be non-existent ALWAYS, IN THE PAST, PRESENT AND THE FUTURE, we have the third type *Sadaabhava* i.e. non-existence *ever*. The son of a barren woman is the typical classical example. His non-existence is not confined to any limits. Limitless non-existence is the third type. Limitlessness is explained in the following terms. After the actualisation of potentiality, *Pragabhava* does and must cease! This is its obvious limit. *Pradhvamsa* must cease to apply so long as the object itself is in existence. The very existence of an object as a concrete entity is the obvious limit to its *Pradhvamsa*. It exercises the fullest sway after the destruction of the object. No such limits can be shown to apply in the instance of the non-existence of the illustrative son of a barren lady! or the mare's nest! Its non-existence is described as *TRAIKALIKA*—non-existence in the past, present and the future. It is *ergo* limitless. The exigencies of significant negation, and the fact of every negation being positively significant, necessitate the admission that in the absence of specification one is entitled to infer that non-existence implies some form of existence somewhere. For the sake of exhaustive enumeration, limitless non-existence is also mentioned.

The Bhava—or the positive—the existent is then divided by Madhva into CHETANA AND ACHETANA. The former is sentient creation. The latter is non-sentient. A purely materialistic view and a purely animistic view of the universe are equally untenable. The universe represents a mixture of sentient and non-sentient entities. The non-sentient is intended for the sake of and for the benefit of the sentient. The latter is superior to the former, being endowed with the necessary accessories and equipments and it turns the non-sentient to its own use and advantages. The much vaunted identity between the finite and the absolute can never be maintained in the light at least of this division of all creation into sentient and non-sentient.

The division of CHETANA is next attempted. The choice of a striking and vital fundamentum is not easy. Any division can be undertaken from any purposive point of view. The problem of evil and pain attendant is the most persistent one. A division in reference to it would be significant. Madhva takes his stand on enlightened and rational hedonism—not the vulgar one. There is no gainsaying that every sentient agent desires to secure happiness and joy here and elsewhere in all his concerns and undertakings, and the riddance of evil and attendant pain. A moral life of devotional dedication of one's best to the Supreme Being is advocated only for the achievement of that end. If the securing and the perpetual enjoyment of unalloyed happiness be considered to be the nearest approach to a suitable fundamentum, two classes would suggest themselves—one absolutely devoid of all contact with pain,

and the other in contact with various degrees of intensity of pain, misery, suffering etc. Madhva maintains that DUKHASPRISHTA AND DUKKHA-ASPRISHTA are the only two classes or species of the genus, *Chetana* sentient creation. (cum salis grano). The *chetana* not at any time, and in any manner in contact with pain, evil suffering etc., is LAKSHMI—the consort of Lord VISHNU. She is a CHETANA. She is DUKKHA-ASPRISHTA. It would be inaccurate to render the term into *free* from pain. Freedom would imply previous contact with pain. At no time was LAKSHMI in contact with pain of any kind. She is eternally pain-untainted. The other chetanas are all DUKHASPRISHTA. They have had or do have or sure to have at some point of time in future some contact with DUKHA-pain. The Lord Vishnu's Consort is an eternal, free, pain-free and evil-proof spirit. The rest are not.

The SPRISHTADUKKHAS—those who are pain-tainted fall into TWO classes namely VIMUKTA AND DUKKHASAMSTHAH. *Vimuktas* are those who by a course of spiritual discipline have freed themselves from pain. They have shaken themselves free from the shackles of Karmic and samsaric bondage. Whatever their past they have nothing more to do with pain, suffering, and misery. They have freed themselves. They are free spirits. (2) The other class is named DUKKHASAMSTHAH. They are still enmeshed in the coils of evil, pain and suffering—(the members of the said class). The stock of their Karma has not yet been exhausted. They have to liquidate so to say the stock by slow and gradual suffering and cheerfully facing the consequences of their Karma.

A further question easily suggests itself. How are the pain-tainted *Dukkkhasamsthas* themselves to be divided. Are all of them entitled to and able to secure release from the bondage of metempsychosis? Obviously not. Some of them are in the essential constitution of their nature eligible for *Mukti* or final liberation while others are not. Those that are eligible for final liberation are termed MUKTI-YOGYAS. Others who do not have the eligibility are MUKTYA-YOGYAS. From the stand-point of the finite intellect of man, there does not exist any key for unlocking the mystery of the precise determination of or the identification of those individuals who are and those who are not eligible for final release. None-the-less it would be easy to assent to that division, as final liberation is the summum bonum eagerly wished for by all and it is impossible to choose a better basis of division. There would not be any justification for any nervous apprehensions about any pre-established harmony being surreptitiously smuggled into the system of Madhva, as Karma which is beginningless would function to render satisfactory account of the eligibility or otherwise of any given individual for release from the bondage of Samsara.

The MUKTAS and the MUKTIYOGYAS i.e., those who have already attained liberation and those who are entitled to it, can be divided into five classes (1) *Devas* or the gods, (2) *Rishis*, evolved souls who are what they are on account of a severe and sustained practice of a disciplined course of austerities and penances etc. (3) The *Pitris*—the dead ancestors who are believed to be watching over the destinies of their posterity living, moving and having their being on earth (4) The *PAS*—chakravartis i.e., rulers of men and countries by spiritual merit raised to well deserved eminence and (5) *NARAS* eminent men and women who have cast off the coils of Karma, suffering, pain and evil, and are enjoying a state of uninterrupted and unalloyed bliss and such as are eligible for it.

Those who are ineligible for Mukti i.e., Mutktyayogyas fall into TWO classes—TAMOYOGYAS and NITYASAMSARIS i.e., those who in the fullness of time would be consigned to eternal damnation, and those who would eternally be revolving in the panorama of of metempsychosis. The part YOGYA in the compound TAMOYOGYA is very significant. It appears that the members of the said class have not yet been consigned to eternal damnation. But they are sure to be when the nascent evil Karma enters into newer and fresher combinations of sin and iniquity. Have they no chance of saving themselves? Are they beyond redemption? Yes. Such they are would be the implacable answer of Madhva. Who are they? (1) DAITYAS (2) RAKSHASAS (3) PISACHAS and (4) MARTYADHAMAS are the four classes who are eternally ineligible for Mukti not merely, but who are eligible for TAMAS—darkness and damnation. Daityas are the offspring of Diti, and they are irredeemable. So are the Rakshasas. Pisachas are evil spirits. Martyadhamas are abandoned wretches among human beings and they are lost to all sense of higher and moral existence.

There is however the time factor to reckon with. Not all of them could simultaneously be consigned to eternal damnation and darkness. Some would be leading lives of unredeemed and unparalleled iniquity and sin as human beings and pursuing their nefarious career while others would have reached the state of eternal darkness and damnation *after* the completion of their mundane career. Each of the *four* classes would therefore be divided into those who have been consigned to eternal darkness and damnation and those who are qualifying themselves for the said consignment by leading iniquitous lives on earth. The former are PRAPTANDHATAMASAH—those who have already reached cimmerician darkness. The latter are SRITISAMSTHAH—those who are in the samsara—who are pursuing their mundane career.

This is not the occasion for examining the criticism levelled by some that in view of the doctrine of eternal damnation Madhva



should have *borrowed* consciously or unconsciously from Christian sources. The present writer does not believe in any of the cheap and unfounded allegations of borrowing that might easily be made against anybody! Parallel thinking and speculation are perfectly possible by system-builders and writers, and there is no improbability whatever in the view that Madhva arrived at his own conclusions independently of any influences Christian or Islamic! There is yet another fact. Madhva would urge that in support of all his divisions explained in the present treatise, he would quote passages from the work of Sri Veda-Vyasa himself. The Indian mind would readily acquiesce in such a line of procedure, and the allegations of Christian influence are as unfounded as they are ridiculous.

The allegations are evidently based on the resemblance that there is between the doctrine of Madhva and that of Christianity regarding eternal damnation of certain souls!! Personally I cannot attach any value to allegations of borrowing as the theory of parallel speculation can logically explain all the relevant facts. Nor can I countenance the stretching of the undoubted resemblance that there is on this typical point between Madhva and Christianity, to the breaking point. I am inclined to leave the matter an open question to be settled strictly according to the canons of interpretation of ancient texts and sound principles of chronology. As it is, the allegations of borrowing can be repudiated solely on the ground that Madhva has quoted elsewhere corroborative stanzas from the work of Sri Veda-Vyasa in support of his own theories and conclusions. (1)

Spurious and effeminate considerations should not at all be permitted to prevail in a reasoned metaphysical discussion which should be, (trite as it might seem) carried on in an atmosphere free from all passion prejudice and subjective sentimentalism. If indeed there is the possibility of the existence of social and moral paragons, why not admit the existence of eternally damned persons and souls? There is absolutely nothing illogical about any such admission. The question —“can a merciful God act thus and consign some of his own creatures to eternal damnation” is irrelevant. The individuals concerned should be assumed to act on the maxim or motto **EVIL BE THOU MY GOOD** and such satanic conduct can lead only to their condemnation to eternal damnation which is but just and proportionate punishment. The *Summum Genus* and the *Infima Species* will have to be admitted as perfectly logical and valid possibilities and there is no reason why they should be discredited on sentimental and non-rational grounds. The problems of sin and evil are not susceptible of any ready-made and easy solution. Inconsistencies in the solution have dogged the footsteps of many a metaphysical system. If it is questioned whether a merciful god can

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(1) See “*Tatvaviveka*,” P 241, Vol.-1, Sarvamuula. The conception of eternal Hell is related to the notion of **TAMAS** in Sankhya. See discussion in the concluding chapter.

be so bad as to consign some of his own creatures to eternal damnation, the question can equally logically be asked whether the Absolute would tolerate the presence of evil and misery in the world. If the Absolute can tolerate them so can the god or the Supreme Being of the Pluralistic system, consign some to Eternal Hell.

The TAMOYOGYAS are again those who have actually been consigned to eternal damnation and those who are revolving in cycles of births and deaths and have *not* yet been condemned to eternal damnation. The latter are obviously those who are pursuing their respective careers of iniquity in their mundane lives. Life on earth is granted to them so that their evil Karma might gather the necessary momentum. A metaphysically nervous conscience might even now ask—whether persons pursuing careers of iniquity cannot turn new leaves under the force of and impetus of some sudden inspiration. Madhva would answer there does not exist the slightest chance for the tamoyogyas to turn out new leaves! The former are styled PRAPTANDHATAMAS and the latter SRITISAMSTAH i.e., the former have reached eternal darkness. The latter are putting and serving their term of probation or preparation for the damnation!!

So far Madhva was engaged in the task of dividing the CHETANA or sentient existence. He next takes up the Achetana, or the non-sentient creation for division and subdivision. Three classes of non-sentient existence can be distinguished from one another. One is the *Nitya* or the eternal. The Vedas i.e., the revealed texts the *Varnas* i.e., the letters of the Sanskrit alphabet and the *Avyakritakasa* (that is a peculiar space admitted by Madhva to exist) are *nitya*—eternal and imperishable. (2) The *Nitya-Anitya* is the second class of non-sentient creation which is partly eternal and partly not. The sacred texts other than revealed ones, time and prakriti are *Nitya-Anitya*. Something in the nature of a compromise is evidently intended. There might be some change in the parts or aspects of an object while its essential nature is retained intact. It is an identity in difference. A synthesis is effected between the being and the becoming aspects. The latter would change. The former would not. The *Nitya* aspect is evidently the being or the relatively eternal aspect. The *Anitya* aspect is the becoming one which is susceptible and capable of change. Synthesise the two and we have the NITYA-ANITYA, the eternal-cum-non-eternal or perishable aspect. The Puranas might serve as illustrations. The letter might and does vary. Several authors have composed several epics,—historical and mythological accounts. The spirit is the pervading one of unity. It is an identity in difference. The letter dies. The spirit lives and persists for ever.

The third class is the *Anitya*—the non-eternal or the perishable. It can be divided into SAMSRISHTA and the ASAMSRISHTA. The latter means the non-created. The former means the created. As such the uncreated is superior to and

independent of the created from a certain angle of vision, which is obvious. The Asamsrishta or the uncreated are merely the 24-tatvas or entities that enter into cosmic constitution. Their existence and function are inferred on a *priori* grounds. Without resort to them explanation of experience becomes impossible and incoherent. While they certainly contribute to a satisfactory explanation of experience, they are not derived from it. The *Mahattatva* is one of such uncreated entities. It is believed to be the body in which Brahma clothes himself. It stands evidently for the creative principle or creative-cum-preservative principle. 2. The *Ahankara* tatva is the second. It is the envelope of Siva—the destroyer. It is the principle of separation, dissociation and destruction. 3. *Buddhi* or the intellectual synthesis or the cognitive principle alone, is the third. As to why importance is assigned to the cognitive principle alone it is possible to surmise that as cognition determines and evokes the appropriate emotional and volitional reactions, it can be assigned primacy as the prompter of responses. The cognitive principle would make the organism acquainted with all about its environment and indicate what responses it has to make for purposes of effective adjustment. 4. *Manas* is the fourth. Its nearest English approach is the term MIND. It denotes a harmonious synthesis between the cognitive and the emotional on the one hand, and the cognitive and conative on the other. The mind is thus the synthesising or the unifying principle of the members of the tripartite of cognition, emotion and conation. 5. The *Ten Indriyas* or the sense organs are mentioned next in order. They are the gateways of knowledge. They are the channels of communication with external reality. They are uncreated entities. Without them experience is impossible. The sense organs with specialised structure and function, render easy the reception, co-ordination and interpretation of the incoming sensory stimuli which assail the organism. 6. The *Five Tanmatras*, and the five *Bhutas* complete the list of Tatvas which are computed to be 24. The *Tanmatras* stand for the qualitatively distinct, independent and irreducible sense-qualities with a definite leaning towards the appropriate objects. The *Bhutas* are the five elements—earth—water—fire—air and Space. The 24-tatvas enumerated explain the constitution of the cosmos. (2)

The universe on the other hand in which we live, move and have our being is the *ANDA* the created entity. All in it men, animals and things are created. The container and the contained are all created. The issue is between the manifest and the unmanifest. In the case of the 24-tatvas, the emphasis lies on the unmanifest aspect or the latent state in which all the tatvas lie prior to

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(2) Though he presses into aid some of the doctrines of Samkhya, Madhva does not accept the system as a whole uncritically. His computation of the 24-Tatvas is an instance in point. The Samkhya speaks of 25-Tatvas. See "Samkhya. Karika", Muulaprakritiravikritir-mahadadyah-prakritivikritayas-sapata-shodasa-kastu-vikaranna-prakritir-navikritih-purushah." Karika-8; //

manifestation. In the case of the Universe and all in it, the emphasis is on the manifest aspect. It is easy to see that in the hypothetical pristine state of unmanifestation or potentiality, it is not even possible to classify and identify the various tatvas. All would then exist in an undifferentiated mass which can be conveniently but vaguely designated as PRAKRITI. After differentiation, the 24-entities can be designated with their proper names.

With the enumeration of the tatvas, Madhva's object of giving an account of the cosmos under the eternal and direct control of the Supreme Vishnu is achieved, as the *achetana* has been divided, and that denotes the final step. But an important question remains to be answered. The Supreme Being—Vishnu—is in charge of the Governance of the cosmos. That is merely a vague assertion. In fact, not even the meanest straw can be wafted by the wind, if not directed to be wafted by the Supreme Being. One might assert that there are TWELVE vicissitudes through which creation has to pass and all the TWELVE are under the control and direction of the Supreme Being. Such control and direction would effectively and finally prove the independence of the Supreme Being, and the dependence of finite creation on Him. The dependence is a mark of difference. If there were identity between the two as the absolutist asserts there is no reason why there should exist this marked and radical difference between the finite and the Supreme. Nor is there any reason why the former should be dependent on the latter. Nor is there any reason again why the former should be subject to pain, suffering and misery and not the latter. On these grounds alone can Monism and Absolutism be effectively overthrown and repudiated.

<sup>f</sup> *SRISHTI* is creation. It is coming into being. Since the existence of a spiritual and non-material entity is postulated by the Vedanta, creation should be interpreted to mean the contact of the spiritual with the material embodiment. The act of embodiment or encasement is creation. *STHITHI* is maintenance and protection after creation. Allowing one to work out one's destiny in pursuit of his chosen and appointed career, is his maintenance in a given place in a social order. *SAMHRITI* is destruction. It signifies the dissolution of the material encasement or the embodiment. It is death or demise in popular language. Finite creation has to pass through all the three. There is absolutely no escape from them. *NIYAMA* is prompting to various types of activity. This is used in a comparatively narrow and specified sense. It is the Supreme Being who prompts finite creation to various types of activity—beneficial as well as harmful in the strictest conformity with the Law of individual and Collective Karma. *AJNYANA* is ignorance. *BODHANA* is enlightenment. Enveloping of the finite creation in ignorance and the enlightenment or lifting off the veil of ignorance are under

the control of the Supreme Being. *BANDHA* is bondage of Prakriti. *MOKSHA* is release from the said bondage. *SUKHA* is pleasure or happiness transient and permanent. It signifies the hedonically toned pleasure of finite existence as well as the more refined pleasure and happiness. *DUKKHA* is pain transient and eternal. *AAVRITI* is physical darkness or absence of light. *JYOTIH* is light. The last Two terms literally mean darkness and light. They are however intended to stand for all psycho-physical vicissitudes of finite creation.

All the Twelve (3) *ipso facto* are under the control and guidance of the Supreme Being. According to the purposiveness of the arrangement or the scope emphasis can be placed on one or more of them. For instance, it does not mean that *LAKSHMI* or the superior souls—the *MuktiYogyas*—of the previous division do experience pain or suffering—or are tainted by evil. Nothing of the kind. The Twelve vicissitudes or determinations would apply to the various objects of creation in accordance with the law of selection and rejection.

Madhva's conclusion is this:—If identity or oneness between the finite and the Absolute were a fact the difference between the two and the pain and suffering with which the former is inevitably and inseparably associated, become absolutely inexplicable. Either the identity is no better than the most indistinct and vaguest music of the distant drum or it is something more real, effective and potent. It cannot be the latter. Facts and experience are against it. If it is the former, too much store need not be set by it. On the other hand, scripture and science alike support difference between the finite creation and the Supreme Being. The utter dependence of the finite creation on the Supreme Being and the absolute helplessness of the former can be explicable only on the view of difference and not of identity.

#### SUMMARY.

1. Reality is firmly rooted and grounded amidst difference.
2. Difference exists everywhere in equipment, endowment, constitution etc.
3. The Finite Creation is dependent on the Supreme Being.
4. His Grace alone would free the finite from misery and bondage.

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| 1. Tatvasamkhyana   | by Madhva |
| 2. Tattvaviveka   | do        |
| 3. Commentaries on them by Jayatirtha.  |           |
| 4. Commentaries on 3 by Srinivasa Tirtha, Raghavendra-swami and Vyasaraja's Mandaramanjari. |           |

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(3) Eight determinations of the Cosmos are mentioned in a stanza quoted in "Tatvanirnaya". P. 264. Vol.-1. "Sarvamūla". The numerical strength of cosmic determinations is a minor matter.

## CHAPTER VIII

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### TATVODYOTA

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The work of Madhva TATVODYOTA which is slightly more advanced than those previously examined, has more than ordinary interest for the student of Indian Philosophy. The *Tatvasamkhyana* was devoted to an exposition of the nature and character of difference in which reality is so strongly rooted—a difference which resting mainly on that between the independent and the dependent, explains further differences which are present even in the state of final liberation. Madhva sketched a picturesque hierarchy of souls, differing in ambitions and aspirations, in endowment and equipment, above all in radical and fundamental nature. The souls have been so to say gradually graded according to a spiritual scale. Any advancement of one species of the hierarchy into another PER SALTUM is impossible. By the general spiritual life led, by equipment and endowment, by character and conduct, by aspirations and achievements, by motives and mastery, it might with some degree of certainty, be ascertained inferentially to which particular species an individual might be considered to belong in the scale of spiritual evolution. (i.e., ascertained whether he belongs to the *Nitya Samsari* cadre or class or to that of the *Muktiyogya*). In the work under discussion, the reign of difference is further sought to be reinforced in a controversial manner. The starting point for the discussion is the customary salutation by the Acharya of the Deity after his heart who is the controller of the entire finite creation sentient and non-sentient. The Supreme Being is the only independent agency. The rest is all dependent as explained in the *Tatvasamkhyana*. The dependence presupposes difference between the two, as it is meaningless if between the two identity were a fact.

The ball is set in motion by a query in reference to *Mukta* or a released soul. The opponent who must at any cost deny difference, is anticipated to ask—How can difference be established in the case of a *Mukta*? Subjugation, dependence and difference are invariable concomitants. The sentient and the non-sentient creations are dependent on the Supreme Being. They are different from the Supreme Being. But a *Mukta* (a released soul) is not under the control of anybody. If he still were, he would not be a free soul. Such is the thin end of the wedge. If identity were

somehow established between a Mukta or free soul and the Supreme Being, it is easy to extend the identity so as to make it envelop within its sweeping fold (as sweeping as incomprehensible,) all sentient and non-sentient creation. (of course other than the Muktas) A Mukta's freedom from bondage and control is made the ground for the assertion of the existence of identity between the Supreme Being and himself. When once freedom has been attained there is nought that would dislodge a Mukta from his spiritual eminence. Nought would degrade or gravitate him to finitude once more and to the vicissitudes of finite existence. The state of liberation is the only reality. Liberation means freedom from bondage and control. Freedom means absence of difference, which is the concomitant of control and bondage. The hope of the opponent is that if identity were established in the final state, the empirical difference can be brushed aside as illusory and unreal.

Madhva clearly sees through the transparently illogical character of the contention. He realises that logical consistency in speculative system-building based on reason and revelation, would require that difference, should be shown to persist even in the state of fraternity of free souls. The task is undertaken in the opening sentence of *Tatvodyota*. A syllogism is coined to satisfy fastidious logical conscience. No doubt *Agama* as the most powerful *pramana* should have precedence. But as a preliminary a syllogism is mentioned—VIMATO BHINNAH MUKTATVAT-YATHA SAMPRATIPANNAH. The minor term is VIMATAH i.e., the subject of investigation. What is that? It is left unspecified. The non-specification of the minor term is methodologically intended to facilitate a purposive fixation of the appropriate boundaries of the minor term, so that the latter might take the predicate without inconsistency and contradiction. The parties to the controversy would easily understand that the term VIMATAH denotes the free soul—freed from the bondage of *Samsara*. The significance of the syllogism is this. A mukta or a free soul, by having become liberated from the cycle of births and deaths, retains intact and unimpaired even in the state of fraternity of free souls, the difference essential and radical which confers inalienable individuality on the soul. Liberation from the miseries of existence in *samsara* does not annihilate the difference and individuality and make the soul identical with the Supreme Being. The liberation must imply a previous state of bondage and existence cribbed, caged, and confined in *Samsara*. If not liberation is meaningless. Previous bondage in Karmic chains forged by the freewill of the agent placed amidst response-evoking environments, the perception of and realisation of uncomfortableness in such chains, putting forth of the requisite spiritual effort for shaking oneself free from the shackles of finite existence, and final liberation are implied as constituent elements in the evolution of a soul to perfection and its admission to the fraternity of free souls. The Supreme Being has nothing whatever to do with such evolutionary stages of

perfection. It is for ever and eternally perfect, free and not bound by anything. A Mukta on the other hand has risen to a state of blessedness by dint of spiritual effort and ethical endeavour. The difference between the Supreme Being and a Mukta is grounded on the fact that the latter had to pass laboriously through stages of progressive advancement while the former is eternally free and perfect. MUKTATVAT is the ground of generalisation or the syllogistic middle term. He who is now a Mukta must be different from the Supreme Being on account of the fact of his being a Mukta, i.e., on account of his long spiritual apprenticeship under a guru, and of spiritual effort etc. The purpose of the controversy is amply fulfilled by establishing that a free soul in the state of its freedom, has upon it the indelible stamp of difference or difference in a radical and essential characteristic of the free soul. The question can be postponed or need not be raised at all "difference from what?" To the opponent who contends that in the final stage all is lost and absorbed in fontal nullity and that a free soul merged in that nullity has none of difference it is sufficient answer if a member of the fraternity of free souls is shown to retain intact whatever difference he did possess even in his samsaric state i.e., the state prior to *mukti* or freedom from bondage. Madhva's syllogism does establish the difference,—(the object or objects and the subjects too from which the free soul differs being purposely left unspecified so that specification can be resorted to when necessary, in satisfaction of a pragmatic need). The difference that the syllogism seeks to establish is ANIRDISHATAPRATIYOGIKA i.e., difference one member of which is left unspecified. Or the answer is perfectly logical and valid that whatever difference a free soul possessed and whatever individuality in the bond state of samsaric existence, are retained intact and unimpaired even in the final free-state. Ultimate freedom is perfectly compatible with difference which indeed contributes materially to enhance the spiritualised emotional bliss of a free soul. On the view of identity between the Absolute and the finite, there is nothing to strive for, nothing to be achieved. Identity with the Absolute is freedom from bondage. The identity is there. It is not something to be realised by someone in the course of time. It acts like a blind *vis a tergo*! The identity is ever a *fait accompli* or it is nothing. On the view of difference, there is every scope and justification for spiritual progress and advancement. A free soul becomes what it is as a result of its own spiritual endeavour. The Supreme Being QUA eternally free should be different from what *becomes* free having once been bond! No riotous imagination, no mystical reverie can annihilate the difference which is an inherent characteristic. When it is maintained that even a free soul is different from the Supreme Being—Iswara—a *fortiori*, the difference between a bond soul and other relevant entities becomes a stubborn fact, and PRO



TANTO identity between it and the Absolute a more glaring absurdity. The identity therefore is the merest mare's nest!

The opponent—who is the absolutist—is not to be so easily silenced. He asks—"What is the difference that is thus syllogistically sought to be established?" "I know of only Two categories. The *anirvachaniya*—the illusory—the indescribable and the indefinable—and the *Paramarthika* or the real. Is the difference the former? If so, difference-view would have then committed suicide. If the latter, the illustrative instance would be devoid of and divorced from the major term, as the only *paramarthika* object is the Absolute!" Madhva rejoins that the opponent's query itself is absurd. Just see. A question relating to the specification disjunctively of one of the alternative predicates can legitimately lie only when the several alternative predicates are shown strictly to conform to the laws of thought, and be capable of being coupled with the given subject in an assertion. If a person utters the term EGG, it is illegitimate pompously to raise the query whether it is the EGG of a horse or of a cow and so on. Equestrian EGG is a zoological zero. Even supposing the question is natural in the mouth of a child who might know something of an egg and (might be in an interrogative mood) ask the worried school-mistress if there be an egg of a horse! But the query is absurd on the plane of an intellectual adult. A genetic study and analysis of the situation would reveal that a question relative to the choice of alternatives can lie only when all the alternatives known and ascertained appear to be equally valid and tempting. That is the procedure in all disjunctive reasoning. The alternatives should (within the limits of relevancy and within an universe of discourse) be valid and reasonable. In the present instance however, nobody has any notion of what the *Anirvachniya* or the indescribable or indefinable is or is like. When a person experiences difference between ruler and the ruled, the knower and the known, subject and the object etc., he does not ask himself if the said difference is real or illusory! (as the latter is not a legitimate alternative at all). No one has any notion about the *Anirvachaniya* until it is artificially engendered by a state of metaphysical sophistication, by whatever means or agency brought about! Difference under any circumstances is real and the difference perceived by the individual (there is nothing *infra dig* if one should choose to style it empirical consciousness, as no one has any notion of non-empirical or absolutistic consciousness!) is always the real one. The *anirvachaniya* (1) as pointed out elsewhere is a mere figment of the imagination. It would not present itself as a legitimate disjunctive alternative at all in reference to anything—not to speak specifically at all in reference to anything-about difference and disparateness. Quibbling about difference being

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(1) See Anuvyakhya. "Vailakshanyam-sadasatorapyetena-nishidhyate." P. 162. Also "Mayavada-khandana." "Anirvachaniyaasiddhescha." *Anirvachaneeyasiddheh* P. 240.

real or illusory is the privilege of a metaphysically sophisticated mentality. Difference is real wherever perceived. At any rate it is not *anirvachaniya*—indescribable, indefinable and a conceptual non-descript.

The disingenuousness of the query is all the more glaring when it is considered that for the absolutist, real difference can never exist as the Absolute is the only reality. When therefore the concept of *anirvachaniya* is knocked on the head, real difference will have to be admitted even at the sacrifice of absolutism!

The absolutist now makes an attempt to prove that all the three *Pramanas* point unmistakably to the existence of the *Anirvachaniya*—*pratyaksha*—sense-perception, *Anumana*—inference and even *Agama*-scripture. Madhva refutes the arguments seriatim.

Consider the familiar illustration of the appearance of silver in a fragment of mother-of-pearl. There is perception of silver where there exists none. Subsequently when the truth of the matter flashes across the mind of the percipient, he says that *unreal silver appeared*. The piece of evidence proves that the *Anirvachaniya* has the support of *pratyaksha*—*pramana*—sense-perception. This is the substance of the argument of the opponent who alleges that direct sense-evidence exists in support of the *Anirvachaniya* the unreal!

Madhva's answer is that the term ANIRVACHANIYA does not denote an indefinable non-descript entity! When a person after his initial experience of silver subsequently sees there is no silver he is merely putting a correct interpretation on the sense-data presented to him. A shock is administered to his expectancy! The non-fulfilment of the expectation convinces him of his error in having interpreted wrongly the sense-data before him as silver. The error lies in interpretation as already explained. The term *Anirvachaniya* would mean *Mithya*—the product of an erroneous interpretation of sense-data. So the *Asat* or the non-existent alone would be denoted by the term *Anirvachaniya*, and not a mysterious entity which is neither *Sat* nor *Asat*! If it is contended that sometimes there arise perceptual errors as a result of which genuine difference is obscured, Madhva would say the obscuring is due to interpretational error. Perceptual error is evidence of something which trespasses into a concatenation of circumstances wherein it has no right to be. Silver has no right to appear in the concatenation of a fragment of mother-of-pearl. Yet it appears. It is due to wrong interpretation. The silver is *anirvachaniya*. It is *Mithya*. But it is neither indescribable nor indefinable. It is not a mysterious nondescript something. Sense-perception therefore establishes only difference between data and interpretation and does not succeed in annihilating difference.

The flight is from post to pillar! If not *pratyaksha*, there is *anumana* or inference as evidence for the existence of *anirvachaniya*. The inference is this: *Vimatam-Anirvachaniyam-Badhyatvat*. This (the appropriate minor term within a given universe of discourse) is *Anirvachaniya* (neither *sat* or *asat*) because it is *Badhya* i.e., stultified by a subsequent negation. The ground of inference or the middle term is stultifiability. As a detailed refutation of the entire position of the absolutist was undertaken in the course of the earlier chapter on *MITHYATVANUMANA-KHANDANA*, only the leading objections are pointedly hinted at in the present context. (1) Any conclusion or truth sought to be established by inference should be supported by sufficient corroborative evidence. Even supposing that the heart's desire of the opponent be realised and a nondescript entity which is neither *Sat* nor *Asat* be established by means of the syllogism in question, there is a serious drawback that prior to the pragmatic use of the syllogism, there did not exist a nondescript entity like that. Wherefrom is the corroboration to be secured? The validity of the inference should certainly suffer on account of the lack of *Prasiddhi* or natural well-knownness of the mysterious concept of *anirvachaniya*.

(2) The absolutist contends again—Suffice it to maintain that everything other than Brahman—the absolute pure being, the only reality—is unreal. The *Asat*—the absolutely non-existent championed by the Madhvaitees,—and his own *Anirvachaniya* must fall under the category of OTHER-than-Brahman. Both fall under the category of the unreal (the illusory). Suppose the illusoriness is syllogistically or inferentially established. Only general illusoriness of all other than Brahman has been thus established. A general inference like that or a universal should be shown to inhere or be embodied amidst relevant particulars. Otherwise a general statement hanging in the air without specification amidst particulars cannot command logical acceptance. Where shall the specification be? Something appears to exist. Whatever appears is *asat*! and what is *asat* except *anirvachaniya*? When the *asat* in the sense of appearance is thus familiarised, the *anirvachaniya* also becomes familiarised!

Such a contention cannot stand a moment's examination. It can hold water only when the parties to the controversy agree to understand by the term *MITHYA* illusory—a comprehensive concept which would include under its aegis both the *asat* and the *anirvachaniya*. The formulation of such an all-inclusive concept is impossible. If a thing is illusory, it is non-existent. It is *asat*. What is *asat* can never be *asadvilakshana* also! The *anirvachaniya* unfortunately is said to be different from the *sat* as well from the *asat*! *Sadasad-vilakshana*—different both from the existent and the non-existent—is a contradictory and self-annihilating or suicidal concept!. Nothing is gained by the naive assertion that

everything other than pure being is illusory. What is the nature of the illusion? If it is an illusion even then, why does it persist? Is it an illusion on a gigantic scale never to be dispelled? Such questions are all conveniently shelved without an adequate answer. Seeing however that the other-than-Brahman, the other-than-pure-being is not a mare's nest, it does exist as a real entity even as the immutable pure being. If it is not *asat*, it must be *sat*. Brahman is also *sat*. Realism is thus vindicated. Persistent espousal of a concept—i.e., of the *anirvachniya-sadasadvilakshana*—different from the existent and from the non-existent—which is radically and inherently contradictory constitutes the bane of absolutism. After all, notwithstanding the *ipse dixit*s of those who say that life is more than logic, that life is experience, and that the experience of the mystic would guarantee the reality of the pure being and the illusoriness of the finite existence, logic cannot be so summarily repudiated. What is *not non-existent* should be existent. Why then should violence be done to such an inexorable law of thought from the standpoint of mystical experience which (if records of such experience be true) contains as its life-breath the negation of all logic. *Sadasadvilakshana* must therefore go. The opponent now turns to *Agama* or scripture for support. The scripture never speaks of anything which is neither existent, nor non-existent. Even as any other body of texts, the scripture would speak of something which is quite intelligible, existent, and of some decided spiritual serviceability. In fact, resort to scripture is necessitated only for obtaining enlightenment on matters which lie beyond the purview of sense-perception (*pratyaksha*) and inference (*anumana*). It would be a self-stultifying procedure if one should (after having agreed to satisfy the exigencies of debate, and agreed to attach supreme value to the authority of the *Agama* or the scripture) stigmatise the identical text as dealing with a subject matter which is neither existent nor non-existent!! Madhva explains that nowhere do the scriptural texts proclaim anything of that mysterious entity—of the *Anirvachaniya* or the *Sadasadvilakshana*.

But there is a passage, rather a sentence which speaks of the mysterious *sadasadvilakshana*, interrupts the opponent. NASAD-ASIT, NO SADASIT TADANEEM NASIDRAJO NOVYOMAPARO-YAT etc. The sentence speaks of Avidya. How? At that time, there was neither (*sat*) existent, nor (*asat*) the non-existent. But there was (*Tamas*) cosmic darkness. Avidya is *sadasadvilakshana*. The sentence has reference to (*Pralaya*) cosmic annihilation. At that time, there was not the *sat*. Nor the *Asat*. But darkness alone (*TAMAS*) was reigning supreme. The meaning of the terms *sat* and *asat* has to be properly understood if the propriety of the assertion made in the sentence is to be realised.

There is yet another small point. That in the final annihilation stage nought remains is the meaning of the sentence. What ther

is the residuum that remains? It is *tamas* or darkness cimmerian! It is neither *sat* nor *asat* as usual. Why not it be *sadasadvilakshana*? For *sat* and *asat* are expressly stated to have then ceased to exist. Such a line of argument would be, writes Madhva, fatal to the absolutist. It is not the *tamas* alone that remains as a residuum. The sentence "ANIDAVATAMSVADHAYA TAD-EKAM" makes clear that the Absolute or Brahman is the residuum at the time of final annihilation when all else should have been destroyed and dissolved in cosmic vapour. If so on the basis of reasoning adopted in connection with the residuum of Tamas—darkness—the absolutist would have to hold that the residuum of Brahman is also *Anirvachaniya*—or *sadasadvilakshana*—(neither existent or non-existent) a conclusion which is fatal to him. True the passage asserts that at that time neither *sat* nor *Asat* existed. If, on the basis of the said denial, it is sought to be maintained that the residuum should be the mysterious entity of *sadasadvilakshana*—the Absolute would have to be on a par with Tamas or darkness, as both are residual! There is not on the view of the absolutist, even the slightest justification why the application of the contradictory concept of *sadasadvilakshana* should be restricted to Tamas or the darkness and not extended to the Absolute, while both are equally residual persisting at the time of a final annihilation or Pralaya. The *onus probandi* in the matter of the restriction of the application of the concept must rest on the absolutist.

What then is the real and true interpretation of the sentence quoted above which denies the existence of both *sat* and *asat*? The context requires the interpretation which has been advanced elsewhere. *Sat* is *Murtha*. *Asat* is *Amurtha*. Brahman and Prakriti (Tamas) are neither *murtha* nor *amurtha*. What do the terms *murtha* and *amurtha* signify? Collectively, they mean the five elements. Earth, water and fire are known as *Murtha*, while air and space are known as *Amurtha*. Brahman is different from both *Murtha* and *Amurtha* i.e., the five elements. The Supreme Being, Brahman is certainly distinct, different from and superior to the elements. It is ergo neither *sat* nor *asat*. As the sruti passage affirms only the distinctness and superiority of Brahman, no contradiction is involved, while contradiction would dog the footsteps of the argument of the Absolutist if the terms *sat* and *asat* be taken in the sense of existent and non-existent. The sentence NASADASIT etc., would then be rendered thus: During the time of final annihilation—PRALAYA—the *sat* (fire, water, earth) did not exist. Nor did the *asat* (air and space) *Rajas* did not either. (The three Gunas—Satva, Rajas and Tamas). The ubiquitous *Avyakritakasa* did not exist either. As it is quite possible to include all creation within *sat* and *asat*, if they be taken in the sense of existent and non-existent, there is no reason why the gunas etc., should have been mentioned separately. Their separate enumeration is conclusive evidence which proves that *sat* and *asat* are used

to denote collectively the five elements. So the Sruti sentence under discussion can never be quoted in support of the absolutist's theory that something different from *sat* and *asat*—in the sense of *anirvachaniya*—the indescribable is mentioned in the said passage.

What then is the meaning of the term *Anirvachaniya* which is applied to Brahman in so many contexts? The meaning of *Anirvachaniya* is *adbhuta*. It means wonderful. All philosophy has its origin in wonder. The sheer wonder of existence should be striking to a deep thinker. It is all too wonderful to imagine. It is *ACHINTYA* i.e., cannot sufficiently be contemplated by finite intellect. It cannot be known directly. Nor can it indirectly and inferentially. The terms, *adbhuta*, *achintya*, *atarkya*, and *ajneya* do not mean that Brahman is indescribable and a non-descript mysterious entity.

But what of the passages in which Brahman is described to be the only *Rita*—the only reality and all else as *Anrita* i.e., unreality? Are not such statements in support of the illusoriness and unreality of the universe? *RITA* is from the root *RI* which means going. *Gati* also means *avagati*. Going from the state of unknown to that of known is *avagati*. Brahman is described to be *RITA* as it maintains all its characteristic and is known as not subject to the Bergsonian flux. But finite creation reveals change, contingency and uncertainty. It is therefore best described as *Anrita*. The terms thus do not meant real and unreal. Both Brahman and the finite creation are equally real. The former as the author of all finite creation and as the ground of all existence, is known to have certain characteristics—set, definite and unchanging, while the latter is rooted in change and contingency. *Rita* might mean eternal. *Anrita* is changing and perishing. The world of change and transformation is *anrita*. The world of contingency is *anrita*. Brahman is *rita* as it is not subject to change and any contingent whimsical flux. No contrast is contemplated in the texts between illusion and reality, between a thing as it appears and as it really is. Brahman is *sat* as eternal bliss. *Samsara*—finite existence in the world of births and deaths—is *asat* as full of evil and misery.

The aforesaid interpretation of the texts is necessitated on account of the pronounced and unequivocal statement found elsewhere that the world of finite existence—the world of organised and unorganised matter and spirit—is perfectly real. Vyasa *smriti* is the first authority quoted. It maintains that the world is *Satyam* (real). It is under the power and control of Vishnu who is the Supreme Overlord. The divinity and supremacy of Brahman would be seriously compromised if He is to be the overlord of something which is unreal and illusory! He is the real overlord of a real universe. But then does He like a churlish boy break the bowl he made? He does not. The universe is *nitya* (eternal.) Not

however static for all time. It is eternal on the analogy of a *pravaha* or flood. There will be cessations of and commencements of the flood. The universe never changes its characteristic of being real—stubbornly real. In particular times and under the influence of particular concatenations of circumstances, the universe under the control of the Supreme Being—Brahman—behaves exactly as it should for adequate adjustmental purposes. The *Vyasa-smṛiti* contains a condemnation of those who propagate the mischievous and misleading doctrine that the universe is unreal, illusory, ignorance-begotten etc. The *Bhagavad-gīta* has a similar condemnation denunciation of those who maintain the doctrine of the unreality and illusoriness of the universe.

2. The following *Sruti* sentences also support the reality of the Universe. The statement commencing with the terms—VISVAM-SATYAM can thus be done into English. “Oh! Indra and Brihaspati (i.e., the Supreme Lord who has assumed the two forms or who guides the two deities) your universe is undoubtedly real. Not only I, but the waters as well (i.e., the deities presiding over the elements etc.) are full well acquainted with the creation by you of real universe”. Another statement commencing with the terms PRAGHANVASYA—is to the effect that “we described the gigantic creative activity of Parameswara, which is real”. A third sentence runs to the effect that “The greatness of the Lord as manifest in the creation etc., of the universe, is perfectly real. I extol such greatness for my happiness, in sacrifices conducted and presided over by the Brahmins”. And lastly the sentence beginning with the words KAVIRMANISHI means that the Lord really created the real entities of Mahat etc.” The passages now, where speak of the Supreme Being engaged in the task of bubble-blowing or in creating phantasies and illusions, and in projecting image-pictures. Harmonising the texts which definitely proclaim the reality of the Universe, and those which apparently seem to indicate otherwise, it would be seen that, if the terms *asatya*, *anirvachaniya* etc., be re-interpreted as suggested above, the reality of the Universe would be firmly established, and Agama—*Sruti* and *smṛiti* texts—cannot be quoted in support of the mysterious indescribable, indefinable, and non-descript entity—the *Anirvachaniya*—which is the merest figment of the imagination of the absolutist.

Very often, the very hopelessness of a case would engender the courage of despair. The absolutist contends that if the three *Pramanas*—do not support the existence of *anirvachaniya* there is a fourth one—*arthapatti*—which would establish the favourite concept. How? If anything is *Asat*, like the horns of a hare, it would not be admitted to the membership of any sort of experience and perception! The universe is not so. It appears in perception and experience. If anything is *sat* like Brahman, it would never be denied, negated and stultified. The universe is stultified after the

dawn of genuine insight. The universe is therefore neither *sat* nor *asat*. It should be described only as *anirvachaniya*—indescribable,—as it cannot take the two predicates which alone are logical and relevant. Inapplicability of the (only two) relevant predicates to the Universe cannot but render it indescribable and indefinable—*anirvachaniya*.

Madhva advances two arguments by way of refuting the contention of the absolutist. 1. In the first place, *arthapatthi* is not a separate and independent *pramana* at all, as pointed out in the *Pramanalakshana*—(2). It is merely *anumana* or inference in a different guise. As it has been earlier shown that *anumana* cannot be quoted in support of the *Anirvachaniya* on the ground of lack of corroborative instances, as the mysterious category of *anirvachaniya* was never thought of by anyone prior to the unearthing of the present syllogism, *arthapatthi* also must fall to the ground. The same arguments advanced to disprove *anumana* would disprove *arthapatthi* as well.

2. Secondly, the inapplicability of the two predicates *sat* and *asat* is ill-sustained. The absolutely non-existent, or the *asat*, does enter into some intelligible relationship with a subject at least in the earlier stages of the evolution of knowledge. Terms like mare's nest would bring about an intellectual reaction in the mind of the person who hears them uttered. If a nest be actually imagined to exist, existence in the intellectual realm cannot be denied to it! That would continue until some one should correct the person by imparting the truth to him that there is no such thing as a mare's nest! The nest now has appeared as an element in knowledge, and that is exactly its *pratiti*-appearance-in some fold of knowledge. Even so the *Sat* might be held to undergo clarification in knowledge. Progressive clarification commencing from humble beginnings and advancing to more accurate and specialised knowledge is a characteristic mark of human experience. So even the *Atma* might be regarded as subject matter of progressive clarification. That would *pro tanto* make *atman* *Badhya*. So can the world be. It is known first vaguely and then more fully and minutely. In that way it is *Badhya* even as *Atman*. There is not the slightest justification why such an interpretation should not be put on the terms. So the inapplicability of the terms is itself illogical as they are perfectly applicable provided they are looked at from a different angle of vision.

There is yet another aspect of profound importance. The argument of the absolutist that absolutely non-existents like man's horn do not appear in knowledge, while the universe does is based on a confused psychological mentality. Well—objects and things which are assigned some sort of existence in the experience of an

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(2) "Arthapatyupame-anumavisheshah" *Pramanalakshana*. P. 235.



individual as the result of misapprehension or reproductive imagination, cannot be regarded to have been stultified simply because they can never be members of a physical universe of discourse. Sō is the son of barren woman. But when other things are contrasted with the *asat*, and described to be different from it, the perception of the difference and contrast would necessitate the prior apprehension of the absolutely non-existent!! The prior apprehension of the non-existent can never be got rid of. What is the basis of contrast? Why is the universe contrasted with the *asat*? How does it differ from the *asat*? If questions like these are to be answered there should certainly exist some knowledge of what the *asat* is from which the universe is described to be different and with which it is contrasted. If a psychological analysis of the perception of the contrast be attempted, it will be seen that the *asat* must appear as an element in knowledge. So there is no absolute ruling, that if anything is *asat* it would not appear in knowledge. In treatises on occidental logic, we come across similar discussions of the exact status of the contradictory. When something is being denounced as being contradictory the parties who might be interested in the discussion have a clear understanding of the matters of which they speak, otherwise, the very act of denunciation would be impossible. At any rate it would not be undertaken. When it is remarked that "Virtue is a square" is a contradictory statement one should be sure of what exactly is being denounced as a contradiction. So the *asat* "square-virtue" does appear in our knowledge albeit just to be denied, denounced and repudiated. The quibbling that the *asat*, is never directly the object of understanding, though it might be indirectly cannot bear a moment's examination. Perceptual illusions are the best illustrations in support of the *asat* being a direct object of experience. (knowledge) *Pravriti* or activity quickly follows on the footsteps of perception of glittering something which is mistaken for gold. All that glitters is not gold is a later realisation which springs up when the agent has grown wiser after experiencing a disappointment and a thwarting of his conative tendencies. How is it possible to explain his original activity which made him stoop to pick up the glittering object unless it is taken for granted that the *asat* does appear in knowledge as the agent stoops to pick the shining substance up with the consciousness that it is not *asat*. Elsewhere—(3) it has been sufficiently explained that the necessary sense-contact exists in cases of illusions, so that the objection becomes invalid that the *asat* not existing cannot be in actual sense-contact! There is sense-contact but error lies in the mind putting a false and misleading interpretation on the sensations with which the organism is confronted. In the light of such considerations, the argument of the absolutist that

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(3) See "Anuvyakhyana," "Asad-vilakshanjnyaptiyai-jnyatavyamasadeva hi-Tasmadasat-prateetischa-katham-tenanivaryate" P. 162.

because, the *asat* does not appear in knowledge while the universe does, the latter should be regarded as *asadvilakshana* is overthrown.

Similar is the case with *Badhyatvam* (stultifiability). The Universe of time and space, of organised and unorganised matter and spirit is never denied, or stultified by knowledge. The *Pramanas* cannot be adduced in support of any such stultification. Sense-perception is not in support of it. Nor is inference. Neither syllogistic nor inductive inference can be pressed into service for the establishment of the stultifiability. It is perfectly in consonance with the laws of thought that in the progressive evolution of knowledge, we speak of higher types of knowledge superseding the lower ones, but there is no doubt that both are perfectly real. The lower is *not unreal* and illusory. It is as *real* as the *higher*. Nowhere do we come across any instance of any object being stultified by knowledge. Knowledge is seen to render its objects progressively clear but nowhere does it lead to the stultification thereof.

The absolutist is in an unenviable predicament. Not merely the universe, the stultifiability of the universe also is bound to be unreal according to him. The stultifiability along with every blessed quality—characteristic etc., of the universe should logically and consistently be held to be unreal, as the Absolute is the only reality, and in that case one would be attaching to the world a predicate which is unreal and illusory. The result would take the breath of the absolutist away. If *Badhyatva* or stultifiability be *Mithya*—unreal or illusory—unstultifiability would be then real. No fallacy incidental to any immediate inference can be urged. The reality of unstultifiability follows from the inevitable logical implications of absolutism. Absolutism then must fall by its own inner contradictions. The *Sadvilakshanatva*—being different from the *Sat* or the absolutely real existent—which was made by the absolutist a ground for maintaining the illusoriness of the Universe, has other difficulties to encounter. If the term SAT be adequately analysed in reference to its appropriate connotation and denotation, it will easily transpire that the pet theory of the absolutist has no foundation in fact. In interpreting the significance of a term some say the universal is the only reality. Others emphasize the particular which is an embodiment of the universal. Others maintain that the only reality is the *Svarupa* the essence or essential nature of the object pragmatically and purposively determined and ascertained. The controversy among the Nominalists, Relists and Conceptualists is well-known and the issues need not here be repeated. If the Universal-cum-particular aspect be held prominent, it would be obligatory to acknowledge the existence of several real particulars which are so many embodiments of the universal lying submerged amidst them. The admission of several real particulars is fatal to absolutism. The universal is real. The universal is embodied or

embedded in the particulars of a class. Several *sats*, that is, several real particulars would have to be admitted.

If, on the other hand, the essence of anything is conno-deno-tatively referred to by a term, then *Sat* (that which has no derivative reality) is Brahman, and the Universe is admitted to be different from Brahman by the parties to the controversy. The attempt to establish difference from '*sat*' is a futile superfluity as the (*sadavilakshanatva*) difference from the *Sat* is already admitted by the realist. So an analysis of the interpretation of the term *sadavilakshana* would convincingly refute the absolutistic doctrine that the universe is (*sadavilakshana*)—different from the *sat*!!

Whichever definition is adhered to, it is impossible to deny *difference* in which reality is firmly rooted and on which it is grounded. The *anirvachaniya*, the favourite category of the absolutist, i.e., the indescribable, and the undefinable, can be brought home to the minds of the metaphysical dilettante and the unsophisticated layman, only as something *different* from what rational humanity understands by common consent, as existents and non-existents. When the idea can only thuswise be made part of the intellectual stock or possession of an individual, it is inevitable that the notion of striking *difference*, (*Bheda*) must enter as an unriddable constituent factor in any conceptual make up of the indescribable and the undefinable itself. If such a line of argument be conceded, as indeed it must be, difference would be the very salt of creation. The indescribable should be definitely abandoned. If difference from *X* be sought to be maintained unreal and illusory, identity between the limbs of reference, would ensue. If therefore, difference from the *sat* and from the *asat* be unreal as it must be according to the absolutist, *X* which is asserted so to be different, would be identical with the contradictory and inconsistent mass *sadasat*—(existent-non-existent) which a philosopher as well as a layman would surely abhor!! And then why should the ordinary laws of disjunctive reasoning be suspended in order to accomodate the absolutist? *Pratishedhasamucchaya*, that is, existence together of TWO negations of alternatives disjunctively exclusive is a logical monstrosity. If *X* is not *sat*, it should be *asat*. The simultaneous negation of *Sat* and *Asat* is impossible. The affirmation of one of the alternatives would be inevitable. Thus the world would be *sat* or *asat*—but under no circumstances the curious contradictory of *sadasadavilakshana*—different both from the *Sat* and the *Asat*!!

The conclusion so far reached is this: Reality is rooted in difference. The bottom has been knocked out of the contention that the Universe, because it is neither *sat* nor *asat* is *sadasadavilakshana*.

The starting point for the present discussion was the syllogism coined by Madhva with a view to the establishment of difference even in the final state of liberation. Up to the present, Madhva explained that the opponent's criticisms, (such as neither real nor unreal difference can be validly established etc.,) have all been overthrown; similar criticisms which might be urged by the opponent in connection with the *hetu* or the middle term—or the ground of inductive generalisation, will have to be shown to be invalid and unfounded.

## II

It is at this juncture that the absolutist puts forward his main thesis that the unreality and illusoriness of the universe can be established on various grounds. Brahman is the only reality. The universe of sentient and non-sentient creation—the universe of difference and diversity—is mirage-like appearance caused by the influence of beginningless ignorance. (individual as well as cosmic) It is Brahman that is styled by ignorant children, soul, god etc. The so-called real universe is manifestation of the Absolute. It is mere appearance. Here is the syllogism. *Vimatam-Mithya-Drisyatvat-Jadatvat-Paricchinnatvat-suktirajatvat*. This is illusory, because, it is *Drisya*—it appears—it is non-sentient—and limited (circumscribed) (2) *Vimata-atmanah-Tatvato-na-bhidyante*. *Paramatmanah*. *Atmatvat-paramatvat*. These finite souls do not in reality differ from the supreme soul—because they are *atmas*—even as the *paramatma*—or the supreme soul. (3) There is *sruti* also in support. *Vacharambhanam-vikaronamadheyam-Nanyosthi-drashta* etc. Beginningless *Avidya*—or ignorance should be got rid of by means of the knowledge of Brahman. The bondage is unreal. So is release! When release itself is unreal, difference in the state of release should be farcical and chimerical absolutely.

Madhva has undertaken a detailed and thoroughgoing refutation of the absolutist's position summed up in the previous paragraph. The general line of refutation is already known to the reader which is elaborately set forth in the earlier chapters entitled "*Mithyatvanu-mana-Khandana*" and "*Mayavada-khandana*." The nature of the illusion itself is left indeterminate and vague. No definition which is logical and free from contradiction and inconsistency has been given. Stultifiability at the dawn of real insight is riddled with inconsistencies. Nothing is stultified by knowledge. One type of knowledge might be and is more reliable than another. Sometimes there is altogether misleading knowledge. But there is no stultification of any object by knowledge. It is however the detailed refutation of the syllogisms which is of special interest and to its exposition we should at once pass on.

The *hetu* or the ground of generalisation is present in the *Vipaksha*—the instance containing the absence of the *Sadhyā*

that which is sought to be established. It is strictly speaking trespassing of the cause in the negative instance ; Atman—or Brahman is also *Drisyā*.—But it is not *Mithyā* or illusory. So invariable concomitance between generalisation and the ground thereof is seriously jeopardised. No such generalisation lies that what ever is *drisyā* is *mithyā*—whatever is decidedly not *mithyā* is seen alike to be *drisyā* as the atman or Brahman ! The entire trouble is due to uncertainty regarding the connotation of the term—*drisyā*. How is Atman *drisyā* ? retorts the opponent. Madhva answers sruti is the best evidence. ATMA-VA-ARE-DRASHTAVYAH. The sruti says that atman is to be seen—i.e. understood. Another sruti has it DRISYATETVGRAYA—BUDHYA. He is seen by a keen intellect etc. It must therefore be admitted that the Atman is *Drisyā*—in the sense of being known or becoming admitted to membership in the world of knowledge or in the relationship known as knowledge—as no other sense of the term is admissible logically, and that means that there is no invariable concomitance between the ground of generalisation and the generalisation itself. If it is urged that something which is poles asunder from illusions is also *drisyā*, it is certain there is something radically wrong in the generalisation itself. By a tortureless twist of expression, it is possible to exhibit the fallacy as thinly veiled undistributed middle ! It is however better put in inductive terms. If for instance an invariable concomitance is sought to be established between X and Y, and if Y is present in a place where there is not the slightest trace of X invariable concomitance between the two must go. Similar is the case at present. The Atman or Brahman which according to the absolutist is the only reality and which is not illusory—not *Mithyā*—is also *Drisyā* ! *Drisyatva*—the characteristic which is alleged to be the invariable concomitant of *Mithyā*—the illusory—is to be found in the Atman as well which is decidedly not illusory or *Mithyā* ! So the invariable concomitance between *Mithyā* and *Drisyā* is the merest myth. There is no invariable concomitance between the two.

But why ? interrupts the absolutist. Why should Atman or Brahman be admitted to be *Drisyā* ? It is not. The controversy is based on the connotation of the term *Drisyā*. Madhva desires to mark off clearly the conceptual and connotative boundaries of the term, so that the opponent might be pinned down to a particular position without resorting to constant shifting of connotations—a shifting which would render all discussion and controversy a farce ! *DRIK-VISHAYA* is *DRISYA*. That is the interpretation to which Madhva would confine the opponent. What harm if Atman is not *Drik-Vishaya* ? The sruti proclaims that Atman is to be seen and understood by a keen intellect, a clear vision and so forth. What is the significance of such utterances ? Atman should be capable of being known, understood, and realised. It could not be an obscure, unintelligible, mysterious and nondescript entity. It should be capable of entering into the intimate relationship which

is knowledge. Atman should be something capable of being known. It is the object of knowledge. If not, what is the meaning of speaking about *Atma-Jnyana* knowledge of Atman! The term would be perfectly meaningless and unintelligible, if Atman were not *Drisya*—capable of entering into the relationship (with a subject or knowing agent) called knowledge. When a person asserts self-complacently, he is in possession of the most exalted type of knowledge—the knowledge of Atman—what does he mean? The meaning is obvious that he has secured knowledge *about* Atman. Atman itself is the object of knowledge. Someone—some X or spiritual aspirant is the subject of such knowledge. Without this objectifying or the objectification of Atman, knowledge about it is impossible of achievement. But *Atman-Jnyana* or knowledge about Atman is a familiar and beaten expression in all philosophical treatises and discussions. It would be rendered meaningless and unintelligible, if it is not admitted that Atman, like any other entity, is also an object of knowledge. That means Atman is DRISYA.

What is after all the knowledge which a person gains or derives from a study of the Vedanta? It is *Atma-Jnyana*. It is knowledge about Atman. So Atman should be *Drisya*.

The contention that the knowledge derived from a study of the Vedanta might not be *Atma-Jnyana* at all is flippantly amusing. If such knowledge is not *Atma-Jnyana*, it is idle to expect it to dispel cosmic ignorance and reveal the real and fundamental nature of Brahman thus bringing about a state of bliss and freedom from the bondage of evil sin and misery of existence. Thus would salvation or final liberation be inexplicable if it be not admitted that Brahman is the object of knowledge. A study of the Vedanta is undertaken with a view to securing knowledge of Brahman. Such knowledge and illumination would dispel darkness, sin and ignorance. Removal of sin and ignorance is final bliss and liberation. Salvation itself would become unintelligible and inexplicable if it is not admitted that Brahman is *Drisya*—object of knowledge. The admission would, however, be fatal, as invariable concomitance between DRISYA and MITHYA would be jeopardised.

Objectless knowledge is a contradiction in terms. Knowledge crude or developed is always knowledge of something. So is Brahman obliged to be an object. The absolutist cannot tolerate the quality of being an object in his Absolute. He queries—why not somehow knowledge of Brahman be originated by a study of the Vedanta, even though Brahman is not admitted to be object, just as some knowledge is sure to be when we hear the term here's horns uttered, though the horns can never be said to be objects of knowledge? The query is meaningless. The form of knowledge is always dependent on the matter of it. It is possible to distinguish between the two, but they are inseparable. The form is fashioned

on matter. All matter cannot indifferently be stuffed into all forms of knowledge. Objectless knowledge would be formless. It is the object that determines the form of knowledge. Matter of knowledge determines its form. The AAKARA or the form of knowledge is inseparably connected with the VISHAYA or the object thereof.

It would be a futile attempt to annihilate the well-known distinction between knowledge, knower and the known. Knowledge and its object are disparate and apprehended as such. The distinction applies to all knowledge, and must so apply. There would be thus no escape from the position that Brahman should be admitted to be object of knowledge. It is *Drisya*. Hence in the syllogism which is constructed to establish the illusoriness of the universe (the ground of the Universal being divorced from the conclusion sought to be established) the middle term is not distributed!

The absolutist is ready with another objection. The pure being need not be object of knowledge. Still as it removes ignorance relative to Atman, and is related to Atman, it can be regarded as *Atma-Jnyana* i.e., knowledge of Atman! The contention is based on a verbal quibble. It is easy to appreciate the anxiety of the absolutist who wants to preserve intact the purity of the pure being which would suffer if it is to be admitted to be object of knowledge! The contention is based on a verbal quibble thus—Knowledge of Atman is so called because, it removes ignorance in respect of it! Similarly, knowledge of a jar is so called because, it removes ignorance in respect of it. Here is a dilemma. If it is admitted that it is knowledge or ignorance of something or in respect of something, there would be no knowledge without an object. Brahman would have to be an object too! If it is said that knowledge removes ignorance existing in or inhering in, an object, the statement is absurd as ignorance *never exists or inheres* in an object. It always inheres or exists in an agent—a percipient subject. If this is not acceded to, and if ignorance is said to be inhering and existing in an object, then when once ignorance is removed by X knowing it, all others would know it too, as the veil of ignorance would have been torn asunder by the act of cognition or knowledge of X and then the entire percipient universe would have to know it too!! Ignorance would ergo inhere in a percipient agent and each agent's ignorance is his own and *not transferable*. So is knowledge.

The conceptual settlement that each act of knowledge has its own appropriate *vishaya*, or object can never be repudiated. In the absence of any such settlement, there would be no knowledge at all. A percipient agent should be admitted. There would be a situation in which he is placed, which is composed of partly known and partly unknown constituents. Knowledge has its appropriate

object. Knowledge of K would remove ignorance about it. Knowledge about the working of political institutions would never remove ignorance about medical matters. If such a settlement be not accepted, there is no reason why a simple act of cognition or knowledge that "this is a pencil," or "Queen Anne watch" should not remove all ignorance about the real and fundamental nature of Brahman. Any act of knowledge cannot indifferently be expected to rid a percipient agent of any ignorance in respect of any object. Each act of knowledge is thus an independent response to a troublesome situation which involves some constituent elements which are unknown. Objectless knowledge is a contradiction in terms. Knowledge has its appropriate object. So has ignorance. Knowledge about X removes ignorance about it. Trite as it might seem, it is a profound psychological truth that, without object, there is no knowledge. The knower, known, and knowledge can never be arbitrarily rolled up into an undifferentiated mass!! They should be differentiated from one another. If that were done, Brahman or Pure Being would have to be object of knowledge. That means Brahman is *Drisyā*. In the inference of the absolutist, there would then be no invariable concomitance between DRISYA and illusoriness, as Brahman is also DRISYA. If it is not admitted that Brahman is object, then knowledge derived from a study of the Vedānta would *not* be useful and profitable knowledge. It would not remove ignorance relative to Brahman. Hence no final release or salvation would be possible. In a word, either Pure Being would have to lose its purity by being object of knowledge, or knowledge derived from a study of the Vedānta would be futile and inefficacious.

### III

After the foregoing detailed refutation of DRISYATVAT—one of the grounds of generalisation—the Acharya proceeds to criticise the second JADATVAT. A JADA in common parlance means non-sentient object. The contention of the absolutist is that everything which is non-sentient is unreal and illusory. Madhva commences his criticism with an analysis of the connotation of the term. What is Jada? Jada is *apramata*. Material object is one which is never a subject of cognition or a percipient agent. It is always an object. *Pramata*, though it strictly means a knower stands for a sentient agent who knows, feels and wills. *Chetana* is the term applied to such a percipient agent. Jada is not. A jada is thus eternally object only, but never a subject. This ground of inference also would be seen to trespass into the negative instance which is Atman or Brahman. It is an object which is entirely qualityless. It is subject and yet not a subject. If it is attributeless, Atman can never possess the attribute of being a subject or a percipient agent. Why if it is attributeless, should any partiality be shown to that attribute alone can never be satisfactorily explained. *Pramatritva*—knower-ness—or the quality of being the knower should strictly be



absent from the attributeless Brahman. It is an instance in which alone reality inheres. It is in technical terminology *VIPAKSHA*, an instance from which decidedly the feature sought to be established by inference is absent i.e., from which *Mithyatva* of illusoriness is absent. If the *hetu* or the ground of inference, i.e., *jadatva*—non-sentient-ness be found in instances divorced from the predicate sought to be established in reference to the world—i.e., divorced from the quality of being unreal and illusory—the inference should break down, as no invariable concomitance could be shown to subsist between the truth inferentially sought to be established and the ground of such inference. In cases like these, one might always anticipate what the absolutist (opponent) would add by way of reply. His is the usual stock contention that some sort of *pramatritva*—knowerhood or knowerness, which however is unreal and illusory—or which is of a less degree of reality than the Absolute—is admitted as a quality of Brahman or the Absolute. The admission is futile and would serve no useful purpose whatever. Illusory knowerness has been repudiated already when the concept of *anirvachaniya*—the indescribable—was shown to be riddled with inconsistencies and contradiction. The knowerness possessed by Brahman is perfectly real. It is only according to the absolutist that it is termed unreal, as the Absolute cannot tolerate the possession of any attributes. So the *Jadatva* trespasses into the realm of the Absolute as well and vitiates the inference that the universe is illusory because it is *jada*—non-sentient.

The absolutist attempts to trot out the bogey of another definition. A *Jada* is *aprakasa*. *Atma* is essentially of the nature of knowledge. Knowledge is illumination. It is *prakasa*. *Jada* is non-luminous. It has no *prakasa*—no light. *Atma* is *svaprakasa*—self-luminous. *Jada* is *aprakasa*—blind, and non-luminous. So non-luminousness has nothing to do with Atman, Brahman and the Absolute. It will not trespass into it. This ground of inference will be all right.

Madhva replies that, in a serious metaphysical discussion, one need not and should not allow himself to be misled by figures of speech. Atman is a spiritual entity. Whereas, non-sentient creation is non-spiritual. It is material. If, however, one would persist in making the statement that Atman is luminosity, it is perfectly relevant to ask—what are the objects that being obscure are rendered clear and distinct by this light or luminosity of Atman? This must mean, the distinction between knower, known and knowledge. The illumination can be *svavishaya*, i.e., referring to the objects which are capable of being brought into the relationship with the Atman—known as knowledge, prominence being assigned to self-consciousness. Or if prominence be assigned to other-consciousness, the distinction between knower, known and knowledge is equally well-sustained. The issue is this. The knowledge

or illumination which is the essence of Atman should have some object or not. If the former, one will have to admit an entire range of objects (capable of entering into the relationship of knowledge) and the Atman itself as object in instances of selfconsciousness. Neither the one nor the other can logically be the case according to the absolutist. The impossibility of one and the same object being the knower and the known must preclude the latter alternative. The absence of real objects other than Atman must exclude the former alternative. The possibility of objectless knowledge cannot be seriously considered at all. There is no such knowledge. Science and philosophy, common sense and technicality, know not such knowledge. The position amounts to this. No definition of *Jadatva* would suit. It cannot be defined as *Aprakasa*—non-luminosity. If it is Atman would be so. If the figure be removed, knowledge would be the essence of Atman. But knowledge requires an object. Objectless knowledge is a chimera. What is the object? It cannot be the self. If it were, it would have the attribute of being object. In fact, it is attributeless. Self-consciousness in the view of the absolutist becomes impossible. The other (other than the self) cannot be the object either. The other is unreal and illusory. Therefore *prakasa* or illumination according to the absolutist becomes inexplicable in fact, as the illumination would be objectless—would have nothing in respect of which illumination or knowledge is sought and gained. The definition of *Jadatva* would as usual trespass into the realm of Atman as well. As we have already seen, the other definition of non-knower would not suit either; Atman according to the absolutist cannot possess the quality of being a knower as in reality it is qualitiless, and therefore Atman is as much a non-knower as the *Jada* or the non-sentient creation.

## IV

*Paricchinatva* or limitedness is another hetu—or ground of the inference that the universe is unreal and illusory. A *pariccheda* means a limitation. *Paricchinna* is a limited object. The limitation can be three-fold. *Desatah-paricchinna* is limited by place—*Kalatah-paricchinna* is limited by time. *Vasthutah-paricchinna* is limited *qua* object in virtue of its independence. It is the third that confers independence on the various objects of the cosmos no two of which are alike. The absolutist desires to urge that because the Universe is thus spatially, temporally and objectifiedly *limited* it is unreal and illusory.

Madhva points out that spatio-temporal limitedness can never be made ground of inference that objects so limited are illusory and unreal. What mundane connection is there between limitation and illusoriness or unreality? A limited object *QUA* limited is not the less real than the one which is *un-limited*. Limitation is not a

mark of unreality. On account of its limitations, an object is bound to be perishable. But it is as much real as the unlimited object. There cannot be any intimate universal connection between limitedness and illusoriness.

*Prakriti*, *Kala* and *Akasa*, i.e. matter, time and space, which should be included in the class denoted by the minor term, are clearly not spatially and temporally limited. Under the circumstances the universal premise that whatever is limited is unreal and illusory cannot be had and formulated at all. In the absence of the mediating universal the inference itself would be impossible.

Limitations possessed by objects *QUA* having determinate boundaries marked off from the rest of the environment, is again no ground for the inference of the unreality or the illusoriness of the universe. A limitation like that is possessed by *Atman* as well. It is marked off from the rest of the creation sentient and non-sentient. It is an object. It is a *vasthu*—even as anything else. This limitedness *QUA* object is thus trespassing into the negative instance—*Atman* which is the only reality. The limitation ergo cannot serve as ground of the inference that the universe is unreal and illusory. There is not merely no universal concomitance between spatio-temporal limitedness and limitedness qua object on the one hand, and unreality and illusoriness on the other, but *Atman* itself which is considered to be the only reality by the absolutist, is also limited *qua* object thus making the ground of generalisation trespass into the negative instance.

#### V.

It is convenient at this stage to sum up the conclusions so far reached. In support of the reality of the universe and more particularly in support of the difference even in the stage of final liberation Madhva constructed an inference. The absolutist-opponent constructed a counter-inference in support of his doctrine that the universe is unreal and illusory. Madhva criticised the opponent's inference. First it was explained that the definition of the term illusoriness itself was faulty and secondly the grounds of generalisation were examined and rejected seriatim. The criticisms were directed against particularities. Madhva now adopts a general line of attack from a more comprehensive point of view.

#### VI

The unreality or the illusoriness of the universe is repudiated and stands refuted by *Pratyaksha*—or sense-perception itself. The existence-aspect is the most striking and prominent aspect of the objects of the universe. Sense-knowledge is only in the shape 'that the universe exists.' Unsophisticated consciousness knows no difference between existence (as a reality) and an

illusion (or unreality). Sense-knowledge is its own standard like truth. *Veritas Norma Sui* Neither by inference nor by scripture is sense-knowledge ever stultified or repudiated. *Pratyaksha* is *upajivya*. It is the support and feeder. *Upajivaka* is dependent or that which is in need of and receives support and succor. The latter can never be powerful enough to oust the former and bring about its stultification and refutation. It is idle to contend that the illusoriness of the universe is inferentially arrived at. Inference would never be powerful enough to eradicate the reality established by direct sense-knowledge and sense-perception, which is a superior *pramana*. Nowhere is sense-knowledge inferentially repudiated. Accurate and well-informed sense-knowledge modifies and corrects inaccurate and ill-informed sense-knowledge. Here and there occur perceptual illusions which are dispelled by correct acts of cognition progressively arrived at. There is nothing to invalidate the sense-knowledge that the universe is a reality. The reality of existence is stubborn and persistent. It is never challenged. It is neither stultified nor repudiated. When a rope is mistaken for a snake, and when subsequently it is realised that one's fear was groundless when he was confronted with a rope, it is only correct sense-knowledge that dispels the illusion. There is no indirect inference. Similarly, when trepidation ceases on his being told it is only a rope, other's observation should be brought home to the percipient of the illusion only in the shape of the latter's sense-perception and not otherwise. The *onus probandi* rests on the opponent—(the absolutist) who asserts the universe is unreal and illusory. Its reality is striking and strikingly brought home to every rational agent. It is never doubted.

But the absolutist contends that *pratyaksha* or sense-knowledge is misleading. The moon appears as small as a disc. Is it really so? Madhva replies that the Moon's appearance is due to the circumstances over which the percipient has no control whatever. It is due to distance. The sense-knowledge has been distorted by distance. Normally sense-knowledge is quite accurate and gives no room for ill-executed responses. It functions within well-known and obvious limitations. Its range and scope are definite. Limited scope does not mean illusory knowledge within the said scope. Limited as its scope is, sense-knowledge is perfectly reliable and gives us information about objects as they really are. The apparent exceptions only prove the general rule. *Exceptio probat regulam*. The moon's disc-like appearance is an exception which only proves the general rule. A normally constituted healthy sense-organ, an object which is not hidden and obscured, and a favourable concatenation of circumstances, being guaranteed sense-knowledge is perfectly reliable. In the instance of the moon, the object is separated from the

sense-organ by enormous distance. The disc-like appearance is caused by distance. That is a special instance. If the factor of distance is kept aloof, sense-knowledge is knowledge of a real object. A child might cry for the moon, and not the adult. The latter has some notion of the distance that separates the moon from himself, and the distance-factor explains to him why the moon appears disc-like. The awareness of the special circumstances and factors arrests the volitional response of the individual. *Pravritti* or volition or activity is arrested by knowledge of special conditions and circumstances. Special conditions are not universal. Their effect is seen wherever they are present and operative.

No such special circumstances are alleged in the case of perception of a real universe. The existential-aspect of the world strikingly impresses itself on the mind of every percipient. Why should such sense-knowledge be condemned as unreliable? Why should it be assumed to be an illusion? There is not even an iota of justification for any such assumption. Sense-perception as it is is quite valid. If allegations as to the intervention of special circumstances are made, they must be proved to be substantial. There is no use merely making baseless allegations. Madhva emphatically states that there is absolutely no *pramana*—no authority—for proving that sense-perception of the reality of the Universe is a misleading distorted or a handicapped perception.

The absolutist again resorts to another analogy. A juggler produces in a trice a mango-tree, and sense-perception of it is bound to be a perception of an illusion: For, there is obviously no such tree at all. Similarly, the appearance of the universe is due to ignorance of the real nature of Atman.

Madhva replies that the aforesaid objection is puerile. There is no evidence of any kind to demonstrate that the universe is the result of ignorance of the real nature of Atman. Ignorance? Of what? It is no answer to say it is ignorance of Atman. The subject know knows full well he is a percipient agent and has knowledge about the environment in which his lot has been cast. There is no causal connection or relationship between the universe and ignorance of the individual.

On the other hand, there exists a mass of overwhelming evidence which proves that the universe is the outcome of knowledge and purposiveness and not of ignorance. The Supreme Being creates, protects and destroys the universe which is the training ground of the finite souls in matters spiritual. The world is the theatre for spiritual apprenticeship of the individual strictly under the control of the Supreme Being. The creator ever has a vigilant and watchful eye on his creation. It is idle to contend

that the Supreme Being indulges his whims and fancies in blowing bubbles and creating illusions and unrealities. The universe pursues and works out its destiny ever under the eye of the Supreme Being.

In the juggler—analogy, the juggler himself is not a victim, but the spectators are. The juggler himself sees no illusions and sees not the objects of his creation : Here on the contrary, the Supreme Being is described as *ever seeing* the objects of His creation. To the Supreme Being it is all the case of an ever-lasting present, or an eternal present. The knowledge possessed by the Supreme Being is APAROKSHA. It is *direct and immediate*. Directness and immediacy are the criteria of truth in the absence of course, of counteracting circumstances. In the case of the *Supreme Being*, no counteracting or obstructing circumstances can be operative. His perception should be admitted to be accurate and never liable to any illusions and errors. He always sees directly and immediately the universe created by Him. The latter cannot therefore be an illusion at all. There is a statement to that effect in the Brahmandapurana. APAROKSHADRISO MITHYA DARSHANAM NA KVACHID-BHAVET. SARVAPAROKSHAVIDVISHNURVISVA DRIK TANNATAN MRISHA. One who directly and immediately sees everything and whose perception is under no circumstances liable to illusions and errors, sees all as *real* members of a real order and system. Vishnu, the Supreme Being, is knower of all directly and immediately (Sarvaparoksha-vid.) and He sees always directly and immediately the universe created by Him Ergo, the latter can never be unreal and illusory.

"If all this be true," interjects the absolutist, "what is the fate of other statements which are to the contrary effect and which point in the direction of regarding the world as unreal and illusory?" Just see. The world is unreal. The Supreme or the Absolute under the influence of ignorance is the finite soul. The world is unreal and illusory. Guru or the spiritual teacher need not be worshipped, as at the dawn of knowledge, ignorance would vanish and no grace or favour of anybody is required. There is only one spirit or soul. Identity with the Absolute is salvation etc. What is the fate of such utterances ?

The Vyasa-smṛiti has the relevant, rational reply to all such and similar contentions of the absolutists. The entire question has intimate bearing on the canons and problems of interpretation. The Vedas are the supreme *Pramanas*. They are the most authoritative texts. There are other texts less sacred and holy (evidently less apocryphal too.) The authoritative texts are thus the vedas and those that follow in their footsteps. The problem of interpretation does not arise so long as there is no conflict among the several

sources and *pramanas*. Should however there be a conflict, texts of the vedas and others that follow them have to be reinterpreted, and their surface-meaning abandoned. The work of reinterpretation is the work of harmonisation. Why this trouble? It has to be taken because the conflicting texts follow the Vedic ones. They are therefore entitled to respectful consideration. If the texts entitled to respectful consideration, happen to be in conflict the conflict should be resolved, and the texts harmonised by resort to rational reinterpretation, as they cannot be summarily rejected and repudiated. If however other texts and authorities not owing allegiance to the vedas happen to be in conflict, the best way of dealing with them is unceremoniously to reject them as they not being in conformity with the vedas the supreme *pramana* are not entitled to any consideration at all. It could be the merest weariness of flesh to attempt to harmonise and reinterpret them. At that rate there would be no end to the task of harmonisation and reinterpretation which would be eternally annoying and inconclusive. So the issues should be first settled. Texts not contravening Vedas should be reinterpreted and harmonised. Those that contravene the vedas should be summarily rejected. The same rule or canon of interpretation holds good for estimating the validity of YUKTI—arguments and ratiocination. The substance of the position laid down in the Vyasasmṛiti is that the authority of the vedas should not be challenged and arguments and texts which are in conflict with the Veda openly and unabashedly should be summarily rejected.

The reality of the universe, as indicated in the early portion of this chapter has the support of the Vedas. It is further strengthened and reinforced with the help of the other *pramanas*. Sense—perception confirms the reality of the universe. Inference does. Smṛiti texts also support it. In view of this concensus of testimony and all—round corroboration, it is the reality of the universe which should be accepted by thinking minds. It has the authority of the vedas. Textual passages and arguments which point to a contrary conclusion should be rejected, if they are in open and avowed opposition to the Veda, and if not, they should be harmonised and reinterpreted. The conclusion so far reached is this. The reality of the universe has the authority of the vedas. It has also the support of other texts. It has the support of reason and revelation alike. Passages which seem to convey the impression that the universe is less real than the Absolute unreal and illusory should either be reinterpreted or rejected, accordingly as they are not or are in open and undisputed conflict with the Vedas. The reality of the universe is thus established on the unshakeable foundation of the *Pramanas*.

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(4) Madhva's demonstration of the reality of the Universe is a direct refutation of the "Vivarta-Vada" of the Absolutist. See "Anuvyakhyana" "Śrutayah-visva-satyatva-vachikah." "Satyatvam-gaganadescha-sakshipratyaksha-sadhitam" etc. PP. 176—177.

## VII

We now pass on to the most important, controversial portion of the TATVODYOTA. Petty-minded polemics would hardly advance the interests of philosophy. The safest way is to give a faithful account of the line of arguments adopted by Madhva who turns his attention to the Sūtras of Bādarāyana. Madhva maintains that the doctrine of advaitism—the Mayavāda—stands discredited by the author of the Vedānta sūtras. How? In the second quarter of the second chapter of the sūtras, aphorisms are devoted to a refutation of several systems opposed to the Vedānta. Advaita also is repudiated. There are doubtless no separate aphorisms devoted to its refutation. But those that refer to a refutation of Buddhism can be interpreted to be repudiation of Advaitism as well. Madhva makes out that in point of doctrinal profession and leanings there is very little or no difference between the advaitin and Buddhist. In later controversial literature, under the urge of sectarian recriminations Advaitins have been characterised as PRACCHANA-BĀUDDHAS—i.e., Buddhists incognito who have been hiding their convictions for reasons of their own. We need not seriously consider sectarian wrangles and quarrels at all. They are not necessary for the ascertainment of truth, trite as it might seem. Sectarious apart, and their virus-ridden and rancour-begotten controversies, it is necessary to determine, as a matter of literary and philosophical critical research how far the equation of Advaitism and Buddhism to one another, on the basis of identity of doctrines, can be sustained in the light of the internal evidence of texts and doctrines. Madhva's contention is this. The author of the Vedānta-sūtras has repudiated Buddhism. The doctrines of Advaitism are identical with those of Buddhism. So, in virtue of this identity refutation of Buddhism also constitutes refutation of advaitism. If certain texts refute a particular school of speculation, other systems of schools the doctrines of which are identical with those of the former, should logically be considered to have also been refuted by the texts in question. The crux of the problem is thus the identity between Advaitism and Buddhism. If the identity between the doctrines of Buddhism and of Advaitism could be shown to be based on internal textual evidence, it would certainly stand to reason, that the identity can be urged in support of the thesis that the Vedānta-sūtras which openly and avowedly refute Buddhism contain implicit refutation of Advaitism as well. Madhva at once proceeds to draw out explicitly the doctrinal identity between Buddhism and Advaitism. The Advaitin is styled in the present context, *Mayavadi*, and the Buddhist *Sunya-vadi*. Madhva writes—"Nachasunyaavadinas-sakasatvailakshanyam Mayavadinah." There is no doctrinal difference between Mayavadi and Sunya-vadi. *Prameya*, or object to be known is either *Para* or *Apara*. Both together exhaust knowable objects. The absolute is *Para*. The universe with all finite existence is *Apara*. In respect of both of these there is identity between a Mayavadi and a Sunyavadi.



(1) Let the Apra-Prameya—i.e., the finite universe be first discussed. Some sort of reality is grudgingly granted to the universe by the Mayavadi. So does the Sunyavadi. Vyavaharika—satyatva—reality for purposes of empirical discourse and social intercourse is admitted by the Sunyavadi, even as by the Mayavadi. How is this fact known? Madhva has quoted chapter and verse. Buddhists have written Karikas (stanzas) which are quoted by Madhva. SATYAM TU DVIVIDHAM PROKTAM SAMVRITAM PARAMARTHIKAM. SAMVRITAM VYAVAHARYAM SYAT NIVRIT TAU PARAMARTHIKAM. The real is of two kinds or types. They are the Samvriti-satya, and the paramartha-satya. The former is empirical reality. The latter is absolute reality. The reality which explains and which is necessary for empirical existence and social intercourse and communication is Samvriti-satya. The reality on the other hand which remains and persists even even after the Empirical has vanished and ceased to exist when illumination has set in, is the absolute reality—the paramartha-satya.

What is the definition of empiric reality? The sunya-vadi says:—"VICHARYAMANE NO SATVAM SATVAM CHAPI PRATEEYATE. YASYA TAT SAMVRITAM JNEYAM VYAVAHARAPADAM CHA YAT. If vichara or logical inquiry be carried to its extreme limits, there is no reality whatever. Yet, something appears to exist. It is this tantalising reality which is *Samvritisatva*. It is and yet it is not paradoxical though the statement might appear. It is this tantalising reality which is *Vyavaharapadam*. i.e., which is responsible for and which explains adequately the empirical existence and social intercourse. There is yet another stanza. DVESATVE SAMUPASRITYA BUDDHANAM DHARMA DESANA. LOKE SAMVRITA SATYM CHA SATYAM CHA PARAMARTHATAH. The Buddhists teach and propagate their Dharma (their special doctrines.) in reference to and by taking their stand on TWO types or kinds of reality—Empiric reality in the world of daily life—and absolute reality elsewhere when the world of appearance has ceased to exist after the dawn of illumination.

(2) In the matter of the Para-prameya—which is the Absolute—there is very little or no difference between the Absolute—Brahman of the Mayavadi, and the Sunyam—fontal nullity of the Sunyavadi. NIRVISHESHAM SVAYAM BHATAM NIRLEPAM AJAMARAMAM. SUNYAM TATVAMAVIJNYEAM MANOVA-CHAMAGOCARAM. JADYASAMVRITI DUKKHANTA PURVADOSHAVIRODHIYAT. NITYABHAVANAYABHATAM TADBHAVAM YOGINAM NAYET. The absolute nullity is differenceless. Specificationless. It is self-luminous, or self-shining. Nothing sticks to it. It is beyond virtue and vice. It is eternal and free from senility and destruction. It is the one reality. It is Sunyam. It cannot be known. It is beyond the reach of the mind and speech of the finite individual.

It is inimical to Jadya non-sentientness, to Samvriti—(envelope of) ignorance, to Dukkha—pain, to Anta—end due to spatio-temporal-thinghood limitation, to other Dosha—evil such as bondage etc. It is realised as the sole, existent reality. If so realised, it would lead the Yogi, to identity with self. i.e. with itself. There is yet another stanza. “BHAVARTHA PRATYOGITVAM BHAVATVAM VA NA TATVATAH. VISVAKARAM CHA SAMVRITYA YASYA TAT-PADAMAKSHAYAM.” Affirmation and negation do not exist in reality. The Sunyam—fontal nullity manifests itself as the Universe under the influence of Samvriti—ignorance. Such is the one knowable, ultimate reality—the Being—indifferently known as Being—one reality, fontal nullity etc. The Mayavadi, in the Murari-sataka has a stanza to the same effect in substance. ANRITAJADAVIRO-DHIRUPAMANTATRAYAMALABANDHANA DUKKHA T A V I -RUDDHAM ETC. The idea contained has a striking similarity, verging on unmistakable identity with that in the foregoing stanzas of the *Buddhists*.

What is the *meaning* of the term NIRVISESHA ?—It means devoid of all determination, specification, quality and attribute ? It has nothing to do with evil. Nothing either with good. It is neither to be abandoned, nor secured with avidity and enthusiasm. Such is the eternal, fontal nullity. Such also is exactly the position of the Absolutists who do not admit that Brahman has any attributes and qualities. All determination is negation. The Absolute should be free from all taint of determination. It is SARVAVISESHA VINIRMUKTA i.e. Freed from and devoid of all determination. Thus runs the Buddhist Karika. NASYA-SATVAMASATVAM VA NADOSHO GUNA EVA VA. HEYO-PADEYARAHITAM TAT SUNYAM PADAMAKSHAYAM.

The Sunyam is doubtless indescribable by any of the terms and yet they do conno-denotatively (indirectly) indicate it. It is unknowable, and yet brought within the individual's mental possession. The Absolute of the Advaitin is just the Sunyam in verbal disguise, AVACHYAM SARVASABDAISTALLAKSHYATE—CHAKHILAIH PADAIH. AJNEYAM JNYANALAKSHAM CHA TAT SUNYAM PADMAKSHAYAM.

Similarly, the Absolute by the Mayavadi and the Sunyam by Sunyavadi are regarded as AKHANDA—the illimitable, and limitless. Free from and devoid of all determination—yet it is somehow (indirectly) denoted by terms suggestive of determination and qualifications.

Without the importation of any needless heat and passion in the controversy, it is necessary to note that Madhva's equation of Advaitism to Buddhism is based on the doctrinal identity he has been able to detect between the two schools of speculation.

There are however *TWO* considerations which would appear to militate against Madhva's equation of Advaitism to Buddhism and which deserve careful examination. (1) In the first place, Madhva himself has commented on The aphorisms under discussion saying that they are devoted to a refutation of the doctrines of Buddhism. How now can the Acharya go back on his own assertions and maintain that the same, self-same aphorisms are devoted to a repudiation of the doctrines of Advaitism? (2) Secondly, the absolutist writers in their commentaries on the Aphorisms have explicitly stated, that they are devoted to a criticism of the four schools of Buddhism. How can Madhva's equation between Buddhism and Advaitism stand in the face of the explicit statement that the sutras in question constitute a refutation of Buddhism? Let us take up the considerations in turn.

Madhva himself while commenting on the aphorism has stated that they refute the doctrines of Buddhism. There is however no contradiction or inconsistency between that statement and his subsequent assertion that the aphorisms might as well be construed as refutation of Advaitism. Sutras are defined as VISVATOMUKHA—capable of several interpretations. In first interpreting the sutras under discussion, as refuting the tenets of Buddhism Madhva simply followed a hallowed tradition. The Bhashyakaras who had preceded him (of the Two important schools of the Vedanta) had construed the aphorisms in question as embodying refutation of Buddhism, Madhva kept consistently close to tradition. This adherence to tradition would never preclude the Acharya from urging a different criticism altogether from a different point of view. So the first consideration has really no value whatever. As Madhva followed only a longstanding tradition, his original interpretation of the sutras in the second chapter, as embodying refutation of Buddhism is not in conflict with a later one to the effect—that they constitute refutation of Advaitism as well in view of the doctrinal identity between the two schools of speculation. If the reader on a careful examination of the textual internal evidence available, should be convinced of the doctrinal identity between Advaitism and Buddhism, a verdict should be entered in favour of Madhva. If not, the verdict of course would be against him.

(2) How can this identity be sustained in the light of the Absolutist's own (Sankara's condemnation for instance) refutation of Buddhism? If the Absolutist repudiates Buddhism how is it possible to maintain that absolutism is identical with Buddhism? The only explanation is that the Absolutists' refutation of Buddhism is due to traditional philosophical usage operating at a time when, whatever the reason, Buddhism must have fallen on evil days and positively into disrepute. It is only on such a hypothesis, the attempt made uniformly by the two Acharyas at a repudiation of

the tenets of Buddhism can be adequately explained. A repudiation however is perfectly consistent with esoteric or surreptitious sympathy with the doctrines of Buddhism which could not (evidently), overtly be expressed on account of the (presumably) pronounced hostility of the intelligentsia to the tenets of Buddhism. The surreptitious sympathy apart which can only be inferentially known to have influenced the absolutist, there is a stronger reason adduced by Madhva in the doctrinal identity he has detected between Buddhism and Advaitism, which would support his equation of Advaitism to Buddhism.

The crux therefore of the entire discussion is the identity between the doctrines of Buddhism and Advaitism. In the matter of the reality of the Universe, of the nature of the Absolute, and the nature and status of the finite souls, etc., Madhva has (after citing the appropriate texts,) pointed out a striking identity between the doctrines of Buddhism and Advaitism. The identity appears to Madhva stronger reason (and convincing more assuredly) than anything else, in the light of which the advaitic refutation of Buddhism should be traced to adherence to traditional procedure at a time when a severe ban had been placed on Buddhism for whatever reasons. The present writer does not pretend to unravel the mysteries of the past, nor does he undertake to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the research-mentality of the modern English-educated critic, the existence of the alleged sympathy surreptitiously entertained by the Absolutist with the doctrines of Buddhism. The sympathy is merely alleged to reconcile the absolutist's refutation of Buddhism with the striking identity between the doctrines of both. In fact there is so little to refute in the tenets of Buddhism which would be described as odious to the Absolutist. Yet there is the refutation of Buddhism by the Absolutist. Yet there is also the identity pointed out by Madhva between the doctrines of both schools of speculation. The appeal in the last resort should lie to the texts solely and exclusively. The Nagarjuna Karikas quoted by Madhva and the texts (too well known to need any repetition here,) of the absolutist writers would decidedly support the view urged by Madhva. The identity is striking. The Absolute is devoid of and free from all determinations, attributes, and qualities. So is the Sunya. The Absolute is unknowable. So is the Sunya. The finite universe is the result and outcome of ignorance. It has only a pseudo-reality—a re-ality so called for the sake of metaphysical courtesy: To the absolutist, the universe is unreal. So is it to the Buddhist. The final state of liberation is to the absolutist identity with the Nirgunabrahma—the attributeness Brahman. To the Buddhist it is merging into the fontal nullity—the Sunya!! It will thus be seen that the approaches to the problems of God, man, the universe and of their inter-relation, psychological, logical, and metaphy-

sical (approaches from the standpoints of psychology theory of knowledge, and metaphysics) point in the direction of unmistakable identity between Buddhism and Advaitism. If on the other hand, the identity is sought to be repudiated, and if suggestions relative to its existence are indignantly repudiated, the *onus probandi* must lie on the absolutist, and not on Madhva who has summed up sufficient textual testimony in support of identity between the essential doctrines of Advaitism and Buddhism.

### VIII.

Madhva then directs his attention to a discussion of the peculiar absolutistic doctrine known as the AKHANDARTHA\* (5) The doctrine can thus be briefly stated. The Upanishadic texts—the sruti—speak only of the Nirguna Brahma—the qualityless and attributeless Brahman—The Absolute. *Akhandartha* means the view or interpretation of texts QUA whole or totality. Piecemeal interpretation or meaning might be this or that, and according to sketchy or piecemeal interpretation, Brahman might in some contexts be regarded as Saguna—endowed with qualities and attributes. Viewed as a whole or as a totality, the Sruti speaks only of the Nirguna-Brahman—the attributeless Brahman. This total interpretation would have to exercise its regulative function. This would be the guiding and prevailing interpretation. Should there be—there are undoubtedly—passages which describe a Brahman endowed with qualities and attributes, they should be reinterpreted and modified in the light of the guiding and regulating interpretation. That is to say, the passages which speak of a saguna-brahman a Brahman endowed with qualities and attributes—should be methodologically separated and divorced from their surface and apparent interpretation, and they should be considered as somehow emphasizing the swarupa or the essential nature of Brahman—the Pure Being. Pure existence alone is contemplated and emphasized. Not any attributes and qualities of the Absolute. Some slight torture of texts would be inevitable, and violence to texts in some instances necessitated by consistent adherence to the total or *en bloc* interpretation of the Sruti-texts need not be deprecated. Such violence to texts is the only legitimate weapon that can be effectively used during the time of interpretational exigencies. There is nothing illogical about such-reinterpretation of texts which appear to emphasize Brahman with qualities and attributes. It is clear from the foregoing brief statement that the Doctrine of Akhandartha has been propounded by the absolutist for the sustaining and substantiation of the thesis that the passages of Sruti emphasize the attributeless and qualityless Brahman as the only reality. The Mahavakyas-like Tatvamasi, should be interpreted as teaching and indicating identity of the finite soul with the attributeless and qualityless Brahman. In the

(5) "Vyavrittasyavishesatve-tadakhandam-cha-khanditam." P. 165, "Anuv-yakhayana".) See "Nyayamrita" P. 430.

light of this view, terms like *Satyam*, *Jnanam*, etc., should be reinterpreted and held to mean the *swarupa* or the essential nature of Brahman QUA Absolute. They do not stand for real qualities or attributes. An inquirer desires to be enlightened as to which is the moon amongst the heavenly bodies. "That which shines brightest" is the reply. It is intended to convey to the mind of the inquirer an idea about the nature of the object of his query. The terms do not so much emphasize the qualities and attributes of the object. They have to be taken and understood in their secondary sense — *Lakshana*.— not the primary sense — *Mukhyartha*. There is yet another analogy. Suppose, a query is asked in reference to a person "who is this." The answer to it is "this is that Devadatta." The answer contains three terms—*this*, *that*, and *Devadatta*! The terms cannot be alleged to be redundant and meaningless QUA synonymous with one another!! They together give the answer which makes clear for purposes of identification, the nature of Devadatta. Similarly, the Sruti renders the answer relative to the nature of Brahman; the terms signifying qualities, attributes etc., should be shorn of their primary significance and held to mean and indicate the nature of Brahman. Bereft of all technicalities and interpretational artificialities, the doctrine of *akhandartha*, is this. The *Nirgunabrahman*—the attributeless and qualityless Brahman is the object proclaimed by the *Surti* texts. To maintain this interpretation intact, terms which seem to speak of attributes and qualities, have to be reinterpreted and taken in their secondary sense.

Madhva points out the untenability of the doctrine first by exposing the misleading character of the moon analogy. The abandonment of the natural interpretation (or surface interpretation) would be rendered necessary only in case its acceptance would be in contravention of any law of thought or otherwise illogical. The stock illustration is *GANGAYAM GHOSHAN*. i.e., cowherd-quarters in the Ganges! The natural or the surface meaning suggested cannot be accepted, as the existence of quarters of human beings in a river is impossible. So, the locative *Gan-gayam* should be interpreted to mean "on the banks of the Ganges." and not in the river itself!! There is no such impropriety or impossibility in the present case. The adjectives and epithets attributed to the moon are perfectly real and there is no impropriety or incompatibility in understanding and interpreting the terms in their natural sense. Resort to torture of expression can be justified only in very exceptional circumstances. The adoption of the analogy would lead the absolutist into strange and unenviable predicaments. The descriptive and definitive terms applied to the moon are perfectly real and its luminosity would serve the purpose of identification for which they are intended. The terms then and the epithets employed as applying to Brahman would, (on the analogy,) have to be considered as speaking of real attributes and qualities. That is exactly a conclusion which is

positively unpalatable to the absolutist. The attributeless Brahman would have to be then abandoned and another substituted which would possess qualities and attributes. The suggested abandonment of the natural meaning of the epithets is as needless as it is illogical, there being no impropriety in understanding them in the usual connotation, to which logic and usage entitle them. *Lakshana*—or modification of the natural and the surface meaning—natural in the sense that the terms used unfailingly suggest it—should have to be resorted to, only in cases where the latter manifestly happens to be in contravention of the logical requirements and the laws of thought. Otherwise, to suit the controversial exigencies of the opponents, an abandonment of the natural meaning can be suggested or urged at any stage with increasing chances of introducing confusion into the debate. In the present context however, there is no impropriety or illogicality in interpreting and understanding the terms used in their moon, “brilliant” “luminous,” etc., are all perfectly fitting into the moon, “brilliantly” “luminous,” etc., are all perfectly fitting into the given context so that there is not the slightest necessity for conjuring up visions of *Lakshana* or modification of meaning. It would be quite apparent how circuitous and unwarranted is the procedure of the absolutist. He has to discard summarily all the explanatory or descriptive epithets applied to the moon, in order to enable the inquirer to identify and understand clearly the nature of the planet, and hold that the inquirer wants to ascertain merely the *swarupa*—the existential nature of the moon and not its qualities of brightness etc.

The analogy of Devadatta urged by the absolutist is again misleading. Suppose pointing to a person one queries—who is he? He gets the answer—The individual is that Devadatta. Here the answer relates just to the nature of, existence of, an individual, and to nothing else: So, the terms, used “it is the Devadatta”—“This is he”—etc., have to be shorn of their apparent meaning. This contention of the absolutist is advanced to support the cardinal doctrine TATVAMASI—thou art that: The absolutist says—discard all meanings and interpretations. The statement he is that Devadatta affirms by analogy identity between THAT AND THOU: Madhva replies that the analogy is misleading for the following reason. The query “who is this?” is not an idle one based on the curiosity or ill-assorted inquisitiveness of a madcap. It is purposive. It is prompted by a situation. It would be silenced by an appropriate end—reaction. There is in the mind of the inquirer a partial knowledge, or atleast vague reminiscence. He has seen the individual somewhere. Atleast he thinks he has. Resemblance appears to be striking. That sets him reflecting. Is he the same person who has been seen elsewhere? Rack his brains he might. No amount of autoreflexion would afford him the answer he wants. He asks a person whom he considers an APTA—a truthspeaker who is in a position to enlighten him. He gets the answer—“This

person is that Devadatta." The terms have a perfectly intelligible meaning. They are intended to emphasize difference in point of time and place and also what is most important continuity of an experiencing agent and personal identity. There is no use dismissing the terms as incapable of being read in their natural interpretation. So, absolute identity and oneness of the THAT and the THOU cannot be proved by such analogies. Far from it, the analogy supports indirectly only the Pluralistic world-view. Devadatta is understood as a separate and independent entity who persists amidst a changing environment which is as real as himself.

It is pointless to contend that the question is asked just relative to the nature—the existential aspect of the THAT—THOU or the DEVADATTA of the analogy!! Devadatta as an existential entity—a nervous system is already before the eyes of the inquirer. No question about the existential is relevant. Its swarupa—its existential nature is already siddha—established proved and realised. Even so the inquirer sees some object sensorially present in the heavens, and there can therefore be no relevant question about the existence of that sensorially present. The question must mean something else. It relates to further elucidation and explanation of the nature and characteristics of the sensorially present. The descriptive and explanatory epithets and terms have the fullest significance. They cannot be dismissed as meaningless or as requiring reinterpretation. There is no need to resort to Lakshana-abandonment of the natural meaning.

Similarly if a relevant question, cannot lie relating to the nature of that whose existence in a spatio-temporal system is sensorially assured, there can be none either relative to the perception of pure contrast or difference of that object from its environment. In the analogies, Devadatta is actually at the moment of putting the query perceived and seen as *different* from the various individuals who might happen to be then present, and *different* also from the environment. No one outside a lunatic asylum would ever ask if such contrast actually exists! So, the contrast from the other objects, and difference from them of the moon, and of Devadatta are already existent. The query therefore in both the instances should relate only to the real characteristics of those real objects or persons. That the moon is actually perceived as different from the surrounding stars needs no explanation. So is Devadatta perceived as different from the other individuals. If there were not some vague apprehension of this contrast, there would never be an intelligent question at all—Who is Devadatta? or which is the moon? The query must involve a state of partial knowledge which carries with it perception of difference and of the contrast of the said individual from the environment.

The question therefore in the instances should relate to the nature of the moon and to the features of Devadatta. That brilliantly shining luminous body is the moon. He is that Devadatta.



Devadatta might have been perceived elsewhere in a different environment and in different condition. The **THAT** explains Devadatta's existence at a *previous* point of the spatio-temporal series. **THIS** explains his position at the present point in the series. Such explanations are all real and necessitated by a real difficulty in a real situation. The nature of both Devadatta and the moon is vaguely apprehended, and any further questions should relate to points of elucidation only. A question is prompted by (a slight or great as the case may be) adjustmental difficulty.

The result of the discussion is this :—In support of the identity between **THAT** and **THOU**, the absolutist quoted illustrative instances which are indeed irrelevant. As the natural meaning of the terms perfectly fits in with the logical and psychological requirements, Lakshana—or modification of the said natural meaning should not be resorted to.

The point of the analogy then according to Madhva, is this. Moon and Devadatta are partially known. Partial knowledge creates a difficulty in the environment. It prompts a further question. Who is Devadatta? Which is the moon? It is he that Devadatta. It is the moon which is self-luminous and radiant. Mere, bare or abstract identity is never sought to be established by anyone. Even so, Brahman and the finite soul are vaguely known. Further light is sought for. The Sruti has explained the nature of both. God made man in his own image. There is no opposition or cleavage between the two. We say that X is a veritable lion!! No identity is intended indeed between a lion and a man! The expressions implying identity—would have to be figuratively understood. So the Sruti says **THOU art THAT**. Why then has the Sruti adopted a particular language implying identity? The reason is this :—Svetaketu was arrogant fancying himself to be very great, powerful, efficient etc. Svetaketu is representative of the finite humanity which not unoften arrogates to itself omnipotence. The Sruti aims at the eradication of this arrogance which is detrimental to a consistent pursuit of the Higher Life. How can this eradication be most successfully achieved? If for instance the finite individual be told that he is the very concentrated quintessence of Knowledge, Power, etc.—his arrogance would never vanish. Far from it, the conceit would then be augmented. If on the other hand, identity were affirmed to exist between the finite individual and the Infinite, such assertions of identity would set the mind furiously thinking. Is that identity a fact? Am I really so powerful and efficient? Am I the Infinite? Obviously the identity is never practical politics. The absence of it on the other hand is poignantly and painfully realised at each and every moment of existence. The assertion of the identity is never intended to be literally understood. Its significance should be metaphorically construed. Verily Devadatta is a lion! Thus the Sruti says **THOU ART THAT—YOU are Oh! Svetaketu as great as**

THAT, being made in the image of the Deity. Another alternative might be tried. THOU ART LIKE THAT might be the interpretation based on a similitude. But there is a rub. Generally the object to which you compare a given one, happens to be familiar. Otherwise, the purpose of the similitude would be frustrated. This woman's face is charming as the full moon. Here the objects are familiar. But the THAT always eludes the human grasp. Its nature is unfamiliar. It cannot be involved in any similitude. The individual would thus realise, that the identity should be something like that between the original and the image—Surya and the Suryaka—the sun and its image. The analogy of the Bimba—and Pratibimba—the original and the image is intended to convey to the mind of an earnest enquirer the absolute dependence of the finite on the Supreme Being. The copy or the image is so dependent on the original—the model. The image is controlled by the original. The former is dependent on the latter. A sense of dependence of the finite on the Supreme Being would alone contribute efficiently to the eradication of the arrogance of Svetaketu who was metaphysics-intoxicated. If mere dependence be suggested by the use of such a term as *paratantra*, the finite would be in the position of a menial servant of a king. That is an inaccurate interpretation and misleading representation of facts. The finite is surely not a menial servant. It is in the image of the Supreme itself. Surely then the analogy of the original and the image would give an adequate idea of the exact relationship that subsists between the finite and the infinite—between the jiva and the Paramatman.

That is to say—the doctrine of Akhandartha—according to which all the passages in the Sruti point to the existence of the Nirguna-Brahman—the attributeless Absolute—should be rejected as the passages in fact possess what is called *visishtartha*—a contextual import fitting in with the purposive query of the investigator. The non-contextual general import which sweeping off every speciality and peculiarity culminates in the attributeless Absolute should be summarily repudiated, for the best of all possible reasons that if the pure attributeless Absolute were the only object of Sruti passages so many terms and expressions with distinctly different connotations need not have been used at all. Only a merciless torture of the natural sense of the passages and its abandonment which is technically styled LAKSHANA—would lend some simulacrum at least of rationality to the doctrine of Akhandartha—non--contextual general import of the Sruti which ever points to the attributeless Absolute as the only reality. There is yet another reason why the doctrine of Akhandartha—Non-Contextual general import—should be summarily rejected. The interpretation according to contextual modifications, descriptive and explanatory epithets is forced on the minds of inquirers by sheer necessity of logic. *Lakshana* or modification of the natural meaning presupposes the existence of some real original natural meaning in supersession of which subsequent modifications are

advanced. Otherwise in the absence of any such original natural meaning, the subsequent, Lakshana or modification itself would be utterly devoid of use and significance. In the Sruti passages like SATYAM Jnyanam—ANANTAM etc., the terms used would have to be assigned some natural interpretation. In the illustrative instance of GANGAYAM-GHOSHAA (cowherd quarters in the Ganges) the modified interpretation would indicate that the locative GANGAYAM—means 'on the banks' and not 'in the river' itself!! In the Sruti passage however, the terms Satyam, Jnyanam etc., would have to apply only to Brahman and to nothing else. The terms would connote real attributes and characteristics of Brahman. Their difference from Brahman would be real. Whether it is the natural one or the modified, the meaning should attach itself only to the characteristics of Brahman. The modified meaning cannot commence to function unless there is the natural. The latter would compel the admission that Brahman is Satyam etc.,—an admission that is fatal to the doctrine of Nirguna Brahman—the attributeless Absolute. The argument that these qualities and characteristics are *Anirvachaniya*—illusory and unreal—cannot stand a moment's scrutiny. The concept of *Anirvachaniya* has long ago been shown to be impossible, and its contradictory character exposed. Extreme anxiety on the part of the absolutist to do violence to the natural meaning has only resulted in the said natural meaning (firmly entrenched in the epithets applied to Brahman) repudiating any need for the modified one to function at all! That is the inevitable nemesis. The natural meaning cannot be so summarily rejected in favour of the modified one. The latter might admirably suit a whim or a controversial exigency but it is not more cogent and logical than the former. Once more, the general non-contextual import, must be overthrown and contextual particular interpretation accepted. *Akhandartha* should be abandoned and *Visishtartha* accepted.

The absolutist urges another objection. If according to Madhva, the *visishta*—the qualified—is the object of the Sruti, if Brahman qualified by certain epithets is the object, then what is this *visishta*—this qualified entity? There are three things to consider. There is the *viseshya*—the object to be qualified. Secondly there are the *Viseshanas*—the qualifications. There is the *sambandha* or the appropriate relationship between them. The modified whole is the *visishta*. The question is—Is the whole the modified *Visishta*—different from the constituents? (the object, the qualifications and the relationship) Is it identical with them? Or is it both different and identical? (*Bhinna-Abhinna*) The whole obviously is not different from the constituents—Otherwise any random concatenation of the constituents would behave as if it were a systematic whole. Nor is the whole identical with the constituent parts. There is the obvious difference in the face of which it is impossible to affirm identity. The third alternative is self-contradictory and self-stultifying. In

view therefore of the impossibility of explaining in any intelligible manner the precise nature of the *Visishta*—the modified whole—it becomes *anirvachaniya*—hence illusory. ERGO, the nirguna Brahman—the attributeless absolute—is the object contemplated by the Sruti.

The aforesaid objection is perfectly puerile. The conceptual analysis attempted with a view to showing the impossibility of the whole being different from or identical with the constituents is based on mere sophistry. The *anirvachaniya* or the indescribable is a chimera. Experience has nothing to do with it. It must for ever elude rational human experience. The whole or systematic totality is always to be understood and interpreted as an identity in difference—unity in multiplicity and one in many. Experience convinces us that the systematic whole is of that kind and not any other. The parts should co-operate for the welfare of the whole. As independent and warring elements they have no useful function to perform. They can find meaning only if they are at their proper places in the system. Each part has its own place and its own function. Co-operative functioning of the parts ensures the welfare of the total whole of the system or organism. The *visishta* or the modified whole can be understood as an identity in difference.

Conceptual analysis is not the be-all and end-all of philosophy or life. A clear-cut artificial disjunction under the mask of exclusiveness and exhaustiveness is often faulty. Mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness are illusory. There might always be other alternatives overlooked and unexplored. So, the *Visishta* can be supported on the basis of identity in difference. Experience is the only reliable guide. If experience would present or reveal an entity like the attributeless Absolute or the *anirvachaniya*—the indescribable—one cannot easily discredit or disbelieve such experience. Surrender or abandonment of one type of experience can be possible only in the light of a counter-experience. The strongest argument for rejecting the concept of the *anirvachaniya*—the indescribable—is that experience is yet to reveal such an outlandish concept !

If merely conceptual analysis be relied on, then according to the absolutist, Brahman — the attributeless absolute — would be (DURGHATA) impossible to substantiate conceptually or even otherwise. The Absolute is different from everything known and from everything imaginable ! On that basis why not overthrow the Absolute ? It is hugged to the bosom by the absolutist. Even so the identity-in-difference, the qualified whole or the concrete Universal can be admitted to be real and the only object of the Sruti passages and texts. The only reason why Brahman is admitted by both the parties to the debate is that its existence is

vouched for by the *Pramana*. Even so, the *Pramanas* support the concrete Universal—modified systematic totality.

Madhva pays the opponent in his own coin. The opponent previously queried whether the *Visishta* — the qualified whole — is different from the *Viseshana* etc.,—constituents—or identical with them or both etc.! The same query would be asked in reference to the Absolute or Brahman. Is Brahman different from the Universe? Is it identical with it? Or is it both? Brahman cannot be different from the Universe. If it is difference would attach to it, or would qualify it. It would be qualified one having attributes—and not the attributeless Absolute. QUA qualified it would be illusory—*mithya*. Once more, if it is contended that the Absolute as *Suddha-Brahma* the pure unalloyed attributeless Brahman is the only reality, the query persists, is the *Sudha*—pure being,—different from the qualified one? Or identical with it? etc. If the pure being be said to be different it would QUA different be qualified and lose its character as pure being!!

If on the other hand, Brahman is said to be identical with the universe, the former would be as illusory as the latter in virtue of the said identity—a nemesis quite deserving of the absolutists. Or the Universe would have to be as real as Brahman, in virtue of the identity—and then absolutism will have gone never to reappear in any shape! In the present context however, Madhva has not expressly mentioned the latter alternative, but has emphasized only the former, i.e., if Brahman and the Universe were *Abhinna*—identical—Brahman would have to be unreal and illusory even as the Universe!

The third alternative cannot apply. Brahman can never be different from and yet identical with the Universe! The absolutist himself said that this alternative was self-contradictory and self-stultifying when he quibbled and queried if the *Visishta*—the qualified—is identical with or different from its constituents etc., Payment in one's own coin cannot be now resented or prevented. If Brahman is somehow said to be both different from the Universe, and yet identical with it, one would be using self-contradictory concepts and self-stultifying predicates!

If as an after-thought a fourth alternative be added, and if it is contended that Brahman is different from all the blessed attributes etc., etc., Brahman would be *anirvachaniya* even as the Universe!

If in spite of everything and every criticism urged so far Brahman is *not* *anirvachaniya* (indescribable-illusory—) then on the same showing and on the same logic, the universe too would not be *anirvachaniya*—(indescribable-illusory).

If on the other hand, it is contended that such hair-splitting logic can be given a decent burial as there are powerful passages in the Sruti—which establish the reality of Brahman then wait. There are passages which speak of the reality of the universe as well e.g., VISVAMSATYAM-etc., If it is argued that logic and revelation both support the rejection of the visishta—the qualified whole—it is equally true, that reason and revelation both support the unreality of Brahman. Reason was mentioned above. Revelation is in the shape of passages, NASAT—TAT—NAASAT' UTCHYATE. ASADVAIDAMAGRAASEET. etc. Asat the unreal was at the beginning of things etc.!! Let alone all this tit for tat.

The real state of affairs can thus be represented. Madhva maintains that in the absence of counteracting circumstances and obstructionist agencies, *Pratyaksha*—sense-knowledge—is the most reliable *Pramana* and *Yukti* or ratiocination can never stultify the former. Experience is largely based on sense-knowledge. Ratiocination and sophism can convince if logic be exalted at the expense of commonsense and sense-knowledge that the Tortoise can never be overtaken by Achilles! But we cry halt to the wild and riotous procedure of ratiocination. Movement is movement and it is not a sum of immobilities. We accept the former position inspite of logic-chopping which supports the latter!!

That is the corrent way of vindicating the sovereignty of unsophisticated common-sense and experience of the individual. Experience furnishes ample evidence in support of the view that the universe is as real as the Absolute itself.

So is the visishta—or the qualified whole—. Visishta Brahman or Brahman qualified by epithets is the object of the Srutis. The futility of mere ratiocination is evidenced in the fact that even the arguments of the absolutists employed to overthrow the Visishta—qualified whole,—themselves involve a notion of the very qualified systematic whole which was sought to be repudiated!!. All philosophy must take its stand on rational human experience. Experience advances by a progressive modifying process in which error gives place to right knowledge. Sense-knowledge that is normal and that is not hindered and obstructed by counteracting factors and influences should be understood to yield knowledge of the objects as they are. It is admitted that it is progressively clarified. So, when there are explicit and unequivocal passages in the sacred texts which speak of Brahman qualified by many attributes—infinite number of infinite attributes—there is no reason why the plain import of such texts should be overthrown in preference to the doctrine of the attributeless Absolute. The sruti thus reveals in a way (not fully yet sufficiently for purposes of meditation, worship and spiritual concentration) the Supreme being—Brahman—which is full of infinite number of infinite excellent attributes. The author

of the Brahma Sutras has undertaken the task of systematic interpretation of the Sruti texts. The interpretation rests in the Supreme Being as the only object of the countless passages which all proclaim His Mahima—or greatness and Majesty.

So far Madhva explained that inference cannot be the support of the illusoriness of the Universe, since the central concept of the *Anirvachaniya*—the indescribable—itself has been left indeterminate and contradiction-ridden. When and where even the slightest attempt was made towards the securing of its determinateness, it is seen that the ground of generalisation which according to the absolutists should be *Anirvachaniya* (indescribable) must become baseless and propless. The arguments in support of this objection have been fully and sufficiently developed by Madhva in the earlier chapter on *Mithyatvanumana-Khanadana*.<sup>\*</sup> (6)

The absolutist now seeks to quote Sruti in support of the illusoriness of the world. There is the well-known *Vacharambhana* Sruti which speaks of all else being known by knowledge of Brahman. How is that possible? If the Universe were as real, as Brahman, knowledge about Brahman leading to knowledge about all else, would be meaningless. The passage must mean that Brahman is the only reality. The Universe is illusory. The statement in the Sruti would then be—know the reality and all else would become known. The Universe has no existence apart from Brahman. When the latter is known, the former is known too. *The Vacharambhana Sruti* should therefore be regarded as supporting the illusoriness or the unreality of the Universe. The interpretation put on the Sruti by the absolutist can thus be summarised. The names and forms are unreal. Absolute is the only reality. So is mud. All mud vessels, the different names and forms are all unreal. Even so, know Brahman is the only reality. All else is illusory. Know Brahman and you know all else. The famous sentence runs — EKA — VIJNYANENA — Sarvam Vijnyatam-Bhavati. All becomes known when you know the one. (the one reality).

The issue regarding this passage is interpretational. Does the passage mean that the names and forms are all unreal and that only the substance or stuff of which various kinds of objects are manufactured by the skill and ingenuity of man, is the reality so that knowledge about the latter leads to that of the former? Or is a different interpretation of the text possible which would pronounce no opinion on the reality of the names and the forms? It is analogy on which the absolutist has relied. The names such as bangles ear-rings etc., are all unreal, while gold is the only reality. Even so, Brahman is the only reality. Other objects with other and different names are unreal, and illusory.

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(6) "Mithyatvanumana-Khandana." P. 240.

Madhva exposes the misleading character of the analogy. The reality or the illusoriness of the names and forms is not the relevant point at all for discussion. The *sruti* develops the doctrine that knowledge about Brahman is so comprehensive and so all-inclusive, that by the knowledge obtained about one i.e. Brahman, all else would become known. There occur also several illustrative instances, i.e. of gold and the ornaments with different names and forms etc. The doctrine and the instance can never lend support to the fantastic theory of the absolutist that Brahman is the only reality and all else is illusory. The illusoriness or the reality is not the relevant point for discussion at all. The passage can never lend countenance to the theory that the universe is a superimposition on or appearance of Brahman.

The *Vacharambhana Sruti* is intended to vindicate the importance and permanence of the Sanskrit language and emphasize the relative unimportance and impermanence of other languages and tongues. The statement MRITTIKETYEVA SATYAM means that the Sanskrit term *Mrittika* (mud) alone is conno-denotatively related to its appropriate object. What then about other languages? They are not as important as Sanskrit. Nor are they permanent. The *Prakrit* and other non-Sanskrit tongues are relatively unimportant and impermanent. Wherein does the permanence consist? It lies in the inseparable relationship between a term and its appropriate object. It is only on the basis of the permanent relationship that the eternity of the Vedas can be understood in the proper light as also the doctrine of the Vedas not being composed by any author.

Sanskrit is thus eternal. Its connection with the objects that are denoted by the terms is eternal.\* The *artha* or the object and the term *pada* were brought into existence at no ascertainable point in time. The *veda* is thus beginningless. The other languages are due to the ingenuity of men, and the relationship they bear towards the objects denoted by their term-system, is not an eternal one. Sanskrit is thus *Nitya* eternal, and hence *pradhana* chief or pre-eminent and important. Other languages are not eternal and hence not *pradhana*—not primary and pre-eminent but secondarily important.

The next step in the development of the argument is this. If a person has acquired sufficient command over the pre-eminent and important language, he can well be said to have understood others which are of lesser importance. If the *Pradhana Bhasha* or the chief language is known, it can as well be asserted, as a compliment more or less to a person, that other less important languages have as well been known. It is easy to see that the statement cannot be literally interpreted. Obviously a person acquainted with Sanskrit may be ignorant of Tamil. The point is that when a chief language has been mastered, others not mastered need not stand in the way of the accomplishment of a particular object in view. The other less important languages become as good as known, by knowing the chief or the pre-eminent language. What if?



Madhva asserts that this linguistic analogy is intended to facilitate understanding of a very important truth. Brahman the supreme being is the *Pradhana* or the *Svatantra-Tatva*—the independent substance. If this pre-eminent category or substance is known, then the (*apradhana*) other less important ones are tantamount to being known. A person who knows Sanskrit is considered to be a wise man though ignorant of other languages. Even so, a knower of Brahman is doubtless a wise man even though in his intellectual-cum-spiritual ecstasy, a Brahman-knower might not care to recognise or emphasize other objects. The *Vacharambhana-Sruti* therefore conveys the meaning that Sanskrit is the pre-eminent language. Other languages are not so. When the pre-eminent language has been understood, one need not worry about others which are less prominent and important. The latter are tantamount to having been understood. For the truths embodied in them are only those—nothing new—with which the person concerned is already familiar having had access to them by means of the Sanskrit language.

Even so, when Brahman—the Supreme Being and the supreme category—is known the world too becomes known. A knowledge of the Supreme Category presupposes and involves that of others as well. The reality of the world is never for a moment sought to be doubted or questioned at all. It is as real as the Supreme Being itself. The interpretation put on the *Sruti* texts, by the absolutist cannot stand a moment's scrutiny. That names and forms are unreal is only a pet personal predilection that is surreptitiously squeezed into the texts which on their natural interpretation have nothing to do with the alleged illusoriness of the universe. Know the *Pradhana* or the pre-eminent and the lesser ones too might be regarded as known. Brahman is the pre-eminent category. Know it. All else is known too. The world is known. For instance, know a pre-eminent language—such as Sanskrit. Others are as good as known. That is the truth in a nut-shell sought to be conveyed by the *Vacharambhana-Sruti*.

The Absolutist interjects—that the aforesaid interpretation of the *vacharambhana-Sruti* is not in conformity with the account of creation given in the texts such as SADEVA-SOMYA-IDAMAGRA-ASEET-etc. The texts would find better meaning if the absolutist's interpretation is adhered to. The (*Karya*) effect does not exist in isolation and separation from the *Karana* the cause. Brahman is the *Karana*. The world is the *Karya*—the *Vivarta*, i.e., manifestation. Manifestation is unreal. Brahman is the only reality. An account of creation would be justified only on the hypothesis of the absolutist that the world is the *Vivarta*—or the manifestation of Brahman.—(7.)

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(7) "Vivarta" is variously defined by Absolutists.—"Aparityakta-purvaroopasya-ruupantaraprakarakapratiti-vishayatvam—" "Samavayikarana-visadrisa-karyotpattih". The "Vivarta-vada" is repudiated by Madhva and his followers.

Madhva replies that the account of creation is purposely mentioned to support the position that Brahman is (*Pradhana*) the Pre-eminent and Supreme Being. How is the pre-eminence established? It is proved by the fact of Brahman being the creator of the universe. It is needless to emphasize that the created is under the power of the creator. The latter is preeminent. The former it not. The account of creation is in perfect harmony and conformity with Madhva's interpretation of the texts. It is advanced in support of the fact and as evidence of the fact, that the author or the creator of the Universe is (*Pradhana*) pre-eminent. Know it and you know all else. In all this discussion there is not the slightest reference to the question of illusoriness of the world unless it is imported mainly by a predilection or by a fiat.

When a statement is made for simplifying purposes to the effect that when the pre-eminent category or substance is known, the less important ones are as good as known, the conclusion is irresistible the less important is as real as the more important. Where is the propriety of importing in this discussion, the reality of the Universe? And where again the propriety of impugning it?

Madhva next proceeds to explain how his own interpretation fits in with the illustrative instances quoted in the Sruti texts. When Brahman is known, the world is known too. How? There are two operative factors. One is *Pradhanya*—or pre-eminence. The other is *Sadrisya*—or resemblance—analogy. The *Vacharambhana Sruti* illustrates how when the pre-eminent is known the less important is as good as known. (e.g. Sanskrit and other languages.) The other texts commencing with YATHASOMYEKENA—etc. illustrate the same. If you understand all about a mass of clay, you understand all about the "clay population" !! (in the language of old Khayyam). The basis of the assertion is analogy. Clay and clay-made objects do resemble one another. The latter are as real as the former. Clay known would make the clay-made objects known, too.

That this is the only natural interpretation is shown by Madhva in the following manner. The central idea of the Sruti in the given context is YEKAVIJNYANENYA-SARVAVIJNYANA. i.e. by the knowledge about the One, knowledge about all else is secured. It can only be by means of analogy and emphasis on the pre-eminent. The Absolutist's interpretation that Brahman is the only reality would not fit in with the present context. There are two terms. YEKA is the one reality Brahman. SARVA is all else minus Brahman. If the latter be stigmatised as illusory the sentence would have to mean that by knowing reality, the illusory also becomes known !! or in other words—know the reality and the illusion is as good as known !! Or if *Bhavati* were strictly rendered, knowledge about illusion is caused by knowledge about reality !! The assertion is meaningless. On the other hand knowledge about the illusory is dispelled and not caused by knowledge about the real. So, it is inevitable when an assertion is made that by knowing the one, you know all else, both the one and all else should be perfectly real.

The statement is intended only to emphasize the preeminent character of Brahman and the less important nature of the universe. Or the context read with the account of creation would mean that Brahman is preeminent as the creator of the universe. The latter being created is under His control and direction. etc. If therefore, the natural interpretation of the passages be considered without the importation into them of any extraneous predilections, prejudices and presuppositions, it would be easily realised, that the statement that when ONE is known all else is as good as known, should be construed as revealing the truth that when the preeminent in any sphere is known, the lesser are as good as known. The lesser are real in their own right and on their own merits. The preeminent is likewise real. The reality and the illusoriness are not discussed as alternative predicates. The latter has no place at all under the sun, only the Preeminent—the *Pradhana*—is the controller and director of the world. The *apradhana*—the lesser universe—is controlled and directed. *EKA*—*Vijnyanena Sarvavijnayana*—means that when the Preeminent is known the lesser universe is as good as known. Having thus focused the discussion on the *Sruti* passages, Madhva concludes that they can never be claimed as supporting the unreality of the universe. It was shown in the earlier portions of the work, that *Pratyaksha*—or sense-knowledge can never support the illusoriness of the universe. Nor can *Anumana* or inference. In the present context it is shown that *Agama* or *Sruti* does not lend any support to or countenance the illusion theory. The illusion theory is thus shown to be devoid of the support of all the *three* *Pramanas*. (sense—knowledge inference, and *Sruti* or *Agama*). Anything that stands discredited by all the three recognised *Pramanas* can have no standing whatever in Philosophy. Seeing therefore as the previous discussion would have amply demonstrated, that the concepts of *Anirvachaniya*—the indescribable—*Mithyatva*—illusoriness—and of *Aikya*—identity between the absolute and the finite soul—are unsustainable in the light of the *Pramanas*, difference between the finite soul, the Supreme Being, and the released soul. (pointing in the direction of a pluralistic universe.) and reality of the Universe are firmly established. Madhva next turns his attention to a fuller discussion of the difference that there exists between the *Mukta* or the released soul and the Supreme Being and the rest of the sentient and non-sentient creation. The absolutist puts forth what is perhaps his very last argument—the last shaft or weapon in his armoury—and asks whether the ground of generalisation might not be a futile one. i.e., unable to establish the universal in view. The original inference was—The *Mukta* or the released soul is different. Why? Because he is released. (the implications being others are bond—and the Supreme soul knows nothing of bondage whatever). The absolutist would urge the technical objection that the *Hetu* is *Aprayojaka*. i.e., the ground of inference is futile and ineffective. How ineffective? Because *X* is a released soul, the fact of its being a

released one, is not sufficient and adequate to establish the conclusion that it is different as well from the Supreme soul and from the non-released souls etc.

That the given one is the only ground of inference, is established by Madhva who points out a serious flaw which militates against the position of the absolutist. The fact of release is conclusive evidence in support of difference. If it were not sufficient proof in support of the difference, then, the released soul would feel the weight of bondage, and the bond soul would feel as light or cheerful as the released one! In fact the concept of ultimate release itself would become an impossible one. Should there be oneness between the released and the bond soul, what are the criteria which would decide the fact of release at all? The oneness with the Absolute would on the one hand mar the efficacy of final liberation, as the released soul would be experiencing identity with the bond one and on the other make light of the bondage itself and pooh-pooh effort at securing liberation from it, as the bond souls would be experiencing identity in their turn with the released ones!. Therefore, the fact of release should be admitted to be real. The difference between the released soul and the bond should be admitted to be real. Release would then be sufficient ground for the generalisation that because, X—is a released soul, it must be different from those that are bond, and from the Supreme Being himself who is beyond all bondage and release, in the sense that he is eternally a released soul.

The absolutist once again contends that the apparent difference is all due to ignorance. The bond soul—the *Samsari*—feels the effects of bondage on account of his ignorance. So long as ignorance is not eradicated the consciousness of difference would persist. When once true knowledge dawns, difference would all vanish (being illusory and unreal,) leaving only a differenceless reality—the attributeless Absolute.

The crux of the contention is ignorance and the part played by it in producing illusions of differences and disparity where as a matter of fact only oneness and identity reign supreme would enable one to assess the logical value and significance of the said contention. If difference were not admitted, if identity alone were sworn by, and if it is contended that consciousness of difference is due to the influence of ignorance, Madhva replies that the Absolute Brahman which at any rate should be admitted to be free from all ignorance, by both the parties to the controversy, should feel and experience its identity with the bond finite soul, and share in all the anxieties and vicissitudes of the latter. That admission is fatal to the hypothesis of absolutism. How can the Absolute share in the anxieties and cares of the finite? So, if identity is sworn by, the Absolute would have to suffer even as the finite soul with which it is identical, and as difference

is laid at the door of the upadhis an enquiry into its nature would jeopardise the absolutism of the Absolute itself and its exclusive monopoly of reality. The absolutist has only two ways open before him. He can say that the difference noticed everywhere is due to ignorance relative to the real nature of Brahman. This will not save him. As the Absolute is free from all ignorance, relative to all conceivable things, it will have to experience uninterruptedly identity with finite creation the vicissitudes of which it cannot but share being identical with it. Or, he may say that consciousness of difference or disparity is due to the fissiparous activity of the Upadhis. Even then, the Absolute should be admitted to be free from the disrupting operations of Upadhi and *qua* free it should be (as in the previous instance) obliged to experience the vicissitudes of finite creation. The net result of the discussion is that difference can never be brushed aside as being due to ignorance, and that identity will never be experienced at the dawn of true insight and intuition. Even supposing it is conceded that having his natural intuitive light obscured by the Upadhis or ignorance the finite individual does not actively experience identity with the Absolute, the position of the absolutist becomes ridiculous when it is considered from the standpoint of the Absolute itself which should be admitted to be untainted by any ignorance, and *Qua* untainted and pure it should possess a live and intimate experience of its identity with the finite creation in the vicissitudes, pain, sorrow and suffering of which it must have a share!! Or it is inaccurate to speak of the Absolute having a share. Oh No. The pain, suffering, sin, and sorrow of the finite are the Absolute's *own* in virtue of the identity between the two which is clearly and distinctly realised and experienced by the Absolute as its intrinsic light can never be obscured by ignorance or the Upadhis.

The Absolute would then be as much pain-ridden as the finite individual. The inference is irresistible that he who experiences identity with the sinner, should participate in the sin and sinful activities of the latter too! As a matter of fact however the identity is a myth. The Supreme Being can never be and is not identical with the finite. The *Samsari* the finite individual is definitely and unequivocally stated to be different from the Supreme Being. Madhva quotes the Gita in support of the difference between the Supreme Being and the finite. In reference to the countless past existences of an evolving soul, the Lord says that He *knows* them all while Arjuna the finite soul *does not*. The difference is plain and no straining of the natural explanation is needed. Arjuna is ignorant. The Supreme Lord knows all. How can there be any identity between the two? Can identity be asserted to exist between ignorant finite creation and all-knowing Supreme Being unless a violent premium is put on the credulousness of the rational investigator?

There is yet another point of difference. The Lord says that He is the Supreme Being-*purushottama*, while the whole creation

derives its sustaining energy from Himself. The Supreme Being is the overlord. The finite creation is under His control. There can never be any identity between the governor and the governed—between the overlord and his subjects and subordinates. The Lord could never have misled Arjuna by telling him that He is the Purushottama etc. The assertion made implies that the Supreme Being is conscious only of difference and not of identity.

The conclusion reached is this. The ground of generalisation that the Mukta is different from Isvara is not inefficacious as there are insuperable objections to the view of identity between the two (between the finite and the infinite).

Madhva establishes difference even in the state of final liberation thus—The difference should be real. It is not annihilated even in the state of release. For the difference is experienced by the Supreme Being. It is obligatory to admit that the Supreme Being is never subject to any illusions. It is never misguided and misled by error. If it is, its omniscience would be seriously jeopardised. The Supreme Being's experiences are all real. They are never stultified. Iswara is not a *Bhranta*—victimised by illusions. He is always and eternally (Pramatha—) the knower of all. He knows all correctly. Anything experienced by the Supreme Being should be real. Difference from the finite creation is experienced by Him. So the difference should be real. When difference from the released soul is experienced by the Supreme Being, a *fortiori* difference from the unreleased or bond finite creation should be experienced by the Supreme Being. Difference thus becomes proved to be true. There is difference of the Supreme from the released soul on the one hand. On the other there is difference of the Supreme Being from the Bond soul and from the finite creation. Such a difference is experienced by the Supreme. Its experiences are real. Difference is thus real too. Nothing that enters as a constituent element in the experience of the Supreme Being is ever unreal or illusory. The Supreme Being is never subject to any illusions—any errors of judgment at any time. It is the eternal infallible witness of the entire cosmic process. Difference thus can never be annihilated. At all time it exists.

A sub-sect of absolutists objects that after all the difference should be attributed to the influence of *Upadhis*. When they are destroyed difference also must vanish. It has been already explained sufficiently clearly in the earlier chapters that resort to *Upadhis* would never mend matters. Greater and paradoxical complications rear their heads when an analysis of the exact status of *Upadhis* is attempted. Notwithstanding the difference brought about by *Upadhis*, *anusandhana* or experience is the only criterion of identity. In the present instance however there is always different *anusandhana* or different experience. The Supreme Being never has

any *anusandhana* or experience of identity with finite creation, nor has the latter any sense of identity with the former. In the absence therefore of *Anusandhana*, it is clear that difference is experienced both by the finite and the Supreme Being, but never any identity. The real and unshakable experience of the Supreme Being is the only guide. If *Svarupaikya*—or identity in fundamental nature be asserted to exist the Supreme would have to participate in the sorrows and vicissitudes of the finite, as the difference caused by *Upadhis* will have to be brushed aside, being ineffective. The Supreme Being never participates in the joys and sorrows of the finite. They are both radically and fundamentally different from one another. The difference is (*svabhavika*)—due to inherent nature, and not (*aupadhika*)—due to fortuitous operations or disruptive activities of *Upadhis*.

That is why on account of the difference between the Supreme and the finite being real and grounded in the essential nature of both—the released soul—the *mukta*—is not identical with *Iswara*—the Supreme Being. There can be no legitimate talk of identity as difference has been shown to be grounded in the essential nature of both. As far as *Pratyaksha* *pramana* is concerned, difference is experienced in the everlasting present of the Supreme Being.

The experiences of the Supreme Being are never illusory. They are always correct. The *pramana* of inference also establishes the said difference. In fact the present work of Madhva under exposition commences with an inference that the *Mukta* or the released soul is different from the Supreme *Iswara*. *Agama* is then quoted by Madhva in support of the difference. The stanza of the *Gita* runs thus. —“*Idam Jnyanamupastritya—mama—sadharmyamagatah. Sargepi—nopajayante—pralaye—nav-yathanticha.*” Persons, says the Lord, who have secured, or after securing the type of exalted knowledge very nearly resemble me, etc. If identity were a fact that talk of resemblance should have to be idle. The Lord does not say that they become identical with Himself. That those persons are not reborn at the time of creation, and do not get agitated at the time of destruction, are marks of their attainment of the final state of liberation—which is beyond rebirth and destruction.

There is the other well known passage *NIRANJANAH PARAMSAMYAMUPAITI* in the interpretation of which Madhva joins issue with the *Visishtadvaitins*. The passage speaks of the evolved soul attaining *Parama-samya*, i.e., exalted type of maximum resemblance. Even in the *Samsaric* state the finite does possess some resemblance with the Supreme Being as the latter has created the former in His own *imgae*. But by consistent and devoted adherence to a course of spiritual discipline, the finite soul manages to gain exalted type of resemblance with the Supreme Being. Never can it attain identity with the Supreme Being.

The absolutist here interjects the query—what is the interpretation of the passages which explicitly speak of identity between the finite and the infinite such as PARE-AVYAYE-SARVA-EKIBHAVANTI. PARAM — BRAHMA — VEDA — BRAHMAIVA — BHAVATI. etc. etc. ? Madhva replies that such passages should be read in conjunction with others that speak of simple difference between the two, and in the light of the testimony of the three *Pramanas*. If that interpretational procedure be strictly followed, the terms implying identity should be construed as connoting the maximum amount of or exalted and perfect type of resemblance between the finite and the Supreme Being. The issue is this. There are passages in which the terms—Eka, Aikya-Ekibhava—are used. There are others in which terms meaning resemblance are found. Is there a way of harmonising the apparently conflicting texts ? There is. Madhva relies on a text which runs thus:—Where the *agamas* appear to be conflicting with one another, their meaning or interpretation should be settled by reference to *Pratyaksha* our own sense-perception which is after all the only primary source of knowledge. *Pratyaksha* is *Upajivya*—it is the primary and fundamental source of all experience. There is also inference which is relied on for purposes of corroboration or additional testimony. There is not the slightest evidence of the *Pratyaksha* that there is identity between the finite and the infinite. The *Pratyaksha* of the former is clear and distinct. It leads only to a perception of difference and disparity. The eternal and everlasting perception of the latter reveals only difference, otherwise, as explained already, the infinite would have to participate in the vicissitudes of the finites as well. The passages quoted from the *Gita* are clear and the Supreme never experiences any identity with the finite. If therefore, there are yet passages which speak of identity between the finite and the infinite, the identity should be interpreted as resemblance, as identity stands discredited in the light of the other *Pramanas*. The agamic passages speaking of identity are merely emphasizing resemblance and should be read in conjunction with those that indicate unmistakably difference. Sense-knowledge affords no clue to identity. Nor does inference, as was exhaustively argued in the earlier chapter on *Mithyatvanumana Khandana*. Only in the *agamas* you come across passages which speak of difference in some places and identity elsewhere. The latter cannot be rejected. Nor can the former. Both are reliable. Both form parts of the *Apauruṣheya* texts—texts whose validity cannot be questioned as they cannot be attributed to any known author and hence are free from the defects and imperfections usually and generally associated with human writers. The passages implying identity between the finite and the infinite should be reinterpreted as signifying resemblance in the light of the more powerful passages which stress only difference. Anyhow there lies in the *Pratyaksha*—perception—itself of both the Supreme Being and the finite the strongest ground



in support of difference and identity must vanish. The Supreme, as pointed out before, experiences only difference from the finite. The latter too only difference from the former.

The absolutist however, is not so easily to be silenced. He urges that this perception of difference is illusory. Even as the disc-like appearance of the moon etc., (—The *Bhedanubhava*—) experience of difference is (Bhranti—) illusory. When that is so, where is the necessity or justification for the suggested re-interpretation of the Agamic passages emphasizing identity in the light of sense-perception seeing the latter leads only to an illusory perception of difference? Here then is the inference. This awareness of difference, different objects etc., is an illusory experience. For it is awareness of difference. Just as the experience of two moons when you squint!!

The fallacy in this reasoning is immediately exposed by Madhva. What is the ground of generalisation or inference that experience of difference is illusory? The ground relied on his *Bredadipratyayatvat*—i.e., 'being awareness of difference.' The illustrative instance is the awareness of two moons. If the ground, namely, awareness of difference be earnestly pressed, it will lead to the following *reductio ad absurdum*. Look at the experience that consciousness of difference is illusory. Analysing this intellectual psychosis, you find, that awareness of difference itself enters as a constituent element! This is fatal to the absolutistic position. Awareness of difference is the first experience. The subsequent experience is—awareness of difference is illusory. Is this the latter experience of difference or not? Does or does not awareness of difference enter as a constituent element in the psychosis—that awareness of difference is illusory? Enter it must. That means on the ground of its being awareness of difference, the subsequent experience which the absolutist fondly believes would establish the illusoriness of difference, becomes itself illusory and hence totally unreliable!! Escape from the *reductio* would land one in an unenviable dilemma. Just see. Awareness of difference is illusory. That is the starting point. This awareness is itself illusory on the ground of its being awareness of difference. All awareness of difference is illusory. This, namely, awareness of illusoriness is awareness of difference. *Ergo*, this is also illusory! If on the other hand it is admitted that the awareness of illusoriness should be real, the Inference is impossible as the said awareness is the awareness of difference and qua awareness of difference it should be unreal as first stipulated. If not, the ground of generalisation is unable to sustain the generalisation itself. The suggested *hetu* or the ground is no ground at all. If on the contrary it is admitted that the subsequent awareness of the illusoriness of difference be itself illusory as it is bound to be, because it is also awareness of difference, reality of difference would be established—a thing so odious to the

absolutist. The dilemma is this—either the suggested ground of generalisation that awareness of difference is illusory is really no ground at all, or the experience of illusoriness of difference is itself illusory, so that difference becomes established when illusions cancel one another!!

There are thus two things—Experience of difference or its awareness is one thing. The other awareness of illusoriness. Both cannot be true at the same time. Nor can both be false. There is a genuine disjunctive relationship between the two. If the latter is shown to be false, as has been actually done in the earlier paragraph, the former cannot be but true. That is to say, experience of the illusoriness of difference being itself illusory, experience of difference or difference gets itself firmly established and entrenched behind facts of perception and inference.

The theory of *Eka-jiva-vada* is then resorted to by the ABSOLUTIST in the hope of demolishing the thesis of difference advocated by Madhva. Madhva commenced the present work with the establishment of difference between the Supreme and the released soul. As a matter of fact, contends, the absolutist, there is only one soul—EKAJIVA,—and nought else. It is Brahman. Its ignorance is responsible for the cosmic show. Remove it. True insight dawns. The soul is released from ignorance. Nought else remains. Where is then the point in talking of released souls, and the Supreme Being, and the difference between the two?

Madhva exposes the folly of *Eka-jiva-Vada* thus: Let us assume the existence of the hypothetical one-soul. Catch it embodied in a particular existence. Is that *Advaita nishta*. i.e., is it in a state of advaitic realisation? Oh, No. It is on the other hand in so many embodied existences as those of Sankara, Jaimini, Gaudapada, Vyasa etc., etc., If the *Eka-Jiva* theory be true, then, after the first hypothetical advaitin's surrender of the nervous system, the world-appearance should have vanished as its projection is due to the one soul's ignorance. But in the history of philosophy there must have been several prophets with advaitic realisation, and if the one-soul theory were true, one act of realisation, must have been quite sufficient for the stultification of the cosmic show! That is ridiculous. Advaitic teachers and saints have come and gone. The world goes on for ever. It has so far not been stultified by anyone. So the hypothetical one-soul should be aware of a pluri-verse or a multiverse of men and things, of which he is one. Difference and plurality would be what he perceives. He sees and experiences only difference and plurality. As the one-soul sees nought but difference and plurality, and as the Universe has not so far been stultified by the advaitic realisation of ancient saints and prophets who have come and gone, the one-soul should ever be difference-ridden-and existence-evil-ridden. It would not have a chance of release at all! If however a plurality of

independent centres of activity and free rational, moral agents be admitted release and bondage can be better understood and explained. The *Eka-jiva-Vada* thus stands discredited in the light of concrete rational experience. Besides there is not even the slightest evidence of the *Pramanas* in support of the view that only one soul is responsible for cosmic show, or more accurately, that there is only one soul or sentient agent running through the diverse and multitudinous units of life, the ignorance of which is responsible for the projection of the gigantic cosmic show. For purposes of simplified metaphysics one might assert by a fiat that there is only one soul. So did the ancient speculators consider Demiurgus as the sole creator of the universe. But they did not say that the universe was due to the ignorance of Demiurgus!! Others spoke of a world-soul. But there too no question of reality was raised. It was not asserted that the cosmic show was the result of the ignorance of the world-soul. The conclusion therefore is irresistible that the released souls are totally different from the Supreme Being.

Madhva then briefly answers the objection of Ramanuja and his followers to the effect that even though the Mukta or the free soul is different from the Supreme Being, the latter does not guide and control the former. That is to say, the Lord is not the (Niyanta—) unquestioned controller of all the Muktas. Madhva quotes the following *pramana*. BRAHMESANADIBHIR DEVAIRYAT-PRAPTUM-NAIVA-SAKYATE. TAD-YATSVABHAVAHA-KAIVALYAM. etc. That unquestioned and unchallenged supremacy which is beyond the reach and attainment of even deities like Brahma, Rudra, and others—that supremacy is the essential and fundamental feature or characteristic of Lord Vishnu. What the other deities fail to achieve even after the putting forth of their best effort, is just the nature of the Supreme Vishnu. If this is admitted to be the case, no further evidence is required to prove the supremacy and overlordship of the Supreme Being Vishnu who controls even the Muktas—the released souls. The attainment of release by evolved souls, does not in any way interfere with the unquestioned overlordship of Supreme Being Vishnu. There is yet another piece of agamic evidence. PARO-MATRAYA-TANVA-VRIDHNA-NA-TE-MAHITVAM-ANVASNUVANTI. Addressing Vishnu, it is said—Thou art indeed immeasurably and incalculably Supreme. Thou art of the fullest glory and greatness. Others can never hope to attain them.

One might add a paragraph in passing on the objection that is urged in certain quarters that control exercised by the Supreme Being even in the state of final release or liberation, would detract from the value and spiritual significance of the state of salvation. Is it logical to talk of control even in the state of liberation? If the latter could tolerate control *pro tanto* it must cease to be regarded as liberation at all.

The only answer that can be offered to all such and similar objections is that restraint of free activity and arrest of individual initiative that are usually associated with the concept of control have no place whatever in the state of final liberation. There is after all difference between control and control. The Mukta—the released soul—considering himself an humble servant of the Supreme Overlord of the Universe, can by no twisting of texts be regarded as suffering from a sense of restraint and aggressive suppression of his free volitional individuality. The released spirit would enjoy the most perfect type of bliss in the service of the Lord even in the state of liberation. Such service is perfectly compatible with the free state of the free soul. If the contaminating constituents of restraint, oppression, arrest of liberty etc., are laid aside and removed, the free soul would enjoy bliss under the control of the Supreme Overlord of the universe. In all departments of speculation as well as action, Freedom does not connote unbridled and unrestrained license. It means self-realisation or self determination. The Supreme Overlordship of the Universe possessed by Vishnu does not in any way interfere with the self-determination of the free-souls. Madhva as usual concludes his work with obeisance to the Supreme Being (8).

#### SUMMARY

1. Difference or Bheda-is established to be the fundamental factor of existence. Difference exists even in the state of final liberation. *A fortiori* it must in the ordinary (Samsaric) state of the world and its affairs.
2. The inference or generalisation relating to the illusoriness of the Universe is shown to be faulty and fallacious. The grounds of generalisation mentioned by the absolutist are refuted in a detailed manner.
3. The illusion-theory stands discredited by all the *pramanas*. *Pratyaksha—Anumana—and Agama* (sense,-knowledge— inference and scripture or revelation.)
4. There is a palpable doctrinal identity between Buddhism and Absolutism. So, when the Sutrakara overthrew Buddhism he should have by the same act overthrown Absolutism as well.
5. The *Akhandartha-vada* according to which the Sruti passages are believed to speak only of the attributeless— Absolute is refuted, and the passages are reinterpreted in harmony with Theism.

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(8) If the notion of self-determination found in modern works on "Ethics" is logical and well-sustained, there will be little difficulty in realising that the Overlordship of Vishnu is quite consistent with the freedom possessed by Free Souls.

6. Vishnu is the Supreme Overlord of the Mukta—Amukta—prapancha. i.e. He is the overlord of the entire universe free and bond.

## REFERENCES.

1. TATVODYOTA by Madhva.
2. Commentary on (1) by Jayatirtha.
3. Do. on (2) by Vedesa Tirtha.
4. Do. Do. by Raghavendra Tirtha.
5. Do. Do. by Srinivasa Tirtha.
6. A comparatively recent controversial work—by Anaiyappa-charya.

## VERNACULAR-TEXT.

7. Belgaum edition of the work with a canarese translation of the commentaries.



## CHAPTER IX

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### VISHNU — TATVA — VINIRNAYA

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(Realism—Pluralism—and—Theism)

In the previous chapter, Madhva showed by a consistent pursuit of the controversial procedure, that there persists difference even in the state of final liberation, the Universe is real and that the Inference attempted by the absolutists relative to the illusoriness of the universe is fallacious. The present work under exposition Vishnu— Tatva—Vinirnaya is undertaken with a view to more elaborate and systematic establishment of Realism, Pluralism and Theism. There is a tradition prevalent that the entire thesis of the work should be indicated even in the preliminary benedictory stanza, or the stanza in which the preliminary salutation to the deity of one's choice is embodied (so that the work undertaken might be finished without obstruction or hindrance) and the tradition has surely a rational basis. One might know from the very commencement something of the general nature of the thesis sought to be maintained in any given work. He would then be able to follow in an intelligent manner the discussions and controversies. Madhva's salutation runs thus—I salute the Lord Narayana who is to be known only through the instrumentality of the good and reliable Agamas—or sacred texts, who is different from and superior to all creation—sentient and non-sentient static and dynamic etc., and who is the Supreme Lord of countless and infinite number of infinite holy attributes. The epithets used correspondingly are sadagamaika-vijneyam--Samatita-ksharaksharam-Nirdoshashesha-sadgunam. Each represents a main plank. The first is intended to convey the important vedantic doctrine that the Sacred texts are the supreme Pramanas which alone would reveal the true nature of Narayana—the Supreme Being. The second in a nutshell contains the doctrines of realism and pluralism. The Third is the plank of Theism. Keeping close to the rules of debate and dialectics, Madhva establishes his doctrines in the present work after a refutation of those of his opponents.

#### I

The opening section deals with the establishment on a sound basis of the question of the Pramanya of the scripture. Scripture alone is competent and able to reveal the nature of the Supreme ;

Being. Ratiocination is not. There is no end to reason. None to human ingenuity. A syllogism or argument establishing the existence of the Supreme Being can always be confronted with a counter reasoning or argument. If one were to say that the Universe is created by the Supreme Being, another would retort that it is all nature, and no intelligent agent is responsible for creation. A genuine aspirant in quest after the Supreme should find in scripture alone his only and reliable prop. It would shed sufficient light along his path. What are the Scriptures? The Rig and other Vedas, the Mahabharata, the whole of Pancharatra. The Mula-Ramayana—the Puranas that are in harmony with the previous, and works like those of Manu and others which from the elucidatory or corroboratory texts as the case may be, of the Vedas, constitute the Sadagamas, i.e., the true and reliable agamas. The others are *not* Sadagamas. They are not true and reliable sacred texts. But they are the Duragamas, i.e., unreliable sacred texts i.e., unreliable texts that are trotted out as genuine ones. The latter are unable and incompetent to reveal the nature of the Supreme Being.

A pious and devoted aspirant, a seeker after truth, will alone be able to profit by the sacred texts. A careful and reverential study of the sacred texts alone would reveal the real nature of the Supreme Being. There should be the right approach to the texts in the right spirit of quest and inquiry. The modern critical attitude which approaches the texts with a pre-established prejudice that they contain nothing but some unintelligible stuff may not perhaps be the most successful one. Sympathetic understanding should precede all criticism. The latter for its own sake will be good on certain occasions. It might have to be undertaken in that light in reference to texts of a particular description. But an initial critical attitude is fatal to pursuit of fruitful philosophy. Madhva therefore insists on the necessity for a reverential and sympathetic approach to the sacred texts. Then alone can truth be reached.

Why make so much capital of the sacred texts? TARKA—argumentation or ratiocination is never final. One set of them can always be confronted with another. Both would appear to have on them the stamp of validity. Reason unaided and not guided by revelation is a risky mentor. A statement in the Brahmanda-purana runs thus. The Supreme Being is not to be known by means of dry-as-dust logic and ratiocination. Hair splitting logic would not take one a step nearer Him. The Supreme Being should therefore be known only through the instrumentality of sacred texts studied by devoted and earnest seekers after truth.

A statement in the Taittiriya-sruti is to the effect that a person not proficient in the sacred texts has no chance whatever of knowing the real nature of the Supreme Being. The Katha-Upanishad

sounds the clarion call that knowledge about the Supreme Brahman can never be secured by means of (Tarka) ratiocination or hair splitting logic. Thus again the Pippalada sruti—Not sense-knowledge, not inference, but the Vedas alone reveal the real nature of Brahman par excellence and pre-eminently. Hence are they styled the vedas.

The opponent of the authority of the Vedas contends that they are not reliable sources of knowledge at all. The vedas abound in contradictory and redundant assertions and statements. If a particular sacrificial ritual is performed, one will have a son, says the veda, but the performance never makes an issueless person have a son!! Sometimes a sacrificial offering is enjoined to be thrown in sacred fire in the morning by one text and by another in the evening!! And then stale and jejune utterances like—Fire wards off cold etc. are to be found in the Vedas. When such is the fate of the Vedas, a fortiori the purana texts are more unreliable. What is the fun of regarding such texts as are of palapable unreliability and untrustworthiness to be the only means of attaining knowledge about the Supreme Brahman? The latter will have to be assigned a share of the stigma attaching to the untrustworthy texts!!

Madhya replies that the validity of the texts cannot be doubted at all. Why? They could not be assigned to the authorship of any known human agency. If it could be proved that the vedic texts have their origin in human composition they would be then liable to defects and errors. The latter are inevitable as the defects of authors would be reflected in their compositions. That is why the vedic texts are considered to be "*apaurusheya*" not ascribable to any known human agency. That is something like the postulate of every science. No one will be permitted to question the validity of the postulates themselves of a science. That the vedas constitute reliable texts is a postulate. They are infallible. Factors contributing to error and mistakes are not operative in the case of Vedas. The modern critical scholar will not countenance the position that the Vedas are creations of no known human agency. But the purpose of exalting the hypothesis that the Vedas are not compositions of any known agency to the status of a postulate is obvious. Instead of permitting reason to run riot, philosophical conclusions have to be based on sacred texts which would check and correct riotous ratiocination. No controversy should be allowed to centre round the authority and reliability of the sacred texts themselves. All opposition can be effectively disarmed only when the position is taken up that the texts cannot be attributed to the authorship of any known agency. If such authorship were proved, one might object that the defects of the author must have crept into his compositions as well. No such allegations can now be made. The texts not being capable of being traced to authorship should be regarded as free from de-



fects and errors. They thus become reliable and authoritative texts.

Why should the strange theory of "*Apaurusheyatva*" be admitted? Why not maintain that the texts are valid as they have been admitted by people? Well. There is no such thing as a majority rule in matters of philosophy. Acceptance by large numbers of persons would not confer any validity or authority on the texts. They might very well be blind following the blind, and blind men again leading the blind to the promised land. If on the other hand a set of texts is to be admitted valid because it has been hallowed by approval of a great name like that of Budha or Sankara, there are others who do not acknowledge the greatness of those leaders of thought and the result is inevitable chaos and confusion. That is why it is best to avoid all reference to personalities altogether. The sacred texts have been handed down from generation to generation in the same order. They retain their pristine purity. They cannot be regarded as being composed by this or that author. They are thus free from the errors and defects that are the inevitable concomitants of human effort. Nor need they be regarded as compositions of the Deity. Others would contend the Devil might have as well written and composed them!! To cut the gordian knot even in the early stages of philosophical controversies, it is safest to admit that the Vedas are "*apaurusheya*"—not traceable to any known agency as their author. (1)

Granting all this is true, what about the Puranas and such like texts? Two explanations are possible. There is a saying that the Itihasas and the Puranas are to be considered as the *fifth* Veda. If so, the former have to be regarded valid and authoritative even as the latter. If however this be regarded too large and sweeping a demand, only such of the texts of the Itihasas and Puranas as are in conformity with the vedas have to be accepted as authoritative and valid. Others that are not have to be discarded. That is why the division of Agamas into Sadagamas and Duragamas is justifiable. There are agamas and other texts which inculcate theories and doctrines opposed to those of the Veda and vedanta. The agamas then are Duragamas. They have to be summarily rejected. It will thus be seen that the puranas derive their authority and validity from their *conformity* with the vedic texts. Absence of the said conformity is a mark of discredit. There is another minor matter. Why cannot the Puranas be regarded valid as they have been composed by an "*apata*"—a reliable rishi or some such author? Even then, the question who

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(1) The Theory of "*Apaurusheyatva*" Vedas not being ascribed the authorship of any known agency is elaborately argued in TARKATANDAVA, PP 100—163. Existence of the Supreme is proclaimed only by the Vedas. Ergo, the former can not be regarded to be the author of the latter. The position that Inference (Anumana) can establish the Existence of God is also refuted by the author of TARKATANDAVA. See also Jayatirtha's NYAYASUDHA. (Vaiseshikadhikarana.-Samayapada.)

is a reliable author etc., cannot be decided without reference to vedic texts. It is therefore better to postulate the hypothesis of "*apaurusheyatva*"—and maintain that the sacred vedas cannot be assigned to the authorship of any ascertainable and known agency.

Madhva then embarks upon a refutation of the position of the "*charvakas*" or "*Lokayatikas*," whose contention is this :—To describe the vedas as "*apaurusheya*" texts—i.e., texts which cannot be traced to the authorship of any known agency—is contradictory. Veda constitutes a set of terms and sentences. These must have been used by some agency in a purposive manner. To describe such set of terms and sentences as "*apaurusheya*" is contradictory. And then why all this trouble of dialectically establishing the conclusion which is so all-clearly contradictory? One might think of establishing a probable conclusion or statement, but not one that is inherently beyond the boundaries of probability. People do not set about dialectically establishing the validity of a round-square. "*Apaurusheya vakya*", sentences not composed by any one cannot exist at all. That must finally dispose of the entire problem of the authority and sanctity of the vedas.

Madhva answers that all Samayas, Religions and systems of philosophy and Ethical Speculation should accept the existence of some texts described "*apaurusheya*"—not ascribable to the authorship of any known agency. In the absence of such texts, the moral concepts (Dharma and Adharma) of virtue and vice, of the obligatory and the prohibited, etc., would never have any validity at all. They will cease to be binding. The entire fabric of individual, social, national, and international morality is based obviously on certain well-known concepts which would fail to derive any sanction whatever if revealed texts are to be denied in toto. Social well-being is not the only goal of moral conduct. Adjustment without any hitch is not the only incentive to social and moral endeavour. If so a machiavellian might well justify his conduct and code of ethics. The superman will have his way in all matters. That cannot be. The authority of concepts and commands derived entirely from human agencies can be challenged as the history of morals and the evolution of Ethics have amply demonstrated, by any superman—*Urbarmensch*—or an organisation wedded to the performance of anti-social activities. Moral commandments may be categorical imperatives. Such imperatives can be violated with impunity! Where lies the security and, where the sanction? One would be able to offer no better explanation for moral conduct and concepts than individual and social well-being. There are many and diverse ways of securing it. Exploitation of the weaker by the stronger will have reinforced authority. So, the ultimate and final authority according to the Vedanta is the sacred and revealed text. Without it you cannot mark off the boundaries of Dharma and Adharma—of moral and immoral conduct. A text having human

origin must suffer from defects that are the inevitable concomitants of all human endeavour. The Vedas therefore are postulated to have had no ascertainable human origin. If Dharma and Adharma are to be accepted as fundamental moral categories, guiding life throughout, resort has to be made to the Vedas. They are above suspicion. They are not human compositions. Not even compositions of the Deity! Prejudice cannot be alleged against them. Nor can fallibility the besetting sin of humanity vitiate their utterances and interfere with their authority. If, however, one should contend that he can get on quite well without such vedic texts and commandments give him a long rope. But even he on second thoughts will see the folly of his philosophy and realise the risk his free-lance conduct would involve him in.

If a founder of a system of thought like that of the Charvakas would not admit the existence of Dharma and Adharma and sacred texts which alone are the sources of knowledge regarding the moral concepts he is not a SAMAYI—not fit to be classed and styled as a leader and a founder of a school of speculation or a religious sect. Denying Dharma and Adharma why does he want a system of speculation at all? Every one is free to pursue his or her mode of conduct. The individual's whims can be indulged in. There are no restraints. Sense-knowledge is the only guide. For whom then a philosophy is intended at all? The fundamental requirements would be absent. There would be no "*Adhikari*". All supersensuous reality has been denied. Sensuous reality is revealed in ordinary knowledge. Each would then understand reality to the best of his lights and adjust himself to the environment. There need be no system of philosophy. It is perfectly superfluous, if offered with persistence. There is no "*Prayojana*" or fruit in the advocacy of such a system of thought when there is no one who would profit by it. There is in fact no object worthy to be investigated at all. Successful getting on in life by whatever means is the goal. This needs no philosophical investigation.

What after all is the service rendered by the founder of a system from which the concepts of Dharma and Adharma have been banished and boycotted? If one should proclaim from the house tops that Might is Right, there is no Dharma—No Adharma—the weak man might go to the wall, etc., he would then be undermining the foundations of a stable social order. He would be doing little good to himself or his followers. Exploitation would be rampant. People would be involved in disasters and dangers, by the pursuit of Charvaka philosophy. Each man unto himself and Devil take the hindmost. A libertine philosophy would lead to social chaos and confusion. Might will be right for a time. The relentless aggressor in his turn will have to submit to the tyranny of a stronger person or party.

No good would ever be done by the promulgation of a philosophy like that. The hereafter is denied peremptorily. The here will take care of itself. No philosophy is wanted. The Charvaka system itself would thus stand self-condemned. Its doctrines cannot easily be translated into practical politics. Some of them may have a superficial charm for the nonce. The folly of adopting them and acting up to them would soon be apparent. A person therefore who denies the existence of the Moral concepts of Dharma and Adharma writes himself down like Dogberry an ass. His own system of speculation stands discredited in the light of his own principles.

An ingenious defence of the Charvaka position may be anticipated. One might contend that the system of philosophy is intended to enable pusillanimous souls sophisticated and emaciated by a study of the Vedanta to undertake a course of action which would ensure their happiness in this world without their needlessly worrying themselves about a hereafter. The defence carries with it its own condemnation. More harm than good will be done by the inculcation of the Charvaka-doctrine of denial of all super-sensuous concepts, in general and those of Dharma and Adharma in particular. Popularisation of such doctrines would lead to anarchy. Wearied with exploitation and aggression, the aggressor himself victimised in his turn would only curse the author of an irresponsible philosophy in the long run. The Charvaka thought would thus never command hearty approval. It might blind some for a time. In fine then a person who so vehemently denies the concepts of Dharma and Adharma signs by the very act of denunciation the death-warrant of his own system of speculation. A system like that benefits neither the leader nor the public. The former would be cursed when chaotic conduct engendered by the consciousness of the absence of spiritual values, runs riot. The latter would be ruined by progress of anti-social activity. The hereafter being denied, there can accrue no other-worldly benefits. Even in the present existence only chaos would result from a system of philosophy which denies the moral concepts of Dharma and Adharma.

According to Udayana—the illustrious writer on Nyaya—people will not undertake sundry charitable acts like the performances of sacrifices and the digging of wells, tanks, etc., if they had not some faith in non-sensuous spiritual values and the concept of Dharma. Such an argument would not satisfy the Charvaka! The fact of some people performing acts of sacrifice might merely be an instance of the blind following the blind. Or they might have had some motives in the performance of those acts which we at this distance of time have no means whatever of fathoming. Mere selfish conduct of a section of people will not carry spiritual sanction for all. After all inference cuts both ways. An inference can always be confronted with a counter-argument. It is never conclusive.

Inability directly to apprehend Dharma and Adharma is no

argument. Taste cannot be denied simply because it cannot visually be experienced. Similarly the appropriate sense would reveal Dharma and Adharma. Analogies do not run on all fours. The Veda would reveal Dharma and Adharma though they are not patent to the ordinary eye even as taste spots reveal taste even though other sense organs do not. When an inference and a counter-argument are placed before a truth seeker, very often the reaction is a state of doubt and suspense. So it is in the present case. There would be no sudden and precipitous decision that there are no such concepts as Dharma and Adharma. Rather one would hesitate to jump at such denials and negations. There are two parties to the controversy. One denies *in toto* the existence of Dharma and Adharma. The other affirms their existence. Is the former entitled to greater credence simply because he is an iconoclast? Are Dharma and Adharma non-existent in the scheme of things even as the mare's nest? Or may it not be that they are not apprehended on account of the lack of the appropriate medium which alone would reveal them? Taste cannot be denied if the eye cannot detect it. When a person is thus confronted with two antagonistic opinions he would feel a doubt. Only the Vedas can help him in the riddance of the doubt. Doubt or suspense would arrest or inhibit successful activity. Vedas would remove it and a recognition of the value of Dharma and Adharma as being the only spiritual concepts which would serve to regulate and guide man's conduct in life is essential for efficient existence. The Charvaka too will thus have to revise his opinions. He too in common with the rest of humanity will have to admit the validity of the concepts he has so vehemently denied. In the absence of a recognition of the authority of the Vedas, we would never know aught of the concepts of Dharma and Adharma. They alone are the sources by which the two moral or spiritual concepts can be and are actually revealed. The Vedas are the only authoritative sources of reliable knowledge about the concepts of Dharma and Adharma. If they could be known with the aid of other pramanas, such as sense-perception and Inference, Agama can be dispensed with. But no. The other Pramanas are unable and incompetent to reveal their existence and nature. Agama is the only source which reveals them. Persons like the Buddhists and the Jains who regard the founders of their respective systems as infallible prophets contend that Dharma and Adharma can be ascertained from the precept and words of such prophets. Why should the existence of "*Apaurusheya*" texts—texts not assignable to known agency—be postulated? Madhva's answer is this. The moment some person is considered the author of the Vedas, there springs up naturally the doubt that however eminent, the prophet may not be infallible. The prophet of a particular age and clime need not universally and at all times be acknowledged as such. There would be many pro-infallibility will be challenged. Ignorance and prejudice might be phets. Let that alone. Sectarian loyalty apart, the prophets' alleged against them. Or one might maintain that doctrines have

been advocated with a view to a deliberate misleading of sections of humanity ! There is thus no end to this sort of speculation and argumentation. It is therefore the safest course to do away with the personal authorship of the Vedas.

Why should a personal author not be admitted, and why should he not be regarded infallible and omniscient ? The procedure is entirely arbitrary. So far no one has come across an omniscient being. If one such be admitted, it should be the result of excessive loyalty to a prophet. The admission of omniscience is emotional and not rational. The omniscience thus postulated would be a sentimental affair. It can never be realised by us to be true. The omniscience of X cannot be realised by us to be true and reliable unless we ourselves become omniscient ! That is not practical politics. On sentimental and emotional grounds, therefore, one might imagine some chosen prophet to have been the author of the Vedas, but his omniscience would have to be assumed too. One would be hovering in an atmosphere of arbitrary assumptions.

Inference would not help us much. If universal concomitance between X and Y is to be established, such a concomitance should be experienced as embodied in a number of particulars inductively investigated. As far as omniscience is concerned, no one has ever come across it anywhere in any person. How is universal relationship to be established when omniscience can find no illustrative instance ?

The position is this, if the "apaurusheya" theory is abandoned. Veda is composed. It is done either by Omniscient Being or by one who is not. The latter must be summarily rejected. A being not omniscient is as good or as bad as ourselves. An omniscient being is thus postulated. But who proclaims the omniscience ? Sometimes the prophets themselves have declared their omniscience. Others are declared omniscient by texts. There is vicious reciprocity. Texts are considered reliable authorities because they are composed by omniscient being. The omniscience of the author is proclaimed by the texts themselves. We are in a mutual admiration society. A plurality of prophets would further complicate the problem. The omniscience of one cannot be based of course on the utterance of another. What of the omniscience of the latter himself ? Infinite regress would result. That is why Madhva insists on the abandonment of the postulation of an omniscient being as the author of the vedas. "Upamana," or analogy too is helpless in the matter. If X and Y had been experienced together simultaneously or in succession, one might assert that there is some resemblance between the two. Where has omniscience been experienced ? Nowhere. Analogy would not mend matters. Why not then resort to "Arthapatti"-pramana i.e. admission of a particular fact—simply because, another well-known set of circumstances become inexplicable *unless* this

particular fact is admitted. That Buddha and other prophets have been able to exercise a remarkable influence on the minds of millions of followers—among whom were laity and royalty alike—would become inexplicable unless it is taken for granted that the prophets must have been omniscient. Omniscience is thus established. If it is not admitted, the popularity of the prophets becomes unaccountable. This is the substance of the "Arthapatti." But it will lead only to confusion and not enlightenment. If omniscience is claimed on behalf of Buddha, why not Jina be regarded omniscient too? We shall be left with a plurality of omniscient prophets and founders of systems of philosophy uttering contradictory and mutually inconsistent propositions and all claiming intuitive insight and omniscience. The result would be a deplorable chaos. That is why Madhva rightly says that omniscience has not been witnessed by any one.

The Arhatas—seek to maintain the omniscience of their own prophet by means of an inference thus—There should exist some Atma—some agency—which should be capable of witnessing everything. For it is its essential and fundamental nature so to witness. And there is nothing to obstruct or render infructuous the essential characteristic. The inference again is faulty and fallacious as the conclusion sought to be established cannot be found embodied in any illustrative instance.

Similarly the establishment of omniscient agent as the creator of the cosmos is shown by Madhva to be insufficient. Anyhow omniscience has to supported in a roundabout manner that the creator of cosmos cannot be ignorant in respect of anything created by himself.

Whatever may be the convenient subterfuge ultimately decided upon, there is so to say a regular and uninterrupted chain of imaginary and arbitrary constructions if an author is to be established of the Vedas. (1) An omniscient agency should be admitted to exist though as far as finite beings are concerned, they must for ever Qua finite remain strangers to any omniscience. (2) The agency should again be assumed to be above the temptation to mislead humanity. (3) It should be assumed to be a perfect agency in every way. (4) Such agency should then be regarded as the author of the texts—vedas.

Instead of resorting to such a line of arbitrary construction, it is by far better to maintain the hypothesis that the Vedas cannot be assigned to any known authorship at all. It is a requirement of philosophical procedure that the minimum alone of Kalpana—arbitrary explanation—should be resorted to. We want a sanction for moral conduct. The law, if human, will have no universal validity. Moral concepts of Dharma and Adharma are eternal. They have the sanction of illustrious tradition embodied in texts

which cannot be traced to the authorship of any known agency. And such texts are free from all defects and drawbacks that are the inevitable concomitants of human authorship. If Divine authorship be attempted to be maintained, the aforesaid chain of arbitrary constructions and assumptions would mar metaphysical methodology. It is therefore safest to admit the theory of "apaurusheyatva" of the Vedas—the theory of the texts having no-known-origin. The motive behind the theory is plain. The sacred texts are embodiments of eternal tradition. The concepts of Dharma and Adharma are the corner stones of moral theory and practice. That is tradition. Instead of postulating a plurality of prophets as the authors of tradition, the safer course would be, while insisting on the continuity of tradition, to maintain the theory of "Apaurusheyatva"—the unassignability of the Vedas to any ascertainable agency as their author. The conjecture that superior evolved souls may have supplied suffering humanity with the necessary revealed texts in order to guide it to the appointed spiritual goal, impelled by feelings of love and compassion, is baseless, as several such superior souls are (like the Siddhas) indifferent to the affairs of men and things. The best and the safest course would be this. A tradition relating to the moral concepts of Dharma and Adharma has been built up. It must be supported and maintained intact. The prophets of the world like Vyasa, Buddha and others are merely the upholders of tradition. The moral tradition is embodied in the sacred texts. The latter are not human compositions. They are not therefore liable to faults incidental to and necessary concomitants of human effort and endeavour. They are to be considered as "apaurusheya." They cannot be assigned to any known authorship. It need not be supposed that they are divine compositions. Such a supposition entails a long chain of imaginary constructions such as, Omniscience of the author of the texts—not found elsewhere—his freedom from temptations to mislead humanity etc., The prophets too of the world are not so much the creators as the upholders of tradition. It is therefore irresistibly to be concluded that in order to know anything about the concepts of Dharma and Adharma, one should admit the existence of revealed texts which alone are able and competent to throw adequate light on them. As has already been made plain in the previous discussion, if the said concepts are not admitted by any one to be binding he is at once to be regarded as out of court with enlightened humanity. He need not be taken seriously. He has not any status in the philosophical world. He should be severely left alone.

If the theory of "Apaurusheyatva" be accepted, there is no need to resort to any imaginative constructions whatever. The only initial assumption you need make is the Vedas cannot be assigned to the authorship of any known agency. That is all. The very assumption would suffice to guard the sacredness of tradition.



It would guarantee the validity of moral concepts. Madhva puts it thus—Aparusheya—Vakyangikare—Na-Kinchit-Kalpyam—i.e., if the existence of texts not composed by any known and ascertainable agency be accepted, nothing more need be assumed or imaginarily constructed. (2)

If the foregoing truth could be brought home to the minds of the Charvakas, they too would realise they should accept the validity of revealed texts as otherwise no one would learn what is virtuous and what is not. If each were permitted an unrestricted pursuit of his own freelance activities, moral and social chaos would be the only outcome. That is the "reductio" of the Charvaka position. If sense-knowledge is the only guide, if there is the conviction in the mind of everyone that he need not much bother about a hereafter, sufficient motive power would have been supplied for anti-social and anarchic conduct. Proclivities and tendencies running along such lines can be sufficiently checked and counteracted only with the help of a slow and gradual educative process which must commence with the admission or recognition of the sacredness of the Vedic texts and their authority as the only competent and reliable sources of knowledge relating to the moral concepts of Dharma and Adharma. Even an atheist and agnostic would be made to see the truth of this. Objections against regarding the Vedas as incapable of being traced to known authorship have now been answered. It has been shown that they need not be attributed to the authorship of any omniscient agency. Omniscience should be assumed. Infallibility of the author should be assumed. To avoid all assumptions, the theory of no-known-authorship is advanced. (Aparusheyatva.)

Still some may entertain the scruple-born doubt—how is the Veda after all different from the ordinary sentences or strings of sentences composed or uttered by the ordinary man? If the latter have an author, the former should have one too. Or many as the case may be. Madhva's answer is that age-long tradition knows no author of the Vedic texts. If an author or authors had been known, tradition would certainly have recorded and proclaimed such authorship. There is no motive whatever for the conservers, transmitters, and custodians of tradition, to deceive humanity in respect of the authorship of the Vedic texts. Madhva writes—**"VEDA-KARTURAPRASIDDEH"**. A veda-karta i.e., writer or composer of Veda is (aprasiddha,) not known and heard of. Why should one undertake the construction of an elaborate air-castle? If fruitless speculation and construction regarding the authorship are abandoned (as indeed they will have to be,) the apaurusheyatva theory gets itself firmly established.

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(2) "Aparusheya-vakyangeekare-Na-Kinchitkalpyam." P. 260. Sarvamuula. ("Tatvanirnaya.")

On the contrary, (the *Laukika-vakyas*—) the sentences and utterances we come across in the world do possess their respective authors. Their authorship is not doubted. Their human origin is clear and not questioned. It is possible with a little or great amount of effort and trouble to spot out the author or authors. In some extremely doubtful cases the identification of the author or authors will have to be abandoned as a hopeless task. Anyhow one is accustomed to consider the *Laukika-vakyas* as the compositions of human brains! But there is no such "*Prasiddhi*" in the case of the authorship of the *Vedas*. One might retrace his steps into the past. Even then he finds a uniformity of tradition that baffles him even if it might not carry conviction. Tradition quite early in the day began holding the theory that the *vedas* cannot be traced to any known authorship. The theory is not of recent origin. It is contemporaneous with the commencement of a line of tradition itself. It is indeed a foolhardy attempt to dismiss such a tradition—or theory as spurious and illogical.

Any composition by any one is not a *Veda*. Tradition has scrupulously guarded the genuine *Vedas*. A modern composition however attractive and weighty would not command the status of the *Vedas*. There is (a *Parampara*—) a continuous and uninterrupted tradition which can identify what is and what is not a *Veda*. The texts have survived the ravages of time. They have come out unscathed from the fire-ordeal of ancient and modern criticism. The texts possess an organic unity and systematisation which have not suffered by the passage of time. The *parampara*—or the unbroken continuity of tradition is evidence enough in support of the theory of *Apaurusheyatva*. Even the ancient seers, were merely seers, and were not authors and composers of the *vedic* texts. They saw the truth. They saw texts which were in the strictest conformity with tradition. It is rather far-fetched and roundabout to maintain that the real authors out of extreme humility and sense of modesty did not wish their names as authors of the *vedic* texts be proclaimed from house tops. If even in those dim ages, the authors had been known and identified they would have been mentioned as such. They are just described as seers. They are *not* described as authors or composers. The existence of uninterrupted textual continuity is thus evidence enough in support of the doctrine of "*Apaurusheyatva*". The absence of the said continuity would render inevitable that any artificial modern composition masquerading as a *Veda* would be exposed in its naked-spuriousness in a trice by those who are acquainted with the genuine tradition, and the continuity of texts. It is quite possible that in quarters where there are no such upholders of tradition, a neo-veda or a spurious sacred text, or any kindred pretender may have some chance of successful acceptance by the unwary. The pretender, however, will soon have its true nature exposed.

There is yet another point. Just as there is a continuous tradition or continuity of text in reference to which the claims of any modern composition to rank as a veda can be adequately adjudicated upon, there are criteria whereby genuine seers can be identified and recognised. The Brahmanda-Purana lays down that of the Thirty-Two characteristics or marks mentioned by works on Astrology, Palmistry etc., a seer should possess not less than Twenty and should have a recognised longstanding status as a seer in contemporary society. Not all can be recognised as genuine seers. These then are the cardinal conclusions established by Madhva. (1) The Vedas are to be regarded as "Apaurusheya"—not ascribable, not attributable or traceable to any known authorship (2) God need not be considered the author as such a view entails a chain of arbitrary constructions. Further there is a vicious reciprocity between the omniscience of God and the Authoritativeness and reliability of the Vedas. (3) Uninterrupted tradition and continuity of texts would necessitate dispensing with the said authorship.

## II

The Vedas are Pramana—par-excellence. What is a Pramana? It is sometimes rendered into source of correct cognition or knowledge. At other times it is explained to be an authority or authoritative source of knowledge. It is also explained to mean reliability. There are certain objects and concepts to be known only with the help of the Vedas. The concepts of Dharma and Adharma for instance can be (made) known only through the instrumentality of the Vedas. Pramanya in abstract is rendered into reliability—reliability in the matter of revealing certain objects. ]Wherefrom does this reliability accrue to the texts? Is it from some external source? Or is reliability the intrinsic characteristic of the Vedas? Madhva's answer is Pramanyam—svatah i.e. reliability is intrinsic—in its own right. It is not derived from outside. It is non-derivative. All knowledge does possess the characteristic of revealing the nature of certain appropriate objects as they are. Sometimes on account of defects in the sensory channels of communication or circumstances like distance etc., knowledge might not make the subject acquainted with the real nature of the objects. But those instances are exceptional. The exception only proves the general rule.

In the course of an earlier chapter (devoted exclusively to a discussion of the problem of the Pramanas,) Madhva has clearly elucidated the question. The authoritativeness or reliability of the vedas as proclaimers and revealers of certain objects and concepts which are inaccessible through other means and sources, should not be held to be derived or derivative. It is svatah. It is innate. It rests in its own right. Knowledge is sui generis. That was asserted with vehemence by Prichard. (3) But what about

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(3) "Kant's Theory of Knowledge" P. 245.

its reliability—its ability to reveal to the subject nature of the objects as they are? Wherein lies the guarantee that what the subject knows is real? The Pramanya—of knowledge—i.e. its reliability and trustworthiness as the only means of establishing a relationship between the subject and the object must be based on some ground—on some unimpeachable authority. Knowledge is rendered possible by a concatenation of conditions. Why not postulate that the concatenation itself is a guarantee of the trustworthiness and reliability of knowledge? There is no other go. The validity of the concatenation itself may be made dependent on something else. If so, an infinite regress would be inevitable. To avoid all risks and complications, it should be postulated that the very act of knowledge is perfectly reliable and trustworthy. The Indian vedantin postulates a Sakshi—a witness. It is he who enjoys the benefit of the cognitive, affective, and the conative processes. This witness, in Indian Psychology is different from what is called the mind. Some identify the witness with the soul or consciousness. Others do not. It is not a profitable venture to enter into a discussion of the problem in the present context. The witness in one comprehensive grasp clutches at *knowledge* and its reliability—its authoritativeness etc. The two are inseparable. They originate, grow and decay “*pari-passu*.” But in some of the situations, the grasp of the trustworthiness and reliability of knowledge is arrested by counteracting circumstances, such as doubt, defect in sensory apparatus. Such an arrest necessitates a discussion—an examination of the pros and cons. It generally stimulates the spirit of inquiry and investigation. Ratiocination supplies the arguments. Arresting and counteracting circumstances are got rid of. The riddance facilitates grasping at one stroke knowledge and its trustworthiness. Arguments, ratiocination, are intended only to counteract the influence of the counteracting circumstances themselves. The witness or sakshi is not in any way positively benefited by the part played by reason and argumentation. The moment the counteracting circumstances are eliminated the intrinsic power of the witness grasps the situation and its meaning—knowledge its reliability and trustworthiness. The foregoing postulate is indispensable in any realistic theory of knowledge. The question whether knowledge reveals the characteristics of objects as they are or merely as they appear to us has been illegitimately smuggled into epistemology. Why should any doubt arise at all? Why should mud be thrown at knowledge at all? When you throw mud stick it must. Idealism can culminate only in the cul-de-sac of solipsism. If from the very commencement the capacity and power of knowledge be doubted and suspected, then there is no reason why any inquiry should be undertaken at all as finite man has to employ only knowledge as the means at his disposal and as its capacity and power to reveal the characteristics of objects as they are are

challenged. When once the challenge has been thrown, knowledge stands discredited. It cannot be rescued from its deplorable plight. It is so easy to begin doubting the senses. From Parmenides and Plato to Bradley and Bosanquet, all have done it. It is a sickening fad in philosophy. Bergson suspected intelligence. Yet his metaphysical system is the result of the suspected intellect. In Indian philosophy the difficulty was anticipated quite clearly. After all the only means at finite man's command and the only weapons are the sense-organs. Why should their inherent and characteristic ability to reveal the nature of objects as they are be doubted? May be in exceptional circumstances, on account of some defect in the sensory apparatus, or elsewhere illusions are created. Such exceptions cannot justify a permanent ban on intellect—an eternal taboo on sense-knowledge. No elaborate ratiocination is in fact needed for the apprehension of the intrinsic validity and reliability of knowledge in general and of the Vedas in particular. Where indeed arguments are advanced they are intended to counteract the influence of conditions that block and arrest correct cognition as it were. Persons with a sophisticated outlook and intellect might entertain doubts relative to the validity of Vedas. Reasons might have then to be adduced. Not otherwise. Several of unsophisticated mentality would accept the inherent validity and reliability of the Vedas.

Udayana's contention that if the Pramanya of knowledge i.e. its reliability and validity could be "Svatah", inherent i.e. apprehended in the act of knowledge itself there never would arise any doubt at all is superficial and trivial. The validity will doubtless be a matter of uncertainty when the perception is arrested and blocked as it were by counteracting circumstances. Remove the latter. Their riddance makes knowledge and its validity stand revealed simultaneously. X, Y or Z might doubt the efficacy of a certain drug, but the characteristic of the drug whatever it is cannot be altered by any amount of doubt. It is therefore correct as Madhva maintains that knowledge—and its validity and reliability go together. There can never be any divorce between the two. A-pramanya, or invalidity or unreliability is always due to the operation of obscuring agencies or factors. It is hence termed paratah i.e. originating from external sources.

The reasoning can be applied to the Veda. Its validity is sui generis. It is not derivative. If derived, from which source has it been derived? What about the validity of that source itself? An infinite regress would result. To avoid all needless complications, the self-validity or validity in its own right of the Veda should be postulated even at the commencement of metaphysical investigation. Where one speaks of Akansha or doubt relating to validity, it is obvious it is due to the operation of counteracting circumstances. Akansha is merely Buddhi-dosha.

There are degrees in suspicions or doubts. Only the sophisticated entertain them. It is an unprofitable inquiry how the sophistication of intellect itself is brought about or engendered. Those who are not, do not entertain any doubts. The several steps in the argument can thus be summed up. All knowledge is *sui generis*. Its reliability and validity are so too. 2. An enquiry which commences with doubting the capacity of knowledge to reveal the characteristics of objects as they are, stands self condemned. 3. *Apramanya*—or unreliability is engendered by a conspiracy of circumstances which arrests the perception of the validity. It is "*paratah*"—due to or engendered by extraneous circumstances. 4. The Vedas should be regarded self-reliable. They are valid on their own merits and in their own inherent right. Prichard's attack on Kant has a profound significance. There is no need to doubt our knowledge. Such doubt far from having any methodological significance is suicidal. If doubting is to be persistent one would be left eternally with the doubting self! It is merely solipsism rechristened. Unprofitable as it is to investigate the origin of the sophistication itself, it is yet possible to see that contradictory statements, lack of faith or belief, abnormal perverseness etc., might and do engender distrust or mistrust in the minds of the sophisticated about the validity of the Vedas. Others who do not permit themselves so to be sophisticated realise the self-validity of the Vedas, or its self-reliability. The unsophisticated feel no need for raising any questions about the validity at all. They feel no need for any *Akansha*. In their case there is no questioning, no cross-examination, no doubting of the validity of the Vedas. If therefore the validity of the sacred texts is doubted, nay even challenged and repudiated, the cause of such doubt challenge or repudiation must lie in the perception of contradiction, redundant statements etc. Anyhow the "*Apramanya*"—or unreliability or invalidity is described to be ("*Paratah*")—due to external factors, whereas "*Pramanya*"—reliability or validity is "*svatah*"—internal and intrinsic. Our knowledge of external reality carries with it its inalienable validity and there is no use doubting it. There is the indelible stamp of reliability or validity on knowledge. The cheap cavil that it is after all only sense-knowledge would stand exposed in all its absurdity. That is the only knowledge at our disposal. Knowledge is self-valid. The sacred texts are so "*a fortiori*." There they stand from time immemorial. They cannot be traced to any ascertainable human origin. Their divine origin is fraught with a series of arbitrary constructions. Ergo, they are in all their glory—"svatah pramana." Self-valid, self-reliable, proclaiming to man spiritual categories like Dharma and Adharma, and others that cannot be known or ascertained from any other source, or by any other means.

### III

Madhva then takes up for discussion a controversial issue—Whether the Varnas—(the letters of the Alphabet—here of course

the Sanskrit) are Nitya—eternal, or Anitya or perishable. The latter view is urged by the opponent who seeks to link it with the theory of “Paurusheyatva” or the hypothesis of the Human-composition of the Vedas. Vedic texts are made up of sentences. They are made up of words. These latter are made up of letters. The letters again are produced at the time of pronunciation by human effort which is termed—“Prayatna.” How is it possible for the Vedantin to maintain that the vedas are revealed texts, not ascribable to known authorship, when there is the patent fact staring him in the face that the letters, words, sentences, passages etc., are all at the mercy of the individual whose effort in the shape of utterance and pronunciation is responsible for (the “Utpatti”—) the creation or production of the Varnas—the letters, and through them of the words, sentences, etc.? The controversy is known as the “Varna-nityatva Vada.” The anxiety of the opponent who contends that letters are perishable is plain. He wants to discredit the theory of “apaurusheyatva”—and discredit the authority too and the reliability of the sacred texts. How is he best to do it? The Vedas are no better than human compositions. Look at the production of the letters—the pronunciation which is at the mercy of human effort in toto. Can a body of texts made up of such letters and words be regarded revealed—and not composed by human agency? The letters are merely momentary existences. When you pronounce them they are created. They are immediately destroyed after pronouncement. The Vedic texts are composed of merely such perishables—the letters. Ergo the former should be perishable and must have been human compositions. This is just like saying that a drop of water is a small object. The Pacific ocean is nothing but drops of water. Therefore the Pacific ocean is a small object. The controversy has relevancy at all simply because it is bound up with the human-composition-theory of the Vedas directly and indirectly with the problem of pramāṇya thereof.

The Vedantin naturally maintains the theory of eternity. The eternity of letters would guarantee the eternity of Vedas. Seeing that all human endeavour is limited and perishable, he can infer that the non-perishable or eternal is not a human composition at all. Of course here and there flaws might be detected in the translation of the reasoning into formal types of arguments, but the controversy should have clearly owed its origin to some such move on the part of the discreditors of the Veda. Not merely the discreditors. The Vaisesika who accepts the authority of the Vedas nonetheless considers them as wise divine compositions.

Madhva takes his stand on “Pratyabhijñā”—“Pratyabhijñā” means recognition of the revived. The revival may be sensory or ideational. Recognition is the most important factor in memory. The elimination of recognition will reduce sensory or ideational revival to a meaningless pageant of a passing show. Madhva

contents that on the strength of recognition the letters are not to be considered as created at the time of pronunciation. Letters are not at the mercy of momentary creation. The recognition takes the form—this is the Ga-kara (the letter Ga) which I have experienced and uttered and heard others utter too *before*. The recognition points in the direction of permanence of letters. The origin of script may be a fascinating problem for anthropologists and philologists. Never mind the script. At least there must have been symbols or signs, or gestures by means of which thoughts should have been communicated to others. Making due allowance for the fullest scope of originality of creation and investigation, the stock of linguistic responses at the disposal of a human being cannot but have been limited. Had it not been for a relative fixity and permanency about these responses, the life of the organism itself would have been endangered. The responses cannot be changing and shifting daily. When the time of their formation and crystallisation is past, one cannot think of originality of responses. This must apply to letters of the alphabet, all human attempts, discoveries and inventions etc. We are only reading some modern conceptions into Madhva's texts if we hold that such considerations weighed with him in this controversy. Madhva's point is this. The contention that letters are produced at the time of pronunciation cannot be valid. The letters are recognised as being those which had been employed and used before. This recognition—Pratyabhijnya—gives the lie direct to the momentariness or the perishableness of the letters—the Varnas—"Akase-utpannah-sabdah-Akase-vinashtah"—is a familiar Vaise-shika comment. The sound (letter) was produced in Akasa—and into it it vanished.

Why not the recognition (the Pratyabhijnya) be put down as being due to false analogy which engenders an illusion of recognition? There is, no doubt, some resemblance. This leads to an illusion of recognition or identification. The contention is baseless. At this rate all memory and recognition would have to be ruled out of experience. Life is full of instances of effective recall of the past imagery and recognitions thereof. The recognition perfectly dovetails with the present and helps an intelligent anticipation of or projection into the future. If all recognition is credited to the discernment of resemblance which is said to create illusory-identification, experience becomes unaccountable. He is the same Devadatta or John whom I had seen elsewhere and under different conditions. Experience is replete with such instances. They too will have to be stigmatised illusory if recognition is illusory. Recognition is not illusory. Nor does it involve *de novo* creation of the objects and situations recognised. It implies prior or previous existence of the objects recognised in a spatio-temporal series. The Varnas or letters are not momentary existences. They are permanent. Pronunciation only makes them manifest.



The Buddhist who maintained the momentariness of creation has still to admit the permanence of Akasa-space. It is not every moment brought into being *de novo*. What is permanence of Akasa grounded on? On its difference from the five—skandhas of the Buddhist. The Buddhists admit that Akasa and two types of vinasa or destruction—i.e. Pratisankhya and Apratisankhya Nirodha—are eternal (Nitya). Pratisankhya Nirodha is intellectual negation or stultification. X which seems to exist does not really exist. Apratisankhya Nirodha is not intellectual but natural (physical or non-intellectual if we please). The latter is shared by all objects (non-sentient). They are incapable of the former. The three alone are permanent. They are not caught in the current of evanescence. If then according to the Buddhist Akasa or space is permanent, what about recognition? A person perhaps having for some time been a victim of “Vertigo of directions” recollects this is the direction. The recollection is common. It relates to Akasa. Akasa is permanent. Its recognition is therefore not illusory.

Why not hold that the directions are themselves illusory (bhranti-kalpita)? If so, the Vijnyana and the Sunya, the two fundamental categories of the Buddhist might as well be illusory! Another contention is anticipated. Direction is imagined on account of the symbols like sun-rise, sun-set etc. No. Even when darkness reigns supreme, there is directional perception. Should however a confusion or vertigo arise, sun-rise would indicate the right direction. Sun-rise thus is not the basis of an illusory construction. It is the indicator of a direction in space already existent and which is permanent. One might not be able to know easily in a new or unfamiliar locality which is East and which is West. Sun-rise would remove the doubt. The doubt does not render space and direction illusory. Their reality and permanence are not in any way compromised by such doubts. Why? Doubts are as a matter of fact possible relative to the Two fundamental categories of Sunya and Vijnyana as well. The Vaiseshikas and others do not admit the reality of the Sunya. Even as the Sunya, the directions are (Sthira—) permanent and fixed. The fixity and permanence are compatible with different co-ordinates of reference according to change of latitudes. What is the purpose served by this establishment of the permanence of the Directions and space? Even as the Sunya, Akasa is real—Dik is real—Even so the Vedas are. That is the central object of the discussion. To the Buddhist who clings to the philosophy of momentariness, it is pointed out that in as much as he admits the permanence of Akasa and Sunya, he has to admit the permanence of the Vedas as well. There is the recognition that X is only the old passage transmitted by tradition. It will thus be seen that Madhva compels the Buddhist as well to assent to the authority of the Vedas. His theory of momentariness will not hinder this forced consent. There are even according to the Buddhist

theories, things or categories like Akasa and the two types of destruction which are out of the clutches of the relentless flux of momentary sensations. Even so are the Vedas. What applies to the permanent entities does apply to the Vedas as well, though of course analogies do not run on all fours. The permanence of Vedas and the eternity of Letters (varnas) are reinforced by recollection and recognition.

That there are such guiding and controlling factors as Dharma and Adharma is to be known only through the instrumentality of the Vedas. When once this general fact is ascertained, people are bound to differ in the details of Dharma and Adharma. Such differences do not matter. They will have to be settled or adjusted as best as they might. Such differences of opinion in the matter of details will not however invalidate the general notions of Dharma and Adharma.

Madhva then clinches the argument. "The Pramanya"—the reliability of the Vedas is not derived. It is innate. Not merely the reliability of the Vedas. Knowledge itself is self-valid. If sometimes we are misled, it is due to extraneous circumstances. That must be so. Otherwise, the fact of defective sensory, apparatus being the cause of illusory perceptions cannot be accounted for. Experience convinces us that defects in the sensory apparatus do produce illusions. In the absence of such defects, perception is normally valid and reliable.

The Varnas or the letters are not *de novo* created at the moment of pronunciation. They are manifested at the moment of pronunciation. Vedas are merely revealed to the chosen few who hear the texts and transmit them on for the benefit of humanity. That is why they are characterised "Srutis" quite appropriately.

There have been many dissolutions of worlds, and there have been creations. Countless dissolutions and creations are yet to be. The Vedas are to be considered as having been retained intact in Divine mind and at the time of creation, the texts were delivered safe and sound unto humanity. Some such explanation will have to be offered.

The modern critic may perhaps indulge in a subdued sneer or laughter. But the motive which must have impelled the ancient thinkers is quite plain and unchallengeable. After all even the best of us are fallible. Dharma and Adharma cannot be made to rest on human sanctions merely. They must have super-human ones. There is a body of texts without which concepts of Dharma and Adharma cannot be understood in the proper perspective. Argue one might indefinitely, there is no chance of settlement. One argument as good as another establishes

Dharma and another demolishes it. Ratiocination wearied with the game must turn to the Veda for rest, comfort and consolation. Not owing its origin to any agency human or divine, the body of texts would reveal eternal verities for the unanimous acceptance of humanity. (4)

#### IV

Madhva has so far endeavoured to establish the authoritative-ness and reliability of the vedas as the only sources from which knowledge about the nature of Dharma and Adharma can be derived by man, as also the eternity of the sacred texts, and letters (as against the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas). Veda is the only authority. It cannot be traced to any known authorship. The body of sacred texts is free ergo from all defects and faults inevitable to human authorship associated with fallibility. The texts again proclaim the nature of Dharma and Adharma. Pre-eminently they proclaim the nature of Brahman—the Supreme Being. The Prabhakara School of Purvamimamsa now contends that the Vedas cannot be considered to proclaim the nature of Brahman at all. Madhva joins issue with the Prabhakaras and devotes the next section to a discussion of their theory.

{ The Prabhakaras argue thus—Let the reliability and the authoritativeness of the Vedas etc., be all accepted without demur. But how can the texts reveal or proclaim the nature of the Supreme Being? Consider the general scheme of linguistic symbols and the way in which they convey thoughts to other minds. We (so self-complacently) believe that a particular word or term conveys a particular meaning or significance. There is some connection established between a word and its appropriate object. But for this there would be universal chaos. There is such a thing as "Vyutpatti". It means a right apprehension of the connection between a word and its object. This apprehension originates from the conduct of elders and the way in which they communicate with others. The elders again adopt a particular line of activity which serves as the only real and ultimate basis of all communication and the employment of linguistic symbols. The child is the father of man. The child carefully observes the conduct of elders. It concludes that they are influenced by motives and desires. When people act in obedience to the command of others, the child learns that action is intended for the satisfaction of certain needs. It drinks milk when it is hungry. Even so do others enter on certain lines of activity to satisfy their desires and needs. In this manner by a slow and gradual process of evolution language, a huge conceptual system has been built up. There is the verb—the life-breath of a sentence. It denotes action. Other terms make clear to

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(4) In the absence of texts free from faults concomitant with human compositions, eternal verities like Dharma and Adharma, (Virtue and vice.) cannot be proved to exist. "Nahi-dharmadi-siddhihsyat-nityavakyam-vinakvachit." Anuvyakhyana.- P. 163.

the agent other factors that enter into the action. Karya or action is the central object of linguistic expression. Such indeed is the case in the affairs of the world. No one outside a lunatic asylum acts without a purpose. Purpose implies striving, search for means, the volitional individuality needed to secure the satisfaction of the needs, and the fulfilment of purposes. Look at the various parts of speech and the sentence. The "karya"—or action is the central object denoted. The verb does it. The others work in the interests of the "karya". An "Anga" is a part. The "pradhana" is the chief ritual. The former works in the service of the latter. So do the mantras. They remind you of the parts of and auxiliaries to the central (sacrificial) event. The "arthavada" portions function likewise. They create desire in the mind of an agent by singing the praise of a line of conduct or the performance of a sacrifice. The goal again is the "karya". Similarly the vedanta also should be regarded as referring to karya—to something that is to be achieved and secured as the result of human endeavour. It is only in the fitness of things. There is neither normal reasoning nor justification why an exception should be made in the case of the vedanta. The "Vidhi" or the injunction is that in order to secure "apunaravritti", final release from the cycle of births and deaths (literally non-return-once again). Atma must be known and realised. The injunction cannot refer to a settled fact. A *fait accompli* is not its object. The injunction must relate to something not already acquired. It should be worth acquiring too. Sufficient effort should be put forth. The spiritual resources should be mobilised. Realisation of the Atma would be possible only then. As it is the Vedantic assertion that the texts refer to Brahman which is one, changeless, immutable, Being could have no intelligible import. Such a static Being cannot be the object of the Vedas. Why should such a static Being be in need of any texts to have its nature proclaimed for the benefit of aspirants who might wish to realise its nature? The Vedas should be understood to refer to activity that is within the reach of man. Putting forth of effort is indicated without fail. Effort leads to activity. Activity pleases the individual or the agent. Activity is in essence creative. Static being, immobile Brahman, the changeless absolute, can never have anything to do with the vedic texts which sing the praise of action and activity. The Dynamic ideal of activity is the goal. Not stable Being. Not the Absolute.

Madhva argues that the aforesaid objection of the Prabhakaras cannot hold water. The mutual intercourse and inter-communication in the world are the outcome of a steady process of growth and evolution. Rome was not built in a day. The linguistic and conceptual systems could not have been built in a day or even in a generation. Countless years of trial and error should have laid the foundations on which the linguistic superstructure has been now erected. Perhaps it would be nearer the truth to maintain that

perception of the nature of objects in outline precedes the christening of it in words. There are two questions that should be kept apart. (1) Who was it that first introduced the linguistic system? (2) The other, how does an individual gradually assimilate language, and learn its effective use? The former is not a very profitable enquiry. Perhaps philologists and anthropologists might be interested in it. It has no philosophical significance. The latter is more concerned with the general psychology of learning and that of learning language in particular. In the absence of the spoken or the written language something in the nature of gesture, some symbol should have existed through the instrumentality of which the individual made his thoughts known to those with whom he came into contact. The symbols perhaps originated with reference to some objects of external reality amidst which the lot of the individual had been cast. It is thus primarily to designate the objects of external reality that language comes in handy. It served a like purpose in the early stages of its evolution. If this view—the only one natural and reasonable—be accepted, then the “Prabhakara” hypothesis would be seen to be untenable. It is not activity or action always which is revealed or made known by language. The objects, desires, ambitions and aspirations, hopes and fears, in fact all these according to the environmental demands and exigencies are what language is revelatory of. It is an irrational exaggeration to maintain that action or activity is the only one revealed by language. By the establishment of a prolonged convention, a systematic network of linguistic symbols has come to stay. It is idle to query why an object should be designated by a particular name and not by another. Why should a typewriter be so styled? Why water is called water and not anything else?!! Who first gave the name and why? If a person is to be brought up in complete isolation from all humanity without any chance being allowed of his coming in contact with any linguistic symbols what sort of medium of communication would he make use of? Such experimental investigation is bound to be interesting. But Madhva's point is that the Purvamimamsic action is not the only denotative goal of language! When (“Anvaya”), the co-operation between word and its significance is studied, or the interrelation of terms in a proposition, it will be seen that a subject-predicate relationship exists. A partly known situation which constitutes the subject is already partly apprehended and it is a *ergo* (“*siddha*”) already established and known partly. Language has to deal with such situations only. The entirely known and the entirely unknown do not worry us at all—It is only the partly known. So long then as this distinction between the subject and predicate could not be annihilated, so long it must be accepted that words, and language refer only to objects and situations already apprehended in part and awaiting further elucidation and clarification. The linguistic system does not refer to *de novo* action or activity always. Rather it has a pointed reference to situations already arisen and apprehended in part.

Consider an analogy that can profitably be drawn from infantile learning. A child first sees some person or object. It is then told by a nurse or by some elderly person that so-and-so is its parent, friend, relative and so forth. Language then gets gradually assimilated by the child. Progressive growth would then accomplish the rest until perhaps the concepts become petrified with the onset of senility and the consequent loss of receptivity and responsiveness to newer situations and fresher opportunities. The order of evolution is something like this. A vague apprehension of objects and situations first appears. Then learning from others how to designate them by means of language of the community to which an agent happens to belong, he becomes grounded so to say in the linguistic system. In comparatively advanced years when the volitional individuality of the subject is fully developed and his conative tendencies are active, he realises that the linguistic system works in the service of his own interests and welfare. Trite as it might seem, he is not alone in the world. He is a member of a social order willy-nilly. Society influences him powerfully while he reciprocates the influence in but a feeble degree. If a novice, he will have to depend on his advisers and well-wishers for light on the course of his conduct. Even when he acts otherwise, he will feel the need to communicate his thoughts to others. He then employs the linguistic machinery simply, efficiently and successfully. All activity is thus inspired by "*Ishtasadhanata-jnyana*" i.e., by knowledge of what is beneficent for the organism and the means of securing it. But for such knowledge volitions would be futile. Why should the "*purva-mimamsaka*" swear by and make a fetish of activity when as a matter of fact the linguistic system works in the interests of a prior apprehension of objects already there, and by no means *de novo* brought into existence? It is easy to see why the "*Purvamimamsaka*" swears by action. He wants to interpret all vedic texts as supporting ritualism. The only way is to narrow down the connotation of the term (of activity) and confine it to ritualism. In that case too, the Vedantic position that Brahman is the only reality proclaimed by the texts can be challenged on the ground that Brahman is already ("*siddha*") established Qua static Being and it is *de novo* activity that is aimed at by the texts.

Madhva does not deny that activity does serve its purpose and has allotted it a definite function. But he only contends it be kept in its proper place. It cannot usurp the legitimate function of others. Language then contemplates and apprehends a situation first partly. Then curiosity is incited. Adjustment to the situation would alone ensure the welfare of the organism. Knowledge of the details of the situation is then sought for. Emotional factors exercise their own influence. The hedonic element enters. If on weighing the pros and the cons, it is found to be a beneficent course of action, then the agent acts. Otherwise activity is directed to counteracting the evil influences.

Activity thus comes into the forefront only after a situation presents a problem, and after it is understood in all its details, and after the resolve that adjustment to it would mean happiness to the organism. It is idle to contend that all this (pre-action-stage) understanding of the situation is not contemplated when the linguistic system is so freely employed. The situation is *siddha*. It is already there. It is expecting and so to say awaiting adjustment. The "vyutpatti"—power or the ability of the words etc., is directed to an apprehension of situation already existing. A *de novo* creation every moment of experience is not contemplated.

Why does Madhva controvert the "purvamimamsic" position? It is because he wants to maintain as against the latter, that the texts proclaim Brahman as the Supreme Reality. It does not matter if the Supreme Reality is (*Siddha*) already existent. It is in fact the only be-ent. If in the ordinary transactions of life, linguistic system is concerned with situations already existent, *a fortiori*, the vedic texts are concerned with the proclaiming of Supreme Brahman as the only Reality whose nature has to be investigated by all genuine aspirantes. The "purvamimamsic" theory that the vedic texts relate to activity allied to ritualism would thus fall to the ground. They relate on the other hand to the Supreme Brahman. The starting point is the partly-apprehended situation. The individual puts forth effort. Sometimes he succeeds. Otherwise often success is not to be had. Failure is attributed to causes and circumstances over which it is said NO ONE HAS ANY CONTROL! It is natural that a successful person sees nothing so to say beyond his nose. He arrogates to himself powers that are not his. He fancies he is the lord of creation. There is nothing beyond his reach. Fire, Earth, Water and Air have been conquered. Who would then dispute man's supremacy in the world? But success is not always guaranteed. Failure is often writ large on the endeavours of man. He is obliged to fall back upon religion for prop and support in moments of doubt and despair. He will realise that there is a Supreme Power which makes for righteousness. He should know more. A vague and nebulous apprehension that some Supreme Power exists is in itself not sufficient. The individual should know all about the Supreme Power, at any rate as much as can be vouchsafed to one of finite intelligence. The Vedic texts reveal the real nature of the Supreme Brahman to discerning eyes. Having understood it, he would naturally strive for its realisation, for so to say coming face to face with the Deity, for intuiting Duration, and for installing oneself safely at the very fountain head of the *elan vital*. Upasana or worship is the only means. Worship advances *pari passu* with meditation. Worship and meditation can be practised successfully only by him whose mind has been rid of all impurities and imperfections, in thought, word and deed. Purity has to be acquired by the performance of the prescribed rites, and by steadfast adherence to the duties

of one's station. The vedic texts prescribe some course of ritual as well. Ritual and worship are thus harmonised. They are not incompatible with one another. The former prepares the mind by a discipline. The latter is then easy to gain. The entire body of vedic texts would thus be seen to proclaim only the nature of Supreme Brahman for the realisation of which a spiritual aspirant strives.

Or a different point of departure is possible. An individual finds in the world only pain and misery. The body, mind, sense-organs, etc. only cause pain and misery to the subject. Is suffering then the very essence of human-constitution? To suffer is human. Is that the last word in Philosophy? If so it would indeed be a poor philosophy. May it not be that the fundamental essence of the soul is happiness? It is obscured by ignorance. There has been a fall from the exalted pedestal of divinity. Man must come into his own. A rich and glorious divine heritage is his. He would come by it easily. The Vedic texts remind an individual of his own high destiny which he appears to be oblivious of for the nonce. What is the destiny? His essence is pure unalloyed bliss. In this respect the individual resembles the Supreme Brahman. The latter made the former in His own image. The individual has lost his way. Ignorance has beclouded his eyes. Vision proper, correct and accurate will have to be restored to him sooner or later. By what means can ignorance be got rid of? How is man to come into his own? How is he to realise his fundamental essence of pure joy and bliss? Divine grace is the only means. How to secure His grace? He should be worshipped, meditated upon and realised. The little narrow self should be surrendered to Him. The nature of the Supreme Lord should be known. His worship should be devoutly practised. The mind should be purified. The Vedic texts not only proclaim the nature of the Supreme Brahman, but lay down as well a course of spiritual discipline. The "Purvamimamsaka" is obviously playing only a partisan game in restricting the function of the vedic texts to a mere revealing of a course of ritual. Primarily the nature of the Supreme Brahman is first revealed. As means of realisation spiritual discipline is emphasized. The Purvamimamsic view therefore that the vedic texts relate only to *de novo* activity connected with ritual should be abandoned for good. "Karyevyutpatti" is a partisan plea merely. "Siddhe-vyutpatti" cannot be given a bad name and hanged. It is possible to turn the tables on the "Purvamimamsaka." All linguistic communications, and texts are intended to function in reference to some courses of action intelligently anticipated and envisaged. QUA anticipated and envisaged, the course of response or activity is to be christened "Siddha" already potentially achieved. There is nothing illogical in such an interpretation.



The best thing would be neither to exaggerate the interpretation put by the "Purvamimamsaka," nor by the Vedantin. A rational compromise is possible. Progress implies advancement from a given basis to higher stages. The latter are yet to concretise. Their nature, however, is vaguely and roughly envisaged or anticipated. Otherwise intelligent activity would be unthinkable. The basis or the foundation is as important as the superstructure. The "Siddha" or the already achieved has pointed reference to the basis or the starting point. The "Karya" refers on the other hand to the superstructure. In the absence of a firm foundation the superstructure would crumble down. All language refers to the starting point first. The reference is inevitable. Further all activity must presuppose awareness of the fact that the pursuit of a particular line activity would advance the interests and the welfare of the organism. This awareness is "Ishta-sadhanata-jnyana." One must be aware of what would be healthy and what would advance his interests. He should likewise be clear in his mind as to the means to be adopted. The means are already there. He has to select what would suit him best. He would thus be in a position to adjust himself effectively to his environment.

The discussion of this problem can thus be wound up. The Purvamimamsaka is guilty of exaggerating the importance of his narrow view-point. The "karye-vyutpatti" is his hobby-horse. There is no evidence to prove that all language, sentences, words and texts etc., refer only to *de novo* activity. Far from it they may all refer, and they actually do refer (the moment genuine spiritual desire is awakened in man) to pursuit of activity or a course of action calculated to yield the agent the maximum of benefit. The material benefits are there doubtless. But an aspirant has no attraction for them. He is not blinded by their glamour. He has hitched his wagon to the stars. His desire is to undertake quest after Brahman. He should strive and endeavour to realise Brahman. He should undergo a course of spiritual discipline to realise his ideal. The Vedas are there to proclaim the nature and character of the Supreme Overlord of the Universe. The puranas and other texts follow suit. It has been made sufficiently clear (5) elsewhere that without the help of the vedic texts, the nature of Brahman will never be known by any amount of ratiocination. The vedic texts are all "apaurusheya" texts.

Madhva quotes a passage from the Naradiya-purana which is to the following effect: The Vedas, the Upanishads, the Puranas etc. find their prime justification as the sources which reveal the nature of the Supreme Brahman. This Universalistic view-point should be adequately appreciated. Of course the passages would have a sort of narrow interpretation when for instance they speak of a

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(5) "Naavedavinnatarkena-matirityadi-vakyaiah-Tarko-jnyapvyitum-saktonesitaram-katham-chana." Anuvyakhyana. P. 165.

god or deity like Indra or Varuna. The narrow interpretation is however not the final one. Madhva has thus established on a firm and secure foundation his thesis (in opposition to that of the "Purvamimamsaka") that texts do refer to objects already existent—the Being aspect—and that the reference fully guarantees the validity and the possibility of all linguistic communication not merely, but conceptual progress as well. There is the science of grammar. There is the "Nirukta." All these should be accepted by parties to the debate as referring not to nascent ideas, objects and things in the formative stage, cast into the boiling cauldron, but to those already formed and definitely contoured. If this view be disputed, the science of grammar etc. would have to be dismissed as invalid and unreliable. Nobody would be foolhardy enough to attempt that absurd venture.

## V

Madhva next considers the question—Is the identity between the finite and the Infinite (Brahman) the chief or fundamental import of Sruti—the Agama? This is a very important section. Some of our modern philosophical pandits consider that it would be impossible for Madhva to refute the authority of such a patent and well-known passage as "Tatvamasi". The question of interpretation cannot be settled off-hand. There are definite canons of interpretation and the principles of exegesis which have to be adhered to in an attempt at an interpretation of the Vedic and Upanishadic texts. supposing there are texts and passages which are pre-eminently indicative of identity between the finite individual and the Infinite Brahman, in their light and on their authority, other texts and passages might be made to lose their surface interpretation, so that the grand interpretational synthesis might be achieved in support of identity or Aikya. But fortunately or unfortunately there are no such categorically conclusive passages. It cannot be contended that statements like "Tatvamasi" are there. But then there are others like "Dvasuparnau" etc. which speak of a disparity between the finite individual and the Infinite Brahman. Now there would be no problem for discussion if one set or body of texts were to be unanimously accepted to be final. That cannot be. Nor is it a matter which can be settled by the numerical strength of the passages themselves. If for instance more than seventy or eighty per cent of the texts are indicative of identity that is no reason why the minority passages should be ignored altogether. Their interpretation has to be reckoned with. Of course for purposes of mere controversy one might assert that a majority of passages support identity. Such an assertion is not bound to be accepted as final. One might as well contend that the minority of passages alone contain the truth of the matter, and that in their light the majority of texts should be re-interpreted. Madhva does not however have any recourse to

actual counting of the texts or passages. He takes his stand on the canons of interpretation. The sacred texts have not been assigned to any known authorship. They are postulated to be free from all error, free from all mistakes. The sacred texts are not unanimous. Some passages are indicative of identity between Brahman and the finite soul. Others assert the existence of fundamental difference between the Individual and Brahman. The relative interpretational strength of the passages should be ascertained according to the canons. The first step in the evolution of the argument is this—The texts like “Tatvamasī”, cannot be accepted as they stand. They are in express and obvious contradiction with those like “Dve-Brahmani—” “Davasuparnau”—etc. The identity-theory should suffer some modification therefore. The absolutist contends that passages which speak of identity between Brahman and the finite soul might be admitted to need modification in case it is proved that the texts proclaiming difference between the two are either superior to the former in interpretational strength or of the same strength. That could not be done. As a matter of fact the passages which proclaim difference between Brahman and the finite soul are of inferior strength. Why? They proclaim a difference which has already been established by means of “pratyakṣa”—sense-perception, and Anumana or Inference. Difference therefore is nothing new. If the passages only emphasize a difference which has already been brought home to the minds of philosophers and lay men alike, they should perforce be considered as inferior to those which proclaim identity between Brahman and the finite, as such identity has not previously been established through the instrumentality of any other pramana. The criterion of interpretation is this. If any Sruti passages merely repeat or re-emphasize a truth which has already been arrived at by means of some other pramana, they are to be regarded as passages of inferior strength. They are “Anuvadaka”—merely repetitive of something already known and ascertained. On the other hand, the identity between Brahman and the finite soul has not been arrived at or ascertained by any independent pramana other than the Sruti itself. The passages which proclaim it are not repetitive of anything. They should be assigned a superior status. They cannot be permitted to suffer any interpretational modification in the light of the passages and texts which proclaiming as they do only difference between the Brahman and finite beings so plainly seen, are relatively inferior.

Madhva answers the objection easily thus. Certainly if the difference between Brahman and Atman had already been ascertained, the objection might stand that texts proclaiming difference are weaker as they repeat a difference already ascertained, but the pity of it Iago, the existence of Brahman itself cannot be established unless recourse is had to the authority of the Vedas. Just see. There are two very different things which should not

be confused with one another. The ascertainment of the existence of Brahman as the supreme overlord of the Universe, is one thing. Realisation of the difference between Brahman and the finite is quite another. The latter is impossible without the former. Difference can be realised only when you have some previous notion of what the entities are between which you perceive a difference. Well, taking your stand on finite existence, you can establish difference between the finite and the Supreme (Brahman.) Or conversely you can take your stand on the concept of a Supreme Power and establish difference between finite and the Supreme. In either case perception of difference or disparity should be preceded by apprehension of the objects or entities which are so different. Before the absolutist dismisses the texts speaking of difference between Brahman and Atman as weaker, he should see if they merely repeat what is established already. No. The existence of Brahman itself has to be proved only in the light of the Agamas. Texts which assert the existence of difference between the Absolute and the finite form part of the general body of texts which alone have to be resorted to for the demonstration of the existence of the Supreme. That means difference between the two is as much a genuine subject-matter of the sacred texts as any other hypothesis relating to the finite and the Absolute. The position is this. Some of the texts specifically mention that the finite soul is not identical with but radically different from the Absolute or the Infinite. An absolutist usually dismisses such texts by giving them a bad name. He says they are merely repetitive of a truth already established. QUA repetitive they are weaker texts. The texts or passages on the other hand which proclaim identity between the Supreme and the finite are not repetitive as they make known the truth of identity not known or ascertained before by means of any other source of knowledge. Madhva turns the tables. Is difference repeated? May be. But how? Prior to the perception of a difference between any two objects or entities, say X and Y, they should have been apprehended in isolation. X is different from Y. You can assert difference between the two only when you discern them in sufficient disparity. However vague the initial apprehension the two should be thought of as existing separately from and independent of one another. But in the present case, the existence of Brahman itself is known only through the Agama-pramana. Prior to the functioning of the Agama how can Brahman be regarded as one whose existence has been demonstrated? If therefore sense-perception and inference establish a difference between Brahman and the finite, that can only be after the existence of Brahman has been established on the rock-foundation of Agama. It is in that Agama you come across texts which emphasize difference between Brahman and the finite. The difference therefore cannot be lightly and light-heartedly dismissed as already established, and texts laying stress on it cannot be relegated to the limbo of weaker authority as only being repetitive

of a difference already established. In a word, one of the entities entering into the predicated relation known as difference, namely Brahman is not brought home to the mind of the finite at all without the sanction and authority of the texts. That means the texts have to be invoked for the establishment of the existence of God. God is thus not an entity established independently by some other pramana. Difference or any relation for the matter of that is bi-limbed. If difference is to be dismissed as a jejune repetitive affirmation of something established already, both the limbs should have been established too prior to a discussion of the difference. It is not so. One of the limbs can be established only with the help of the Agama. Therefore, the relationship known as difference into which this limb enters cannot be considered to have been established independently of the Agama without which the limb itself of the relationship is nowhere. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the texts of the Agama which affirm difference between Brahman and Atman cannot be condemned as weaker or of lower status. In other words if the demonstration or proof of the existence of Brahman is practical politics without any reference to the Agama whatever, then, will it be possible to maintain that difference between Brahman and the finite can be perceived by means of other pramanas, and ergo, the texts which speak of such difference are repetitive and weaker. However the existence of Brahman itself cannot be demonstrated without the help or support of the Agamas. Brahman is not established by any other Pramana. When Brahman itself has not been established by other Pramanas its difference from the finite cannot be established by the other pramanas. Ergo once more Difference and Brahman have not been established by pramanas other than Agama, and the texts of the Agama affirming such difference are as strong and valid as those which affirm identity.

At this stage, the opponent interjects—"Why is it not possible for the existence of Brahman to be demonstrated by some other pramana, say for instance by Anumana or Inference?" If that be so, Brahman would be proved to exist already prior even to an appeal to Agama. Its difference from the finite too would have then been established. Texts in the Agama which echo this difference would be repetitive and hence weaker than those which affirm identity between the two. Madhva categorically answers that though ever and anon appeal has been made to inference for demonstrating the existence of God, the appeal is bound to be vain and futile. There is no end to ratiocination. There is none to argumentation. Reasons can be adduced for any conclusion provided the parties interested desire to bolster up their pet theories. That is but the story of refutation of a Dilemma. If one of the alternatives is emphasized by one, the other party shifts the stress on to the other. There cannot thus be any conclusive refutation of one and an establishment of the chosen or the desired one. That is also the case with inference. One can employ

inference to establish or prove the existence of God. Suppose, one considers the Universe an effect. It should have an intelligent agent as its cause. There is the inference in a formal manner. This universe should be regarded "sa-kartriṇa"—i.e.,—as having a maker who is the intelligent cause. Why? Because it is a *karya*—something produced, or made. Look at the illustrative instance—a jar. But it is a vain hope that this inference is final and is powerful to silence all opposition and counter-inference. As a matter of fact a counter-inference is as easily possible. This universe is devoid of a "karta"—a creator. Why? There is no agent whom we could see and pitch upon as the creator. If one were there is no reason why we should not know him or come face to face with him? Therefore there is no "karta." Look at the finite soul or "Atma" for illustrative instance. What is an investigator to do when he is confronted with the two types of counter-argument and the original? If one of the parties to the controversy—to wit the absolutist is to maintain that inference is quite sufficient to establish the existence of Brahman, the opponent, an atheist or some one else might advance the counter-inference and say that the existence of Brahman cannot be demonstrated by means of inference. One inference is set against the other. One is as good and as valid as the other. That is why the Vedantin—the absolutist as well as the pluralist—should abandon inference or *anumana* as a *pramana* for the demonstration of the existence of Brahman.

The abandonment necessitates appeal to the sacred texts which alone would prove the existence of Brahman. That means Brahman is not an entity the existence of which could be proved by any *pramana* other than *Agama*. The second step is if Brahman cannot be proved to exist without the help of *Agama* difference between it and the finite cannot be proved by any *pramana* other than *Agama*. The third step is—the texts of the *Agama* which proclaim the said difference are as valid and powerful (if not more) as those that affirm identity between the two.

Madhva has thus endeavoured to establish that the summary disposal of the *Sruti* passages proclaiming or containing reference to difference between the Absolute and the finite, is a vicious, and illogical methodological procedure, clumsy polemics, and finally amounts to an indirect damaging of the sanctity or sacredness of the *Sruti* itself and undermining of its validity. However astutely one might try it would be impossible to dismiss the texts in question—those relating to difference—as merely repetitive. There has been in fact no repetition of anything. Nor has any redundancy occurred.

After having demonstrated so far, the theory that the existence of Brahman itself has to be proved only by means of the *Sruti*, and difference between it and the finite has to depend on *Sruti* texts, and therefore these latter cannot be dismissed

as repetitive, Madhva directs his attention to showing that after all, the opponent, (the absolutist) need not have taken so much pains to condemn the texts proclaiming difference definitely as repetitive. The alleged repetitiveness is sought to be bolstered up by the argument that the difference between the finite and the Absolute is established by sense-perception and inference. If the Sruti should speak of it again, surely, it carries coals to Newcastle! Thus to discredit Sruti texts supporting difference, the absolutist has to admit the validity of the pramanas, pratyaksha and anumana. But the very pramanas—sense-perception and inference—the validity of which he is obliged to admit in order to discredit the difference-texts, run counter to his own pet texts proclaiming identity between the finite and Absolute! That is Nemesis. Are the pramanas—sense-perception and inference valid or not? Yes. They are. They should be valid. They proclaim difference between the finite and the Absolute. This runs counter to the texts of Monism. If to escape from this nemesis, the validity of the pramanas—sense-perception and inference—be denied, then the difference-texts cannot be discredited *qua* repeating the difference already ascertained by the very “pramanas” the validity of which is denied for purpose of controversy. Monistic texts thus stand doubly discredited. They are discredited by texts of the sruti explaining difference between the finite and the Absolute. Such texts of sruti are as scared and as valid as the Monistic texts. Secondly they stand discredited by the pramanas of sense-perception or common sense and inference. The difference-texts too from part of the sacred “sruti,” every part of which must share the validity—authority—and sanctity. If so why do the texts repeat difference between the finite and the absolute? The answer is obvious. There is no jejune and aimless repetition. Even supposing there is any, it is intended for purposes of clarification and making assurance doubly sure. Persons might be suffering from the delusion that they are all-powerful, omniscient and so on, and the sruti texts relating to difference dispel such delusions, and make them stand on terra firma of facts.

The absolutist now put forward the objection that “sruti” is the most powerful “pramana”, and if common sense and inference run counter to it they should be discarded *in toto* or re-interpreted. Are the monistic passages in the sruti to be overthrown simply because they are in conflict with the conclusions and judgments of two pramanas — common sense and inference? The discussion of this question leads on to a consideration of a very interesting topic, namely — UPAJIVYA—PRABALYA—superior strength of the source. The significance is this. Upajivya in popular terminology is the lord who supports. Upajivaka is the supported. Should there be conflict or should an incompatibility be perceived between the two, naturally the “Upajivaka” is inferior to “Upajivya.” The latter is stronger. It is “prabala.” It has greater validity. The former

is "durbala." It has only a lesser degree of validity. It will be seen that "pratyaksha" and "anumana" are the two "upajivya" of the sruti. Sruti is "upajivaka"—i.e., dependent on the "upajivya," namely "pratyaksha" and "anumana." How? Sruti cannot speak of entities *in vacuo*. Take the sruti believed to proclaim the truth of identity between the finite and the Absolute. Identity has to be affirmed either in reference to the finite or the Absolute. You can take as subject first—the finite. Then you will say finite is identical with the Absolute. Or you can take the Absolute as the subject. You will then assert the Absolute is identical with the finite. Or taking both as the subject, you merely affirm the identity thus — both are identical, the absolute and the finite. If such assertions possess any significance at all, some clear or distinct perception or apprehension of the nature of the finite and the Absolute is indispensable. Otherwise the identity cannot be affirmed at all. Why then do we choose those two alone as the subjects? Why do we scrupulously predicate identity between them? Prior to the assertion of identity, the nature of the finite and the Absolute should have been rendered clear. What are the Pramanas? As sure as anything, they are "pratyaksha" and "anumana." The latter reveals the nature of the Absolute. The former that of the finite. So much will have to be admitted by the absolutist himself. For this is the main plank of his argument that difference-texts are all repetitive. On his own showing therefore, the pramanas — pratyaksha and anumana supply the two subjects in reference to which the predicate of identity is sought to be established. QUA supplying the subject, the pramanas—pratyaksha and anumana are "upajivya"—sources of support of life, of validity etc. The Sruti becomes then "upajivaka" dependent for its material or the subject on them. The former would then become stronger—more valid than the latter. Should there be a conflict the latter will have to yield to the former. As matters stand, neither "pratyaksha" nor "anumana," would lend even the slightest support to the view of identity between the finite and the Absolute. They support difference between the two. Therefore the sruti texts which affirm identity should be re-interpreted in the light of difference revealed by the more powerful pramanas "pratyaksha" and "anumana." If this pill be too bitter to swallow, condemnation of the difference-texts, should be abandoned. What is after all the basis of condemnation? The basis is that difference between the finite and the Absolute stands already revealed by common sense perception and inference. If the Sruti should again proclaim it, it is guilty of repetition. That is the line of argument adopted by the absolutist. Using the same argument, Madhva points out that if the upanishadic predicate of identity is to be attached to the proper subject or subjects, the latter could be perceived only by means of common sense perception and inference, which are of greater strength and validity. They reveal only difference. They establish only disparity between the



finite and the Absolute. Sruti texts which proclaim identity are in conflict with them. The latter as supplying the subject for the upanishadic predicate are stronger. In the light, therefore, of the stronger common sense perception and inference, the weaker sruti texts proclaiming identity should either be abandoned or re-interpreted. Common sense perception reveals the finite self to be the centre of all experience. The Absolute is inferentially grasped. Difference between the two is striking. Madhva sums up the discussion and maintains that in the light of and on the basis of obvious contradiction and incompatibility of the deliverances of "anumana" and "pratyaksha" on the one hand, and those of the "sruti" on the other, the latter being a weaker pramana as it derives its subject from the former, which are hence stronger — the texts proclaiming difference cannot be brushed aside as repetitions (Anuvadaka). This means that texts proclaiming identity between the finite and the Absolute are not entitled to a strict literal interpretation. They should be re-interpreted, and their import modified.

At this stage the absolutist urges an objection. May be sense-perception and inference are stronger pramanas as supplying the subject for the upanishadic predicates. But where in the name of goodness is difference perceived? Ordinary commonsense perception involves no doubt the awareness, ego—consciousness. Difference is nowhere in that awareness. Similarly one might inferentially arrive at the existence of Iswara. QUA creator etc. Even then difference is nowhere. Just the existence of finite and Absolute is apprehended. What is their mutual relation? Identity is the answer. Hence the texts proclaiming identity are not absurd. The merest apprehension of existence is a myth—replies Madhva. Such an existential judgment is of no use. As a matter of fact, when inference establishes the existence of Iswara as "Sarvakarta"—the author of all—the finite-self cribbed cabined and confined and suffering under the countless difficulties and disabilities of existence, readily realises that there must be striking difference and disparity between the Supreme and itself. Such a realisation—the "sakshyanubhava"—is as much a valid pramana as anything else. In fact, sakshi, our own experience, with an immediacy that is uniquely intimate, is the best pramana. Our experience tells us we are different from the Supreme. If any conclusion or texts run counter to this intimate subjective experience, the former should be unconditionally rejected.

It is through the instrumentality of the Agama-text, "Nehanana etc.," the absolutist seeks to establish the unreality and illusory character of the universe. But to understand aught of agama and its texts, pratyaksha has to be resorted to. Hence the latter becomes upajivya—stronger and more powerful.

Let us for the sake of argument drop the question of "upajivya and upajivaka" for a moment. It is undeniable that "anubhava" is the best means of anything being brought into intimate relationship with the subject. What is the verdict of "anubhava" or experience? It is indubitable that the finite and Supreme are different as poles asunder. If agama-texts happen to be at variance with the verdict of experience, the former will have to be thrown overboard. If not, science experience and life in fact will be chaos. If one experience is denied or doubted another can be. Anarchy and chaos would be the only outcome. If it comes to the matter of indiscriminately throwing mud at and casting a slur on experience, why should one believe the experience of regarding the agama as reliable at all? Such anarchy in philosophical speculation is reprehensible and fatal. Difference and disparity between the finite and the Absolute are a part of everybody's experience. It has supreme pragmatic sanction. It is supported by vedic texts—as well. If this intimate subjective experience is at variance with some texts which assert identity between the two, the latter should be reinterpreted in the light of the former. Experience—"Sakshyanubhava"—must sooner or later assert its mastery over the agamic texts.

What then is the exact status of the agama-texts proclaiming (aikya) identity between the finite and the absolute? Madhva sums up the position thus. The texts in question have been shown to be at variance with the two pramanas "pratyaksha" and "anumana" which are "upajivaya"—sources supplying material to the agama, which is upajivaka — the benefitted or the obliged one? The latter being under obligations to the former is weaker. Incompatibility with the stronger testimony of sense-perception and inference invalidates the texts of agama proclaiming identity—(2) Secondly, even keeping in abeyance the question of upajivya and upajivaka, "sakshyanubhava," which is the final appellate authority—subjective, intimate, immediate experience bears testimony only to the existence of marked, pronounced and unstultifiable difference between the finite and the Absolute. Incompatibility with this experience also invalidates the identity-texts of agamas.

Different pramanas therefore go to strengthen the difference between the finite and the Absolute. It should not be contended that it is weariness of flesh to seek to corroborate the verdict of one pramana by those of others. Far from it. Corroborative testimony strengthens the conviction. The difference for instance first perceived by all, may be liable to be doubted later. Someone might say that man in fact is identical with the Absolute. Others might flaunt in the face sacred texts proclaiming identity. Such doubts are dispelled by other pramanas like inference and the agama texts bearing on difference. A conclusion first suggested is strengthened. Assurance is made doubly sure. There is no redundancy. There occurs no repetition. Where several pramanas support a conclusion, its value is enhanced. It should be (on that account) capable of commanding universal acceptance. Corroboration

is indispensable on account of the liability of mankind to doubts and vacillation. On this hypothesis, texts bearing on difference cannot be ignored as repetitive.

If so, and if it can be justified that wherever there is repetition it is intended for corroboration, for removing doubts, and for making assurance doubly sure, it would be tantamount to putting a premium on illogical repetition. For instance "siddha-sadhana," establishing a conclusion already established, is a logical fallacy. If it is sought to be justified on the basis it would benefit many a doubting Thomas, one will have to bid good-bye to the logical fallacy. Is this not a way of encouraging vicious thought?

Madhva replies with irresistible force of logic that one should clearly and carefully distinguish between cases in which the parties to the controversy are agreed over a question, and cases in which they are not. Or again there are certain theories which have passed the stage of discussion and are considered to be demonstrated and established laws of nature. They do not require establishment or proof over again. If one is attempted you can condemn it as involving waste of time and energy, repetition and so forth. Even then this condemnation will not apply to cases of beginners who understand for the first time things already there and theories already proved or established. But in cases, however, in which the parties to the controversy are by no means agreed, the question of repetition cannot arise. When the difference-texts are brushed aside as repetitive, the absolutist commits the fallacy of a pathetic petitio-principii. Only if the identity between the finite and the Absolutist has been established by independent evidence, you are entitled to dismiss difference-texts as unless and repetitive. But all along you are taking for granted the very identity which is the bone of contention and which is required to be proved. It is methodologically an unsound procedure to take so naively and tacitly for granted the very thesis one is required to prove. Identity between the finite and the Absolute is implicitly assumed as a proved fact. On the basis of this tacit assumption texts in sruti which proclaim difference and disparity between the two are condemned as repetitive and useless. Says Madhva — SARVA AVIVADASTHALAEVA KATHAMCHID ANUVADAKATVAM (6) Only in the matter of that thing or thesis about which there is no "vivada"—dispute or doubt or opposed views, a set of texts referring to the name matter over again can be brushed aside as repetitive and hence devoid of use. Where the central thesis itself is a matter of speculation, doubt and uncertainty, no texts can be repetitive or redundant.

Madhva reinforces his conclusions with the help of a long quotation from Brahma-Tarka which has championed the pluralistic theory of knowledge, and which establishes the superiority of sense-perception and inference—"pratyaksha" and "anumana"—over "agama" as the latter is "upajivaka"—deriving material

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(6). "Tatvanirnaya". P. 262.

from the former which are "upajivya." The passages of sruti therefore which appear to contain indications of identity between the finite and the Absolute, should have their surface-interpretation modified in conformity with the difference supported by two stronger pramanas. Nothing that has the support of more than one pramana should be rejected. There is the familiar analogy. A piece of mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver. One who knows would tell you it is not silver. It is the statement of a friend or onlooker whose words are believed. You then walk near enough, examine the piece and convince yourself that there was no silver. You can test the piece experimentally and satisfy yourself. The knowledge that there was silver thus stands discredited by a consensus of pramanas. So is the case with the texts relating to identity between the finite and the Absolute. The identity has not yet become practical politics. Difference however is strikingly and poignantly clear. It is perceived and experienced by all philosophers—professional and amateur — laymen and specialists. It is realised. Man's incompetence and impotence, his failures and discomfitures are standing reminders of his own finiteness. If indeed the finite were the Absolute there is no need, no justification for all this error, failure, sin and misery. Difference is thus supported by powerful pramanas. In conformity with it, the passages which appear to indicate identity should be deprived of their surface-interpretations.

The absolutist is caught in a dilemma. Either the difference between the finite and the Absolute has or has not the evidence and support of pramanas. If the former, the agama texts *qua* "upajivaka" would be inferior to "upajivya," and hence should be made to surrender their surface-interpretation. If the latter it means difference is on a par with identity. Both are possible relations. The Finite and the Absolute can enter into either relationship. Difference between the two is as valid a metaphysical solution as identity. The question of repetitiveness of difference-texts simply cannot arise on this alternative. Either therefore, the surface-interpretation of the identity-texts should be surrendered, or the difference-texts should be acknowledged to be as valid as the identity-texts, and cannot be dismissed as redundant and repetitive. No escape is possible from this dilemma.

The absolutist of course cannot resist the temptation of contending that after all "pratyaksha," sense-perception and "Anumana" (Inference) are not competent to grasp reality as it is, and therefore the sruti texts which alone are capable of revealing the nature of the Absolute cannot be invalidated by them. Such a contention involves a palpable vicious reciprocity. If the unchallengeable and unquestioned authority of the identity-texts can first be independently established, then the ordinary sense-perception can be discredited. Once more starting from the discrediting of ordinary sense-perception one might glory in the

supremacy of the identity-texts. That is precisely the way to vicious reciprocity. Nor is it possible for the absolutist to employ the respective superiority and inferiority of the revealed texts and sense-perception in the bargain. He will ever try to escape by asserting that *sruti* is more powerful. What if? On his own showing then, sense-perception and inference are weaker. This weakness would cut both ways. It is (to the undisguised chargin of the absolutist) double-edged. If sense-perception and inference—"pratyaksha and anumana"—are unable on account of their weakness to invalidate the identity between the finite and the Absolute indicated by the *sruti*, on account precisely of the same weakness, they are unable to render the difference-texts repetitive. If the texts are thus to be dismissed, sufficient strength should be assigned to sense-perception and inference. But they are denounced as weaker and unable to invalidate the identity between the finite and the Absolute. That is blowing hot and cold in the same breath. If they are weak and unable to affect identity, their weakness would dog their footsteps eternally and they will not be able to achieve the *prima facie* establishment of difference either which would according to the absolutist make difference-texts repetitive!! The weakness cuts either way. It would leave the difference-texts and identity-texts exactly where they were and even to-day are. They should be judged on their own merits. The result is fatal to absolutism. Difference between the finite and the Absolute explained in *sruti* finds confirmation and corroboration by means of sense-perception and inference. Whereas, identity cannot have such confirmation. The net result of the discussion is that texts which speak of or appear to speak of it, should have their surface-interpretation modified in the light of difference-texts.

Not so soon can the discussion be closed. The absolutist is ready with another weapon. His armoury is almost inexhaustible. According to the canons of interpretation enunciated by the Purva-Mimamsa, and freely employed by the Vedantic schools, *apurvata* is a powerful interpretational criterion. Suppose a statement or a theory is new and novel. It has not been made known already—not been disclosed. That should have preference, but a theory spoken of by several *pramanas*, and rendered old and familiar by collateral references, would have inferior status and validity. Let us judge the value of the texts bearing on difference and those on identity in the light of the *apurvata*-criterion. The absolutist contends that identity not made known by any authority other than the *sruti* texts, is *apurva*—is new, and novel. Difference on the other hand has been made known by other *pramanas*. It is therefore old and valueless.

Madhva readily exposes the untenability and the hollowness of the aforesaid contention. . . . Mere novelty will never mend matters. Two alternatives are possible. One might cling to this novelty even

when the novel conclusion stands contradicted by other pramanas. Secondly the novel conclusion may not be so contradicted. Both the alternatives are fatal to absolutism. Carried away by the blind craze for novelty one might as well maintain that sruti-texts which proclaim the Asat—the sunya—the cosmic zero to be the originator of the universe, teach something *new* and might insist on the other passages and texts being re-interpreted in the light of what even the absolutist would term atheistic texts. That unfortunately is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the absolutist's position. Why should a fetish be made of "apurvata"? Why should one so hanker after novelty? If novelty be the end-all and be-all of metaphysical speculation, by all means, the texts which proclaim the sunya—the Void—as the originator of the cosmos will have to be considered most powerful as no other passages speak of the Void in such glorious terms. The result is fatal to absolutism. The identity-texts will have to be re-interpreted in accordance with the new strong texts supporting the claims of sunya—the Void. The absolutist will thus find himself sacrificed to his own vicious logic of "apurvata" or novelty. Such a riotous procedure will lead to chaos in the thought-world. No text need be lauded to the skies simply because it is new. Nor need any be condemned as being old. Each text will have to be judged only on its merits. It is no argument to retort that the Void being the cosmic origin is repudiated by further ratiocination. For, being at variance with reason and ratiocination is a point in favour of absolute novelty. According to the subtle logic of the absolutist, it will have to be admitted that if any conclusion is already established by means of "yukti" reason and ratiocination, and then again referred to, the procedure involves repetition. Just see. In this instance, as the Sunya being the originator of cosmos is repudiated by all, this universal repudiation is a characteristic of its absolute novelty. That is the logical end of the Absolutistic position, but novelty has interpretational significance only when the universe of discourse is marked off clearly and when within the limits of relevance and purposive investigation, it is seen a given conclusion cannot be reached through the instrumentality of other Pramanas. Novelty therefore, does not support the absolutist's central doctrine of identity between the finite and the Infinite.

Madhva clinches the issue thus—There is the body of texts proclaiming difference between the finite and the Infinite. This difference is guaranteed by the pramanas, "pratyaksha and anumana." There is another body of texts which proclaims identity between the two. The absolutist cannot run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. If he is anxious to make short shrift of the difference-texts as they are merely repetitive and hence less valid or invalid, because the difference is there an empirical item apprehended by sense-perception and inference, and the texts only repeat the difference, then he will have to admit the validity of the pramanas.

"pratyaksha" and "anumana". If he does that, he will see that the identity between the finite soul and the Absolute, stands and must stand discredited and repudiated by the very pramanas which he is so anxious to swear by in order to brush aside the difference-texts. That is the inevitable nemesis. If on the other hand he would doubt the validity of sense-perception and inference and condemn them as concerned with the apprehension of appearance merely and not with reality, this very doubt is sufficient to strengthen the difference-texts which proclaim and support an unique and independent truth. There is no mere doubt. The absolutist denies definitely the validity of sense-perception and inference in matters of a grasp of reality. If so they are powerless to render the difference-texts merely repetitive. Why? They proclaim difference between the soul and Absolute. This truth is unique and independent. One cannot dismiss it as a mere repetition as sense-perception and inference which give knowledge of it are ruled out by the absolutist. So the difference proclaimed stands on an independent and unstultifiable basis. Even at the risk of repetition, it is worth while to point out that the parties to the controversy consenting as they must (the opinion of the modern critical scholarship on the value and validity of this type of sastraic controversy really does not matter!) to certain well known rules of debate and principles of discussion, cannot indulge in any free-lance discussion. There is of course the eagerness to discredit the texts proclaiming difference between the finite selves and the Infinite. How can this discrediting be achieved? By stigmatising them as Anuvadaka or as being repetitive. Whrt do they repeat? They repeat or reiterate difference between finite selves and the Infinite. If this is a repetition how was knowledge of difference *first* obtained which is subsequently repeated? Knowledge is obtained through the instrumentality of the Pramanas—Pratyaksha—sense-perception and Anumana—inference. It would represent a definite stage in the controversy. To discredit the difference-texts, validity of the pramanas Pratyaksha and Anumana is indispensable. The Absolutist can never go back on this indispensable admission of the validity of the two pramanas.

The consequences of this admission are not merely not palatable, but absolutely fatal. The Two Pramanas, the validity of which has to be accepted by the Absolutist, if he is to discredit the difference texts successfully, lend no countenance whatever to the central doctrine of the Absolutist—identity between the finite and the Infinite. If the validity is challenged or denied, to safeguard the citadel of Absolute Monism, the pramanas become incapable of functioning *ex hypothesi*, and unable to yield knowledge of anything. Thus incapacitated, they will not be able to help the discrediting of the difference-texts. The incapacity arises in this wise. The moment you begin to doubt the validity of sense-perception and inference, the doubt means that they do not give any reliable knowledge of anything. The knowledge that they give rise to is

a mere simulacrum. The avenues of knowledge thus being closed from the side of sense-awareness and inference, the approach is naturally from the side of the sacred texts, the Agama, especially the difference-texts that go to constitute that Pramana.

The fundamental difference between the finite and the Infinite embodied in the texts thus becomes not reiteration as sense-perception and inference do not reveal the difference having been declared unreliable and incapable of revealing anything useful or reliable. Difference is thus strictly original. The texts therefore, stand on their own legs. They cannot be dismissed as being repetitive.

Admit the validity of sense-perception and inference. You succeed in evaluating difference texts as repetitive. But a disastrous consequence follows. They discredit Monism and identity between the finite and the infinite.

Discard sense-perception and inference, and doubt their validity. The difference-texts are then seen to be competent to yield original knowledge and *not* repetitive. Escape from this inevitable dilemma is impossible so long as one keeps strictly close to textual and contextual considerations bearing on theory of knowledge.

The value and validity of the difference-texts, having now been established, Madhva proceeds to answer a minor objection which can easily be anticipated. The objection is this. If the same idea, truth or concept is conveyed by different means of communication, there is waste. Why should difference between finite and Infinite ordinarily perceived by senses, and inference be again expressed by texts? In the light of what has just now been said, this is only a vexatious interruption or interrogation, but by no means a genuine objection. If the same idea is expressed differently and perceived with the help of different pramanas, it is all the more strengthened. Assurance is made doubly sure. The difference between the finite and the Infinite which all perceive and infer, philosophers and laymen happens to be strengthened by sacred texts the validity of which is unquestioned. What is the use of murmuring or grudging? The identity on the other hand between finite and Infinite, though it can be said to have been embodied in some texts, is not perceived and is not inferred. The pramanas *pratyaksha* and *anumana* do not converge on or support identity. Only texts support it. Not the other pramanas. The difference, on the other hand, has added support. It is expressed by texts. It is reinforced. It is strengthened by the other Pramanas—sense-perception and inference.

There is a well-known purvamimamsic canon of interpretation. It is "Abhyasa." It means reiteration. When a statement is repeated or when a particular act is repeatedly said to be beneficial and useful, a subject acting under the influence of and in response to repeatedly applied stimuli,



realises the advantages of repetition. If anything had been incorporated just in a stray, solitary, occasion or context, it may escape notice. Of course "Abhyasa" is not idle repetition or beating about the bush or aimless reiteration due to lack of new ideas.

Difference between the finite and the Infinite is a matter of sense-perception and inference. It may be this truth is not metaphysically realised or brought home to a subject. Or one may have suspended judgment. To him, the strengthening of the difference may be and is essential. The difference-texts would appeal to him. If mere texts would not satisfy a soul, there are the authorities of sense-perception and inference. If one is dissatisfied with the latter, an appeal to the former would console him.

Thus, sense-perception and inference acting in concert with the sacred texts, i.e., the Bheda-vakyas, difference-texts establish difference between the finite and the Infinite on a firm, solid and substantial foundation, that cannot be shaken at all even by absolutistic dynamite!!

There is no use trying to disguise the obvious fact, that the body of texts which proclaim identity between the finite and the Infinite is at a disadvantage, in the matter of reinforcement or corroboration by means of other *Pramanas*. The said identity is based on texts. No doubt. It is experienced. Subjective experience however valuable *qua* personal possession or even mystic realization cannot claim objective validity. The identity cannot be and as a matter of fact is not perceived by direct sense-awareness or sense-perception. Nor could the identity be inferentially apprehended or arrived at. X, Y or Z suffering from the countless ills that head and heart, spirit and flesh are heirs to, cannot by any trick *infer* that he is fundamentally identical with the Infinite. The difference between the two is certainly at decided advantage. It has the support of texts. It can be perceived by sense-perception. It is reinforced by inference. It is part and parcel of the experience of every individual.

If this sort of corroboration or re-inforcement of a truth by more than one *pramana*, be not admitted, the central and cardinal text on which Monism is based would lose all significance and value. The assertion "Tatvamasi" is repeated nine times. The Absolutist will never agree that this repetition lessens the value of the text. The same logic will have to be extended to other texts as well. The difference-texts are re-inforced and corroborated by sense-perception and inference.

Whatever the logical and interpretational considerations pressed into service by the Absolutist, they would apply to the difference-texts, as well. For instance, he may contend that ninefold repetition

is intended to attract attention, and that the less attentive and indifferent mentality could be attracted by repetition of stimuli. If so, difference between finite and the Infinite which is perceived only partially or vaguely is clearly, distinctly and fully perceived under the impelling urge of corroboration or re-inforcement. If the difference is not decidedly apprehended, texts come to our rescue to make the apprehension clear, distinct and decided. If on the other hand, one hesitates to see the metaphysical truth of difference and plurality, mainly by means of texts, other pramanas, sense-perception and inference would come to his rescue. The Absolutist obviously cannot be allowed to welcome "reinforcement" as a weapon only to strengthen Tatvamasi (nine times repeated,) and condemn it when it aids the establishment of a pluralistic universe.

From the foregoing discussion, it is bound to be clear that the sacred texts when interpreted and understood without any violence to natural meaning and significance, cannot be squeezed into absolutistic moulds, but point in the direction of a Realistic and Pluralistic Universe under the overlordship and guardianship of the Supreme Lord Sri Vishnu the only object of the quest of spiritual aspirants. "Tatparaya" is import, significance or meaning. "Mahatatparaya" is central, pervading interpretation. In the interpretation of ordinary secular texts, we speak of a central theme or a plot towards which minor texts, and subsidiary passages converge, and they are kept under the grip of an interpretational unity. Even so, the texts, the agamas, are held together under an interpretational grip or import-grip. The overlordship of Vishnu, and His supremacy constitute the grip under which the texts are kept.

A spiritual aspirant will first realise the Greatness, Magnificence and Supremacy of the Overlord of the Universe. Such a realisation strengthens the devotional bond between the finite and the Infinite. The Supreme Lord will be worshipped, prayed to and sung to by aspirants and devotees. By His Grace, the individual would realise his own self and state of perfect bliss free from the ills due to his imprisonment in karmic meshes. Freedom from karmic enmeshment is Moksha, and that freedom cannot be obtained unless one realised the greatness of Vishnu, the Overlord of the Universe.

In support of this position, Madhva has extensively quoted from the "Gita", "Mahabharata" "Katha-Upanishad", and other texts, the relevant passages kept under grip of interpretational unity. All the agamas, all the texts converge towards an interpretational unity or synthesis. It is known as "Maha-tatparaya" as distinguished from "Avantaratatparaya" subordinate or subsidiary interpretation. No doubt stray passages here and scattered texts there might appear to exalt one god now and

another at a different time. That is a subsidiary interpretation. It will have to be modified in the light of "Mahatatparya" the harmonious synthesizing interpretation which converges towards the undisputed overlordship of Vishnu.

1. The well-known stanzas commencing with "Dvavimau purushau.....and ending with "Buddhimansyat-krita-kriyascha-Bharata" in the Gita establish the undoubted and unchallenged supremacy of Vishnu. He is known as "Uttamapurusha." The Gita promises a reward to those who realise the *real* nature of Vishnu. The reward is Heaven itself.

2. The same truth is embodied in the Sruti or the sacred text as well. Sarvotkarshedevadevasya-vishnoh..... Purusharthastatota ..... Moksha or final liberation is the Most Precious of Spiritual rewards. Who will be in a position to grant an aspirant that supreme reward? It is only the Supreme Being. Other gods, minor deities, lesser divinities will not be able to grant the highest reward. There is thus an inseparable and inevitable relationship between the Most Precious Purushartha—object to be aimed at—and He who alone is able to grant it to an aspirant. The text explains that in the light of the Highest reward, the Supremacy of Him who alone can grant it becomes firmly established and unquestioned.

3. Mukhyamcha-sarvavedanam-tatparyam-sripateh etc., The foregoing conception contained in the sruti is corroborated and reinforced by a text in the purana literature.

4. The relationship between Moksha, the highest reward or the object to be aimed at and the Giver of the Highest gift is emphasized in another passage—"Moksha-evahi-Nityah" etc. Hedonistically determined happiness is perishing and tinged with unhappiness. Unalloyed and unadulterated happiness can be securely enjoyed only in the state of final liberation. Final liberation cannot be secured without the Grace of the Supreme Lord Vishnu. If the Karmic Gordian Knot is to be cut, His Grace is required. "Yasyaprasadat.....karmapasadamushmat" is a text of the Narayanasruti. "Nayamatma .....vrinute-tanuumsvam" is a Katha Text. "Teshamaham-samuddharta" has the Gita. A Skandapurana text maintains that He is the supreme Overlord under whose guidance the world (of souls) passes through eight phases. (1) Utpatti—creation, (2) Stithi—existence, (3) Samhara—destruction, (4) Niyati—control. (5) Jnyanam—Knowledge, (6) Aavriti—ignorance, (7) Bandha—bondage and (8) Moksha—Final liberation. (7).

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(7) In the "Tatvasamkhyana" however, cosmic determinations are described to be Twelve. It is obvious there is no incompatibility between the two views as the extra four can be subsumed in the eight.

Madhva cites a striking popular analogy. Oriental potentates as well as Democratized Bureaucrats love flattery. Even those who do not encourage it either love to see their greatness understood—and felt or spoken of by their subordinates. Of course, analogies do not run on all fours. But the applicability is striking as far as it can be stretched without violence to validity or import. The Supreme Lord would be pleased with those who realise His Greatness and Majesty. Others who not only fail to realise His Majesty but are positively guilty of *Lese Majesty* by affirming they are one and identical with the Supreme, incur only His displeasure and should be prepared for condign punishment. On the other hand it is quite obvious that secular officers give a lift to and shower favours on those who sing their praise and glory. When tin-gods are thus worshipped even in the most democratic of countries there is absolutely no reason whatever why the Supreme and undisputed Overlord of the Universe should not be worshipped. If the fallen desire to save their souls, they will have to lift their hands in prayer to Him, notwithstanding Omar Khayyam's cheap sneers at the "inverted bowl" and those who lift their hands in prayer to it!

A grand interpretational synthesis, far superior to the Hegelian, is thus effected. Vishnu is the Supreme Overlord of the Universe. Only by His Grace can man with salvation. Mukti is the Supreme Purushartha, object to be desired and sought. The sacred texts possess an interpretational unity embracing the two leading spiritual concepts or concepts of concepts, namely Vishnu's Overlordship and Moksha being in His and His gift alone. The "mahatatparya," main or all-embracing interpretation is that the texts emphasize the Fact that Vishnu is full of Infinite good qualities and His Supremacy is unchallenged.

Another fact deserves notice. Suppose A & B are in superior and inferior positions respectively. If A for some reason or other in recognition of some services rendered to him, gratefully says addressing B that after all they are *one* etc., etc., then B might and will feel flattered by the recognition or compliment. One in an inferior status will naturally feel pleased and gratified when another in a superior status claims Identity or equality with him, for by such a claim he feels for the nonce lifted out of his own inferior status. Suppose, on the other hand, B of inferior status claims Identity or equality with A of superior status, the latter would grow irate!!

The cheap absolutistic retort that conditions obtaining in secular life, have no application in discussing the relationship between the finite and the Infinite is beside the point as Madhva has cited only an analogy for the elucidation of his position and has not suggested any repetition point for point of the secularly ordered and ordained conditions in the metaphysical realm.

Madhva's Theism does require some analogical argument like that. There is nothing unsound about that analogy. In the previous discussion of the central import of the vedic and upanishadic texts, Madhva has shown that after all in a mass of literature ranging over an extensive field of topics, there are only a few passages and texts which affirm identity between the finite and the Infinite. Countless other texts affirm difference. It will not do to dismiss the latter as merely *repeating* difference cognised by sense-perception. Madhva has shown that difference has the reinforcing sanction of sacred-texts as well as secular testimony. It is futile to hope for any light when one deliberately starts a metaphysical discussion with an initial distrust of human knowledge. Knowledge is foundational. It grasps difference between the finite and the Infinite. That is an ultimate metaphysical fact as also object of proximate sense-perception. Difference thus ratiocinatively and scripturally established is also strengthened by the analogy of A and B of superior and inferior status respectively who are taken as King and his favourite dependant. At this stage the absolutist interjects an objection to the effect that "difference" is impossible of perception. If it could be brought home through the instrumentality of a recognised "pramana," and if reality be rooted in difference, it may be possible to establish Theism involving the supremacy of Vishnu. Where there is no difference, there can be no talk of supremacy.

The Absolutist contends that Difference is an impossible concept. Why? In the very perception of "difference" there lurks a fallacy, which is known as "Annyonyasrayata" vicious reciprocity. Difference is never perceived independently. We say A and B, Ghata and Pata, Jar and cloth differ. Difference is predicted of A and B. Or we may say there is difference between A and B, shifting the emphasis from objects to difference, as is sometimes natural. As to which mode of expression to be assumed one would be guided by contextual exigencies or the state of knowledge and information possessed by him to whom the proposition might be addressed. Difference appears as *Visheshana* or *Viseshaya*. I shall render *Visheshana* as a qualifying or limiting concept, and *Viseshya* as the qualified or the limited concept. Sometimes we say "A and B are different or differ" "ghatapatayor bhinnau." Difference appears as a limiting concept that has gripped together two objects which have been limited *qua* entering into relationship of being different from one and another and *qua* revealing different features. At other times, we may say "Ghatapatayor bheda" i.e., the difference that there exists between A and B or there is difference between them. Difference here becomes a "limited" concept and the two objects take on the role of limiting agencies. There are undoubtedly other objects that differ from one another. They are all kept in abeyance. "Difference" is in this particular instance "limited"

by or limited to two specific objects. It does not matter which assumes the role of limiting agency.

A perception of "limiting", "limitation" and "limiting agency" involves a prior perception of difference without the apprehension of which "limiting" affair can never arise at all. Two objects or things are essential. One would not suffice trite as may seem. For difference to be perceived, A and B will have to be introduced as "limited" or each as a "limiting agency." But at the time of their being perceived *qua* "limiting agencies or *qua* limited" difference should have been already perceived. "Difference" will be perceived only when "limiting" (etc.,) has been perceived. And "limiting" (etc.,) will be perceived only when "difference" is perceived. This vicious reciprocity renders perception of difference impossible. This would apply to all cases in which *two* objects are gripped by difference.

But it is also possible to regard that "difference" affects or touches only one object, while the other from which it is said to differ indicates the extent to which the long arm of difference has been stretched. A differs from B. "Ghata" differs from "Pata." Jar differs from cloth. You can convert it and say B differs from A. In the statement of difference of cloth from Jar, cloth is known as *dharmi* that which is limited by difference, and jar is *pratiyogi* the boundary or the determinant of difference, i.e., cloth may differ from several other objects, but, here its difference *qua* determined by jar is emphasized. Once more *Dharmi* is that in which difference is supposed to inhere or more correctly exist. *Pratiyogi* is that from which a given object is described to differ. Even in this interpretation vicious reciprocity is impossible to avoid. The technical concepts of *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* *Dharmi* and *Pratiyogi* can be employed to useful purpose only when difference between two objects has already been perceived! In the absence of the prior perception or apprehension of difference, one is not entitled to observe at all that X differs from Y. May be difference in the latter interpretation of the concept instead of embracing *two* objects with two arms, touches *one* object, while the other indicates the extent or the boundary of the difference, and yet vicious reciprocity has not been got rid of. The very concept of *boundary* or *extent* of difference becomes ridiculous in the absence of a prior perception or awareness of *difference*. Difference, therefore, is an impossible concept.

Madhva replies that allegations of a vicious reciprocity can have some semblance of truth *provided* one can point out *two* different acts of cognition or awareness. It is absurd to contend that first *Dharmi* or the object about which difference is predicated is perceived, and subsequently difference. The perception of the object itself is *perception* of difference. "*Dharmi*—

prateetireva-bheda-prateetiriti-prateetidvaya-abhavat-na - annyon-yasrayatvam." In the act of perception of an object itself difference is perceived. There is no other go. Analyse childish or adult perception. Even the booming, buzzing confusion with which an infant is greeted into life on this best of all possible worlds, contains germs of an incipient difference. It is sharpened, chiselled, and thrown into bold relief later on in accordance with the social and intellectual needs and exigencies of the subject. Difference is there from the very commencement, and it is not being *put* or *projected* into the sense-multiplicity as a *form* of perception by the mind. The subject or the mind *only finds* the difference which already is there inherent. Perceive an object, and you perceive in the very act of perception difference as well. There is no perception, no awareness anywhere without perception and awareness of difference. So there are not *two* cognitions or perceptions involving any temporal transition, and there is no vicious reciprocity therefore.

This is a very important contribution made by Madhva to the Psychology and Epistemology of Perception. Conclusions drawn from child, animal and adult psychology amply support Madhva's position. The child does perceive difference from the very commencement of its mundane career and existence. If according to Bosanquet and others, the first cry of an infant is a logical judgment which is the unit of thought, there is no reason why the first perception should not involve some difference. That it does as a matter of fact, is the main contention of Madhva. Animal behaviour too affords evidence for the perception of difference. In adult perception, differences are accentuated and perceived with greater clearness and distinctness, and difference is not introduced like a Jack-in-the box at some later stage by a fiat of the individual or that of merciful Providence. In plain language Madhva maintains that the very perception of an object involves perception of difference. That is Radical Realism, or Radical Pluralism. An object is what it is on account of its difference from others, and on account of a possession of certain identifiable characteristics. If this difference is sought to be annihilated or denied the object ceases and must cease to be what it is. There is an electrically intuitive rapidity with which the subject or the mind cognises an object at the same time taking cognisance of difference as well. The countless aspects under which an object can be studied and viewed are all differences which are cognised in the very act of cognising the object. There is no obligation or any need even to emphasize *all* the differences and aspects at the time of the original or a subsequent act of perception. Whether differences are explicitly and avowedly stated and described or not, there they are waiting as it were to be summoned at the proper time. X differs from Y. Jar differs from cloth, and from various other objects. Whether any difference-aspect is to be emphasized

and if so, which will depend on the pragmatic exigencies of the situation with which the subject may chance to be confronted. Absence of emphasis on difference does not mean its negation or annihilation. Every object, every individual, every concept, every idea comes under the relentless grip of difference. It is at the same time repository of difference and a measure of difference. Difference from the rest of the cosmos inheres in any given object. It is at the same time a measure or indicator of difference inhering in other objects. There is no temporal transition in the act of perception of difference. It is absurd to contend that an object is first perceived and *then* its difference from other objects. Should there be any such temporal transition, the charge of vicious reciprocity can be brought against the concept of difference. But perception of an object is also perception of difference, plurality and individuality.

Another objection is anticipated and answered by Madhva. The Absolutist (Monist) contends that a given object is perceived *without* the help of any other perception direct and straight. Whereas, difference is always perceived *only* after the perception of objects that are said to differ from one another. How then is it possible to maintain that the perception of an object or the *Dharmi* is itself perception of difference? There are two mutually exclusive and antagonistic notions. One is a direct perception—namely perception of objects. The other is an indirect perception of difference which involves a prior perception of the differing objects. *Ergo*, difference cannot be the essential form of the *Dharmi* or an object.

The kettle cannot malign the pot. Take the notion of the Monist—identity between the finite and the Supreme self. That is the only Reality. It is perceived directly and exists in its own right. Yet, this identity is expressed in terms of the finite and the Infinite which are indirectly apprehended. Even so, difference though apprehended in the very act of apprehending an object can be expressed indirectly in terms of any two or more objects or ideas, systems and so forth. What applies to the central Monistic doctrine, applies with equal force and justification to the concept of difference as well on which Madhva's Dualism and Radical Pluralism rest.

Another objection is anticipated and answered. In some cases, perception of objects does not mean perception of any difference. In instances of erroneous perception or doubt, it is always so. You see a huge pillar and (mis)take it to be a human being. Here pillar is perceived, but not difference. A piece of brittle glass is mistaken for a coin, where difference is not perceived though object is. This objection again is as puerile as the previous one and can be answered in reference to the central doctrine of Monism. If an object is perceived without at the same time perception of



difference, then may we ask, whether oneness or identity is perceived when there is perception of individuals? The Only Reality is already there in the I-awareness, or the ego-awareness, and yet awareness of identity is nowhere. Identity is held to be the fundamental form of the self, but even though the self is within the range of introspective I-awareness, Identity is *not*. If this position can be logically sustained, then, the other position can be defended more successfully that in certain special cases, perception of difference is arrested or held in abeyance by peripheral as well as central factors, factors sensory and interpretational—even though the *Dharmi* or the object can be apprehended.

Reality is thus rooted in difference. Logical legerdemain like vicious reciprocity does little harm or injustice to *difference*. Lay and scientific, sophisticated and unsophisticated humanity perceives difference everywhere. Excepting cases of illusion and cases of abnormal perversion of perceptions brought about by pathological factors, normal perception not merely involves but is as well perception of difference. Identity is not so perceived. Not at any rate the oneness or identity between the finite and the Infinite. In the very act of apprehension of individuals difference has to be apprehended. There is no avoiding it or circumventing it in any manner. An individual or an object is what it is in virtue of its difference from other objects belonging to the same class or genus and difference *ipso facto* from members of another class or genus. Whether the linguistic medium is used or not, whether there is outward expression or not, difference is the essential constituent of an object or individual. An object is what it is only on account of its difference from other objects. Difference is emphasized. In accordance with the pragmatic purpose of the subject, and in accordance with the fundamental and essential constitution of the objects themselves, difference is stressed. It is difference that lends significance to identity.

(8) “Yad - yad - drisyate - tat - sarvatovyavrittameva-drisyate - na - tusarvatmakatveneti - etc.” Philosophy, science and common sense alike are all obliged to take their stand on the solid bed-rock of rational experience. Difference is the very warp and woof of experience. When an object is perceived as a type-writer (Remington,) difference is at once and in the same act perceived. There is no other go. Difference from other types of machines is perceived. Difference from other machines of the same make is perceived. How then is it possible for difference not to be apprehended when an object is itself perceived?

Still the Absolutist can argue though vanquished. In all forms of knowledge, difference is always perceived as difference of

something from something else. If so there is the old vicious reciprocity haunting the pluralist. This is a puerile objection or a baseless contention. Take the form of an object. Prominently the form is the object, as you can never imagine *form* qua form without reference to any object, class or individual or whatever it is. Still *vyapadesa* or conventional usage allows the manner or mode of expression—I perceive *its* form, as if the “it” can be really divorced from the “form.” Even so making due allowance for the terminological eccentricities and linguistic idiosyncracies, it can perfectly be maintained that the *Dharmisvarupa* or the fundamental form or essential form is difference itself. “Its form” is merely conventional usage. There is no separation or divorce in reality between form and matter. Such at any rate is the position, familiarised by Western writers like Bosanquet. We have only to add difference to form and matter. Difference is rooted in form-matter, and matter-form is rooted in difference. One form may disappear. One conglomeration or collocation of matter might change or be dissolved. Still there would be some other form. There would be some other arrangement of the particles. Form would persist. Matter would persist. Difference would persist too.

Madhva maintains, therefore, that Reality is deeply rooted in difference. Even the hypothetical first perception is perception of difference. In the booming, buzzing, confusion itself there are germs of difference. Difference has been as it were, injected into the central structure of experience itself. If Kantian terminology can to a certain extent be parodied, one can say that difference is a form of perception even as time and space!! with this difference that even on the Noumenon-level, difference persists according to Madhva. In the highest types of existence and experience other philosophers and thinkers might speak of all difference being transcended even time and space not excepted. but to Madhva difference is never and under no circumstances transcended. It exists, guides and controls matters here and it reappears in the hereafter as well. The here and the hereafter, Earth and Heaven, secular and spiritual, all concerns of daily routine life, and all concepts of the intellectual life, and conditions of scientific disciplines—all come under the relentless grip of difference. *Bheda* is *Dharmisvarupa*. The fundamental form of objects is difference.

If this is true, and if perception of an object means perception of difference as well, how is it in ordinary language and common parlance we say “its difference” as if an object is apprehended apart from difference. Though difference is the fundamental form of objects, it is spoken of separately from an object just as the form of an object though inseparable is spoken of as different from and separate from the object. Usage is just

due to social and linguistic exigencies, and it does not vitiate or invalidate the fact of fundamental form of objects being difference.

Look wherever you like. Difference is perceived. Granting there is astonishing similarity between two objects or more, still there is numerical or quantitative difference. Similarity does not annihilate the individuality of objects. Because two or more objects happen to be similar to one another, they do not cease to be independent of one another. Matter differs from spirit, the animate from the inanimate. Material objects again differ in accordance with the variety of interests they are employed to satisfy and the pragmatic purposes they subserve. A plurality of knowing, feeling and willing individuals is dogging the footsteps of philosophers and laymen. There is no use fighting shy of it or repudiating it by a metaphysical fiat.

In the absence of this difference, science and philosophy, life itself would be inexplicable. A subject never doubts he is different from the objective environment, and even in pathological cases where sense of personal identity is seriously disturbed, some sort of difference is perceived. Even the most abnormal pathological specimen does not identify himself with objective environment.

Even in the most primitive type of awareness or apprehension, a given object X is apprehended as different from the rest of the cosmos. It has a place in the scheme of things. It retains intact its individuality and independence. When the subject attains gradual progress, when his individual and social needs and requirements get multiplied with time, when he is in need of a better adjustment with the environment in which his lot happens to have been thrown, further differences are perceived which are there latent. Better and more effective adjustment is the result of a keener and more accurate perception of difference of the objects from the rest of the environment. Of course, the Universe of Discourse is plainly contemplated in this argument. The Universe of Discourse is first marked off by an educative process, and that involves as it must perception of difference. Even in the Universe of Discourse so marked off, individual objects and situations will have to be differentiated from one another. In this manner advance in knowledge and progress have as their invariable and inevitable concomitants perception of a general difference of any given object from the rest of the cosmos and apprehension of specific difference later on with the growth of the differentiating capacity or faculty. There are as many aspects of difference as there are *Pratiyogis* objects or systems from which difference is emphasized in order to render efficient knowledge and conduct. Plurality of aspects is inevitable.

Difference is thus the fundamental form of objects, and there is no temporal transition in perception—such as first object and then difference—and consequently, there is no fallacious and vicious reciprocity as in the very act of apprehension of an object difference is and must be perceived.

There is a minor objection which Madhva easily disposes of. If in the perception of X *qua* different from the rest of the cosmos, the latter also enters into knowledge producing a jumbled or confused perception! there need be no item left out of the said perception, and every object would have been included in the perception as also the entire cosmos difference from which is predicated about a given object! The expression “rest of the Cosmos” is just intended to secure exclusion and exhaustion. As in the case of the Infinite or the Indefinite term of a Dichotomous Division, the “rest of the Cosmos” would have to be specified later on, in conformity with situational exigencies and adjustments. It is preposterous to contend that because, X and non-X are species of a Genus Y—one who utters or gives expression to this Dichotomous Division is an omniscient Creature possessing accurate knowledge about the non-X!

(9) “Samanyatah-sarvajnyanasya-pranabhrinmatra-vrittivat” A general apprehension of the range and extent of “all” wherever it might be used is enjoyed by all sentient creation. Presumably, even the animals enjoy it. Rational animals do undoubtedly. Such a general awareness of difference is the mark of consciousness that is normal. It may not be and it is not specifically asserted—affirmed or denied unless and until a need is pragmatically felt for so doing. X differs from Y, Z and countless other objects, It all depends whether its difference from Y or Z is going to be pushed into the focus of consciousness at a given time. Various aspects are presented incipiently in a disjunctive form. One can be chosen at a time. That would satisfy a specific need. Take such a simple case as chalk differing from pencils, chairs et hoc. In a mass of a number of writing materials chalk will be differentiated from a pencil, or chalk from chocolate, if one white piece is likely to be mistaken for another! But no one outside Bedlam ever thinks of affirming difference of a chalk from a motor car or a Cabinet Minister, or the difference of both from a Film Star and her Retinue! Madhva in the characteristic language of radical Pluralism maintains that it all depends. Certainly when an object is apprehended even for the first time difference also is and must be perceived. Difference is not a superimposition on the sense-data or sense-multiplicity brought about by the subjective activity. If difference did not inhere there it would never be perceived.

There is evidence to prove that it is so. It does not require any very laboured or elaborate proof or demonstration to show that even in the vaguest form of awareness, there is an incipient perception of a general difference—a given object and its difference from the rest of the cosmos being perceived in one and the same act of cognition or perception—and later on specifications would be marked, and difference assumes various aspects, in fact as many aspects as there are objects from which difference of a given X is affirmed. Suppose there is no such universal perception of difference. One might easily doubt if he is not himself the typewriter! The difference between the animate and the inanimate, between the sentient and non-sentient creation is the common stock of the experience of men and the animals, men and the gods. That is the common heritage of humanity and animality as well! This general awareness of difference is coextensive with consciousness or awareness. General difference is further accentuated or specified in pursuance of a purpose. The solution of this problem is pragmatic. If the satisfaction of a purpose on hand requires emphasis of difference of the given X from Y, the said difference is stressed, while the other aspects of difference are kept submerged purposively or methodologically. Accentuation or emphasis of difference involves a logically efficient disjunction. Though *Salem Junction* is different from all the junctions and Railway stations in the world, its difference from *Victoria Terminus* is never emphasized because, it is so plain and obvious, but in the case of a new-comer or a tourist, its difference from *Salem Town* with which it is most likely to be confused needs emphasis. So is the case everywhere.

It is absurd to contend that this awareness of a general difference entitles anyone to Omniscience! Because it is a mark of all consciousness or awareness. By a slow and gradual process of development under social stress and stimulus, other aspects of difference are pushed into prominence or the focus of consciousness and retain their prominence intact until they subserve the purpose for which the difference was drawn and then accentuated and emphasized. Clear and distinct perception of the difference is thus purposive and springs up in response to a definite need. The need satisfied, the particular difference-aspect is relegated to the background.

Another objection to the possibility of difference is advanced. It is this. If difference is the fundamental form of an object, Dharmi, it should admit of infinite divisions of an object into parts, so that nothing would remain landing one in a nice Nihilism! This fallacy of infinite divisibility is as old as Zeno, Achilles and the Tortoise, and perhaps older still. Difference however has no reference to division, and it is familiar to all that physical and metaphysical divisions are illegitimate, and disjunction is the characteristic of Logical Division. Difference according to Madhva does not mean

VIDARANA—cutting or any cleavage. It is only ANNONYAA BHAVA i.e., reciprocal negation with an invariably concomitant positive basis. X *qua* determined a material body is in the nature of a negation from the point of view of Y another material body with boundaries of its own marked. So on the conceptual level. Red a concept is a negation *qua* viewed from another *blue*. Blue is a negation of red, and red is negation of blue and so on. Abhava is strictly non-existence, but I am right in rendering the term into negation as the nearest English approach with suggestive and rich connotation. The entire scheme of the cosmos, material and spiritual is constructed on the basis of this reciprocal or mutual negation with a positive basis—the nearest approach to contrary Negation spoken of by Western logicians like Bosanquet. (10).

Madhva desires to seal for ever the mouths of his opponents who quibble in opposition to him day in and day out. Another objects that difference has reference to many aspects. Say *Pata*—cloth differs from *ghata*—jar. This difference has many aspects. This difference is the fundamental form of the object—*pata*. Ergo—the object itself comes under the *grip of the many*. Parts tell the same tale. Many-ness is the law of existence. There would be nowhere any one-ness. Should there not be one-ness, neither would be many-ness anywhere! Thus an object that cannot admit of a numerical characterisation either as one or many is practically non-existent—*Sunya*. Madhva laughs at this legerdemain. Plurality of aspects as of objects is inevitable. Because an object can be viewed under many different aspects, it can never cease to be one, and its individuality is not surrendered or lost on account of its being viewed under different aspects. Hence one-in-many does not militate against radical Pluralism. The one is as real as the many. In conformity with the purpose dominant at the time or for the nonce, the one or the many would receive emphasis. That is the plain truth of the matter. The many-ness or plurality of aspects would never interfere with or militate against the one-ness and the individuality of an object or concept or a system. The one-ness however is in intimate reference to the Individuality of objects. The one-ness is not Monism! The one-ness is intended to guard and preserve intact the independence and integrity of the Individual. There is nothing like the many being subsumed or swallowed up in a comprehensive Hegelian synthesis of One or one-ness. Nor is the many relegated to a lesser degree of reality as is done by the Absolutist. “*Svasminnekopi-anniyena-sahito-aneka-iti-virodhabhavat*” puts Madhva’s commentator in a remarkably striking manner (11) Each object or individual is certainly one so far as its individuality is concerned. Its independence is guaranteed in a scheme of things. In the intellectual realm

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(10) Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*. Chap. 8.

(11) Commentary on “*Tatvanirnaya*,” P. 51.

or the thought-province a concept or a notion is certainly one, and retains its individuality perfectly intact. But the object cannot and does not stand alone. Nor does the concept or the notion. It has to come into adjustmental relation with others which retain their individuality intact. There should be no manner of clash or conflict between one object and another—one concept and another, and one notion and another. Mutual adjustment is the principle or law of life. The individual is obliged to be viewed in connection with many aspects and many objects. The latter are independent. The relationship does not annihilate the individuality of the object that is said to differ. Differences when emphasized throw into relief the individuality and independence of objects in reference to which difference is predicated and the objects themselves that are described to differ. Difference is thus the very stuff of the cosmos. Apparent chaos yields cosmos after systematisation simply because there is the inherent difference, which while maintaining intact the individuality and independence of objects renders possible a study of various aspects into which they are capable of entering and into which they enter as a matter of fact, to satisfy the adjustmental needs of the subject. The object is one-in-many. It is many-in-one. The many-concept is as independent and valuable as the one-concept. The affairs of the daily world as well as science are governed by this all-enveloping difference.

Another contention is that the object difference of which from the rest or the cosmos is emphasized, and the latter will have to be objects of the same perceptual act if difference is the fundamental form of objects. This has been answered already in a way. Madhva puts the reply in slightly different terms, and points to the psychology of perception for an effective illustration. If the universe of discourse has been marked off and its boundaries settled there need be no simultaneity in perception when anything that is absent from a given space-time continuum, can be summoned by an act of memory to aid the affirmation of difference. If on the other hand the field of investigation is limited to a few instances, the latter would be present along with the one that forms the subject of investigation, and the common-sense psychology of perception bears ample testimony to the actuality of a number of objects being embraced in a single act of perception, in which there is the well-known discrimination of the subject and the predicate, the starting point and the goal, the problem and its solution, the stimulus and the appropriate response.

A final objection is anticipated. It is this. If difference be the fundamental form of objects, one of them can well be eliminated without any loss anywhere or to anybody. Why do we want two at all? X is. That affirmation will do. If it is itself incarnation of difference, the latter needs no affirmation. Even so another can maintain that there is only difference and no object.

X or the term X denoting an object and *difference* would be synonymous.

Madhva brushes aside this objection in the light of his Radical Pluralism. His commentator writes "Vidyamanyoreva Pata-bhedayoh - savishesha - abheda - svikarat" (12) Both are first rate existent entities, difference and the object. They come under an identity-in-difference, technically known as SAVISHESHA-ABHEDA. "Abheda" is identity. "Savishesha" means with difference or tolerating difference, or embodied amidst difference. Viseshha is pluralising or differentiating agency. It is a substitute of difference itself. The pluralising agency renders possible the independence of difference on the one hand and the objects on the other, and this identity-in-difference comes in quite handy. On account of the identity, the vicious reciprocity (object cannot be perceived without a prior perception of difference, and the latter cannot be perceived without a prior perception of the former—ergo the concept of difference involves a vicious reciprocity etc.) is rejected, and on account of the viseshha, the difference, the necessity for the independence of object, and difference, are established, and they cannot be considered to be synonymous.

Why? This sort of an identity-in-difference has got to be admitted even by those who are professedly monists, and absolutists, and *a fortiori*, Dualists and radical Pluralists stand committed to it. In the scriptural sentence "Neti-neti-etc.," difference of the One Supreme Reality—Brahman—from the rest of the cosmos of lesser degree of Reality is affirmed. Now there are here two things—Brahman, the Supreme Reality and its difference from the rest of the cosmos (minus Brahman!) How does the Absolutist or the Monist explain the mutual relation between the Supreme Reality of Brahman and the difference of Brahman from the rest of the cosmos which is of a lesser degree of Reality? There is the term "Atma" used in that Upanishadic text. It must denote some specific object. There are two negations—neti-neti. How does the negation stand related or more accurately how do the negations conveyed by the two sentences stand related to Atma? The relationship cannot be one of *difference*—bheda-. Nor one of bheda-a-bheda-difference-cum-identity. For the two relationships run counter to the cardinal advaitic doctrine of "Akhandartha"—namely that the Upanishadic passages refer only to one Supreme Reality. Only one course is left open. Identity should be accepted or admitted between Atman and the negations expressed by the text—"neti-neti" Not this—not this—says the text. Two Negations are there. Difference from X is one. Difference from Y is another. Difference also indicates exclusion—or vyavritti. There are two exclusions indicated by the two neti-neti's. To maintain Monism or Absolutism intact only identity will have to be admitted between Atman



and the two negations or exclusions. Notwithstanding the identity thus necessitated, *visesha*, differentiating agency should be admitted also. Otherwise, *neti-neti* would involve a redundancy or repetition of expression that is hardly consistent with scriptural sacrosanctity. If by the stroke of a pen or by a fiat of the philosopher akin to the bureaucratic fiat, as in dichotomous division non-X could be made to function for or do duty for the entire cosmos *minus X* bid good-bye to all rational speculation. The repetition of *neti-neti* should be taken and interpreted to be purposive and significant. Difference from and exclusion from X now, and from Y now, are aimed at, and it is obvious that the textual repetition directly points to the existence of a plurality of objects from which Brahman, *qua*, the one supreme reality is sought to be differentiated. Otherwise the text might as well have been that Brahmin is not anything other than itself and different from the rest of reality. If so a single *neti* would have been quite sufficient. The repetition should be rescued from the charge of redundancy. Then more than one exclusion should be admitted. Though excusion *qua* exclusion is one, there should be also the operation of *visesha* which while guaranteeing the sort of Monism that is wanted and identity of exclusions would as well save the text from the charge of redundancy.

Even so, Madhva maintains that his own Radical Pluralism can be sustained not merely, in fact that is the only world-view doing justice to all the facts of life and philosophy. There are countless objects. Each exists in its own undisputed right. Each is different from the rest. Each can be made to figure in as many propositions as there are objects from which its difference is emphasized. Yet, the difference perceived is just identical with the object. In the very (perceptual) act of apprehension of an object, its difference from others is also perceived. For metaphysical purposes, *bheda* or difference is just the form of the object itself—"dharmi-svarupa." There is an identity-in-difference to use the modernest terminology. *Visesha* steps in just to keep apart the object—(dharmi) and (bheda)—difference, because a given object can be said to differ from X, Y, Z and other countless objects. Difference from X is not difference from Y. Nor difference from Z is difference from X or Y. Yet all these differences emphasize only the independence and individuality of the—dharmi—given object. Not merely that. As far as the Dharmi is concerned, emphasis on its difference from any one object is quite sufficient to vindicate its independence. But such an arbitrary restriction cannot be imposed. Pragmatic purpose at a given moment might require emphasis on its difference from X and Y at another moment. In Railway Parlance, red is distinguished from green. The same red in a different context would have to be distinguished from yellow. Difference from yellow is not the same as difference from green. A woman distinguished from husband

is wife and from children mother. There are two points of view, and two differences or exclusions—"Vyavrittivaya." Difference from husband is not the same as difference from children, though the person said to differ (dharmi) is the same. There is visesha according to Madhva—the differentiating or pluralising agency—which renders possible the validity of countless viewpoints while the object retains its independence. Countless are such objects. It all depends. As in dichotomy you may emphasize an all-inclusive difference or exclusion Non-X. That is not practical politics. Further specification and determination of the positive significance of the indefinite or the infinite term is inevitable according to the exigencies of the situation. In that determination and specification further difference and exclusions are inevitable. Yet, difference or bheda is the very form of the object. That is the fundamental doctrine of Madhva. The difference is seen when the object is seen. It is sensed when the object is sensed. At any given moment difference from some specific object or group of objects in accordance with the purpose or the point of view involved would be prominent or uppermost. So difference should be admitted to be gripped into an identity-in-difference (for which visesha is responsible) relationship with the object. If not there would be bare-difference as in dichotomy, which is of no use whatever. Difference from anything vaguely asserted is practically as good as difference from nothing!! In the light of this radical pluralism, necessitated by the constitution of cosmos not merely, but by the intellectual exigencies and categories as well, the previous objection that if X and its difference are identical, the former or the latter alone could be perceived, stands exposed to the hilt. Visesha is there to keep at arm's length any number of differences every one of which being pushed into prominence or the focus of consciousness at a given time according to environmental exigencies and needs of the subject is just the form of the object said to be differentiated. Such difference will have to be admitted by the Monists or the Absolutists as well in order to maintain inviolate the sacrosanctity of the scriptural texts—*neti-neti*. If there are no genuine and real differences between Brahman and the objects sought to be excluded, one *neti*—just a single expression—would quite suffice instead of a repetition which is proof positive that Brahman is sought to be differentiated from *many* objects. If this view can be maintained consistently, there can be no valid objection whatever against Madhva's doctrine that reality is rooted in difference, and that even in the act of perception of a given object its difference from others is also perceived albeit vaguely or undifferentiatedly. Adult perception only makes more explicit the difference which is already there implicitly. No *de novo* difference is anywhere thrust into reality or knowledge like a *deus ex machina* at some advanced stage of evolution or progress. If difference were not there, it would never be perceived later. It exists from the beginning of creation. Reality is firmly grounded on difference. Differences

engendered by different objects and points of view from which statements can be made are, of course countless. "*Tot homines quot sententiae.*" Many differences could be predicated of a given object. Difference is not *put* into any sense-multiplicity or sense-manifold by a perverted mind. Difference is just there to be perceived by humanity and animality. Regress *ad infinitum* anywhere we like even to the most primitive types of intellection, they are grounded on radical pluralism and definite differences between subject and subject, and object and object. Haldane was at very great pains to drive home the point that knowledge is foundational. Mādhva was anxious to drive home the point that difference and radical pluralism based upon difference are *foundational*. It is impossible for the human intellect to probe into the mysteries and the secrets of this fundamental and foundational difference. It is basic of Reality. Reality is grounded on it. It is *sui generis*. Analysis of the concept and category of difference and of the Pluralism it leads to would well reveal other differences. Difference or *bheda* cannot be explained in terms of anything other than *bheda*, something which cannot accommodate further and deeper differences.

*Pratyākṣha* or ordinary sense-awareness is the final guarantee of the validity of this perception. No doubt there are cases of illusions, and they are quite capable of being satisfactorily and adequately accounted for. In all normal perception, difference enters as a constituent element inevitable and unriddable. The question of perception first of object and difference next has been disposed of. There is no such succession in the perception of difference. There is no such transition from perception of an object to perception of its difference from something else. In one and the same act of perception of a given object difference is also perceived. It cannot be otherwise. Difference can never be divorced from and can never exist or subsist apart from the *dharmi*. *Bheda is dharmisvarupa*. Difference is the form of the objects which are described to differ from one another. There is no such vicious reciprocity as alleged by the absolutist. The entire trouble springs up in the following manner. Not being able to do violence to the difference manifest in creation, and to the plurality of objects, the absolutist resorted to a dialectical objection that difference is an impossible concept on account of a vicious and fallacious reciprocity in perception (explained in the earlier paragraphs) and the only effective answer to such an objection would be for Madhva to establish that difference can never be got rid of at all. It enters into the very constitution of the cosmos. It enters into knowledge as well as into existence. Without difference there is neither existence nor knowledge. Even the lowest type of awareness involves awareness of some difference. Greater niceties and discriminative refinements are noticed as evolution proceeds higher in the scale. The theory of evolution

might be pressed into service. Commencing from the comparatively undifferentiated mass evolution proceeds by differentiation and integration, revealing increasing complexity of structure and efficiency of function. So is the case with knowledge and perception—in fact human life and experience. Difference and plurality are in evidence, even in the lowest types of experience, awareness and perception. There could scarcely be any doubt that the big, booming and buzzing confusion with which a new born infant is confronted on seeing the light of day, contains within it germs of plurality, and difference and many-ness, which are later developed into clear-cut and chiselled differences and a rationally grounded plurality of realities. Difference is there. It is *sui generis*. It is foundational, if you please. It is basic of the cosmic structure. It is the form of Dharmā of any object about which difference is predicated. It is directly an object of sense-awareness. It need not be and in fact is not indirectly perceived as suggested or alleged by some. Difference is a direct object of Perception. When you just see an object, however vaguely its outlines are drawn or perceived you see in the same act of perception difference also. If not, you have no business to perceive it as an object at all. Perception of any object, concept or relationship, in fact of anything, involves perception of difference as well. A concept does not fuse into another concept. An object does not telescope into another object. A relation does not merge into another relation. Values do not coalesce into values. Judgment the unit of thought does not get merged in judgment. Inference is not lost in inference. A proposition does not melt into another proposition. Sense-awareness or sense-perception is grounded on difference. That is Madhva's fundamental position.

Difference is the form of the object itself. Many aspects are naturally distinguished from one another. A given object can be viewed from many angles of vision. Each is real. Each is significant. Each is purposive. Each is pragmatic. Each has a distinct identifiable value of its own. They are separate and distinguishable from the another. Further a given object differs from so many other objects similarly and differently constituted. Differences thus get discriminated and they cannot be jumbled into a mass unless violence is done to thought and expression. Difference of a given object X from Y is not the same as difference of the said X from another object Z. The given object forms a centre of departure for many-sided differences. One such difference gets pushed into the focus of consciousness when required by situational exigencies. Then it is the prominent form of the object. When it is relegated to the background, another difference occupies the mental focus and so on and so forth. The object and so many differences are identical with one another and yet separate from one another. There is no mystery in that sort of relationship. There is

no miracle either. There is what Madhva calls *Visesha* in every object. It is the differentiating or individualising agency. It would pluralise and yet exhibit the pluralities and pluralisations *qua* centripetally flowing to a given object that happens to be occupying the focus of consciousness on account of the dominant pragmatic interest of the moment. The differences cannot be dismissed as unreal. They are as real as the object the pragmatic elevation of which to a coveted position makes it a centre of interest and attraction. The object at any given moment is one. But there are countless such objects. Though constituted one in virtue of the possession by it of certain physical features and characteristics, it falls into the grip of many and many-sided differences all of which relate to it as the centre or the point from which differences proceed and to which differences flow. Radical pluralism requires a world-view like that based on strict and uncompromising differences.

Madhva is careful to emphasize that in adult experience or adult perception differences are apprehended in sharper lines and clear-cut relief. That is as it should be. To a dull mind all appears to be a confused mass. Primitive awareness comprehends a sort of unity dull undiscriminated and undifferentiated. Primitive societies display the same lack of discrimination, of specialisation and of multiplication of interests and purposes. As one ascends the scale of progress or evolution, discrimination and differentiation confront him at every stage. The greater the progress the nicer are the discriminations. Sometimes discriminations border on subtle hairsplittings for which the man-in-the-street has no patience whatever. They characterise metaphysical thought and they are quite in order notwithstanding the taboo placed on them by the *man-in-the-street*. They are due to the presence of a differentiating or pluralising agency which Madhva calls after the Nyaya school of thought—*Visesha*. It would be idle to challenge Madhva or any Radical Pluralist for the matter of that to demonstrate the existence of *Visesha* under laboratory conditions. One might as well challenge Bergson to demonstrate the part played by the *elan vital* in the constitution of the cosmic scheme of things, under laboratory conditions, and Bradley and Bosanquet would not escape too. The *Visesha* is a *padartha* according to the Naiyyayikas. Madhva would subscribe to that view. It lurks in everything. *Sosti—Vastushvaseshatah*. An object or concept without *Visesha* is impossible to have, to arrive at. To be perceived as different, objects should be two, and to be perceived and be two, they should be different. This sort of jugglery would not do. When you utter the word object or concept, you utter the word *difference* as well. An object is what it is simply because it is different from the rest. Without this foundational difference, neither existence nor thought would be possible. The Cartesian Cogito should be considerably amended, if not completely altered. What does Descartes say? I think—

therefore, I am. Madhva would alter it as—I differ—therefore, I am. Of course, the converse would be true as well. I am—therefore I differ from everything that is. Difference is foundational. Existence is inconceivable without difference. Existence means difference, and difference means existence—not of course literally. No eternal or even a temporary gulf can be thought of between existence and difference. Should there be any such gulf or transition between the two, the question of vicious reciprocity can be raised. As it is, it cannot rear its head at all. Nowhere in knowledge or existence, in knowledge or reality, or thought or reality, in the objective or subjective, in theory of knowledge or metaphysics, in doctrine or conduct, is it ever possible to separate existence and difference. That existence is perception needs a thorough overhauling. Existence is difference. Or no existence without difference. Difference is existence. Or no difference without existence. On this line of argument, no vicious reciprocity would ever be able to create any accidents. Analyse any act of thought or piece of perception at any level or plane, there is no getting beyond the fact of difference against which we either knock our heads or with the help of which we have the doors opened to be admitted into the brilliantly lit Drawing Room of Metaphysics and are greeted by Truth, Beauty and Goodness. There is not the slightest doubt that an eager aspirant in quest after the Supreme Reality of God, would unhesitatingly prefer the latter alternative. From difference all creation sprang up and into difference would it ultimately be dissolved. Difference is thus the solid and substantial groundwork—we should go on varying the figures of speech to convince even the most non-technically minded—on which Madhva's Realistic and Pluralistic Metaphysical system has been constructed. Perception of the wonderful and profound part played by difference is not the monopoly of the professional philosopher or the armchair lecturer. It is injected into the very constitution of humanity and may be of animality as well in the light of some of the latest researches in animal Psychology. By a mere stroke of the pen, by a mere fiat, a speculative gesture, or an adroit assertion, or a craze for unity-mongering it would be impossible to deny or annihilate the *difference* that is constitutive and foundational of all Reality—of sentient and non-sentient creation.

## VI

In the foregoing passages, Madhva and his commentator Jayatirtha endeavoured to establish difference and argued it is foundational and constitutive of all Reality. The Absolutist, however, is not to be and cannot be so easily silenced. Not merely sense-perception, but inference as well is grounded on difference. The Universal or the ground of inference or generalisation cannot be hanging in the air. It has to lie embodied in particulars through which alone it is rendered intelligible. Of course, inference is not from particular to particular. Long before Mill, Indian logic

advocated it at a particular stage and exposed its fallaciousness subsequently. Though one might be crazy about or over unity and Monism, he has to admit difference for the sake of inference. Data must differentiate themselves or should be differentiated from interpretation. The latter can never coalesce with or get merged into the former. The latter again cannot monopolise all reality. Data and every item of the data would be as real as the interpretation. May be. The absolutist or the Monist shrugs his shoulders and advances the following very interesting and almost formidable objection to reality being grounded on difference.

Look here. The difference, the objects and concepts that differ from one another, the Dharmi, the Pratiyogi, the object that is said to differ, and that from which the former is described as differing, the whole world, the entire universe is a huge and gigantic illusion. How do you know that? Here are a number of inferences or syllogisms that establish beyond the shade of a shadow of doubt the illusoriness of the universe. The baby cannot remain when the bath-tub has been emptied of all its contents! When the entire universe is unreal and illusory how can difference—just a relation—an attribute—be real?

Here are the inferences which can easily be thrown into syllogistic form cited by the Absolutist—Monist—to establish the unreality or the illusoriness of the Universe. (1) This—i.e., the universe is unreal, because it is perceived, it is inert and it is spatially temporally and individually determined or conditioned — Vimatam-Mithya-Drisyatvat-Jadatvat-Paricchinatvat-Suktrajatavat—even as the silver-in-mother of pearl. That is the “drishtanta” of the Indian Logic—the confirmatory positive instance. (2) This cloth is the object of negation or denial in this thread or threads that constitute it i.e., the cloth does not exist anywhere else. If its negation could be proved among the threads that constitute it, surely it should be unreal or illusory! Ayampatahetattantu-nishtatyantabhava-pratiyogi etc. (3) Look at the moon through finger-intercepted vision. You see many moons different from one another. The difference is illusory. Even so is the difference with which we are familiar in this world. Bhedo-Mithya-Bedatvat-chandrabhedavat. (4) There is only one Atman—only one Reality. Several Atmas do not really differ from X-Devadatta. Vimata-atmanah-devadattannabhidyante—etc. Other syllogisms of a similar nature are found plentifully scattered in leading works by the Absolutists and the Monists. What is the central contention? The difference that is perceived is illusory because, reason that is more powerful compels the conclusion that the difference is unreal. Are the many moons real? Reason compels the conclusion that it is one. The sky is blue. They say. There is nothing blue. Science and reason come to our rescue. We satisfy ourselves there is nothing blue at all. It is merely illusory appearance. Even so, reason and ratiocination would lead one to the conclusion that difference is unreal.

Madhva refutes the foregoing contention by entering into an elaborate and exhaustive analysis of the relative strength and weakness of sense-awareness on the one hand and inferential knowledge on the other. In the chapter on *Pramanalakshana* it has been fully discussed that Pratyaksha or sense-perception is more powerful than inference as the latter is rendered possible at all only on the basis of previous perceptual knowledge. The distinction between "*Upajivya*"—the master—the patron—or the support-giver—and the "*Upajivaka*"—the servant—the patronised—and the support-receiver has been already drawn by Madhva elsewhere. Pratyaksha is "*Upajivya*"—the patron and Inference is only the patronised—the "*Upajivaka*." The latter cannot invalidate the former. Inference is derivative. Its authority is derived. It cannot invalidate sense-perception. Where there is incompatibility or contradiction between sense-awareness and inference, the latter should be compelled to surrender or abandon its surface—interpretation and should be re-interpreted according to the former. If indeed inferential knowledge and ratiocination are allowed to run riot anything can be established by means of inference. First *prima facie* correct sense-knowledge has to be considered unreliable and invalid. Then inference would be considered reliable *qua* giving or rendering knowledge of reality that is unstultified. On the basis of this reliability of inference and inferential process, sense-awareness and sense-knowledge are sought to be tabooed! There is no escape from vicious reciprocity. So, sense-perception cannot be stultified by inference.

How is it then that in instances of perceptual illusion (like this piece is silver,) we see sense-awareness is stultified by inference that it is not silver because, it breaks when brought into violent contact with a stone, and burns when in contact with fire, so it should be mother-of pearl? The answer is that the stultification is the work of sense-awareness itself occurring at close quarters and grounded on greater and nicer discrimination. Perhaps when swayed by an expectant mood or greedy mood, one would have perceived silver where there was none, but the moment calmness settles on, and a more careful scrutiny takes the place of greedy haste and impetuous cupidity, the party finds to his chagrin that there is only a piece of mother-of pearl but no silver whatever. Like Moses the party would awaken to the realisation that there is no silver in the bargain!! Inference plays a subsidiary part here. No doubt the inference that it is not silver on account of its brittleness and on account of its unexpected reaction to fire would aid and accelerate the perceptual process which ultimately leaves the subject with a clear conviction that he has been confronted only with a piece of mother-of-pearl and not silver, but it would not be correct to assert that the inference is so powerful as to repudiate the legitimate jurisdiction of sense-awareness and sense-knowledge.

The position is this. In all cases of perceptual illusion there is no doubt an element of objective reality acting as stimulus



and prompter of the illusory experience. The stimuli are *wrongly* interpreted by the percipient. The sense organs may be of defective constitution. Or may not. Even granting the normal constitution and normal functioning of the sensory apparatus, illusions would be caused by the ill-directed interpretative activity of the mind. The current of the said interpretative activity turns awry. Subsequently the real truth of the situation is grasped by the subject. He realises it is an illusion and the conviction is brought home to him that it is after all an innocuous rope and that his trepidation under the impression it was a deadly reptile was entirely unwarranted and baseless. In this realisation it is again sense-perception that plays a prominent part. Inference does not step in and invalidate the illusory experience. The analysis of the situation is this. Suppose a person is confronted with a perceptual illusion. He mistakes a rope for a snake. Consequent on the mistake he reacts to the total situation in a manner different from that in which he would have acted if the obstructing agency or factor had not been there. He does not enter a room at the door of which lies the rope—mistaken for a snake. The illusion however is just momentary. It would never monopolise one's attention even in comparatively complicated instances. The need of the hour or an adjustmental exigency in the total situation of the subject would necessitate a closer analysis and a scrutiny more careful and searching. Even supposing the illusion persists for a length of time, the need for a closer scrutiny would be felt sooner or later. After the scrutiny the subject would realise that the original perception was illusory on account of a wrong interpretation of the sensory data engendered either by expectancy or haste, impatience, or some other consideration too powerful to be lightly dismissed or dispensed with. The illusory experience is stultified, negated or sublated in the light of later accurate, correct or corrected perception.

Unprejudiced reason would easily grasp the truth that the inherent jurisdiction of sense-knowledge cannot be questioned by anybody much less denied or repudiated in cases of normal functioning of the nervous system and intellect. Senses are the gate-ways of knowledge. If metaphysical or any other inquiry should be commenced with an initial suspicion relative to the senses, the investigator would never rise above the level of doubt, suspicion, indecision, and vacillation. No amount of reason or ratiocination would be of any avail. *Pratyaksha* — sense-perception — does possess an unchallenged and unchallengeable authority and reliability that make it *par excellence* source of all valid knowledge. Hair-splitting logic, logic-chopping, and similar feats would amuse but never enlighten serious-minded thinkers.

The *Onus probandi* lies and must lie with the Monist-Absolutist if he wants to demonstrate that the world perceived in sense experience is all illusory. He cannot summon the aid of

inference or ratiocination. Inference at variance with sense-perception is to be rejected. If everything is to be decided on the basis of inference, one might go on endlessly arguing that as the constituent elements of the universe are water, fire, air etc., the earth also should be subsumed under one of them and has no independent existence!! Some such would be the *reductio ad absurdum* of the absolutistic position.

Inference cannot work or function *in vacuo*. It has to work with the material supplied by sense-knowledge. *Qua* supplying the material the latter is more powerful than the former. In the event of there arising some incompatibility between the two or some discrepancy, certainly the authority of the inferential process is less than that of sense-awareness or sense-knowledge. On the other hand, sense-perception is a source of valid knowledge independently and on its own merits and in its own inherent right. Its validity need not be established in any roundabout or circumlocutory manner *qua* corroborated by and as not at variance with inferential knowledge. Madhva's commentator cites an analogy. The King of Beasts exists in the forest in its own right not because it is assured of the absence of other Zoological Specimens! On the other hand, if a herd of deer is to get into safe quarters, it would instinctively make certain as far as possible if no dangerous animals are near! A strong community or nation conscious of possession of strength gets merrily on irrespective of its weaker neighbour, with whom it can afford to quarrel. But the latter, the weaker can never exist when war has been declared with the stronger. Pratyaksha or sense-knowledge is undoubtedly stronger. Inference at variance with it cannot be sustained. So inference of the illusory nature of the world cannot stand as against sense-perception which is there to give a subject knowledge of external reality, *as it is*.

Parmenides and Spinoza, Kant and Bradley would not help us. Critical judgment on European Philosophy is aware how the conclusions of the Critique of Pure Reason were all in some material particulars recanted in the Critique of Practical Reason. There is nothing strange about it. Mere reason, performing acrobatic feats in the air, can never sustain a serious conclusion against the onslaughts of perception valid and reliable standing and functioning on its own merits and in its own inherent right. It is the birth-right of sense-perception to give a Subject knowledge of external reality *as it is*. The time-honoured, almost worn-out, and platitudinous distinction between 'as it is' and 'as it appears or seems to be' has only interest for a philosophic pedant and not for an eager student or an earnest aspirant.

Madhva, therefore maintains that mere reason unaided by sense-perception cannot be powerful enough to invalidate perception and the reality of the world implied in all valid perception, and indirectly indicated by perceptual

illusions. When difference is there and when its validity has been sanctioned and guaranteed by perception, which is the only final court of appeal, it is indeed impossible to deny difference which is foundational fact of reality, simply through the instrumentality of the so-called reason, ratiocination or inference. That is a foolhardy feat worthy of those who would not shrink from the commission of metaphysical dacoities in broad day-light! How indeed can the foundational fact be denied or negated? Knowledge is foundational of Reality. Difference is equally foundational. All knowledge involves and must involve some real difference, somewhere in reference to some real objects and things—an objective system. With the exception of what is familiarly known as mystic knowledge and mystic experience, in which it is alleged that the distinction between subject and object, of knower and known, etc., disappears, in all other types, degrees and manifestations of knowledge, difference is always involved. It would be a speculative impossibility to regress beyond the foundational fact itself. One can be adroit. One can be foolhardy. He can dig deep into the foundations. He would then be digging the grave of all philosophy. Madhva maintains that Difference and Reality are foundational and their validity can never be questioned. "*Veritas norma sui*". Truth is its own standard. Perception is its own standard. It can never be negated or stultified by inference. Otiose is the inferential process and unable to deny the significance of foundational facts.

Thus the following are landmarks in the development of Madhva's metaphysical speculation. "Pratyaksha" or sense-awareness is valid, in its own right and is more powerful than "Anumana or Tarka"—inference—which derives its being as it were, from the former, and which is therefore unable to overthrow the parent. (2) Sense-awareness yields knowledge of reality as it is. (3) Difference is foundational of Reality. This difference is grasped by intellect primarily by sense-awareness or sense-perception. (4) Distrust of sense organs is suicidal to speculation. (5) Foundational difference can never be got rid of anywhere. (6) The argument or the ratiocinative effort, which seeks to establish the unreality of the Universe, repudiated by a stronger and more powerful Pramana stands self-condemned. (7) Lastly the metaphysical speculation which seeks to establish the unreality or the illusoriness of the Universe is at variance with the following authorities—Sruti-Smriti, sense-perception and inference. No doubt in certain peculiar cases, perception leads to illusions and that is hardly enough justification to condemn it always. "*Exceptio probat regulam*". The occasional perceptual lapses and inaccuracies in the shape of illusions, engendered by peripheral as well as central factors, only prove the general rule that sense perception working normally under unobstructed normal conditions gives reliable, accurate, truthful, pragmatically efficacious, knowledge of external reality and external objects as they are. The unreality

or the illusoriness turns out to be just a will-o-the-wisp! It may be a pet theory, a fond doctrine or a bold speculative stroke. But it is not supported by evidence of any kind—by any *Pramana*. Analyse any perceptual act you like. Regress to the most primitive type of awareness and perception. That rudimentary awareness involves in an embryonic form *Difference* and *Reality*. Subtler distinctions and nicer shades are later springing up in proportion to the intellectual and speculative needs of the percipient. But the *Reality* and *Difference* are foundational. They are the foundational facts of the cosmos. They cannot be thought away into nothingness by fiat of will, emotion, or of intellect. Foundational knowledge, it is necessary to explain, even at the risk of some inevitable repetition, involves and must involve difference, and reality of the objects that enter into the foundational fact of knowledge. This must apply to all knowledge whatever the stage of evolution. But a clear and distinct apprehension of the philosophical significance of it all is the mark of evolved intelligence, whereas, its absence indicates a comparatively lower order of intelligence. There is no absolutistic monopoly in the use of the term *degree* or *order*. Degrees of reality have been nearly done to death by the Absolutist. A higher degree of truth does not render the lower unreal and withal illusory. Madhva is perfectly entitled to speak of degrees of clearness and distinctness, in the apprehension of *Reality* and *Difference* that are foundational of the cosmos. There are degrees in the clearness and distinctness of awareness. Degrees do not imply any unreality of the lower degree of *Difference* and *Reality*.

*Reality* and *Difference* are *sui generis*. It would indeed be a vain metaphysical endeavour should one try to explain or account for *Reality* and *Difference*, in terms of something else. They are guaranteed by the *Pramanas*. Reliability and trustworthiness are the birthright of perceptions. It is the birthright of an object or a system of objects to be perceived or apprehended by a subject. It is perceived or apprehended as it is. It does not merely appear to him as is contended by the Absolutists. A system of objects and things existing, persisting and enduring irrespective of what happens to the knowing subjects, has reality and difference as foundations. Knowledge is *Pramana*—source of valid information. It is a source by birthright, in its own rights, and on its own merits. Its authority, reliability and trustworthiness are not derived from some other agency or source. There is no knowledge in which difference and reality do not enter as constituent elements, in some relationship or another. Even where one would be inclined to place pre-eminent emphasis on identity-aspect, difference is not annihilated. Such an emphasis in fact becomes practical politics only because, there lies the substantial background or difference which would support aspects of identity for the purposes of theory of knowledge, philosophy romance, in fact of anything, relating to doctrine and conduct. Even so when

some item is pronounced to be unreal or illusory, there lies the unridable and inalienable background of reality which is object of direct and immediate perception. It is not the Kantian *Nooumenon*. Nor is it the Absolute. The Reality is here and now, within the reach of every sentient being. There is not the slightest mystery about it. No one need be mystified or allow himself to be mystified by a professional philosopher.

When reality is deeply rooted in difference and when the system of objects and things, our physical, social etc., environment is perfectly real the *onus probandi* lies and must lie on the absolutist, if he seeks to prove and demonstrate that the system of objects and things is unreal and illusory. Mere reason and ratiocination can never be the final arbiters. There is no end to reason and ratiocination. When they commence a career running riot under the protective aegis of philosophic speculation, anything can be proved and anything demonstrated such as the impossibility of movement or motion in the famous fallacy of *Mentiens!* and similar pieces of ratiocinative jugglery or performance. Reality and Difference are systematically sustained and guaranteed by knowledge. If these are to be denied, doubted and dethroned by means of what is styled reason or ratiocination or *tarka*, there is no gainsaying the fact that reason has commenced its career of running riot. The consequences are bound to be disastrous for philosophy, and commonsense, the scientist and layman! Madhva contends that we have here a nice "*reductio ad absurdum*". Since most of the known constituent elements of the cosmos behave unlike Earth—it is likely the Earth will have to be subsumed under one of the other constituents like, fire, water, air, or ether or space. On the level of this sort of reason or ratiocinative existence, and speculation, philosophy cannot but degenerate into verbal jugglery or linguistic legerdemain.

It is inevitable therefore, that "*Tarka*"—reason or ratiocination which seeks to establish the unreality of the universe and nullify difference cannot but be rejected. For, ratiocination denies all difference—denies just by a stroke of the pen as it were. It is hardly able to invalidate the adult and even childish perception, rooted in difference and grounded on reality. This is indeed a distinct gain for theory of knowledge. The question whether in our knowledge we know a thing *as it is* or whether *only as it appears* to us cannot rear its ugly head on Madhva's realistic theory of knowledge. Certainly, knowledge is knowledge of a thing as it is, and as it was made by god or some other agency! Under different aspects it appears differently! That is just a matter for convenience of social and linguistic intercourse. The aspects are undoubtedly real by birthright. Appearance in any one of the aspects according to the exigencies of a situation is appearance of reality, and not appearance in the sense opposed to reality. The

Absolutists all the world over might endeavour to confute the two and seventy jarring sects and even more by means of their query whether objects are perceived as they are or as they appear to us. All that in the opinion of Madhva is love's labour lost. Why give a quadruped a bad name and then hang it? If the latter is to be done by a fiat, earlier christening or canine characterisation must be deemed unnecessary. Doubt the reality of the knowledge of objects as they are by a fiat. That would be a feat indeed. But why draw a distinction between objects as they are and as they appear to a subject? Perceptual illusions would have nothing to do with this distinction. Objects to Madhva appear as they are and what they are and are what they appear to be. All that glitters is not gold. True. But closer perception and a more careful analysis would reveal the truth of the matter.

Analyse the well-known instance of a stick immersed in water, appearing bent. In the arresting terminology employed by Stout in the latest Edition of his Manual of Psychology (reviewed by me in the Literary and Educational Supplement of "The Hindu") a sensation never occurs alone, is never perceived alone. A pure sensation is a magnificent myth. A sensation then always appears and exists in relation to *some condition somewhere*. Of course the bend is not actually in the stick, but somewhere in the progress of the light rays proceeding from the surface of the stick immersed in water, factors and conditions that are responsible for the bend being perceived should be located and identified. So according to Einstein, light rays proceeding from the fixed stars are seen bent when photographed during a total eclipse of the Sun. It is weariness of flesh to worry oneself with the rays as they are and as they appear. If certain agencies (like the gravitational force that deflects the *rays* from a particular path which they will be obliged to take in the event of there being no such disturbing factor or deflecting agency,) are fundamental of reality and are hence unriddable, and if perceptions are to be affected by such agencies, the best thing for the philosopher, the scientist, and the laymen would be not to worry how matters would or might stand if the said agencies did not exist or did not continue to operate successfully. That is just like the odd story of an Inspector of Schools who used to put the question—"what would happen if there were no Himalyan Range"?!

Thus, on all levels of perception, sensation and a related condition or assemblage of conditions are inevitable. They cannot be got rid of. There is no use in any endeavour to think them into nullity by a fiat. It is always easy to think them into first rate existences by an equally adroit counter-fiat. When one fiat is set against another fiat, philosophy may be conveniently bidden good-bye. Instead Madhva counsels that dry ratiocination, hair-splitting logic, word-chopping argumentation might more conveniently and profitably be bidden good-bye. Let the philosopher and

the commonsense man, let the layman and the scientist take their stand on the facts of experience of rational human beings, and on the facts of perception without raising the bogey of the difference between a "thing as it is" and "as it appears to be." The moment this Croquemitaine is conjured up, all rational thought is paralysed as it were. Let alone perceptual illusions which have been shown to be due to peripheral or central interpretative factors. Rope appears always and to all only as a rope under all normal circumstances. When it is mistaken for a snake the poor rope is not at fault. Nor is the snake to blame. It is the subject who wrongly and erroneously interprets his sensations. Rope produces only such sensations in the organism as a rope would. Snake does and must produce only such sensations in the organism as a snake would! When this aspect of interpretation being responsible for perceptual illusions, or the other aspect of there being some congenital or acquired defect in the sensory channel of communication itself, is borne in mind, there would be little difficulty in realising that sensation is permanently found conjointly with a related condition or set of conditions that is unriddable so long as one remains on the level of human intelligence imprisoned or encased within a nervous mechanism. It is futile to speculate how experience would come home to the subject in the absence of the peculiarly constituted nervous structure, and nervous mechanisms, specialised sensory structures through the instrumentality of which *alone* the subject has to apprehend reality.

Realism is the only explanation. The related condition can never be thought out of experience. It cannot be dismissed by mere pen strokes however clever, catching and coloured. No amount of reasoning or ratiocination would think away the condition into nothingness. The related condition must persist. That is foundational of sense-perception. There is no knowledge without sense-perception. The related condition-set would have to be admitted to be foundational of all knowledge. That is the quintessence of Madhva's Realism

The related-condition-set is the basis of Realism as well as a Radical Pluralism. There are countless such condition-sets. They enter into the constitution of human experience and animal awareness according to the purposive adjustmental exigencies of the former and the instinctive life-exigencies of the latter. Difference between the various related conditions, and sets of conditions is the natural characteristic of the cosmos. There is nothing that has not been leavened by difference, not gripped by it, or clutched by it.

How then can this difference that is foundational of the cosmos be proved to be illusory by mere speculation christened albeit ratiocination or reasoning? Some one can quote scripture. Some

one can reason too. Such a piece of reasoning as seeks to deprive Reality of its constituent element of *Difference* must come into conflict with all *Pramanas*—measures or guarantors of knowledge *pratyaksha*—sense-awareness, *Anumana*—inference, *Sruti* and *Smriti*—texts revealed and transmitted by oral tradition or word, and as a result of the said conflict the vicious piece of reasoning should be rejected. There is hardly any justification for upholding the majesty of that piece of reasoning as it stands alone, preposterously alone, in denying Reality its characteristic property of *Difference*. This is surely not a question that can be decided by votes or show of hands. If a piece of reasoning comes into clash with several guarantors of valid knowledge which corroborate one another, it has to be rejected. There is no other go.

Sense-awareness, Inferential knowledge, texts, revealed and transmitted collected, criticised and codified support the position that *Difference* is the fundamental characteristic of the cosmos, in fact basic of it. It is foundational of the cosmos. It is foundational of knowledge. It is foundational of experience, human as well as animal in the light of investigations of the problems of animal psychology. There is no human value, intellectual, emotional and volitional without its being gripped by *Difference*. *Bheda* or *Difference* is the very oxygen of life. An argumentation or piece of ratiocination that even feebly endeavours to deny this foundational fact of difference stands and must stand condemned. The *reductio ad absurdum* of reasoning running riot has been already explained. Look round where one may. In all departments of human effort, he is confronted at every step with *Difference*. Mere human reason however powerful would never perceive difference if it was not there as the fundamental constituent element of the cosmos. It is because difference is basic and foundational that nicer distinctions are brought to light with the progress of knowledge. There is consensus of the guarantors of valid knowledge which emphasizes the foundational difference. It cannot be wiped off by a ratiocinatory fiat of the Absolutist. Nor could it be waved out of existence by the magic wand of the Absolutist.

The net result of the discussion is that the ratiocinatory piece of argumentation which seeks to establish Absolutism or Monism nullifying all distinctions and differences must be rejected root and branch on account of its coming into a severe conflict with the other *Pramanas* like *Sruti*, *Smriti*, *Pratyaksha* and *Anumana* which is fatal to its validity. The ratiocinatory prop is but a miserably slender reed. Monism or Absolutism clutching at it must share the fate of the drowning person clutching at a straw. Along with the reed of ratiocination, Absolutism or Monism, or Monistic Absolutism or Absolutistic Monism must be carried away down the current or stream.



Madhva anticipates the usual contention of the Absolutist at this juncture. Reality rooted in difference is admitted by the Absolutist as belonging to the sphere of reality of a lower degree—"vyavaharika." Higher degree of truth does not belong to the world of difference. That is the dogmatism of Monism or Absolutism. By an inferential ratiocinative process *real reality* as Bosanquet puts it, or reality of the first water, of the Supreme degree is denied to the world of distinctions and differences in which we live, move and have our being. This inferential denial of *real reality* or "Paramarthic" reality is perfectly compatible with some sort of lesser degree of reality being affirmed of the world-order in which "crawling coot we live and die" as Khayyam reminds us. There is thus no conflict or incompatibility between the perceptual reality of a lesser degree possessed by the world and inferential denial of supreme degree of reality of the same world. This is more or less a stock objection of the Absolutist to which reference has already been made in the chapter on *Tatvodyota*.

Madhva answers the foregoing objection very effectively maintaining the thesis based on a careful psychological analysis of perception that the world-order in which we live move and have our being, (philosophers professional and pinchbeck and laymen, sophisticated and unsophisticated,) has the inalienable characteristic of reality of the Supreme degree which is according to the Absolutist possessed by the Absolute or the Real Reality. The contention of the Absolutist is that the world of differences and distinctions being neither *Sat* not *Asat* should be described to be *Sadasad-vilakshana* or *Anirvachaniya*. If anything is *Sat* it should never (under no circumstances physical or psychical, or somatic) be stultified, negated and denied. If anything is *asat*, it should never have any appearance in physical and psychical relationship, technically called *pratiti*. The world is denied, negated, nullified and stultified at the dawn of knowledge about Brahman. So it cannot be *Sat*. Nor can it be *Asat*. For it has *Pratiti*; it appears in some physical and psychical relation to a percipient. *Asat* stands in no such relationship. So the world should be described as *anirvachaniya* or *Sadasadvilakshana* having a lesser degree of reality. Madhva's answer is that, there is no such category known as "*neither sat nor asat*."

Madhva's contention is that all reality and knowledge are exhausted by *Sat* and *Asat*. They are mutually exclusive not merely but exhaustive. What is not *Sat* is and must be *Asat*—and vice versa. All perceptual illusions come under the category of *Asat*. Madhva exposes the absurdity of the Absolutistic contention that *asat* has no *pratiti* i.e., it is not object of apprehension. The *Asat* is and must be object of some sort of apprehension. There is no other go. When a statement is made that the *Asat*, the non-

existent, is not object of apprehension, it has in the very characterisation or description become an object of apprehension. That is inevitable. The son of barren woman is the usual example. He is *asat*. The non-existent in a spatio-temporal series of point-events, in being described and distinguished as non-existent becomes object of some apprehension as otherwise the distinction between existent and non-existent must vanish!! What then is the non-existent or the *asat* that is at the back of the mind of the absolutist when he dithyrambically complains that if anything is *asat*, it should not be object of apprehension? An analysis of instances of productive imagination would convince anyone that a barren woman's son can marry a barren woman's darling daughter and in utter defiance of the modern cult of birth control worship most effectively the cult of fecundity!! All perceptual illusions have to be described as *asat*. They are non-existent. Yet non-existence does not mean non-appearance in experience as an object of some apprehension. /

Eligibility to occur as an object of apprehension or awareness, and actual occurrence are the inalienable birthright of the *asat*—the non-existent. The controversial procedure adopted by the Absolutist is itself irrefutable evidence to prove that the non-existent, the *Asat*, is object of apprehension. He is so keen on refuting the position that the *asat* can be object of apprehension. Is this refutation a wild-goose chase? It cannot be. If the refutation is to have the status of a sane intellectual act of a sane person engaged in a sane and serious debate, the conclusion is inevitable that the *asat*—the non-existent—is bound to enter and as a matter of fact does enter into relationship of awareness or apprehension by a subject. Unless one believed that this appearance or entry of the non-existent into the said relationship is so potent as to disturb one's cherished metaphysical notions or pet philosophical theories, he need not undertake serious refutation of it. The very attempt at refutation proves that the *asat* has *pratiti* i.e., enters into apprehension of a subject.

An analysis of the slogan of the Absolutist that if anything is "*asat*" it does not enter into apprehension or awareness or simply the *asat* does not enter into any such relationship, would reveal the fact that it does and must enter into apprehension of a subject. "*Khyati*" or appearance-apprehension is negatively predicated of the *Asat*. This act of negative predication or refutation, as explained in the foregoing paragraph, proves that the non-existent enters into apprehension. Madhva asks was there *Khyati* or not when the Absolutist, uttered the slogan that the *asat*—the non-existent—has none? If the latter i.e., if there is no *khyati*, or, entering by the non-existent into relationship of awareness by a subject then the refutation by him of the position that even the *asat* does enter into the relationship is a skirmish with shadows. For would anyone outside the mental hospital think

it worthwhile to refute something which is not? The very refutation or denial of the position that the non-existent is perceived or enters into awareness of a subject, proves the fact that it does enter into the said relationship. If the former, i.e., if it is admitted there is *khyati*, one cannot deny it without involving himself in self-contradiction.

If X, Y or Z is to be apprehended as distinct and different from the non-existent, certainly the person to whom this difference is brought home, should have a clear and unmistakable notion of the non-existent. This perception or analysis must reveal the fact that the non-existent must enter into awareness of the percipient as it is something in the nature of a significant limiting and circumscribing concept. The distinction and difference between the *sat* and *asat*, the existent and non-existent, can never be drawn, perceived and sustained, unless one possessed clear knowledge of the nature of the non-existent. Hence the contention that the "asat" is not object of awareness is baseless.

Inference is equally powerless to establish the thesis of the Absolutist. He contends that the following inference establishes the unreality of the universe. X-Y etc., are "anirvachaniya," illusory, because they are "badhya," negated at the dawn of real or true knowledge. The silver in mother-of-pearl is "anirvachaniya"—neither *sat* nor *asat*. But wait. Madhva retorts that the objective and subjective factors that enter into perceptual illusions reveal a different state of affairs and tell a different tale from the one anticipated by the Absolutist. There is some slender datum or complex datum i.e., a glittering piece of shell. It is interpreted or misinterpreted into silver. That there are some data objectively no one doubts. The source of error lies in interpretation. The error is realised when in the subsequent cognitive act and a thwarted volition, the subject perceives that it is not silver. The realisation of the absence of silver in the given perceptual context is known as "*Badhakajnyana*." It settles the matter finally. You stoop down under the urge of an impulse of greed to pick up what you consider to be a piece of silver. Examination of it at close quarters disillusion you. It is *not* silver. It is this correct cognition subsequent to the illusory experience that settles the question—whether what shines in front of you is or is not a piece of silver. The subsequent correct cognition proves that the "silver" experienced in perceptual illusion is to be assigned to the category of the "Asat"—the non-existent. It cannot belong to the dubious category of "*sadasadvilakshana*"—neither existent nor non-existent.

"No"—rejoins the Absolutist. "It cannot be absolutely non-existent—Asat. For in illusory experience, a given object appears as something existent. Perceived *qua* existent it can never be *asat* non-existent. In the nature and fitness of things, *asat* or the

non-existent can never appear as *sat* or existent. As the silver has the appearance of existent, it cannot be *asat*—non-existent.

Madhva queries—what does the Absolutist mean by claiming or contending that the “*asat*” never appears as the “*sat*”—the non-existent never appears as the existent? Is this principle of perception restricted to normal correct awareness—“*a-bhranti*”—or applicable to “*bhranti*” or illusory experience as well? If it be the former, it is irrelevant. For the entire controversy centres round a piece of illusory experience the Constituent elements of which are to be interpreted. If it be the latter one will be obliged to bid good-bye to all illusory experience. As a matter of fact, an analysis of illusory experience reveals that the “*sat*”—existent—appears as the “*asat*”—non-existent and vice-versa. If not there is no meaning whatever is characterising one piece of experience as illusory and another as correct and non-illusory. The actually existent in a spatio-temporal series, the piece of shell appears as “*asat*”—non-existent i.e., piece of silver. The latter on the other hand, the non-existent piece of silver is identified with the former—the existent piece of shell. The appearance of the existent as the non-existent and vice-versa is thus the life-principle or the vital breath of all illusory experience. If the *sat* or the existent appeared in its true colours as *sat* and the *asat* in its respective colours as *asat*, where then is illusion? If X appears as X and Y as Y where is illusion when both belong to the same category of existent or non-existent as the case may be? Only when X appears as Y, and Y as X—i.e., when existent appears as non-existent and non-existent as existent there is illusory experience. It is inevitable that in all illusory experience the non-existent appears *qua* existent.

If it is contended that one existent appears as another existent in illusions, it would be apparent that as far as the interpretational aspect is concerned some non-existent enters into the constitution of illusory experience under the garb of existent.

Under some rather peculiarly poignant metaphysical exigencies, the “*vijnyanavadi*”—the Buddhist—whole-hogger—has to admit that externalisation into the cosmos of plurality of sentient and non-sentient objects of the only reality—*vijnjana*—incandescent act of awareness—which is entirely unreal and non-existent somehow appears as existent and real. Whether therefore it is the comparatively superb and stressing exigency of attempting a philosophical explanation or advancing a world-view or the narrower and more limited exigency of analysing a perceptual illusion, it would necessitate the admission that the “*asat*” or the non-existent does appear as the “*sat*” or the existent. Otherwise illusions would remain unaccounted for.

The Absolutist at this stage repeats his stock objection that illusions can be explained by resort to the concept of "Anirvachaniya"—neither *sat* nor *asat*. Madhva replies that the usual stock objection will disappear the moment appeal is made to experience. Let alone metaphysical orthodoxy and its terminology. When one stoops down to pick up the piece of silver, does the latter appear to him in the dubious manner suggested by the Absolutist—neither as *sat*—nor *asat*—neither as existent nor non-existent? The appearance of silver should be so positive and pragmatically compelling as to elicit volitional response. "*Arthakriyakari or arthakriyasu-upayujyamana.*" No one disputes there is response. There is the volitional reaction in the shape of one stooping to pick up the piece of silver. The silver then should have been perceived and apprehended as something existent. An entity neither existent nor non-existent, neither fish, flesh, nor good red herring, or one that is perceived to be and apprehended as absolutely non-existent, will never produce or evoke the said reaction. In conformity with the undoubted reaction, it should be admitted that in all illusory experience the "*asat*" or the non-existent appears as "*sat*" or the existent.

If it is contended that the silver is "*anirvachaniya*," the answer is this. The silver that appears in connection with a piece of shell belongs to the lowest order of reality. ("*Prati-bhasika.*") It has an existence. That existence belongs to a higher degree of reality—i.e. "*vyavaharika.*" If a higher degree of reality is not assigned, the volitional response cannot be explained. In the admission of the foregoing degrees of reality, the Absolutist should admit that the "*asat*" appears as the *sat*. The higher degree of reality is just appearance of the non-existent as existent.

A third contention is put forward by the Absolutist, to the effect that the higher degree of reality belonging to the basic datum of the piece of shell is erroneously transferred to the silver and hence there is no need to admit that the non-existent appears as existent—the "*asat*" qua "*sat*". This will not do. Further enquiry is necessary. Is the existence of a higher order erroneously transferred to silver to be assigned to higher or the lower order *after* transfer? Not the former. If "Yes" the silver also would be entitled to participate in a higher degree of reality. If the latter does it appear as lower degree of reality? Not lower. If it did there would be no volitional response. If it appeared as belonging to a higher degree is it existent or non-existent. It cannot be existent. If it were the original assignment to a lower degree would not stand. If it is non-existent, the admission is inevitable that the non-existent appears as existent.

The net result is this. Resort to "*anirvachaniya*" is of no use unless its connotation is fixed up first and settled. As the "*anirvachaniya*," neither existent nor non-existent is nowhere to be found in experience, it must stand ruled out of order. In the

correct cognition that ensues—that is not silver—no one feels that the silver which was erstwhile perceived was neither existent nor non-existent.

After all metaphysical and psychological theories should be brought before the bar of experience. When the subject stoops down to pick up what he considers to be a piece of silver, and realises that he is confronted with a piece of shell, his realisation, if expressed in words would take the form—"This is not silver." Neither introspective nor objective testimony could be collected in support of the contention of the absolutist that the silver involved in the transaction of perceptual illusion is neither *sat* nor *asat*—neither existent nor non-existent. The realisation is "it is not silver—or silver is non-existent."

In the face of such a realisation, the absolutist still contends that the subject awakened from the spell of illusion realises that the silver is "Mithya." What is "Mithya"? In the usual parlance "Mithya" is synonymous with "Anirvachaniya" Madhva rejoins that this verbal legerdemain will not hold water. The term "Mithya" in such contexts is used to mean "Abhava"—non-existent.

Neither introspective nor objective testimony supports the contention of the Absolutist that there could be an entity which is neither "sat" nor "asat"—neither existent nor non-existent. Neither sense-perception, nor inferential ratiocination, nor verbal testimony can establish the existence of that dubious entity. Experience reveals only two categories, the existent and the non-existent. The law of excluded middle should apply. What is not the one should be the other and vice versa.

The position is this. The arguments sketched in the foregoing paragraphs have shown that there is no such category as the "anirvachaniya" neither existent nor non-existent. The absolutist does not admit that the "asat"—the non-existent—can be the object of awareness and enter into the constitution of rational experience. On his own showing as differences and distinctions do become objects of awareness and enter into the constitution of rational experience they share and possess the inevitable, inalienable birthright of Satva—reality, of the highest degree. As therefore sense-perception itself is quite competent to give knowledge of the difference and distinctions in which Reality is rooted, such a perception cannot be invalidated by inference which is secondary and which is based on previous sense-perception. Inference is thus incompetent to invalidate perception of distinctions and differences that are foundational of Reality.

It is worth while to recall the salient points of the discussion and gather the threads of the disputation. The absolutists' main

plank is that the differences and distinctions perceived are "anirvachaniya" or "sadasadvilakshana" neither sat nor asat—neither existent nor non-existent. According to the Sastraic methods of controversy, the best refutation and destruction of the plank would be an analysis of experience and demonstration of the impossibility of the concept of "anirvachaniya." If anything is "asat," contended the absolutist, it could not appear in awareness as a constituent element. Madhva replied that the "asat" must and does appear in awareness of illusions. The existent appearing as non-existent and the latter appearing as former are the essence of illusions. The existent appearing *qua* existent and non-existent appearing *qua* non-existent are the marks of normal non-illusory experiences. As the category of "anirvachaniya" has been proved to be untenable, difference cannot be assigned the dubious status of being neither existent nor non-existent. (2) Nor can it be dismissed as totally non-existent, as difference is foundational of Reality. (3) As the two alternatives are ruled out, there is only the third, namely that difference is sat—real—real with the highest degree of reality. Only three alternatives are disjunctively possible—difference is "sat", or "asat", or "sadasadvilakshana" or "anirvachaniya." }

The two latter alternatives had been demonstrated by Madhva to be untenable. Difference is not "asat" or non-existent. Nor could it be "sadasadvilakshana." The category itself had been shown to be spurious. When the two alternatives are thus disjunctively excluded, it follows that the world of difference—the "bheda" should be "sat"—existent not merely but real with the highest degree of reality i.e. "Paramarth-sat." Only those three alternatives are possible. They are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. When the two alternatives are shown to be untenable, the third must *ipso facto* be valid and untenable.

At every turn in the controversy, the absolutist endeavoured to explain away all difficulties by resort to the concept of "sadasadvilakshana"—"anirvachaniya". He premised that if anything is "asat" it could not appear in awareness. Difference does "appear" in the sense of "occur." The world of difference again is not negated in the sense that silver is negated in the realisation that "this is not silver but only a piece of shell." By knocking the dubious and the spurious concept of "sadasadvilakshana-anirvachaniya" i.e. neither sat nor asat—neither existent nor non-existent—on the head, Madhva has demonstrated that Difference or "bheda" is basic and foundational of reality. Secondly Madhva did demonstrate that the world of difference cannot be "asat"—non-existent. It should therefore be "paramarthika-sat"—real with the highest degree of reality without any reservations in metaphysics or theory of knowledge.

When sense-perception is quite competent to grasp and lead on the subject to knowledge of a world of distinctions and differences, it is certainly competent to invalidate inferences relative to unreality of the basic differences, as the latter are secondary and based on previous sense-awareness for their validity, and the latter too in their turn are incompetent to dismiss as illusory basic and foundational differences and distinctions that have on them the stamp of guarantee and pragmatic imprimature of sense-perception. When the inferential process does not run amok, the conclusion is inevitable that difference is foundational of reality and is real with the highest degree of reality attaching to it.

For all purposes of Theory of Knowledge and general Metaphysics, Madhva has maintained the thesis in the foregoing paragraphs that inferential process, "yukti," the ratiocinatory process is weaker than sense-perception which has a direct reference to reality as it were, and which establishes direct contact between subject and object. The most powerful source and guarantee of valid knowledge is "Sruti" or the revealed text, not of course in the matter of perceptions of daily life like S is P. If you are in doubt about the nature of X, whether it is a genuine or a forged currency note, you certainly do not appeal to "Sruti" or the revealed text. You would rather employ a powerful magnifying lens to see the genuineness of water-marks etc., or appeal to an experience treasury or currency officer. In matters beyond the jurisdiction of sense-awareness and inferential process, as the real relationship between the finite selves and the Supreme Self, and kindred topics and problems, appeal to the Sruti or the revealed texts is the only go. When the inferential process, and ratiocination are powerless to dismiss the basic and foundational differences and distinctions in which Reality is rooted, which are brought home to the subject by sense-awareness and inference and the validity of which is guaranteed by the two processes, they will be a *fortiori* more powerless to invalidate the difference between the finite selves and the Supreme Self which is the subject-matter of Sruti or the revealed texts and the truth and validity of which are guaranteed by a body of texts which not being traceable or ascribable to known authorship will have to be considered free from the defects and drawbacks that are the inevitable concomitants of all human authorship.

## VII

It will thus be seen that by a systematic refutation of the concept of "sadasadavilakshana-anirvachaniya"—i.e., neither "sat" nor "asat," and by the demonstration of the impossibility of sense-awareness giving the subject knowledge of something "asat" or non-existent, Madhva disjunctively established the only correct alternative that the sense organs functioning normally intact, give



a subject knowledge of the objects as they are which form members of an immanent order or systematic totality the foundational features of which are reality, differences, and distinctions. Madhva next directs his attention to a detailed examination of the passages in the Sruti texts that are usually cited in support of Absolutistic Monism with a view to showing that the said passages and texts are, if rightly understood and interpreted, capable of emphasizing only *difference* between the finite selves and the Supreme spirit, and not identity between them.

Difference between the finite selves and the Supreme Spirit is emphasized by the Sruti which is the most powerful *pramana*—source and guarantee of valid knowledge. How is it possible to deny the said difference or explain it away? It is possible to argue that the Sruti Texts emphasizing difference between the finite selves and the Supreme Spirit are merely repetitive of the difference with which we are all familiar in life. This possible objection voiced by the absolutist has been anticipated by Madhva and it was elaborately refuted in an earlier section of the discussion. Another objection is that the Sruti texts which speak of “*bheda*”—or difference are “*Atatvavedaka*” not revealing the truth, the whole truth. As pointed out just a few paragraphs before, the concept of “*anirvachaniya*” is untenable. The world of difference cannot be “*asat*” or non-existent. It should therefore be “*sat*”—existent and real with the highest degree of reality.

When one begins to assess the exact and precise significance of the Sruti Texts and passages, his procedure should be uniform and standards of judgment and critical evaluation should within the limits of relevancy and consistency be uniform too. Unfortunately, however, the Absolutist claims “heads, I win, and tails, you lose”! If by adherence to a particular standard of critical evaluation, he pronounces the Sruti texts proclaiming and emphasizing difference or “*bheda*”, between the finite selves and the Supreme Spirit, untrustworthy *qua* giving expression to something which is not truth—“*atatva*”—the same logic has to be disinterestedly and impartially extended to the texts that pro *ñim* and emphasize oneness or identity between the two, and the absolutist, argues Madhva, will certainly find himself confronted with the unpalatable, nevertheless perfectly logical, conclusion that the texts making reference to oneness or identity between the finite selves and the supreme will have to be evaluated as giving expression to something which is not the truth i.e., “*atatvavedaka*.” There is absolutely no reason which such a logic should be used only to discredit the texts that proclaim difference and it is not fair controversy either thus to restrict the application of the logic only to one set of texts. Either both the texts that proclaim difference and identity are sacred and deserve equal respect or they do not. It is arbitrary and withal unfair to seek to maintain that only the difference-texts are

untrustworthy while the identity-texts are trustworthy. If the difference-texts are condemned, by the same logic identity-texts should be condemned. Absolutism will then find no support in the Sruti texts. If it is contended that there are other objections, against the world-view based on difference, surely there are equally potent and significant objections against the world-view based on identity. That way decision lies not. If the absolutist should repeat the stock objection that the difference-texts are repetitive of the difference found in ordinary experience, it can be met with the counter-objection that the identity between the finite selves and the Supreme Self, is a pseudo-concept not yet demonstrated in anybody's experience.

Madhva urges another objection. It is usual for the orthodox Vedantin to denounce the Buddhists as "avaidikas" because, they refuse to admit the authority of the vedas not merely but contend that the so-called sacred texts give expression to untrustworthy stuff. The Absolutist in his anxiety to denounce the difference-texts, is in the same boat. All canons of decent controversy are flung to the four winds if the Absolutist would endeavour to contend that parts of the texts are reliable while other parts are not. Even the Buddhists admit the truth of what may be favourable to their own pet theories. If the absolutist should put in that the vedas speak of difference, different individuals and different actions, like sacrifices etc. just as a concession to "Mandahikari" i.e. a faint-heart aspirant, the reply is he is no better than the Buddhist, as the net result of the contention is the untrustworthiness of the sacred texts. If it is further contended that actions, sacrifices etc. which are unreal or which belong to a lower order of reality do not contribute to the realisation of the oneness or identity self and the Supreme Self, the reply is that the difference between the finite and the Supreme contribute it is the subconscious core of a self that contribute to the realisation of one-ness. Technically : an act cannot be "anga," contributory accessories or necessary accessories to the main object—"pradhana or mukhya karma"—the realisation of the oneness—"Aikya-Jnyana."

It will not do to object that difference-texts merely repeat popularly perceived difference. On the other hand the difference deriving as it does the support of corroborative testimony of sacred text and sense-perception because firmly entrenched against the onslaughts made on it by Absolutism. Some texts have undoubted value as they teach truths *de novo* that are not to be learnt from any other source. Certainly other-worldly matters can be learnt only from the sacred texts. They cannot be lightly dismissed as repetitions.

Further according to the cherished conviction of the orthodox absolutist, the supreme truth namely, the truth of the identity

between the finite and the Supreme Self is strictly unknowable, and *qua* knowable it is not the supreme truth, and the absolutist is mistaken in claiming that something which is fundamentally unknowable is made known or revealed by a portion of the sacred texts.

Mere "Tu quoque" retorts are of no use. Either the body of sacred texts, the entire lot of it, proclaiming identity and difference between the finite and the Supreme is trustworthy and reliable in which case, some reconciliation is to be attempted between the apparently conflicting texts—Madhva's reconciliation has been indicated in a way in the preceding chapter, and would be developed in the succeeding sections—or the entire textual lot is untrustworthy in which case one is on a par with Buddhists and others who deny the authority and trustworthiness of the sacred texts and who are therefore considered as equal partners in sharing a common spiritual and metaphysical heritage—and unfit to be recognised as a decent party to metaphysical controversy. There is no point in the contention that only such texts and passages as emphasize and proclaim identity between the finite and the Supreme Self, are trustworthy and those that emphasize and proclaim difference between the two are unreliable and untrustworthy. Metaphysical discussion should proceed on the basis and on the lines of rational thinking of the members of the human family, but should on no account be restricted to a whispering of pet theories and doctrines that may command attention only in a narrow and esoteric coterie of metaphysicians. If the difference-texts are to be discredited and discarded, by the same logic, the identity-texts deserve the same fate. So difference is real. Distip real. They are foundational of reality, of all creation, sentient of matter and spirit. The Supreme Spi reals is "Sarvottama"—superior to everything, † its supremacy being never questioned . grandest of metaphysical truths is revealed by .. ic "Srutis." To a more elaborate and controversial c. ablishing or demonstration of the said thesis, the rest of the first section is devoted.

According to the rules and principles of orthodox metaphysical debate, when the truth of a proposition or doctrine is challenged, "Agama or Sruti" is the first and foremost authority to be mentioned. Madhva devotes the subsequent paragraphs of the first section to demonstrating the unsoundness and hollowness of the "Pramanas," the authorities and guarantees pointed out by the absolutists in support of their thesis of identity between the finite and the Supremé, and cites "Pramanas," in vindication of his own doctrine of difference between the two.

Madhva queries—how is it possible to prove that the central import of the Srutis centripetally converges towards the thesis

of identity? The said thesis runs counter to all the "Pramanas," sources and guarantors of valid knowledge—namely sense-awareness or perception, inference and revealed text. They do not guarantee the truth of the thesis if you interpret the term "pramana" as a guarantee. They do not lead the subject to apprehension and realisation of the identity, if you interpret the term as source of knowledge.

In the first place, the I-awareness or the "sakshi" as it is technically termed, in terms of which alone all experience comes home to the individual, does not support the identity-thesis. Every one feels that he is ignorant or knows little, possesses little power. etc. while the Supreme Being is described in the sacred texts as Omniscient Omnipotent etc. and realising as every one must, his own limitations, how is it possible for him to claim identity with the supreme Being? If the identity between the two is to be practical politics, the finite individual enjoying to the fullest extent, the benefits, rights, privileges, power and enlightenment et hoc, should feel in his being, essence and the daily transactions of the affairs secular and spiritual, the identity and its concomitant features, but as a matter of fact, even the most powerful of finite individuals is after all a hopeless creature tossed about like the ball which right or left as strikes the player goes and it would be no better than idle philosophy if one were to be contented with the belief as some of the absolutist actually are, that a mere apprehension of the meaning of the words and terms spoken or written "Tatvamasi" That Thou Art—is tantamount to realisation of the fullest benefits of the identity between the finite and the Supreme. One may write on the black-board or a piece of paper the proposition "That Thou Art" or the proposition that the "Finite is identical with the Supreme" or utter it countless number of times without being any the wiser for the scribbling on the blackboard or the utterance. Sense-perception cannot be any evidence in support of the identity. But the absolutist contends that Omniscience, Omnipotence etc. are the attributes of a Supreme Being which is itself relegated to a lower degree of reality namely, the Saguna Brahman. So, absence of experience of Omniscience etc. belonging to a lower degree of reality is really no evidence against the identity between the finite and the Infinite. The identity is however with the "Nirguna Brahman"—the attributeless Absolute. Madhva retorts that sense-awareness never conveys to any one or brings home to any one the experience that he or she is identical with the attributeless Absolute. Madhva asserts "Na-kasyachidanubhavaḥ". The Realisation of the identity objects the absolutist can be secured only through the employment of trained and practised perception, not the perception of the man in the street. An expert in the evaluation of diamonds has a trained and practised perception. The flaws and flawlessness of precious stones not discernible to the lay eyes are detected and perceived by the trained ones. Even so identity between the finite and the Infinite can be perceived only

by those whose perception has been trained, and perfected by a study of the "Sastra." Madhva readily replies that even those who have mastered the "Sastras" do not feel they are Omniscient and Omnipotent Beings. Those eminent authorities in "Sastras" yet strive to secure the necessities of life like "Bhiksha," food etc. If ignorance or "avidya" is destroyed by realisation of the identity, such striving has no meaning. You cannot speak of remnants of "avidya." If search after food etc. even after realisation of the identity, be due to persistence of remnants of "Avidya," the remnants which persist even after the realisation of the identity will never perish, and the implication being that freedom from "avidya" under that doctrine is impossible, the expert and the tyro would be in the same boat. Mundane activity cannot be explained by appeal "to Karma." The entire stock of Karma should be admitted to have been destroyed root and branch by the realisation of identity. So, neither the Sastraic expert nor the uninitiated tyro has any experience of the identity between the finite and the Infinite.

On the other hand, difference between the finite and the Infinite, inferiority and helplessness of the individual are poignantly experienced by the initiated and uninitiated alike. Study of the Sruti texts is sure to give one correct and accurate definition of the nature of Brahman—the Infinite. The attributes of Brahman are also enumerated. An individual with reflection—even with a very little amount of it—would soon realise that he or she does not possess those attributes. Far from it. Other attributes and helplessnesses are the marks of the finite. One who feels that he has attributes different from those possessed by the Absolute or described in the sacred texts as possessed by the Infinite or Brahman, cannot fail to realise the radical and fundamental difference between the two—the finite and the Infinite. As the difference between the finite and the Infinite is thus matter for sense-perception and awareness of the individual, identity between the two should be pronounced to be at variance with sense-awareness. A "Pramana" which supports and guarantees difference between the finite and the Infinite can never support and guarantee identity between the two. If it did it would commit suicide and cease to be regarded a "pramana" for practical and theoretical concerns.

Another supreme objection in all controversial exigencies, (in fact the magnificent missile of the absolutist) is resort to the illusion theory. The contention is that qualities and attributes which are experienced by the finite self and the degradation and helplessness as contrasted with the Absolute, are merely illusory and difference which is experienced along with them should likewise be illusory, and no harm will on this view be done to the essential and fundamental identity between the finite and the

Infinite. Madhva's reply is that in all cases of perpetual illusions and cases, similarly circumstanced the subsequent "Badhaka-jnyana" i.e. correct cognition convinces the subject of the real nature of the illusions—and it is all a matter of time when the correct cognition would dawn. It will sooner or later. If, however, it does not, during the life time of a subject, the task of discriminating the correct from the incorrect perception becomes well-nigh impossible. The absolutist has not proved that the perception of difference between the finite subject and the Infinite Being is stultified or negated or denied by a subsequent correct cognition. Difference is foundational. Madhva maintains that in view of the absence of the said cognition or knowledge, difference cannot be viewed as unreal and illusory.

The absolutist again contends that even as the ruddy colour is perceived as shared by a piece of white crystal placed in close juxtaposition with a red flower, though as a matter of fact there is no real transference of colour from flower to crystal, even so, on account of the close proximity of the subject with the *antahkarana*, the inner sense associated with the I;—pain, misery etc, that are due to the latter appear to be transferred to the former. Hence the perception of difference—so called. Madhva replies that in the light of the cardinal Upanishadic text, "Ētat-sarvam-mana-Eva" the cognitive, the emotive, and conative experiences and responses of the individual would have to be traced to the mind itself, and the analogy of the crystal appearing red and flower is unsound as in the former the red colour is inherent in the flower but in the latter the emotions etc. are the experiences of the subject. There is really no crystal at all as closer analysis is bound to reveal.

The joys and sorrows concomitant with existence here are not however final. The subject is pure joy and unalloyed bliss. That state would be reached after pursuit of rigorous spiritual discipline.

Pratyaksha, sense-perception, and Sakshi—the witness—I—in terms of which alone all experience is brought home to the individual do not reveal and support the identity between the individual do not reveal and support the identity runs counter to the I-witness-awareness. Difference on the other hand is revealed and supported by it. No doubt Agama or sacred text is the supreme means of knowledge. But even that has to seek corroborative testimony from Sense-perception. Hence the latter being *pro tanto* superior to Agama was mentioned first as running counter to the doctrine of identity between the finite and the Infinite. Madhva next proceeds to demonstrate that the doctrine of identity between the finite and the Infinite cannot be revealed by or formulated on the evidence and data supplied by Agama or sacred text, but runs counter to it.

Madhva takes up the first question and observes "Nachabhede-kaschidagamah-Santi-cha-bhede-sarvagamah." The former means that sacred texts do not supply data for formulating the doctrine of identity. This will be subsequently elaborated. The latter sentence emphatically asserts that all the relevant sacred texts support only the theory of difference between the finite and the Infinite.

In the course of the famous Upanishadic discourses between father and son, between Uddalaka and Svetaketu—difference between the finite and the Supreme is emphasized and proclaimed with the help of striking and suitable illustrations and analogies. The central thesis is repeated and reiterated *nine* times with suitable illustrations from widely divergent fields of inquiry and collections of facts, to the effect that the finite subjects and individuals are different from the Infinite Supreme Being.

Madhva's magnificent metaphysical masterstroke is evident in the interpretation of the famous Upanishadic text "Tatwamasi" usually translated into "That Thou Art." Two other famous Bhashyakaras, Sankara and Ramanuja, authors of brilliant expository treatises on Brahma-Sutras, had taken the text as it stands and interpreted it to mean "That Thou Art. (13) The text is a very important and significant one and is believed to lend support to identity between the finite and the Infinite. All the European students of Indian Philosophy and authors, and Indian students and authors of Indian Philosophy who have mostly blindly followed in the footsteps of the European workers, have accepted and repeated the said interpretation. Madhva stands alone in taking the text differently and interpreting it in support of his metaphysical doctrine of difference between the finite and the Infinite. It is the duty of impartial and disinterested students of Indian Philosophy to consider how far Madhva was right in abandoning the beaten track and chalking out a path of his own. Feeling that what is needed is only a faithful exposition of the trend of thought of Madhva and of his commentator let me undertake such an exposition reserving to a subsequent section or occasion examination of the ill-mannered criticisms that have been levelled against Madhva for his temerity in having abandoned the beaten track followed by Sankara and Ramanuja.

Most of the students would be familiar with the Upanishadic story or legend containing the metaphysical dialogue between father and son, between Uddalaka the parent and Svetaketu the son. "That Thou Art"—Tatwamasi—is the central core, the

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(13) In the matter of correct interpretation of the works of Madhva occidental writers are hopelessly inaccurate, and ill-informed. Keith in His "History of Sanskrit Literature" commits the ridiculous blunder of observing that Madhva wrote commentaries on seven Upanishads, while as a matter of fact, he has commented on Ten.: See. P. 479. Keith for this comedy of research.

basic and fundamental quintessence of the teaching contained in the said context. To mark the departure from routine effected by Madhva direct and without any needless prefatory circumlocution, the Acharya let it be noted has just split up the pada or terms by prefixing the negative familiar in grammar as "Atat-twamasi" instead of the Tat—taken by other commentators, Madhva has taken ATAT—the simple meaning then is—Thou Art NOT-THAT or NON-THAT if that is permitted.

By this splitting up Madhva maintains that the text usually and traditionally claimed to support the thesis of identity between the finite and the Infinite, as a matter of fact, emphasizes the doctrine of difference between the two. There is absolutely no manner of grammatical difficulty or incongruity or untenability in splitting up the compound "svetaketotatwamasi" into "svetaketo-atat-twamasi." That the illustrious predecessors of Madhva did not think of such a splitting up is hardly excuse enough for a summary dismissal of Madhva's attempt as undeserving of serious attention. If as there obviously is not, there is no grammatical incongruity in the said splitting up as A-TATTWAMASI, the next pre-eminent consideration is the context in which the text occurs. If father and son enter a metaphysical discussion, it is of course, impossible to pre-determine the trend of their conclusions. The parent is as much at liberty to teach his son the doctrine of identity between the finite and the Infinite as the doctrine of difference or he is as much at liberty to teach difference as identity. The instinctive interest of the parent in the welfare of the off-spring is universal and does not require any proof at all. The metaphysical teaching imparted by the parent can be and has to be assumed to have been of a nature calculated to make the maximum contribution to the spiritual welfare of the son to whom the teaching of the doctrine was addressed. Judging by human calculations, and estimates, it is more in consonance with the context that the father would have taught his son a philosophy the translation of which into practical politics by him would lead him to bliss that is unalloyed and unadulterated by any admixture of pain, misery etc. and the bliss too that would be eternal. Whether the philosophy would be identified as Absolute Idealism or Monistic Idealism, or as Relative or Radical Realism or Pluralistic Realism should be left an open question which can be dispassionately decided in the strictest accordance with the canons and conditions of interpretation of the concerned texts and passages. It should however be pointed out that if a person approaches the relevant texts with the deep rooted conviction that Monistic Idealism is the only fashionable philosophy of life or rational world-view, his procedure is *prima facie* a pre-judiced one and the counterblast can easily be imagined with no better philosophic gain or advantage. When Madhva's interpretation of the nine passages has been set forth it would be time enough to consider whether it is more in accordance with the interpretative requirements than others or not.



Madhva's interpretation can thus be stated keeping as close as possible to the language employed by him and the elucidatory comments offered by his illustrious commentator Jayatirtha. Madhva maintains that A-TATWAMASI is the proper splitting. This is necessitated by the illustrative instances and analogies indicated in the Upanishadic texts. The explanation and careful description of the nature of the Supreme Brahman are attempted with a view to emphasizing that the finite self is *not* identical with the Supreme Self. Uddalaka (father) tells (his son) Svetaketu that the finite self ("you" being taken as a typical representative of all finite selves) is not identical with the Supreme Self. In a different Upanishadic text, (chapter 8—of the Chhandogya Upanishad), Prajapati addresses Indra and Virochana in rather mystifying terminology which the latter misunderstands. In the present context, it is natural to assume that the father who has the welfare of his son at heart does not and would not employ dubious and mystifying terminology. It is not correct to contend that the passages are intended to convey, (being exaggerations made to impress upon inattentive minds), a meaning different from what they *prima facie* appear to convey as the central thesis or conclusion is repeated *nine times* to make assurance not merely doubly but many times sure. In addition to the nine-times-repetition of the cardinal and central thesis, illustrative instances and apt analogies are cited which leave no manner of doubt whatever that the passages in question convey and proclaim only difference between the finite and the Infinite, and by no means identity. It is a well known canon of interpretation according to the principles emphasized by "Purva Meemamsa," that repetition of the same thesis a number of times, not surely redundant or tautologous repetition, but significant and purposive repetition which has deep methodological and speculative significance, and the citation of illustrative analogies and explanatory examples are surely unchallengeable means of interpretation technically termed TATPARYA-LINGAS. Of course there are other texts and passages which reveal difference between the finite and the Infinite beyond all doubt, textual and interpretational quibbling but this passage has been chosen specially for debate because, in such a choice two birds can be brought down with one stone, namely it can be shown that identity is not a conclusion from Upanishadic data, and secondly it runs counter to the Upanishadic texts and passages.

At the very commencement of the discussion the usual and familiar objection is anticipated to the effect that the nine passages under critical notice have been already taken by others to signify identity between the finite and the Infinite—AIKYAM. May be. If one's predecessors have interpreted them in a particular manner, a successor is not under any obligation to ape or imitate the former uncritically, though in undisputed matters of interpretation deliberate cleavage from the traditional past for the sake of spurious originality is to be deprecated. Let alone the question of originality or

of repetition. If we come across a compound which can grammatically be split up in two contrary ways, the determination of the correct one will naturally depend upon contextual considerations. "Tatwamasi" is one possibility. "A-tatwamasi" is another. Madhva maintains that if the illustrative instances and analogies cited in the context in question, are carefully scrutinised, the conclusion is inevitable that they converge towards the thesis that there is fundamental and radical difference between the finite and the Infinite. The evidence which is textual and internal cannot be lightly dismissed as inconclusive or dubious. It is conclusive and free from dubiousness. In *nine* cases, illustrations and analogies are such as unmistakably point to difference between the two. If the illustration chosen just in a single case be indicative of the said difference, it is permissible to argue that reference to difference between finite and the Infinite is but accidental, but when as is actually the case, illustrations emphasizing the said difference are repeated *nine* times, the only rational and unbiassed conclusion will be that the repetition of the thesis of difference between the finite and the infinite is purposively supported by a multiplication of the illustrative instances methodologically. Suppose a statement is made "sabdonityah." Two splittings are possible grammatically—"Sabdo-Nityah" and "sabdo-anityah." Which is to be chosen as the correct one? Should there be no other or further indications, our judgment will have to be suspended. Both alternatives are grammatically correct. If in the said context, further indications are given by the enumeration of an illustrative instance ("Ghatavat" just as the mud jar) the choice is easy and determined by contextual exigencies. There is hardly any room for quibbling or circumventing. Sound is perishable, for it is like a jar. In the light of the ("Drishtanta") illustrative instance or analogy "sabdo-a-nityah" is the only correct choice. Sabdah--sound is a-nityah-perishable-ghatavat—just like a jar.

Even so in virtue of the nine illustrative instances, that occur in the said upanishadic context, A-TATWAMASI—Thou art NON-THAT is the only correct splitting up of the compound. This canon of interpretation is of universal validity. Illustrative instances are cited not for the sheer fun of it, not for any rhetorical or ornamental effect, but for the definite purpose of fixation of the significance of the passage or passages in question. The legitimate boundaries of the central thesis are marked off as it were and drawn in clear outlines, so that there may not be any overlapping or shading off of interpretation. The building up of the boundaries is achieved by means of illustrative instances. Madhva's commentator carefully points out that in addition to illustrative elements, there are other factors which support the splitting up A-TATWAMASI stressing difference between Jiva and Paramatma—the finite and the Infinite.

Madhva's commentator now proceeds to analyse the nine passages with a view to demonstrating that difference and not

identity is the central thesis of the sacred text. The father wanted to impress upon the mind of his son the philosophical truth that however eminent and exalted he may imagine himself to be in his mundane career, however highly power-intoxicated or puffed up by success, the lord of creation is different from the Supreme Being. The difference will be brought home to the minds of individuals when the achievements of the Supreme Being are recounted as narrated in the sacred texts. To impress upon the mind of an aspirant, the grandeur and greatness, the magnificence and majesty of the Supreme Lord of the Cosmos, the text proclaims that the Supreme Being unaided by any other agency or power creates the vast universe of Fire, Water, Earth etc. (such creative activity is totally absent from the finite beings,) the vast universe, spatio-temporal-stellar etc. the vastness of which staggers the imagination even of the expert scientists, and the majesty and the magnificence of the Supreme Being can be learnt only from the sacred text. A believer of orthodox mentality will accept the account given in the sacred text unquestioningly, but the truth should be realised by the finite individuals themselves in their experience. How is the greatness of the Almighty Lord of the Universe to be made realisable in some measure at least by finite individuals? In the waking state when finite individuals transact the affairs of life, they act as if they were independent and themselves masters of the situation, developing not unoften megalomania of the most mysterious make and in that frame of mind, finite individuals will never realise the Majesty of the Almighty. In the state of sleep however the Egoism and sense of independence and freedom of the individuals are relaxed and relegated to the level of the sub-conscious, and in that state, the dependence, (indispensable and inevitable) of the finite on the Infinite can be brought home to the mind of the former. The father begins by observing "Let me now explain to you the state of sleep."

In the waking state as well as the state of dreams, the subject is obliged to direct here and there his senses, which direction brings on fatigue as an outcome, a necessary effect. Fatigue which is the law of life indicates that recuperation and reconstructive rehabilitation of the fatigued tissues and senses, are also inevitable. Bio-chemists, Physiological-Psychologists and others may claim that the reconstructive rehabilitation of the tired and fatigued nervous mechanism is brought about exclusively by chemical and physiological processes, but if the upanishadic passage be interpreted in metaphysical terms, the conclusion will be that the fatigued finite individuals rest in the Supreme Being Itself, and equip themselves with the necessary energy for the adjustment of a day as it were, and the performance of the day's work from the Infinite which is the central source of all cosmic life and energy. It is a fine and attractive conception that finite individuals once in 24-hours, return to the Infinite, quite fatigued in order to re-absorb energy from the Infinite, and nothing would bring home to the human mind

the greatness of the Infinite better than facts of fatigue felt at the end of the day's work and the refreshing reconstructive rehabilitation and onrush of energy which are felt at dawn the next day. How can the individual who draws energy from the Infinite be identical with the latter? The dependence of the finite on the Infinite for the supply periodically of the necessary quantum or amount of energy to keep the former going, till the moment of death in any given life, and till practically the exhaustion of the past stock of Karma—is a stubborn fact which cannot be explained away. This dependence is a philosophic fact. There should be some eternal and inexhaustive source of ever-ready and never-failing energy to satisfy the needs of all sentient and non-sentient creation, and that source of energy is Brahman, the Infinite or the Supreme Being, in whatever manner one may choose to describe it. The Supreme source of energy can never be identical with the finite objects and individuals that share the said energy. The rehabilitation that is daily experienced by finite individuals is irrefutable evidence in support of the difference that there should subsist between the two.

In support of the difference between the finite and the Infinite an illustrative instance is cited. A bird tied down flies here and there in all directions and returns to the cage not finding comfortable rest and habitation elsewhere. Each finite soul is such a bird. Its numerous activities in the waking and dream states are compared to the flights of a bird. A bird returns to rest and so does a finite individual. The Upanishadic texts mean that all sentient beings have as their source and origin the Sat—Brahman, the Supreme Being, which is their prop and support and reservoir of energy and life-force which are periodically absorbed by the finite beings when they resort to the Supreme Being in moments of deep sleep.

2. It may be a finite individual resorts to the Infinite for rehabilitation, reconstruction of fatigued nervous tissues, but objects, the son—I do not in my body feel and realise the presence of any other. How then can I accept the dependence of the finite on the Infinite? The father answers by mentioning an illustrative analogy. Bees gather honey. They fly humming from flower to flower and from tree to tree. Drop by drop they gather honey and deposit it in the comb. The drops that must have been collected from trees of widely divergent Botanical classification and characterisation are not conscious that they belong to different flowers of different trees. Even so the finite individuals when they resort to the Infinite in deep sleep and absorb energy from the common reservoir which is in every nervous system, do not refuse they come into contact with the source of all Cosmic Energy—the Supreme Being, and yet non-realisation of this protective and reconstructive contact with the Infinite is no evidence against the difference between finite and the Infinite, not merely, but is positive confirmatory testimony of the difference there is.

3. The son contends that inanimate drops do not and cannot realise any difference, but he being animate, and endowed with reason should realise the presence of the Infinite in his body which he does not. Where then he asks is the question of his dependence on the Infinite? The father replies by making a reference to the deities that are believed to preside over the rivers, like Ganga, Yamuna etc. The rivers taking their sources in different places and flowing in diverse directions, discharge themselves in the Oceans. They do not realise that they still subsist in the extensive expanse of the sea. Sun's rays are responsible for rapid evaporation of water drops from the sea. Clouds are formed and drains fall giving rise to rivers which reach the sea from which they in a sense had come. Even so, the beings that derive their existence from the Infinite do not realise this derivation. Nor do they realise their contact with the Infinite when they automatically resort to it for the daily refill of energy. The Deities that preside over the different rivers do not feel though they are animate and rational, their contact with the Infinite from whom they are so totally and radically different. Non-realisation by X of his contact with the Infinite is certainly no evidence against difference between the two and dependence of the former on the latter as his vision is clouded by age-long familiarity which breeds not exactly contempt but gross ignorance and engenders oblivescence.

4. Let it be granted that the finite individual is different from the infinite. Even then where is the evidence interrogates the son—that the former is dependent upon the latter?

The father replies by citing an illustrative analogical instance. Consider a huge and luxuriantly grown tree. Cut it at the top, at the central trunk and at the bottom. Some juicy mucous-like discharge oozes or flows out of the portions cut. But the tree itself does not perish. It is full of life-force. It is protected as it were from destruction as the Immanent God—the cosmic reservoir or life-force and energy favours it and on account of the said favour the time of its destruction is not yet. If, however, the protective blessings of the Merciful God are withdrawn as they must be at the appointed or fated moment, the huge tree must perish. Even a feeble cut will suffice to bring the Botanical Monster crashing to Earth, when the divine supply of the life-force has been withdrawn by sheer efflux of time, whereas at the time of the continuance of the said supply intact, even the sharpest cut only causes discharge of juicy matter but never kills the tree. Extend the analogy to human life from plant life. Powerfully attracted by life-values and life-interests, one may endeavour his best to circumvent fate, and cheat Death of its legitimate dues, but it is a familiar phenomenon, that even after the application of the best available medical remedies, a patient steadily sinks to his or her appointed doom. Equally familiar is the phenomenon of the poor man unable to summon

greedy doctors to his bed side leaving his ailments and even serious diseases to take care of themselves, and recovering from them all and becoming hale and healthy once more. From such phenomenon only one inference is possible. So long as finite sentient creation, human, animal, and plant, is under the life-supplying protective aegis of the Supreme Being, it does not die out even though subjected to terrible dangers and destructive influences. At the time of the withdrawal of the said protection and withdrawal of the supply of protective and sustaining life energy and life-force, (which withdrawal would automatically occur according to Karmic Law—at the appointed or fated moment,) sentient creation would perish notwithstanding the best efforts where these are possible, to preserve and protect life. Finite creation is thus dependent, vitally dependent, on the Supreme Being without whose grace, favour, protection and patronage it could not get on.

It is well to note that arguments like these are addressed only to those who may happen to have cultivated a "will to believe" and Indian Philosophical systems of orthodox type, will not take any notice of sceptical or ultra-sceptical arguments that instances like those cited are hardly sufficient to carry conviction to a scientific mentality. One may refuse to proceed further in the speculative direction, and stop with the assurance that there is nought beyond and that organisms perish because decay and death are the natural ends of life. If such refusal has any scientific or methodological significance, then surely willingness to proceed further grounded on the solid bed-rock of faith in Divine immanence, should be conceded to have at least as much value if not more, and anticipating such a concession, not as a matter of charity, but as a fundamental requirement of fair and clean methods of controversy, Madhva and his commentator have elaborated the improt of the Upanishadic text, in the foregoing manner. There is absolutely nothing *Infra dig* about the philosophical position which grants and recognises the fact that the finite creation is every moment under the protective care of the Supreme Being, without whose favour life is impossible. Dependence of the finite on the Infinite or the Supreme Being for the life and sustenance of the former is perhaps the best and most conclusive evidence that can be adduced provided of course the parties to the controversy agree about the inevitability of Divine Immanence revealed and vouched for by the body of sacred texts the authority of which is accepted without challenge. Uddalaka addresses such arguments to Sveta-ketu because, they meet on the common platform of orthodoxy. If Uddalaka had been a professor of philosophy in any of our modern Universities, and Svetaketu a free-lance research scholar or a post-graduate researcher, different would have been the arguments, as appeal to revealed text is *prima facie* uncritical and unphilosophical according to modern estimates.

5. "How is it" the son proceeds to query "that the Supreme Being which is the source of the very existence of the finite, and which exists in the nervous mechanisms of finite beings in such closest proximity, is not seen by the finite or why is its presence not felt by the finite? It is no answer to state that the Infinite is so ethereal or subtle that it is not seen. The finite self which by the use of I-my-mine etc., sees itself though subtle and ethereal, should be credited with the possession of the power to see or feel the presence of the subtle and the ethereal. How is it then that the Supreme is not so seen?"

The father replies by asking the son himself to undertake experimental investigation tree. The father asks the son to fetch a fruit of Nyagrodha tree. It is fetched. The next instruction is to break it open. It is broken. What are seen? Small seeds. "Break open one of the seeds" is the next instruction. The son obeys. The father asks—when the son is on the tenterhooks of suspense—what do you see inside the broken seed? NOTHING replies the son. Oh No. That NOTHING is in fact EVERYTHING. The Supreme Being though immanent in the small seed is not seen, even so It being immanent in the finite self is not seen by the latter. In this illustrative analogy (or allegory if that is allowed) the huge tree is symbolical of the Universe—the cosmos. The fruit is the body. The tree is the macrocosm. The fruit is the microcosm. The seeds are the countless finite selves. Though the seed is seen the Immanent Being is not. Madhva's commentator observes—"Jivadapi-sukshmatvat-tadantargata-ityuktam-bhavati". As the Supreme Being is immanent in the finite the latter is not aware of the presence of the Former. It is on account of the sustaining and protective influence of the Immanent Being that the huge tree stands—the huge tree that springs up from a microscopic seed.

The point is this. The Supreme Being though immanent in the finite sentient and non-sentient creation is not seen or its presence is not felt and realised as It is more subtle than the subtlest of subtle entities. It is this Immanent Supreme Being which is the source of all life. Once again, a too close proximity and unconscious familiarity or more accurately sub-conscious familiarity would appear to have engendered complete oblivescence in the mind of the finite of the existence of the Supreme Being. This oblivescence is the common property of all—till the moment of realisation of the real nature of the Supreme Being. In the Botanical world huge trees are sustained by the protective power of the Supreme Being that is immanent in the small seed, in fact immanent everywhere, and at the same time transcendent. In the world of human life, it is the Supreme Being unseen and unrealised that sustains the life and vitality of finite beings lying in them immanent. Its existence and the part played by the Supreme Being, are to be inferentially

realised on the basis of the observation of sustenance of sentient life, and it is not a matter for direct sense-perception or sense awareness not at any rate so long as finite beings continue in the state of finitude which means bondage, ignorance and oblivescence. The analogy of the Nyagrodha tree is thus striking and illuminating.

The Supreme Being though immanent in the finite being itself and withal so close and proximately situated, is not realised and felt to be present, on account of the subtlety of the former and the limitations of the latter—Non-realisation, however, is no evidence in support of Non-existence.

6. "How am I to understand and realise the significance of the position that even though the effects of the animating power of the Supreme Being are accessible to perception, the Being itself is not?" puts in the son. The father elaborates another analogy or illustrative instance. The father asks the son to deposit a quantity of salt in a vessel full of water and leave it undisturbed for a night, and the next morning asks him to bring the grains of salt deposited in water. The son ran his fingers in water here and there, but could not find the missing grains of salt. They had gone. They appeared to have been lost without hope of their being recovered. The father then asked the son to taste a few drops from all the cardinal points like East, West, centre etc. of the vessel. Drops chosen and selected from all parts of the vessel only tasted salt. Just as the grains of salt are not seen by plain visual apparatus though the effects thereof are realised and experienced, even so, the Supreme Being is not felt and realised to exist even though the effects of the life-giving sustaining power of the Supreme Being are. The salt grains are there unseen though, and the Supreme Being is there immanent in all creation sentient and non-sentient though unseen.

7. The Supreme Being though unseen is not for ever beyond the reach of and realisation by finite beings. On account of certain well-known limitations and disabilities, the finite has its spiritual vision beclouded and when the hindrances are removed and got rid of, the finite will be in a position to stand face to face with the Supreme Being. The son asks—how is it possible for the finite Beings whose vision is thus blurred and beclouded, to realise the Infinite? The substance of the father's answer is this. Find a proper preceptor—the Guru—who has the spiritual welfare of the pupil at heart. You will be taught the means of realising the Infinite. Suppose a rich man is attacked by a band of robbers. His eyes are bandaged over, and the robbers leave him in a lonely forest. The poor victim cries aloud. Some sympathetic passer-by hears the cry, removes the bandages from his eyes, and directs him to proceed carefully in a particular direction so that he may reach in safety the place



from which he had been kidnapped by the robbers ! A resourceful person, with self-confidence and self-possession, who is quite capable of adjusting himself to his environment, will note the route taught to him by the sympathetic passer-by, proceed along it making enquiries on the way to satisfy himself if he has come along the correct route, and in course of time, reach the place from which he had been thrown into the wilderness.

The Karmic forces and factors are the robbers. Primal ignorance is the bandage put round genuine spiritual vision. The finite being with the eyes thus bandaged over is thrown into the wilderness of Samsara—the recurring cycles of birth and and deaths—and cries aloud for help. The impulse to find the proper preceptor should come from Divine Grace. When once the impulse is implanted, he is sure to seek and find the Guru. He would practise the spiritual discipline taught to him, and go back to his original home, and source of all existence—the Supreme Being. Paradise lost is thus regained. The illustrative instance rightly emphasizes the supreme importance of the choice of the right person as Guru or spiritual preceptor as without his help the finite being would be obliged to grope eternally in the dark without ever enjoying brilliant sun-shine.

Philosophy as understood and practised in India is not a matter of repetition of certain (so-called rational) rigmaroles from text-books and journals, but a matter of strenuous spiritual discipline and practice. If the practices are not carried out according to the instructions of the preceptor, there is grave danger. This dependence of finite beings on the Guru is inevitably itself. There is nothing compromising or *infra dig* about it. Just as the common run of humanity is obliged to depend on expert advice and guidance in so many concerns of life, (dependence being inevitable,) even so, it will have to take expert advice in matters spiritual. A *fortiori* dependence on a Guru properly chosen must find a place in all rational speculative system-building.

8. In the matter of the huge tree which it was said would perish if the divine sustaining life-force were withdrawn from it, dependence of the finite on the Infinite was no doubt sought to be illustrated, but the son asks the father to illustrate and exemplify this dependence in the human nervous system itself. The father replies that the dependence is quite evident if the state of the gradual sinking of a patient into death be analysed. Round bed of a sick and sinking patient, friends and relations gather and ask him or her "Do you recognise me ? Do you know me ?" He or she indeed knows or recognises and perhaps feebly answers, so long as his or her speech is not withdrawn in mind, mind not withdrawn in breath, breath not withdrawn in self-light of the soul, its luminosity, and this self-light is not withdrawn in the Supreme Being. Power of speech merges in mind. Mind merges

in breath. Breath merges in soul-light. The soul-light in divine. That is Death. When the supreme Being gradually deprives the finite being of the supply of life-force, speech is lost first. Mental activity remains. Next mental activity is lost. Still breath remains. Next breath is lost. Yet there is soul-light. Some warmth is still left. Finally the soul-light deprived of all its mundane being, disappears. The supply of the life-force is cut off, and the finite shuffles off the mortal coils. When, however the withdrawal does not occur, and when on account of a full and free supply of the life-force and life-energy by the Divine Being that is Immanent, 'vak', 'manas', 'prana', 'tejas' are all in normal efficient working order the person knows, and understands his environment. When the Supreme being deprives the finite being of the life-force, the latter does not know and understand anything. There cannot be a more striking demonstrative instance of the dependence of the finite on the Infinite than this fact of supply of life-force and life-energy, which when intact contributes to the happy existence and enjoyment by the finite of the values and interests of life, and which when withdrawn means the destruction and death of the finite.

Modern psychological, physiological and allied research would not invalidate the interpretation put by Madhva on the Upanishadic passage relating to the phenomenon of death. Strict determinists may call death the cessation of the functioning of the vital tissues and so on, but the phenomenon of death which is so democratic and universal would certainly make thinking minds see some deep and intimate relationship between the finite and the Infinite. Life even in the first moment of its coming into being contains within it the germs of death. That means the life-force and life-energy are not ours and they have been placed at the disposal of the finite temporarily extending over an allotted span of duration at the termination of which, they are withdrawn. So long as they happen to be at our disposal, it is our duty to turn life and life's activities towards the betterment of the lot of suffering fellowmen and towards the perfecting, in however small a degree, of our own self. There is no knowing when the supply of life-force and life energy will be cut off by the Supreme Being. It may be withdrawn to-day or a century hence. Withdrawal is certain. The withdrawal is evidence strong enough to support dependence of the finite on the Infinite.

9. Gathering the threads of controversy and concluding the discussion the son interrogates "How do these two classes of persons get on in the world and what is the reward they get respectively, those who adhere to the doctrine of difference between finite and Infinite, and those who adhere to that of identity between the two?" The father mentions a telling illustrative or analogical instance. Suppose some property belonging to the Supreme Sovereign is lost, and some one is captured by the police on suspicion. He denies. The king

suggests the crude old test. If the suspected person grasps a red-hot piece of iron and comes out of the ordeal unscathed he is let off. If he envelopes himself in untruth and gets scorched or burnt, he is decided to be guilty and punished. If on the other hand he civers himself with the cloak of truth, grasps the red-hot piece of iron, and is not burnt or scorched he is judged not guilty and let off. Even so a philosopher or a person who adheres to the doctrine of identity between the finite and the Infinite really desires to rob the Supreme Being of Its power, status etc. He is guilty of "*Lese Majeste*." Only punishment can be fit for him. The person or the philosopher on the other hand, who adheres to the doctrine of difference between the two would be loved and honoured by the Sovereign. The illustrative analogy of the robber and the robbed can have significance only if there should be difference between the two and not identity. If X and Y were identical with two or more names or aliases—it is meaningless to speak of X robbing Y of his status, power and prestige etc. If they are different from one another, then only has the analogy of robbery relevant import. If on the examination of evidence it is found that the finite arrogates to itself and misappropriates for itself what does not legitimately belong to it, namely, identity with the Infinite, together with the concomitants of Omniscience, Omnipotence and Omnipresence et hoc its lot is only well-deserved punishment and chastisement. If it is found on the other hand, that the finite realises its own limitations and finitude, and does not lay false claim to and misappropriates what does not genuinely and legitimately belong to him, he will not only be not punished, but rewarded for loyalty and devotion. Notwithstanding the possible comment of modernest critical scholarship that the analogy is crude and unscientific, it is highly significant and suggestive and the Upanishadic seer or seers to whom this passage can be traced would unhesitatingly be credited with the possession of genuine insight, for after all, theft and misappropriation are the only offences of serious and grave character that could be thought of as nearest approaches to or equivalents of metaphysical misappropriation and rationalistic robbery by the finite of the attributes of the Infinite. Analogies do not run on all fours. They need not. Nor need they be strained to the breaking point or the point of the ridiculous. A Dualistic teacher could not have cited a better or more striking analogy as he considers the Supreme Being as the Sovereign, and the finite as the subject. Theft of property belonging to a neighbour, a finite being, is heinous and criminal enough but theft of or attempted theft of property belonging to the king or the Supreme Sovereign, when the king is not an ordinary mortal like Charles or the Czar whose head may be chopped off or who may be deposed and disposed of, but the Supreme Overlord of the Universe, cannot but become aggravated millionfold, bringing in its train penalty and punishment of condign character. Actual theft and deprivation of the attributes of the Supreme Being is of

course unthinkable, but in the present instance the finite arrogates to itself what does not belong to it. This arrogation is attempted theft of the attributes, powers, prestige, and the privileges of the Supreme Being. Recognition of the Majesty of the Sovereign has its own rewards as is quite familiar. The recognition has nothing to do with sycophantic adulation. The finite does not lose its inherent status and self-respect by such recognition.

In the nine instances cited above, Madhva maintains that the Upanishadic seers aim only at emphasizing difference between Finite and the Infinite. Between the bird and the cage or string, among the juices of various trees and flowers, among the drops of honey collected from various flowers of various trees or different flowers of different trees, between the rivers and the ocean, between the tree and the source of sustaining life-force or life-energy, between the microscopic seed and the Immanent Power in it, between the Gandhara country and the person who kidnapped from it first later reaches it, between the finite spirit and the Overlord of the life-breath etc., between the robber and the robbed, positively there is *fundamental difference*.

It is to be expected that such a revolutionary interpretation cannot be accepted without a first-rate full dress debate and Madhva and his commentator have anticipated all the relevant objections which an Absolutist would urge against such a view, and refuted them. The two instances of the collection of honey and the discharging of the roaming rivers in sea, illustrate only that the drops are not conscious of having been gathered from this flower or that, and that rivers after they discharge their floods in sea are not recognised and identified in their disparateness as—'this is Ganga, Yamuna' etc. but they do not establish the existence of difference as positive entity. Even so, it is possible to interpret the text to mean that the finite selves after merger in the Infinite do not realise their disparateness. "No" observe Madhva, and his commentator. "The illustrative instances establish the existence of difference". The text mentions or indicates a penalty for those who do not realise the difference. They are born into a lower order of creation as animals like tigers etc. Let alone this picturesque penalty. Drops are collected into honey. Drops from different flowers go to form honey taste of which would reveal that different drops have entered as constituent elements. The resultant honey is either a mixture or a modification. The former is different from the constituents. The latter is an identity in difference, or difference-tinged identity or identity-tinged difference. They do not enter into a state of identity with honey which is already there from time immemorial as the only reality. There is no entity known as honey with which drops of juice from different flowers may be asserted to be identical, already in existence for the best of all possible reasons that the drops themselves will have to co-operate

to bring honey into being, and this demonstrates that there is only difference between the two.

The finite selves periodically, (from an obvious point of view) enter into the Infinite and come out of It reinvigorated and refreshed, and to establish this thesis, the Upanishadic text uses grammatical forms indicative of "into" and "from" technically known as "adhikarna," and "apadana" and the use of the *foras* is meaningless if there were really identity between the thing or the object that enters and the place or the locality in which it is said to enter. Similarly a thing which emerges or comes out of another cannot be identical with the latter.

A person enters a building and after finishing the transaction of his business comes out of it, and it would be absurd indeed to assert that there is identity between the two or that the house is of a higher degree of reality or that the entry is illusory and so forth and so on. When a proposition or thesis is sought to be illuminated by illustrative instances and apt analogies, and if on account of the expressional exigencies, there happens to be a reasonable or even an unreasonable doubt whether difference or identity is the central doctrine of the Upanishadic texts, the illustrations gain a prominence *qua*, explanatory and exemplifying aids, which cannot be lightly ignored or dismissed, and in the light of that pre-eminence, the abstract truth sought to be impressed upon an earnest inquirer, should if necessary be re-interpreted. That has actually been done in the present Upanishadic context. The nine illustrative instances on analysis reveal only difference between two entities, and not identity. To recuperate energy the finite daily resorts to the Infinite which is the central reservoir of cosmic energy. Only on the basis of difference between the finite and the Infinite can recuperation of energy be possible. Disparate drops gathered from different flowers do not enter into an *already existent* unity—honey. Rivers discharge themselves in the sea, but the two are not identical with one another.

As rivers lose their identity in ocean, it is contended that the illustrative instance cannot support the doctrine of difference. Madhva carefully analyses the instance, and explains that the Upanishadic passage in question, reveals only difference and not identity. If the Upanishadic seer had wanted to establish the thesis of identity, he would have said that the *rivers* become the *sea*. But he has said that the *sea* remains the *sea*, notwithstanding evaporation, formation of clouds, condensation, rains, origin of rivers, and the final discharge of their floods in the sea and similar phenomena. Indirectly the rivers owe their origin to the sea, and discharge their floods in sea. The latter remains the same. It retains its identity. The rivers retain theirs. Or more

precisely, the sea retains its individuality. The rivers retain theirs intact. The rivers are never identical with the sea. Nor is the sea ever identical with rivers.

If it is contended that the statement sea remains the sea means state of identity after the final discharge of floods or rivers in the sea, Madhva's commentator in reply points out, that may be good grammar or technically faultless language, but doctrinal vitiation there certainly is. According to the well-known Nyaya-Vaiseshika theory of destruction, particular objects on account of clash with some destructive agency, cease to be what they are. The wholes are sundered into, are resolved into their atomic constituents, and that is death or destruction. If anyone contends that the rivers and sea are identical, he should answer two or three questions—In the first place, do the two wholes or totalities or collocations, known respectively as sea and river first get dissolved into their atomic constituents, and does the absolutist maintain there is identity between the atoms—(causal) that were responsible for the bringing into existence of the totality known as sea, and those that brought into being the whole known as river? Or does the absolutist seek to maintain that (causal—) atoms other than those mentioned co-operatively bring into being the totality—sea? Or is it sought to be maintained that the wholes prior to dissolution itself were identical with one another or had become identical with one another? It cannot be the first alternative or possibility. The causal atoms are there. They do not merge into one another. Here is the syllogism. The two causal atoms do not lose their individuality and become one. Because they are constituents of two totally different wholes. In a monster meeting individuals enter, depart and re-enter. The individuals so entering and re-entering are by no means identical with the meeting itself. The individuals are different from the main body of the meeting. Further there is no increase of the total quantum when the alleged merger takes place, if at all. The second possibility is untenable. The absolutist cannot admit that Jiva and Brahman *qua* wholes first got dissolved and the causal atoms of the two dissolved totalities conspire to bring into being a third totality. The third possibility of two wholes intact becoming somehow identical with one another cannot be seriously considered even for a moment. The merger between two causal atom-groups of the two totalities is an impossibility. The co-operation or conspiracy of two-atom groups, without a merger, to bring into being a different whole is riddled with contradictions. The merger between the two totalities respectively known as finite and Infinite without any dissolution is unthinkable.

The illustrative instance of rivers and the sea should be understood to have been cited only to impress upon Svetaketu and through him all aspirants, the truth that there is only difference between Finite and Infinite, which is radical foundational

and basic. In the light of the arguments summed up in the previous paragraph, and adopting the same lines of reasoning, one is bound to maintain that in the illustrative instance of honey and drops gathered from various flowers and trees, there can be no merger or identity. The Upanishadic term "Ekatam" in the context should mean only a state of intermixture, or more appropriately what the Western Logician calls homogeneous intermixture but not a state of identity. The identical questions will recur, whether two totalities called drop and honey first dissolve causing identity of causal atoms, or whether the actual atoms without merger conspire to produce a third totality or the two totalities without any dissolution merge into one another somehow. The answers are the same. There cannot be and there is not as a matter of fact any merger or identity.

"Now" contends the absolutist, "the use of the term 'svam' as in 'svam-hi-apeetobhavati' proves identity between finite and Infinite, as 'sva' which means one's own indicates identity with Brahman which is denoted by the term 'sva'". Anything denoted by a term which means one's own should be identical with the latter. Whose own? Finite's own. If Brahman be finite's own the two are identical. Or 'Sva' means itself. If Brahman be denoted by a term which means itself i.e. finite itself, the two are bound to be identical. Madhva explains that the term 'sva' has no reference to 'itself' or identity. The 'sva' in the said context means only Supreme Brahman. Not the incipient Brahmanhood of the finite. The Brahma sutra 'Svatmanachottarayoh' (2—3) is evidence. It is the Supreme Being that controls the departure of the finite spirit from the nervous vestige and it is again the Supreme Spirit that controls the encasement of the finite spirit in some body after the karmic course of punishment or reward has been run, and in the light of that usage by the author or the Vedanta Sutras, and in view of the contextual appositeness, the 'sva' should be interpreted to mean only Paramatman—the Supreme Being. Madhva cites a corroborative passage from the Paramopanishad. The terms 'sva', 'atma' and 'Brahma' are applicable only to the Supreme Being, on account respectively of independence, Ubiquitousness, and Attribute-fullness. The Upanishadic passage is cited just to convince those who may not be inclined to accept Madhva's interpretation of the said Sutra.

'Still' the term 'Apta' 'would indicate identity between the finite and the Infinite'. If the finite becomes lost in Brahman, it becomes one with it certainly. Against this contention Madhva argues that the import of the term considered split up into the constituent grammatical elements, and the import considered in totality apprehended suddenly in a flash as it were, are both against the doctrine of identity. The 'Api' stands for obscuration, envelopment or a sort of eclipsing. This eclipsing has meaning when

one passes into the Umbra. Entry into the hidden Brahman is the meaning and entry is not identity. If therefore the constituent elements of 'Api' the root 'in' and the form 'Ita' be carefully considered, only entering or entry would be the most natural, rational and unstrained interpretation and not identity between the finite and the Infinite. 'Avijnayatam-Pravishtam-Yadapeetamitikirtyate' is quoted in Vedesiya. (14).

Suppose 'Apeeta' is considered as a whole without reference to constituents. It is not a finite verb. 'Bhavati' is the verb. It is intransitive. But the 'svam' in the accusative looks very appropriately like an object. The object cannot be in order as the verb is an intransitive one. If identity had been the truth of the passage, the instrumental case should have been used. 'Svena-apeetobhavati' the text should read. Grammar the task-mistress though assigned to a lesser degree of reality is still exacting and demands allegiance from all not even the absolutist excepted. When there is a merger or identity between any two, the instrumental case is inevitably to be used. There are two points against the interpretation of 'apeeta' as a whole. The first is the inappropriateness of the accusative juxtaposed with an intransitive verb. The second is absence of the instrumental case which should be there if identity is sought to be conveyed. The two are technically termed 'srutahana' and 'asruta-kalpana' abandonment of the explicitly heard or seen, in the context and importation of that not explicitly found in the given context.

As the "Akhandavritti" i.e. interpretation of the total term (the whole term) without reference to the grammatical constituents cannot be in order, one is necessarily thrown back upon the "avayava vritti," interpretation in reference to the said constituents, and in that case there is neither abandonment of the explicit terms in the context nor the importation of what is not in it. The root 'in' being transitive, the 'svam' in accusative is quite apposite as an object. It means reached or reaches. What is it that is reached? 'Sva' i.e. the Cosmic source of energy is reached. This interpretation of 'reaches' or enters into being fixed by grammatical exigencies, the doctrine of difference naturally finds support in the said interpretation. X cannot reach itself. X cannot enter into itself. Reaching and entering can mean sense only when difference is the regulating and determining relationship between X and Y. Therefore 'svam' should mean 'into Brahman'. That the finite enters into Brahman is the natural interpretation and identity is not thought of at all.

A rather superficial objection is anticipated and answered. In (the 'Sakuni-sutra-drishtanta') the illustrative instance of the

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(14) See Vedasatirtha's commentary. Sva-sabdah—.....svatmani-pravesaasambhavat-paremesvaravachyevasveekarya-ityapi siddham. P. 63. Commentary of Jayatirtha.



'Bird and the string' granting there is difference emphasized how would that enable one to establish difference between the finite self and the Supreme Self? interrupts the absolutist. Is it not stated in the text that 'Manah' mind—at last quite tired resorts to 'Prana' ordinarily meaning life or life breath? What has this difference between ('Prana and Manah') life and mind to do with the difference between (Jiva and Brahman,) the finite self and the Supreme Being? Madhva answers that such an objection can be expected only from those who are deluded by superficial surface interpretations without an eye on contextual determinants. In the previous sentence, explaining the psychology of sleep, it is pointed out that the 'purusha' finite self, resorts to the 'sat'—the Supreme Being—and in order to maintain interpretational continuity necessitated by the context, the terms 'Manah' and 'Jiva' occurring in a subsequent sentence should be made to surrender their surface interpretation and reinterpreted as 'Purusha' and 'Sat' of the previous sentence. It is pointless to contend that violence has been done to the ordinary meaning of the terms. The dictionary-meaning of a term is not always its final interpretation. The lexicon takes no account of the context. In the present instance, maintenance intact of contextual conformity and interpretational harmony leave no other alternative than that of reinterpreting "Manah" and "Prana," as the finite and the Infinite respectively. Nor is this interpretation without support or guarantee. Madhva cites a sentence from agama, an undoubted Pramana, which means that the terms 'Mana' 'Pudgala' 'Samsari' and 'Anusayi' are applied to the finite Purusha, while the terms 'Prana' 'sat' are applied to the Supreme Being.

In the 'Sakuni-sutra-prakarana' i.e. in the context which discusses the illustration of the Bird and the String the terms 'Mula' 'Aayatana' and 'Pratishta' occur. The 'sat' i.e. Brahman is 'Mula' origin or material cause of the finite creation, just as mud is that of a jar. After origination finite creation subsists. In this subsistence the Sat i.e. Brahman is 'Aayatana' is the prop or support of all finite creation. (just as a jar finds support in clay.) After destruction, Sat i.e. Brahman is 'Pratishta' the goal into which all finite creation merges. The terms 'mula' 'Aayatana' and 'Pratishta' have reference to past, present and future or origination, sustenance, and destruction of finite creation and they all indicate that Sat i.e. Brahman is all the three, and identity with it of finite creation is the thesis of the passage.

In refutation of the anticipated objection set forth in the preceding paragraph, Madhva's answer is this. Brahman is not emphasized to be the material cause in the foregoing stock instance of the text. On the other hand Brahman is 'Nimittakarana' the Agent who regulates the destinies of finite creation according to

the inscrutable operations of the Karmic Law. Finite selves though like Brahman not having origin in time, spiritual and withal indestructible and imperishable, are under the care and governance of the Supreme Being. The secular and spiritual career of the finite is fashioned by the Supreme Being in His Infinite Wisdom and Mercy. It is an ugly effort of intellect to compare Him to the mud or the clay of the pot as material cause. When the existence of the finite, in the sense of countless bodily encasements and nervous mechanisms, and mortal coils, is under the control of the Supreme Being, it would be more appropriate to compare Him to an intelligent person who designs and constructs Jar out of clay but not to the clay itself.

With a view to the working out of the destiny of each finite individual, according to the Karmic Law, the Supreme Being provides the finite creation with the necessary nervous mechanism and sustains finite creation by keeping the mechanism in live working order and refilling it with energy periodically, and when the final hour strikes, shows finite individuals their respective places and keeps them there and maintains this sort of control in keeping persons to their places even in the state of final liberation; when liberation itself is no guarantee of or occasion for free miscellaneous motivation and an equally free miscellaneous response, it would be the height of illogic to contend that the Supreme Being can be or is identical with the finite. The terms 'mula' 'Aayatana' and 'Pratishta' refer only to the eternal overlordship of the Supreme Being over Finite creation and control even of the blessed and beautiful souls that have realised their true state in salvation or freedom from the recurring cycles of births and deaths. "Vishnu-ranyah-samsarinomatah" Vishnu, the Supreme Overlord of the Universe being the causal agent who governs the existence sustenance and final dissolution of the cosmos, cannot but be different from the finite selves or souls.

How is the illustrative instance of the tree flourishing and perishing respectively in the presence of Divine Grace and absence thereof, in support of difference between the finite and the Infinite? interrogates the absolutist. Madhva replies that as in the previous case, one should not be misled by the surface interpretation of the term 'Jiva'. It means the supreme Self and not the finite self. If in a context intended to illustrate the thesis that plant, animal and human life can get on quite well and does as a matter of fact get on well, whatever the obstructions and destructive forces that are operative, provided the Immanent Divine power gives it lease of life, and the complementary thesis that the said plant, animal and human life would perish whatever the artificial aids, and sustaining forces operating to keep the flame of life burning, when the Grace of the Supreme Being has been withdrawn, as it should be sooner or later by sheer efflux of time, and by the relentless operations of the Karmic Law, the term

'Jiva' occurs, it would be meaningless to interpret it as the finite self as the latter cannot obviously be in charge of the life-giving and life-depriving functions which by force of logic can belong only to the Supreme Being.

If the said functions were shared indifferently by the finite and the Infinite the very infinitude of the Infinite is seriously compromised. The term 'Jiva' in the said context can mean and must mean only Paramatman-the Supreme Being.

The 'tree' has to be symbolically interpreted to mean the finite self-'Anena-jivena-atmana-anupravisya etc.' In that context also, the term 'jiva' means the Supreme Being. 'Jivenatmana anuprabhutah-pepeeyamano-modamanah-tishtati' etc. In the context also 'Jiva' means the Supreme Being. 'Jivapetam-vakiledam-mriyate'. All creation *minus* 'jiva' is dead. Here also 'Jiva' means the Supreme Being. The finite Being cannot be considered to be the sustainer of life, as the finite derives its own essence from the Infinite. In all the contexts cited the term 'jiva' means only the Supreme Being and not the finite self. The import of the passages is of course the dependence of the finite on the infinite. Dependence relates to origin, maintenance or sustenance, and dissolution. Dependence has meaning only on the basis of difference. It does not require any elaborate speculative or practical proof that if X depends on Y, the two should be different from one another. Dependence cannot be reconciled with identity between the two.

In the Nyagrodha-seed illustration as well the term 'Anima' the bone of contention means only the Supreme Being. It cannot mean the seed—(Dhanah.) The term denoting the seed always occurs in the feminine gender and preceded by 'iva'. From the succeeding sentence, the feminine gender and the prefix 'iva' are absent and the term 'Anima' occurs in the grammatical glory of a full-blown masculine gender. The central source of all cosmic masculinity is the Supreme Being and it is that which sustains the huge tree etc. The term 'Anima' cannot apply to the seeds, once more. For the Upanishad is explicit in the statement 'You do not see the Immanent—microscopic.' As a matter of fact, however the seeds though small are actually seen by the son, and the father. The point is this. Though small the seeds are seen. There is the Supreme smaller than the smallest seed (by mere rhetoric) immanent which makes the huge tree stand. That immanent power is the Supreme Being. On this interpretation the father's experimental procedure in asking the son to break open the seed has significance. If the inquiry were to stop with the discernment of the seed from which the huge Nyagrodha tree springs up, the contention of the Absolutist that the term 'Anima' applies to material cause in illustration of Brahman being the said cause of the Universe, may stand, but the inquiry

does not stop there. The son is asked further to break open the seed, and report what is seen by him inside. He says 'nothing'. But 'no' says the father there is the Immanent Supreme Being which though unseen by mortal eyes, yet sustains the huge tree. The conclusion is inevitable that the term 'Anima' in the said context must refer to the Supreme Being, and the illustrative instance is intended to support only difference between the finite and the Infinite but not identity.

There is another term in the context which would appear to lend support to the interpretation of the absolutist, namely, the intriguing 'Aitadatmyam'. It is usually interpreted to mean that there is only one real Atman in the Universe, or even the Atman which is the sole and only reality has manifested itself as the universe. According to Madhva the term 'Aitadatmyam' means the Universe is the Supreme Being's own and ownership is but the natural concomitant of overlordship. On this view, difference between the finite creation which is owned, and the Supreme Being which owns, stands out in clear outlines and bold relief.

The term 'Atma' is equally intriguing. While the absolutist contends that it refers to the finite self which is of course identical with the Infinite, Madhva maintains that in the light of the explicit statement of the Sutrakara, it should be taken to mean only the Supreme Being. In the three aphorisms, 'Dyubhva-dyayatanam-sva-sabdat' 'Nanumanam-atat-sabdat' and 'Prana-bhrit-cha' it has been once for all settled and established that the term 'Atman' refers only to the Supreme Being. The reference is quite natural. In relationship with the categories of time, space and attribute, He is Infinite. This Infinitude is appropriately and adequately conveyed by the term 'Atma' in virtue of the root from which it has been grammatically formed. Omniscience and Creatorship are also implied. By uncritical usage it has come to be applied to the finite self as well, and we get the pair *jivatma* and *paramatma*, to denote respectively the finite and the Infinite. Whatever the conventional usage philosophic precision requires that its boundaries should be fixed. It has been done by the Sutrakara himself whoever he was. It is noteworthy that according to the interpretation clung to by the absolutist, the expression 'sa-atma' after 'aitadatmyam' is surely redundant.

The absolutist next turns his attention to the illustration of the sinking patient. He contends that the said Upanishadic passage, illustrates the gradual stages through which one has to pass to reach Brahman. What has that to do with establishing and illustrating difference between the finite and the Infinite? Madhva explains that the illustration in question demonstrates the fact of the finite being entirely in the power of the Infinite. When

the senses, mind, inherent light, are gradually abstracted from the finite, the latter loses life and consciousness. The Supreme Being abstracts them at the appointed hour. When the said abstraction or withdrawal does not take place, the finite is quite intact breathing and living. The gift of life and its withdrawal by the Infinite are proof positive, that the finite is within the power of the Infinite. This can be rational and understandable only if difference between the finite and the Infinite is the philosophic truth of the matter and not identity. Madhva cites a smṛiti stanza in support of his interpretation. It is not an ordinary, work-a-day pragmatic dependence of the one on the other, but a vital, irreducible and foundational, dependence for life, and sustenance of the finite on the Infinite and dependence too for final dissolution of mortal vestiges. One may get so disgusted with life as to desire to put an end to it and try means. But No—If the Infinite wills the suffering, struggling individual should linger on and suffer attempts at suicide do not succeed. He is rescued, hauled up and imprisoned for attempted suicide! On the other hand, another so passionately clings to life, its enjoyments and values. He tries all means, money, power, prestige and influence can purchase, to stay on, but the Infinite withdraws its sustaining supply of life force and he perishes. Such is the inevitability of the dependence of the finite on the Infinite.

The absolutist then, directs his attention to the instance of the thief and the articles stolen, and contends that it is intended to illustrate quite a different truth, but not difference between the finite and the Infinite. The person who dies and he who has attained salvation are subject to the gradual and progressive merging of 'vak' into 'Manas,' 'Manas' into life breath—'prana,' Prana' into 'Tejas' soul's own light, and 'Tejas' into 'Paramatman'—the Supreme Being, with this difference that a vidvan, a philosophic initiate never again returns to the world of births and deaths, while the ignorant folk that perish like epidemic-stricken cattle, do so return. In order to illustrate the return and non-return the instance is cited. He who firmly retains the idea that he is identical with the Infinite, never returns while he who cannot exercise a firm hold over it, and retain it, returns to suffer. What has this instance to do with difference between the two.?

Madhva maintains that special pleading and loose talk will not be of any avail. The doctrine in the Upanishadic text should be clarified by analogy or illustrative instance, but should not under any circumstances be confused and clouded. What is the point in comparing a philosopher who perceives difference between the finite and the Infinite to a thief? Only he can be styled a thief who wrongly claims and misappropriates what does not legitimately belong to him. Infinitude, Omniscience, Omnipotence etc. are the properties of the Supreme Being. If the finite individual lays claim to them and endeavours to misappropriate them

he is guilty of attempted theft. If he doggedly and dogmatically presses the said claim and proclaims that he is identical with the Infinite, his crime becomes actual theft. The illustration becomes pointless should there be no difference between the finite and Infinite.

If a person loses, or abandons what belongs to him he may be described to be a fool or indifferent to worldly matters and things. He cannot by any linguistic legerdemain or trick of logic be characterised a thief. The finite has lost his way. He has lost paradise. He is groping in the dark. Sooner or later Paradise would be regained. Heaven is his birthright. The spell of temporary obliviousness would be over. It is because, he has now lost his way, he cannot be called a thief? If he has forgotten his identity with the Supreme Being, as is claimed by the Absolutist, and surrendered a portion or the whole of what is legitimately his, he would be a fool, but not a thief surely! On the interpretation of identity between the finite and the Infinite, the illustrative instance of theft and thief becomes pointless on the verge of the ridiculous. It exactly and appropriately fits in on the interpretation that jiva and Paramatma are different. The former trying to claim Omniscience which is the Supreme Being's is a thief. He should be dealt with according to the law. He who does not misappropriate Omniscience which is not his is let off. The finite stands before a tribunal awaiting judgment. No charge has yet been brought home to him. If it is found that he asserts ownership of something that does not belong to him he would be punished. If he realises where he is exactly, and does not lay any extravagant claim to what is not his, he would be let off. If this plain and simple illustrative instance is twisted to support identity between the finite and the Infinite, then all illustrations and analogies can be bidden good-bye. If this illustrative instance is construed properly, difference between the finite and the Infinite, is the only metaphysical relation that can stand the test of science and common sense alike. Corroborative textual testimony is cited by Madhva from the "Mahabharata" (Moksha Dharma Parva) and the "Paramopanishad."

It will thus be realised that in the light of the *nine* illustrative instances, the Upanishadic text contemplates only the doctrine of difference between the finite and the Infinite. The usual argument of the absolutist has no point. Faced with such a crisis, the absolutist ever argues that there are more interpretationally powerful passages, like 'Aham Brahmasi' etc. which unequivocally proclaim identity between the two. The answer is obvious and has been in a way indicated in the preceding chapter. No doubt there are texts that proclaim identity. There are also texts that emphasize the contrary. There are texts and texts. The problem cannot be decided by counting a majority of texts.

In addition to texts, there are other means of arriving at reliable and valid knowledge. If the texts that proclaim difference can be proved by independent corroborative testimony to be of no use, then those that emphasize identity can command approbation. But no. Independent corroborative testimony is on the side of difference between the finite and the Supreme. Sense-perception does not lead to realisation of identity. Nor does it guarantee it. Inferential process and ratiocination are powerless alike. They support the doctrine of difference. The relevant Upanishadic texts that proclaim difference thus reinforced by the verdict of sense-perception and inference become powerful enough to compel the texts that emphasize identity to surrender their surface-interpretation. It will not do to dismiss the difference-texts as 'atatvavedaka' not revealing truth. Such a dismissal can be possible if the identity-texts proclaim identity in their own right. They do not. The identity suggested is a rhetorical device or a figure of speech, as Devadatta, is described by a quantity of his admirers as a lion! Surely Devadatta is not a lion.

On the other hand, texts proclaiming difference find ready corroboration from other independent sources—namely sense-perception and inferential process. The corroborated and reinforced texts are undoubtedly powerful enough to compel re-interpretation of the identity-texts. A reconciliation like that is indispensable. When one is confronted with passages that proclaim identity on one hand and difference on the other, and when one stands committed to the orthodox position that the two texts are equally sacred and holy, some enduring reconciliation is to be sought for. "*Tu quoque*" arguments and mere tit for tat will not do. If the Absolutist can cast a sneer on them and contend that the difference-texts are proclaiming an untruth, the retort is obvious that the identity-texts are no more reliable and they too proclaim untruth. Then would result a deadlock. A way out is open if the texts are all thrown overboard—difference-and-identity texts. That cannot be. While in European philosophy sacred texts count for nothing, they are the Supreme "*Pramana*"—revealers of profound truth not revealed by other "*Pramanas*." Sacred texts have thus a peculiarly important status in Indian Philosophy and where they are found to be in conflict with one another, some sort of reconciliation is to be attempted and secured. The reconciliation is by no means arbitrary or left to the sweet will and pleasure of an individual. It has to be attempted according to the canons of interpretation, and exigencies contextual as well as textual. In the present instance Madhva has demonstrated that in the light of the nine illustrations cited, the Upanishadic passages contemplate and emphasize only the doctrine of difference between the finite and the Supreme Being. To be bound by or regulated by the canons of interpretation, or to have import determined by textual and contextual exigencies,

and kindred considerations, will not mean anything derogatory to the sanctity of the sacred texts and passages.

There is no doubt that Madhva has taken a radical step in splitting up the compound as "ATAT-TWAMASI." The philosophical value, and significance of the step will have to be judged entirely on the basis of the canons of interpretation. As far as grammar is concerned, there is nothing ungrammatical about the said splitting up. It is always possible to anticipate the contention, that splittings that do not violate grammar-rules are not entitled to special consideration simply *qua* grammatically correct. That is why Madhva has concentrated attention on the analogies and illustrative instances. They certainly should influence interpretation. They have been mentioned only to clarify matters. There should not be even the slightest incompatibility between a doctrine expounded and the illustrations and analogies mentioned to make the doctrine better understood.

Madhva has demonstrated, as may be evident from the preceding paragraphs, that the illustrations look absurd and cease to have any meaning if they are understood to support the doctrine of identity between the finite and the Infinite. Not even one of the nine instances could be strained to support the identity view. They illustrate and clarify only the difference view. It will not do to argue that some of them indicate identity. Then some indicate difference. But a majority of them are in favour of difference between the finite and the Supreme. The illustrations *inter alia* serve two purposes. They emphasize radical, and foundational difference between the finite and the Infinite, and secondly they stress the dependence of the former on the latter. The finite's career is guided by the Infinite. The origin, evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the life of the finite is in the power of the Infinite. Even granting for the sake of argument that though grammar allows a particular splitting up like ATAT-TWAMASI it carries no weight, Madhva's interpretation of the texts and passages in the strictest accordance with the illustrations, is entitled to impartial and disinterested consideration, and so far, it is clear that unless very great violence is done to interpretation it is not possible to maintain that the nine illustrative instances support the doctrine of identity between the finite and the Infinite. It is no argument against Madhva's interpretation that his predecessors did not split up the compound in the way in which he did. If his predecessors, did not, there is no reason why he should not, or why he should slavishly and blindly imitate them. The illustrative instances form the crux. That they do not countenance the identity doctrine he who runs may read. Unless one believed the illustrations are purposeless, puerile and pointless, I do not see, how they can be twisted or tortured into confirmatory evidence in support of the identity-theory or doctrine. The concept of difference does



not stand alone. It is intimately bound up with that of dependence. This linkage between dependence and difference is a powerful determinant of the significance of the Upanishadic passages. Dependence and difference are foundational and fundamental. Viewed in the proper perspective of the linkage, dependence finds its own natural justification and difference its own "*raison de etre*."

The absolutist at this stage advances another technical objection. Granting the propriety of the splitting up of the compound into ATAT-TWAMASI and the consequent inevitability of the doctrine of difference between the finite and the Infinite, in the light of the nine illustrative instances, the whole thing would amount to the assertion (according to the rules of debate) that Oneness or identity is to be ruled out or denied; it is obligatory on the party that denies it or negates it to exhibit how identity is likely to occur the minds of readers and aspirants as a tenable doctrine, and in the absence of this exhibition, denial itself is unthinkable. If you desire to deny reddishness in reference to an object by saying X is not red, your procedure and statement will have value only if suggestions had been made of its being red. In the absence of such suggestion, the denial has no value. Just to conform to this rule of debate, Madhva points out how in more than one or two ways, suggestions of the validity of the identity-doctrine can be advanced, and how in the light of such suggestions the denial of identity is purposive and relevant.

In the first place, proud man easily arrogates to himself identity with the Divine. The body, the senses, life breath, intellect, emotion, and volition are all under the control of the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being is the Author of them all. The overlordship is erroneously arrogated by the finite. Intoxicated by success in life's little ludicrous adventures and quixotic quests, the individual imagines he is himself the overlord of the Universe. He thinks, feels and acts as if he were the overlord of the bodily and mental functions etc. From such arrogation of overlordship to claims of identity it is not a far cry not merely but, only an intimate mouth-to-ear whisper.

The Ego-awareness is so strong in all that sooner or later, it will develop into arrogation of the Overlordship of the Universe and Overlordship of the bodily and mental functions. That may not be. Svetaketu is typical of persons who are on the summit of arrogation of overlordship that is not legitimately the property of the finite. To drive that sort of conceit out of the minds of misguided aspirants, (misguided, yet, having the spark of hope,) and to save them by indoctrination of the real and genuine truth, identity between the finite and the Infinite that is claimed by success-intoxicated finite is denied in the texts, the denial being illustrated with appropriate instances. That is the general indication of how identity can be suggested.

There is a special manner in which the suggestion of identity presents itself. Svetaketu is introduced to the readers as having mastered all the Vedas, and as being 'Sthabdhā' highly self-conscious, arrogant and with a swelled head. Scholarship blinded him to his real status. He believed he was omniscient etc. Pride goeth before a fall. Conceit goeth before calamity. What little or great achievement he had to his credit was simply gift from the Supreme Being on whom he was dependent for his all. Oblivescence of this truth had filled his head with moonshine. It had to be driven out. Sunshine had to be let in to make matters clear or for matters to be made clear. His father taught him the truth of the doctrine of difference and counselled him to regard himself as dependent on the Divine Lord devotion to whom was the only means of extrication or escape from the recurring cycles of births and deaths. To knock the conceit out of Svetaketu's head, the father counsels adoption of attitude of awe and reverence to the Divine, and not arrogation by the son of identity with the latter. If the significance of the term STHABDHA in the text be borne in mind, the conclusion is natural and inevitable that the conceit will disappear only when Svetaketu is shown his proper place in the cosmic scheme and kept in his place too and not when he is allowed to grow into a swell-head with the consciousness that he is either already identical with the Supreme Being—the identity having been temporarily obscured—or can hope to be identical with It at some future date, and the father indeed having the spiritual welfare of his son at heart would never have taught him a philosophy of life which when translated into practical politics cannot but involve him in grave spiritual danger concomitant with attempted usurpation of the Omniscience etc. of the Almighty Being by claiming identity with Him.

There is yet a third manner in which a suggestion of identity is possible. In the context in question, the doctrine of identity is stated in substance only subsequently to be refuted. How can a body of texts claimed to be beginningless in time make reference to a definite doctrine like that of identity championed by thinkers in definitely ascertained and place or times and places and refute it? The question is pointless. The body of sacred texts cannot but make reference to topics and doctrines which have existed from time immemorial and history will always repeat itself and there is nothing new under the sun! That is to say a traditional view has persisted, and will continue so to persist that identity between the finite and the Infinite is the true philosophical doctrine, and there is no impropriety whatever, in the sacred text refuting this in the relevant context. The present context has perhaps the maximum advantage in as much as nine illustrative instances are cited to clarify the doctrine of difference. Suggestions of a world-view based on the identity-doctrine have been there, and they are refuted in the present context. Just as the Buddhist doctrine is

also refuted in the well-known passage "asadeva-idam-aasit etc" even, so in A-TATWAMASI identity-doctrine is refuted.

Fourthly, a suggestion of identity owes its origin to failure to understand aright the real import of texts like 'Aham Brahmasi' and to a positive misapprehension of the meaning as well of those texts. Such strange doctrines that owe their origin to ignorance and misapprehension are refuted by the sacred texts themselves. There is a sruti text that enjoins the performance of sacrifices. They have to be performed *qua* promoting mental purity as leading ultimately to realisation of the Divine. They should not be performed with an eye on material gains and advantages. Sacrifices done with a view to material gains are condemned. So when one is confronted with enjoinder of certain acts, and condemnation thereof, harmony should be secured. It is natural. Even so in the light of the illustrative instances harmony is secured by reinterpretation of passages. Suggestions of identity emanate from ignorance of the real import of the sruti texts. Texts like—I am Brahman—have reference to the immanent Supreme Being, and not to identity between the finite and the Infinite. The suggestions are refuted by the text "A-TATTWAMASI" "Thou are not That" and it is thus evident that the refutation of the doctrine of identity has not been sprung upon the readers of the sacred text nor has it been surreptitiously smuggled into places and contexts. Four possibilities have been indicated of a suggestion of identity and the doctrine is then refuted in the context—'A-TATTWAMASI'. The refutation is just a natural and logical evolution of the main Upanishadic thought.

Against this interpretation of the Upanishadic texts, the Absolutist hurls the following objection. The previous chapter, (i.e. the fifth,) of the Chhandogya was devoted to an exposition of the doctrine that Brahman is the material cause of the Universe, on the strength of the peculiarly significant expression that is applied to describe the Universe, namely 'Tajjalan'. It means, that which is given existence by Brahman, which is absorbed in Brahman at the time of final dissolution, and that which moves, on account of the dynamic force supplied by Brahman, and the material Causality of Brahman however, does not and cannot mean any actual transformation, but only material causality *qua* substratum of the superstructure of illusory experience. To explain this view, the sixth chapter is in order. The substratum or the only reality of Brahman being known all else is known, because the material cause known makes all the effects known too. Creation was explained just to illustrate that Brahman is the only Reality and all else akin to illusory phenomena. This is the central conclusion of the first part of the sixth chapter. How is that according to Realists and Dualists the second part of the chapter can be interpreted to convey difference between finite and Infinite? It cannot be. The latter

half has to be interpreted as supporting the doctrine of identity in consonance with the former half which emphasizes the unreality of the Universe and the Reality of Brahman.

Madhva exposes the untenability of this contention by a careful and rigorous analysis of the expressions that occur in the said context. The foregoing contention may have some semblance of validity or tenability if the illusoriness of the universe is in fact, subject-matter of the first half of the sixth chapter. The illusory-doctrine or the illusion-doctrine is the inevitable concomitant of ascription of material causality of the Universe to Brahman. Material causality is a convenient fiction. Brahman is *not* the material cause of the Universe. That is not a matter which can be decided arbitrarily either by numerical majority of votes or by temperamental considerations. Unlike contemporary romance, philosophy is not a matter of temper or temperament. Indian philosophy stands committed to assignment of pre-eminence to interpretation of sacred texts which alone are capable of revealing the real nature of the Supreme Being. The text affirms explicitly 'Tadaikshata-Tattejosrijaṭa', etc. Creation is not a blind creation or process of manifestation or production, or reproduction. It is described to be an intelligent act. 'Tadaikshata' says the text. The Supreme Being prior to the bringing into being of the Universe is described to have exercised intelligence, (whatever the nature of the intelligence and the exercise, because, they, relating as they do to the Supreme Being, should for ever remain beyond the ken of the finite,) and the material cause or the unintelligent or non-intelligent stuff of which things are made, is never described to have exercised any intelligence. The text is unequivocal, definite and decided, and that emphasizes that exercise of intelligence, not of course of the type of ours, did precede the act of creation, production or manifestation, did precisely occur—involving peradventure the decision that the world would be the best of all possible worlds—and if the Upanishadic chapter contemplated advocacy of the material causality of Brahman, there would certainly have been no reference to the act of 'Ikshati' intelligence, which can not be predicated of unintelligent stuff of which things are made. Reference to intellection prior to creation, is convincing evidence, unless one has prejudged the case, which proves that the sacred text insists upon the Supreme Lord being regarded as the Intelligent agent or the "Nimittakarana." He is the designer and Architect, and all in that line, but under no philosophical interpretation the material cause of the dull non-sentient stuff of which the cosmos is made and brought into being. But then why is creation explained in the said context? It is absurd to contend that the account of creation can be in order only if the view be upheld that Brahman as material cause is the only Reality and that the universe created is an illusory phenomenon. The account will be perfectly in order, even on the interpretation of the text that Brahman is the "Nimittakarana," intelligent designer,

any, in fact it can be in order *only* on the "Nimittakarana" view. The entire creation is in the power of the Supreme Lord, who is the Designer, Defender and Destroyer of it all. It is a familiar phenomenon that things or objects created, designed or projected are in the power of the creator, the designer or the projector. 'But no,' contends the absolutist 'The text took on hand the exposition of the view that The knowledge of the One yields of course, knowledge of the rest. Knowledge of Brahman yields knowledge of the world as illusory. That is the point in all being known when the one is known. This again can be tenable only on the view of material causality of Brahman. So the exposition of "Nimittakarana" theory, view of God as intelligent designer of the cosmos cannot fit in with the metaphysical notion of all being known when the One is known'.

Madhva rejoins that the metaphysical doctrine of ('Ekavijnayanena-sarva-vijnyana) all being known when the One is known, can be sustained only on the basis of three reasons or grounds. In the first place, pre-eminence is one reason. Brahman is pre-eminent. When the pre-eminent is known, the others, lesser luminaries, are as good as known too. Pre-eminence is an inevitable concomitant of overlordship of the Universe. If God were not the Overlord, He would certainly not be pre-eminent. If he were not pre-eminent His overlordship would not be admitted. Secondly there is some resemblance between the Universe and the Supreme Brahman. In a marked sense, the universe which is the result of Divine craftsmanship or workmanship, cannot be so alien to divine. Some resemblance there is bound to be between the Designer and the designed. Thirdly Brahman is the designer as pointed out before. The import is this. The One being known all else becomes known. Or by the knowledge of the One knowledge of all else is secured. Because, the One is -pre-eminent', resembles the others, and is the intelligent Designer of the cosmos. (—i.e. all else included in it, except of course Brahman). When the pre-eminent becomes known, lesser luminaries are known too. When two or more objects or entities resemble one another, when the model one becomes known, the others are as good as known in virtue of their resemblance. When the "Nimittakarana" or the Intelligent Designer becomes known it is permissible to argue that the designed also is as good as known as it cannot be alien to the character and mentality of the Designer who is known, and as it is bound to throw pre-indications of its nature or potentially reflected in the character etc. of the Designer. The three reasons would justify the general philosophical position that when the Supreme Being is known, all else is known too. There is absolutely no question here about the reality or illusoriness of anything. The world is as real as the Supreme Being. The Designer is as real as the designed. There is no other rational way or manner in which the metaphysical conundrum of all

being known when the One is known can be solved and rendered intelligible.

The absolutist once again makes an attempt inspired by a forlorn hope to revive the controversy by suggesting that instead of the three reasons just mentioned, it would be simpler to admit the material causality of Brahman and regard identity between the world and Brahman itself as the only reason for the upholding of the doctrine that knowledge of the one yields knowledge of all else or by knowledge of the One knowledge of all else can be secured. Madhva retorts that such a simplified procedure cannot be. The Absolutist who maintains the material causality of Brahman cannot be permitted to talk with the tongue in his cheek. The Absolute or Brahman is not *directly*, (sakshat) the material cause of the cosmic cinema show. Maya that is somehow an ally of Brahman through metaphysical thick and thin is the material cause. The truth then about the material causality of Brahman is just this—that the cosmic cinema show is only something like a superimposition or superimposed structure erected on the foundational reality of Brahman. The superimposition cannot be the reason for upholding the doctrine that by means of the knowledge of the One all else becomes known, or knowledge of all else can be secured.

Suppose a person knows all about superimposition. X is the substratum. Y is superimposed in illusory experience. If one knows all about the former, he would know that there is nothing substantial in the latter. If knowledge is secured under the conditions of normality and validity namely the sense organs functioning all intact, the interpretative mechanism being intact, the adequate stimulus being guaranteed, that knowledge which is valid and real knowledge of a real object in the space time *continuum qua* point-event, can never lead to knowledge of something that is illusory. Analysis of illusory experience will convince that knowledge of the foundational base on which a superimposition is erected is no guarantee of knowledge of all that is superimposed. It is just the other way. After the initial perceptual victimisation is over, the subject realises that he has before him only a piece of shell. A person on whom the realisation has dawned, is not described by people as one who knows all about silver. On the other hand he is characterised as one who knows all about *absence* of silver, namely that there is no silver in that particular type of experience. To know that the piece in front is shell and not silver and continue smarting under the victimisation practised by one's own sensory apparatus or the interpretative faculty of mind, are certainly not marks of omniscience—"Sarvajnyatva." But the Upanishadic text is emphatic. It claims that knowledge of One reality leads to Omniscience. If the text be interpreted in accordance with the illusion-theory the text should have been to the effect that by means of knowledge of One knowledge of

*nullity* of all results. (sarva-abhava-jnyana) The term Sarva-vijnyana in the text points only to Omniscience. Or to knowledge of the real import of the various vedic injunctions. The truth about the latter becomes known only when Brahman is realised.

As a matter of fact knowledge of the substratum or base and knowledge of the Superstructure or the Superimposition, are incompatible with one another. If one knows the truth about the substratum that it is a piece of *shell*, he knows it is *not* silver. If he sees the illusory silver, he does *not* see the shell. If he knows or feels the presence of silver, he does not see the shell. If he sees the real shell, he does not see the illusory silver. Of course he may see the real silver and real shell *elsewhere* and under a different concatenation of circumstances. When he sees the shell, he does not see the absence of shell. When he sees silver, he does not see the absence thereof. The net result of the analysis is this. Nihilism would be the outcome if the text is to be interpreted as proclaiming the illusion-theory. To regard the cosmos as illusion is no key to omniscience, or even to a clarification of objects and values.

There is another important point to note in discussions like these centering round an analysis of perceptual illusions which is intended to bolster up the absolutistic interpretation of the texts and truths. When under the stress of some organismal defect or of the nervous mechanism or the defect of the current of interpretative faculty running awry, one sees silver where he should normally see a piece of shell, the fact of the matter is that the silver which enters at a given moment as a constituent element in illusory experience, is a real entity existing and subsisting, *elsewhere* even at the time of illusory perception at a different point in the space-time continuum, which however, does not deprive it of its reality which is its birthright shared in common with countless objects of the cosmos. Realistic and Pluralistic Universe would be the only world-view supported by analysis of instances cited by the Absolutist. Reality is the birthright of the cosmos of matter and spirit. If the analogy is to be a fruitful one the metaphysical position will amount to this. When the truth about the shell is realised, the subject will see that he mistook it for silver for the nonce, not that silver is a worthless mirage. Even to him who has realised the true nature of the shell that is the substratum, silver as a real entity is bound to exist. Even so to him who has realised the truth of Brahman that is the substratum, the cosmos will exist as a real entity. After realisation, the mistake of identifying the cosmos with Brahman will disappear. The latter will be seen to be the Supreme Controller of the destinies of the former. Realisation of the true nature of the substratum—Adhishtana—is thus no bar to reality of the elements of the superimposition, which reality is temporarily *obscured*, but never destroyed or nullified. The reality is reinforced if perceptual illusions are analysed from a slightly different angle of vision

For instance why not mistake shell for a sastri or a snake ? Why not mistake a rope for a ragamuffin ? There is method in madness. Erroneous perception is determined by factors like resemblance. Rope is mistaken for snake on account of resemblance. Shell is mistaken for silver on account of resemblance. The resemblance has the key to a right interpretation of illusory experience. Resemblance resides in a real object. It indirectly demonstrates that a certain object like silver on account of its resemblance with shell enters as a constituent element in a situational or environmental totality in which shell is mistaken for silver. When the situational demand has been properly and adequately met, the subject sees the truth of the matter. Even so real knowledge about the nature of Brahman will under no circumstances be able to deprive the cosmos of its inalienable birthright of reality. Just as silver is erroneously identified with shell, the cosmos is identified with Brahman. Subsequently it is realised that the identification is erroneous and that the former is under the power, control and guidance of the Latter. That is real and genuine philosophical wisdom, and it will gradually lead one on to permanent eradication of the besetting sin of recurring cycles of births and deaths.

Neither scripture nor psychological analysis of perception and perceptual illusions will accord any support to the metaphysical doctrine that all else becomes known by Brahman becoming known ; nor is the doctrine capable of supporting the illusoriness or unreality of the cosmos. The context does not warrant the raising of the problem of reality at all, and the material causality of Brahman which seems to afford some prop to the illusion-theory is knocked on the head. By means of an acute and penetrating analysis of illusory experience, Madhva maintains that indirectly the reality of cosmos is demonstrated. The superimposition is conditional and occasional which demonstrates the undoubted reality of that which is superimposed on a substratum, and which under no circumstances is stultified. If silver as a real entity did not exist as a point-event in a space-time continuum, it can never appear as a constituent element in perceptual illusions. It is because, one knows what silver is, its use and value, that he in his greediness stoops to pick up a shell mistaking it for silver. No one speaks of superimposition of a totally non-existent unreal object on another totally non-existent unreal object. All superimposition should mean the reality of the object superimposed, *elsewhere*.

In the light of the foregoing analysis, it becomes obligatory to interpret the Upanishadic text 'By knowledge of one, knowledge of all else can be cured' without reference to the material causality of Brahman and to the concomitant (according to the absolutist) illusoriness of the Universe. Madhva interprets the text to mean that when a representative type is known others



scientifically advanced countries of the West. According to the Vedānta, however, God and Cosmos are inseparably together. Both are known by *Pramanas*—sources, means and guarantors of valid knowledge. Both are real. The cosmos is under the eternal vigilance, direction and control of God. When the latter is known, the former is known too. If we begin at the wrong end, and allow the world to be too much with us, knowledge of Brahman is sure to be delayed and even denied to us. We should begin at the right end and strive for attainment of knowledge of God. Then knowledge of the world, with all its ritual and religion, cults and ceremonies, injunctions and interdicts, will follow as a matter of course. Resemblance (*qua* knowable by *Pramanas*) between Creator and the Cosmos is the thing sought to be emphasized by the text, and there is no reference whatever to the question of reality or to that of illusoriness of the universe in the context which indicates that in virtue of resemblance, knowledge of One leads on to knowledge of others.

At this stage the Absolutist contends that the interpretation of the Upanishadic text given by Madhva cannot be sustained. The *sruti* cites three instances which support the theory of superimposition of the cosmos on Brahman and the material causality of the latter. Madhva meets the objection by explaining that the three instances are just elucidatory of the significance of 'resemblance' as a powerful determinant of knowledge of one leading to knowledge of others. If a pre-eminent member of a class is known the lesser fry are as good as known. If the Intelligent Cause or Creator is known, the effect or the created is as good as known. If two entities resemble one another and when one is known, the other is as good as known. That was the order in which Madhva explained the Upanishadic text—*Eka-vijnyanena-sarva-vijnyanam*'. By means of One knowledge of all others is obtained.

Of the three grounds mentioned by Madhva, pre-eminence, causality (intelligent agency) and resemblance, the last mentioned has been illustrated in the Upanishadic text, as the value of analogy and resemblance in the establishment of universal laws, and in demonstration of generalisations, can never be over-estimated. The 'resemblance' which appears second in order, in the text of Madhva, occurs as the third just because Madhva winds up the argument with the mention last of perhaps the most appealing ground of generalisation; and it is sought to be illustrated by means of three instances. Why waste time in duplicating instances? retorts the absolutist. Echo answers why? On his side Madhva queries why duplicate illustrative instances even if they are intended to exemplify not 'resemblance' but the illusoriness of the 'manifestations' of the One? If it is urged that the manifestation-doctrine being difficult of comprehension, requires more than one illustrative instance, the same argument would apply to 'resemblance' which is equally difficult of comprehension as that 'resemblance' has to be pressed into service, to render clear an important

metaphysical notion that knowledge of the one yields knowledge of all.

Madhva then elucidates the significance of the three illustrative texts. The Upanishad says 'Ekena-mritpindena-sarvammrin-mayam vijnyatam-syat'. The sentence does not convey or imply the material causality of Brahman, the unreality of the manifested world and things like those of the absolutist. EKA means one or single, and MRITPINDA means ball or mass of clay. Know the nature of the single ball of clay, and you know the nature of *all other* varieties, and complexities of clay-modelling or clay-work. Because the latter resemble the former. Take a ball of clay. Make a building. Make a mono-plane, and other objects, the entire "clay population arranged in rows" as Omar Khayyam puts it. When you handle and find out for yourself that one is a ball of clay, you easily realise in the same act that others that resemble it are of clay too, and not of any other stuff. Ball is real, building is real, and so all the objects that are made of clay are real. Other objects can be made of not clay but gold. They two are real and so on and so forth. Such a perception is due to resemblance. Even so, Brahman and the world are known in virtue of the resemblance they possess, and as a matter of fact the instances are in order only as illustrative of a plurality of objects in a pluralistic and realistic universe, and if they indicated monistic idealism and unreality of the plurality of objects, the terms "EKA" "PINDA" then are surely redundant and needless. "Mrida-vijnyataya-sarvam-mrinmayam-vijnyatam bhavati" should be the text. The example of the nail-clipper is fatal to monistic interpretation. It is the *infima species*, standing as it were at the lowest rung of the ladder, and if material causality had been intended, the representative instance to choose would not be the *infima species*. On the other hand, the *summum Genus* should have been pitched upon. If according to Monistic absolutism, the only Reality is Brahman or the Substance, and if its manifestations are either unreal or at best possess only a lesser degree of reality, the Upanishadic text should have said "know the summum genus, and then you know all else" and *not* "know the infima species, and you know all in that line etc." The illustrative instance has special appositeness on a pluralistic and realistic world-view. When detailed knowledge is not required to meet the exigencies of a situation, when too a comprehensive view is aimed at, only a general review is what is wanted, and a ball of clay known will give a general working knowledge of all the forms and varieties of the clay population only if it should be taken as a representative instance of the various possibilities. Knowledge of a particular member of the clay population will lead on to knowledge of others, because they all resemble one another. All are real. They reveal the latent potentialities of the stuff of which they are made. Clay in the scheme of things is distinguished from other substances like iron, gold etc. Where a clay model would quite suffice, no one outside the asylum would think of or strive

to instal a gold model. Likewise it is easy to imagine where an object made of gold would be required, a clay one will not function instead. If you invite a minister or some big functionary to open your new sky-scraper, you will naturally present him with a gold key by means of which he declares the structure open. A clay key will be ridiculously out of order. Gold again though precious and valuable elsewhere and on other occasions would be ridiculously out of order in a kindergarten class where clay would be required for teaching young folk modelling. The instances, therefore, cited in the Upanishad all converge towards the thesis maintained by Madhva that God when known would make other constituent elements of the cosmos known too, as the latter resemble the former in being real entities that can be known and guaranteed by the channels of knowledge and sources of correct cognition. As there is the palpable absurdity of interpreting the terms "EKA" and "SARVAM-KARSHNAAYASAM" into all iron-made articles are manifestations of a nail-clipper, and as the material causality of Brahman sought to be supported by the absolutist, would be better indicated by terms like "LOHENA" and "KARSHNAAYASENA", the only correct interpretation would be to regard the illustrations as converging towards the thesis maintained by Madhva that when there are objects gripped together by resemblance, knowledge of one which is pushed into prominence or the focus of consciousness, on a particular occasion to answer a particular environmental demand, will also lead on thinking and reflective minds to knowledge of others in virtue of the resemblance possessed and revealed by them all. The terms "EKA" and "PINDA" are significant. They show that clay which is capable of taking shape into many objects is different from gold, silver, copper etc. which also do take shape into objects which are all real and which retain their reality and independence intact. It is thus a pluralistic and realistic universe that is brought home to the minds of the readers of the said upanishadic illustrations. Even a lingering doubt or a lurking misapprehension is removed by the illustration of the nail-clipper. A single nail-clipper is not the stuff of which all iron things are made. There is a palpable absurdity in interpreting the text as the absolutist would. By no stretch of imagination is it possible to make out that the tiny nail-clipper is the *summum genus*. It is *infima species*. The text can only mean that many other real objects like the nail-clipper can be made out of the stuff to suit characteristic demands and to answer particular pragmatic purposes, all of which are perfectly real. Their reality which is their birthright can never be questioned or disputed. That form depends on matter as much as matter depends on form is quite familiar in logical discussions and works by Western writers. By examining a representative or striking object, it is possible roughly to understand in a general way what objects can be made out of a certain stuff. The stuff is real. The objects are real. They resemble one another. One of them prominent for the nonce

known means others are as good as known in virtue of resemblance. The centre of gravity of prominence would of course shift in accordance with the needs of the moment and the purposes sought to be fulfilled. Winding up the discussion, Madhva and his commentator emphasize that the Upanishadic instances cited support only a realistic and a pluralistic universe or pluriverse. There is absolutely no reference at all in them to the question of reality or unreality of the objects of the universe which owe their origin and existence to many material causes and intelligent agents who are all real, and retain their reality and independence intact at all times. Not even the acutest torture will make the text yield the interpretation after the heart of the absolutist that the material cause is the only reality and that the effects are all unreal and illusory.

“But” contends the Absolutist again, “the three passages examined in the foregoing paragraphs do not stand alone, and they are followed up by three others which leave no doubt that the question of reality is raised, discussed and decided. The substance of the passages is that names and forms are unreal. VACHARAM-BHANAM-VIKARO-NAMADHEYAM-MRITTIKETYEVA-SATYAM etc. The terms “vacharambhana” and “vikara” emphasize that the names and forms are unreal and that the stuff or the substance, clay alone is real. The material cause is the only reality, and the effects in association with names and forms are all unreal.” Madhva by acute and penetrating analysis, explains that the passages consisting the key words “vacharambhana”, “vikara” etc. have again no reference to the reality or the unreality of the cosmos and its constituents. If certain texts occur in a particular context, they should all be gripped by the same comprehensive import, and it will be remembered that the preceding passages were interpreted to mean that “resemblance” makes known objects, and renders easy the passage from the known to the unknown or from the partially known to the fully known. The texts that succeed should work in the service of the same idea. They should be pressed into service to illustrate the same comprehensive import as the preceding texts, in virtue of the identity of context. Thus interpreted the “vacharambhana” text illustrates the truth that when a pre-eminent thing or idea is understood or grasped, the less-pre-eminent is as good as known and understood. For instance, the term “mrityika” followed by “iti” has reference by grammatical rule to the linguistic symbol. There are several languages. There are several linguistic symbols through the instrumentality of which object are designated. Of these the linguistic symbols pertaining to sanskrit which is the sacred or according to Madhva divine language, the parent of all languages, are permanent and dynamically fixed, whereas, other linguistic symbols are perishable and evanescent. When the Sanskrit language is known other languages are as good as known. Instead of Sanskrit, a modern student can substitute any other language which he considers the *lingua franca* of the world.

When the *lingua franca* is known and mastered, the other languages are as good as known, and the benefit which the subject would reap is the same. Instead of wasting one's time and energy in mastering the details and intricacies of many languages, it is economy and wisdom if one masters the pre-eminent *lingua franca*. Even so, a spiritual aspirant will do well to worship the Supreme Being and earn the grace of that Being in which case all the advantages, secular and spiritual worldly and other-worldly will be his as a matter of course. He need not worry himself with worshipping minor gods, or with the performance of dull, dreary, religious routine and ritual. The latter in themselves are not worthy of attention. They prepare the mind for receiving and reflecting spiritual illumination. Knowledge of the pre-eminent yields knowledge of the less-pre-eminent. Knowledge of God exhibits the cosmic objects in their true perspective. The "vacharambhana text" affords a confirmatory illustration in support of the thesis that the pre-eminent *lingua franca* known serves all the purposes of other minor languages being known. The text once more, does not support the doctrine of material causality of Brahman, nor does it countenance the theory that the effects are illusory and unreal phenomena.

Another interpretation is possible though it has no direct textual warrant or support. Examination of the linguistic mechanism reveals the fact that the language-symbols are comparatively mobile and in a state of flux. Languages are enriched by the coining and importation of new terms, and impoverished as well. There are petrified concepts, and dynamic ones. Changes in the material world and the objects of the cosmos do not occur as rapidly as changes in the linguistic mechanisms. Notwithstanding the changes in the linguistic mechanisms and symbols, the objects retain their identity. Even so, Brahman though variously called, and characterised, described and defined, is the same, one and Supreme Overlord of the Universe. Even according to the present interpretation, there is not the slightest evidence of any doubt about the reality of the cosmos and the plurality of objects, sentient and non-sentient.

The term "vacharambhana" is not connotative of illusoriness or unreality. It does not mean mere word without corresponding object. If it is to be squeezed into the strait-jacket of illusoriness, there should be the juxtaposition of the term "matra" (only) and "vacharambhana" should be "vacharambhanamatram". Unfortunately there is no "matram" in the text. If the text is to be interpreted just by a fiat, to mean that names and forms are unreal, the terms "namadheya" and "iti" are redundant. Why is the former used when all is well with the use of "vacharambhana"? Why is "iti" used—if the context is to convey the idea that clay is the only reality? According to the well established principles of Sanskrit Grammar, terms "mriddika-iti" juxtaposed in the order in which

they occur in the sacred text, would inevitably mean *not* the substance clay, but the *term* clay. That means the Sanskrit language is the pre-eminent unchanging language, and *qua* pre-eminent language when it is known and mastered, others less important and pre-eminent are as good as known. It will have to be admitted by the absolutist, unless all the canons of interpretation and grammar are to be repudiated and thrown to the four winds, that neither the context, requirements of relevancy, neither the text nor the term, would lend any support to the illusion-theory linked with the material causality of Brahman. Neither in the creation-text (srishti-vakya) nor in the knowledge-of-one-yielding-knowledge-of-all else text (eka-vijnayanena-sarva-vijnayana-vakya) nor even in the illustrative language—or naming—the objects texts (vacharambhana-vakya) is there any even the slightest justification for importation of the illusion-theory or the theory of unreality of the universe which is the outcome of the material causality of Brahman. Madhva winds up the discussion of the import of the “vacharambhana text” and the topic proper of the reality of the universe by emphasizing that the sixth chapter of the Chhandogya reveals not material causality of Brahman, and not therefore the concomitant unreality or the illusoriness of the effect which is the universe, and that the earlier and the later parts of the sixth chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad,—the former dealing with the reality of the cosmos, and the latter with Pluralism and difference among the countless entities that are the constituent elements of the cosmos,—delightfully stand or lie dovetailed into an interpretational unity which is a perfect harmony in itself.

### VIII

Madhva's interpretation of the sacred texts like the “Vacharambhana Sruti” EKA-VIJNYANENA-SARVA-VIJNYANA etc. is only part of the work to be accomplished by him. At best the interpretation negatively criticises the one urged by the Absolutist, and positively, sustains the pluralistic universe and metaphysics or the Realistic universe and metaphysics that are nearest the heart's desire of Madhva. Pressing the texts cited by an opponent-into service of one's own system of philosophy may doubtless be a nice dialectical device, but that will not exempt Madhva from the necessity of citing texts that openly and pronouncedly proclaim the doctrine of the reality of the Universe, and to the task therefore does Madhva address himself. The following are the texts cited by Madhva in direct support of his Realistic metaphysics. (1) Kavirmanishi etc. Yatha-tathyathorthan-vyadadhat-sasvateebhyah-samabhya” (2) “Yacchiketa-satyam” etc. (3) Viswam-satyam” etc. “Praghanvasya-satyasya-karanani-etc.” After citing vedic upanishadic and sruti texts, Madhva explains that the analogy of the dream-world and dream-phenomena about which much ado is made by the absolutist, will not

support the theory of the unreality of the universe. All phenomena endowed with reality which is their birthright are perceived eternally in their own nature and as they are, by the Supreme Being, and perceptual illusions, on analysis reveal either central or peripheral defects. They are exceptions which prove the general rule of reality of the Universe. *Exceptio probat regulam*. Exceptions do not invalidate a general law. If the universe is compared to dream-phenomena, the comparison is intended to emphasize that the former is under the control of the Supreme Being. In the light of the central doctrine of the supreme Overlordship of Vishnu, terms, like ASATYA take on new meanings in the contexts cited by Madhva. The term ASATYA does not mean unreal. "A" means Vishnu or the Supreme Overlord. "Satya" means reality. The meaning of the compound is that the reality of the cosmos of real constituent elements, is under the eternal guidance and overlordship, direction and control of the supreme Being.

Similarly, the term AVIDYA does not mean ignorance. It means the mysterious and wonderful power possessed by the Supreme Being by means of which He rules, and guides the destinies of the cosmos. AVIDYA, MAYA, PRAKRITI, NIYATI, MOHINI, etc., are terms that denote the mysterious power of the Supreme Being. The possession of the said power by the Infinite and the absence of its possession by the finite are rocks on which every variety of monistic metaphysic should be sooner or later wrecked. The difference between that which has the power to control the affairs of the cosmos and those who under the inverted bowl coopt, crawling, die, should certainly be fundamental and radical difference. Identity between the two is unthinkable.

If so what is the meaning of texts, passages like "AHAM-BRAHMASMI-SOHAMASMI-SA-EVAHAMAMSI" etc.? Madhva is emphatic that they have reference to the Immanent Supreme Power which the inner controller and inspirer of all finite beings i.e. the ANATARYAMI—inner inspirer, the immanent censor. God-intoxicated persons and prophets all the world over have proclaimed themselves to be divine, and as powerful as godhead itself. Such phenomena are not known in modernest religious denominational organisation, though organisations are condemned, and assertions like "I am God-head" etc. should be interpreted to convey the meaning that one in moments of deep religious fervour, feels (working in close association with the Infinite consciously felt, and turning himself with the will and pleasure of the Infinite,) as if he is entitled to exclaim "I am God-head" All the vedic texts proclaim only difference between the finite and the Infinite. At the same time they proclaim that the Infinite is full of all virtues, infinite number of infinite attributions etc. A technical objection is possible that harmony among the

texts cannot be secured if they have to discharge the dual duties of proclaiming difference and fullness of attributes. The splitting-up of texts is inevitable. Some would convey difference between the finite and the Infinite. Others would emphasize fullness of attributes. Madhva's answer is that there is no danger of sentence-splitting or text-splitting. When the texts proclaim the fullness of attributes, in the *very act* difference between the finite and the Infinite is guaranteed. "Bheda" or difference is the "Svarupa" of the Lord. Difference from the finite is the fundamental constituent of Divine Essence. If not the divinity of the Divine would be seriously compromised or jeopardised. Interpretational harmony is secured as in the very act of the textual confirmation of the fullness of attributes of the Infinite, Its difference from the rest of the cosmos is affirmed.

To safeguard and maintain this interpretational harmony passages which emphasize identity between the finite and the Infinite should be considered to be rhetorical and made to surrender their surface import. The "antaryami" doctrine which pushes into prominence Divine Immanence that is eternal, is indeed as intriguing as interesting. It cannot help Monism or Absolutism, Mystic or Monistic Absolutism. The very concept of Immanence implies difference between the Supreme that is immanent, and the finite agents and objects in which the Supreme is Immanent. To secure the maintenance intact of a social system of mutual communication, we have throughout the world a complicated network of linguistic symbols. Language and grammar have brought into existence an elaborate scheme of symbols, terminations, roots etc., the sole object of which is to render intelligible the various ways and means in which the subject adjusts itself to the environment. X beats Y. Grammar insists on certain fixed arrangements of the parts of speech to render this thrashing intelligible to society. Similarly, as may easily be seen, all the cases, parts of speech, inflections, conjugations, etc. reflect age-long convention, and are conventional—but none the less scientific—symbols which adequately tell the tale of man's adjustment to his surroundings. But wait. The activity of man is under the eternal direction and control of the Supreme Being, who is immanent in all objects and persons of the cosmos. Who then is the real and genuine author of man's activity? Not surely man. He has but derivative independence. Though apparently, to mortal eyes, man seems to be the author of activity resulting in adjustments to environmental demands the real agent, the author of man's thought, feeling and volition is the Supreme Being Who directs the various relationships in which man stands to his environment. So, the first second and third person forms, the numbers, genders, cases et hoc, all primarily refer only to the Supreme Being Who directs the affairs of the cosmos. Vain man, success-intoxicated, goes to the extent of arrogating to himself power and independence which are not his. A religious soul on the other hand sees



that it is the Immanent Supreme Power Which moves him and makes him act. When all cases, conjugations, etc. refer to the Supreme, there is no wonder or impropriety in the "Aham"—"I"—being considered to be "Brahman". In the lower man the assertion "I am Brahman" is mere braggadocio. In the mouth of the genuine spiritual aspirant the statement means that he is under the eternal vigilance and censorship of the Supreme Being. He has attuned himself to the Supreme so intimately that he can venture on the assertion that he is Brahman or the Supreme Being. Madhva has shown already that the texts proclaiming difference between the finite and the Infinite are more powerful and guaranteed by a consensus of the *Pramanas*, the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge, and as such they are puissant enough to compel the texts that affirm identity between the two to surrender their surface interpretation and import. The latter only mean that the universe is energising, and living only on account of the life-force eternally supplied by the Immanent, Supreme Being,—the supply ofcourse will be cut off the moment the Karmic bell rings the knell of parting entities—and they can never mean any identity between the finite and the Infinite. If on the other hand real identity between the two is claimed to be the real import of the texts it is not supported by the experience of aspirants nor by corroborative evidence

To cite a very simple instance, a man says to teach a child or to meet some such situational demand, that "Fire burns". It is the property of fire to burn. It is the property of a rose to smell sweet. But, it is surely permissible—that is a view-point to the heights of which the ordinary pound-shilling man will never rise—to argue that pious and religious souls to whom mundane gains and values do not matter, will say,—not surely to teach a child or to meet mundane demands which have ceased to attract and trouble them,—that the Immanent Power burns, smells etc. In the mouth of one who has realised Divine Immanence, this statement or assertion has deep and profound philosophical significance. All texts and passages which affirm "I am Brahman" converge towards the central truth that all the activities of the "I" (not merely activities, but the innermost thoughts and feelings as well, nay, the very life of the 'I') are directed and energised by the Supreme Being who is Immanent in "I" and the entire cosmos. Madhva has thus pointed out the texts in support of difference between the finite and the Infinite and suggested an authoritative re-interpretation of the texts that seem on a *prima facie* and superficial view to indicate identity between the two.

"Is it not all love's labour lost"? interrogates the Absolutist. "The difference in support of which texts were cited by Madhva is only difference that is unreal, illusory and relegated to a lower degree of reality. Is it to establish something of a

lower degree of reality that so much trouble was taken to cite texts?" Such an interrogation is really pointless. Earlier in the discussion and elsewhere, Madhva has established by means of ratiocination and reasoning that difference is the foundational fact of reality. Difference, he has pointed out already is the solid and unshakeable foundation on which the realistic and pluralistic Metaphysics has been constructed. Difference which is the fundamental constituent of the cosmos automatically necessitates a Pluriverse or a pluralistic Universe. Difference is ("Dharmisvarupa") the basic form and structure of entities of the cosmos. All this has been argued out at length previously. But now the interrogation is anticipated to have matters made clearer and to cite the appropriate sacred texts once more to make assurance doubly sure in the matter of establishing the thesis that difference is the foundational fact of reality, analysis of which will reveal only difference, till the analyst rests with difference, having commenced his analytical career with difference. Difference is *sui generis*. It is futile to attempt to explain it in terms of anything which is not difference. Difference is foundational. It is the stuff of which reality is constituted. The sruti passages cited in support of difference are these—1. Satyamenamanuvismadamanti etc. 2. Satyasso-asya-mahima. 3. Satya-atma-satyojivah-satyam-bhida-maivaru-vanyo etc. 4. Atma-hi-paramasvatantrah etc.

The absolutist contends that difference spoken of in the foregoing passages is of a lesser degree of reality. Brahman is the only reality with the fullest degree. That full reality is emphasized by passages like "Aham-brahmasmi" - I am Brahman- and in the light of the latter, the interpretation of the former should be that the difference spoken of is only of a lower order or lesser degree. To this, Madhva replies that when difference is shown to be ruling supreme even in the state of final liberation, *a fortiori*, its pre-eminence in the stage of earthly existence or the stage of non-realisation of Brahman, is guaranteed and established. 1. Sosnute-sarvankaman-saha-brahmana 2. Anandamayamatmana-mupasankramya. 3. Brahmatvovadati-jatavidyam 4. Param-jyotirupasampadya. 5. Sa-tatraparyeti etc. 6. Yatratvasya-sarva-matmaiva-abhuut-tat-kena-kam-pasyet. 7. Udakam-suddhe-suddhamasiktam-tadrigevabhavati. 8. Niranjana-paramam-sanyamupaiti. 9. Akshanvantah-karnavantah. 10. Isamasritya-tishtanti. 11. Mamasadharmanyamagatah. 12. Jagadvyaparavarjam. 13. Prakara-naśasanihitatvatcha. These are the texts (15) that proclaim the existence of difference between the Supreme Being and the released souls

According to the Absolutist, it is admitted for the sake of argument that a lower order of reality is assigned to the world

as its manifestation is due to ignorance. But the texts point out that difference persists even in the stage of final realisation. Among the many arguments indicated one is unanswerable. The Vedānta-sūtra "Jagad-vyaparavarjam" clinches the matter. While describing the greatness achieved by Released souls, the author of the Vedānta Sūtras is quite emphatic and positive that whatever the extraordinary powers gained by Released souls as the result of their having attained perfection after riddance of karmic effects, good and evil, they do not succeed in gaining such a power as to be creators of the cosmos. The "Jagad-vyapara" the activity of creating the world or the cosmos must and does for ever remain beyond the achievement of Released souls. Souls do perfect themselves and attain freedom from the recurring cycles of births and deaths. That is the maximum of spiritual advancement they are entitled to. They cannot succeed and they do not in gaining the power to create the cosmos. That power is possessed only by the Supreme Being. The śruti texts clearly mention that it is the Supreme Being that guides the destinies of the cosmos.

The possession and non-possession of the power to create cosmos are very significant criteria, and in the light of them the Supreme Being which has that power and Released souls which do not have it must be different from one another. It can be easily argued out. It is unphilosophical to admit or postulate a plurality of creators of the cosmos even in a pluralistic system of metaphysics. Plurality of creators would mean a plurality of conflicting wills and schemes, and cosmos will not be evolved out of the conflict in question. Only one Supreme Being is the creator, and this creatorship is not shared even by Released Spirits. Difference then based on the solid bed-rock of non-possession by Released Souls of the creatorship, between the Supreme Being and Released Souls even in the state of final liberation, is proof positive that the said difference between the two is not one to be relegated to a lower order or a lesser degree of reality. As the influences of ignorance which alone are responsible for manifestations of lesser orders and degrees of reality have been eradicated or should have been, in the final state of realisation, destroyed root and branch, the difference touching Released Souls, which characterises that state, will have to be regarded as final and unridable, unridable because, the final state does not mean merging of finite personalities in the Absolute, but only realisation of the inherent bliss to which they are entitled.

It is possible to anticipate another objection that Mukti or final realisation in which difference persists is "Aparamukti" or release of a lower order, but until satisfactory evidence is let in, to demonstrate that difference does not persist in the state of release, and until evidence again is let in to prove that

there is a "Paramukti" in which difference does not exist, the sacred texts cited and ratiocination, point only to the existence of state of release in which differences among the released souls prevails and is bound to prevail as a matter of fact, on account of the stern and stubborn fact of their inability and incapacity to participate in the creation of the cosmos, and on account of difference too among themselves, in matters of spiritual energy, endeavour and effort put forth, and above all in the intrinsic ability to enjoy the state each in its own way.

Madhva is wrong in quoting the Upanishadic text "Kena-kimpasyet" etc. in support of his thesis that even in the state of final release, 'difference' persists—contends the Absolutist, for the meaning of the passage is that when the sensory mechanisms etc. due to the influence of Avidya, exist in life prior to release, difference is perceived. When however the influence of ignorance (of Avidya) is got rid of in release, the sensory channels etc. of the bondage-state vanish and excepting pure existence, there is nothing to be known in that state, nothing at all except identity which cannot be squeezed into conceptual moulds. How can this text be cited with any show of reason by Madhva to prove his doctrine or thesis that even in the state of release, difference persists?

Madhva and his commentator maintain that if the texts are dispassionately considered in the proper context and sequence, it will not be difficult to see that the passage in question has no manner of relevant or logical connection with the negation of knowledge in the state of release. The term "Kim" in the text is not indicative of interrogation. On the other hand it means, — as is usual in rhetorical—flourish like do you say there is no type of knowledge in the final state?—that there is knowledge even in that state, as otherwise the state would not be worth striving for.

The context indicated is the well-known metaphysical dialogue between Yajnyavalkya and Maitreyi. The latter is not satisfied with the account of final release given by the former, and expresses unfeigned surprise on learning that the state of final liberation for which so many strive would be no better than the Dead Sea Fruit as it involves or indicates absence of all knowledge and merely a blank. She rightly asks her lord if he is not trying to plunge her in darkness by telling that there is no knowledge in the state of release. If that is all the philosophy her lord has to teach her she will have none of it, as that state of blank is not *summum bonum* "Purushartha" to be striven for by rational man or woman.

The dissatisfaction felt by Maitreyi can be removed only if the assurance could be given that knowledge, feeling and volition are spiritualised in the state of release and purged of all their baser associations, and taints. The text therefore must mean a rhetorical flourish with an affirmation for an answer. The rhetorical query is

—By what means can the knower be known? etc. Or do you say that the knower cannot be known in that state? The answer is “Most certainly can he be known and is as a matter of fact known. Otherwise the state can never be the spiritual ideal that is to be striven for.” The released soul is described to be “Anucchitti-Dharma” i.e. one who retains intact attributes, qualities etc. “Ucchitti” means eradication. The attributes, qualities, and features, know no eradication in the state of final liberation. If these were not retained intact resplendent with added spiritual hue, the final state will not be worth striving for. To meet the perfectly natural and legitimate objection of Maitreyi, Yajnyavalkya assures her that far from being a blank, the state of final liberation indicates a fullness and richness of attributes and values inconceivable in the state of bondage. Such spiritual fullness cannot be described, but it should be lived and experienced.

Maitreyi wonders if her lord is not trying to plunge her in darkness, and her lord assures her as a spiritual teacher is expected to do. Why not understand Maitreyi as pointing out a discrepancy between two texts—“Vijnayana Ghana” and “Na pretya Samjnyasti” i.e. which mean respectively “that the self is full of knowledge,” and “it loses all awareness after death,” that is reconciled by the explanation that the former text refers to the live state while the latter to the state after death? asks the absolutist, and why not her complaint about being plunged in darkness relate to this very discrepancy? Madhva’s commentator explains that if that objection were valid, the three sentences, namely “don’t plunge me in darkness” by saying that the “self is full of knowledge” and yet “does not retain a trace of it even after death” will have to be juxtaposed in quick and unbroken succession, but as a matter of fact however, the complaint about Maitreyi being plunged in darkness appears only in connection with Yajnyavalkya’s assertion about the released soul being devoid of all qualities, attributes etc. and canons of interpretation require that her complaint has to be dealt with only in connection with that particular text. So it has been dealt with in Yajnyavalkya’s answer that in the final state of release or state of final liberation or release, attributes persist in their spiritual fullness.

The points in the Maitreyi-Yajnyavalkya dialogue can be progressively summed up thus. 1. In the state of samsaric life, the self comes into contact with a nervous system, made up of the elements, and when the latter is dissolved, it is said to “die” as it is said to be “born” in the former case. 2. In the state of release, the associations and influences relating to the elements cease. They are eradicated. With their eradication “Vritti-jnyana” knowledge engendered by association with nervous mechanism, and life and death are also eradicated. 3. Maitreyi desiring to gain perfect and accurate knowledge about the state of final liberation, complains that by speaking of eradication her lord is trying to plunge her in darkness. 4. Yajnyavalkya replies that

he is not trying to plunge anybody in darkness, but on the other hand it is Maitreyi who misunderstood his observation, as eradication is only of the influences of association with a nervous system composed of the elements and not eradication of all qualities etc. 5. Further to enlighten her, Yajnyavalkya refutes all the rival hypotheses relating to the state of final liberation. By the term "Avinasi" he refutes the Buddhistic conception of release *qua* annihilation of personality; by the term "Anucchitti Dharma" he refutes the Vaisheshika conception of the release *qua* cessation of "Atmavishesha-guna" special attributes of self. 6. Finally he refutes the absolutistic conception of release *qua* pure existence. 7. The refutation is rendered telling and effective by analysis of the term "Dvaita" which on any splitting up means the persistence of spiritualised attributes in the state of release. 8. As a matter of fact the texts are quite emphatic that difference persists between any two of the countless released souls, on the one hand and the free souls and Brahman on the other. Let alone other considerations. Even in the release-state a finite individual knows and realises that after all his spiritual labours have not been in vain and that they have been crowned with success. There is the awareness or realisation that X who was an erring struggling individual has attained to perfection and release. 9. In addition to the knowledge about individual's own self, there is certainly knowledge about the All-merciful Providence by whose grace, select individuals after many struggles and efforts, attain to perfection. In the absence of this knowledge coupled with eternal and undying gratitude, individuals would be guilty of deep dereliction of spiritual duty. 10. There is knowledge of the state of releases itself which has been reached after very rigorous spiritual discipline. Otherwise how is one to distinguish between the state of bondage and that of release, should there be no knowledge of the latter? Knowledge of that state there must be. Otherwise release would cease to be. 11. The conclusion is therefore inevitable that the Sruti text "Yatratvasya" etc. means not the complete absence of knowledge etc. from the released state, but only emphatically that the state of release is not one devoid of knowledge etc.

May be. "But" contends the absolutist again "there is another text "Natu-tad-dvitiyamasti" etc., which proves the absence of all difference from the state of release, on the analogy of the state of sleep, in which the inoperativeness of the forces of ignorance that determine the waking state, cause only a blank, and *a fortiori*, a blank is assured in the state of release when all traces of ignorance are eradicated. So there is really no difference persisting in the state of release". Madhva completely and fully throws overboard this contention and reinterprets the text in the following manner. The context speaks of the state of

sleep. Adjustments to waking conditions and environmental demands cause fatigue. The self should recover energy for the next day's work. Sleep is that condition in which the self comes into contact with the central cosmic reservoir of energy--Brahman--and refills itself with power for the next day's work. With a deep religious and mystic conviction, Madhva interprets the text to mean that Brahman assumes various forms and presides over various physiological functions going on in the various nerves and nerve cells, centers etc. It is easy to see that this control by a Deity can be dispensed with and has to be in a scientific analysis of the nervous system. But there is nothing *infra dig* if a mystic temperament would assume control by Deity of the nervous system. There is really no difference among the various forms assumed by the Supreme Being to be here, there and everywhere in the nervous systems of finite beings fatigued by the day's work and adjustments to demands of environment, in order to replenish them with energy for the next day's work. A well-trained mystic may realise the presence of the Infinite in him. Absence of difference has really been predicated of the various forms assumed by the Supreme Being to conduct, guide, intimately initiate and take to the desired end, the bio-chemical tissue-building processes that go on in the nervous systems. The Supreme Being is certainly conscious of personal identity as the only Agent responsible for the reconstructive processes and there is no one to deprive God of His functions. At the same time the Supreme Being sees that the world of finite spirits is different needing Its loving care and attention. The passage thus means not the absence of all difference from the state of deep sleep, but perception of personal identity of Himself by the Supreme Brahman as Director of the reconstructive tissue-building processes going on in the nervous system, and the conception as well of difference among the finite spirits and objects of the cosmos the destinies of which are guided by the Supreme Being. It is perhaps permissible to contend that your perception or mine may be erroneous or wrong. To err is human. But the perception of the Supreme Being is certainly infallible. It is never disturbed by illusions and hallucinations. What appears in the perception of the Supreme Being has the birthright of reality. They are obtuse-visioned indeed who claim that there is no difference in the state of release or bondage. But for the protective aid and rendered by the Supreme Lord, the finite beings cannot live even for a moment. Identity between the finite and the Infinite is thus unthinkable. Perception of difference is shared by the finite as well as the Infinite. Even granting for the sake of never-ending perversity of speculation, that the experience and perceptions of the finite are fallible and unreliable, those of the Supreme Being are infallible and reliable and difference that appears as a constituent element in Divine perception can never be rejected. To the modernist question—"How

do we know anything about the nature and constituents of Supreme Being's perception? the obvious answer is that the sacred text mentions the characteristics of the Supreme Being and in matters not accessible to human senses, sacred texts are the only sources and guarantees of correct knowledge.

The released souls do and must have similar perceptions. For one thing release cannot be a bewildering or babyish blank. X who has secured release from the recurring cycles of births and deaths would undoubtedly see that he has secured what he wanted and he is now enjoying the fruits of his spiritual labours. He would look back too on the almost interminable track of births and deaths strewn with many a wreckage, from which he has leapt into paradise with a sigh of relief. He would perceive difference between his previous and the present states and he would be aware of his colleagues in state of release, and others whom he had left behind struggling for release. Above all he would be eternally grateful to the Supreme Being for the grace showered on him to bring about his release. Knowledge of self, awareness of the refined hedonistic joy of release, and realisation of the glory of the Supreme Being are the unriddable constituents of the mental and intellectual compose of released spirits. Perception of difference is thus inevitable in the state of release.

The Sruti texts are not the utterances of persons *non-compos mentis*. They are sacred and sensible, revealed yet rational. Why should then the expression be "Drashtuh-drishteh" etc.? The vision of the seer is never erroneous. Why should it be explicitly stated "vision of the seer"? There cannot be any vision of the blind or otherwise optically incapacitated. The object is to make the readers realise that even in the state of final liberation, there is the distinction between the seer, seen and seeing. It is futile to expect the annihilation of the said distinction in the state of release. The genitive case "drashtuh" is deliberately used in the text to convey the truth that the state of final release or liberation is not one of difference-less, distinction-less, blank, but one in which distinctions, differences etc. persist. In the securing of the objects of the world, and in the appreciation of the values, there is the feeling of satisfaction that as the result of putting forth of volition, and as the outcome of the energising of the volitional individuality, certain pleasurable experiences have been ours and in the absence of difference between want and satisfaction, there would be an end to all initiative and effort. When this state of affairs prevails here and now, when a felt need is the dynamic motive force for activity, and when a need is experienced as distinct and different from its satisfaction, there is no wonder that in the state of final liberation from the ills that samsaric existence is heir to, there should be perception of difference between intense spiritual satisfaction secured after unabated energy and effort, and the need,



and there should be awareness of personal identity, of the Supreme Being through the instrumentality of whose Grace, freedom has been secured, and of released souls admitted to the same fraternity and of countless other spirits that are still struggling for the attainment of freedom and so on. The sruti text is quite positive in emphasizing that the perception of a realistic and pluralistic universe, even in the state of release from bondage is inevitable and unriddable. It is not a state of blank in which nought is perceived.

"What about the text" asks the Absolutist, "which explicitly states that the finite attains identity with the Infinite-Karmant-vijnanamayascha-atma-pare-avyaye-sarva-ekeebhavanti?" Madhva interprets the texts in the following manner. There are *fifteen* factors that are responsible for the encasement enmeshment of the pure spirit in a nervous system and continued existence. The factors have presiding deities. The good and bad acts performed by the individual are termed "Karma" and Karma has its own presiding deity. The factors and the presiding deities are responsible for the mundane career with recurring births and deaths of the individuals. At the time of final liberation the deities and the finite self find themselves in a state of perfectly attuned harmony with Divine Intellect, a harmony unknown in mundane career. This harmony with Divine will is explained in the text but not identity between the finite and the Infinite.

In the mundane career or career in the pre-liberation existence, actions of finite individuals cannot always be said to have been in tune with Divine intellect and will. Acts entailing divine displeasure would have been done. The presiding deities too would have directed such acts according to the previous stock of the Karma of the individual, and in the state of release there is no longer any disharmony or discord, between divine intellect and finite intellect. Perfect attunement with the Divine is the result. On account of the riddance of all evil, the finite self becomes after release so spiritually transparent as to reveal accurately and faithfully divine intellect.

The prayer of an aspirant is—let my desires, inclinations, acts be such as to commend themselves to the Supreme Spirit. Let there be perfect attunement between mine and Divine intellect. Let me know His Will and carry it out. Let me not do anything which would make me look sinful and unholy in God's eyes.

Or it may be that the text cited signifies residence of the released spirits in the Holy Abode of God. The "ekeebhava" or Oneness is not identity between the finite and the Infinite, but has reference only to attunement or harmony between the intellect of the released soul and that of the Supreme Being, or identity of place of residence after release. Whichever the interpretation

that may ultimately command the approval of the critical fraternity of modernest researchers, one thing is certain that the text does not and cannot mean absolute identity between the finite and the Infinite. Why not? Madhva mentions the following objections against and improprieties in the interpretation of it as indicating absolute identity between the finite and the Infinite. (1) In the first place, even on the absolutist's own showing, there cannot be any identity between Karma—inanimate—and Brahman—the animate of animates. It is permissible to speak of identity between animates and animates or between inanimates and inanimates, but surely the talk of identity between animate of animates (Brahman) and inanimate (karma) is too wild to need any serious refutation. (2) If, on the other hand, the term "Ekeebhavanti" should be taken to mean negated or denied or stultified after the dawn of true knowledge, then, there is absolutely no reason why the "Vijnyanatma" the finite self also should not be negated at the dawn of true knowledge, leaving only a state of blank to be reached at the end of spiritual endeavour. (3) If again "Ekeebhavanti" means riddance by knowledge, there is no reason why "karma" should be mentioned independently, and being itself a "kala" (finite-existence-engendering-factor) it should have been included in the previous list and the text should have been "shodasa-kalah" (sixteen factors.) (4) Further the text as it stands, states that the fifteen factors disappeared ("gatah,") while "Karma" and "Vijnyanatma" are said to become one. This difference in predication is futile and purposeless if the absolutistic interpretation be true that they are all negated at the dawn of true knowledge. Either riddance or oneness would suffice. Why both? (5) The juxtaposition between "Karma" and "vijnyanamaya" is again fruitless, if stultification is all that is aimed at and that could be indicated by a single predicate with "all" as the subject intending the inclusion of any number of objects under it. (6) If riddance be the primary meaning, then there is no sense in immediately affirming that something which is got rid of by knowledge is one with something else. For instance no one ever affirms oneness between illusory silver which is negated by true knowledge—This is not silver—and the piece of mother-of-pearl. Similarly, Karma etc. negated at dawn of true knowledge cannot be affirmed to be one with Brahman the substratum which sustains the superimposition of illusory experience. (7) The locative case "Pare-Avyaye" must indicate only difference between the finite and the Infinite. X enters into a state of oneness with Y. The two will have to be different from one another. Otherwise the locative case in sanskrit would be nugatory. As it is used, there is no reason why its birthright of grammatical interpretation should be denied or surrendered. If indeed, the oneness after the heart's desire of the absolutist were intended by the text, it should have been "Karmani-vijnyanamayascha-atma-para-eva-bhavanti" and not "pare

avyayc-ckee-bhavanti " as you actually have it. " Karma and other factors *become* the Absolute" should have been the wording of the text. But not surely they become one *in* the Absolute. With the locative as it is, we gain the natural interpretation. The members of the pluralistic universe or the pluriverse, warring entities and repellent particles, each pursuing antagonistic lines of activity and courses of conduct after they reach their original spiritual abode in the kingdom of God, after they come face to face with the Supreme Being, the Ruler of the Universe, so attune themselves in conformity with Divine Knowledge, and Will that they appear to be one individual. The oneness lies in the members of the pluralistic Universe, unfailingly seeing what would commend itself to Divine Pleasure and pursuing it, and *not* in annihilation of the personalities and individualities of the finite members of the pluralistic universe, in a *merger* in the Absolute.

On account of the foreshadowed interpretational and grammatical misfits obvious in the elucidation of the text by the absolutist, oneness has to be understood only as the finite's attunement to Divine Knowledge and Will. The attunement is not in any manner signficatory of Omniscience. That is the property of the Supreme Being—only One without a second. What then is the essence of this attunement? In the state of recurring cycles of births and deaths, individuals act arrogating to themselves freedom, omniscience etc. in moments of success-intoxication. They do not stop to consider that if their acts are such as would command the approval of the Supreme Lord of the Universe—the cosmic censor—who can neither be bought off nor hoodwinked. In that state again, individuals act coming into conflict with one another and with the Almighty Himself. There is perfect harmony or attunement in the spiritual Democracy of Free spirits in the stage of final liberation. Secular democracy is a sanctimonious simulacrum as it obtains at the present day even in the most democratic of countries. It is a democracy firmly grounded on self-interest and exploitation of the weak by the strong, but the democracy of final liberation is one based on the riddance of evil and roots of evil, after which all selves act in unison with Divine Desire. Clash and conflict for ever cease in that state. The locative "Pare" has then the fullest interpretational significance according to Madhva. In the Divine Cosmic Ruler, they all become one who were not one before. That is the literal translation. Oneness or identity with Supreme is not shared by finite selves. In fact after having realised His Nature and earned His Grace, they act in unison in the final state of liberation. The subjects of the predicate "become one," are the released souls whose wills become attuned with that of God. Warring individuals and repellent particles realise a double harmony in that stage. In the first place as free released spirits members of a fraternity of pilgrims marching to the kingdom of God, they see no conflicts of interests among themselves and as recipients of the Grace of God, they are all

one body and their post-release behaviour knows only harmony and nought else. Secondly they see with a crystal-clear vision, which can be attained only after release from cosmic bondage, what the will of the Lord is and there reigns perfect attunement among their wills and the will of the Lord. More strictly it is "Buddhi sarruopya"—intellectual attunement, which of course must extend to emotional and volitional attunement by implication, and as already pointed out the attunement is absolutely no evidence whatever, of the released souls merging their individuality in the Absolute, nor is it evidence of the former sharing the Omniscience of the Latter. Or in all the passages where oneness or identity appears to be indicated, the meaning may be oneness *qua* residing in the same place or locality. Of course, God is Immanent everywhere, here and there. This pre-realisation intellectual awareness of immanence is of no use. It is the realisation of the presence of the Infinite in the post-release state that is spiritually significant. It may be blessed and beautiful souls and spirits enjoy bliss in the abode of the Divine Lord wherever that abode be. Just as favoured individuals know and enjoy Government House hospitality or royal hospitality in places to which the man in the street has no access at all, even so, released souls may be understood to enjoy Divine Grace in Heavenly regions to which the sinner and the truant have no access.

The reasons are plain. It cannot be "svarupaikya" or identity by merger of and loss of individuality in the Absolute. Even a "mukta" released soul is different from the Supreme Being, in two striking particulars. In the first place, the Supreme Being is "svatantra" independent with complete, unalloyed and unqualified independence. Whereas the released souls are still, even in the stage of release, under the direction and control of the Supreme Being. Secondly the Supreme Being is "purna" Full, the Immanent Whole, while the released souls are not. It is idle to contend if released souls are at liberty to do whatever they please, they may act in defiance of the Supreme Being and so on. No. They do not. As there is perfect and complete attunement among the intellect of released souls who see what is commendable to the Lord, there cannot be any conflict or defiance as suggested and even in the stage of release the free-spirits do see that they are under the control of the Supreme Being, in the contemplation, (untrammelled and unhindered by alien considerations and distractions) of Whose Infinite number of Infinite attributes they spend their post-release existence. To clinch the matter, the texts are quite definite and unequivocal in emphasizing that on account of the fundamental and basic inability of the free or released souls to participate in the creation of the cosmos, first, and on account, secondly, of the non-possession by them of Fullness and Independence, they must be different from the Supreme Being identity with Whom is not practical politics even in the state of release.

The absolutist now turns his attention to a text which states "Brahma-veda-Brahmaiva-Bhavati" that he who knows Brahman becomes Brahman and queries whether that is not irrefutable evidence in support of absolute identity between the finite and the Infinite. Madhva maintains that the text on closer scrutiny will be seen to mean something quite different from the fond, futile, fads of the absolutist. After practising a prolonged process of spiritual discipline, an aspirant knows the real and true nature of Brahman which he had learnt from texts, before realisation, and after realisation the free soul resembles the Supreme Being in certain respects, while in others as pointed out above, he is still radically and fundamentally different from Brahman. It is this resemblance that is emphasized by the text. X knows Y. This knowledge makes X resemble Y in some particulars. The knowledge does not annihilate the individuality of X, nor does it indicate any merger of the former with the latter. In the secular concerns of life, it is ordinarily said that one who is intimate with a chief or king is the chief or the king for all practical purposes. In that sense a free soul that comes into intimate contact with the Supreme Being may be just spoken of with pardonable rhetorical exaggeration as the Supreme Being and the only natural interpretation of the text is that knowledge gained by an aspirant confers on him certain powers which are akin to those possessed by the Supreme Being, but not absolute identity. There can be no talk of absolute identity as explained above on account of the independence of free souls on the Supreme Being.

An analogy will make matters clearer. There is a familiar saying that members of the other communities who worship a Brahmin with devotion, become themselves Brahmins. For instance it is said that a *Sudra* becomes *Brahmin* when he worships the latter. No personal identity or merger of the one in the other is or can be indicated or intended here. It only means such worship confers spiritual efficacy on non-brahmins. Suppose such worship is shown to stand to one's credit. Neither Society nor the State would recognise a sudra to be a brahman in virtue of that. Even so, no identity or merger is intended in the text. The released souls approach Brahman but never become identical with It.

In modernised or anglicised India or oriental countries, adoption by orientals of occidental way of life, sartorial, dietetic, romantic et hoc is a familiar spectacle and notwithstanding knowledge of and intimacy with occidental modes of existence there is no talk of identity between the two. That it as it should be. Such anglicisation or occidentalisation only connotes the oriental's approach to the occidental. To compare great things with small, a free soul is the oriental and John Bull or Uncle

Sam the occidental Brahman! and so on and so forth on however odious and blasphemous of the comparison.

Madhva seeks to overthrow the absolutistic interpretation of the text by pointing out divergence as well in readings adopted and the point is just mentioned as the opponent may not feel bound by divergent readings. "Paramam-Brahma-Veda-Brahmaiva-bhavati" is the reading adopted.

He who knows and realises the true nature of the Supreme Brahman becomes spiritually full, approximating to Brahman. That would be the interpretation according to the altered reading adopted. Realising however that the reading suggested by one party will not be accepted readily by the other, Madhva attempts a different interpretation of the text retaining it as it stands. "*Brahma-veda-Brahmaivabhavati*". The first *Brahman* means the Supreme Spirit. The second stands for the finite self. No doubt the finite spirit is able by means of severe discipline and spiritual practices to approximate to God in whose image he is said to have been made, but approximation is the best achievement of the finite. The finite does *not* cease to be *finite even* after release. It is still dependent on the Supreme. Though approximating to the Supreme Brahman, the finite retains its finitude even in the state of release. *Brahmaiva-bhavati* means the finite continues to be finite notwithstanding release secured after strenuous spiritual endeavour. There is no cleavage between the finite and the Infinite, in certain respects. The finite approximates to the Infinite and comes face to face with It. But the former never obtains any identity with the latter nor does it realise an identity with it already existent but obscured by ignorance. The only relevant question in connection with this interpretation is whether usage permits the employment of the term *Brahma* generally associated with the Supreme Being to denote the finite. Madhva cites the relevant texts to prove that there is such a usage. All finite spirits are called "Brahma." Those that have obtained release from cosmic bondage are styled "Para-Brahma." Neither the released spirits nor Maha-Lakshmi, the Lord's consort, will ever reach the greatness of the Supreme Being—Sri Vishnu—who is unique and whose eminence and majesty are unapproachable.

There is yet one more objection to be answered. "The text" contends the absolutist "*Brahmaiva-san-Brahmapyati*" "is definite and unequivocal. Though the Finite is Brahman Itself, the Brahmanhood is obscured by ignorance in pre-release state. After release from cosmic bondage, the Brahmanhood is realised in all its resplendence." Madhva replies that this text has to be re-interpreted on the lines already suggested. If X is already X, there is no meaning in the assertion that X-hood is obscured and then realised. The assertion that being X it |becomes| X is on

the dangerous borderland of tautology. In sleep as well as in the state of release, the finite selves reach the Infinite without surrendering their finitude which is their birthright—inalienable cosmic birthright. A rough analogy may be mentioned. When the Sun shines in its fullest splendour and glory, other luminous heavenly bodies shine too, though the latter are not discernible. Non-discernment is no evidence of non-existence. Under proper conditions of perception or realisation, other luminous bodies shine in their own light. Even so the released souls in the presence of the Infinite are swept away by the brilliance of the latter. Under proper conditions, they shine in their own spiritual light. Just as the luminous bodies are not identical with the Sun, and just as there is no merger of the former in the latter, even so, finite spirits retain their individuality intact even after release, and there is no merger of the finite into the Infinite.

By the foregoing examination of some leading and representative texts which seem to lend support to the absolutistic interpretation of identity between the finite and the Infinite, Madhva maintains that all other texts wherever found which seem to favour the absolutistic interpretation of identity between the finite and the Infinite, should be re-interpreted to mean that the terms "identity," "Oneness" etc., are used just to signify approximation of finite spirits to the Infinite, in virtue of the spiritual endeavour and efforts put forth by aspirants and to indicate the intimacy that is possible to attain to with the Infinite. If not textual and interpretational inconsistencies and incongruities would arise as pointed out above. It is apparent that when in the transaction of the secular concerns of life two or more persons having common interests are spoken of as one just to emphasize their intimacy, it is certainly permissible and in order for the texts to proclaim that in view of the spiritual intimacy between the finite and the Infinite, their oneness can be asserted just as a matter of rhetorical stroke, or linguistic embellishment which would more forcibly and tellingly than anything else bring home to the minds of aspirants, the need that there is to transvalue the values of mundane existence and strenuously to endeavour to come face to face with the Supreme Being—the Overlord of the Cosmos. Concluding this portion of the discussion Madhva recapitulates the central doctrinal truths. (1) Even in the final state of liberation when all traces of root ignorance had been eradicated and wiped out there is difference among released souls themselves on the one hand and difference between them and the Infinite on the other. Difference persisting even in the state of final liberation cannot be light-heartedly dismissed as illusory or as possessing only a lesser or lower degree of reality. (2) *A fortiori* difference exists and genuinely must exist in the pre-release state in which we all live, move and have our being.

(3) Difference is the foundational fact of Reality. (4) Passages and texts which appear to proclaim oneness or identity between the finite and the Infinite should be understood as rhetorical. There is obviously the need for such rhetoric even in metaphysics. (5) Thus, the doctrine of identity or oneness between the finite and the Infinite is opposed to the letter and the spirit of the sacred texts.

Appeal to such texts will not commend itself to the modernest critical mentality. Madhva never expected it would. The Absolutist cites his own texts. Madhva cites his own. Who is to decide between the two? Madhva has explained no doubt that textual, contextual and interpretational exigencies require reinterpretation of the texts which emphasize identity between the finite and the Infinite, but he is quite alive to the fact that the same texts the reinterpretation of which he has suggested will still be cited by the absolutist as favouring the doctrine of identity. Citing scripture is a game at which both can play. The devil can cite scripture. So can the Angel. Though according to orthodox traditions, sacred texts are the final arbiters in matters of dispute relating to the nature of the Infinite, and the relationship between finite and Infinite, *yet*, in the interests of philosophical and rational stability in debate, the conclusions indicated and supported by sacred texts, should be reinforced by reason and ratiocination. Madhva devotes the next section of his work to a rational repudiation of the doctrine of identity between the finite and the Infinite.

Two procedures are usual in Indian Philosophical controversy. Reasoning and ratiocination are endless. Any thesis can be sought to be supported by reason. With equal validity and propriety, reason may be employed to secure the overthrow of the thesis. Where then is the end to controversy? To decide between the claims of rival thesis both supported by reason and ratiocination, appeal is made to sacred texts which not being traceable to any human authorship should be postulated to be free from all defects concomitant with human intellect, and human endeavour. The other procedure is something like the converse. There is the same amount of uncertainty in an appeal to sacred texts as there is in an appeal to reason. If the conclusions of the latter are seen to be unreliable in certain cases, those of the former sometimes share the same fate when faith is shaken in them. To make assurance doubly sure, it is always better to attempt a rational and ratiocinative justification of the conclusions indicated by the sacred texts. What applies to justification of a thesis, applies with equal force to a condemnation—criticism or refutation thereof. Madhva undertakes systematic refutation of the thesis of Absolutism (which he demonstrated in the earlier section had no sanction of or support in the sacred texts,) on the basis of reason and ratiocination.



Madhva's commentator sums up the different conclusions arrived at by slightly divergent sects of Absolutism, which while they display remarkable unanimity in tenacious championship of fundamental identity between the finite and the Infinite, exhibit differences in doctrinal details necessitated by the metaphysical exigencies of rendering clear and comprehensive the plurality and multiplicity that characterise the cosmos, notwithstanding the Monism and Absolutism adumbrated to be the basic truth of the world of organised and unorganised matter and spirit.

Some maintain absolute identity between the finite and the Infinite. To them Brahman devoid of all conceivable difference is the only reality. On account of ignorance of Its real nature, the plurality and multiplicity including God, self, world, etc., appear. This ignorance is a positive entity. Not a mere negative, absence of knowledge. It achieves a twofold purpose. It obscures the real nature of Brahman. It projects the cinema-show of cosmic plurality and multiplicity. The cosmos is just a (super-imposition) structure erected on the substratum of Brahman, etc. The essential oneness is realised after the dawn of true knowledge. Two sub-divisions are noted. (a) According to some, there is only one self which is the image or reflection of Brahman. Others are merely illusory. (b) According to others, a multiplicity of selves is admitted on the analogy of a multiplicity of reflected faces seen in many mirrors. (2) Others do not maintain or affirm Absolute identity between the finite and the Infinite, but only Bheda-abheda i.e., (not exactly identity-in-difference as the occidental terminology would suggest, but) identity-crossed difference or difference-crossed identity. Elements of both identity and difference are discernible—while the identity aspect is the real one, the aspect of difference is to be evaluated illusory or as having a lesser degree of reality. Three sub-divisions are noted of this class of absolute idealists. According to one sub-division, Brahman viewed under the aspect of Sat-sakti, (existence-power,) power *qua* existence or existence *qua* power, is the material cause of the cosmos and cosmic manifestations. Viewed under the aspect of intelligence-power, power *qua* intelligence or intelligence *qua* power, it reveals multiplicity of selves and the god of religion. Identity is real and difference is due to operation of an alien limiting, conditioning agency. The second subdivision makes out that the finite selves are parts of the Infinite, are sparks from the central flame. The third subdivision makes out that the finite selves are really and fundamentally identical with the Infinite. The identity is never impaired. Difference is neither illusory merely ideational without existential support in a non-ideational substratum or framework—nor due to limiting and conditioning agency or factor or factors or agencies—nor is it indicative of the part and whole or the spark-and-flame relationship.

But it is due to something else the nature of which is incomprehensible. The one Brahman *somehow*—Bradleyan Somehow, must come in handy in monistic metaphysical systems sooner or later—pluralises and multiplies itself. “How” and “Why” are futile enquiries. They cannot be satisfactorily answered on the human level of intellection and speculation. What is on the other hand required is the firm faith of an aspirant in the essential oneness and fundamental identity between the finite and the Infinite, which will surely be realised in due course.

## IX.

Of the varieties of Absolutists or Monistic Absolutists summed up (the “Eka-Jiva-Vadins”) those who maintain there is only one self or spirit to account for all cosmic phenomena, to account for all microcosmic and macrocosmic phenomena,, are pronounced to be uncompromisingly antagonistic to Madhva’s Pluralistic Universe, or the metaphysics of pluralistic realism, and as such they are given the place of honour in being first subjected to criticism. In a ratiocinative repudiation of absolutism, the first question is this. There is the inference that the cosmos is the effect or manifested effect of the ignorance of the one spirit which is the only reality. Because it *appears* i.e. as a superimposition on a substratum. The inference is supported by the illustrative evidence or testimony of dreams or dream-phenomena. Suppose X utters the Syllogism unto himself. Who is this X? Has he been identified with the help of a proper name? Is he at the time of utterance of the syllogism, a votary or champion of difference or of identity? Is he a votary of absolutism or of pluralism? Then again, is he a teacher or a pupil? It is absurd to retort such distinctions are futile and fruitless. The essence of the absolutistic doctrine being that there is only one spirit which is the only reality the ignorance of which is responsible for the projection or the elaboration of the cosmic show, it is perfectly in order for an opponent to open the controversial attack by an acute analysis of the concept of the one reality (of one self) and of all its implications.

There is an initial difficulty in all absolutistic talk of ignorance being responsible for the projection of the cosmic show. X is ignorant of the mechanism of the new model locomotive YB. Ignorance is determined by time, object, circumstances etc. The Absolutist speaks of ignorance on a cosmic scale, not on any limited laboratory scale. According to some, ignorance is a positive entity. According to others it is merely negative. That this mere negative leads to the projection of the cosmic show, needs demonstration. X is ignorant of the said mechanism, but his ignorance does not project or elaborate anything else. How does elaboration of the cosmic show take place? No answer is forthcoming. Even among the

absolutists who maintain that ignorance is a positive entity, there is no unanimity. Some state that ignorance affects only the self rendered disparate by the limiting condition (i.e. Upadhi). Others maintain that Brahman itself i.e. The Absolute itself that is affected by ignorance is its abode. Others contend that without any commitments regarding the difference between the finite and the Infinite, ignorance should be stated to reside just in substance, and yet evinces a partiality in affecting the finite, just as a mirror has a partiality in affecting the image—not the original. This divergence among the champions of absolutism will itself afford sufficient proof of the utter untenability and instability of the doctrine, but Madhva is not a thinker who will have anything to do with mere *tu quoque* arguments.

Let us assume according to a set of absolutists that ignorance affects the finite self, and that the finite self is a professor of philosophy pursuing research (so-called) for the sake of his salary and self-glorification, and that he means business and knows what he is talking about, that above all knowledge has dawned on him. How is it possible for him to continue his teaching and his researches that are investigations of the show projected by ignorance? Will anyone outside the mental hospitals worry himself with such futile attempts to unravel the cobwebs of cosmic mystery when he perfectly realises that all the cobwebs are dream-stuff? The situation itself is endowed only with the reality possessed by mirage. The disciple, his spiritual ambitions, the goal to be reached, all come under the grip of unreality and if there is a realisation of this huge cosmic fraud, as there should be, in the case of one who is a professor and who professes to teach his students, there should be an end to all transactions and values. If a person fully and perfectly realises that he has been blessed with a girl in his dreams, he does not obviously worry himself with quest after a suitable son-in-law for his dream-daughter. A wise man is one who has woken up from his dream. He does not care for dream-stuff. Should however he dream of undertaking a quest after son-in-law, the quest will be in order when his dream is in progress. Not after waking from the dream. The truth of the matter is this. Volitional effort and activity of an agent are possible where there is absence of realisation that the objects towards which effort is directed are due to error or errors in perception. Here the professor teaching absolutism should have clear and distinct apprehension of the unreality of the finite cosmos, and this realisation is surely incompatible with his efforts and endeavour on behalf of a disciple or disciples who are all seen to owe their origin to error. The Professor's occupation is gone, and go it must!

But there is a deeper difficulty. The doctrine is labelled “Eka-Jīva-Ajnyana-parikalpita-vada” i.e. the entire cosmos is the

fanciful creation of the ignorance of one self. On the absolutist's own showing, several selves appear in the transaction of mundane affairs. Of these countless selves, which is that blessed *one* self ignorance in whom is responsible for the projection of the cosmos? A State of indecision is the outcome. Until that self is spotted, indecision must continue. But why should that self be spotted at all? The answer is this. If that one self is not spotted out, that self ignorance in whom projects the cosmic show, the syllogism itself about the unreality of the universe, cannot be constructed. Be it remembered this is the context in which Madhva critically examines the syllogistic grounds of inference of the unreality of the cosmos. The inference should run thus—X-Y-Z- etc. cosmic phenomena are illusory or unreal, because, they are projected by the ignorance of one self which is the only reality. If the inference is syllogistic, the Middle term is "projected by ignorance of the one self". Trouble arises about the Minor term i.e. the subject of the syllogistic conclusion. If the conclusion be All phenomena are unreal, the universal "All" in the said conclusion i.e. the minor term to be valid would include the *one* self as well, which will not escape the clutches of projection on account of ignorance. If the absolutist should desire to limit the ambit of the universal by separating the one self, ignorance in which is responsible for cosmic show, the latter should be isolable and identifiable from the matrix of phenomena. Until therefore the one self is identified all talk of cosmos being projected by its ignorance is wild. If the inference be inductive, even then similar troubles of it. To conclude inductively that selves X-Y-Z are ignorance-projected, a few particulars which reveal the hidden presence of the universal surely should be observed. The one self therefore ignorance in which projects the cosmos, must for ever remain unidentified and the inference would remain for ever baseless, and ungrounded.

Either unmitigated solipsism or unstultifiable reality of the universe—conclusions both of which are unpalatable pills bitter for the Absolutist to swallow—would be the natural end of ratiocination. Each individual is entitled to believe and he will believe—that he is the Supreme Being under some enforced *incognito* due to ignorance, and that his neighbours and the cosmos are unreal. Granted. But then X believes in his reality and Y in his own reality and in unreality of X even as the latter believes in the unreality of the former. At this rate, if the belief of each individual is to be respected—there is no reason why it should not according to the Absolutist—then the entire cosmos with individuals believing in the unreality of one another will itself be reduced to nullity. It is not permissible to argue that proceeding on the same lines reality of the individuals would be established. Each individual believes *only* in his own reality. That is solipsism. It is a fundamental fact of Idealistic theory of knowledge, that

*vikalpa* or alternation of aspects is apprehensional not existential—i.e. X believes Y to be unreal. The self-same Y believes X to be unreal. There is no knowing whether X or Y is the one real self ignorance in which has projected the cosmos. If the belief of both should be unreal, we are all revolving in ignorance and illusion. The “all” leaves indeterminate the question if there is that one self at all ignorance in which has projected the cosmic show. Then Monism is bidden good-bye. If the belief in both be real, we are left with a contradiction, namely the same X is apprehended to be both real and unreal. In this inevitable contradiction, Monism is engulfed. Until therefore that blessed one self ignorance in which is responsible for the projection of the cosmic show is identified (when that is done some inference may be possible) absolutism with its doctrinal concomitant that the cosmos is “one-self ignorance-engendered” should be laid aside in metaphysical pigeon-hole.

It is a psychological truism that all rational beings act under the dynamic urge of a motive or motives. Motives are the main spring of the meta-behaviourism of man. The Supreme Motive or the Motive of Motives is to earn freedom from the recurring cycles of births and deaths. If spiritual action and endeavour are to be possible under the urge of the said motive, the individual should have the certitude *that he is the one real self* ignorance in which has projected the cosmic show. In the absence of that certitude, all endeavour would be a wild-goose chase. There is absolutely no use of the vague assertion that all are appearances of One Reality, as reality can degenerate into appearance at any time, and appearance can be raised to the eminence of reality. Indeed the basis of division itself coming as it must under the grip of appearance cannot but stultify the entire quest undertaken by absolutism. The quest is just a race after the “Fair Maid of Ireland”.

There may be less exalted motives from which action is possible. One is hedonistic desire. The other is fear from some strong secular authority whose commands are to be carried out. Hedonistic pursuits proceed on the basis of reality of the self and when one is counselled by Absolutism to doubt the reality of the self, hedonistic endeavour is simply out of the question. As for any external command from secular authority or even a religious dignitary, that endeavour should be put forth even in the absence of certitude that one's own self is the one real self that is destined to be crowned on the throne of Absolutism when fontal ignorance is got rid of, the suggestion is too absurd to be entertained even for a moment as such external commands involve an amount of coercion which is itself an incentive to a violation of them, and even in the absence of the said violation, external commands interfere with moral autonomy and as such are to be summarily dismissed.

We have then reached the following position. The "Eka-Jiva-Ajnyana-parikalpita-vada" i.e. the metaphysical doctrine of absolutism in the ramification of the cosmos *qua* one self-ignorance engendered renders the syllogistic inference itself impossible, namely, that X-Y-Z etc. are due to ignorance of the one real self. As already explained, there is trouble about the determination of the middle term should that be viewed as syllogistic inference and trouble again about an examination of a few representative particulars before the formulation of a universal generalisation should it be regarded as Inductive inference, on account of the uncertainty about the basis of distinction between reality and unreality, and secondly in the absence of and impossibility of identification of the one self ignorance in which projects the cosmic show, no spiritual endeavour and effort are possible. The particular variety of the Absolutistic doctrine thus stands discredited.

Suppose, by some mysterious agency or ability the identification of that one real self is possible. Is that the self of the teacher or of the taught? If the former, his occupation would be gone, as he would realise the unreality of the entire cosmos, and as he would realise too the futility of teaching a pupil whose reality he cannot but deny. Such a *reductio ad absurdum* is perfectly logical. All the relations, values, concepts and transactions of life would turn topsy-turvy on the absolutistic hypothesis. If that one real self is identified to be that of the disciple, he would find himself in a strange predicament, when he rises above "Statu pupillari" and himself becomes a professor! He would then have a disciple. According to this variety of absolutism, the cosmic show is due to the ignorance of the one real self which is that of the disciple. The moment he commences having a disciple, he would be the outcome of ignorance in his own pupil and so on and so forth.

It will be easily seen that Madhva just exhibits the absurdities to which one will be led on the hypothesis of this variety of Monistic metaphysics. Humanity will be a huge army of blind being led by the blind with no prospect whatever of any ophthalmological operation being performed and with no chance whatever of restoration of vision and sight.

If a particular state of cosmic affairs can be ordered and arranged to exist on account of ignorance in a self, other absurd consequences are inevitable. No one would be ever eligible for release. Who is the teacher pray and who the taught? Who is the potter pray and who the pot? Spiritual instruction imparted and assimilated by a disciple would be interpenetrated by ignorance not merely, but would be such as to involve the parties concerned in an endless panorama projected by ignorance from which escape is unthinkable. On the absolutistic hypothesis or world-view,

spiritual search after knowledge and release are respectively a wild-goose chase and a mare's nest. Ignorance, first and ignorance last would be writ large on the portals of absolutism.

No one can possibly dictate what sort of a philosophy of life the one real self ignorance in which projects the cosmic show should have. If that self took a fancy for Dualism, or Pluralism and Realism—there is no known human or superhuman agency that would prevent the occurrence—it being the only reality difference in the cosmos that owes its origin to that self, would never be eliminated and there would be no "monistic" release. If it is contended that his sympathies with Dualism are the outcome of ignorance, the counter-contention is equally tenable and valid that his sympathies with Monism and Absolutism are also the outcome of his ignorance. If in the plenitude of ignorance that self should mischievously or in a spirit of revenge will that all should be roasted eternally in hell fire, eternal damnation will be the lot of all. If his sympathies are with Monism, mere vocal or verbal sympathies will not do. They will have to concretise into realism. Who is to decide which is that self (the only real) destined for realisation? Every Tom, Dick and Harry would claim he is the real self. Claims will clash with counter-claims. Chaos will be the result. Philosophical anarchy, unmitigated solipsism, or nihilism would be the natural end of a metaphysic grounded on the thesis or hypothesis that the entire cosmos is the effect of "one-self-ignorance". As emphasized before so long as uncertainty haunts—and it would continue to haunt till the end of eternity—the decision as to which is that real self ignorance in which projects the cosmic show, and so long as no definite information is or can be forthcoming about the metaphysical preferences, predilections and prejudices of that self, all talk about cosmos being projected by ignorance is wild, fantanstic and futile.

When stripped of all artificialities, and ornamental trumperies, Bosanquet's "mental construction of reality" and his analysis of the three interpretations of the term "objective" would not escape Madhva's comments and criticisms. Whose mind is it that constructs? Does it construct alone or in co-operation with something else — active or passive agency? What is the raw-material out of which reality is constructed? Regressing backwards to the mental construction of Reality by Adam, similar questions would be perfectly in order relative to Adam's mental construction of reality. Subjective Idealism or Pluralistic Realism are the only alternatives. If Bosanquet should fight shy of the latter as most of the so-called fashionable philosophers do, then the former is the only go. Reality is independent of anybody's mental construction, in whatever sense and import the expression may be used. Reality is apprehended by human, and animal mind, and by plant mind as well if some of the modernest researches are true. The

objection that if mind and reality were entirely disparate, the two would never come into any intelligible relationship at all has not much force or weight. It is possible to contend on the other hand, that the very disparity brings the two into the relationship usually known as knowledge. On the hypothesis of mental construction, neither theory of knowledge nor metaphysics would be possible. There is hardly any improvement in clinging to the definition of "objective" as what we are obliged to think. Notwithstanding some superficial agreement, there is marked difference in the manner in which this obligation is discharged or fulfilled BY DIFFERENT individuals. For the efficient construction of reality in so far as it still continues to be "construction" raw material is necessary and without brick and mortar of some peculiar nature mental construction is unthinkable. Unless therefore, interacting entities of mind and matter are postulated, it is not possible adequately to account for knowledge and reality and their mutual relationship at all.

Though the Syllogism embodying the conclusion that the cosmic show is the outcome of ignorance in some self, (the only reality,) has been shown to be faulty, the absolutist contends that such formal faults do not vitiate it as it has the sanction of sacred texts which proclaim unequivocally that the cosmic show is the outcome of ignorance in the self which is the only reality and which "somehow" pluralises itself into men and things. The following is the well-known authority cited—"Prapancho-yadividyeta-nivarteta-nasamsayah Mayamatramidam-dvaitam-advaitam-paramarthatah". This stanza (16) is claimed to support Monism the ultimate truth of which is emphasized and discard Dualism which is merely an illusory or misleading world-view.

Madhva re-interprets the stanza in the strictest conformity with context and the canons of interpretation and maintains that the stanza in question really establishes his own Pluralistic and Realistic Universe on a sound basis. Only violence to the actual language used can lend any support to the absolutistic world-view. The apparent meaning of the first half of the stanza is—if there is a world, it will disappear. The mood of the verbs "vidyeta" and "nivarteta" clearly indicates that the truth embodied is sought to be conveyed in a hypothetical form in antecedent consequent relationship. What is the significance of the terms used? If there is a world, it would disappear. What does follow? You can arrive at a conclusion either by affirming the antecedent and then affirming the consequent. Or you may deny the consequent,

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(16) Madhva has been accused of having mistaken Gaudapada's karikas on the Mandukya Upanishad as part of the Upanishad itself. The accusation is baseless. Gaudapada himself may very well have incorporated stanzas from the Upanishads in his work without explicit acknowledgement of the source. Mr. B. N. Krishnamurthy Sarma discusses the question in the "Review of Philosophy and Religion." Vol-2-No. 1.



and then deny the antecedent. Or if it be possible to demonstrate that the antecedent-consequent relationship is perfectly commensurate and ideal, you can proceed either way without adherence to the formal rules of a hypothetical syllogism. The third alternative is almost immediately ruled out of order. The commensurate ideal one-cause-one-effect relationship cannot be established. It is open for one to substitute the minor premise as "there is a world" and then conclude "it would disappear" or substitute the minor as "it would not or has not disappeared" and then conclude "there is no world." In either case the hypothetical syllogism conveys only an absurd meaning. That there is a world nobody would deny and that in course of time, it will come to an end would be equally difficult to deny. What then is the point sought to be made out in that text? This apparent hypothetical syllogism is followed in the next half of the stanza with the statement that "Dualism is only illusory—and that Monism is the truth of the matter." What has that hypothetical syllogism to do with the latter doctrine? Whatever the procedure formally pursued, whether you affirm the antecedent or deny the consequent, the conclusion is *nihil ad rem* to the fundamental doctrine of Absolutism.

Madhva explains that the term "Prapancha" in the text does not mean universe or world. It stands for the fivefold difference that is foundational of the cosmos and which governs all secular and spiritual transactions of the world. The ways of man to god, of god to man, of man to man and of god to god *et hoc* are all based on this rock of difference. The fivefold difference or five differences are (1) Difference between the Supreme Being and the finite self—(2) The difference between inanimate creation and the Supreme Being. (3) Difference between the finite self and inanimate creation. (4) Difference between any two of or among the finite selves themselves. and (5) difference between any two or among the inanimate objects themselves. The preposition "pra" indicates well-reasoned, systematised or superior. "Prapancha" means the well-ordered and well-systematised scheme of fivefold difference. If this scheme were the creation of some one or a mental construction, in the idealistic sense of the term, in other words, if the scheme had any origin in time, then surely it would disappear even as any other effect. Denying the consequent, the minor premise would be—"Five-fold difference does not disappear" The conclusion is that the scheme has no origin in time, in other words beginningless. Madhva argued out in the earlier section of the work that difference is the characteristic mark of the state of final release as well. *A fortiori*, it must characterise the state of non-release or pre-release state as well. That the five-fold difference scheme is there, has been there from time immemorial, and will continue to be there till the end of time are the eternal truths sought to be impressed by the context

in question and it has absolutely nothing to do whatever with the doctrine of illusion or unreality of the universe associated with Absolutism.

How do you know that the scheme is beginningless? Madhva answers that analysis of the term "maya-matra" reveals it as well as other facts. "Maya" means the wonderful power possessed by the Supreme Being. The scheme of difference is clearly and distinctly discerned by the Supreme Being and is protected by the same Being from decay and destruction as being the best possible for the regulation of the affairs of the cosmos. The roots "ma" to measure and "tra" to protect take on the form "matra" which means "known and protected by the Supreme Being." "Maya-matra" finally means "that known and protected by the Supreme Power of the Supreme Being." This scheme of five-fold difference—usually known as "dvaita" for the sake of brevity—is perceived and protected by the Omniscience and Omnipotence of the Supreme Being. Perception, intelligence and other powers of the Supreme Being are—anadi—originless.

The difference is explained to be originless for the satisfaction of obvious metaphysical needs. Should it have origin in time, the difference is seen to bring about various kinds and degrees of equipment, opportunity, ability and achievement. Naturally there is heart-burning. Justice appears to be a mere word. To account for the countless contradictions, differences and distinctions and to exonerate the Supreme Being of the charges of favouritism and partiality etc. the career of each individual is explained to be the effect of Karma or sum total of actions done in an earlier existence. Regressing, it is easily seen that timelessness or originlessness in time is the only satisfactory solution—even though to some critical or over-critical minds it may seem unsatisfactory.

Further, the five-fold difference being perceived and protected by the Supreme Being, is bound to be real. To preserve intact the Supremacy of the Supreme Being, it is necessary to maintain that His Perception is able to grasp the nature of objects "as they are" and not "as they appear." From divine perception the Kantian distinction between things "as they are and as they appear" should simply disappear. The five-fold difference *qua* object of divine perception which grasps things as they really are, cannot but be real. If it be contended that it is illusory, it would be tantamount to attributing ignorance and illusions to the Supreme Being which cannot be.

The fourth quarter of the stanza is "Advaitam Paramarthatatah". This does *not* mean that Monism is the truth of the matter. Nor does it countenance the opposition between the view-points "sub-specie-temporis" and "sub-specie-aeternitatis."

It rather indicates Mono-theism, but *not* Monism. The governance of the affairs of the cosmos is not entrusted to many gods, but is in the hands of one Supreme Being—Vishnu. That is the truth of the matter—the truth of truths—“paramartha.” The text does *not* mean that Brahman is the only reality and others are all illusory phenomena. Among the illusory phenomena there cannot be any war or fight for supremacy. That the tiniest particle of dust is as real as the Supreme Being, there is no manner of doubt. But the Supreme Being is one only without a second, without an equal, and *a fortiori* without a superior. All are decidedly inferior to the Supreme Being. Other agents or spirits or selves have equals, and superiors, “sama” and “adhika”, but the Supreme Being has neither an equal—“sama” nor “adhika” a superior. The text cannot sustain Monism of any kind. If the meaning is that Brahman is the only reality, there is no propriety in the use of the expression “sarvabhavanam.” “Bhava” means a real entity. Amongst the various real entities of the cosmos, it is Brahman that is without an equal and without a superior. Whereas other real entities are in the grip of relativity and are in reference to some, superiors and in respect of yet others, inferior and so on. The supreme Being is beyond the reach of this relativity of inferiority and superiority. The entire creation is inferior to Him—the Supreme Being. The use of the term “Bhava” real existent, permanently precludes the possibility of a monistic interpretation being forced on or smuggled into the text which on its natural and unstrained import is a brilliant sign-post of a pluralistic and realistic universe. There is absolutely nothing, indicative or suggestive, of a Monistic Metaphysic in the said stanza. Reality of the five-fold difference is affirmed. Reality of the different cosmic phenomena is affirmed. The Supremacy of Brahman which indicates Mono-Theism is affirmed. And above all it is affirmed that the entire cosmos is within the grip of relativity of inferiority and superiority, while the Supreme Being is one only without a superior and without an equal.

Madhva maintains that the foregoing interpretation is necessitated in virtue of the next stanza which figures in the context and which avowedly rejects the absolutistic doctrine that the universe is the upshot of ignorance in some one spirit (i.e.)—one-spirit-ignorance-engendered. “Vikalpo-vinivarteta-kalpito-yadikenachit” etc. If *vikalpa* or difference is *kalpita* engendered by ignorance in some one, then surely it would be stultified or denied. As it is not at any time denied, it is *not* the upshot of ignorance. The text is unequivocal in the affirmation of difference. If difference is ignorance-engendered, it would go. The syllogism is specially appropriate to prove and establish the reality of difference. It will not do to affirm the antecedent in the minor premise. There should be some material evidence in support of the affirmation of the antecedent. On the other hand all evidence converges

towards the denial of the consequent. That difference is nowhere stultified or denied has been established by means of the pramanas --the sources and the guarantors of correct and valid knowledge. Difference persists in and characterises the stage of final liberation. It is not a mere accident or illusory appearance. The correct procedure guaranteed by material evidence is the denial of the consequent. The conclusion (with the minor premise denying the consequent) is formally valid. If the truth of the matter be absolutism with the unreality of the cosmic phenomena, the text cannot indicate as it now does, unpleasant consequences in the shape of persistence of the difference.

It will not do to contend that far from there being any indication of threats of unpleasant consequences the stanza contains a plain unvarnished statement of fact that difference being ignorance-engendered vanishes at the dawn of true knowledge. If it were a plain statement of fact, the verb used will have to be in the indicative mood, and whereas the potential mood actually used in the context and the hypothetical form of the argument, convincingly demonstrate that the context does not contemplate a mere statement of fact. It is not colourless and calculated statement of fact. A categorical form would have been more pointed and efficacious than any other. The hypothetical form and the potential mood are proof grammatical and linguistic of the fact that the stanza conveys only unpleasant consequences in the event of the acceptance of the absolutistic world-view.

Further, if the term "vidyeta" be interpreted to mean "if anything exists" then there is no sense in following it up with the consequence "nivarjeta" it would be denied or stultified, as *prima facie* the statement is absurd, as so many entities like the self, Avidya, etc. exist and there is no chance of their stultification. On the other hand if it is interpreted as is done by Madhva to mean "if created or brought into existence" then, it would perish as all things brought into existence perish sooner or later. The world of five-fold differences does not perish and that means it has no origination in time and is beginningless. In other words, if unpleasant consequences are shown to follow, the obligation is that some universal connection should be exhibited between the unpleasant consequences and the antecedents. That can be done only on the interpretation advanced by Madhva.

The contention that the stanza contains a statement of fact of illusion engendered by ignorance and of its vanishing cannot at all stand a moment's scrutiny. The hypothetical "yadi" and the potential mood "nivarjeta" "vidyeta" are there to prove that the absolutistic contention is unsustainable and wrong lock, stock and barrel.

The text will have to be interpreted to mean that difference is "anadi"—beginningless and "satya"—real. The Universe likewise the fundamental systematic scheme of which is grounded on foundational difference is beginningless and real.

The text utters a condemnation of those who have not realised the significance of difference. The absolutist contends that the stanza should be "Jnyate-dvaitam-na-vidyate" i.e., if there is true knowledge or after true knowledge dawns difference or "dvaitam" would disappear. Madhva argues that the context requires—nay renders it imperative, that the splitting up of the expression should be "ajnyate-dvaitam-na vidyate" i.e. Dvaitam or difference is denied only by the ignorant and not by the wise, in the light of the arguments mentioned earlier. As the foundational fact of the fivefold difference is perceived guarded and guaranteed by Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence, it has to be regarded as object of a perception which is faultless and free from all degrees and kinds of errors. As such it is beginningless and real. In support of his position Madhva cites a passage from the "Parama-sruti."

In another passage of the "Maitreyisakha", there is also an express condemnation of those who advance metaphysical arguments akin to those advanced by Buddhists. As usual there is the possible objection that the condemnation refers to Buddhists or to the Nihilistic aspect or manifestation of Buddhism, and not to Monism. Madhva replies that the passage refers unequivocally and pronouncedly to those who are anxious to remain within the fold of orthodox traditions built upon the recognition of the sanctity of revealed texts like the Vedas and the Upanishads, and who in their anxiety advance all sorts and conditions of inconsistent arguments to sustain Monism. Buddhists are not only not anxious to remain within the orthodox fold, but they openly laugh at and ridicule the vedantins' adherence to the sacred texts. The text of "Maitreyi Sakha" condemns such as have the said anxiety and they are the Absolute idealists or the Monistic Idealists. Their doctrine is known as "Nairatmya-vada." Does not the term mean Nihilism—or Negation of self—of the Buddhists? again asks the Absolutist in a veiled and indirect manner repeating his old objection. The answer is that the term refers to denial of all that can in any manner be related to Atman. Atman is the only reality. There is nothing else which can be real and which can be related to Atman. This metaphysical doctrine is certainly Absolutism. It is criticised in the text cited above. The absolute idealist is spoken of as metaphysical kinsman of the Buddhist with this difference that while the latter openly repudiates all allegiance to the sacred texts, to vedic and upanishadic traditions, the former erects his metaphysics on the foundation of the sacred texts.

The "Maitreyi-sakha" definitely opens the section with the prefatory observation that in the following lines or sentences, obstacles to real and genuine metaphysical insight would be mentioned or enumerated. In that category systems like those of the Buddhists and the Kapalikas are included. They fly at a tangent. They are antagonistic to the Vedānta. They are to be brushed aside as unreliable. As Absolute Idealism is mentioned in the said category the inference is irresistible that the school of thought though standing comparatively higher in estimation, than Buddhism etc., on account of its anxiety to owe allegiance to the Vedas and the Upanishads, is still to be condemned on account of its denial of all objects that can in any way be related to a subject which is claimed to be the only reality that somehow manifests itself as plurality and multiplicity characteristic of the cosmos. That is the attitude of the sacred text itself towards "Nairatmya-vada." "Atma-sambandhi-kimapi-nasti" says Madhva. That is the quintessence of the doctrine known as "Nairatmyavada". It may not be exactly nihilism. It is its nearest approach. It accepts only one reality and maintains that all else is illusory. Atman is an objectless subject. For the objects are all illusory or are only of a lesser degree of reality. It matters not which way it is put. Illusoriness and lesser degree of reality must mean the same thing.

## X

The doctrine that appearance of the Universe is engendered by ignorance in oneself only was refuted by Madhva by means of analysis of its implications and exposition of the fallacies that inevitably dog its footsteps. The self which was believed to be the 'kalpaka', the projector of the unreal universe, was subjected to analysis and it was shown that the projection theory was a baseless one. Madhva next directs his attention to a refutation of the same from another angle of vision. One approach to a criticism of the doctrine is from the side of the projector and the other approach is from the side of the projected. The cosmic illusion is the projected entity. It is the illusion of well-ordered systematic cosmic phenomena which obey certain observed uniformities known as the laws of nature. An analysis of this gigantic illusion also will convince, that there is no such illusion and that the universe is as real as the Absolute Itself.

The entire trouble is this. A psychological analysis of illusory experience demonstrates beyond doubt the existence of three constituent elements or factors in the said experience. Take the case of the familiar illusion of rope appearing as snake. Or of piece of mother-of-pearl appearing as silver. In either case illusory experience is possible only on the acceptance of *two* or *three* entities which are perfectly real. In the familiar instance, the piece of shell is perfectly real. Silver is equally real. The

element of resemblance between the two again is equally real. Then on account of some defect in the sensory apparatus or on account of misdirection of the interpretative activity of the mind, or the self, this resemblance is perceived to an exaggerated degree engendering the perception of shell as silver. In the conspiracy to produce or engender illusions and illusory experience, *real entities* or elements—as real as the Absolute and with the reality of the Absolute—are involved, AND WHETHER there can be any conspiracy in which *all* the constituent elements are *illusory* is a matter for speculation, but as psychological knowledge stands at the present day an illusory experience is impossible unless there is a conspiracy in which real factors and entities are involved. The rope is a real entity or substance. The snake is real. There are several snakes in the grass and elsewhere which are all real. Resemblance between the rope and the snake is real. The error lies in the attribution of exaggerated importance to this superficial resemblance which is surely due to either some defect in the sensory channels of communication or the interpretative activity or faculty of the mind. Introspective as well as experimental evidence supports the existence of the three elements of perfect reality that enter into conspiracy to engender illusions. Without them and their operations no illusions are possible. For instance, there is a method in the manner in which illusions are produced. No one experiences illusions in which two objects as radically opposed to one another as possible (and at the very antipodes) are identical with one another. A piece of rope is mistaken for a snake, but no one has ever mistaken or would ever mistake an ocean for a snake or a luminous planet for a snake. There should be some basic resemblance to engender illusions. (The substratum on which illusions are superstructures is known as “Adhishtana.”) Shell-piece is the substratum—“Adhishtana.” The rope is similarly “Adhishtana.” Silver is Pradhana i.e., the pre-eminent substance that enters into the superstructure and in the light of which the superstructure is erected. The illusion is in terms of the perception of the silver experienced elsewhere. It is technically known as “Pradhana”. Similarly, the snake is “Pradhana” in the other example. That in terms of which illusion appears is “Pradhana.” That which appears as something else is “Adhishtana.” If the terminology could be profitably varied, X appears as Y in illusions. That is the general way in which all illusions are described. X the subject of the proposition is “adhishtana” or the substratum. Y is the superstructure—“Pradhana.” Of course there is no fixity in this usage. To suit some particular situational exigency or to meet a situational demand, you can vary the usage and say Y appears as X and so on. It is however more natural and usual to put in the place of subject the substratum and in the place of predicate the superstructure of illusions. By means of an inductive examination of a number of illusions, it is possible to arrive

at a generalisation that all illusions reveal on analysis two or three real entities—the substratum, the superstructure and resemblance between the two. Without them, there is *no* illusion. This fundamental psychological position has to be granted. It cannot be challenged. When once the real significance of the inevitability of two or three real entities participating in the projection of illusory experience is realised, it will be seen that the doctrine of the universe being an illusion or illusory appearance presents acute difficulties and entails unpleasant consequences. There is no valid reason to suppose that the illusion of a universe is in any way different from or differently manufactured from other illusions. A substratum should be pointed out which is real. There should be a superstructure. There should likewise be resemblance between the two. If the illusion of cosmos is to be sustained (just as an illusion), it is obligatory on the part of the absolutist to point out the substratum and the superstructure. In a microcosmic matter like the illusory perception of shell as silver, shell and silver resemble one another. In macrocosmic or cosmic illusions, cosmos can resemble only another cosmos but not chaos. The substratum also will have to be a cosmos. Then superstructure will have to be a cosmos. Then it may be possible to detect some resemblance between the two. Cosmos can resemble only cosmos and not chaos. To sustain therefore the illusion of a cosmos, two real, first rate cosmos-es, will have to be pointed out demonstratively to function as substratum and superstructure respectively without which illusions are never engendered. Looked at from any angle of vision, the consequences are unpleasant. There should be an universe which is to serve as substratum. There is to be another as superstructure. There should be resemblance between the two. Then only can there be any talk of illusion at all. In his anxiety to establish that the universe is illusory existence, the absolutist has reached the unenviable position that there are indeed two *real*-first rate universes which will have to serve as substratum and superstructure of the illusory experience of the cosmos, or of the illusion of the cosmos. This admission is obligatory. It cannot be brushed aside. Otherwise, no illusion can be satisfactorily accounted for. If the logical consequences are such as to entail—they indeed are such—acceptance of *two* real universes by one who fights hammer and tongs to establish the illusoriness of the universe in which we live, move and have our being, all philosophy is love's labour lost. The establishment of the very thesis of the illusoriness of the universe, *ipso facto* implies the acceptance of *two* universes—one as a substratum and the other as a superstructure. It is futile to argue that Brahman is the substratum. If so Brahman will be determined *qua* substratum and all determination is negation. It would destroy the absoluteness of the Absolute. Even supposing it is permissible to point to Brahman as the substratum, there is difficulty about the



superstructure. A real universe should have been experienced elsewhere, before it could be superimposed on something else in virtue of striking resemblances between the two. Where has a real universe been experienced? It is unpsychological and unphilosophical to speak of an illusory thing being superimposed on another illusory object. The inference that the universe is illusory or is the outcome of ignorance in one self, is really vitiated by "tarka—" better argument—that to sustain the illusion itself admission of a real world or two real worlds would be necessary. The formal validity of the syllogism is blown up by the *Prima facie* pressing inevitability of admission of *two* real worlds.

Alarmed at being confronted with *two* real worlds, in his anxiety to establish the unreality of the universe, the Absolutist turns his attention to dream-phenomena to see if they will not afford any support to his pet doctrine. He contends that dream-phenomena are all unreal and illusory. There is nothing that could be pointed out as the substratum or "Adhistana." Yet illusions are plentiful. They are engendered by error and misapprehension. So can the universe be.

Madhva maintains in reply that this objection will not stand a moment's scrutiny as dream-phenomena are as real as the facts and phenomena of walking of life, but the difference lies in the former being very evanescent and transitory. It is a real enough world with which one is confronted in dreams. Dream-phenomena are just flashed across the mind like lightning. The past experiences stored up in the shape of all but obliterated images, somewhere in the vast sumtotal of the unconscious enveloping the present and the past lives, and throwing occasional glimpses of the future as well, constitute the raw material out of which dream-phenomena are woven out as it were. The images are the material causes. Nature's compensatory scheme of rewards and revenges etc., would be efficient cause and so on. Whatever the ultimate explanation of dream-phenomena and whatever the nature of a reconstruction of dream-psychology, it is plain that experiences of other objects in perfectly real situations and concatenations of circumstances are responsible for the projection of dream-phenomena which are real but which are extremely evanescent. If it is contended there is the illusory identification of the body with the mind, which may serve as an analogy to explain cosmic illusions, the reply is that the identification is tall talk merely, and as a matter of fact, the nervous system is understood, felt and acted upon as being different from the mind or the self. In all other instances of perpetual illusions like white objects appearing yellow to a jaundiced eye, sky appearing blue, it is absolutely impossible to explain or account for them, unless it is admitted that there should be *two* real objects and some real resemblance between the two as basic of illusory experience.

The absolutist now seeks to establish that it is possible to point to Atman—the one reality—as the substratum on which the superstructure of illusory cosmos has been erected. In a series of apparently endless, and beginningless succession of worlds, the preceding one can always serve as a model for the succeeding one. That model is “Pradhana.” If inconvenient questions are asked about the model which inspired the first creation, there is the obvious answer that such questions are illegitimate as creation is beginningless. In the succession of ignorance-engendered universes, one can serve as a model for another. Substratum, model and resemblance between the two all being thus guaranteed, it is easy to account for the magnificent illusion of the cosmos.

It is in refutation of this position taken up by the Absolutist that Madhva has undertaken a systematic critique of the doctrine of “Adhyasa” set forth with a wealth of detail and illustration that is unparalleled in the metaphysical works of any nation, or any language, by Sankara in the opening portion of his commentary on Brahma-Sutras. Sankara maintains that the spiritual entity of Atman—the self—is mistaken for or is erroneously identified with something that is *not* Atman—self, namely, the body or the material encasement of the embodiment of Atman. Madhva retorts that this sort of mistaking is simply out of the question. Certain experiences and errors come naturally within the range of perceptual illusions or illusions and hallucinations centrally initiated. They are easily explained by the well-known facts and principles of psychology that are now current coin. But there are other items and experiences which never come within the clutches of illusions. Take our own self—the self of each individual. In all normal awareness, the self is perceived as *different and distinct* from something that is not self. Even in abnormal awareness, there is no conclusive evidence to show that the abnormal person thinks or imagines himself to be a piece of stone or a broken article of furniture. If any two objects, ideas, relations etc., are ascertained to be opposed to one another—radically and fundamentally opposed, as the self and the not-self are—one can never be mistaken for the other. There is a tiny microscopic mustard seed. There stands Mount Everest eternally kissing the clouds. The mustard is never superimposed on the Mountain. Nor is the mountain superimposed on the mustard, even in the most chaotic of experiences and illusions. If this sort of superimposition is admitted to exist anywhere and somehow, there is no knowing on this side of life, when it would terminate, as it is not governed by any laws, and as two totally contradictory objects can be superimposed on one another eternally. Why not then superimpose a triangle on a square? Why not a square on a triangle? When and where there is geometrical ignorance there is difficulty only in the matter of expressing what is seen. There is no manner of doubt that even a baby would see triangles to be different from

squares. Only it may not be able to express itself. Even in childish consciousness, even in abnormal awareness, contradictory objects are not superimposed on one another. Even illusions and hallucinations obey certain laws and they can be adequately accounted for. It is absurd to contend that the self is identified with the body, (in such experience as "I am Stout—I am lean" etc.,) which is not self!! Madhva asks if at the moment when one actually experiences the Ego-hood, as in "I am engaged in this piece of work"—he also experiences that he is the not-self as well, such as a piece of wood or stone. Such an experience is as valid as a round-square and as easily can it be realised and rejected too. It is absurd even to speak of superimposition of an A proposition on the O, in propositional parlance. In the face such facts, the contention of the absolutist that the cosmos is just superimposition of the not-self on the self, needs analysis. Analysis would surely demonstrate the untenability of the position. That the not-self, material, non-spiritual, can never be identified with the self, even in illusions is the central, fundamental and foundational rock on which Madhva's critique of Sankara's doctrine of "Adhyasa" is based. Analyse the dream-phenomena which according to Madhva are real and which according to Sankara are illusory. Whether dream-symbolism is or is not admitted, there is absolutely no evidence (neither introspective nor experimental) to support superimposition of the not-self on the self or in support of the self being mistaken for the not-self.

"Adhyasa" cuts either way. That is the fundamental doctrine of Sankara. Having shown the utter impossibility of the not-self being the illusory superstructure on the substratum of the self, Madhva directs his attention to a criticism of the reciprocal doctrine that self is to be considered the illusory superstructure on the substratum of the not-self. If the self can never be mistaken for the not-self *a fortiori* the not-self can never be mistaken for the self. The characteristics of the self and of the not-self being so radically incompatible, the latter and the former cannot be identified with one another. In the "Adhyasa" of the self on the not-self indicated by Sankara's expression, "Itaretaradhyasa" the not-self will be the substratum. The self would be the erroneous superstructure. On the Absolutist's own showing, the substratum is real, whereas the superstructure is unreal or illusory. The self being the superstructure will have to be pronounced unreal or illusory. Unpalatable consequences will naturally follow. The not-self is the substratum. It will have to be pronounced real. That is so in the usual illustration of the silver-appearance-of-the-mother-of-pearl. The piece or slice of shell is real, while the silver is illusory. Even so, the not-self viewed as the substratum will have monopolised all reality leaving none for the self, which as mere superstructure will be illusory or unreal. Monism will have to be surrendered. If super-imposition or, "Adhyasa" or wrong identification is to be

possible at all and if self is to be superimposed on the not-self, the latter would monopolise all reality. This conclusion is sure to be the logical outcome of the doctrine when fully worked out. To maintain the other type or variety of superimposition, the self will have to be considered as the Substratum, when it will monopolise all reality. Reality cannot thus be tossed about by our fiat as if it were a ball, from self to not-self! The ball may make no question about ayes or noes, but reality does. If *qua* substrata self and not-self both share reality, Monism would have to be scattered to the four winds. Though this is the logical consequence to which the Absolutist may find himself driven, he may still argue. He may still contend that he admits the existence of only one Reality. Self is its name. What is there after all in a name? This indifferentism will be an idle pose. Never mind the name. The essence of Madhva's argument is that when the self and the not-self clearly and distinctly recognised respectively as the "EGO-I" and as extended in time-space series, would claim reality as their own when they in turn serve as substrata for the superstructure of illusion or mistaken identity, Monism must stand repudiated. Texts maintain that the self is the only reality. But the not-self as shown will have to be admitted to be another reality. If not it could never be substratum (of superstructure) of the illusion of self. Either the doctrine of "itaretaradhyasa" (self superimposed on not-self, and not-self on self) has to be surrendered or Monism. Escape out of this dilemma is unthinkable. The fond hope cannot be hugged to heart that towards the termination of all argument, the one reality is the self. If this position is to be strictly maintained and rigorously rationalised, one may be entitled to some extent to speak of "adhyasa" only one way—i.e. of the not-self on the self. The latter *qua* substratum would be real. The "itaretaradhyasa", mutual mistaken identification would then be a fiction. If the reciprocity in wrong identification is to be justified, the not-self *qua* substratum should be regarded real. Thus two reals are inevitable and Monism must be surrendered. In a word, either Monism or Mutual or reciprocal mistaken identity of the self and the not-self, (both in turn being real substratum and illusory superstructure) should be willy-nilly repudiated. In either case, the consequences are bound to be unpalatable.

Dualism of two reals is the minimum to the acceptance of which the Absolutist will be driven on his own showing. If the reciprocity of mistaken identification or self with not-self and not-self with self is to be maintained, then dualism of the substrata is inevitable. If the self alone is to be considered real, then it will never be mistaken for the not-self. If the not-self alone is assigned reality, materialism will be the only consequence. Madhva drives home the criticism that the reciprocity of erroneous identification of the self with the not-self, and not-self with self, and metaphysical Monism are incompatible with one another, since dualism of *two*

*reals qua* substrata of erroneous identification, is the pivot round which the former doctrine is obliged to revolve. If Monism is to be "somehow" maintained, reciprocal mistaken identification of the self and the not-self is unthinkable. If self is to be the only reality, it can never be mistaken for the not-self as the essential characteristics of both are opposed to one another. If the not-self is the only reality materialism will be the result. All these consequences are unpalatable, to the absolutist. "Adhyasa" cannot be sustained or maintained as metaphysical doctrine.

Having criticised the "Adhyasa" doctrine, Madhva urges further objections against the view that the universe is illusory perception engendered in reference to the substratum of the self. The "Vivartavada" is the most fundamental doctrine of Monism. A substance possessing a higher degree of reality obscured by ignorance appears as an illusory object which has a lesser degree of reality. If the cosmos (the entire universe of organised and unorganised matter and spirit) is to be viewed as a gigantic illusion, an analysis of it will help proper appreciation of the nature of the illusion. The superimposition or illusion is due to erroneous interpretation of some peripheral stimuli. That the stimuli are real needs no demonstration. They are wrongly interpreted. The error or illusion is interpretational. At the time of the actual occurrence of the illusion the stimuli and interpretation are not discriminated and distinguished from one another. The discrimination takes place only after the riddance of the interpretational error which occurs generally soon after a close and careful scrutiny of the object perceived. At the time of the illusory experience, the base or the substratum and the erroneous interpretation which imports into the transaction another object, are *not* perceived separately. The mother-of-pearl appears as silver. The two are *not* perceived in isolation, separation or discrimination. In all cases of illusory experience non-discrimination between the basic substratum of superimposition, and the object superimposed, is the fundamental element. There is no reason or justification for the cosmic illusion being exempted from the operation of the general law of all illusory experience, that the said non-discrimination is the very life of illusions. The moment one attempts to apply the general law of illusory experience to the cosmic illusion, it is observed that the law breaks down. The self or "atman," the spiritual entity which is the only reality, is the substratum. The cosmos is the superimposed. The two are perceived in perfect isolation and discrimination from one another. At any rate the animate and the inanimate are perceived in distinction and difference from one another. The self is perceived or experienced as different from the not-self. Neither normal nor abnormal mentality would ever mistake the self for the not-self. If it is contended that notwithstanding the palpable difference between the two, the cosmos is superimposed on Atman then this difference-tolerating illusion should be an

extraordinary one, and it will continue to be till the end of eternity. If it does not obey the proved law of illusions and if it can tolerate difference clearly perceived between the substratum and super-structure, one is entitled to argue that this illusion so-called will continue to haunt us till the end of eternity or it is no illusion but a reality.

There is yet another argument to show why the cosmos cannot be viewed as illusory superimposition on the substratum of the only one reality of Atman. Analysis of the fact of illusions, and the general psychological theory of illusions would indicate that at any given moment, a substratum or datum, or unit of data may be erroneously interpreted as *an* illusory object, but not as a plurality of objects. The plurality may come in successive perceptions of the illusion. In most of the text-books on psychology we find a list of perceptual illusions mentioned. There is a method in interpretational error. A piece of rope appears in illusion as a snake, or a garland or a chain, but *not* all these *simultaneously*. The datum or the substratum is the same. It is mistaken for this or that object in illusions, according to the predominant interest of the subject at the moment and in consonance with the features revealed by the datum or the substratum. If the cosmos is to be considered to be a gigantic illusion, it is inexplicable why it appears as a plurality of objects, animate and inanimate, a plurality or multiplicity which is riddled with contradictions and incompatibilities, differences, inequalities, and which sometimes reveals a topsy-turveydom of affairs that creates in the minds of struggling spiritual aspirants, doubts like those by which the hermit is described by Parnell to have been assailed, and why different objects are perceived by countless subjects *qua* different, at the same time is not made clear. The simultaneous perception of multiplicity of objects and subjects is proof positive that experience is not illusory. The instances of illusion may be varied as much as possible under laboratory conditions, and under favourable conditions, the same datum or substratum can be placed in the path of half a dozen individuals, who may be observed and whose account of illusory experience may be recorded. X may mistake a rope for a snake, Y for a garland simultaneously but the same individual will never mistake it simultaneously for a snake *and* a garland. One thing at a time is the law of illusions. A datum apprehended as a unit, is mistaken for something else misapprehended as a unit. A simultaneous perception of plurality and mastery of multiplicity are never the characteristics of an illusion, and the conclusion is inevitable that the multiplicity and plurality perceived should be as real as reality can be. To put it in other words, a datum or substratum is never by the same individual and at the same time grasped in perceptual illusions, as a multiplicity or a plurality. It cannot therefore be illusion of Atman. Nor can Atman be the

datum or the substratum of the cosmic illusion, which is of multiplicity and plurality, because it is one. Simultaneousness in perception of plurality and in the mastery of multiplicity is the criterion on which Madhva bases his argument to demonstrate the reality of the cosmos. Plurality being illusory, superimposed on one Reality and the one Reality being the datum of illusory perception of plurality are the two elements of the cardinal concept of the Absolutist which at the slightest touch of psychological analysis, resolves itself into a self-contradiction. Two inferences are indicated by Madhva. Taking the cosmos as the subject, the syllogism would be cosmos is *not* an illusory perception, the datum or the substratum being the one Atman. Why? Because, it appears simultaneously as a plurality or multiplicity. Taking the Atman as the subject, the inference would be—Atman cannot be the datum or the substratum of the (Illusion) appearance of the cosmos that is perceived as plurality or multiplicity. Why? Because it is one. The Absolutist puts in that such inferences may be possible if the multiplicity in the universe were to be viewed as real, but there is really speaking no multiplicity whatever. The multiplicity itself is an illusion. It is a superimposition. In reply Madhva asks—what is the substratum or datum on which that is a superimposition? It will have to be the Atman. There is no other go. Is the multiplicity perceived in illusion grasped as entity or substance or as an attribute? Neither the one nor the other. No one ever entertains the illusion that “I am multiplicity” or “I am dissected into multiplicity”. The ego or the self is ever, and essentially apprehended as one, and it can never be (in virtue of its personal identity,) the datum on which illusions of multiplicity can be erected as superstructure. What is in nature one, and indivisible can never be the basis or substratum of illusory perception of multiplicity and plurality. Even so what is essentially plurality or multiplicity can never be superimposed in illusions on a substratum that is one and indivisible. Atman is one and indivisible. The cosmos is multiplicity and plurality. Assuming for the sake of argument that the former is the only reality, and the latter an illusory perception, Madhva contends that an examination of illusions will reveal that the one indivisible Atman, can never be substratum of illusions of plurality and multiplicity, divisibility and dividedness. Nor can the cosmos, divisible, divided, into plurality and multiplicity, could be an illusory perception based on what is one and indivisible and undivided. The general law of illusions is that a substratum and its being erroneously apprehended are never discriminated in illusions. Non-discrimination between datum and interpretation is the law of illusions. There is clear and distinct discrimination between the self and the cosmos. So there is no illusion at all, in awareness of the cosmos. It will be noticed that first Madhva argued because Atman is one, it cannot be the substratum of superimposed

perception of cosmos which is many. Subsequently Madhva reinforces the argument in reference to the indivisibility of Atman and the divisibility, plurality and multiplicity of the cosmos. Even at the risk of some repetition, it is necessary to point out that in illusions when certain data with which a subject is confronted are erroneously interpreted, there is a unity or oneness about this misinterpretation, and there is no plurality of misinterpretations, of the same data, by the same individual and at the same time. All the "sames" should be underlined. On the other hand, the cosmos at any given moment, be it in normal or abnormal awareness is essentially apprehended as a plurality and multiplicity. This apprehension in virtue of the law of illusions can never be an illusion, but is obliged to be considered a reality.

Attempting an answer to the arguments sketched above, the Absolutist maintains that the pure, ubiquitous, immanent Atman, somehow pluralised by (Upadhis,) the pluralising agencies, of course endowed with a lesser degree of reality, will have to be admitted as the datum of the arch-illusion of the cosmos. Madhva rejoins that this line of argument cannot be allowed, because the law of illusions, is that the datum or the substratum should be gripped into the act of awareness along with the erroneous interpretation. The datum or the substratum is projected as it were into the illusion and *sensed* as well. The datum *qua* datum cannot but be *sensed*. But the pity of it is, that the Immanent Atman is a crayon" According to the Absolutist, the Immanent Atman is never *sensed qua datum*. Take an ordinary perception like "X is the datum. But no one ever perceives that the Atman is the crayon. Nor does the perception, when overtly expressed take the form—"The Atman is now perceived as a crayon." In fact, crayon is perceived as crayon, and the percipient as percipient. But the Absolutist explains that the form of perception is to the effect—an existent is perceived as a chalk. Existence, a particular form, a place in a time-space series, these enter into any awareness. Brahman or Atman is of the essence of existence, and when any existent is sensed, it is sensed only *qua* dashed across or dashed through with Atman—the only reality. Madhva points out that this line of argument will lead to absurd consequences. An existent, a characteristic, a form spatio-temporal location, definite identification as a point-event, enter into awareness. Normal awareness is of the form X is perishable—X is black etc. Why not maintain as one well can, that these constitute the substratum? Why drag in Atman? If it is contended that perishability, blackness etc. are the attributes of the object, then existence in its own right, *not* existence *qua* perceived by subjects, the victims of huge cosmic illusion or a fraud, can also be its property. If it is argued that objects of the universe do not possess any existence in their own right, but only have existence in the illusory awareness of finite selves, the Absolutist is plunged into a vortex of vicious reciprocity. Before any philosopher



or layman or a scientist, endeavours to deprive an object of the cosmos, or the cosmos itself for the matter of that, of its inalienable property of existence as a reality in itself, and in its own right—not a concessional existence in somebody's illusion—he should prove that the object or cosmos is an illusion taking care to lay down criteria to distinguish the real from the illusory and taking care as well to demonstrate that the cosmic illusion obeys the laws of abnormal awareness formulated by psychology. Existence—"Satta"—*qua* real object, in a real spatio-temporal series cannot be written off by a stroke of the pen of monistic metaphysicians. If through the instrumentality of reason, or revelation, text or tradition, the illusoriness can be demonstrated and existence as a reality can be repudiated, then it will be time enough to adumbrate the doctrine that the substratum of the Atman is the only reality and it somehow gives rise to appearance of plurality and multiplicity of the cosmos. The point is this. Absence of reality, or existence *qua* reality is one thing. (satta-abhava) Illusory appearance of a datum as something else or superimposition (aarpitatva) is another. To demonstrate the one the other should not be pressed into service. If that procedure be adopted, the fault is vicious reciprocity—*annyonyasraya*. Neither the one nor the other from of expressing the doctrine of Absolutistic Monism or Monistic Absolutism can be held to be proved, if one form is pressed into the service of the other. When it is said one "thing" "another thing," in reference to "Sattabhava" and "aarpitatva" of course the two forms are meant of developing or stating the central thesis of absolutistic illusionism. *Before* it is proved that objects in the cosmos have no real existence, or existence *qua* reality, one cannot be permitted so coolly and surreptitiously to take their non-existence for *granted*, and then on that facile assumption, to proceed to demonstrate that the One Central Reality is *sensed* in awareness like 'X is crayon,' and in fact neither the X nor the crayon could be apprehended otherwise than as an illusion. If on the other hand, it is a matter of methodological postulation of one Reality, another system of thought is at perfect liberty either to postulate, methodologically a duality or a plurality of realities or to postulate a Fortal Nullity *a la* a variety of Buddhism.

It will not do, Madhva proceeds to argue to press the device of a number of "upadhis" or limiting or pluralising agencies that "somehow" while maintaining intact and unimpaired the Absolutism of the Absolute yet, give rise to appearance of multiplicity and plurality. It may be recalled that Madhva devoted an entire controversial treatise to a conclusive and exclusive refutation of the doctrine of "Upadhis," and in the present context, he briefly summarises the objections urged against the doctrine therein. "Upadhis" or the pluralising agencies cannot themselves be real. Should they be, Monism will have to be surrendered. If it is maintained that the limiting agencies belong to a lower order or degree of reality, the obvious reply is that which

is of an admittedly lower degree of reality cannot be so powerful as to involve the Absolute in pluralisation of itself into the cosmos, or in giving rise to an appearance of plurality, as if by the mere characterisation of something as an appearance, its reality could be written off. The doctrine of the Absolutist is that anything which is of a lower degree of reality will have to be viewed as illusory appearance based on a substratum of a higher degree of reality. What about the Upadhis—the limiting agencies—or the pluralising agencies? They will have to be admitted to be only of a lower order or degree of reality to maintain the prestige of Monism, and if they are mere appearance, the substratum will be Brahman. The illusory appearance of “Upadhis” will have to be due to the operation of an agency other than the “Upadhis” themselves. If that is also an “Upadhi” or a “super-upadhi,” of course an appearance, another “upadhi” to explain it will have to be admitted. There is and can be no end to this regress-retrospective to locate responsibility for the appearance of plurality and multiplicity. Unless therefore, the same degree or order of reality is admitted to be the legitimate property of the limiting agencies, as that assigned to the Absolute, plurality and multiplicity cannot adequately be accounted for.

There is another trouble. Let it be granted for the sake of argument that somehow, the appearance of the cosmos, (of course, the illusory appearance), has arisen. The one Reality of Atman somehow again perceives this, (as it has to do—) the cosmic illusion. The Absolutist seeks inferentially to establish that the cosmos is illusory appearance. A subtle analysis reveals that in perceptual illusions, there is a curious compounding of ignorance and knowledge. *Ignorance*—heads have been broken over the problem if it is positive or negative—which obscures the substratum and erects as it were on it a superstructure of illusion, and *knowledge* of something perceived then and there *are compounded*!! When the unreality of the cosmos is established, what is the fate of this knowledge and ignorance? They too should be included in the cosmos which is the minor term of the Monists' syllogism. Are they included or not? One or the other alternative should be chosen. It is seen to be Hobson's choice. If the forms of knowledge and ignorance referred to, are not included in the cosmos, the inevitable consequence is they have to be accommodated in the Absolute or they should be merged in an identity with the Absolute. Or the Absolute then will have to be determined as being of the form of knowledge and ignorance. All determination is negation. There is an obvious contradiction in the Absolute being of the form of ignorance.

If the said knowledge and ignorance are included in the cosmos, the Absolutist is seeking to establish an unsustainable thesis. In any given situation, lay or metaphysical, that stimuli are impinging on the organism is not and cannot be denied. Validity and invalidity

relate to interpretation of the stimuli. Illusions are due to erroneous interpretation. The life of this erroneous interpretation is a well established order in which knowledge and object are distinguished in their own rights. Or in better terminology, the life of correct and incorrect interpretation of the stimuli is an order of affairs in which a subject perceives an object. The distinction is basic and foundational. Illusions arise if and when stimuli are wrongly interpreted, misinterpreted. Normal perception involves a correct interpretation of the stimuli. When given data or data with which a subject is confronted are misinterpreted, compounding of knowledge and ignorance arise. Whether it is compounding in the scientific chemical sense, it is irrelevant to query and needless to discuss. As far as the data are concerned, the stimuli, there is no doubt they are perceived, and so far there is knowledge, but data are erroneously interpreted. So far there is ignorance. Or the angle of vision can be altered. There is knowledge even in erroneous interpretation. That previous experience is pressed into service indicates knowledge, in misinterpreting the data. There is ignorance regarding the nature of the data. Anyway, knowledge and ignorance are there as real as reality itself, at the moment of perception. Analyse the subsequent stage when the subject realises, that he had been a victim of delusion or illusion. Then he says to himself—"Up till now I understood this to be silver and not as a piece of mother-of-pearl." The two forms of knowledge and of ignorance persist as realities in the stage of post-illusion awareness. From another angle of vision, he may say to himself, "I now see this to be mother-of-pearl. I no longer see it to be silver." Madhva's contention is that both in the illusion and in the post-illusion stages, knowledge and ignorance exist as clearly distinguishable elements which are irreducible, fundamental and foundational, and hence, the inferential or syllogistic judgment about the illusoriness of those forms as constituent elements of the cosmos, (the minor term of the syllogism,) will not stand the test of reason.

Syllogistic judgments may come and go, but Absolutism goes on for ever. The absolutist contends again, that somehow, knowledge and ignorance are themselves illusory, forms, or notions or concepts or empirical determinations or facts, having only a lesser degree of reality. On this view the old questions recur. Is the illusoriness or knowledge and ignorance due to the active agency of illusion-engenderer? Or has the agency been dispensed with? Not the latter. If the agency is dispensed with, what are the guarantees that the illusions may not persist till the end of eternity? If the active agency engendering illusions be admitted to exist, is that agency real or itself an illusion of a lesser degree of reality? If the former is it other than Atman or Atman itself? It cannot be other than Atman in the interests of Monism. Nor can it be identical with Atman which is determinationless. An entity that is determinationless cannot be the originator or engenderer of illusions.

And again, if the agency be identical with Atman, the only reality it will continue to exist till the end of eternity and salvation would be an impossibility. If the latter, i.e. illusory with a lesser degree of reality, it should itself be in need of another illusion-engendering agency and so on *ad infinitum*. If on the other hand, it is sought to be maintained, that illusions are self-engendered somehow the fallacy of "Atmasraya" will result. Then why not all perceptual illusions be explained as self-engendered or *sui generis*? If illusions are argued to be beginningless, the Absolutists' position that they are *caused* is absurd. The distinction between knowledge and ignorance will thus be seen to be perfectly real with the reality of the Absolute itself.

Thus cornered the Absolutist challenges Madhva to cite criteria for discriminating a valid from an invalid piece of knowledge. In invalid knowledge, the object is misapprehended as something else. This misapprehension—"vishayanyathatva"—is the criterion. Objectless awareness or knowledge is inconceivable. Under normal conditions, an object is apprehended as it is. Under abnormal conditions of illusions objects are apprehended as things other than themselves. Such a criterion never breaks down. A well-ordered systematic reality in which various objects have their own places and unmistakably characteristics, (as a totality each) is object of omniscient awareness. Finite human knowledge grasps only parts or fractions of the said reality and the parts or fractions are themselves miniature totalities which become objects of knowledge according to the purposeful exigencies of the subject or the percipient. That is the normal state of affairs. In abnormal circumstances, stimuli impinging on the organism, are misinterpreted. If judgments of validity and invalidity are to be pronounced *ex cathedra* without reference to the correct and incorrect interpretation respectively, the Absolutist will be in trouble. His sacred text—"That thou art" *qua* text forming part and parcel of the world, belongs and must belong to a lower degree of reality. It is not considered invalid though only endowed with a lesser degree of reality. The questions of validity and degrees of reality should be carefully separated and discriminated from one another. Madhva contends that validity or invalidity of knowledge or judgment, can be determined only in reference to the object which is apprehended as it is in its allotted place in the cosmic scheme, or apprehended wrongly as something else. The position is this. Knowledge and ignorance which latter always means knowledge of something other than the real substratum or the source of stimuli involved cannot be dismissed as illusory or belonging to lower order or degree of reality. Knowledge and ignorance about things in reality are as real as the Ultimate Reality itself. Their reality is foundational. Summing up this portion of the discussion, Madhva maintains that the inferential argument about the illusoriness or the unreality of the Universe cannot be sustained in view of the persisting,

standing, and foundational reality of knowledge and ignorance which also will have to be included in the sweep of the minor term of the syllogistic argument advanced to establish the unreality of the universe. There is no knowledge without subject-object relationship. The knower, the known, knowledge and the relational grip of unity that binds and holds them into an organic unity, or an effective response or a system of responses to environmental stimuli, are endowed with reality or do possess the characteristic or reality which is their inalienable birthright. One may not try to obstruct the progress of Madhva's argument by interjecting—"What is it that you understand by the term reality?" The reply is obvious. What does the Absolutist or the Monist understand by the term in question? "Jnyana" and "Ajnyana" are ultimate. Knowledge and ignorance indicate the presence or absence of a particular intimate relationship between the subject and the object. Absence is only absence of a certain expected relationship which implies another relationship *not* expected. The latter will be expected when the subject finds himself confronted with a different situation. The subject-object relationship indicated by the terms knowledge and ignorance is ultimate, and foundational and it is as much real or the Absolute Itself. Madhva refuses to dismiss the relationship as mere illusion or as belonging to a lower degree of reality. The doctrine of the Absolutist that the cosmos is an appearance engendered by ignorance, which is of a lower degree of reality, and which again is of such a nature as to be dispelled by knowledge of certain texts and contemplation of the truths contained in them (which have only a lesser degree of reality,) and which somehow clouds the only one spiritual entity—"eka-jiva" will break on the rock of the undoubted and inalienable right of reality possessed by knowledge and ignorance,—relationships between the subject and object which are *sui generis*, basic, fundamental and foundational. The Absolutist goes wrong because, he suffers from an ambition to explain and account for knowledge in terms of something which is not knowledge. The ambition has its own reward in a reduction of knowledge to a fatuous futility. Madhva concludes that this much will do for an exhaustive criticism of "Eka-Jiva-" Vada, the doctrine that the cosmic show is "one-spirit-ignorance-engendered." i.e., engendered by ignorance affecting oneself. (17)

Madhva's commentator takes up the thread here and in a page of terse and close argumentation analyses critically the grounds of the absolutistic generalisation as to the illusory, character of the cosmos. In a well-known Syllogism of the Absolutist, the conclusion is sought to be maintained that the Universe is "Mithya," unreal, illusory or has only a lesser degree of reality on three grounds—*drisyatvat*, *jadatvat*, *paricchinnavat*, (Middle terms) i.e., appearance under

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(17) The "Eka-Jiva-Vada" is refuted in detail by subsequent writers of controversial treatises. See Nyayamrita, P. 294

certain conditions, inanimateness, and time-space bound or cribbed, cabined and confined state in a time-space series. Madhva's commentator analyses the grounds *seriatim* briefly and exposes their untenability and fallaciousness. (1) What is *Drisyatva*? Does it mean being object of "drik?" conditional appearance or perception? Or "A-svaparakasa"—i.e., incapable of self-revelation? If it be the former, what is "drik"? Is it of the form of "*vritti jnyana*," empirical knowledge, or is it of the form of "*adhishtana chaitanya*"—i.e., the one reality that is the substratum of illusory appearance of the cosmos or any given object of the cosmos? The first alternative is inadmissible. Even Atman will then have to be considered illusory, as it is the object of empirical knowledge derived from a study of the vedanta. Or the ground of generalisation will be seen to exist concomitantly with Atman which is admittedly not illusory. Nor can the latter hold water. According to the Absolutist "antahkarana" (there is a strong sankhyan tinge about the term) shoots out, and takes on the form of objects. That X is chocolate is a form of perception. The "vritti" knowledge, unveils the nature of the object. The nature is of course a superimposition. The substratum is Atman (known "adhistana"). If it is contended that objects are pronounced illusory or of a lesser degree of reality, because they enter into the relation of becoming an object, in virtue of an act electrically contrived as it were, of superimposition, on the substratum of Atman, Madhva's commentator replies that the entire fabric of absolutistic theory of knowledge is a castle in the air. The lay and the technical, the sophisticated and the unsophisticated realise as the result of philosophical endeavour that a percipient under all normal conditions of awareness, sees objects as they are in virtue of the subject-object-relationship known as knowledge. That "antahkarana" shoots or projects itself forth into the form of object as if it were a projectile, then "aparokshavritti" destroys the veil of "avidya" and reveals the substratum, and then an identity is realised between the "pramatri chaitanya," "paramana-chaitanya," "prameya-chaitanya," are castles in the air. What is the self-revelation absence of which renders objects illusory? The concept of self-revelation (absence of which renders the finite world merely as an illusory appearance,) should be definitely ascertained and fixed before a doctrine is erected on the basis of its absence. Thus the second definition of drisyatva (or appearance) will be seen to be riddled with fallacies. Self-revelation cannot be unknowability. (avedyatva) If it were, it would mean that "drisyatva" connotes knowability. If knowability is analysed, fallacies narrated in respect of the first alternative will recur. If self-revelation means absence of dependence on something in the nature of revelation or knowledge, (other than itself,) and if such a dependence means, illusoriness, no universal connection can be established between the ground of generalisation and the conclusion itself, as such a dependence is to be

found in Atman from which illusoriness is absent. In the empirical denomination of Atman as the one Reality without a second, Atman is seen to be dependent on another piece of knowledge, that is of the "other" which if *unknown in toto* would never be excluded to have the oneness of Atman established. If such a dependence is held to be universally concomitant with appearance and not reality, Atman will have to be relegated to the realm of appearance! If it is contended that Atman is quite independent of knowledge of the "other" in differentiationless determination of itself, why even a jar has that sort of independence. If it is observed that objects of the finite world like a jar, cloth, etc., have nothing like differentialisationless determination, Madhva's reply is that Atman has it neither. If it is further contended that such a differentiationless determination is experienced in the state of dream-less sleep (sushupti) the answer is that neither introspection nor experimental testimony is in favour of that theory of sleep. If as a further possibility it is claimed that self-revelation is just being object of self-determination, while retaining the characteristic of unknowability, the concept itself is riddled with inner contradiction and inconsistency. When the concept itself is so precarious, it is uncanny to formulate the doctrine of the illusoriness of the universe, based on the absence of self-revelation from finite creation.

(2) Similarly the second ground of generalisation, namely inanimateness (jadatva) cannot stand a moment's scrutiny. Does it mean, "not being knowledge," or "not being a knower?" It cannot be the former. It does not apply to "vritti jnyana." Even Atman cannot be considered according to the Absolutist, to be knowledge. Hence it would be in the same boat as finite creation. It cannot be the latter either. Atman cannot be determined to be knower. Determination is negation. The determined *qua* determined is finite. It does not apply to I-awareness (ahamkara).

(3) Even so the third ground of generalisation, the isolation, or individualisation cannot be made to sustain the doctrine of illusionism. What does individualisation imply? Is it in reference to space? Time? or finite object—the substance itself? It cannot be the former two. If individualisation in reference to time and space is to be a ground of generalisation of illusionism, how are time and space themselves to be determined? The time and space that bring about the cribbing, cabining and confining should not themselves be cribbed, cabined and confined!! Reason requires that they should be understood differently. Absence of all bounds is evidence of their reality. If it is said that they two are cribbed, cabined and confined, they stand in need of other cribbing agencies. Once again the sickening game—do these agencies need something else to crib and confine them? There is no way out of this cul-de-sac. Nor would the third alternative hold water. If individualisation, be a ground of illusionism,

Atman itself is perceived as individualised and determined differently from the inanimate. If it is contended that determination of difference between Atman and inanimate creation is only of a lesser degree of reality, the contention is pointless, as the absence of real difference between creation and the Absolute is affirmed by a fiat, and if individualisation cannot be predicated in reference to Atman, nor could it in reference to finite creation, as such individualisation is in all cases only of a lesser degree of reality; it is as good as saying that the ground of generalisation of illusionism has proved to be as elusive as the horizon.

The inferential argument that in any given piece of thread it is possible to establish the total absence of a cloth, and to demonstrate its illusoriness is unsustainable. The point sought to be established is just a chimera. The *Atyanta-abhava*—i.e. symmetrical or total non-existence, in reference to space-time-continuum—is a concept which stands cut loose from all reference to a positive entity. In other types of negation, it is easy to fix upon something the absence of which is asserted in satisfaction of a situational demand or exigency. Nothing of that kind can be possible in reference to total negation. The "*atyanta-abhava*," is technically termed "*Nishpratiyogika*." "*Pratiyogi*" is that the absence of which is asserted in answer of course to an environmental problem. When we say "*Ghatabhava*," the absence of a pot, the "*ghata*" or the pot is the "*pratiyogi*." A mare's nest is such an object. It has no spatio-temporal existence. The mare has existence. The nest has. But the mare's nest has none. If the Absolutist seeks inferentially to establish the absence of the full-blown cloth from or its non-existence in any given piece of thread, the pity of it is that the absence that is sought to be established, is exactly on a par with absolute self-contradiction, which will not sustain illusionism or the lesser degree of reality admitted in respect of the universe either as a concession to popular opinion, needs of system-building or to something else of that kind. The inferential argument therefore, is vitiated by a logical fallacy which is unriddable. Formal validity will not help. One may as well argue that because all virtue is a square or a pentagon, this virtue which is mentioned is also a like geometrical figure! The absurdity lies of course in the major premise which has to be challenged in the interests of logical and factual considerations. The Absolutistic inference will not thus stand a moment's scrutiny. The motive of the Absolutist is quite clear, crystal-clear. That a given piece of cloth (a particular-context-time-space-bound) does not exist elsewhere in a different context and at a different space-time-point is obvious. If its non-existence could be inferentially established here and now, its total non-existence or illusoriness could be established with ease. But the pity of it lags. All that could be established is that something designated



by convention *qua* cloth, derives such a designation or characterisation only at a particular stage of sartorial evolution. A visit to a weaving centre may convince anyone that clothes are not threads and threads are not *qua* threads clothes. Logical requirements that are invariable and inevitable concomitants of the nature of negation and non-existence, make it perfectly ridiculous on the part of the Absolutist to attempt inferentially to establish that the cloth does not exist in threads. The non-existence of the cloth cannot be demonstrated as part of the illusionistic propaganda. For the cloth has a time-space-bound existence. If what is sought inferentially to be established is just the absence of clothes in given lines of threads, it is "siddha-sadhana," establishing that which is already established, involving wastage of metaphysical or logical endeavour. If what is sought to be established be just that the cloth is not the effect of the threads, the argument will amount either to denial of "causedness" of the cloth or affirmation of another cause different from thread. In either case, illusionism has been given the go by. Such an inferential argument cannot apply to "akasa," ether or space. Finally the entire fabric of illusionism of the universe engendered by ignorance in respect of the one spirit (eka-jiva) must crumble down to dust as it is impossible to identify the one spirit, and as this absence of identification leaves the entire problem unsettled on account of the indecision that must surely result as to who is the originator of or sufferer from ignorance and illusion. Who the potter pray and who the pot? It will easily be seen that the other inferential argument that all the nervous systems and mechanisms are the instruments through which *Devadatta*—some X, enjoys the cosmos and cosmic values will turn out to be equally fallacious. The one existent thus sought to be demonstrated may be the Immanent Agent, and identity between the finite and the Infinite is not yet proved. Or it may be taken to be proved that *Devadatta* may be one able to enter into the nervous mechanisms of other persons, leaving his own frail frame temporarily in suspended functioning, by means of yogic powers. None of these inferential constructions would establish identity of the finite and the Infinite and the illusionism, the heart's desire of the Absolutist.

Madhva observes that there are practically and speculatively *no difficulties* in the acceptance of his own doctrine of the reality of the universe. Madhva's commentator elaborates this statement of realism. The "Pramanas," the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge support reality of the universe. Sense-perception actually yields knowledge of external reality and of objects as they are. Under all normal conditions, sensory channels of communications intercept stimuli from external reality which cause the appropriate responses. Of course there is perceptual distortion in abnormal circumstances, but the abnormal only demonstrates the normal. On the inferential plane too, or by means of inference as well, the reality of the Universe can be established. The argument will run

thus—the universe is real or a reality, because it is brought home to the subject by means of a “pramana,” source of valid knowledge and a guarantor, to boot, and anything that is so brought home cannot but be real, as in the case of Atman or spirit. There is no cheap compromise, no half-way house. In the establishment of the reality of the Universe, Madhva even as the Sankhyas and the Nayyayikas is a whole-hogger. The reality sought to be established in reference to the world of finite objects, sentient and non-sentient creation, is the same as the reality that is claimed by the Absolutist to be the property or the essence of the Absolute. The “Agama” or the sacred texts as well demonstrate or prove the reality of the Universe.

Perceptual awareness or sense-awareness is restricted, puts in the Absolutist, to the present, perishing moment. How can it establish reality of the universe which includes future unstultifiability or existence intact? Madhva replies that sense-awareness is a source of valid knowledge and its guarantor.

There is nothing to upset the validity of sense-awareness. If like Parmenides of old, and Kant and others (the *onus probandi* lies on them to be sure) metaphysicians should start their investigations with the postulate that the senses deceive us, there is hardly any end or termination to the deception practised by the senses, though of course, the adroit claim may be advanced that something like a Copernican revolution has been created in metaphysical and speculative system-building; and from attempts made at rehabilitation of the critique of pure reason, by means of practical reason, it is evident that Madhva is not far out in his own endeavour to establish the validity of sense-awareness. There is nothing to dislodge perceptual knowledge from its undoubted status of validity. The power of inferential knowledge to invalidate the perceptual has been repudiated and denied. *Veritas norma sui*. (18) If perceptual knowledge is to be repudiated or denied, that could be achieved only by means of a more perfect perceptual knowledge. There is no such stronger perception that is in a position to invalidate the perceptions of the mass of humanity and of philosophers. That at some future date, a stronger perception may arise and invalidate the present perception, would be an uncritical suspicion associated with a nervous temperament or with a controversially adroit mentality; but hardly proof. It is in order to urge that even at a future date, no such stronger perception, imagined by the Absolutist, will arise and invalidate the present perception. Perceptual knowledge, therefore, as it reveals the characteristics of objects of external reality as they are, in respect of the present, cannot but establish their reality. The truth is familiar that objects of perception in external reality and external reality itself, in whatever sense understood, would all at some future date perish and get resolved into cosmic atoms, but such a dissolution does not mean

however their unreality. Perishability or "anityatva" should be carefully discriminated from "badhyatva" or "mithyatva," illusoriness. "Badha" or stultification the nearest approach in the English language is not perishability or perishing, but only absence of or denial of existence in past, present and future. Objects that enter into perceptual awareness, *qua* existents in the present, cannot be viewed as non-existents in past, present and future.

The Absolutist now challenges Madhva to define reality as different from knowability by means of "pramanas" or the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge. This challenge is sustainable from the point of view neither of the Monist nor of the Dualist. The challenge has no point according to the Monist. To him the Absolute or Brahman is the only Reality—the reality of realities. It cannot be the object of any "pramana". If it is *qua* object of a pramana it becomes determined, and *qua* determined it will lose its absoluteness. How then does the Monist satisfy his own punctilious metaphysical conscience, when he accepts reality of Brahman along with the inaccessibility of Brahman or the Absolute to the Pramanas? The challenge that Madhva should explain reality as distinct from accessibility of an object to Pramanas or the sources or the guarantors of knowledge, comes with ill grace from the Monist who so coolly accepts the reality of Brahman when It is admitted to be inaccessible to Pramanas. From the stand-point of the Dualist again the challenge could have no point whatever. The dualists admit reality as the essential characteristic of Brahman as well as of the world, that is distinct and different from accessibility to Pramanas. Reality is defined as that which is not the object of all-time denial or denial in respect of the present, past and the future (traikalikanishedha). Sense-awareness thus demonstrates the reality of objects, or a system of objects a reality which is of the same degree as that belonging to the Absolute.

The Absolutist now pursues his objection against the reality of the universe from another angle of vision. He contends that the inexplicability of the relationship between the finite world and Brahman demonstrates the unreality of the former. How does the universe stand related to Brahman? Is the world different from Brahman? Is it not different? Is it identity-in-difference or difference-in-identity? Or is it something different from the third alternative? It cannot be the first. If X is to be affirmed to be different from Y, then the concept of "difference" should first be analysed and explained. Is it different from X and Y or identical and so on? There will ensue an interminable regress of difference in the maze of which one would get lost and the relationship known as "difference" will remain unelucidated. The second alternative will not suit either. For then, dualism would be compromised. There cannot be any identity between that which is of a higher degree of reality and

which is of a lower one. The third is just a verbal quibble. Identity-in-difference or difference-in-identity involves a contradiction, and the concept is otiose as a given relationship is to be brought under identity or difference. The fourth cannot be. For it is tantamount to the assertion that the universe is indescribable ("anirvachaniya") Madhva maintains that an effective reply to such objections has already been given elsewhere, to the effect that 'difference' is of the essential form of objects (dharmisvarupa) and that there is no regress as imagined by the Absolutist to silence an inconvenient opponent. When objects are cognised they are cognised as different from one another as members of a system; the membership however does not destroy the independence and individuality of objects, which retain intact their indifference from one another.

Madhva retorts it is strange that it did not strike the Absolutist that the four alternatives mentioned by him can well be extended to the Absolute itself! As the Absolutist maintains identity between Brahman and the finite world, his own queries in respect of the finite world, have to be put and answered in respect of the Absolute. Is the Absolute different from the finite world? Is it identical or non-different? Or is it gripped by an identity-in-difference or difference-in-identity? Or is it a fourth variety something different from all the three alternatives mentioned? If it is different, the concept of difference itself should be elucidated. An infinite regress is the outcome of the attempt to elucidate the concept of difference. If the Absolute be identical with the finite world, there cannot be any identity between what is confessedly a real real and that which for the sake of metaphysical courtesies or amenities, is allowed only a lesser degree of reality. If it is the fourth Brahman will have to be admitted to be (anirvachaniya) i.e. having only a dubious degree of reality! It will not do to seek to escape out of this quandary by resort to any sacred text which vouches for the reality of Brahman. Why? For the matter of that, there are equally potent and powerful sacred texts that establish the reality of the finite world. Why not then admit the reality of the latter without much metaphysical ado?

Granting for the sake of argument that the universe is a reality, interrogates the Absolutist, how does that shine or get known or enter into the relationship of knowledge? It cannot be of itself or in its own right. For it is inanimate. (jada) Nor can it be from other source of illumination or light. For it is not in any understandable relation with any such source. If on the other hand, the doctrine of unreality or illusoriness of the universe be maintained, it will be easily possible to explain the appearance of the finite world, as due to erroneous ascription of features that really belong to the substratum (on which the superstructure of the universe is created as it were,) to the superstructure itself. Madhva replies that after all this importation into metaphysics of

terminology from physical light and illumination will not contribute to the clarification of matters. It is quite in order to explain the knowability of the universe by means of "vritti." The pure self or "chitanya" may be pure to the extent of a punctilious repulsion of objects. But the "vritti" will intervene to establish the subject-object relationship of knowledge. Even the pure "chaitanya, the sakshi" is seen to be the object of pleasure and pain and other hedonistic determinations. On the hypothesis of reality appropriate sense-environmental contact will explain knowledge of the object secured by the subject. There is thus no difficulty in explaining (the fact of knowledge) how reality enters into the relationship of knowledge in respect of a subject on the theory of the reality of the universe.

On the theory of Adhyasa or ignorance-distorted perception of the substratum of the Absolute or Brahman as an illusory superstructure of the cosmos almost insurmountable difficulties present themselves. As, according to the Absolutist, "jiva-chaitanya" conditioned by "Avidya" is ubiquitous (sarvagata) and as anything illusory apprehended as a super-structure on this ubiquitous substratum which is the only reality, one only without a second, is bound to continue so long as the substratum lasts—it would last being the only reality to the end of eternity—the universe will have to continue to appear or shine till the end of eternity. The implication is that even in the final stage of release the continuance or persistence will vitiate the finality and blessedness of release. There will be no release at all! If it is sought to be maintained that the adventitious "avidya-conditioned self is not the substratum, but the Absolute Brahman itself is the substratum on which the illusory cosmic structure is constructed, then the appearance of the universe itself becomes an impossibility. Brahman (adhishtana) the substratum is of course not accessible to any sensory channels of communication. How then is it possible to entertain the illusory perception of a superstructure on a substratum that is avowedly and admittedly beyond the pale of all sense-contact? This is the position on the hypothesis of only one self being admitted as reality. If a number of empirical selves be admitted, there is no improvement of philosophic affairs. If the universe be an illusory superstructural perception, it will continue to shine and appear to all as the substratum-(self) is the common property of all in such simple instances like this is a jar, and it is on this the superstructure will have to be maintained to rest. As in the former case too, the appearance will have to continue till the end of eternity. If, on the other hand, Brahman is the substratum then the empirical selves will never perceive (the appearance of) the illusory superstructure as the substratum must for ever lie beyond the pale of sensory contact. In either case, the Absolutist will find it practically impossible to render an intelligible account of the exact and precise nature of the illusory appearance of the cosmic show,

as his hypotheses of a real substratum of Brahman or the Absolute and of the illusory superstructure on it are seen to be bristling with inconsistencies and contradictions.

At this stage, the Absolutist makes a rallying effort to sustain cosmic illusionism on the doctrine of ("drishti-srishti") creation synchronous with perception. (19) On that view the universe is just an illusory perception of the self. At the moment of illusory perception, or perception of illusion, it is boughit into being. On the data supplied by this theory, the objections mentioned above (that the illusions should be eternal and so on) will vanish. The illusion is engendered just at the moment of perception, and then is no more. There occurs a perceptual, momentary rejuvenation of illusory perceptions. Illusions will surely not appear to all minds and at all places. They will be perceived when the operative conditions become active. That is ("drishti-srishti") creation at the moment of perception. Bosanquet's mental construction of reality is here running riot. It needs only a very slight verbal amendment. It is not mental construction, but mental creation! Illusions of persistence and continuity are explicable by the fact that moments succeed one another so rapidly that creations appear to be endowed with permanence and persistence just as a rapidly revolving top appears to remain stand-still.

Madhva replies, that the "drishti-srishti" doctrine can be supported neither by introspective nor by experimental testimony. Grant for the sake of argument that this doctrinal fiat is somehow tolerated. It will have to be abandoned at the next moment because, there is no kind of ("drishti") perception at the time of deep dreamless sleep, in intense stupor-reactions and similar states, and in the absence of "drishti" "srishti" (creation) is a myth. Be it remembered that the Absolutist admits the reality of only one spirit, and so long as that continues to be awake, sustaining of illusions can somehow be explained, and when however, he falls asleep there is an end of it all-illusions and realities. And no more about Thee and Me.

The absurdity of the doctrine becomes all the more glaring on the hypothesis of a plurality of empirical selves all of whom create the universe as they and when they perceive. Reminiscence and objectivity in reference become inexplicable should a plurality of empirical selves be admitted. X an empirical self now sees Y. In the act of sight or perception the Y is *created*. When next perceptual activity is directed to Z, Y has gone, gone into irrevocable oblivion. Then how is it that reminiscence is a fact of life? I now see, says the empirical self to himself, the same typewriter, the identical machine, with which some pages were typewritten yesterday. The reminiscent mood, recall of past experiences, and

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(19) See "Nyayamrita." P. 292.

the phenomenon of memory, would all become inexplicable on the doctrine of "drishti-srishti". Further, the same Y is perceived as identical by another empirical self which may compare notes and agree with X in the perception of the characteristics of the object in question. Memory and reminiscence in respect of the one and the same empirical self, and objective reference to the same object or systems of objects and to an objective, external reality, vitiate the doctrine of "drishti-srishti" creation-synchronous-with-perception.

It may not matter, puts in the Absolutist which is to be regarded as the substratum and which the superstructure, so long as plurality of empirical selves may have respective perceptions engendered by "vriti", the inner sense. ("antahkarana-parinama.") The doctrine is this. "Antahkarana" the inner sense, is quick, mobile, and lightning-like. When there occurs proper sense-contact between an object and the appropriate sense-organ which is excited by or which intercepts the adequate stimulus, the inner sense "antahkarana", supported and buoyed up by the spirit of the subject ("pramatrichaitanya") approaches the object and rents asunder the veil that hides (the "chaitanya"), the spirit which is the substratum of superimposed object. Identity flashes between the two ("chaitanyas,") and it is that flash which is designated knowledge of the object. The flash will not occur to all at all times, or to oneself at all times, or to all selves at the same time, and so on, and it will occur only when the proper and appropriate conditions for sense-contact are established, or when such environmental exigencies present themselves. The multiplicity of ("antahkaranas,") inner sense-organs of the various finite, and empirical selves, would explain the actual systematic orderedness of the scheme of knowledge and reality—namely that a given of knowledge can only have a given object and not any piece of knowledge could claim anything as its object and so on. This is the famous doctrine of the Absolutist known as "pratikarmavyavastha"—The settled scheme that certain forms of knowledge are commensurate with or adequate only to certain objects, and the scheme of knowledge and reality according to which at any given moment given individuals perceive external reality in the same manner, under settled conditions of sense-contact, render objective reference possible.

Madhva retorts that all this roundabout analysis and circumlocutory verbosity would appear to be love's labour lost. The flash of identity between "pramatrichaitanya", "pramachaitanya" and "prameya" or "vishayachaitanya" is a figment of imagination. It is seen that three things are essential constituents of all perception, "vritti" or the virgin's kiss of inner sense bestowed or inprinted on an object, the object and the appropriate sense-contact. These should be as real as the

Absolute itself. There cannot be any doubt as to their reality in the richest and maximum metaphysical connotation of the term. The "vritti-vishaya" contact if anything establishes only the reality of objects, and of the contact between senses or sensory channels of communication and objects. If the entire phenomenon is to be dismissed as an illusion endowed only with a lower degree of reality, then why should the farce be enacted of explaining the nature of the sense-object contact and the phenomenon of knowledge itself? As a subsequent writer pungently and poignantly puts it, there cannot be a controversy imagining contradictions and inconsistencies and erecting huge castles in the air to store them in. (20) It is controvertibly waste of theorising or speculative energy to imagine three "chaitanyas" or spirit-stuffs among which a lightning-flash-identity is established and perceived in all normal activity. Instead knowledge can be explained on the basis of a realistic metaphysic. Nothing is thereby compromised. If the lighting-flash-identity referred to above can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the fastidious critical conscience of modern scientists, it is impossible to imagine why the less contradiction-and-inconsistency-ridden hypothesis of the reality of the Universe cannot be accepted. The question has to be impartially viewed from the stand-point of the assumptions made and the subterfuges pressed into service to render intelligible the fact of knowledge and participation of a real reality in the establishment of the subject-object relationship known as knowledge. If it is consistent with metaphysical, logical speculative, and system-building dignity to assume three mind-stuffs or spirits or "chaitanyas"—call them by any term you please—and then affirm with an oath that a lightning-like flash identity is established and perceived among them all, there is absolutely nothing *infra dig* either in the admission of the reality of the universe itself which is at any rate straightforward, natural and unstrained account of the facts of life and experience on which alone philosophy should take its stand. The validity of a philosophical theory will have to depend on the number and the nature of the assumptions made, and if Monism can explain knowledge only on the assumption of three ("chaitanyas"—of course sworn to be of lesser degree of reality—) mind-stuffs or spirit-stuffs, and of a lightning-like flash identity among them all, it will not need any intense metaphysical cerebration on the part of the critics of Madhva to realise that the fact of knowledge could be better explained on the hypothesis of dualism and realism which regards knowledge to be foundational and involved also in foundational relationship with a subject and an object. In other words, knowledge, knower, the known and the means or the channels of communication which yield knowledge are all held together in a tight dynamic grip, and if at a given moment or the time

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(20) "Nahi-Kalpita-Virodha-pariharau-yuktau" P. 28. Vanamali-misra's "Chandamaruta." Manuscript in the present writer's possession.



of evolution a cross section could be taken of knowledge, the three constituent elements are sure to be detected. Metaphysical disputation and mutual recrimination apart, the foregoing hypothesis of knowledge based on Madhva's realistic and dualistic metaphysics is as worthy of consideration as a rational world-view as that of the Absolutist who exhibits as if from a magical box, three "chaitanyas", knower-spirit,—known-spirit, and sensory-channel spirit, and treats the gaping unsophisticated and the professional metaphysical sight-seers to a lightning-like flash of identity among them all at the time of perception of objects of external reality—and at the time of the realisation that X is a typewriter. Madhva's commentator asks in subdued humour "Why worry about such a theory of knowledge based on the identity of the tripartite or triple *chaitanyas*, which is devoid of any authority—introspective, experimental and scriptural"? "Kimanaya-pramanasunyaya-prakriyaya"?

That his doctrine is said to be devoid of authority is a criticism which the Absolutist will not brook. He contends that the scriptural text "*tasyabhasa-sarvamidam-vibhati*" supports—"pratikarmavyavastha" and maintains that all creation shines or is illuminated by His Light or Radiance. Madhva explains that the said passage cannot sustain the castle in the air of the triple "chaitanya" identity in theory of knowledge. It means that the Supreme Spirit—the Lord—is immanently present in all creation animating and guiding it. Or it may mean that even the luminous bodies Sun and Moon that contribute to the existence of life on this planet derive their light, sustaining power, vitamins and energy from the Supreme Ruler of the cosmos, who is the immanent Power in all creation, the Sustainer, and the Destroyer when the allotted span is over. The scriptural text cannot be made to bolster up a doctrine which speaks of a triple "chaitanya" and identity among them as an occurrence of electric or lighting-like flash which is said to reveal objects of external reality to a dazed and dazzled finite intellect. (21).

Let alone the scriptural text which admits of many interpretations. Madhva maintains that the doctrine of lightning-like flash identity among the three "chaitanyas", knower-self, known-self and sense-self must sooner or later get wrecked on the rock of knowledge about the past, reminiscence, recalls etc., and of intelligent anticipation of the future. The three—"chaitanya"-identity could not be established there, as an important link in the chain, namely the object, has vanished in one case, and in the other is in the womb of the future. If it is still argued that the veil of ignorance can be rent asunder by "vritti", the logical retort is that in such cases, if the flash is a fact, then knowledge will be in the nature of an everlasting present, without any reference to the past and the future with which humanity and perhaps animality too are

quite familiar. In modern psychological terminology, the flash occurring at the moment of perception must be deemed to have vanished. It does so vanish. In reminiscence, the flash-identity cannot be established. It may be argued that in the absence of the object, identity is established in respect of the image! But then in addition to the three "chaitanyas" postulated above, a fourth should be brought into being which will have to be designated *samskaravacchinna-chaitanya* and in the matter of the future, however, this postulation or assumption will not hold as images can be legitimately spoken of only after a prior concrete perception. If therefore the distinction between "Paroksha" and "Aparoksha" is to be maintained—and life-phenomena are nothing if not determined and regulated by present-past-future-distinction—the doctrine of flash-identity should be abandoned. Ignorance can envelope something which is already there to be enveloped, and if this envelopment is made clear, one can understand the riddance of the veil or the envelopment. But there can be no manner of envelopment before the object comes into being. Even supposing that the "Samskara-avacchinna-chaitanya" is postulated to account for reminiscence, there could be no such "chaitanya" in respect of the objects, yet to be.

"Somehow" puts in the Absolutist, "I do not like the metaphysics of *Two Reals*—namely Brahman and the Universe. The admission of two reals is a superfluity. You can manage with only one. There is a law that economy should be observed even in philosophical or speculative system-building. If Nature abhors waste, so does speculation. In the interests of metaphysical economy *two reals* should be abandoned, and only one real should be admitted to be at the root of the cosmic show". Madhva retorts that the *reductio ad absurdum* of the craze for economy would be straightway to embrace the doctrine of Nihilism. The Absolutist imagines he escapes Dualism only by word of mouth. Does not the Dualism of stand-points, empirical and transcendental haunt his footsteps? Does not the plurality of stand-points of many finite selves (monads) haunt him? Does he not speak glibly about Degrees of reality, each degree being a stand-point? Is there no Dualism or Pluralism then? Does it not all constitute a colossal waste of metaphysical energy? So materialistic Monism or Nihilism may be accepted in the interests of speculative economics. The one Reality without a second may be matter, and spirit may be considered to be a mere epiphenomenon. Materialistic Monism will then be the fashionable philosophy of life. Even then, troubles are not at an end. How then does matter remain at all? May it not also be an appearance? Matter may be as unreal and illusory as spirit. There is absolutely nothing inherently inconsistent or incompatible in a position like that. Nihilism may be openly proclaimed to be the only fashionable philosophy of life or world-view, as it involves the minimum number of

assumptions or postulations, and as it involves too economy in metaphysical system-building and economy of metaphysical energy, speculative effort, and philosophical endeavour. It is plain however that the Absolutist is in no mood to follow up his doctrines to their logical *termini* however unpleasant the consequences may prove to be from the stand-point of sentimentalism. (22) He objects that Nihilism is not and cannot be espoused because the sacred texts proclaim that "Atman" or "Brahman" is the only reality and that its reality cannot be repudiated. Madhva replies that sacred texts are not wanting which proclaim equally authoritatively and unequivocally the reality of the Universe and therefore, the question of economy need not be raised. The point is this. The red-herring of metaphysical economy is drawn across the path of inquirers when the Absolutist wants to establish his own doctrine of illusionism. When however Madhva urges that the same considerations of economy will land the absolutist, if consistently adhered to, in Nihilism, he resorts to sacred texts, but the pity of it is that the sacred texts emphasize the reality of the Universe as clearly and distinctly as one may expect. The doctrine of the two reals has nothing illogical about it, especially when the two reals are the minimum to account for creation and life-phenomena, matter and spirit, difference, plurality, contradictions and incompatibilities in the world. Madhva winds up this portion of the discussion with the statement that none of the speculative and factual defects of the doctrine of illusionism which assumes that the cosmic show is engendered by ignorance affecting the one spirit, would touch the doctrine of realism and pluralism.

## XI

Madhva then proceeds to show that the faults and fallacies incidental to the illusionistic theory of the Universe being engendered by or from ignorance of the one spirit, would apply equally well to the second variety of illusionism which admits however a plurality of spirits or empirical selves, known as "bahujivavada". The plurality of selves empirically observed, and their difference from one another as noted from their varying endowment, equipment, opportunities and abilities etc., are of course only of a lesser degree of reality. Similarly the difference between the finite selves and the Supreme Spirit is also of a lesser or lower degree of reality. If so, how is the appearance of difference and disparity engendered? The Absolutist holds that the appearance of difference, and disparity, of plurality and multiplicity is due to the operation of "Upadhis", the limiting individualising or pluralising agencies. When the truth of this is realised, there is no doctrinal inconsistency in the maintenance of Absolutistic Monism or Monistic Absolutism, side by side with the illusionism of plurality and

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(22) For an equation of Advaitism or Absolutism to Nihilism or Buddhism, see Chapter 7-Tattvodyota,

multiplicity, as the former is the truth of the matter and the latter only an appearance.

{Madhva undertakes immediately an analysis of the nature and metaphysical status of ("Upadhis,") the individualising or pluralising agencies that are believed to be responsible for the illusionistic scheme of things. The agencies are not admitted to be real. Such an admission would shatter Monism. They themselves are gripped by illusionism. The entire question is whether the "upadhis," themselves of a lower degree of reality are powerful enough to create the illusion of plurality and multiplicity. The absolutist points to the analogy of mirrored image and the original. The latter is a reality. The former is just a shadow which is an unreality. Madhva argues that this analogy will not help absolutism and the concomitant illusionism. The image is as real as the original. The difference between the two is real. It is caused by a definite and determinable concatenation of circumstances. The difference between the original (bimba) and the image (pratibimba) is real (satya) and not ("aupadhika") due to illusionistic limiting agency. The instance of the bent appearance of stick immersed in water has been analysed and found not to support any illusionistic doctrines. A sensation ever appears along with a related condition present somewhere with all the reality of the absolute itself. If one should trace the vicissitudes of the rays of light that emanate from the object immersed in water and culminate in a retinal image or images, it will be seen that the sensations appear ever associated with related conditions which are perfectly real. In the analogy of the mirror suggested by the Absolutist, there is no element supporting the doctrine of illusionism. The mirror is a reality. The visual apparatus is a reality. Light rays are realities. The image is a reality. There is difference between the image and the original. It is as real as the objects that are gripped by difference. The original-image-relationship is not arbitrary. It obeys certain fixed and definitely ascertainable laws. If the illusions are there merely to oblige the Absolutist then why not the original of X produce images of Y? That the original X produces image of X and that it obeys the laws of reflection and so on, would conclusively prove that the analogy of ("bimba" and "pratibimba,") the original and the image will not do to explain the appearance of plurality and multiplicity.} The trouble is this. The quixotic quibbling about degrees of reality should be abandoned. The Upadhis are there as realities even as the Absolute or they are not. If the former, Monism is shattered. If the latter, plurality, multiplicity and difference among the latter cannot be explained. Granting for the sake of argument that "somehow" there is the operation of "Upadhis," which are not as real as the Absolute, it means that the "Upadhis," are superimposed on the Absolute, which will have to be regarded as

the substratum (adhishtana). As is usual with Absolutism, only Atman or the Absolute will have to be considered the substratum (adhishtana). It has already been argued that Atman the essence of which is reality self-luminosity etc. can never be the substratum of the superimposition of ("anatma,") the inanimate the essence of which is ignorance. "Upadhi" or the limiting condition or agency *par excellence* is of course ignorance. (ajnyana). It is inanimate. (jada or anatma). It must lack reality. It should be a superimposition. The substratum should have to be only Atman or the Absolute. It has already been argued that "Atman" can never be the substratum to be mistaken as "anatma". "Upadhi" has to be viewed only as a superimposition. There is no other go. There is an inherent inconsistency in its being viewed as a superimposition. Its fundamental characteristic is (anatmata) inanimateness. It can never be superimposed on "atman" (animate). Thus it is clear that the nature and constitution of the concept of Upadhi, the limiting condition itself are riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies. It is strange that through the instrumentality of this contradiction-riddled concept the Absolutist seeks to establish the illusionism of plurality and multiplicity in the universe and of the difference between the Absolute and the finite on the one hand, and difference among the finite selves themselves from one another on the other.

It will not do for the Absolutist to contend that in the creations effected by a juggler who exhibits to a wonder-dazed audience a blazing botanical specimen of a mango-tree from an insignificant seed, there is no substratum on which a superstructure can be imagined. Even assuming for the sake of argument that under the spell of hypnotic trance illusory experiences can be and are perceived, the obvious answer is that there is operating a real suggestion or system of suggestions which is transferred from the hypnotist to the person hypnotised by means of a rapprochement or rapport. The illusion of mango-tree has meaning only in the light of a prior perception of the said mango-tree, and the creations of a juggler have meaning only in respect of objects perceived *qua* real in a different space-time series. It is not to be supposed that the juggler succeeds in the creation of objects that have not been perceived elsewhere. It is demonstrated therefore, that there can be no illusory experience of any kind without a substratum which is real on which the superstructure of illusory appearance has to be erected. "Upadhi" or the pluralising agency is just ignorance and its nature is a superimposition on the substratum of "Atman". The superimposition cannot be sustained as "Atman" is essentially animate and ignorance inanimate (anatma). Thus the concept of Upadhi itself has resolved itself into an impossibility. For empirical purposes, one set of Absolutists holds that the Jiva (finite) and Brahman (Infinite

or the Absolute) are the only two spiritual, entities the former being of lesser degree of reality and the latter the only reality. There is only one spirit or jiva. The subjective world of each individual, his own mental construction and the objective one of common point of reference made by all individuals in their mental constructions, are illusory appearance engendered by Avidya (ignorance) that affects Jiva (finite). The "Bahujivavadis" are the second set of absolutists. They admit jiva, Brahman and Iswara. The subjective world of each individual is the result of ignorance affecting the jiva (finite) whereas the objective world of common reference made by all individuals, is the result of ignorance somehow affecting Iswara—affecting or having Iswara as "asraya" (support, prop, substratum or whatever it is) and the latter is "sadharana" (common to all individuals). The former is "asadharana" (Subjective and individual's own). In the two-fold absolutistic interpretation of the subjective and the objective worlds, or illusory appearances of a system of subjective experiences and objective reality, it is imperative and obligatory that illusions should obey the laws that govern them. That is to say they should be superstructures on a substratum. As noted above, there is the difficulty of viewing "Upadhis" as superstructure on the substrate of "Atma" and hence on either interpretation, the concept of "Upadhis" is impossible. Madhva at this stage cites a passage from the "Brahmavaivartapurana" in support of his criticisms. It should be carefully noted however that the criticisms are not based exclusively on the texts, but are supported by logic and reason. The substance of the argument is this—(1) Illusory experience of any kind on any occasion, can be possible only if three things are granted. (a) "adhishtana" or substratum (b) "Pradhana" or the predominant element in the illusory superstructure (c) (Sadrisya) resemblance between the first two. Even supposing we drop the third, no illusions can be explained unless we admit the existence of two reals or two real objects that are invariably concomitant. That establishes not merely the reality of the universe but a radical pluralism of systems of objects and things for which Madhva stands sponsor. (2) The Juggler analogy only establishes the reality of the Universe. Brahman sees everything with a distinctness and clearness of vision not vouchsafed to the finite. He is not subject to any illusory perception or victimisation. He realises ever the nature of "adhishtana" or substratum. He who understands the nature of a rope as a reality never in the same act mistakes it for a snake. Even so Brahman never mistakes the universe for something else. Divine omniscience necessitates the reality of the universe. (3) Finally, it should be understood that Brahman is not a Juggler who wants to make a hand to mouth living by exhibiting his hypnotic powers and subjecting persons to illusions and magic lantern shows. Brahman is omniscient and is never the victim of

any illusion or erroneous perceptions. He sees all. He sees quite rightly. The cosmic order is ever present in omniscient intellect of Brahman. While it is easy to see how the perfectionless finite self can be and is the victim of illusions either on account of peripheral or centrally initiated factors Infinite Brahmic intellect is never erroneous. If it is argued that Brahman is noticing only erroneous appearances, there is no end to that sort of error as Brahman is eternity and Brahmic error would then continue till the end of eternity. Hence the concept of release will be meaningless. Moral and spiritual endeavour cannot be explained either. They would be futile if Brahmic error is to persist till the end of eternity, making release otiose. On the Hypothesis of Brahman Himself perceiving only illusory appearances, quest after realising the nature of Brahman as the goal of spiritual endeavour will be devoid of all sense and significance. It will not at any rate be spiritually more efficacious than the wild-goose chase. Brahman sees the universe ever. He sees the system of reality as it is. If not, Brahman will be no better than a victim of error and illusion. Such victimisation would seriously compromise the Brahmanhood of Brahman or the Absolutism of the Absolute.

One may argue that knowledge is foundational. It is basic. It may not be the knowledge of X or Y or Z. It is simply divine omniscience. The Supreme Power is never the victim of any illusions. Even assuming that we succeed in speculatively visualising the dim dawn of reason and knowledge on this planet and elsewhere, knowledge would be seen to be foundational and that the knowledge of the Omniscient Being should be admitted to be free from all illusions and errors. The Universe which is the object of Divine Perception cannot be illusory. The Divine Being is never subject to illusions. Objects and systems of reality are known by Divine Intellect as they are. It is absurd to contend that there can be any Subject-object-reality-less knowledge. Such a knowledge is unknown to Divinity, humanity and animality. The universe being the inseparable unutilised and inalienable object of Divine Perception can never be dismissed as mere illusion.

Critics of Madhva may if they care to, see that Madhva's arguments are based upon reason and the requirements of speculative system-building. The absolutist would be hard put to it to explain the doctrine that limiting and pluralising agencies of lesser degree of reality (Upadhis) somehow bring about the appearance of multiplicity of the cosmos. Madhva has argued that assignment of only concessional reality to the limiting or pluralising agencies will not save the doctrine. Unless the fullest and maximal reality is admitted to be the property of the limiting agencies i.e. the same degree of reality as the one associated with the Absolute, the plurality, and multiplicity cannot be

accounted for. Even then it is a subterfuge. The concept of "Mithyopadhi"—limiting agency endowed with a lower degree of reality—has been shown to be an impossible concept. It will thus be seen that Madhva after pointing out the defects of the variety of Absolutism which admits only one spirit and maintains the plurality and multiplicity in the universe to be illusory appearance engendered by ignorance affecting somehow that one spirit (ekajivavada) has urged the same criticism and shown that the same defects vitiate the other variety of absolutism which admits of a plurality of empirical selves. He then proceeds to a critical examination of the doctrinal variety of Absolutism, which admits, for practical purposes perhaps, difference between the finite and the Infinite, and difference among one another in respect of the former, but attributes difference to the operation of "Upadhis"—the limiting agencies. That is to say difference is not in the nature and fitness of things (not "svabhavika") but due to certain adventitious agencies. (Upadhis) Madhva urges the following objections against this variety of Absolutism.

Madhva maintains that this variety or type of Absolutism will not be able to account for the well-established difference admitted to exist between released souls and souls that are yet in the stage of bondage. Nor would this variety be able to sustain the difference between the finite and the Infinite which they half-heartedly admit, but which they relegate to the realm of "Upadhi." It is Brahman according to them that transmigrates from life to life, from existence to existence, in virtue of its contact with "Upadhi." At any given moment of the cosmic evolution, you will find souls struggling in the evil-ridden world. But the selves are not fundamental realities. It is "Upadhi"—dashed Brahman that transmigrates. Simultaneous salvation for all is yet to be understood as an intelligible proposition. As selves caught up in the whirlpool of births and deaths will continue to exist, it would mean that it is the one Brahman that transmigrates under the dynamic urge of "Upadhi" call it by whatever name—limiting agency—pluralising agency—obscuring agency and so on. Looked at from the side of Brahman, the consequence is inevitable that Brahman transmigrating under the irresistible urge of "Upadhis," will be no better than the finite self empirically determined. Looked at from the side of the latter, all endeavour, spiritual effort and knowledge (Jnyana-karma-samucchaya) would be in vain as the net result of it all is identity with Brahman who again is caught up in the whirlpool of transmigration. On a metaphysical doctrine or hypothesis like that, difference between the empirical and transcendental, difference between the finite and the Infinite on the one hand, and that between the imprisoned and free souls on the other will be impossible, though one may swear that there is such difference to account for the phenomena observed in life.



There is no knowing when Brahman commenced cultivation of cosmic intimacy with "Upadhi", and as is usual in such cases, the only solution is to consider the upadhi-contact as incapable of localisation in time. That means the contact is there from time-immemorial. It would continue till the end of eternity. If it ended at any time, Brahman will cease to migrate from its Absolutistic Domain into empirical universe. Attainment of identity with the said Brahman will not mean salvation or freedom. For Brahman is ever in contact with "Upadhi." Bondage is just the outcome of "Brahman-Upadhi" contact. (It would mean that Brahman is a blundering struggling individual and identity with Brahman cannot be viewed as the *summum bonum*.)

In such exigencies, absolutists all the world over and of all shades of opinion and doctrinal adjustment contend that the contact with "Upadhi" does not affect pure Brahman (Suddha-Brahman). Very well. Madhva argues that it is obligatory on the part of those who speak of Brahman-Upadhi contact or simply even Upadhi-contact to explain clearly what is the object that is said to be involved in the contact. Be it remembered that it is a contact that is pressed into service to have the plurality and multiplicity in the universe accounted for. There are only two alternatives. Pure Brahman should be the object of contact with "Upadhi". Or something other than Brahman which is itself the object in contact with "Upadhi". It cannot be the former. For ex-hypothesi, the Absolutist says that suddha (pure) Brahman is free from contact with "Upadhi." There are serious objections to the latter alternative being accepted. To please the Absolutist let it be said that the Upadhi contact is with something other than pure Brahman. What is this "Upadhi" contact? Is this contact the same as that which is admitted to have difference among the finite selves and plurality accounted for or is it something else? Or to stick to the order adhered to by Madhva's commentator—is the upadhi contact *other* than the one so inevitable to explain difference and plurality? It cannot be the former. Before, one is entitled to speak of the "other" "contact" and another "Upadhi" there should have come into active operation another Upadhi or limiting or differentiating or pluralising agency without which the "other" "contact" *et hoc* would be meaningless. The same question may be and has to be raised in reference to any given prior Upadhi that must precede to account for a succeeding order of events and objects, and thus the inquirer would be involved in an interminable regress. It will not do to contend that all "Upadhis" and contacts are beginningless in time, and therefore, endless regress cannot be urged as an objection to the doctrine. Madhva says that the contention is baseless, because "Upadhi" contacts are assumed to be links in a causal chain. If causality in some sense, in the sense of the "Upadhi contact being the only agency that is responsible for

finitisation, differentiation and pluralisation we witness in the world, be denied then, why not admit all upadhis and contact in respect of pure Brahman itself? If on the other hand the causal chain is admitted to exist and operate as it has to be, infinite regress results. Any link is "upadhi"-engendered. How was the link first brought into being? By a prior Upadhi. What is the object with which upadhi is in contact? The object itself is "upadhi"-tainted. If, before the taint, the "Upadhi", and all this fairy tale of contact could be rendered intelligible there should be another "Upadhi" operative endless regress would haunt the speculative attempt to explain difference and plurality by means of the concept of "Upadhi."

If it is sought to be maintained that the "Upadhi" contact is the *same as the one* that explains difference between the Absolute and the finite on the one hand and among the finite selves themselves on the other, the argument will involve the fallacy of *Atmasraya* i.e. making use of a concept before it is got at all. "Upadhi" contact can reside only in something differentiated from Brahman. This "Upadhi" is the initial one which explains difference. If it is to explain difference, how can it be said to reside in objects which cannot be differentiated unless "Upadhi" first operates? Before contact of "Upadhi" is rendered intelligible one should be able to provide for its operations a suitable theatre. —The theatre is of course *other* than pure Brahman. The *other* itself cannot be there as a theatre or as anything else *unless* the "Upadhi", the initial "Upadhi" that is the agency in pluralisation has become active!! The argument amounts to the assertion that the initial "Upadhi" has to rest or reside in or come into contact with itself!! In that case, it is indeed a downright mockery to speak of "contact" resting in respect of Upadhi the reality of which or the lesser degree of which is half-heartedly admitted by the Absolutist who yet fights shy of the logical consequences of his system-building. Admission of a plurality of "Upadhis" will save none from fallacy as the entire discussion will then centre round the *first* "Upadhi" i.e. that which brings about the *first* step in cosmic pluralisation. The consequences are unpleasant looked at from any angle of vision. "Upadhi" can be in contact or in some relationship, whatever it be, that is capable of explaining the plurality and multiplicity in the universe, either with pure Brahman or with Brahman or Spirit Upadhi-affected or Upadhi-tainted. The latter alternative leads to unpalatable consequences. They are endless regress and use of a concept before it has been formed! Infinite regress is from the standpoint of "Upadhi" which is other than the one that accounts for initial pluralisation. The fallacy of using a concept prior to its own formation is from the standpoint of "upadhi" that accounts for the initial pluralisation or differentiation between the finite and the Infinite. That would mean *somehow*, the "Upadhi" contact will have to be admitted only in

respect of pure Brahman. If the contact of Brahman and Upadhi be thus admitted in reference to pure Brahman the metaphysical order of souls or spirits free and bound, the imprisoned and the released will be inadmissible, as one partner of the transaction of Upadhi-contact is eternal Pure Brahman and as there is absolutely no possibility of the termination of the said contact which envelops eternal Brahman.

One can easily anticipate what would be the answer of the absolutist to the foregoing criticisms of his fundamental position by Madhva, and it is to the effect that all such criticisms may have a semblance of truth if and only if, Upadhis or the pluralising or the individualising agencies are admitted to be real, or are admitted to be endowed with the same degree of reality as the Absolute. But no such admission is ever made. Upadhis are after all-unreal-illusory of "Mithya-" (the usual term), which is made to mean neither the sat nor the a-sat—"sadasadvilakshana." The animal has been christened with a bad name. The subsequent process of hanging it is thereafter easy. Why worry about "Upadhis" which are after all unreal? Then how is plurality or multiplicity in the universe to be accounted for and related to the One Reality of Brahman? Somehow, all that will be done.

Madhva anticipates the objection and emphatically asserts that it will not do to endeavour to dismiss the notion of "Upadhi", (whatever the name,) the pluralising and multiplying agency and in addition to the arguments already advanced by him, the Acharya mentions further ones to demonstrate that the theory of the illusoriness or unreality of Upadhis cannot be maintained. There are two concepts—one is "Ajnyana" and the other is "Upadhi" that is illusory, unreal "sadasadvilakshana" or "aaropita." Unless one is prepared to hurl himself down into the abyss of vicious reciprocity, the two concepts will not fit or dovetail themselves into the structure of the absolutistic metaphysics. If "Upadhi" is viewed as "aaropita," the implication according to the absolutist is that "ajnyana" or ignorance hides or obscures the ("adhishtana,") substratum and transforms itself into an erroneous perception into which knowledge and object, data and interpretation coalesce. If therefore "Upadhi" is to be regarded as an illusory superstructure, the view cannot be sustained unless prior "ajnyana" is admitted to operate and function.

Now just consider the problem from the side of "Ajnyana" or ignorance which was just seen to be foundational of the concept of the illusory "Upadhi." Ignorance wherever noticed envelops a given subject (asraya) and an object (vishaya). The form of the absence of knowledge would be "Ignorance of X in respect of Y." Where does ignorance subsist? The inanimate reality (achetana) cannot be the resting place of ignorance. For, the inanimate reality itself is *temporally later* than and posterior

to ignorance of which it is outcome. The ignorance in question will not touch the Supreme Pure Brahman. It will have to reside *somehow* in the finite self rent asunder or differentiated from the Absolute. The renting asunder or differentiation is impossible without the pluralising or differentiating operations of Upadhi. Therefore the concept of Ajnyana or ignorance itself becomes impossible unless *prior* operations of "Upadhi" are admitted to exist in order to make provision for places or centres in which ignorance can exist.

Though the illusory "Upadhis" depend on ignorance, the latter does not depend on the former, contends the absolutist as ignorance *somehow* should be admitted to rest in pure Brahman. The agency of "Upadhis" to make provision in the shape of finite centres in selves, for the residence of ignorance is not required as ignorance rests in Brahman (Pure). Madhva replies that whatever the temptations of doctrinal orthodoxy, Brahman (pure), cannot be the resting place of "Ajnyana" (ignorance). This doctrinal detail intended to assign some independence of status to ignorance, free from dependence on Upadhis, involves absolutism in dangers far more serious than reciprocal dependence on one another of ignorance and Upadhis. If ignorance rests in pure Brahman (suddha) then, the "Mukta," (the released) will have to be the resting place of ignorance (spatial expression cannot be avoided, and it is no answer to retort that they do not touch the pure) as "mukti" (release) is just identity between the finite and the Pure. (23.) As far as Pure Brahman is concerned, there is nothing about it other than itself which could establish the ignorance-contact, and what is fundamental is its own essence qua pure. If ignorance is to touch it, it must mean whatever the linguistic exigencies, that ignorance is its fundamental nature. Its fundamental nature is the fundamental nature of the mukta (released). The consequence is appalling. Not merely that. Pure Brahman is the only reality. Its fundamental nature cannot but be real. Bliss, knowledge, etc., are Its real nature. They must be real. Since ignorance touches the Pure, or resides in it, it should also be assigned the same status as the fundamental nature. "Ajnyana" or ignorance will thus be *real* as it will have to reside in something the essence of which is reality. While identity between Pure Brahman and Bliss and Knowledge etc., has to be admitted to maintain Absolutism intact, identity cannot be urged or admitted between Pure Brahman and tainting ignorance. It is totally self-contradictory to maintain that ignorance can have anything to do with the fundamental essential nature of the Pure. Reality of ignorance will have been involved in that step. Absolutism and Monism are gone!!

Anything that is the fundamental essence, or nature, of Para-Brahman, in whatever manner expressed, is eternal, imperishable, and unstultifiable. The ignorance that is said to reside in the Pure cannot be stultified according to the doctrine of eternity of anything connected with the fundamental, essential nature of the Pure. If ignorance is eternal, it is unriddable, and the talk of scriptural text being transmitted from Master to Pupil in order to enable the latter to rid himself of ignorance, is vain and meaningless or superfluous. In the light of the unriddability of ignorance, affirmation of identity between the finite and the Infinite will be seen to be otiose.

If it is contended that the eternity of Bliss, knowledge, etc., is not due to their being essential nature of the Pure, but due to absence of ridding or removing agency, and therefore ignorance may not be eternal as it has a ridding agency the answer is that the question of the ridding agency (nivartaka) is irrelevant. Anything that is the essential and fundamental nature of Brahman (Pure) is real. It is eternal. "Satya" means "Abadhya." The real means unstultifiable. From the very fact that ignorance is said to be of the essential nature of the Pure, the absence of ridding agency, follows. It need not be separately established or argued into existence.

On account of the foregoing fatal consequence, it will have to be admitted that not the Pure (Brahman) but, the finite self is the seat or the resting place of ignorance. That means, even before, the resting place is secured and identified as such, it should have been limited by the operation of "Upadhi." But "Upadhis" before they commence their pluralising and finitising operation should be due to ignorance to which they owe their origin. They ("Upadhis") cannot be real. They are ignorance-engendered. Thus it will be easily seen that "Ajnyana" (ignorance) depends on "Upadhis," (finitising agencies) and the "Upadhis" depend on the "Ajnyana." This reciprocal dependence is just vicious reciprocity. Until this vicious reciprocity is got rid of, neither the concept of ignorance nor that of limiting agency would be rendered intelligible and acceptable. Whatever the actual wording of the texts, pointing to Pure Brahman as the abode of ignorance, neither the Pure nor the Chaitanya (spiritual entity) that is the common factor of the finite and the Infinite could be the abode, and the process of elimination leaves only one alternative, namely, that it is the finite self which should be considered the abode, the resting place or the prop of ignorance. This alternative as shown in the foregoing paragraphs involves a vicious reciprocity between the concepts of ignorance and limiting agency rendering neither valid. (24)

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(24) See "Nyayamrita" for a refutation of the view contained in "Vivarana." P. 336.

There will be a vicious reciprocity if only *two* entities or concepts are involved. Should, however, there be *three*, the fallacy would be the vicious circle, (known as Chakraka). Madhva then proceeds to show how the vicious circle is drawn or described by means of the compass of Absolutism. The three entities or the concepts are (1) "Ajnyana" (ignorance), (2) "Mithyopadhi" (the illusory limiting agency or differentiating or finitising agency) and (3) "Jiva" (finite self) and among them, there occurs a vicious circle escape from which is impossible. (25) The concept of limiting agency is unintelligible without involving the concept of ignorance. The concept of finite self is unintelligible without that of agency. The concept of ignorance is unintelligible without that of finite self. Or in other words, if ignorance is established, then illusory limiting agency is established. If the limiting agency is established, the finite self is established. If the finite self is established, then ignorance is established. The net outcome of the discussion is that these three entities or concepts should be established to exist in the way in which and with logical and metaphysical values with which they are said to exist by the Absolutist, on the basis of independent testimony *without involving one another*. If that is done, the doctrine and concepts may be rendered consistent and intelligible respectively and as it is, they involve one another in a vicious circle. None of them could be proved to be independent. The vicious circle engulfs them all leaving the problem of finitisation and the problem of error, evil and sin, pluralisation and individualisation yet unsolved. No way seems to present itself out of the vicious circle.

The Absolutist asks—why not explain the doctrine on the analogy of the seed and the sprout? Which comes from which is a vain speculation. Ignorance, limiting agency and finite self can be regarded to be there one engendering another. Madhva's commentator replies that the analogy is manifestly unsound. There are countless seeds and countless sprouts. Even with the aid of dialectic, the analogy cannot be made to appear reasonable. If X and Y are identified to be respectively seed and sprout, the latter springs up from the former. But the seed that is to be after fructification or termination of the career of the sprout Y is not the same seed X! It is *another*. Countless seeds and sprouts participate in the sustenance or sustaining of the developmental or evolutionary chain. In the present case, the Absolutist does not admit countless ignorances, limiting agencies, and finite selves. Each is one. They stand to one another in the relation of the engenderer and the engendered. In view of the oneness of each and its individuality and in view of the absence of a plurality of similar entities or substances, the seed-sprout analogy (Bijankuranyaya) will not stand. The contention that the charge of vicious

circle, etc., will not be admitted on account of the beginninglessness in time of Upadhi, Ajnyana and Jiva is overthrown because though they have no origin in time, they stand to one another in the relation of the engenderer and the engendered (nimitta-nimitti-bhava) which becomes the groundwork of the vicious circle etc.

The Absolutist again puts in that ignorance (ajnyana) itself is the limiting agency or finitising agency (upadhi) and not the Ego-or the I-awareness (ahamkara). For in sleep Upadhi disappears. Yet difference persists in sleep. It is inconceivable how when the limiting agency itself disappears, its effects could be seen. To explain the persisting difference something else should be considered to be Upadhi. Let it be ignorance itself. On this view, the vicious reciprocity will vanish. The reply is that such a simplification will not do. Granting that Ajnyana itself is the limiting agency, it has, be it remembered, only a lesser degree of reality, and it is a superstructure of illusory nature (aaropita). There can be no illusory superstructure unless there is the operation of ignorance! This latter again is only endowed with a lesser degree of reality, and a superstructure of illusory character withal, and to explain this illusion, another ignorance will have to be pressed into service. It will involve *regress ad infinitum*. If *two* ignorances should be admitted, there would be vicious reciprocity. If *three*, there would be vicious circle. If only one, the fallacy will be that it is itself the cause of its own superimposition while all superimpositions *qua* superstructures of illusory nature need the operation of another agency to engender illusions, and if X is engenderer of itself as an illusory superstructure, it means a concept is pressed into service before it is rendered intelligible and got at all (atmasraya). (26.)

The adroit attempt *somehow* to foist ignorance on Brahman itself is hardly successful. The Pure Brahman is untouched by ignorance. The position aims at the doctrine that the Pure Brahman is erroneously imagined to be ignorant. If the Pure Brahman is to appear as ignorant, and if this appearing as ignorant is to be an error of judgment, there is again vicious reciprocity between ignorance and error of judgment (Bhrama). If there should be an error of judgment, there should previously operate ignorance. And if ignorance is to operate there should be previous error of judgment! If ignorance is established error of judgment is established. If error of judgment is established ignorance is established. It is impossible to get out of this vicious reciprocity. Madhva's commentator concludes this portion of the discussion summing up that (as in the case of the view that the

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(26) The concepts of "Jiva" (finite self) "Upadhi" (limiting agency) and "Ajnyana" (Ignorance) can never be rendered in any Absolutistic scheme, intelligible at all. The Magic Wand of **SOMEHOW** will have to be waved at every turn of the discussion.

limiting agencies (upadhis) though real yet somehow do not interfere with Monism, in the case of the other view as well that the agencies are illusory,) it is impossible to sustain the division of humanity into bond and free, the chained and the liberated. The "Eka-jiva-vada" and the "Bahu-jiva-vada" are thus shown to be untenable.

The Absolutist now argues that the vicious reciprocity and other objections urged really do not touch Absolutism at all. What do these so-called fallacies prove? They prove only the illusoriness of the universe. That is all what we want. Now, a line of argument which demonstrates the thesis after one's heart cannot be fatal. The technical fallacies pointed out prove the illusoriness of the concepts. Detection of the said fallacies is love's labour lost!

Madhva replies that the detection of fallacies sanctioned by logical principles in a controversy cannot be prevented or obstructed by the fiat of any party. But the contention that the fallacies prove the illusoriness of the concepts, and of the universe is maladroit. If reality that is the birthright of the universe is to be negated, the unreality or illusoriness should be capable of being demonstrated and grasped by means of a more powerful "Pramana." In perceptual illusions, peripherally initiated and centrally initiated factors can be and are isolated which explain illusions. The factors are lacking in the case of the illusion of the cosmos. Reality is the birthright of the cosmos and cosmic phenomena. Denial and deprivation of the said birthright would be possible only if a more powerful "Pramana" would support them. Sense-awareness (pratyaksha) gives knowledge of external reality as it is. Physical and psychical events, facts and phenomena are apprehended as they are as they occur and if their reality is to be repudiated, in the interests of metaphysical speculation, the repudiation should be backed up by a more powerful "Pramana", and cannot be an arbitrary repudiation. In the case of illusions, the more powerful factors are readily available. There is the subsequent stultifying awareness that X is not silver but just a glittering piece of shell. When a distant person, a Patagonian, appears to be a Lilliputian dwarf, the subject at the moment of perception realises that the intervening distance is responsible for the said appearance, and that a more powerful understanding of the factors of perception and illusions contributes to the clarification of awareness. The reality of the Universe is never stultified by any "Pramana" (more powerful than sense-awareness or perception.) All knowledge is valid knowledge of objects of external reality as they are. Awareness of pleasure and pain, and mental states, or the mental stream or whatever it is, is awareness of the real. Knowledge again impels the subject to some form of activity. If the general behaviour of the subject is seen to be different, one should look



for the disturbing factors. No disturbing agents, agencies, or factors are available, factually or speculatively. An analogy would make matters considerably clear. Of course analogies do not run on all fours. But they serve their own purpose in the establishment of universal relationship and universal connections.

Suppose one finds spread on a table dainty dishes. Under all normal conditions of perceptual awareness, the dishes would be subjected to the usual gastronomical treatment. No one would be embarking on a metaphysical discussion or debate as to the reality or the unreality of the dishes! Should a discussion commence, the subject who commences it should be transferred forthwith to a mental hospital. Reality is thus the characteristic and ineradicable property of objects. On the other hand, if any one were to utter the warning that the dishes have been poisoned by a blackguardly host, or if it were said that what appear to be dainty dishes are only the constituents of a Barmecide's feast, then surely the subject would embark on an investigation of the affair. *Veritas Norma Sui*. The verdict of the chemical examiner which will be regarded final is based on a more systematic, scientific perception. That is also sense-awareness. It is a perception more powerful (balavat-pratyaksha). Or the unreality has to be established by the more powerful sacred text. Neither the one nor the other would be possible. It is idle to argue that the unreality is established inferentially. Inference cannot invalidate sense-perception. Should there be a divergence between the verdicts of perceptual and inferential knowledge, the latter cannot invalidate the former, *qua* inferential. The invalidation will have to proceed from some source and guarantee more powerful than sense-awareness or sense-perception. Inference is not more powerful than sense-awareness.

In the case of an illusion, "this is a piece of silver" the sense-awareness is subsequently corrected, challenged and checked by more powerful sense-awareness, that it is only a piece of shell and not silver. In one case the sense-awareness is uncritical, and in the other it is critical. In the absence of criticism, scrutiny and close examination, illusions arise and the illusory experiences are got rid of by criticism, scrutiny and close examination. The inferential element does not enter into the bargain at all. Perceptual awareness which is hasty and uncritical is corrected by a more powerful, careful and critical perceptual awareness. If therefore the reality of the universe were an illusory experience, it should be capable of being corrected by a more powerful perceptual awareness. That is not the case. On the other hand, the reality that is perceived is seen to be the property and inalienable birthright of objects of external reality and inner experience. It is never stultified at all.

The Absolutist now contends that sense-perception is as a matter of fact stultified by inferential knowledge and by

"Agama" in the following instances. A tree at a distance is seen dwarfed. The moon is seen to be a small disc. Inferential awareness makes the subject understand that the tree is quite a tall one, and its dwarf-appearance is due to distance. The Agama-text lays down that the dimensions of the moon are really enormous, and that it is not a mere disc. In those two instances, perceptual awareness is stultified by inference and Agama-text. (27).

It will be seen that such an objection owes its origin to failure to analyse the psychological conditions of perception. The specialised sensory structures intercept stimuli only within a range of intensity and distance interferes with perception (28.) Sense perception becomes unable to function beyond its range. (apātu). This limitation is Nature's own arrangement, and the limitation of the range does not mean that in the limited range the senses do not yield knowledge of objects as they are. The Mountain cannot come to Mohamed. Mohamed will then have to go to Mountain. Approach the tree and it will be seen to be tall. From practical experience, it is ascertained (even before the awareness of the trees at a distance) that sense-perception will be affected if exercised on objects outside its fixed and limited range or beyond its own jurisdiction. Senses are rendered tardy in the intellectual intimacy established between the subject and the object, if the latter is beyond the limited range (mandagrahi). Distance lending enchantment to the view, though, interferes with the perception of form, shape, outlines of the objects at a distance. The tardiness and incapacity of sense organs in respect of distant objects i.e. objects beyond the psychologically normalised sensory jurisdiction—are understood only through the instrumentality of more powerful sensory-awareness. Two interpretations are possible. If the subject subsequently approaches the object he will realise the dimensions, and contours of the object accurately as they are. Such realisations have been. From his past experience, he will surely take decisions on future occasions as well. Sense-perception not affected by distance is surely more powerful than perception so affected. Or the Eternal witness of the subject (sakshi) acting under the urge of past experience decides that the dimensions have been perceived differently from what they are on account of distance. To render this position clear, Madhva's commentator undertakes next minute and exhaustive analysis of the aspects of knowledge in all its vicissitudes.

Two aspects of knowledge are easily and clearly distinguishable. One ranges over alternatives, swings from one alternative to another in a state of indecision. The other stands gripped

(27) P. 105. Commentary on "Tatvanirnaya."

(28) Disturbance of sense-object rapprochement causes illusions. Illusions are exceptions. They prove the general law that sense-perception is quite competent to yield and capable of yielding knowledge of external reality as it is.

on to a single alternative decided upon. The former is known as doubt (*samsaya*). (29.) In respect of the latter further differentiation and discrimination are possible. Where only one alternative is gripped on, one form of knowledge is to the effect that X is Y. That is a pillar. It is decisive (*svarthanischayaka*). The other form is indecisive, though the condition of one alternative is maintained. The sun-disc has or reveals holes or spots etc. (*svartha-anischayaka*). The former is due to quick perception of objects or guarantee that there is no absence of an object or entity, (*sambhavana*) to careful examination (*pariksha*) and to the absence of pre-perceptual counteracting circumstances in the shape of a disturbance of sensory rapprochement, (*viprita-samskara-bhava*), while the latter is due to awareness of absence of some suspected thing (*asambhavana*), to absence of critical scrutiny (*pariksha-apravritti*) and to the presence of pre-perceptual awareness of disturbing elements. (*viparitasamskara-bhava*). The first is the determinant of unimpeded volitional activity. It is powerful (*patu*). The second is not determinant of unimpeded volitions. It is hence described to be impotent (*apatu*). Perceptions of distant objects from the very inception or commencement of perceptual activity, are affected by distance and hence do not reveal the real dimensions of the objects. If the distance-factor is eliminated either by Mohamed going to the Mountain or by the Mountain going to Mohamed, real dimensions are to be had. Reinforced by the experience of the positive and the negative instances, the I-awareness or the witness (*sakshi*) fixing its attention on the distance-factor decides that though dwarfishness is unchangeably observed the perception is vitiated by the realisation of the tallness of the tree. Subsequently the inferential process may commence work, and establish the tallness of the distant tree looking dwarfish. Strictly speaking the inference and the texts do not stultify prior perceptions at all, because, co-terminus with the perception of dwarfishness, there is the awareness that really what is looking small is tall. The distance-factor-affected-perception even at the moment of its origin is stultification-ridden. Then the question of its being stultified by inference and the Agama-text is far-fetched. The point that Madhva desires to emphasize is this. In his anxiety to establish that sense-perception of the reality of the Universe is stultified by inference and the text, the Absolutist cited an instance that sense-awareness of dwarfishness of distance tree is stultified subsequently by inference. The fundamental argument of Madhva is that analysis of the psychological conditions of the very instance cited by the Absolutist, disproves his case. The sense-awareness of the dwarfishness is not subsequently stultified. At the moment of the awareness of the dwarfishness itself, there is also the awareness that the tree is really tall and that the distance-factor is responsible for the obscuration of tallness, and the

appearance of dwarfishness. It is the I-witness (sakshi) that takes the decision relating to dwarfishness, being appearance of tallness. The subsequent inference, if and when pressed into service operates only as a reinforcing agency in the perception of the real tallness but does not stultify the operation of the I-witness. Or if it still should be described in the language of stultification, the inference is spoken of as it were stultifying perception of dwarfishness. (badhaka-iva) Even in the case of the first perception of the distant tall tree as dwarfish, there is bound to be a quick-electric-flash-like awareness that it is the distance-factor that obscures its real tallness. When in the foregoing instance, the inference is not able to stultify even sense-awareness in which the intimacy of the subject-object rapprochement is disturbed by the factor of distance (apatu-pratyaksha) *a fortiori*, it will not be able to stultify sense-perception in which subject-object intimacy is not disturbed by factors like distance (patu-pratyaksha). The inalienable reality of the universe is apprehended by sense-perception which is powerful, and which satisfies all the conditions and requirements of validity, (patu-pratyaksha) Inference and the text, will never be able to depose sense-perception from its characteristic office of giving knowledge of external reality as it is. That distance is the disturbing factor is decided on the basis of the subject's own experience which grasps tallness as it is and even before the commencement of the operation of inference, sense-perception itself yields knowledge that what appears as dwarfish is really tall. Madhva concludes that the instance cited by the Absolutist does not prove that sense-perception is stultified by inferential awareness.

But the Absolutist still contends that even though inference and "Agama"-text may not stultify even the sense-perception that is affected by factors like distance (apatu) it is not suggested that the perception itself affects inference and the text. So the inference and texts unaffected by arrested perception will decide the illusoriness of the world. Madhva replies that in the history of metaphysical speculation it is yet to be proved that the sense-perception of external reality is an arrested perception. What is the evidence to show that perception of external reality is arrested or disturbed by factors like distance as in the case of the distant-tall-tree-perception-as dwarfish? None. The perception is to the effect that X is a pillar. Y is a jar, and so on. The factors of prior decision of the absence of an object as a spatio-temporal point-event (asambhavana) and absence of critical scrutiny (pariksha-abhava) are lacking in the perception of external reality. The other factor is decision that there has been a disturbing or arresting agency. (viparitasamskara—or doshanischaya). The factor is totally lacking. The unreality or the illusoriness of perception of external reality has not been proved or decided by any of the "Pramanas" or the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge. In the instance of the dwarfishness-appearance of the tall

tree, at a distance, the I-witness (sakshi) decides that sense-perception is arrested or distorted if objects are beyond the range of normal space-time boundaries, and the factor of distance is responsible for the prevention of sense-perception, from grasping the real dimensions of distance-separated objects. In the case of the perception of external reality, the I-witness does *not* decide that external reality is an illusion or illusory appearance. Nor is there any other "pramana" or source or guarantor of valid knowledge which would stand sponsor to the verdict of illusoriness of the perception of objects of external reality (jagatpratyaksha). The conclusion is thus irresistible that the inalienable reality of the objects of the external world is grasped and apprehended in sense-perception. The perception is not and cannot be invalidated or stultified by inference or the Agama-text. When, as shown above, even perceptual illusions are not stultified by inference but only by the I-witness (the sakshi) *a fortiori*, normally conditioned and circumstanced perception of reality of objects of external world can never be invalidated or stultified by inference or the Agama-text.

The instance of the "bent"-appearance of the "straight" stick immersed in a tumbler of water, if analysed on the lines suggested by Madhva will reinforce the same conclusion. (30.) That the stick is straight is *not* inferentially argued out or demonstrated. Awareness of the significance of the laws of reflection and refraction enables the percipient or the I-witness (or the sakshi) to take the decision that the stick is really straight. The appearance of it as bent really means or involves a manipulation of conditions of sensory awareness somewhere. The liquid medium, the passage of the light rays through it and their vicissitudes in the passage are apprehended perceptually and even before the kindling of the inferential process, the perceptual process itself leads on to the conviction that the stick is really straight and not bent. Stout expresses the matter to the effect that a sensation always occurs in experience as a sensation accompanying a related condition operating and existing somewhere and that "somewhere" can be identified and located. If it is granted—it has to be granted—that even in perceptual illusions, the percipient is able to grasp the reality of the situation, without the aid of the inferential process, though superficial analysis may necessitate the remark that inference invalidates or stultifies an illusion, it should *a fortiori* be granted that in all normal perceptions external reality is apprehended as it is, and objects are apprehended as they are. In technical terminology, if the arrested perception itself (apatu-pratyaksha) is really not invalidated by inference, and if it grasps something of the essential, fundamental and foundational reality of the situation, normal, unarrested, free perception that is undisturbed and undistorted will *a fortiori* not

be invalidated and stultified by inference and the text, (patu-pratyakshahah-anumanena-na-badhyate) and will grasp the foundational reality of objects. The reality grasped and apprehended by the undisturbed, unarrested, perception can be invalidated and stultified only if a more powerful perception or a sacred text should challenge it. Neither the one nor the other is conceivable. No perception more powerful than normal perception has been isolated and identified as being able to stultify the perceptual awareness of the reality of the universe. Russell may reveal his scepticism, or have his own view about our knowledge of external reality. Madhva is positive and uncompromising in maintaining that in normal, undisturbed and unarrested perception, knowledge of external reality as it is must be had. Disturbed, arrested and distorted perceptions are easily explained and even there, careful analysis reveals sensations and related conditions which establish the realistic position in opposition to that of idealism and mentalism. The conclusion needs to be emphasized (though at the risk of some repetition,) that no stultifying agency has been so far discovered, isolated and identified which would support the view of the absolutist that knowledge of external reality is just awareness of an illusory appearance and not knowledge of objects as they are. The contention of the absolutist that the stultifying agencies are Inference and Agama-text has been shown by Madhva to be untenable. They are powerless to stultify even an arrested perception. *A fortiori*, they could not interfere with the inalienable and undoubted validity of the unarrested and undisturbed sense-perception. The alleged stultifying agencies are absolutely unable to write off the reality of the universe.

Madhva argues next that when external reality (in respect of which perception is sometimes arrested and mostly not under normal conditions) is perceived as it is in sense-contact, awareness or knowledge of imagery, (manasa-Jnyanam) ignorance (ajnyanam) emotional experiences and states, (sukha-dukkha) experience of the subject or the self as distinct and different from the rest of organised and unorganised reality of matter and spirit, and experience of the subject as different from the Supreme Being (atma-bheda) can never be dismissed as illusory though the absolutist seeks so to do. The inner experiences grasped by the 1-witness (sakshi) are never stultified by any "pramana," source or guarantee of valid knowledge, and let there be no manner of doubt that the reality which is the property of external world and of experience of inner states is the same degree of reality which the Absolutist believes is the property of the Absolute. He may not grant it. But arguments pursued and worked out to their logical conclusions would necessitate the admission of the same degree of reality in respect of the external world, inner experience and the Absolute and that would mean that the reality of the world of bondage will persist blocking the path to salvation. The contention that logic cannot be pursued like that to its conclusion, that

life is more than logic, and that at the dawn of illumination or intuition, all will be well can have weight only in an esoteric circle of system-defenders, who have their own code of metaphysics! The code is unintelligible to the uninitiated. The argument that the uninitiated are ignorant folk is anticipated, and the reply to it is obvious. There the matter should be left. On the other hand, Madhva has endeavoured to establish his position on the data gathered from an accurate and careful analysis of the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge, without having recourse to any esoteric codes, mental reservations and cosmic secrets. The foregoing arguments make it clear that the position of the absolutist that the cosmos is an appearance engendered by ignorance somehow affecting the one spirit (eka-jiva) is illogical and untenable. *A fortiori*, the position of the variety of absolutism that grudgingly admits multiplicity of empirical selves is weaker and more illogical.

The Absolutist discredits logic when it does not suit his purpose, but he espouses it with gusto when it suits a purpose in polemics. It is only logic, ratiocination and reasoning he pressed into service to disinherit external reality in respect of its inalienable property of unstultifiedness and Madhva now points out that the very same logic may be pressed into service to work out unpleasant consequences to the absolutist. It is absurd to retaliate that the employment of logical canons in unfair dialectics. If they could be employed by the Absolutist, Madhva and his commentators are entitled to pay their opponents in dialectics in their own coin. The point is this. If the cosmos is to be cheated of its reality, on logical grounds of course, why not argue that the Absolute with which the empirical self retains identity is also endowed with only a lesser degree of reality? Texts will not avail. If texts which proclaim the reality of the universe are to be brushed aside—and the absolutist has done it—one cannot murmur if the texts which proclaim the illusoriness of the universe are brushed aside equally quickly and unceremoniously. Leave the texts alone. Then experience is the only criterion. Experience vouches for the reality of the universe. That experience is unstultified. It is only a more powerful experience that can deprive universe of its reality. It is not forthcoming now. If it is contended it will be forthcoming at some future date at the dawn of intuition, by all means *suspend your judgment till then*. Leaving the dawn to come at its appointed time let us be content to deal with the pre-dawn stage. It is rhetoric and dreary dialectic to push the figure into prominence and describe the pre-dawn stage as one of darkness!! Reason and logic tell us according to the absolutist that the universe is an illusory appearance. Well, Madhva contends that it is real. Its reality is stamped on it. If it is to be cheated of it, then why not the Absolute of its reality? There is nothing which would prevent

it. When Madhva maintains that sense-perception yields knowledge of reality as it is, the Absolutist brushes perception aside and argues that reason convinces him of the misleading character of all sense-awareness. Extend the realm of reason invoked to cheat universe of its reality. Let Atman or the Absolute be as unreal and illusory as the universe. Nothing is lost. Why then should this distinction be tolerated between the finite and the Infinite, the empirical and the transcendental, the "vyavaharika" and the "paramarthika" and so on? Why knock on the head only the empirical the finite and the vyavaharika? At all costs, let logic be respected. There is no reason whatever why a dualism of stand-points should be admitted at all. When all else is evaluated to be illusory and unreal, why make an exception in the case of the Absolute? What is the source or the guarantee of this exception? Why should this be tolerated not merely but elevated to the position of a cardinal and fundamental doctrine? That such a deprivation of the reality of the Absolute has actually taken place in the history of Indian speculation, is quite evident. The extreme type of Buddhism has the courage of its convictions. It reduces everything to sensations of the moment. Why not espouse the Buddhistic sensationalism or nihilism? The Absolutist is loud in his condemnation of the Buddhistic metaphysic of nihilism and sensationalism. If therefore the Absolutist endeavours to overthrow the reality of the universe grasped in perception, by means of reason, the same reason would compel the admission of the conclusion that the Absolute is unreal as well. Because, when all else is unreal, there is no reason why an exception should be made in the case of the Absolute.

The contention that the Absolute must retain its reality as it is the substratum of all illusions and illusory experiences, cannot stand a moment's scrutiny, because the position that Atman or the Absolute is the substratum of all illusory experience has been overthrown. As perhaps the last resort, the Absolutist will have to maintain that the entity which is viewed as real should be Atman, as all else is only illusory appearance, and this position is untenable as Atman can never be the substratum of cosmic illusion (adhishtana). It may be recalled that an unanswerable argument is that while a piece of shell (substratum) can appear as silver (aropita) while a rope can appear as a snake or a garland, Atman never appears as something that is not Atman and it is never mistaken as something else. So there is no illusion (Bhrama) the substratum of which is Atman (atmadhishtanaka). Madhva takes his stand on the incontrovertible fact that Atman is never mistaken as something other than Atman and the *onus probandi* in the matter of proving or demonstrating the possibility lies on the Absolutist surely. He will have to argue as against this that the unreality of Atman that is urged is repudiated by experience. That means he admits the position that inference is weaker than experience. If the reality of the universe guaranteed by experience



is repudiated by the inference discussed before, Madhva urges the reality of Atman guaranteed by experience can also be inferentially repudiated, as is actually done by extreme types of Buddhism. To save the reality of the Atman, the Absolutist will have to admit that the reality of Atman guaranteed by experience cannot be repudiated by inference. This admission involves a Nemesis. If the experience of the Absolutist guarantees the reality of Atman or the Absolute then surely Madhva contends that the experience of countless individuals, lay and metaphysically sophisticated, guarantees the reality of the universe. It is untenable that experience is valid only in the former case and not in the latter. It will thus be noticed that the unreality of the universe cannot be established by means of inference.

That somehow the unreality of the universe is a doctrine in the light of its eventual stultification at the dawn of knowledge will not again bear any examination. The universe and all it means and stands for are perfectly real. There is evil no doubt. The universe is just a theatre for spiritual endeavour being put forth. By means of Divine Grace alone can release be obtained from the bondage of the cycle of cosmic existence and demise. Potentiality for spiritual mischief possessed by the cosmos ceases to be dynamic when a spiritual aspirant develops to be, as it were, receptacle of Divine Grace. The world does not trouble him who has earned Divine Grace. To him the world does not exist in the sense, it does not touch and torment him. The prison does not exist to him who has obtained release by earning official or royal grace. Bondage is real. The universe is real. The real world and bondage vanish by Divine Grace. The eventual stultification of the universe at the dawn of knowledge is a myth pure and simple. There does not occur any such stultification. The illusoriness of the universe grounded on this alleged stultification is thus shown to be baseless.

In the previous portion of the work, Madhva argued that if inference and ratiocination would suffice to demonstrate speculatively the unreality of the universe, then the same ratiocination and inference may demonstrate that what seems to be Earth may not be Earth, Air nor air, Fire nor fire and so on. If a party to the debate should agree to keep itself within the limits of debate, then the foregoing *reductio* will be seen to be fair. Should the party, however, throw to the four winds the rules and canons of debate, a more powerful *reductio* is to argue as Madhva has done, that if the Absolutist should contend that inference is sufficient to write off the reality of the universe guaranteed by sense-perception engendered by a normally constituted sensory apparatus under conditions of normal functioning, one is perfectly justified, within the limits of the canons of debate and consistently with the requirements of propriety, in asserting on the basis of Inference that Atman will also have to be considered unreal and illusory

seeing that everything else is illusory and unreal, and seeing that there is absolutely no warrant for an exception being allowed in favour of Atman.

It is sometimes urged by the Absolutists serio-comically that liability to intellectualistic objections and the so-called fallacies pointed out above, is a characteristic of abstruse metaphysics and certainly an ornament to the doctrine of absolutism—of the illusoriness and unreality of the universe. That the nature of this illusion cannot be satisfactorily accounted for and that the operations of ignorance (avidya) are bound to elude the grasp of the finite intellect of man would constitute ornaments to the metaphysics of Absolutism (durgatatvam-bhushanam). One, for instance, may not be able exactly to envisage or visualise how the limiting or the pluralising agency acts to give rise to cosmic illusions or illusions of plurality, multiplicity, diversity and difference, and this inability does not mean invalidation of the doctrine.

That a contention like this is advanced *con amore* by the Absolutists is plain, but Madhva argues that inability to envisage the precise and exact nature of the operations of the limiting agency (upadhi) cannot be magnified into a ground for lauding a doctrine to the skies, which unfortunately runs counter to the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge. (the Pramanas). It has been urged in the foregoing paragraphs that the doctrine of the unreality and illusoriness of the universe is unfounded and that the sources and the guarantors of valid knowledge (pramanas) do not support it is plain. If it is contended that a doctrine which is manifestly against the testimony of the normally constituted and correctly functioning sense-organs, is the truth of the matter, just because, it runs counter to popular view or verdict, and if it is further sought to be maintained that the doctrine of the unreality and illusoriness of the universe is an ornament in its contravention of perception which has structural and functional harmony and which enjoys error-proof status in knowledge, the only reply is that the reality of Atman or Absolute should also be negated consistently with the requirements of ratiocination, and consistently with the untenability of a Monism which is obliged to press into service dualism at every stage of its evolution, though by a convenient fiction the dualism is spoken of as having only a lesser degree of reality! The tenability and acceptability of a doctrine must rest only on the testimony of the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge (pramanas). It has been shown, argues Madhva, that the unreality of the universe is not supported by the Pramanas. Sacred texts cited by the Absolutists can always be overthrown by counter texts. That has been done. Inference cannot operate *in vacuo*. Ratiocination cannot reign over empty space, cannot hold sway over mare's nests and fictitious concepts. After the termination of labyrinthian locomotion across absolutistic tracts, lanes, alleys

and by-lanes, and after absolutistic aeronautics one is obliged to come back to *terra firma* of normally constituted and efficiently functioning sense-awareness. Illusionism runs counter to it and the other "Pramanas" as well. If a doctrine which is opposed to the "pramanas," the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge, is to be acclaimed simply because it is ununderstandable by intellect, then nihilism is the only outcome. Why not champion it as the only rational system of metaphysical speculation? The Buddhists have done it. A thinker may be from one stand-point given due credit for having espoused nihilism to which goal courage of his conviction led him. The Absolutist has not the courage of his conviction. He is willing to wound the reality of the universe but afraid to strike at it, because, in the same breath he affirms a lesser degree of reality in respect of it. If a pluralism or plurality of degrees can be maintained and admitted, it is inconceivable why a plurality of subjects and objects could not as well be admitted and maintained. There is absolutely nothing incompatible or self-contradictory about the concept of pluralism. The Absolutist from the stand-point of *sub specie aeternitatis* hunts with the hounds and runs down the reality of the universe. From the stand-point of *sub specie temporis*, he runs with the hare accepting a lower degree of reality. On the argument of incomprehensibility and unaccountability being ornaments to a metaphysical doctrine, the following would be the *reductio ad absurdum* of the position—Inanimate objects may sense and perceive. Atman may be devoid of all perception and sensory awareness. Something may yet appear and continue to appear even though there is no subject to perceive and be affected by the appearance. Illusions can spring up without a substratum. One cannot complain that the *reductio* has been pointed out in vain. Far from it. The *reductio* finds its own legitimate place in a scheme of dialectics, and is urged only in reply to such absolutists as contend that the incomprehensibility and unaccountability of the illusoriness of the universe are really ornaments to the said doctrine. Madhva is perfectly justified in presenting more ornaments of like nature to the absolutists.

Up till now, Madhva concentrated his attention on an analysis of the position of absolutism that difference and plurality will have somehow to be explained in the light of the limiting and pluralising agency (*upadhi*) which has reality of its own and offered detailed criticism, the foremost in importance being that on the admission by the absolutist of a limiting agency (*upadhi*) the basic and foundational fact of the distinction between the bound and the released souls, and the difference between imprisoned (*baddha*) and the free (*mukta*) become inexplicable and unsustainable. The assertion will bear any amount of repetition that philosophy should take its stand on the solid bed rock of human experience. The difference between the bond, and the free, the imprisoned and the released, those who put forth moral

endeavour and those who do not, would be seen to be basic and foundational, and the concept of the limiting agency (upadhi) was shown to be riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies and the argument was also refuted that contradiction and inconsistencies may be viewed as so many ornaments to a really beautiful doctrine. Let alone for a moment, the difference between the imprisoned and the released, the bond and the free. A decent theory of emotion and emotional awareness, and any ethical doctrines that may be grounded on the psychology of emotions become impossible and untenable on the metaphysics of absolutism which recognises a limiting agency (upadhi) to account for plurality, difference, and diversity in the universe. (sukha-dukkhadi-vyavastha-tesham-an-siddhyati). (31).

The sensory-motor mechanism itself is an undoubted limiting agency. The mechanism of one sentient creature is different from that of another. That is so in the scale of evolution. In the case of the sense-organs, though the latter are distinguished from one another structurally and functionally differentiated, the pleasurable and painful feeling-tones associated with the reactions are referred to invariably and without exception to a subject the characteristic features of which are awareness and retention of personal identity in and through a career of multifarious and diverse experiences. If the contention of the absolutist be true and guaranteed by reason, plurality of subjects endowed with nervous mechanisms countless in different degrees of complexity, efficiency, structural and functional, would be inexplicable. If you label something as an "upadhi"—a limiting agency—all "upadhis" should be brought under the law of uniformity of behaviour. If something labelled "upadhi" behaves in a particular manner now and in a different manner at a different time, it is arbitrary so to label it. Hands and feet, eyes and ears are "upadhis". No one would contend that there is no difference among them. Should there be no determinant of difference there is no reason why the auditory apparatus should not intercept light-rays and why the visual mechanism should not arrest sound waves. Sensory mechanisms differ. Still there is personal identity. Responses executed through the instrumentality of different mechanisms are referred to the same subject. "I see, hear, smell, etc." Difference of "upadhis"—sense organs—limiting agencies—does not stand in the way of realisation of personal identity. The inquirer is entitled to expect a similar behaviour in the case of all ("upadhis") limiting agencies. The contention of the Absolutist is that "upadhis", different nervous systems are responsible for the awareness of difference where there is none. "No" replies Madhva and checks the inference. The existence of "upadhis" is no bar to the awareness of identity should there really be identity. For instance the personal identity of the self is realised notwithstanding and

in and through the differences of "Upadhis"—the sense organs. Even so if the tale of the Absolutist were true, there should be awareness of identity of one self in and through different nervous systems. There is no such realisation. On the contrary, the realisation is always to the effect that X has his own tooth-ache. Y his own and Z his own, or her own or its own, any way you please. Personal identity centres round different nervous systems. Each identity centres round a finite self. The "upadhis" do not interfere with the existence or the realisation of identity. Why should there be an exception in the case of "upadhis"—this time not the sense organs, but nervous systems themselves taken as wholes, totalities? If therefore the contention of the absolutist be true the tooth-ache affecting X will have simultaneously and at the same moment to be experienced and realised as the ache of Z, Y and so on. My tooth-ache here and now will have to be realised as tooth-ache of Dr. J. B. Watson now working in his psychological laboratory. Similarly Dr. Watson will have to realise that my type-writing this monograph on Madhva's philosophy is also his doing the same! There is no good getting angry in a debate when such consequences are shown to flow from Absolutistic Monism or Monistic Absolutism. It is not disputed that "upadhis," the sense-organs are totally and irreconcilably different from one another. Stimuli of one kind are not intercepted by a differently constituted sensory apparatus. It is not of course possible to contend that this perceived difference is to be relegated to a lower degree of reality. Such a contention cannot be entertained unless degrees of reality are established on *independent* testimony. The different "upadhis" are thus no bar to realisation of personal identity or the oneness of the experiencing agent or the subject. A similar state of affairs should prevail *wherever* we speak of "Upadhis." The nervous systems are "upadhis." They are different. Difference of "upadhis" is no bar to realisation of oneness or personal identity. Thus on the showing of the Absolutist, as "upadhis" or the limiting agencies are not a bar to realisation of personal identity, extend the identity a step further, and expect that the identity between the finite and the Infinite should be realised even as personal identity of a single individual notwithstanding different "upadhis." That is *not* realised. On the other hand, the intellectual, emotional and volitional individuality of X is always, realised as different from a similar individuality of Y. Z has his or her own individuality. There is no reason why "upadhis" should behave differently. Differences in "upadhis," like differences in sense-organs with their adequate stimuli do not interfere with the personal identity of the subjects. Why then should they not continue their non-interference? That would mean the experiences of all individuals will have to be realised as those of a single individual. But they are *not*. The following is the truth of the matter. "Upadhis" or the limiting agencies are there. There are as well sentient subjects. If, according to the central and cardinal doctrines of Absolutism, there is fundamental

oneness of Spirit—an Absolute Monism—"Svarupaikya"—then there is hardly any explanation as to why experiences are referred to different subjects. It is not possible to argue the case for Absolutism on the basis that differences are due to "upadhis" i.e. limiting agencies so called. Madhva readily answers that differences in upadhis are absolutely no bar to awareness of personal identity. X notwithstanding differences of upadhis like sense-organs, is still ever aware that all experiences are his own and not those of Y. The issue should be confined to the existence or non-existence of ("svarupaikya") unity in nature, fundamental Monism of spirit, or a fundamental pluralism. Should there be "svarupaikya," basic monism of all spirits, experiences should be felt as those of only one spirit call him X, Y or Z. There cannot be a plurality of experiencing or sentient subjects. Human experience lay and sophisticated, metaphysical and unmetaphysical is grounded on the solid bed-rock of plurality of subjects. The plurality itself is maintained because, there is persistent reference to multiplicity of experiencing centres. The argument that the difference and plurality observed on what the absolutist calls the phenomenal plane, are due to difference of "Upadhis" will not stand. For difference in "upadhi" is no bar to realisation of identity. Should however there be a real Monism of Spirits, the one spirit will continue to shine, eternity to eternity, and the inevitable result would be that experiences will have all of them to be referred to a single subject! Experience contradicts this Monism. Madhva urges that a genuine philosophy can be constructed only on "svarupa-bheda," "anusandhatri-bheda," difference radical and irreducible among the various subjects. There is no valid or rational explanation as to why "upadhis" should betray baffling behaviour. In the individual nervous system i.e. in the microcosm, "upadhis" exist different from one another. Yet they do not interfere with awareness of personal identity to which all experiences are traced. Why should "upadhi" behave differently when the macrocosm is concerned? The crux is the existence of "anusandhana" i.e. awareness. Awareness is of something by a sentient subject. Your awareness is not mine, and mine is not yours. On the plurality of the subjects of awareness (anusandhana) Madhva's pluralistic universe is constructed and grounded. Finally as one entitled to expect absence of plurality of sentient subjects, and as one is entitled to expect too that all awareness is to be referred to only one subject according to Monism, on account of "upadhis" being no bar to realisation of such an identity, the monistic doctrine must fall to the ground when it is seen that "anusandhana" awareness of intellectual, emotional and volitional individuality is different in different creatures in different scales of evolution. Madhva's commentator explains that opposition to the Pluralistic Universe on the ground that as difference itself between any two sentient beings is established on the basis of awareness of emotional states being different, the awareness should not be made to rest on the basis of difference,

would not stand, as there is no vicious reciprocity between the concepts of difference (bheda) and awareness. (anusandhana). The crux of the problem lies in the different awarenesses (anusandhanas) that account for different subjects. If Monism were a real world-view, if Absolutism were a true tale, intellectual, emotional and volitional awareness should be at all times referred as that of the same Reality—X. That the Reality has the appearance of a plurality on account of the operations of "Upadhi," will not stand a moment's examination. Different "Upadhis" like different sensory structures are no bar to the awareness of experiences from different sense-organs by the same subject *qua* experienced by one and the same individual. That this individual awareness may be or is capable of stultification by a higher type of knowledge after self-realisation or synchronous with self-realisation is no answer. The existence of such a state or the possibility of its being reached by finite persons should be first established before it is pressed into service for another phenomenon to be accounted for. Thus, "Upadhis," like sensory organs are absolutely no bar to the awareness of personal identity should there be such monism. If the pluralisation had been the work of "upadhis," awareness of identity there ought to and should be. As a matter of fact on psychological and metaphysical planes, and in fact on all planes with which rational experience deals, awareness of intellectual, emotional and volitional experience-sum totals, is different in different individuals. (bhinnanusandhana) This means that the difference which is concluded to exist on the basis of "anusandhana" or awareness being different is a permanent and unriddable factor of the cosmos. Bradleyan SOMEHOW cannot be accepted as a substitute for a reasoned explanation. (32)

Madhva further analyses the implications of Monistic absolutism and asks if all selves obtain release from the evil of existence simultaneously or gradually in succession. If it be the former why should the "Eka-jiva-vada" (one-self-doctrine) be abandoned? The doctrine of plurality of spirits or selves albeit of a lower degree of reality was championed by the Absolutist only in order to account for the states of bondage and release. If as argued above, the lesser-degree-reality-stamped plurality is insufficient to account for bondage, and release, why should one worry himself about plurality at all? It is as well that the one-self doctrine itself (eka-jiva-vada) is championed. The doctrine of simultaneous release renders the assumption of plurality superfluous.

If on the other hand, release be admitted to be gradual and successive, the following questions arise. Does release of an individual like X (Devadatta) mean the annihilation or riddance

of *all* the limiting agencies (upadhis) or the riddance or annihilation of only *some* few of them? It cannot be the former. For, even assuming that all the (upadhis) limiting agencies of X (Devadatta) are annihilated, in respect of that X, still as other "upadhis" of other individuals like Z and Y etc. are *not* yet annihilated, there cannot be any talk of release. Why? The fundamental Monism would necessitate the admission that the Upadhis of X or those of Y as well. Just as there cannot be any release by the chopping off of a finger—for then, there would yet be functioning other parts of the nervous system,—even so, there can be no release if the limiting agencies of X were to be assumed to have been annihilated—for then would still continue the limiting agencies of Y, Z and countless other creatures through which all a fundamental Monism runs, in the light of which the limiting agencies of one are those of the others as well. The doctrine of gradual release would thus stand exposed in all its irrationality.

If the other alternative is sought to be upheld that the riddance of *not* all, but *only a few* of the ("Upadhis") limiting agencies means release, it involves an obvious absurdity. The *reductio* is this. Immediately after the chopping off of a finger let there be release.

Thus cornered, the Absolutist has only one course left open to him. He has to argue—and that he does—that the concatenation of limiting agencies designated by or associated with the proper name "X-Devadatta," is *not the same* as another concatenation designated by or associated with a different proper name Y—"Yajnyadatta," and this difference would account for the absence of simultaneous release, and justify successive gradual emancipation. When a particular individual concatenation becomes dissolved, that individual gets release. This is mere subterfuge. Does the basic and fundamental Monism operate or not? If not, difference, dualism and pluralism would be the logical consequence. If it does operate, then the objections urged in the foregoing paragraphs will stand. Especially, release would be impossible, as "upadhis" in respect of some individual or another would persist, and as a simultaneous destruction of all "upadhis" is unthinkable and so on. The only way of escape is to reiterate that there is doubtless the basic and fundamental Monism, but an appearance of Pluralism has been engendered by the dynamic activity of "Upadhis." Madhva retorts that this sort of argument is against all canons of debate. First demonstrate the existence of "Upadhis" (the limiting agencies in the sense in which the Absolutist understands them,) and then you can press the concept of "Upadhis" into service to account for an apparent plurality. Without first demonstrating the possibility and validity of the concept of the limiting agency or agencies, one cannot use it to explain plurality of subjects. Whom does "Upadhi" affect? If it is said X, Y



or Z then the differentiation or discrimination of X, Y or Z is itself due to the operation of "Upadhi"! That means that unless "Upadhi" is proved on the basis of independent evidence, it cannot be used to account for the appearance of plurality of subjects.

Madhva contends that in the absence of the demonstration required the argument will not hold water that a fundamental Monism can accommodate an apparent pluralism. Release is impossible and un-understandable as "Upadhis" would persist. That "Upadhis" are of a lesser degree of reality is a futile fad. Until the contrary is proved, one is entitled to argue that "Upadhis" are real enough to disturb the placid equanimity of Monism. Another variety of the same Absolutistic view that the destruction of "Upadhis" (limiting agencies) in respect of X is release for that X becomes untenable. Before, X, Y or Z can be spoken of, the possibility and validity of the concept of "Upadhi" will have to be proved. If it is contended that the unproved "Upadhi" has not been pressed into service, then Madhva interrogates—why should one use different proper names such as X, Y, Z to designate different individuals? The very use is proof positive that an undemonstrated or unproved metaphysical notion or concept has been surreptitiously smuggled into the bargain by the Absolutist.

In the earlier context, Madhva pointed out that as Brahman will have to be regarded as the only Reality that should SOMEHOW be in contact with "Upadhis" (limiting agencies) "Mukti" (final release from the recurring cycles of births and deaths,) will be impossible as the eternity of Brahman involves the eternity of the limiting agencies as well as the latter have no habitation, albeit metaphysical other than Brahman Itself. Granting the possibility of riddance of "Upadhis" the previous argument was advanced and in the present context, Madhva argues that riddance or the disappearance of "Upadhis" itself is impossible. The contention urged by Madhva would ever stand intact that if a radical and fundamental Monism be upheld, bondage and release would be unintelligible or totally impossible, and above all the *reductio* of Monism would be that the intellectual, emotional and volitional life of X, will be experienced by Y as well. As fundamental Monism means "svarupaikya" one-ness in nature and essence, in whatever manner the terms may be understood, the *reductio* is—let there be "anusandhana" awareness of the experiences of X by Y as both are gripped by basic Monism.

At this stage, the Absolutist advances another argument—"Upadhis" are of two kinds. One is "Samslishta" i.e. intimately linked or associated—sense-organs for instance embryologically glued or grafted as it were on to the subject. The other is "vislishta" i.e. separated or individualised, as nervous mechanisms of different sentient creatures. The *reductio* urged in the foregoing paragraphs would vanish because X, Y and Z feel, or experience their joys and

sorrow etc. in an uniquely individual manner on account of different "Upadhis" with which they have been endowed, and "Upadhis" are "vislishta" separate, and individualised so that each sentient creature has its own (nervous) receiving and transmitting sets.

Madhva contends that this difference between intimately glued and individualised "Upadhis" will not save the absolutist from the nemesis of the *reductio*. If upadhis would explain difference in the experiences of individuals, then let there be only pluralism. Why worry oneself with Monism? If metaphysical thinking is inevitable, then let it be followed to its logical conclusions. Let the concept of "Upadhis" be settled first. Let the status of the concept be fixed and evaluated. Let it be explained how "Upadhis" get themselves related to Brahman which is the only Reality. That there is difference among individuals is admitted by the parties to the controversy. The *onus probandi* lies on the Absolutist who, in the light of his basic Monism, seeks to explain away difference and experience as valid only in a realm of lower degree of reality. All these are assumptions and have not been proved. They can be confronted with counter assumptions. If, therefore, the basic and fundamental Monism be the ultimate truth of the cosmic scheme, Madhva is perfectly justified in emphasizing the *reductio* that on a Monistic scheme, the experience of X will have to be shared by Y and so on. Further since Brahman is the only prop to "Upadhis" as well their riddance is not possible. Release is thus impossible. Whether "Upadhis" are described to be glued or separated the distinction is one without a difference that matters. Assuming that it matters, basic Monism cannot stand if the intellectual, emotive and volitional experiences of individuals are felt and experienced as separate.

There is another point. The parties to the controversy are believers in the existence of spiritually blessed souls—Yogis. They work miracles. They jump from life to life, from order to order. They may now assume the form and career of an eagle and fly to the Ganges to have a dip into its holy waters or to the Himalayas from where they may survey struggling humanity with petty ambitions and pettier methods of realisation, and pettiest intrigue. The various nervous systems pressed into service—"Upadhis"—are separate and individualised—"vislishta"—and that makes no difference in Madhva's fundamental contention that the same Yogi experiences different careers as his own even though "Upadhis" are separate. "Svarupaikya"—identity in fundamental nature—is the only cardinal point. Wherever there is identity in fundamental nature there is personal identity running in and through different experiences and nervous systems. If, therefore, the doctrine of the Absolutist be true, any experience of any one at any time will have to be realised by somebody else at the same time and so on, or simply all experiences will have to be realised

and felt by all without reference to time and place! Escape from this *reductio* is an impossible feat to perform if one should cling to the doctrine of a fundamental and basic Monism, or Monistic absolutism. The distinction between "samslishta and vislishta-upadhi" does not touch the main question. Some sort of a co-operative contact or a contactual co-operation between the Absolute and the limiting agencies (between Brahman and Upadhis) is indispensable to account for the appearance of plurality and difference and in view of the eternity of Brahman, anything in contact with an eternal substance will have to be eternal. If the limiting agencies (upadhis) are to be in contact with Brahman—there is no other alternative—their operations will have to be eternal too. If the operations of upadhis are to be viewed as eternal, Samsara, or the cycle of births and deaths would be interminable and endless. That means Final Release is impossible if the implications of Monistic Absolutism are worked out to their logical conclusion.

Up till now, Madhva argued that assuming for the sake of pleasing an opponent somehow Upadhi is capable of causing pluralisation and differentiation—keep the question of degrees of reality in abeyance—awareness of intellectual, emotive and volitional states of different individuals or sentient creatures, by all as *their own*, must become unintelligible on the Absolutistic doctrine, and that the metaphysics of bondage and final release would be impossible. The Acharya next directs his attention to showing that the so-called limiting, differentiating or pluralising agency (upadhi) does not fulfil any such function at all.

Madhva commences the demonstration of the impossibility of the concept of "Upadhi," a limiting, pluralising, or differentiating agency, with a straight and direct question which will have to be satisfactorily answered by every investigator. It is easy to apotheosize a particular tenet or a doctrine, but it should be shown to be in accordance with the requirements of reason and the laws of thought. If "Upadhi" is somewhere hanging in the air or operating somewhere, how is it to be demonstrated that it is responsible for individualisation or differentiation? Basic Monism or Monistic Absolutism admits of only one Reality—Brahman. Plurality, however, meets the eye. Difference blossoms or blooms everywhere. If there is absolutely no conceivable manner of contact or relationship between Brahman and "Upadhi" (the Absolute and the limiting agency) there can be no differentiation. There is no use of getting bureaucratically impatient and querulously shouting "Such questions are irrelevant and should not be put". They have to be put and answered by every investigator, seeker after truth or an aspirant. Madhva's question is this—Does "Upadhi" touch, affect or envelop Atman, or Brahman at some part or the whole of it? The point of the question is this. In respect of Brahman or Atman, is the

contact of the limiting agency (upadhi) only at some specific point of Atman or Brahman or is it at all points, to press into service a spatial analogy? Analogies of course do not run on all fours. Contact (samyoga) is what is technically an attribute (guna) and it tells a twofold tale. In some cases, as in the spatial contact of geometrical tangent, contact is at some specific point that can easily be identified and recognised. In other instances like form, shape, etc., the attribute is discernible at all points. So the question raised by Madhva is a perfectly legitimate one. As to what the Absolutist may have assumed regarding the nature of Atman, and as to his contention that such questions cannot be raised in respect of the part-less or non-spatial spiritual entity of the self (atman), the reply is that subjective assumptions are not proved propositions and until the outcome of the present controversy is known, and decided, a doctrine accepted by the Absolutist as proved cannot be forced down the throat of an opponent! That is not fair debate at all. The question, therefore, has to be raised, as done by Madhva, in regard to the Absolutistic doctrine of the pluralising or the limiting agency—(Upadhi) where is the contact? At some specific point of Brahman or in the whole of it?

If the Absolutist should adopt the former alternative the consequence would be that Atman has parts. (avayavas) According to the Absolutist himself the terms "Ekadesa" and "Avayava" are interchangeably used to denote parts. What if? Anything that is endowed with parts or limbs, is perishable. There is universal concomitance between the two. That is admitted by the Absolutist himself. If the contact of Brahman and the pluralising agency or the limiting agency is to have any meaning or is to become intelligible at all, the former will have to be admitted to be endowed with parts or limbs. That would mean Brahman is perishable (anitya). The perishability or non-eternity would logically involve the consequence that Final Liberation (moksha) is impossible. On account of the impossibility of Final Liberation or Release, the metaphysical doctrine and the empirical convention of the usual difference between souls bond and free will vanish.

The other alternative is equally fraught with difficulties. Admission of the limiting or pluralising agency (Upadhi) as the very name suggests is necessitated to have plurality difference and diversity accounted for. But the pity of it is, if the said agency touches the whole of Brahman and at all points, then how can it ever explain difference and diversity? Brahman is the only Reality. "Upadhi" touches the whole of it. Well—what then? If X touches the whole of Y the former *cannot* explain the pluralisation of the latter. Colour for instance is "Upadhi." If the entire piece of cloth is coloured red, the colour cannot account for the pluralisation or the differentiation of the cloth. Brahman somehow pluralises itself. "Upadhi" is believed to explain the pluralisation. If

Upadhi touches Brahman as a whole, Brahman *qua whole or totality* is "upadhi"-ridden. It is on the same level as the awareness that this cloth is totally and entirely coloured red. The uniform colouring of the entire cloth does not explain the pluralisation of the cloth itself.

More consistently however the Absolutist has to maintain that the Upadhi-contact can be only at specific points if it is to explain pluralisation or differentiation. If so, the view that the operations of "Upadhi" may be co-extensive or co-terminous with Brahman will have to be abandoned. If the Upadhi-contact be at some specific point, is it in order to speak of specific points of Brahman? Possession of points is possession of parts. Anything that has parts is impermanent. The Absolutist contends that impermanence may involve a *reductio*, if Brahman *really* has points of contact. The points (amsas) are unreal. They are due to the operations of "Upadhi." Unreal points do not mean real parts. There is no danger of Brahman being impermanent and perishable. Madhva replies that there is no use whatever in clouding the issues in a mist of words and terms behind which there are no realities or real concepts. The fundamental realistic contention is that the limiting agencies (Upadhis) do not explain plurality or pluralisation. It is no answer to say that the points of contact are due to "Upadhi." The question at issue is differentiation or pluralisation of the one Reality Brahman. It is said to be due to "Upadhi." "Upadhi" cannot be in contact with Brahman as a whole. Points of contact are needed. All that the absolutist is able to explain is that the points themselves are due to "Upadhi." This is no explanation at all. Let X be a point of Brahman at which Y "Upadhi" is said to be in contact. Is this the *first* contact? If so there is trouble. Unless there is previous "Upadhi-contact," one is not entitled at all to speak of points of contact. Unless there are points of contact "Upadhi" cannot operate. That is to say, before the Absolutist would press into service the operations of "Upadhi" as explanatory of the pluralisation of the One, he has to prove on the basis of independent evidence, that *there are points* at which Brahman would admit of the "Upadhi-contact."

How is it possible for X to be distinguished and discriminated? The only answer that the Absolutist can render is that the discrimination must be due to the working of "Upadhi." What is that? Is it Y? Or something else Z? If it is Y, the consequences are that Y is pressed into service long before it was born or identified at all. If only one "Upadhi" is admitted for the sake of metaphysical convenience and simplification, then the *reductio* is that a concept is made use of before it is brought into existence at all! If more than one "Upadhi" or more than one "Upadhi-" contact should be admitted, there is bound to be infinite regress with no way out. If three are admitted, there will be a vicious circular reasoning. Even at the risk of some

repetition, or restatement, it is very important to make this matter clear. In the scheme of Absolutistic thought, "Upadhi" serves a purpose only if it satisfactorily explains pluralisation, and differentiation of Brahman. Such a differentiation and pluralisation can be possible only on the basis of some contact between the two. Dualism would thus be the Nemesis of basic Monism or Absolutism. But all the world over the Nemesis is either not recognised with an ostrich-like mentality or if recognised is sought to be tidied over rather clumsily. A co-terminous contact between X and Y (spatial analogies are unavoidable and they are employed not on all fours) will not explain Monism. Nor would it accommodate the doctrine of Degrees of Reality. The contact is thus understandable only at specific point or points and having advanced so far, the position is that "Upadhi" can be contact at some specific point of the Absolute (amsa) but, if it is a doctrine, as it actually is of the Absolutist, that the talk of specific point itself implies the operation of "Upadhi," in plain English, it means that even before the Upadhi-Absolute contact is rendered intelligible the contact has been assumed to operate. Otherwise, talk of specific point or points is wild. Impatience of criticism is the bane of philosophy and common sense. The clincher is that "Upadhi" whatever it is or is not has been pressed into service only with a view to accounting for the pluralisation or differentiation of the One Reality. Otherwise the concept is needless. Y hanging in the air cannot explain the pluralisation of X, the only Reality. Unless some sort of contact is pointed out to obtain pluralisation cannot be possible. Where is that contact to be? Madhva maintains that it cannot be co-terminous with the entire Brahman. If it were, there would be no pluralisation or differentiation. Or there would be a downright dualism of Brahman and "Upadhi". The contact has to be at some specific point or points. Immediately trouble arises. The Absolutist is to demonstrate a particular "Upadhi" contact. Where is that to be? At some specific point or points (amsa). The specific point or points can be spoken of only if "upadhi" had previously operated in contact!! Are the *two* Upadhi-contacts namely, that contact which is to be demonstrated to explain pluralisation of Brahman, and that which must be operating before to render intelligible the notion of specific point or points at which Upadhi-Brahman contact can occur—identical, one and the same? If they are, the technical fallacy committed will be "Atmasraya"—i.e. making metaphysical use of a concept or entity before it is logically derived and demonstrated to exist at all.

Madhva's second objection is this. If two Upadhi-contacts are postulated or admitted to exist to get out of the fallacy mentioned above, another fallacy would rear its head—namely, "Anavastha" infinite regress—X an "Upadhi" enters into contact with Brahman at specific point Y. To render intelligible the

notion of specific point an "Upadhi"-contact is postulated or admitted different from the contact of X with Brahman. Postulation can be only methodological and not arbitrary. Where is the latter contact to operate? The previous interrogations recur. Is the contact at the whole of Brahman or at some specific point? Not the former. Not even the latter, because, to render the latter itself intelligible another "Upadhi"-contact will have to be postulated or admitted and so on, *ad infinitum*.

If to avoid the *infinite regress*, it is contended that there are only two "Upadhi"-contacts the fallacy resulting will be "Anyonyasraya" i.e. vicious reciprocity. X-Upadhi-Brahman contact is explained by Y—notion of specific point or points and Y notion of specific point or points is explained by X the Upadhi-Brahman contact.

If, three contacts are admitted, the Absolutist is not even then out of the cul-de-sac. X—Y and Z may be three such contacts explicable by means of one another in a vicious circular play. They do not get an intelligible explanation outside the trio of vicious circle..

It is only for the sake of argument the Absolutist is allowed to assume as many Upadhi-contacts he fancies! But as the notion of specific point or points is rendered "somehow" clear even by the first contact, the assumption of the rest is superfluous. The superfluity is seen from the data collected by the Absolutist himself. The charge of superfluity is levelled assuming that the concept of the Upadhi-contact is somehow rendered intelligible by the Absolutist. As a matter of fact however, the concept itself stands enveloped in obscurity. If drawn out, it is seen to be riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies. Thus, considered from any angle of vision, it is clear that "Upadhi" does not account for the pluralisation of Brahman. It is absolutely no answer to observe that the pluralisation is only of a lesser degree of reality. Prior to the initiation of the present debate or controversy, the doctrine or the notion of degrees of reality should have been proved or demonstrated on independent testimony—perceptual, inferential and scriptural. Without such demonstration, the doctrine of degrees of reality cannot be pressed into service in the present context.

Madhva then anticipates and answers a minor objection. (may be from one who has not been able to understand the trend of argument.) How can Madhva say that there is no difference or pluralisation caused by "Upadhi"? A stick or a shining ornament is an "Upadhi," and a person marked off by it is differentiated. Even in this instance unless one is prepared for a rude shock to Absolutism, things are not intelligible. What is the status of the stick or the ornament? Surely, the stick or the

ornament is as real as the person himself. Dualism or Pluralism would result. As argued in the previous paragraph, it will not do to contend that the stick or the ornament would be assigned only a lesser degree of reality. With or without a stick, "Devadatta" retains his personal identity. If he clasps a stick to keep off a rabid dog, he is not differentiated. No difference is caused by the stick being clasped or thrown away to the personal identity of "Devadatta" which is not disturbed. The instance really has not even relevancy. The "Upadhi" which is adumbrated by the Absolutist to have the pluralisation of the One Reality of Brahman accounted for cannot rest content with the engendering of an artificial difference or just a difference in view-points, having of course a lesser degree ( sic ) of reality. It should be in a position to account for real differences in an equally real world. How did the One become the Many ? Or at any rate how did the One produce the appearance of the Many ? The analogy of the stick and "Devadatta" is *nihil ad rem* to the question at issue and even assuming its relevancy it is unsound, since the retention or continuance intact of the personal identity of Devadatta with or without a club, is not the question at issue but a very different one of the pluralisation of the one Reality—Brahman. In ordinary as well as metaphysical parlance, anything that is adumbrated as able to explain differentiation or pluralisation should explain the simultaneous existence of the many. If the "many" is to be so unceremoniously brushed aside as of lesser degree of reality then all attempts at an explanation of the phenomena is love's labour lost.

The conclusion arrived at by Madhva is this. As shown in the foregoing paragraphs "Upadhi" or the so-called limiting or pluralising agency is not able to introduce or effect any difference in the One Reality of Brahman. Even supposing that "SOMEHOW" "Upadhi" does introduce or effect the differences in question, such a differentiation or pluralisation is entirely powerless to achieve the riddance of the *reductio* of the logical finale of the Absolutistic position that in view of the fundamental and basic Monism that is the truth of the matter, the differences effected by "Upadhi" would not matter and consequently, the intellectual, emotive and volitional experiences of X, Y, Z, and so on will be ever felt as those of X only, as those of a single person merely. Further what with the basic and fundamental Monism and the inability of Upadhi to explain different experiences by different individuals, the metaphysical doctrines of difference between souls in bondage and those in release, and of the individualisation of experience as the awareness of different individuals are not at all rendered intelligible by any scheme of philosophy or consistent and rational interpretation of experience constructed on the foundations of Absolutism. There is no way out. The parties to the controversy agree that their doctrines should be established not exclusively on the basis of reason, ratiocination, argumentation and



similar efforts of finite human beings, as such efforts euphoristically run riot mostly or involve the subject in moods of depression. Appeal to Scripture is final, but Scripture cuts both ways. The problem of explaining the pluralisation of the One Reality of Brahman giving rise to the appearance of cosmic multiplicity cannot be shirked. If in order to account for the said pluralisation, the concept of "Upadhi" is pressed into service, the critics of Absolutism are entitled to subject it to a searching examination. Anything can be easily branded with the stamp of lesser degree of reality. Such a branding however be it remembered is *not* genuine *metaphysical explanation*. As shown above, "Upadhi" has to be in some sort of effective contact with Brahman if it is to explain pluralisation adequately. The notion of the contact is riddled with difficulties, and inconsistencies. Vital problems like release and bondage, individualisation in experience, independence of subjects, multiplicity of knowing, feeling and willing subjects, are not rendered intelligible by the concept of "Upadhi" championed by the Absolutistic metaphysics.

Madhva then directs his attention to a criticism of another variety of Absolutism, which manages to admit, surely on the level of a lower degree of reality, Brahman, Iswara and Jiva. (Absolute, Deity and the self) This view also is unsound. What is the relation between the Absolute and the Deity on the one hand, and the finite self and both of them on the other? In the explanation of the relation between the Finite and the Absolute, old fallacies are bound to recur. Only Deity is introduced as a *tertium quid*. Well—how is it related to the Absolute? Deity and the Absolute are mere names. Both of them should have the same metaphysical status. If both are eternal beyond time, space, and finite determinations, then why should both of them be admitted? The Absolute will do. Or the Deity. Why both? Even if both be admitted, what is the agency that creates difference? The usual answer is "Upadhi". The operations of "Upadhi" will have to extend to all time-space-gripped entities. "Upadhi" does not operate beyond time and space. If it does, difference, dualism, sufferings, pain and evil due to "Upadhi" will also lie beyond temporal and spatial determinations, and with the exhibition of its ugly head even in eternity, "Upadhi" only keenly reminds that pain evil and suffering are eternal too. Release becomes impossible. That Iswara and Brahman are eternal, (nitya) Immanent and ubiquitous (sarva-gata) is plain from the "Sruti" to which the opponents owe allegiance. If to get out of the said difficulty eternity is denied to Iswara, then why not deny it in respect of Brahman as well? That the same Reality or Brahman manifests itself as Iswara and Jiva (Deity and Finite Self), by the operations of "Upadhi" is a position which is restricted to the understanding of the initiates only. The introduction of the *tertium quid* instead of simplifying difficulties and contributing to the riddance of inconsistencies, only complicates matters. One more entity enters into the

bargain the origin and function of which have to be accounted for. If such are the difficulties that are encountered in the absolutist attempt at explanation of the relation between Brahman and Isvara, more formidable are the difficulties in attempts at explanation of the relation between Isvara and the Finite self (Jiva). The one Isvara runs through all "Upadhis". Difference in "Upadhis" is no bar to experience of personal identity, as in the case of a subject encased in a nervous system. The logical consequence of such a doctrine is that Isvara will have to be regarded enjoyer of all the joys and sorrows of *every* so-called finite personality. The difference that is perceptible is unreal. Different "Upadhis" in the shape of different nervous systems is no bar to realisation of personal identity. Such apparent differences empirically and metaphysically do not matter. That they matter empirically will have to be demonstrated by the Absolutist, on the basis of independent testimony outside the ambit of the present controversy. On the foregoing doctrine therefore the metaphysical difference between Finite self and the Infinite self cannot be sustained. Attempts at sustaining it by a fiat or *a tour de force* will fail because, the joys and sorrows are really those of Isvara or the Infinite and that militates against the very infinitude of the Infinite! Just as the very absolutism of the Absolute is crux, the Infinitude of the Infinite is the crux.

The old, old argument that there is difference between the finite (jiva) and Isvara (Infinite) brought about, engendered or made to appear by the operations of "Upadhi" will not stand close scrutiny. The differences are unreal. The status of "Upadhi" is unsettled. The nature of its contact with the Infinite remains unexplained. Attempted explanations are riddled with contradictions. The conclusion is inevitable that the Infinite will have to be the sharer of the joys and sorrows of the finite, and such a sharing will jeopardise the infinitude of the Infinite. In other words on a view like that, it would be impossible to mark off the finite from the Infinite.

But, puts in the Absolutist, the Infinite is Immanent. Immanence of the Infinite is admitted by Dualists and Monists alike. Though the Infinite is Immanent, it does not share the joys and sorrows of the finite. Some such doctrine will have to be espoused by Dualists as well. Then what is the fun of Madhva urging the objection that the Infinite will have to be the sharer of the joys and sorrows of the finite and so on? The answer rendered by Madhva's commentator is that on the fundamental doctrine of Monism, Immanence will *not* rule out the *reductio* of the Infinite being obliged to share the joys and sorrows of all. Radical difference in nature is the only relevant determinant factor. Pluralistic Theism or Radical Pluralism of Madhva holds fast to the doctrine of real difference between the Finite and the Infinite on the one hand and between one finite self and another, on the other. In the

light of this radical difference, joys and sorrows are the lot of the finite, while Pure and unalloyed bliss is concomitant with Infinitude. Immanence does not mean that the Infinite shares the joys and sorrows of the finite. The Infinite animates and energises the finite. Such explanations are possible on a pluralistic world-view. The Monistic world-view on the other hand would logically necessitate the admission that the Infinite will have to be regarded as the sharer of joys and sorrows *as there is no other reality*. Concomitant with this is the charge levelled by Madhva and his commentators that on a Monistic Metaphysic difference between the finite and the Infinite becomes unsustainable.

So far the term "anusandhana" was being used. It means awareness or realisation. The kernel of Madhva's gravamen against Absolutism was in effect that a basic Monism would mean that the Infinite would be ever aware of or realise the joys and sorrows of finite beings. Another objection is urged by the Absolutist. There is difference between "anusandhana" (awareness) and "Bhoga" (actual enjoyment). The former may exist without the latter. As Immanent throughout the cosmos or throughout existence the Infinite may have some sort of awareness of the joys and sorrows of the finite, but the awareness surely cannot mean that the Infinite actually shares or enjoys them. There is thus difference between awareness and enjoyment. The latter is the characteristic of the finite. The former characterises the Infinite. Thus difference between the two, of course on the empirical or the plane of lesser degree of reality can well be maintained by Monists. Madhva points out by the use of the term "bhoktritva" that such an objection is grounded on difference between tweedledum and tweedledec. Madhva's commentator refutes the objection more elaborately. The tweedledum-tweedledec-difference between awareness and enjoyment may be allowed to stand just to satisfy the whims of an opponent, but the question is, is difference of a dubious nature able to override the doctrinal Monism? Surely not. If the doctrine of Monistic Absolutism or Absolutistic Monism be the truth of the matter, *awareness of the finite is awareness of the Infinite*. Enjoyment of the one is enjoyment of the other. That cannot be helped. Should there be a conflict or incompatibility between two concepts, one of them being of a higher and the other a lower degree of reality, the latter will have to be brushed aside according to the Absolutist to maintain Monism intact. In the present instance, the difference between Awareness and Enjoyment, between "Anusandhana and Bhoga" is and must be of a lower degree of reality according to the Absolutist. Whereas the basic, absolutistic Monism is the truth of the highest degree and Reality of Realities. In a conflict between the two, maintains Madhva, the latter must prevail. The former should go to the wall. If Monism is to be maintained as a serious metaphysical tenet, Madhva is justified in pointing out

that the Infinite will have to be regarded as the sharer of the joys and sorrows of the finite. The difference between the two, finite and Infinite even on the empirical level cannot be sustained. /

The seriousness of the tone of the discussion is relieved a bit by another funny objection of an absolutist *in extremis* that Madhva's attributing enjoyment of joys and sorrows to the Infinite runs counter to the text of the "Sruti." "Anasnan-anyah" etc. Madhva's commentator humourously remarks that the Absolutist who is so vigilant and so ready to convict Madhva of the offence of advancing arguments that run counter to a Sruti text, if he cares to maintain consistently his vigilance and readiness will be obliged to abandon his pet Monism or Absolutism as the said doctrine runs counter to countless Sruti texts like "Dva-Suparna" etc. Appealing to or citing Scriptural texts if and when it suits one's purpose is a game at which anyone can ably play, or at any rate both the parties to the controversy can play, and it leaves the question at issue unanswered.

There is yet another leg to the metaphysical tripod exhibited by the Absolutist which Madhva chops off. The metaphysics of Monism would render impossible the maintenance of difference between the finite and the Absolute, between Jiva and Brahman. Why? As argued in the previous paragraphs, Isvara will have to be the sharer of the joys and sorrows of the finite. Isvara and the Absolute should be identical in any system of Monism. The identity would render the Absolute sharer of the said joys and sorrows. The lot of "L'allegro and Il Penseroso" would be the lot of the Absolute as well. That means the Absolutism of the Absolute is just gone for good. How is one able to maintain difference between the Infinite and Brahman (Isvara and Brahman) when both are said to be beyond time and Space? If plurality or Duality or pluralism or dualism of entities beyond space and time be admitted, as the Absolutist is actually obliged to then why not espouse a Pluralistic Metaphysics? That he will not. The only alternative is to contend that identity between the two (Isvara and Brahman) is real and that difference between the Two is empirical. That will not mend matters. When both are admitted to be beyond space and time, difference between them is absurd. Identity is the more consistent view. Identity would mean that joys and sorrows are the lot of the Absolute. Why? Because the Absolute is identical with the Infinite (Isvara) and it shares them in virtue of the basic and fundamental Monism! That means an Absolute other than the joy-and-sorrow-shot-spiritual-entity-chaitanya or Brahman, call it by whatever name you please, is not and cannot be established.

The trail of unpleasant logical consequences does not stop with that. If the one reality of Brahman be thus joy-sorrow-shot, pleasure-pain-ridden, hedonistic-hue-haunted, the import is that the recurring cycle of births and deaths is endless and eternal.

For there is a general law that nothing perishable, nothing transient or temporary nothing evanescent ever touches the Absolute. In other words, anything that touches or affects the Absolute is eternal, endless and imperishable. Pure Monism, Fundamental and basic Absolutism would necessitate the admission that as Brahman is hedonistic-hue-shot, series of births and deaths that is responsible for joys and sorrows is interminable, endless and unridable. If on the other hand the joys and sorrows of the Absolute are perishable then (why) its fundamental nature *qua* Absolute may be so too. The Absolutism of the Absolute will be perishable. Anyway the logical consequences of Monism are unpleasant. If the Absolute is to bear the brunt of the joys and sorrows of selves struggling in the phantasmagoria of metem-psychosis, there is no valid difference between souls that are in bondage and those that are free. Freedom from bondage becomes un-understandable as the Absolute is in chains.

Madhva's arguments advanced in this portion of the discussion are these. Certain Absolutists exhibit a triumvirate of Absolute, Infinite and the Finite. (Brahman-Isvara-and Jiva). The triumvirate is adumbrated to account for the facts of experience and render intelligible man and his relation to God, here and hereafter and so forth. In his heart of hearts, the Absolutist is and must be certain that consistently with his basic Monism he cannot hold all the three to be real. While asserting that there is a fundamental and basic identity among them and that difference is empirical, he maintains and contends that the latter is due to the operations of "Upadhi." Madhva retorts that unless the concept of "Upadhi" is rendered intelligible and again its relation with the Absolute is explained it cannot be pressed into service to account for the pluralisation of the Absolute and to make clear the triumvirate. Madhva carefully analyses the implications of the notion of "Upadhi" and demonstrates that it is not able to explain the appearance of pluralisation of the Absolute. If "Upadhi" be real, monistic structure would collapse. If it is unreal, its unreality should be demonstrated, by means of independent evidence. The difference caused by "Upadhi" whatever its nature, is not a bar to realisation and enjoyment of personal identity and feelings etc. In view of the basic Monism, the joys and sorrows of the finite will be those of the Infinite. Those of the Infinite will be those of the Absolute. The settlement of the difference between any two of the triumvirate will be impossible on the basis of Monism. Firstly, difference between the Absolute and the Infinite cannot be demonstrated. There can be no *two* entities beyond Space and Time and so on. "Upadhi" can effect some difference only in respect of entities in space and time. Neither would be operative in the present case as both Brahman and Isvara are beyond their sway. Secondly the difference between Isvara and Jiva (Infinite and finite self) cannot be sustained on the foundations of Monism. Differences in nervous systems, local habitations and names not

matter, joys and sorrows of the finite will have to be those of the Infinite. Thirdly, the difference between Brahman and Jiva (between the Absolute and the finite) cannot be maintained on a Monistic substratum. Even then the joys and sorrows of the finite would affect the Absolute, and such inevitable fate would mean the eternity of the series of cycles of births and deaths (samsara) and spiritual endeavour the goal of which is the ridance of the said series will be a wild-goose chase, or a quest after will-o-the Wisp. The difference between the souls or spirits in and out of bondage will be inexplicable on a Monistic doctrine, as the joys and sorrows of the finite would be those of the Absolute. As the former would share in the eternity of the latter all talk of release or freedom from cosmic bondage would be ridiculous.

Madhva then urges further criticisms against the doctrine of the Absolutists that somehow it is the Absolute (Brahman) that is to be regarded the substratum of this gigantic cosmic show. Madhva asks—which is it that undergoes all the vicissitudes of existence, of this samsara? Is it the finite self, finitised by “Upadhi”? Or is it “Suddha” the Absolute which cannot tolerate another reality besides itself in past, present and future? If it be the latter, the Absolutist will find himself involved in a contradiction, “*contradictio et adjecto*”! It will not do to argue that the samsaric influences can attach themselves to Brahman at one time and not at another. Samsara or existence is beginningless and cannot be located at a specific point in temporal transition. So the statement will amount to a contradiction that the Absolute is quite pure, and yet, in contact with samsaric joys and sorrows etc.

If on the other hand, it is said that Samsaric life is shared not by the pure Absolute, but by the “visishta” the finite self finitised by “Upadhi,” Madhva’s question is this:—is the finitised self the same self as the Absolute or is it different? If it is the former, contradiction dogs the footsteps of the Absolutist. To say that the Finitised is the same as the Absolute is one contradiction. Further to state that the two are fundamentally one to maintain intact the edifice of Monism, involves, the contradiction that the suddha, the pure Absolute undergoes the vicissitudes of existence (samsara).

If “Visishta” (the “Upadhi”-finitised self) be different from “Suddha,” the Absolute, is it non-eternal, or perishable (anitya) or eternal and imperishable (Nitya)? If it is the former, the finitised self will simply cease to exist after the dissolution of “Upadhis,” in fact would cease to exist at the next moment after the dissolution of “Upadhis.” If it did, it will not be entitled to enjoy eternal bliss in freedom from all cosmic bondage. If it should be eternal and imperishable, it means dualism between the finite and Brahman is the truth of the matter. As the entity different from “Suddha” is admitted to be eternal, difference is eternal, and

would last even after the cessation of the functioning of "Upadhis." That means difference will persist even in the state of final release (mukti). Difference and Dualism between the Absolute and the Finite will be the truth of the matter.

Here the Absolutist puts in that Dualism is not the truth of the matter. Monism is the truth. The essential, the fundamental Reality is one—i.e., Svarupa. It is finitised or obscured by "Upadhi" and at the riddance of "Upadhi" the fundamental and essential Brahmic nature *qua* pure entity and the Only Reality remains. This may be a doctrine championed with enthusiasm. Madhva contends that it cannot be maintained on rational grounds or considerations. Granted that fundamental and essential nature remains one and the same. Granted also that *somehow* "Upadhi" is responsible for the pluralisation and finitisation or the appearance thereof, of the Absolute. Further inquiry should be undertaken in the following manner. "Upadhi" cannot surely work all the wonders of finitisation and pluralisation *in vacuo*, itself hanging in air. It will have to be in some effective contact at any rate effective enough to account for the finitisation and pluralisation, either with what is empirically known as the finite self (jiva) or with the Absolute (Brahman). It cannot be the former, on account of the well-known and unriddable vicious reciprocity. Finitised self can be established only if "Upadhi" is previously established. And "Upadhi" can be established only if previous finitised self has been established. There is trouble in reference to the second alternative. Suppose it is said that the "Upadhi" contact is with the Absolute (Brahman). Is the pure fundamental and essential nature of Brahman in contact with Upadhi? Or is it Brahmic nature or nature of Brahman with some other concomitants? Not the latter. Other concomitants are not there. Even if they should appear like stowaways, they should be explained in reference to other concomitants and so on *ad infinitum*. If the concomitants are not helpful in the elucidation of the "how" of the Upadhi-contact with Brahman the only alternative is to view pure Brahman itself as being in contact with the finitising "Upadhi." The Absolute if in contact with "Upadhi" will cease to be the Absolute! Other concomitants and causal factors have been ruled out. "Upadhi" can be in contact only with the pure Absolute (Brahman). That means the contact is with the essential and fundamental nature of the Absolute (Brahman), in whatever way the concept of essence of the Absolute may be defined or arrived at. Pure Brahman is thus reduced to a fiction. Other unpleasant consequences quickly follow. Pure Brahman being reduced to a myth, the metaphysical ultimate will be an Absolute that is obliged to tolerate contact with "Upadhi". The nature and status of the contact of "Upadhi" should then be analysed and rendered clear. If "Upadhi" is real, Monism is scattered to the four winds atleast from the standpoint of dialectics. If it is not, appearance of pluralisation and differentiation, plurality, multiplicity, difference and diversity in the universe

becomes inexplicable. The Absolutist admits that anything the nature of which tolerates contact with another something, Upadhi, in the present instance, cannot be the pure Absolute (Suddha Brahman). The Absolutism of the Absolute is yet a far cry or some vague music of the distant drum. It is not a proved or demonstrated doctrine.

When confronted with such unpleasant consequences, it is easy for the Absolutist to contend that in the last analysis one is left with Brahman and "Upadhi" to account for plurality, diversity and difference in the cosmos. It is the contention of the Absolutists that "Upadhi" is only of a lesser degree of reality and that it has not the same status as that possessed by the Absolute. At the dawn of genuine insight and real knowledge, illusory awareness of difference and diversity will automatically vanish. "Upadhi" doubtless will explain the triumvirate of the Absolute, the Infinite, and the Finite (Brahman, Iswara and Jiva) not merely, but all the difference, and diversity in the cosmos, but the point to note is it is not a reality at all. It is there as mere appearance. It is not better than the snake-appearance of a rope, no better than the silver-appearance of a piece of mother-of pearl. The appearance is powerful enough to project the cosmic show. The Absolutist clinches the matter by maintaining that as all diversity, difference and dualism can be explained by means of the appearance of "Upadhi" Madhva's objections do not really hit Monism at all.

Madhva retorts that such a summary and cheap disposal of his arguments cannot be practical politics. If "Upadhi" is no better than illusory appearance, the conclusions drawn by the Absolutist may stand. But who will grant the validity of the premises or the validity of the antecedent? Now it is an important and fundamental doctrinal truth that whatever illusory appearance operates, there is foundational and basic ignorance. Data and interpretation enter as inevitable constituent elements in all illusions. If, therefore, "Upadhi" is to be proved to be an illusory appearance exactly on the same level as illusory snake-appearance of rope, silver-appearance of a piece of shell, it is obligatory on the part of the Absolutist to show that ignorance has been operative as basic and foundational of the illusory perception. But then ignorance itself cannot be a full-blown reality in its own right. It is there by absolutistic sufferance. Unless ignorance is demonstrated and established, there cannot be any talk of "Upadhi" that is mere appearance. Unless again "Upadhi" is established there cannot be any talk of ignorance!! For even in respect of ignorance, the question should be asked what is its status? It cannot be in its own right a reality. If it were, Dualism will be the result. The demand or fiat that such a question in respect of ignorance should not at all be raised



of the genuine spirit of metaphysical quest! "Upadhi" has to be pressed into service to explain and account for every operation, every entity, everything in fact or in fiction other than the Absolute. The universality of the requirement that status should be made clear of ignorance or misinterpretation of the data with which the subject is actually confronted cannot be waived or gainsaid in the present instance. If "Upadhi" is to be secured at all as a serviceable concept consistently with the demands of a radical and fundamental Monism, "Upadhi" can be assigned only the status of illusory appearance. If so ignorance or misinterpretation should have been at work as basic, and foundational. If illusory "Upadhi" is to be established, ignorance will have to be established. If ignorance will have to be established "Upadhi" has to be. There is an unriddable vicious reciprocity between ignorance (*ajnyana*) and the limiting or the pluralising agency (*Upadhi*). Either a Dualism or vicious reciprocity will be the outcome of the usual and familiar Absolutistic endeavour to relegate "Upadhi" to the region of illusory appearance, and press it into service to account for diversity and difference in the cosmos, the plurality and multiplicity therein which are all of course as unreal and as illusory as "Upadhi" itself.

One may yet contend that a system of philosophy with a hoary tradition and a large following, and influential appreciation in the land of its birth and elsewhere, cannot be refuted if a formal or technical fallacy is pointed out. The obvious answer is that the fallacy pointed out is neither formal nor technical. Far from it. If a debate is to be conducted at all, the rules should be obeyed. When a significant and important concept like "Upadhi" is pushed into lime-light and persistently used to secure the satisfaction of an indispensable demand of system-building, the critics of that school are perfectly justified in analysing it and exhibiting the fallacies that lurk behind it. That is exactly the procedure adopted by Madhva. All that need be pointed out in this context is that in their own criticisms of Dualism, the Absolutists have employed the same weapons and one does ill indeed putting on an air of injured innocence if he is paid in his own coin. The obligation that rests on any system of Absolutism or Monism cannot be brushed aside or repudiated. System-builders in Europe and India have faced the problem as best as they might. They have been criticised and defended in turn. Parmenides did not quite succeed in maintaining his Monism. The generalisation that because senses deceive us in some cases they should be condemned as deceiving us always is manifestly illogical. The Parmenidean explanation of plurality and multiplicity in the world is not satisfactory. The christening of a particular quadruped is a particular manner prior to its being hanged is hardly a justification for the hanging itself. That all diversity difference, plurality and multiplicity are *mere* appearances is *mere*

assertion, but hardly proof. In Indian thought, it becomes necessary that the appearance-theory should be supported by *Pramanas*. Madhva's procedure in fact has been just to demonstrate that the illusory-theory is *not* in accordance with them.

Anaxagoras did not succeed in maintaining Monism by means of or in the NOUS. Whether Socrates aimed at Monism is more doubtful than not. Plato had two worlds. He never explicitly denounced one of them as unreal or illusory or of a lesser degree of reality. Aristotle was plainly critical of Plato and he did not aim at Monism. It is obvious that Neo-Platonic Idealists and Mystics did not endeavour to explain plurality and multiplicity as mere illusion.

Descartes set the ball of modern philosophy rolling on the smoothly laid out ground or on the plane of Dualism. Matter was not relegated to the limbo of illusion. Spinoza aimed at a Monism which was not maintained. So long as the distinctions between "*Natura Naturans*" and "*Natura Naturata*" "*Sub specie temporis*" and "*Sub specie aeternitatis*" are maintained, Monism *pro tanto* is diluted. Locke, Berkeley and Hume did not openly champion the illusion-theory or the theory of degrees of reality. Kant did not rise above the Dualism of "sense and understanding," "pure reason and practical reason" "phenomenon and noumenon," "appearance and the thing-in-itself," and if one of them in each pair is to be viewed as illusory, it is obligatory to explain why it is there. Hegelian Idealism, if it was a Monism, did suffer from the same defects. Bradley, Bosanquet and Bergson obtained no better success. His criteria of appearance and reality demonstrate Bradley to be definitely erratic. Bosanquet's reality that enters into all judgments accommodates Pluralism as well as Monism! Bergson has never cared satisfactorily to explain the interruption of the *Elan*. Gentile and Croce if Monists, are under the same obligations to explain Plurality and Multiplicity. Russel, Alexander, Whitehead, Ward, Pringle-Pattison and a number of other thinkers have not sustained a Monism and if they attempted to sustain, they have not adequately explained why the gigantic cosmic illusion persists. James and Dewey are not Monists. It is not obvious if Santayana is.

Other authors and thinkers have been in the same boat. Contemporary attempts in the Old and the New worlds will readily suggest themselves, but they too do not and cannot repudiate the said obligation.

In the progress of Indian thought more or less a similar situation has arisen in Monistic systems. When confronted with the problem of explaining the plurality and multiplicity in the universe, the latter is said to be unreal, illusory, of a lesser degree of reality and so on. A mere characterisation, methodological or doctrinal,

of anything as illusory or unreal does not blot it out of existence. Others there are who maintain its reality. Reality and unreality are thus predicated of the same thing by different parties to the controversy. One of the two views must be false. Both cannot be true. "Via media" may not be desirable. Cheap compromise is the bane of clear thinking. "Upadhi" is made use of to have plurality and multiplicity accounted for. Madhva is perfectly entitled to demand what its status is. It cannot be real, at any rate cannot be as real as the Absolute. If it were, Absolutism will take wings. Grudgingly then, it has to be assigned some lesser degree of reality as if it deserved only an eleemosynary dole of reality! Wherever is discernible only a lesser degree of reality there is the operation of ignorance, (ajnyana). Inquiries into the nature and status of the said ignorance are indispensable. Waiving them for the nonce, it is obvious that unless ignorance is first proved to be there can be no "Upadhi," and unless "Upadhi" is proved to be there can be no ignorance. There is no escape out of this vicious reciprocity. Ignorance cannot touch the Absolute. "Upadhi" cannot. Its operations should necessarily be confined to the Finite self. But then where is the Finite self, unless the Absolute has been pluralised by "Upadhi"-contact? Prior to the arrest and interruption of the Elan, where can be matter, and where the finite self? The Absolutistic relegation of "Upadhi" to the convenient, cool, corner of the "unreal" "illusory" et coc, as means effective escape out of all speculative difficulties and fallacies, fails of its purpose. Such is the substance in brief of the central contention of Madhva contained in the following pithy observation. "Upadhi - Mithyatvangikare - cha - anyonyasrayatvadi - dosha--uktah". Degrees of reality must be established according to traditions of Indian Philosophy on the basis of independent testimony. The doctrine of degrees cannot be allowed to be exhibited like a jack-in-the-box to the amusement of a wonder-dazed audience. Madhva's contention is that "Upadhi" cannot be relegated to the limbo of the "illusory". As the most important and significant entity responsible for the pluralisation of the Absolute, it should be assigned as much reality as the Absolute Itself. Either Dualism will have to be resorted to, or if a Monism be still sought to be maintained by waving the magic wand of SOMEHOW difference between souls bond and free, difference among one another of the triumvirate. Absolute, Infinite and the Finite, (Brahman, Isvara and Jiva) spiritual endeavour, moral effort and other concepts and values founded on the solid bed-rock of diversity and distinction would be inexplicable.

{The Absolutist now argues that such difference can be explained by means of the doctrine of "Karma". In respect of any given existence, "Karma"—sum-total of actions done in an earlier existence,—would account for the operation of "Upadhi," and the difference, diversity, and distinctions would then be automatically accounted for when once "Upadhi" has been shown to operate.

"Chaitanya" or pure spirit, the Reality remains one and the same. Still the establishment of concepts "my station and its duties" "his karma—her karma—its karma" and so on, will be possible on account of the difference in subjects that is caused by "Upadhi". It will be noticed at a glance that there is absolutely nothing new about this argument. It is all old wine in new bottles only. Madhva analyses this position with penetrating insight and exhibits to the view of critics the truth that the concepts of "Upadhi" and "Karma" are involved in a like vicious reciprocity and that neither could be serviceable so long as the said reciprocity is not got rid of. Start from the Absolutistic position that the Absolute or Brahman is the only reality. Of course, the Absolute is beyond all "Karma". It is not permissible even to speak of the Absolute in descriptive or definitive terms, as it is neither describable nor definable. Starting that way, how is it possible to explain the finite? Each individual's "Karma" is responsible for difference. There is a separate issue on which decision has to be taken namely, whether difference is real or unreal. Keeping that in abeyance, the question must be asked how "Karma" proceeds bringing about difference, diversity and dualism, plurality and multiplicity where there is only unity—only one Reality. Chaitanya or pure spirit is the only reality. Well and good. The innocence of oneness is spoiled, defiled and disturbed by the serpent of Karma. Take the "karma" series X. That brings about "Upadhi" Y. If it is said that Y is responsible for the differentiation of the One into Many, the implication is that unless the X has previously operated, there would be no "Upadhi" as a prop to "Karma"! If the same "Upadhi" that is urged to be an effect of a given "karma" series, be at the same time admitted to be a differentiating agent, there is no escape from vicious reciprocity. Unless there is previous differentiation by "Upadhi"-contact, there can be no individualisation of "Karma." Unless there is individualisation of "Karma", there can be no operation of "Upadhi." If on the other hand, one "Upadhi" is said to be responsible for differentiation or individualisation or finitisation, and another is admitted to be responsible for the "Karma" of each individual, "that Upadhi" itself is in need of another and so on *ad infinitum*. There would ensue an infinite regress of "Karma" series and another Infinite regress of "Upadhi"! If the technical mode be a bit abandoned, the plain truth of the matter is this. All differentiation is due to Karma—says the Absolutist. Whose "Karma"? The reply will have to be the "Karma" of Z, Y and X and so on. X. Y. Z. are differentiations due to "Upadhi." Unless therefore, "Upadhi" clears the ground by differentiation of subjects, how can "Karma" be individualised? Unless Karma is individualised, "Upadhis" cannot be individualised. But the Absolutistic position is that successive "Upadhis" meaning nervous systems, and other encumbrances of the spirit, are the effects of previous "Karma"! Settlement of the previous "karma" is impossible unless "Upadhi" steps in, and takes care

of differentiation of subjects. Otherwise, "Karmic" allocation or "Karmic" allotment has to be made in the air. That is the substance of Madhva's contention that vicious reciprocity between Karma-vyavastha (settlement of Karma) and Upadhi-vyavastha (settlement of Upadhi) vitiates the Absolutistic doctrine that "Karma" will explain all difference, diversity, multiplicity and plurality. If more than one "Upadhi" and more than one "Karma" (arrangement) be accepted, there would ensue an infinite succession of "Karma" and "Upadhi" without a satisfactory causal explanation. One "Upadhi" will need the aid of one "Karma". The latter "Karma" will need an "Upadhi". That "Upadhi" again will need another "Karma"! Out of this marshy bog of metaphysics, escape is impossible so long as we remain on the level of Absolutism.

The Absolutist has ready a stock objection against such criticism. Seed sprouts and develops into a tree. The tree again yields seed or rather in the fruit lie seeds according to botanical laws. Seed and tree involve one another in an endless series.

Why not "Upadhi" and "Karma"? or "Upadhi"-arrangement and "Karma"—arrangement? (Upadhi-Vyavastha and Karma-Vyavastha). Madhva replies that the analogy is entirely unsound. In the Botanical realm, no one ever thinks of affirming an identity between the Seed and the Tree. Even a Botanical Booby will not do it. Where a clear and distinct perception and uninvalidated rational experience guarantee the difference of X and Y, there is nothing illogical if they are involved in an endless succession. In technical terminology (Siddha-vishaya-anavastha) i.e., endless regress of two entities difference between which is established and guaranteed adequately—(i.e. endless regress grounded on established data) is *no logical fallacy*—while "Asiddha-vishaya-anavastha" i.e. endless regress in which two hypothetical, unestablished and undemonstrated entities are involved—(i.e. the said regress grounded on the sands of unproved entities) is a logical fallacy of a serious character. In the present instance, Monism has not been demonstrated. That all Chaitanya or spirit is One has not been demonstrated. "Upadhi" has not been. The status of the latter has not been. "Karma" is smuggled in at this stage to mend matters. When metaphysical conditions are thus unsettled and violently fluctuating, the Tree-Seed analogy may strike popular fancy for the nonce, but is hardly a substitute for reasoned philosophical explanation. Madhva winds up this section of the work with the observation that similar and other criticisms can be easily detected and urged by others and that they need not be multiplied in the present context<sup>7</sup>.

Madhva's commentator indicates briefly the nature of the other criticism that have not been explicitly advanced by the Acharya. (1) The following questions will have to be answered by Absolutism which maintains that "Upadhi" is responsible for difference.

Are not all finite selves, in virtue of the fundamental and basic Monism, ubiquitous Immanent right through? Or are they exactly of the same size and extension as the nervous system? Or are they atomic? The first alternative cannot be maintained. The Upadhi-tainted, or Upadhi-differentiated cannot be Immanent right through and cannot be ubiquitous. Ubiquity and Immanence right through are the properties of the Pure Absolute. Further, an ubiquitous limiting Agent is nowhere to be found. A limiting agent is itself limited. The second alternative is more illogical. If the self extends exactly over the dimensions of the nervous system, it means it has parts and hence perishable. (2) If the second and third alternatives are to be championed, since "Upadhi" has some action, movement and energising, does it mean that wherever "Upadhi" moves or migrates there finitised self or the Absolute finitised also moves? Or does it mean that "Upadhi" abandons at the time of movement or migration the finitised Absolute, and creates for itself as it were a new finitised self out of the Absolute, wherever it goes, moves or migrates? If the first alternative be correct, then "Upadhi" will leave a vacuum or a blank in the Absolute when it moves on, and the Absolute will have to be augmented by "Upadhi" contact. Augmentation at the time of the Upadhi-Absolute contact and blank and vacuum at the time of the "Upadhi"-Absolute sundering or separation from one another will be unwelcome consequences. If the second were true it will mean that the self has origin in time and destruction as well. There will be on that view an abrupt termination of "Karma", as well as an equally abrupt commencement of it. (3) A variety of the Bhaskara School maintains rather with an air of anxiety to effect a compromise between the two extremes of radical Dualism between the finite self and the Absolute, and an equally radical and fundamental Monism which evaluates the difference between the two as illusory, unreal and as mere appearance, that the correct relation between the two would be "Bheda-abheda" i.e. difference-shot identity or identity-shot difference. The terms of faddists "Identity-in-difference" and "Difference-in-identity" will not be accurate renderings as in European philosophy identity is as real as difference, and difference as real as identity is (33). The followers of the Bhaskara school should be questioned why they are anxious to admit difference between the self, and the Absolute. The only relevant reply is that it is admitted to have the difference and diversity in the cosmos accounted for, as also plurality and multiplicity of subjects—free, knowing, feeling, and willing subjects. On a view like this, as identity is as powerful as difference, X will experience the joys and sorrows of Y, or the Absolute will share them. Differences and individuality are not accounted for. It is contended that the identity arrested or blocked up by difference will guarantee individuality and explain experience of different individuals, the obvious and unanswerable

reply is that the difference also arrested or blocked up by identity will not be able to explain diversity, difference, plurality and multiplicity for the explanation of which it was admitted. The point is this. The arresting or blocking up cannot be one-sided. It is bound to be reciprocal. If difference is arrested by identity to get Monism, explained, identity is also arrested by difference frustrating Monism. If it is argued that difference is more puissant or powerful, then why should one worry himself about identity? Or if identity is puissant and powerful, let it be championed and worked out to its logical conclusions and consequences, irrespective of other considerations, and let difference then, be scattered to the four winds. Why should one resort to this cheap compromise between identity and difference, which is neither fish flesh nor good red-herring? If it is further argued that in virtue of the unfathomable and immeasurable majesty of Isvara identity and difference will do their respective duties and discharge legitimate functions, then why not straightway admit difference pure and simple between the self and Isvara when the feeling is strong that the majesty of the latter is so grand and immeasurable, and that the limitations and imperfections of the former are so glaring and striking? If it is finally contended that Sruti does not countenance difference between the self and the Absolute, the answer is that in view of the nine illustrative instances cited in Sruti it has been shown that the sacred texts emphasize only difference between the finite and the Absolute or the self and the Absolute. (34). The crucial texts that are claimed to support identity between the finite and the Infinite have been shown to support *only difference* between the two in the light of the nine illustrative instances which lose all significance and relevancy on a Monistic interpretation. Secondly, in addition to this critical demonstration of difference between the finite and the Infinite, Madhva has proved his thesis constructively by citing Sruti texts which unequivocally proclaim difference between God and Man as the truth of the cosmic scheme.

There is yet another objection urged by the Absolutist. Difference is neither illusory, nor due to the operation of "Upadhi," nor due to any notion of part-whole, spark-flame and so on. Identity is "SOMEHOW" the truth of the matter. The difference is "SOMEHOW" brought about by something other than "Upadhi". In lay and philosophical disputes and debates the use of the concept of "SOMEHOW" is inevitable in respect of certain ultimate explanations. Brought about "somehow" by something other than "Upadhi," difference is still illusory and unreal, mere appearance. Identity is the final verdict of all philosophy.

Madhva's commentator replies that granting for the sake of argument all that the Absolutist wants, questions should be asked regarding the nature and status of this mysterious "something" that is

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(34) The dogmatism that Sruti texts do not support difference between the finite and the Infinite is refuted.

responsible for the appearance of difference, diversity and dualism, plurality and multiplicity. If pet concepts proclaimed to serve important and significant purposes in the preservation intact of a huge metaphysical superstructure like Monistic Absolutism or Idealism, are not challenged, there can as well be an end to all debates and controversies as only chaos would be caused by such concepts. Cheap compromise is destructive of all rational philosophy. Uncritical and pathetic acquiescence in a dogma sounds the death-knell of speculative system-building. What is the nature of this "something" that is responsible for the appearance of difference and diversity? What is the nature of the relationship into which it is supposed to enter with the Absolute? Does it come into contact with the Absolute? Or not? Is it related to the fundamental nature of the Absolute? Is it again due to some "Upadhi" or "Upadhi" par excellence? Even supposing that other queries are brushed aside, the two named last will have to be answered. It is not fair play at all in a philosophical game to contend that such questions should not be raised? In that case one system of thought is as good as another. A slavish acquiescence in Monism is pathetic in the indolence it indicates of thinkers.

The questions are classic and standing. They were asked in connection with the Absolutistic account of difference. If that mysterious "something" responsible for the appearance of diversity and difference, be the essential and fundamental nature of the Absolute, then it will be as eternal as the Absolute itself. That which is maintained to be powerful enough to have caused the illusion of cosmic appearance, can do so only if it is puissant enough vitally to affect the Absolute at some vital point or points. If the "something" touches the fundamental nature of the Absolute, it will share in the eternity of the Absolute and that would mean that the difference caused by it will persist till the termination of eternity!

Instead of being mere appearance difference will be a reality even in the state of release. The identity-doctrine will thus be compromised.

If on the other hand the "something" is due to "Upadhi," old troubles will recur. Upadhi and that "something" will be gripped in a vicious reciprocity which deposits both the concepts in an unsettled condition. If that "something" is to be spoken of as an "other" set over against the Absolute to account for difference, it should have been caused by "Upadhi". Otherwise, it would not be there. To explain it without reference to "Upadhi" will give it a status of reality exactly the same as that of the Absolute. Dualism will result. Similarly, if "Upadhi" is to be spoken of as an appearance, this "something" should have previously operated. Without the aid of the Mrs. Harris of "something" "Upadhi" is not rendered intelligible. Without



the aid of the latter the former is not. That is exactly the achievement of vicious reciprocity to the detriment of Absolutism.

## XII

There is only one more important topic with the discussion of which Madhva concludes the first section of his work. (Pariccheda). If the arguments so far advanced, are borne in mind, the conclusion is irresistible that identity between the finite and Infinite cannot be the import of the sacred texts, (Sruti). If the Absolutist should contend (surely he would,) that the central import of the sacred texts converges towards the Absolute, he should be prepared to answer the following questions. (1) Is the identity between the finite and Infinite the same as Brahman, (nothing other than Brahman) or has it assumed the form of Brahman? (2) Or is it something different from Brahman? Madhva's commentator analyses them and exposes their untenability.

If identity between the finite and Infinite is the same as Brahman, the Absolutistic doctrine would mean that the import of the sacred texts converges towards or on the said identity. Brahman is that identity. That identity is Brahman. The Sruti texts should be admitted to converge on Brahman. This is the only manner in which the Absolutist can maintain his Monism intact. But that is not to be. If the Sruti texts reveal the nature of Brahman, and if Brahman is capable of being so revealed by the sacred texts, it would be time enough to embark on a discussion of the precise and exact import of the texts. If for instance some vague and relatively indeterminate connection is established between a work and its import, then attempts will be in order to have the relatively indeterminate rendered specific and determine, or to have the question settled which is the primary natural import of a term and which is the artificial or the secondary sense. But the pity of it is that Brahman, or the Absolute is *not capable of being revealed by the Sruti at all*. Texts human and divine, revealed and unrevealed, (all texts in fact) have been made up of sentences. (vakya). The sentences again on analysis will reveal a number of terms with easily recognisable or identifiable import. If on the other hand the surface-sense or the *prima facie* import is unsuitable it is surrendered, and in virtue of the context, another espoused and expounded. If Brahman is to be revealed or proclaimed by the sacred texts, it will have to be conno-denoted either by a sentence (Vakya) or a term (Pada). It cannot be the former. According to rules of grammar and the canons of interpretation, sentences convey to the minds of those for whose edification they are intended either affirmation of a relation, some attribute related to a substance, (samsarga) or an affirmation of difference, namely that some suggested attribute does not inhere in or relate to a substance in question, Similar relations can be easily imagined. Brahman is neither

"samsarga," a relationship into which two objects or concepts are brought together nor is it the same as difference (bheda). It is obvious that the Absolutist will have to maintain that Brahman (Absolute) cannot be held to be determinable either as affirmation of a relation of inherence or determined as difference. *Qua* determined, the Absolute will lose its Absolutism. All determination is negation.

Neither can Brahman be said to be conno-denoted by a term. (Pada). Four kinds or types of terms can be distinguished and in fact stand so distinguished in virtue of rules of grammar. Some terms signify or convey a class, caste, or community, something not individualised and singularised unlike a proper name. (Jati-sabda). Yet others have a direct and pointed reference to some qualities or striking features. He is white. He has a stick in hand and so on. (Guna-sabda) A third type of terms has a pointed reference to some characteristic act habitually or professionally performed by a subject. For instance, X is called a cook, because of his work, another a teacher, because he teaches and so on. (Kriya-sabda) Lastly a fourth kind of terms has a direct reference to a conventional scheme of linguistic arrangement according to which objects all the world over are known as Gold, Table, Man, and so on in virtue of possession by them of fixed structural formations and in virtue of their fulfilling certain functions. Conventionality which is age-long and an agreement among the rational members of humanity to christen and refer to an object in a particular fixed manner (sanketa) are the characteristics of the fourth type of terms. The Absolutist's Brahman *cannot be known* by the first three types for the best of all possible and assignable reasons that Brahman has nothing to do with "Jati" (class and caste) "Guna" (properties, like colour etc.) and "Kriya," (activity). Can Brahman be known and described by spiritual terms? No. The fourth alternative also is unthinkable as the terms of the scriptural text should be held to be untouched and unaffected by any man-made convention, (sanketa). The "vaidic" terms are beyond such convention and conventional arrangement. According to the traditions of Sastra, a term can be described to have a reference to an object, value, relation etc., *only* if it is capable of being subsumed under one of the four types. Brahman cannot be described in terms of any of the types. Brahman or the Absolute is thus indescribable, un-nameable, un-characterisable and so forth on (even by sruti).

Nor can there be any indirect reference to Brahman. The familiar instance is this. A person says that there is a locality of shepherds in the Ganges (Gangayam-ghoshah). Obviously that could not be in the waters of the river! The term Gangayam i.e., (in the Ganges) should be made to surrender its surface-interpretation. It is admitted indirectly to refer to the - banks of the river. On the same analogy then terms can indirectly refer

to Brahman. That is the contention of the Absolutist. Madhva replies that indirect reference can be admitted *only if a prior direct reference* in virtue of the structure and function of terms had been actually engaging the attention of a subject and only if it had to be surrendered on account of certain obvious incompatibilities and inconsistencies. There could obviously be no human habitation in the waters of a river. In view of the obvious inconsistency, the term is made to refer to the banks of the river. In the present instance however, as Brahman is *ex hypothesi* admitted to be unknowable, incapable of being squeezed into the conceptual moulds, and as It cannot also be directly denoted by any of the four possible types of terms, indirect reference to Brahman is out of the question. (35). Wherever there is indirect reference, prior direct reference must have been operative. Without the latter, no one is entitled to speak of the former. The position is this. Brahman or the Absolute cannot be the import of a sentence (vakya). Because its essential nature precludes all reference to difference, (bheda) and affirmation of relationship (samsarga). Brahman cannot be denoted by a term. Only four types of terms are possible involving class, quality, action and convention. None of these would touch Brahman. Terms have thus no direct reference to Brahman. Nor could there be any indirect reference. It involves previous direct reference and its incompatibility with an accepted order of things and values. How then is it thinkable at all that Brahman can be revealed by the sacred text—(Sruti)?

Further the question whether Sruti reveals the essential and fundamental nature of Brahman can have point only if the existence of Brahman had been proved and metaphysically demonstrated. Such a proof is yet to be. On the other hand evidence is available to show that there is no such thing as the Absolute-(Brahman). If there is any such, it should be capable of being revealed by Pramanas, the channels and the guarantors of valid knowledge, namely sense-perception (pratyaksha) inference (anumana) and Agama (the sacred text or the revealed text). Brahman is inaccessible to any of the Pramanas. Of these, Agama is admitted to be the most potent. Brahman cannot be revealed by it. The text is made up of sentences and terms. As argued in the previous paragraphs, Brahman is inaccessible to sentences and terms. Sense-awareness would grasp the nature of objects which are endowed with sense-graspable qualities and features. Brahman is devoid of all such qualities and features. Inference involves previous sense-awareness. If Brahman is inaccessible to sense-awareness *ipso facto* It cannot be known by inference. Inference syllogistic and inductive is rendered possible only because of pre-inferential sense-awareness. The Absolute is thus nothing being inaccessible to Pramanas. It is unknowable and indescribable. It is Fontal Nullity.

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(35) See Chapter on "Karma-Nirraya."

According to an important traditional doctrine of the Absolutist, if anything is knowable (jneya) it is jada (inanimate) and if Brahman is knowable, the consequence is the Absolute will be an inanimate object.

The Absolutist contends at this stage that it is not correct to argue the absence of indirect reference to Brahman by terms, on the ground of absence of previous direct reference. There need not be any direct reference at all in fact. Even a suggestion that there is such a reference will suffice. Elaborate proof is not required to realise how there is suggestion of direct reference to Brahman. It is self-luminous (svaprakasa). It may be inaccessible to "Pramanas." But Brahman is there and is understood to be there as the only substance, and only reality and as being not in need of any other entity to explain it. It is self-explanatory, self-subsistent and self-sufficient. As there is this direct reference to Brahman as the only reality from which all else derives its reality of lower degree and existence, there can be indirect reference to It also by means of scriptural terms grounded on it, and thus indescribability is powerless to reduce Brahman to "Nothing" or "Nothingness."

Madhva replies that the loud proclamation of a pet theory or admiration of a doctrine is no proof or demonstration. That Brahman is known by all as the only self-luminous reality is a doctrine. It is the issue to be decided. What is the use of pre-judging it? Let the concept or the notion of ("svaprakasatva") self-luminosity be analysed. Does it mean self-knowability? Or does it mean unknowable by others? Not the former. According to the doctrinal truth of Absolutism Brahman is not known even by Itself. It could not be. If it were, the Absolutism of the Absolute would be gone! Not the latter. It should be recalled that the criticism urged by Madhva against the Absolutist was that the Absolute was as good as "Nothing" on account of the fact that *all the three pramanas* were and are inadequate to grasp the nature of the Absolute. If in reply to this criticism it is said that Brahman is not known or knowable by others (that is the alternative meaning of the term "Svaprakasa" now under reference) it is hardly a relevant reply and it very much sounds like the jargon of one *non compos mentis*. A proper retort to the charge that Brahman is not established or proved to exist by any of the Pramans, is to demonstrate how Brahman is proved to exist by them. It is hardly an effective or relevant retort to state that Brahman is not known by others and is not knowable either by others. If mere unknowability and inconceivability should be the criteria of the existence of something, then, surely, contradictory and impossible notions like the horns of the hare, a mare's nest, round square and others may also be quite in order even though their existence is not proved or demonstrated with the help of Pramanas. Madhva's reply is advanced accepting for the sake of argument that a previous direct reference to an object

is not necessary to trade upon indirect reference in clumsy endeavour to bolster a doctrine up. Madhva's commentator has elsewhere (36) conclusively argued that *unless* there is direct reference to an object by a term or a group of them, indirect reference *cannot* function at all. If the Absolutistic doctrine that Brahman is strictly unknowable and unnameable, is advocated with sincerity and with an eye on consistency, the position that Brahman is the subject of an indirect reference by scriptural terms is untenable, as indirect reference must always mean prior direct reference. Prior direct reference means the nameability and knowability of Brahman. That is to say, the doctrine that Brahman is strictly unknowable and unnameable and the doctrine that Brahman is the subject of an indirect reference by means of scriptural terms are mutually incompatible, but the pity of it is that both of them are maintained by the Absolutists with doggedness.

While it is easy to understand that Brahman or the Absolute is unknowable by others, may it not be that it is knowable by Itself? Such an inquiry should be undertaken to have the Absolutism of the Absolute rendered clear and consistent. The Absolutist argues that Brahman cannot be known even by Itself. Knower is let us say X. (Karta)—Y is the known. Knower-ship or knower-hood is different from known-ship or known-hood. If Brahman or the Absolute were to know Itself, It will have to be knower and the known at the same time! Simultaneity between them is fatal. So Brahman not merely remains unknown to and unknowable by others but It is unknown to and unknowable by Itself. In any act of knowledge or in any knowing of Brahman by Itself, Brahman will have to be in respect of one and the same act of knowledge knower as well as the known. That involves an obvious contradiction. All types of Absolutists maintain that in view of the contradiction, Brahman is unknowable even by Itself and even to Itself.

Madhva's commentator argues that the unknowability of Brahman based on an imaginary contradiction will have to be summarily rejected. Why does the Absolutist say that Brahman cannot be subject and object at the same time? Is it because, "subject and object" are defined in a manner involving contradiction or incompatibility between them? Or as a matter of fact (irrespective of definitions) do subject-hood and object-hood exist as such in a state of opposition or incompatibility? The first alternative does not hold good. Definitions can so be managed as to have the element of incompatibility removed immediately. (37). The subject can be defined as that in which activity inheres or he who regulates activity and puts it forth. Object is that towards which such activity is directed. There is no incompatibility between

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(36) See Discussion in "Karmanirnaya"

(37) Commentary on "Tatvanirnaya" P. 115.

the two definitions. As in instances of introspection, the subject can stand aloof and observe its own workings. A subject can be object at the same time. The definitions of subject and object *per se* involve no incompatibility or contradiction.

As a matter of fact, irrespective of definitions that are purposive and that can be changed to suit the pragmatic need and the stand-point of one who defines a particular object, notion or concept, subjectship and objectship co-exist in perfect logical peace and harmony: For instance there is a scriptural injunction that sacred texts should be studied. The injunction itself is not the commandment of any secular authority or official superior. It is scriptural. The scriptural text, therefore, which proclaims the spiritual obligation that scriptural texts should be studied in the same act of proclamation and at the same time proclaims that IT also should be studied. As a proclaimer of the injunction it is subject. As falling within the scope of study of the sacred texts so proclaimed, it is object. That is to say, scriptural study must include a study, of that text also which proclaims the obligation that scripture should be studied. It is object *qua* a solitary text that is to be studied along with so many others that have to be studied in response to scriptural injunction. *Qua* revealing or proclaiming the obligation that the texts should be studied, it is subject. For be it remembered that without such a text, the obligation will never have been communicated to humanity at all and will never have been known at all by erring mortals (It is Adhyana-vidhayaka and Adhyana karma *at the same time*). (2) Secondly, consider the term "term" (sabda-sabda). Terms have been used and are being used from time immemorial to signify or denote objects. When they denote and connote, the terms are to be spoken of as "subjects." The objects denoted and the attributes connoted will be "objects." But what is the matter with the term "term" itself? There are countless other terms which denote, and connote, or conno-denote, objects, values, concepts and so forth. The term "TERM" on the other hand, has obviously a dual function to perform. It naturally signifies *all* terms of whatever nature or category and it is bound to signify *itself* as well in virtue of its being a term. When it signifies the other terms it is subject (karta) and when it is signified it is an object. (karma) In a word the term "TERM" signifies other terms as well as itself and is thus subject and object at the same time. (3) Or consider another instance. A given term like a jar (ghata) on a little analysis will be seen to fulfil the dual function. It signifies an object. It signifies itself *qua* term. It signifies something or some things other than itself. When it signifies itself, it is subject as well as object, the signifier and the signified. Such are the implications in the use of terms, and in the general philosophy of the relation between language and reality, which lie hidden when language is freely used by unthinking folk and which can be dragged out of seclusion at any time by a little reflective analysis.

The three instances cited above are conclusive evidence to support the view that Brahman has to be regarded knower and known, subject and object, and the contradictions and incompatibilities imagined by the Absolutists in a given entity being subject and object, at the same time are merely figments and not realities. Madhva's commentator concludes that in the light of the instances cited above, and in the light as well of the relation between language and reality, thought and reality, Brahman has to be viewed as subject and object. If Brahman did not know Itself its mentality will be surely causing anxiety to the Absolutist. As to how the Absolute will ever maintain Absolutism intact if it cannot know even Itself is a problem which finite human intellect can never hope to solve. Madhva and his commentator have every right to maintain that the highest Reality in a system of metaphysics should also be the most perfect and knowability of Brahman by Itself is a very important constituent element of perfection of the Absolute. If one is not entitled to speak of perfection of the Absolute, because, *qua* determined as perfect, the Absolute will cease to be Absolute, why, the Absolute then is a colossal NOTHING. On the other hand, that it is EVERYTHING, the CENTRAL and FUNDAMENTAL REALITY is the contention of the Absolutist and it is strange that this "Fundamental Reality" is maintained to be incapable of knowing Itself.

To Western minds not fully acquainted with the traditions of the Vedanta, and Vedantic debates, it may seem that a subject can now be a knower and subsequently a known object in accordance with the dominant interest and purpose of the moment, and as it is plain a discrimination of the two aspect of Known and Knower is what is wanted textual discussion is unnecessary. In reply it has to be stated that the discussion is perfectly relevant as it centres round a very important doctrine of the Absolutist that Brahman or the Absolute is *not knowable even by Itself*. As a Theist Madhva feels bound to controvert the said doctrine of Absolutism and maintain that Brahman is Omniscient and knows all. Omniscience without the Omniscient Being knowing Itself is an absurd notion. Madhva's anxiety to maintain that Brahman knows itself and all is justified as he has to vindicate the nature of the Highest Reality in his system of thought.

The Absolutist puts forth a further contention that Brahman can be directly referred to. It is all Knowledge (Jnyana). It is of course not a knower (Jnyatri). Knowledge is self-luminous and self-revelatory (svaprakasa). Brahman can and is directly referred to as Knowledge. It is therefore not surely a "NOTHING".

Madhva controverts the foregoing position of Absolutism in the following manner. The doctrine that Brahman is all knowledge cannot be sustained. Wherever there is knowledge, two constituents are inevitable. There should be a knower (jnyatri) and something known. (jnyata) It is the property of knowledge

that it reveals the characteristics of objects as well as itself and its nature. Knowledge is self-revelatory. But the Absolutistic contention is that though Brahman is knowledge It does not know Itself. It cannot be knower and known. Madhva maintains that if Brahman is to be viewed as Knowledge, that Knowledge (put it with as big a K as possible) should obey the laws of knowledge. If any one contends that that knowledge is peculiar, and that it need not obey the laws of knowledge, the *onus probandi* lies on him who wants to champion the peculiarity and uniqueness of the Knowledge that is Brahman. According to Madhva, even the Knowledge that is Brahman, will have to grip knower and known. In respect of the Knowledge that is Brahman, two questions should be answered—Who is the Knower? What is the Known? There cannot be Knower of Brahman at all. There is nought else besides Brahman. If it is admitted that Brahman is known by others or by any-other-than-Brahman, Brahman will then become the known. The knower will always be according to all canons of critical judgment more powerful than the known. If Brahman is to be the known, It will *qua* determined lose its importance and independence. According to the doctrines of Absolutism itself, there cannot be any Knower in respect of the Knowledge that is Brahman or Brahman that is Knowledge.

Nor can there be any known. What is there to be known? Either the nature of Brahman itself is to be known or something other than the nature of Brahman. According to the tenets of Absolutism Brahman cannot know Itself. If it did, It would be lost in the contradiction of being at the same time knower and known. Is there anything other than Brahman to be known? None. For Brahman is the only existent, and only Reality. There is nought else. According to the cherished doctrine of Absolutism, there cannot be anything to be known or known in respect of the knowledge that is Brahman, or Brahman that is Knowledge. The Absolutist now interjects that though there is not anything other than Brahman of the same degree of Reality, there is the cosmos and there are cosmic objects of a lesser degree of reality to be known. In reply to this contention, Madhva's commentator urges that though other objects of a lesser degree of reality may have some semblance or simulacrum of existence of a lower degree of reality, such objects have absolutely no existence whatever in the state (Mukti) of final release from recurring cycles of births and deaths. Even in that state of final release there is Brahman. It cannot be that its fundamental nature will change or could have changed. Even in Mukti, Brahman is Knowledge. It should obey the laws of Knowledge. All other objects and the entire cosmos are negated and stultified and realised to be mirage-like appearance. In that state what is there to be known? Absolutely nothing. Knowledge without nothing to be known is a misnomer.



The contention that Brahman in the state of Mukti is different from Brahman in the state of bondage is too frivolous to need any refutation. Brahman is the same now, and at all times. Unchangingness is its fundamental and essential characteristic. That Brahman that is knowledge has some objects of lesser degree of reality to be known in the state of bondage, and has nothing to be known at all in the state of Mukti, or final release, may be a story that can be narrated at a comfortable fireside to an obedient family of young folk, but can hardly pass muster for a reasoned out tenet in a system of philosophy or consistent body of doctrines. Bondage or release, Brahman is the same. If there are no objects of the same degree of reality, then there is nothing to be known. If there are objects to be known though of a lesser degree of reality, demonstrate degrees of reality first. The doctrine itself is dubious. The same story cannot be repeated in respect of the state of release. Brahman is Brahman even then. Brahman is Knowledge. There is nought else. The question of degrees of reality has no relevancy in respect of the state of release. There cannot be knowledge without something to be known.

Madhva's commentator pushes the matter further to its logical conclusion. "SOMEHOW" can always be summoned. The Absolutist will surely utter the *open sesame* of "somehow" when he finds himself confronted with a door to which he has no key! Somehow there can be knowledge that is Brahman, even though there is neither knower nor anything to be known. Madhva's commentator vividly points out that if the mysterious "somehow" is to be smuggled into Philosophical discussions whenever there is any trouble to be tided over rational reflection must really rest buried fathoms deep. Certainly, "Somehow" is not the monopoly of the Absolutist. Others can press it into service, and if such a liberty is recognised and translated into practice there will be an end to all honest debate and discussion. Any party can at any time summon the bogey of "somehow" to scare unthinking folk away! Without much ado, therefore, all reference and appeal to the mysterious Mrs. Harris "SOMEHOW" should be forthwith ruled out of order in metaphysical debates. If it is not done, Madhva and his commentators are at perfect liberty to emphasize the *reductio ad absurdum* of an appeal to "somehow." If knowledge, without the existence of knower and known, is admitted to be, why not admit that a mare's nest exists? It is the easiest thing in the world to juxtapose "mare's" and "nest" and bring into being "mare's nest." Why not admit that it can as well exist as any other?

A further contention of the Absolutist is that insistence on the existence of knower and known may be reasonable in all knowledge that includes or has some reference to action or knowledge that has origin in time. The knowledge that is Brahman is neither the one nor the other. It has no reference to action or activity.

Nor has it any origin in the temporal series. The inevitable knower-known relationship is not bound to be discernible in this special type of knowledge that is Brahman.

Madhva's commentator replies that differentiation between a special type of knowledge and one that is ordinary is baseless. There is the root "jna" which means "to know." If this is denied, the denier is fit only for the nearest mental hospital and not for an assembly of serious-minded debaters of a philosophical problem. Knowing is activity—whether it be of the special type or the general type. Activity involves an agent, a field for the exercise of activity and some purposive changes caused in the environment. Without these activity has no meaning. Without, these again, it may be anything, and why should it be still styled activity, when the characteristic marks of activity are absent from it? Even in an existential judgment, "X is" existence involves a subject, which is assigned a local habitation in a spatio-temporal series and when the necessity for the existence of a subject is undoubted *even* when intransitives are used, *a fortiori* subject and object, the knower and the known should be inevitably present when transitive verbs are used. That is according to the rules of Grammar and language. If it is contended that all rules of Grammar and language should be cast to the four winds in respect of Brahman, *then let rules of logic and consistency also be cast likewise, and let Brahman be a colossal Nothing—Sunya*. If a protest is lodged against the latter, a protest is always in order against the dismissal of the Knower-known constituents from the knowledge that is Brahman. The conclusion is unchallengeable that the Absolutist cannot evade criticism by resorting to the plea that the knowledge that is Brahman is of special type from which knower-known constituents can well be absent. Whether the knowledge that is Brahman is considered to be of a special type or an ordinary hum-drum one, or on the same level as the hum-drum one, there must be knower and known in respect of it. Otherwise it would cease to be knowledge. It may be anything else.

It will be remembered that Madhva commenced his critique of the Absolutistic doctrine that identity between the finite and the Infinite is the import of the sacred texts, by formulating two alternatives, namely that identity can be viewed as the form, essential and fundamental nature of Brahman itself or as different therefrom. Brahman is identity and identity is Brahman. In the foregoing paragraphs Madhva exhaustively criticised the view that Brahman and the Identity itself are identical with one another.

The Acharya now takes up the remaining alternative that the Identity may be viewed as different from Brahman. There is Identity between Brahman and the Finite. (Jiva-Brahma-Abheda) Madhva insists on an acute accurate analysis of this

identity. Is it anything positive (bhava-rupa)? If so Absolutism or Monism will disappear. If it be a positive entity of a lower degree of reality it will likewise disappear in the state of Mukti or final liberation. Disappearance of illusory identity means the appearance of very real difference even in the state of final release. Dualism is the outcome. To avoid all these unpalatable consequences, identity should be expressed not as a positive entity but as a negative one, i.e. negation or Absence of difference (bheda). It is a doctrinal truth that Absolutism is not impaired by any number of "others" in the shape of absence, negation, or non-existence of realities other than Brahman. There is the well-known *ipse dixit* of Mandana Misra that features or qualities or attributes (dharma) in the shape of negations, or absences, or denials (abhava) do not destroy Absolutism or Monism. (Abhava-rupa-dharmah-na-advaitam-nighnanti) Among the innumerable and countless negations which readily fall in with Absolutism without impairing it (through every one of the negations is an "other") negation of difference is also one. But it is an important law of thought that negation of something is possible only if previous suggestion that it may be operative in a given context or a situation had been made. Without the previous suggestion of its operativeness, negation is pointless. For instance, no one would suddenly burst forth into the room in which I am type-writing this matter, and exclaim that King Alfonso has *not* abdicated!! I would be entitled to regard the person as perfectly insane if he should make an exhibition of himself with that exclamation. If on the other hand, the statement is made in the course of a table-talk when there is a suggestion thrown out that the King had abdicated, it would be in order. This suggestion may be very well refuted by any one possessing more accurate information. The statement that the king had not abdicated emanating from one who is posted up with up-to-date information about the political developments in Spain will be in order. The same principle of interpretation must apply with equal force to any statement with a negation like *X* is not red. The negation not-red is pointless unless a previous suggestion happens to have been made that it may be of that colour. European logicians state the same truth in characteristic statements like—"Every affirmation denies" and "Every denial affirms." Affirmations and negations are double-edged, and so forth. (38).

If according to the central doctrine of Monism or Absolutism, difference between Brahman and Jiva, between the Infinite and the Finite, is denied, and if it is further adroitly affirmed that denial as an "other" does not destroy Absolutism a suggestion should have been previously made that difference is the truth of the matter. Difference between Brahman and Jiva between Infinite and the finite should have been previously apprehended

by means of *Pramanas*, if it is to be denied to maintain Monistic Absolutism or Absolutistic Monism or simply Monism or Absolutism. Such a previous apprehension becomes impossible. X is said to be different from Y, when both of them are objects of perception. Difference between them may be inferred after the first sense-experience. If difference between the Finite and Infinite is to be affirmed or apprehended, the apprehension will also involve an apprehension of Brahman or the Infinite. Otherwise what is the meaning of the affirmation of difference? Difference may be between any two. That is not relevant to the present discussion. It should be only difference between the Infinite and the finite. As one of the entities gripped by this difference happens to be Brahman which is inaccessible to sense-organs, and hence to inference as well, difference itself should remain unapprehended. Unless Brahman is apprehended difference between Brahman and Jiva could not be. Unless such difference is first apprehended as an alternative or a suggestion it could not be denied or negated. The view maintained by the Absolutist that identity between the finite and the Infinite is the import of the Sacred texts and that the identity is different from the Absolute and understood as a negation or negative in form, (absence of difference between Brahman and Jiva,) is totally erroneous as the form of identity as negation of difference cannot stand even a moment's scrutiny. There is not even the slightest hint that difference between Finite and the Infinite has been the suggestion or subject of debate. When there is no such suggestion, its refutation is entirely irrelevant and uncalled for. It is easy to understand by means of perception that X, Y & Z are different from one another. This will not do. X should be understood as different from the Infinite—Brahman. Brahman is not accessible to sense-awareness—Nor to Inference. Difference is to be first suggested *qua* predicative of Brahman. Difference will then be predicated of Brahman. in respect of Jiva or the Finite, as a suggestion surely. Brahman will then be "Dharmi," and Jiva, "Pratyogi." (39). Or difference may be suggested predicative of "Jiva", in respect of Brahman. "Jiva" would then be technically known as "Dharmi" and Brahman as "Pratiyogi." Madhva maintains that there could not be any suggestion of difference between Brahman and the Finite, and its refutation, therefore, is unthinkable. The *Pramanas*—*Pratyaksha* and *Anumana*—are unfit to grasp the nature of Brahman. How then can they grasp a difference in which Brahman is involved?

The Absolutist once more argues that difference is suggested by sacred texts between Brahman and Jiva, and this suggested difference is negated and denied in some other passages. For instance, the difference suggested by passages like "*Dvasuparnau*", etc., is negated by passages like "*Nehanana*", etc. Madhva emphatically replies that playing one set of Upanishadic

passages against another is not playing the game of philosophy squarely at all. It is always open for one to argue that the identity suggested by the latter type of passages is negated and denied by the former! So greater indeed will be the chances of success in proving a thesis if the import of the Sruti is taken along with the verdict of the other Pramanas as well. Then such a co-operative verdict would be unassailable.

The Absolutists also urge that passages like "Dvasuparnau" etc., which proclaim difference between the Infinite and the Finite *merely repeat the difference already observed in life*. Such repetitive passages are not strong enough to invalidate non-repetitive passages which proclaim the new truth of identity between the two. Madhva readily replies that an idea can be said to be repeated only if it is already known. The same is the case with difference between Brahman and Jiva. The difference cannot be known by other Pramanas as Brahman is inaccessible to them. As the difference is *not* already known, *it cannot be repeated* subsequently. (it is absurd to say that passages like "Dvasuparnau" are Anuvadaka--i.e., repetitive).

The point is this. The central contention of the Absolutist is that the fundamental import of the sacred texts is identity between the Infinite and the Finite. Difference is denied, negated and repudiated by the texts in question. Madhva argued that the nature of the identity should be made clear first and its status defined. Is it of the form essential of Brahman, same as Brahman, identical with Brahman? Madhva pointed out a number of serious difficulties in maintaining the identity itself to be identical with Brahman. Its nature can be nothing positive. It has to be negative. If it were positive, Monism will disappear. Madhva argues that difference can be denied or negated only if it had been suggested to exist by an independent Pramana. There could not be any such suggestion, for the best of all possible reasons that Brahman is inaccessible to the Pramanas of perception and Inference, and it is in respect of it that difference is to be affirmed as a suggestion.

The venue of the discussion should, therefore, be transferred to Sruti or the sacred texts which are valid in their own right and which constitute the means of correct and valid knowledge and the guarantee thereof, as far as Brahman is concerned and Madhva maintains that the Sruti texts proclaim *only difference* between the Finite and the Infinite. If passages like "Tattwamasi" mean identity between Brahman and Jiva, and if this identity is absence of difference or negation of difference, difference should have been previously suggested. Otherwise, denying it will be absurd. Difference from Jiva should have been suggested as predicative of Brahman. And difference from Brahman should have been suggested as predicative of Jiva. Neither had been done or could be done, because Brahman which enters into the relation of

difference is inaccessible to sense-awareness and inference. If difference is thus not suggested at all it could not be negated and denied.

The discussion then, should be focussed on the sacred texts, and the contention of the Absolutist that passages proclaiming difference between Finite and the Infinite are repetitive falls to the ground as difference is not at all apprehended first to be subsequently repeated. The Supreme authority, namely the Sruti proclaims difference between the Infinite and the Finite, in passages like "Dva-suparnau" and this difference apprehended at the time of the study of the texts which is obligatory on all aspirants is seen to be grounded deeply and firmly when an aspirant realises that finite individuals however powerful and wise are ridiculously limited in their outlook, endeavour and achievement and the Infinite is not so limited. This realisation is deepened by means of the other Pramanas, sense-perception and Inference. The doctrine of difference between Brahman and Jiva has the support of *all the Pramanas*, of which Indian Philosophical tradition assigns the first and foremost place to the sacred texts. Whereas, the doctrine of identity between the two has *not* the support of sense-perception. Only some few texts are cited in favour of it, and they are capable of a different interpretation which has no reference to identity at all between the Infinite and the Finite. Let it be assumed for the sake of argument that both the doctrines of Identity between Brahman and Jiva, and of difference between the two have the sanction of the sacred texts. The fact cannot be lightly brushed aside that of these, the doctrine of Difference, has the support of *all the Pramanas*, means and guarantors of valid knowledge that matter, while that of Identity has the support only of the sacred texts, which are quite capable of different interpretation, natural and unstrained and in the strictest accord with the canons of interpretation and the rules and requirements of Grammar and Logic. It has absolutely no reference to that identity whatever. That would mean the doctrine of identity cannot be built upon sense-awareness. Nor on Inference. It may be on the sacred texts. But they are capable of an interpretation which has nothing to do with identity. *Pro tanto* the doctrine of identity has been shown to be weak. On the other hand, it has *not* been shown that the passages which proclaim difference between the Finite and the Infinite are capable of a different interpretation, without any violence being done to texts, truths and traditions. Unless texts are tortured, difference between Brahman and Jiva cannot be shown to be devoid of sanction of the sacred texts. It is no argument to retort that the texts merely repeat the difference which is quite apparent in life, and which is accessible to sense-awareness and then negate it. What is the motive of the repetition? Why should the sacred text which is admitted by the parties to the controversy to be incapable of being traced to any known authorship and which is on that

supreme ground believed to be free from all futilities, foibles and fallacies, be so particular about repeating a doctrine and then denying it? There are, thus, two very significant reasons why the doctrine of identity cannot be the truth of texts. In the first place, it has *not* the support of all the *Pramanas*. Secondly, the texts which are claimed to proclaim Identity are capable of an interpretation that has nothing whatever to do with Identity. There is yet a third argument mentioned by Madhva. A *Sruti* text itself openly repudiates the doctrine that the central and fundamental import of the sacred texts is Identity. The text is from the "Mahopanishad." Madhva winds up the first section of the present work—*VISHNU-TATVA-VINIRNAYA*—with a doctrinal summing up. (40) Thus in the light of the arguments advanced in the foregoing pages, the Supreme Overlord of the Universe—*VISHNU*—is to be known as different from the entire sentient and non-sentient creation, and as the Most Supreme Being, from a study of the sacred texts which are free from even the faintest touch of fallacy foible and futility which are the characteristics of finite creation. Such correct and valid knowledge about the nature of the Supreme Being is an indispensable prolegomena to moral and metaphysical endeavour and effort. It is a truism that no effort will be put forth unless it is made sure that the goal aimed at is the most precious one—a goal the attainment of which means, not a momentary hedonistic joy, but everlasting and unalloyed bliss.

### THE SECOND PARICCHEDA

It may be recalled that in the opening benedictory stanza of the work "*Vishnu-tatva-vinirnaya*," Madhva, in conformity with the traditions of authors of Indian Classics on Philosophy, in suggestive terms, had indicated the general scope of the work. The first section of the work was devoted to an elaborate exposition of the doctrine indicated by the first epithet applied to the Supreme Deity—*Sri Narayana*—namely "*sadagamaika vijnyeyam*." The epithet means that *Sri Narayana* is to be known only through the sacred texts free from fallacies etc. *Sri Narayana* is the Supremest truth revealed and proclaimed by the sacred texts. This doctrine which is of cardinal importance in Madhva's system of Pluralistic Theism, (or Dualism or Dualistic and Realistic Theism, or Theistic Realism. There may be any number of combinations provided one makes sure about the connotation of the terms used in the said combinations) or Realistic Theism, was established in the first section of the work and in the course of the evolution of the doctrine, and its exposition, doctrines of Absolutism (Absolutistic Monism, Monistic Absolutism or Idealism),

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(40) "*Atassarvagamaireva - Sarvasmat - bhinnatvena - sarvasmat - visish-tatvenacha - Vijnyeyo - bhagavannarayana - iti - siddham*". "*Tatvinirnaya*." P 275.

of the Advaita—Vedanta—in short were refuted and repudiated according to the exigencies of the context and the trend of the controversy. The work is essentially controversial, and as is usual in such cases, Madhva developed his doctrines through the instrumentality of criticism of the doctrines of Absolutism and a constructive statement of his own.

The second epithet used in the opening benedictory stanza is "Samateeta-ksharaksharam". Sri Narayana, the Supreme Deity is incomparably above "kshara" and "a-kshara". The second section (pariccheda) of the work is devoted to demonstrating the supremacy of VISHNU and His undoubted superiority over "kshara" and "a-kshara". Madhva's commentator says that the second section of the work is commenced by the author to establish in greater detail citing authoritative Sruti and Smriti texts the said supremacy. Madhva commences the second section by quoting some verses from the "Parama-Sruti". The substance of the verses can be stated in the following terms. Brahma, the Deity to whom the function of creation is delegated, Siva who by direction performs the function of final destruction of the cosmos (of course to be created once again cyclically) and other Gods are to be designated by the term "Kshara". They are so known because, their bodies even as those of others, have to be abandoned. Sri Mahalakshmi, the Consort of Vishnu is known as "A-kshara". Her body (deha) is eternal and imperishable. Sri Narayana is far superior to "Kshara" and "A-kshara".

In independence, in ability, in knowledge, in bliss and in infinite number of infinite attributes, Vishnu is Supreme and His Supremacy is incomparable and unparalleled. The attributes of the Lord are limitless, boundless (Nisseema). On the other hand, other Gods have only limited attributes. It is a principle of Universal validity that anything which is limited will be under the sway of the unlimited and Illimitable.

The following eight determinations, on the basis of which "Kshara" is marked off from "A-kshara" are brought about and controlled by Sri Narayana. They are—birth, continuance of Life for some time, death, bondage by concepts like virtue and vice, knowledge, obscuration of the self by Avidya and subtle bondage and imprisonment in a subtle body known as the "linga sarira", and final liberation from the cycle of births and death of those pious souls that deserve it and that have become eligible for it by consistent pursuit of spiritual life, and moral conduct, and who have earned the Grace of the Lord.

In respect of "A-kshara", the Lord—Vishnu—controls the following—manifestation, immortality, subordination only to the Lord, correct, infallible and intuitive apprehension of the nature of all in the cosmos, except of course the Supreme Lord and eternal and unalloyed Bliss.



In respect of both "Kshara" and "A-kshara" it is the Supreme Lord Narayana who animates, actuates and moves the two, viz. the entire cosmos and all it stands for, created, uncreated. It is the Supreme Lord who inspires activity in active beings, and who makes things what they are. Things and objects are what they are because, the Lord wills that they should be so. In all system of philosophy in which Theology is assigned a proper and significant place, inquiry must stop there. The question why the Supreme Lord, should will water to be a combination of H—2 and O—1 is irrelevant as the finite intellect cannot get any glimpse into the working of the mind of the Infinite.

On the other hand, the Supreme Lord Narayana, Vishnu is the Uncaused cause of all, and Uncreated Creator of all. He is the substance which for its existence is not in need of the existence of anything else. It is plain then that Sri Vishnu is the Substance which is self-explanatory. There is no other agency or power which creates this Supreme Power. In all systems of thought, the highest Substance cannot itself be at the mercy of something else. If it were, it would cease to be the Highest. The Upanishadic texts emphasize that the Supreme Lord Narayana is simply unapproached and unapproachable in Eminence, Majesty and Greatness.

In some texts like the Saiva Agamas and Puranas etc. it is sometimes said Brahman or Siva can be considered as the Supreme Lord of the Universe. In reply to that contention Madhva cites a text from the Skanda Purana which explicitly states that Vishnu —Sri Narayana— is the most Supreme. Brahma, Seshha, Garuda, Siva, Indra, Surya, Guha and others are all known as "Kshara" and Sri Mahalakshmi is the only one who is known as "A-kshara". Sri Narayana is above "Kshara" and A-kshara". One may speak of reason, ratiocination, argumentation, satisfaction of the fastidious conscience of the scientific critic, and yet belief enters as a vital element in the religion and philosophy of every individual. Madhva next proceeds to cite a Sruti according to which Sri Mahalakshmi herself admits that Vishnu is her Lord and His Majesty and Greatness cannot be fathomed by any. The Sruti texts cited demonstrate that Sri Narayana is above "Kshara" and "A-kshara". (41)

In another Sruti passage it is said that there is nothing other than Brahman. The passage in question establishes the unreality of the Universe. In reply to the contention, Madhva explains that the statement in Sruti means only that there is nothing superior to Vishnu. It does not mean that there is no other reality. In the subsequent text it is observed that "this" is pervaded by Him. The pervasion must be meaningless if there is no reality other than Brahman. Secondly

Brahman is said to be above the finite world. If the latter were unreal and illusory, the supremacy of Brahman will be seriously compromised. It requires no very elaborate demonstration to convince impartial minds that supremacy of X can be asserted over Y when the latter is as real as the former, and then only has Supremacy any meaning. Supremacy over nothingness or illusion is hardly supremacy.

It is further contended that in some other Sruti texts Brahma, Siva, and other gods are spoken of as Supreme. Supremacy cannot be shared or divided. If Siva and Brahma are supreme, then Vishnu cannot be. It is pointless to maintain that in some places, and in some periods or epochs Brahma is supreme, Siva in some others, and Vishnu in yet others! It is suicidal for Madhva's theology to admit such a contention. (42).

Madhva quotes another Sruti Text in support of his view that it is Vishnu who is Supreme and not the other gods. The Sruti text proclaims that the names of other Gods and deities apply to the Supreme Vishnu. Without Vishnu's animating Grace, the other gods cannot even draw breath or move about. Other reasons are clear to discerning minds. Vishnu is the only One whom the Sruti declares to be free from all evil, imperfection, free from even the slightest taint of them. Vishnu is the only God who exists even at the time of (Pralaya) cosmic destruction. Other Gods and Deities go to sleep at the time of Pralaya—but Vishnu does not. He keeps vigil as it were, and brings the cosmos into existence once again. Other Gods are not spoken as Supreme and maintaining their Supremacy intact all along and eternally, and only Vishnu is spoken of in glowing terms. In some Sruti texts, no doubt, Brahma, Siva or some other deity may have been spoken of as Supreme. It is obvious that cosmic supremacy cannot be shared or divided, held and enjoyed as a joint-stock concern. An apparent incompatibility in the Sruti texts also should be removed. The following is the only possible solution. Other deities are declared to be affected by anger, lust, or similar evil. Vishnu is the only one unaffected by evil taint of any kind or description. The Sruti further declares that the names of all other Gods are applicable to Vishnu when the thought is uppermost that unanimated by Vishnu's Grace other Gods cannot move an inch. On the other hand, other Gods, are never spoken of as free from all evil taints. Nor is it anywhere declared in the Sruti that the names of other gods are applicable to any one of them as the Supremest. In all Vedas Vishnu is declared to be the Supremest. He is free from even the slightest taint of evil. He is declared to exist even when all else is destroyed by Pralaya. The names of all other gods are applicable to Vishnu as He is the Supremest who animates and

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(42) Appayya Dikshita maintained the supremacy of Siva in his "Siva-tatva-viveka." Vijayindra Tirtha refuted the said work in his "Para-tatva-Prakasa" and established the pre-eminence of Vishnu.

actualates them. On the other hand there are no sacred texts that proclaim the Supremacy of other gods. Though in some contexts one God here and another there may have been spoken of as Supreme, it is *nowhere* said that any one of them *existed even, before all creation and that even after Pralaya*, he would exist and supervise and direct a subsequent creation. Other gods are definitely declared *not to have existed* in the beginning of the cosmos. In the dim dawn of creation, Brahma, Siva and other gods simply did not exist. Other gods are not described to be free from even the slightest taint of evil. Towards the conclusion of this section (pariccheda) Madhva cites another Sruti Text which means that other gods derive their office, function, even their divine bodies, from Sri Narayana, and therefore He alone is the Supremest.

The consolidated general import of the passages from 'he Sruti cited by Madhva is Mono-Theism. Vishnu, Sri Narayana is the Supremest Deity. Other gods are recognised and spoken of. They have different functions and their jurisdictions extend over different spheres. But they are all subordinate to Sri Narayana whose commands they carry out to the best of their lights. There is no inherent inconsistency or impossibility in maintaining a Monotheism in Madhva's Theology. A Deity may be powerful enough to subdue another. Deities may have their own quarrels and they may shake hands after the quarrels are over and so forth. Theological works are full of such instances. They may fire the imagination of the masses. Madhva maintains however that the recognition of the other gods and minor deities should be always accompanied by the realisation that they are under the sway and control of the Supreme Lord—Sri Vishnu—who is the Supreme Controller of all Gods and men. The conclusion though Theological is correlated with a fundamental Metaphysical question. In the opening apophthegm of Sri Vyasa, the elusive term "Brahma" is used. Madhva correlates his Theological doctrine with the philosophical emphasizing that Sri Vishnu, Sri Narayana or the Supreme Overlord of the Universe, is Brahman that is to be investigated in the light of the scriptural injunction. "Tad-Vijignyasasva" etc. (Inquire into the nature of that. Or investigate that and so on.)

It will be obvious to thinking minds that beyond a certain stage, mere argumentation or ratiocination cannot yield any valuable results not merely, but will lead, if employed only to mischievous consequences. No philosopher can maintain mainly on the basis of inferential process or argumentation that there exists a Supreme Lord and so on. Reasoning can as well be employed to prove that there is no God. That is why Indian philosophers have agreed to admit whatever their other differences, that the nature of the Infinite is to be revealed and made known *only* through scriptural texts the validity of which is postulated. Harmonisation of the texts is the work of reason. Even here, there are definite canons of

interpretation according to which harmonisation should be effected. It cannot be a free-lance harmonisation of a weakling or philosophic lotus-eater who runs away from all discussions and fights. It should be the harmonisation of a robust fighter who knows when to demand and when to surrender his rights. Madhva has harmonised the texts accordingly and indicated a Mono-Theism with Vishnu or Sri Narayana as the Summum Genus—the Supreme Overlord of the Cosmos (visvapati jagatpati and so on). It may not perhaps be the occasion to discuss the relative superiority over one another of Madhva's Monotheism and the Absolutism of Sankara and others. The sententious dogmatism that if the game of philosophising is squarely played, Absolutism will be the only goal consistent with the requirements of logic can always be confronted with a like dogmatism that the goal will and may as logically be Monotheism, as the absence of a charter proclaiming that Absolutism is the only fashionable philosophy of life should indeed be obvious to all. Western minds may ignore all reference to apocryphal texts. But traditional Indian philosophy postulates the validity of Scripture. There are texts which proclaim the existence of an Absolute which is free from all determinations. It is attributeless. It is inaccessible to finite minds. It cannot be squeezed into the conceptual moulds and strait-jackets. It is the only reality. All else is appearance. There are also other passages which proclaim that Brahman is the Supreme Reality. It is full of infinite number of Infinite attributes which are all Excellent. There is not the slightest taint of evil in them and so on.

When confronted with those two types of passages, an eager inquirer will feel there is need for harmonisation. Madhva's contention is that in the task of harmonisation, and in the determination of the relative strength of the passages, the logical procedure should be to view that passages which have the corroborative support of other Pramanas, (the means and the guarantors of valid knowledge) are stronger than those that have no such support. It is easy to anticipate a perverted argument to the effect that the existence of such additional support is itself a weakness, because, the other pramanas are misleading and yield knowledge which is mostly untrustworthy. Do not trust the senses. If senses are misleading, then inference which is based on previous perception cannot but be misleading. Additional support so-called is in reality no support, at all.

Madhva's answer to such a line of argument is that the *onus probandi* in the condemnation of the other Pramanas rests on the Absolutist. Senses mislead when there are abnormal factors at work. In the absence of abnormality, senses are quite reliable and they are designed to yield knowledge of external reality as it is. The modern Psychology of illusions will support the view of Madhva.

It is a contention devoid of all point that a theory valid in Psychology cannot be imported into metaphysics. If metaphysics is to declare independence of all other sciences, independence of that type is suicidal. There is no reason why a doctrine or a theory that has validity in psychology should not be pressed into service in metaphysics. Barring those stray instances in which illusions arise either on account of the existence of some defect in the sensory apparatus or on account of the normal rapprochement between a sense-organ and its object, being disturbed or rendered nugatory and ineffective by means of distance, distortion or obscurization, in all other cases, sense-perception of normal beings yields knowledge of reality as it is. Any abnormality noticed anywhere is easily explicable by reference to some factor or factors that can be isolated from the general matrix and exposed to the gaze of the subject, and occasional abnormality is no condemnation of the sensory process *in toto* or *per se*. Madhva is quite right, therefore, in maintaining that texts the import of which finds corroboration in sense-knowledge and inference are more powerful than those that have no such corroborative testimony. The latter should be made to surrender their surface Interpretation and reinterpreted in the light of the former. If that is done, Monotheism will be seen to be the *only* philosophy that has the support of *all* the Pramanas. Vishnu is thus the Supremest Deity. Passages which proclaim the Supremacy of the Lord Vishnu have got the corroborative support of the other pramanas and those that speak of the attributeless Absolute should be made to surrender their surface interpretation. As pointed out elsewhere, (43) if Brahman is described as "indescribable", "attributeless" and so on in some texts, they should be interpreted in the proper manner. The correct interpretation will be that Brahman is endowed with all the Excellent Attributes, man can imagine and even those that he cannot. Epithets denying attributes of Brahman indicate that the Supreme is free from even the slightest taint of attributes bad, evil, and immoral. Attributelessness does not mean absence of all attributes including those that are excellent and that are absolutely essential to maintain intact Omniscience, Omnipotence etc. of Brahman.

Madhva's Mono-theism, be it remembered, accommodates polytheism as well. There are many gods admitted. Not for the mere fun of multiplying gods, but because, Scriptural as well as non-scriptural texts proclaim the existence of a hierarchy of Gods. Polytheism is something like a republic of Gods. One God exercises supreme away over others and over the cosmos. If according to some system-builders, all cosmic phenomena "the starry heavens above, and the moral law within" are to be viewed as "appearance"—an appearance not having any status better than that of mirage, on the basis of some texts,—than there is nothing uncritical

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(43) See "Nyayamrita" Nirgunatva-Bhanga, P. 489.

if another system assumes, on the basis of other texts, that there are several Gods guiding and superintending various cosmic matters, and that there is a Supreme Being who is above all the Gods. That is the substance of Madhva's Mono-Theism. Other Gods derive their status, office, function and cosmic control indicative of a division of labour, from the Supreme Being—Vishnu. The latter is not under the control of anybody else. Vishnu is thus the Uncaused Cause of the Cosmos. He is the Uncontrolled Controller of the material and Spiritual Universe. He is the Undirected Director of Evolution of life and matter in all their ramifications and manifestations. He is "sarvottama", "sarvakarta" and so on. He is as Madhva strikingly puts, above "Kshara" and "A-kshara." If "Kshara" includes Gods, *a fortiori*, Vishnu's overlordship of life, and matter is established. With the statement that Vishnu is superior to "A-kshara" Sri Mahalakshmi—his Supremacy is rendered absolutely secure and unassailable. That Vishnu's Supremacy has been based on Theological grounds and Apocryphal texts is not a valid objection at all. To such of the critical minds as see red when mention is made of any scriptural, apocryphal or theological texts, Madhva's answer is that the Supremacy of Vishnu is established by an inferential argument that the multifaceted universe should have an intelligent first Cause or Creator. In fact, that has always been the argument urged by the Vedantins, whether they be Monists or Pluralists against the Buddhists who make short shrift of an Intelligent First Cause in the adumbration of their doctrine of "Pratitya Samutpada." According to traditional methods of philosophy which require that scriptural texts be made foundational of an important doctrine like that of God, Madhva has cited the texts (just with a view to conforming to traditions.) Those however, who believed that independence of their judgment is compromised by admission of the validity of sacred texts, have been supplied with rational arguments indicated by the author of the Sutras himself. (44). Indian tradition will surely and rightly refuse to recognise anything *infra dig* philosophically in Madhva's explanation and demonstration of the Supremacy of Vishnu by referring to texts. The conclusion of the "second Pariccheda" of "Vishnu Tatva Nirnaya" is thus established by Madhva on safe foundation, that Sri Narayana—Vishnu—is above "Kshara" and "A-kshara."

### THIRD PARICCHEDA

The third epithet used in the opening benedictory stanza is "Nirdosha-asesha-sadgunam." That Brahman is free from even the slightest taint of Evil, and that He is of the essence of all that is good, are the cardinal features sought to be emphasized by the epithet. It should be plain that the body of the Lord cannot be one of flesh and blood as in the case of mortals. Nor

could it be of the nature of the bodies of gods referred to in the earlier section. The Body of the Lord should be understood to be unique. Pure unalloyed and Unadulterated Bliss, Happiness, and Joy and similar attributes constitute the body of the Lord.

Madhva cites a passage from the Brahmanda Purana the substances of which can thus be stated. The passage in question is in the form of a dialogue between Narada and Brahma. Narada feels worried by a doubt. If Vishnu is really free from even the faintest taint of evil, how was it possible for Him to reincarnate Himself among the human beings? In human births, He should have been subjected to all human cares, anxieties, disappointments and delusions. How can the Majesty, Greatness and the Supremacy of Vishnu be reconciled with His birth among the Sin-and-Evil ridden humans? That was a serious doubt which Narada had long been entertaining and he begged Brahma, his father to rid him of the doubt.

Brahma replied that the so-called doubt was all due to a pure misconception, with the riddance of which, the doubt itself would vanish. It is absurd to imagine that there can be any body into which the Supreme Being is squeezed at the time of a particular birth, as ordinary finite selves are. There is no protoplasmic birth at all for the Supreme Vishnu. There is absolutely no union of specks of Ovum and Spermatozoon in the re-incarnations and Avatars of Vishnu which are usually supposed to be births by unthinking and thoughtless folk. On the other hand, the correct view is to regard the births of Vishnu as manifestations for the sake of protecting the weak and for the purpose of punishing the wicked and tyrannical. Such manifestations do not interfere with the Majesty and the Supremacy of the Lord.

But while leading lives of Human beings Vishnu has no doubt behaved and acted as if He were influenced by human values, emotions, and considerations. The mythological stories and the Epics are full of such instances. How are they to be satisfactorily accounted for? The only rational answer is in the words of Brahma, that such seeming responses of the Almighty Lord to human stimuli and adjustments to human situations should be considered to have a motive behind. The motive is to test the sincerity of true devotees. True devotees are those who have the firmest faith in the Greatness and Supremacy of the Lord Vishnu and who do not waver even for a moment and even in the face of gravest disappointments, and even when they are confronted with countless instances of apparent triumph of vice and injustice over virtue and justice. Such an unwavering and constant devotion will enable true devotees to see that the so-called births of the Lord Vishnu are merely manifestations and not births with implications of intra-uterine existence and suffering. There will be no difficulty for the true and the unwavering devotees of the Lord in

realising that when the Lord manifests Himself when it suits His inscrutable will and Purpose during exceptional crisis in the affairs and destinies of the world to maintain as it were cosmic equipoise, such manifestations do not involve any uterine existence and embryonic evolution of the Lord! They are out of His own Free Will and are intended to save erring humanity, to save erring devotees and aspirants groping in spiritual darkness.

Instances, however, are not wanting of the Lord having incarnated Himself among the members of the human race for the fulfilment of His inscrutable purposes or for mere play as some texts maintain, and in fact a proper understanding of the significance of such avatars marks off the devoted from the undevoted, marks off those that "pray" from those that "scoff." True and unwavering devotees of the Lord will understand that incarnations of the Lord do not mean any embryological evolution. Mythological works and Epics are full of examples of behaviour of the incarnations which are human. Human values and estimates have swayed them. A real and unwavering devotee will understand that the Lord only acts this or that part on the cosmic stage, and human values and estimates do not touch Him.

Scoffers, on the other hand, will maintain that Incarnations of the Lord are no better than human beings in their behaviour. The Lord, be it remembered, purposely enters into such incarnations to baffle the enemies of gods—the Asuras. If any should contend that the Lord suffers, sees and scans affairs as do the human beings, they misunderstand the nature of the Lord and the misunderstanding would determine atheistic conduct and endeavour. They develop into scoffers, sceptics and sanctimonious charlatans who make God in their own image! They should be given a long rope. They take as it were, their own long rope. The Deity cannot be accused of any partiality or bias. Each individual works out his or her own destiny. If some were to choose or actually choose the Satanic motto "Evil, be Thou my God" and translate that into practical concerns of life, the Deity should not be accused. They may consider incarnations of the Deity as quite human and imagine that human values, emotions and judgments affect the Deity. They should be quite prepared to take the consequences of such an estimate of the Deity.

There would be others who will surely realise that under no circumstances and in no incarnations is the Deity affected by human values, estimates and judgments. For such constant devotion they get their reward. Madhva maintains that the Lord Sri Narayana is free from even the slightest taint of evil and imperfection. It was also pointed out that such freedom is quite consistent with incarnations of the Lord among specially blessed and favoured families of the human race. A Passage from the Brahmanda Purana makes this quite clear and a summary of its import was given in the previous paragraphs.



Freedom from even the faintest and slightest taint of Evil and imperfection is at best only negative. Demands of clear philosophical thinking require that a positive account (however meagre and inadequate *qua* attempt of the Finite to understand the Infinite), of the attributes of the Deity, should be given.

To put it in positive terms Sri Vishnu—Lord Narayana—is endowed with infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes some of which may be vaguely apprehended and understood by blessed souls, while most of them are and must for ever remain inaccessible to Finite human Intellect.

On a view like this, it becomes obligatory to investigate the precise metaphysical relation between His attributes and the Lord. Madhva's commentator mentions four different opinions held by different schools. (1) In the first place there are the uncompromising Absolutists, whole-hoggers, who maintain that Brahman or the Absolute is attributeless—"Nirguna." Assigning attributes is determination. All determination is negation. The Absolute is above all determination. That is the position of Mayavadins. (2) The Tarkikas—Nyayavaisheshikas—on the contrary hold that Brahman is not attributeless, but endowed with excellent attributes. They maintain that there is difference between Brahman and His Attributes, and difference likewise among various attributes themselves. (3) Yet others incline to the view that the attributes are different from and yet identical with Brahman. (Bheda-abheda). When pressed for clear statement the champions of this school would state that identity and difference are two aspects in which the attributes are related to Brahman. (4) In the opinion of the fourth school, every one of the Divine attributes like Ananda (bliss), Jnyana (knowledge) etc., is of two types, kinds or varieties. One is of the nature of Brahman. There is Ananda or Bliss which is enjoyed by Brahman. That is of the fundamental nature of Brahman. It is identical with Brahman. There is another type of Ananda (Bliss) which is enjoyed by the finite creation. While the former is identical with the Absolute, the latter is different from it.

Madhva maintains that his own view is different from and critical of the four schools mentioned above. In support he cites a text. Guna (attribute), Kriya (action and activity) and similar determinations of Brahman are of the essential, foundational and fundamental nature of Brahman. They are inseparable from the nature of Brahman. They are identical with Brahman. In virtue of this identity, the attributes are identical with one another or devoid of all difference. That is as it should be. Y & Z as attributes of Brahman—X, are identical with X—Brahman. Y & Z in view of their identity with X, are also identical with one another. Y an attribute is not different from another attribute Z.

For they are both identical with Brahman—X. If so it is obligatory for Madhva to answer how it is possible to maintain this identity along with conceptual and verbal description of difference of attributes found in text and tradition as well as experience.

Madhva answers the question in reference to the doctrine of "Visesha" which is a characteristic speciality of the system of Madhva. By the term "Visesha" Madhva understands the peculiar and characteristic, inalienable power or potency in objects which makes description and talk of difference possible, where as a matter of fact only identity exists. When identity or absence of difference is the truth of the matter, there is yet, talk of difference which persists in experience and in language. This peculiar power or the potency which renders possible affirmation or description of difference, where in fact nought but identity reigns supreme, is technically known as "Visesha." It renders possible the maintenance of identity between Brahman and its Attributes, identity again between any two of the Infinite number of Infinite Attributes, and a descriptive affirmation of difference between a Substance and Attributes. Take the essential and fundamental nature of anything. It is technically termed "Sva-rupa." Metaphysical or intellectual analysis will reveal that language has a device by means of which it can speak of (say), the quality of being the essential and fundamental nature. We often employ that linguistic device. The termination "tva" in Sanskrit indicates that quality. It will easily be noticed that there is absolutely no difference between the essential and fundamental nature and the quality of being the said nature. Every object (every category, every value, every concept) in the world has its own essential and fundamental nature, and the quality of being that fundamental nature, therefore, is not different from the nature itself. The Radical Pluralism of Madhva necessitates the doctrine that the essential and fundamental nature of X—is not the same as that of Y. That of the latter is not the same as that of Z and so on. Madhva will not stand on any punctilio as to a cut and dry determination of the exact and fundamental nature or essence of anything. Pragmatic determination, notwithstanding protests, is the safest and soundest one. There is an undoubted element of fixity and stability in the fundamental nature of the cosmos and the object of the cosmos. The Behaviour of human beings under certain characteristic situations continues to be the same, and it will continue to be the same judging from the past and the present which would supply the scaffolding for the future. The essential or the fundamental nature of anything, therefore is to be regarded as identical with the thing itself. The essential nature is that which makes an object what it is, and determines its evaluation in a given manner by a subject whose behaviour and conduct are markedly influenced by such evaluation and judgments. It is identical with the object itself. And yet it is spoken of as being the essence of a given X, and such linguistic expressions throw out the suggestion that objects and their essential

natures may be different. But no. There is "Visesha" which will step in and account for the fundamental identity between the essential nature of anything and the thing itself, which is perfectly compatible with linguistic expressions indicating difference between the two.

Every fundamental and essential nature—"svarupa"—is unique. The quality of being a fundamental and essential nature is identical with that nature itself. Yet, difference is spoken of as discernible in language-communication. Talk of difference is rendered possible by the operation of VISESHA in all objects. The attribute of being essential nature or characteristic of something, if different from the said nature, should be capable of being described as coming under any one of the well-known categories of Nyaya-Vaiseshika. It cannot be Dravya or substance. For it inheres in the form of Guna—attribute as well. It cannot be Guna—for it inheres in the form of Karma. It cannot be Karma—activity. For it inheres in the form of Samanya, the concept of the Universal or General. It cannot be Samanya either. For it inheres in the form of Visesha—the particularity or pluralising agency. If, therefore, the quality of being an essential and fundamental nature is to be viewed as separate from the nature itself, it will have to be subsumed under some one of the known categories. Such a subsumption being impossible, Madhva is quite justified in maintaining that the quality is identical with the nature itself. Even at the risk of some repetition, it is worth while to emphasize this aspect of the discussion, because the Radical Pluralism of Madhva is best in evidence in this doctrine. "Ghata" or a jar has its own fundamental and essential nature. "Pata" or a piece of cloth has its own. So have countless other objects. The cheap comment that the multiplicity of objects reveals unity can be easily answered. Let one speculatively or metaphysically regress to the origin of the cosmos, or to the origin of existence itself. "Prakriti" persists there, with all her manifestations withdrawn into herself and condensed into potentiality kept in reserve for the next creation. "Purusha" persists. Purusha or spirit has a "svarupa" fundamental essence or essential nature of its own. "Prakriti" has her own essential nature. They are irreducible to one another. The essential and fundamental nature of the one is not that of the other. Try to generalise from this position. There is the nature of "Prakriti"—essential, fundamental, inalienable and unridable. There is again the nature of "Purusha", essential, fundamental, inalienable and unridable. The nature (fundamental and essential) of "Purusha" cannot be the same as that of "Prakriti". Differ they must from one another and as a matter of fact they do in accordance with the demonstration urged by "Sankhya." It will not be sound philosophy to contend that the essential and fundamental nature of all objects is the same. When it is seen that the essential and fundamental

nature is what makes an object enjoy a particular status in a scheme of things and makes it object of value-judgments, it cannot be different from the object itself. Madhva maintains that the fundamental and essential natures—the “Svarupa” of objects cannot but be identical with those objects.

In the magnificent multiplicity of cosmos, each object has its own “Svarupa”—essential and fundamental nature, which is identical with the said object. Each physical object entity, unit or whatever the name has its own essential and fundamental nature—“Svarupa”—and the said “Svarupa” is identical with the object. The same is the case in the realm of spiritual values. Validity-and-invalidity judgments are passed on pieces of knowledge or lines of reasoning. Moral and Immoral are the judgment-values that govern facts of the science of Ethics. Judgments of Beautiful and Ugly govern the data of Aesthetics. Every such judgment, every such value has an essential and fundamental nature of its own. It is identical with itself.

But then, if X has its own essential and fundamental nature, its own, and Z its own, is there not a prominent common characteristic shared by all the essential and fundamental natures—“svarupas”—of different objects of the physical and the non-physical world? No. The common characteristic, if any, would be just this—characteristic feature, attribute or quality of being essential and fundamental nature of something. This characteristic is nothing different from the essential and fundamental nature itself. It is identical with the “Svarupa”—the essential and fundamental nature. Countless being the objects their essential natures must be countless too. Madhva's thesis is a radical pluralism of essences.

Perhaps western minds may feel irritated and puzzled as to why Madhva should have been so anxious to maintain an identity between the essential and the fundamental nature—“svarupa”—and the quality of being essential and fundamental nature—svarupatva. The metaphysical motive is quite transparent. It is the maintenance intact of Radical Pluralism. When Madhva denies the existence of a separate attribute of being essential and fundamental nature—“svarupatva”—he would not allow any class-concept. There are hundred tables. Each has its fundamental and essential form. Can not the common characteristics possessed by the century of tables be mentally consolidated into a class-concept? Even so, tables have their own essential and fundamental nature. Chairs have their own. Wood out of which chairs and tables are made has its own. Fire which burns the wood has its own. Matter has its own. Spirit has its own. Why not have a class-concept which may be the result of mental consolidation of the characteristics common to all the essential and fundamental natures—“svarupas”—of the

countless objects of the cosmos, physical and non-physical? Madhva's reply to the questions is an emphatic "No". In the metaphysical scheme of Radical Pluralism each object has and retains to the end of eternity its own peculiar features, and essential and fundamental nature—"svarupa." The essential and fundamental nature, therefore,—svarupa—should be identical with the object. There are many such svarupas—essential and fundamental natures. True. They cannot be linked by a class-concept. "Svarupa" of X resembles "Svarupa" of Y. No common characteristics are there that inhere in both the—"svarupas"—essential natures of X and Y. Should there be any, the common characteristic or characteristics would annihilate or push into the back-ground reference to the individual objects concerned which have a right to independent existence without being eclipsed by the class-concept or the general idea. Hence the quality of being a fundamental and essential nature is just identical with the nature itself. This identity guarantees the existence of the said nature as an independent entity. Even so, the essential and fundamental nature of any given object is identical with the said object.

If this identity be a true tale, how is it that an object and its essential and fundamental nature are spoken of as different from one another? Madhva's reply is that the ordinary common sense (person's) talk about the difference between a given object and its fundamental and essential nature is due to the operation of VISESHA—the peculiar and indefinable power or potency—which is the property of all the objects of the cosmos physical and non-physical. It will thus be seen that by pressing into service VISESHA the peculiar realistic and pluralistic potency if you please, or the inherent pluralising agency—Madhva maintains his Radical Pluralism.

Continuing the thread of the discussion, Madhva points out that in the Supreme Reality—Sri Narayana—Infinite number of Infinite Attributes are not merely identical with one another but all are identical with the Reality-itself—Vishnu. In the absence of identity, almost unanswerable questions will spring up. The relation between the Attributes and the Supreme Lord, on the basis of difference would degrade the Deity to the level of the Finite.

Madhva proceeds to point out that others are obliged to employ similar weapons in maintaining their pet positions. The Monistic Absolutist affirms identity between the Absolute and the Finite. Is the identity different from the Absolute? The Absolutist holds the identity is *identical* with the Absolute. Others affirm difference between attribute (guna) and the entity which has or possesses the attributes (guni). Is the difference itself different from the Guna (attribute) and the Guni? (that which has or possesses the attribute)? The difference is *identical* with the latter. Others

again maintain that the relationship is identity-shot difference or difference-shot identity or identity-cum-difference—or difference-cum-identity. (bheda-abheda) between the two. Is this difference-cum-identity different from the *guna* (attribute) and the *Guni* (that which has it) that are gripped together by the said relationship? No. It is *identical* with the latter. Even so, Attributes of the Supreme Narayana are to be viewed as *identical* with HIM.

The point is this. Absolutists maintain identity between the Absolute and the Finite. Others in explaining the relation between substance and attributes consider them to be different from one another. Yet others view the relation as difference-cum-identity. In all the three cases, a relation is affirmed to exist. Identity, Difference, and Difference-cum-identity are respectively the relations. Now what is the relation between any one of the relations and objects that are sought to be gripped by it respectively? The relation should be one of *identity*. And yet, notwithstanding this identity, language runs to the effect that X and Y are identical. If they are identical how is it that they are spoken of as X and Y when they figure as subject in a proposition? That they so figure cannot be denied. Can the identity accommodate their being mentioned as different from one another when they figure as subjects in a proposition? Madhva remarks that others, have freely used such expressions and he is, therefore, perfectly right in maintaining identity between Supreme Narayana and the Infinite number of His Infinite Attributes, and linguistic expressions of difference are rendered intelligible on account of the operation of VISESHA, which functions in all cases of identity that admit of modes of expression involving or implying difference. X, Y & Z we say are attributes of the Infinite, and we are all along conscious of the doctrine that the attributes are identical with the Infinite, and yet, linguistic expressions of difference are allowed sanctioned and supported by the functioning of VISESHA—that peculiar power or potency which harmonises expressions of difference with a fundamental identity which is a doctrinal fact.

Why all this bother? The Absolutistic Monist admits identity between the finite and the Infinite. Others admit difference between substance and attribute, (*Guni* and *Guna*) and yet others admit between them difference-cum-identity. How are identity in the first case, difference in the second, and difference-cum-identity in the third related to the objects sought to be gripped by the said relations? If in the first instance, Identity and Brahman were different from one another, if in the second, difference were different from substance and attribute (*Guni* and *Guna*) and if in the third, the difference-cum-identity were different from the substance and the attribute (*Guni* and *Guna*) an infinite regress would ensue out of which there is absolutely no escape. If the three relations and the objects related were different from one another, the

inquirer is obliged to fall back upon another difference to account for a given one, and the latter again would be in need of another difference and so on.

To avoid the regress, the only way is to admit identity between the relation and the objects related, and then, press into service VISESHA—the peculiar power or potency which sanctions employment of terminology indicating difference, where really Identity reigns—to have linguistic propositions rendered intelligible. X and Y, finite and the Infinite are identical with one another. In propositions like these the subject and the predicate are seen to be different from one another. Otherwise there would be no proposition at all with any sense. VISESHA saves the proposition guaranteeing difference between the subject and the predicate, and at the same time not impairing the identity between the two which is made the import of the proposition. SA-VISESHA-ABHEDA i.e., identity between relations and the objects related along with VISESHA to guarantee the subject-predicate status in propositions, is the truth of the matter. That must apply to the relation between the infinite number of Infinite Attributes and the Supreme Lord Sri Narayana.

Absolute difference between attribute and substance is again fraught with difficulties. If they are absolutely different from one another, then, how is it they enter into subject-predicate relation at all? If it is contended, some relation is discernible between the two, is the relation *apprehended* responsible for subject-predicate linkage? Or *unapprehended*? In respect of the former, is it *apprehended* as qualificative or connected with the subject-predicate bond? Or apprehended independently, as not qualificative.

None of these alternatives would hold good. The apprehended relation would itself need another relation. Otherwise no explanation is forthcoming as to why it should be apprehended in any particular manner at all. The result is an *infinite regress*. If the relation should be apprehended independently without reference, explicit or implicit to relevant objects then any two objects or concepts can be gripped by any relation and chaos will be the result. The alternative that relation unapprehended is responsible for the subject-predicate linkage between the substance and the attribute is *prima facie* unsustainable, as only *known and apprehended relation* can be responsible for the subject-predicate-hood of the substance and the attribute (Guni and Guna). As none of the foregoing alternatives hold good, Madhva maintains that the only correct view is to regard The Supreme Lord—Sri Narayana—and His infinite number of Infinite Attributes as identical with one another and with Him.

Take any relation you please. There are the related objects, physical and non-physical. What is the status of the relation? It

cannot be different from the terms or the objects related. Human knowledge is rendered communicable through the instrumentality of language. In all logical and philosophical discussions the use of propositions is inevitable and indispensable. Propositional structure is in subject-predicate form. It is grounded on an identity which yet accommodates linguistic expression of difference. If it were grounded on difference, one would see only an interminable regress, as a given difference would challenge another in prospect and retrospect. The very fact that any two objects physical or non-physical are apprehended as entering into a relation, demonstrates that the said relation and the related objects are identical with one another as otherwise they would not at all have entered into any relation. The identity yet accommodates modes of expression indicating difference in virtue of VISESHA—the peculiar power or potency inherent in all objects, which while not impairing identity renders possible difference in linguistic and expressional modes such as X is Y. Not merely VISESHA, but there is also the inscrutable and un-understandable power of the Supreme Lord Himself which explains identity between the infinite number of Infinite Attributes and the Lord, that may not be readily accessible to finite and sophisticated minds.

The following are the modes of expression current coin in secular as well as scriptural literature.—“The Bliss of Brahman (Anandam-Brahmano-Vidvan etc.)” “talk and usage of the plural number in respect of the attributes (Guneshu-Bahuvachanavyayaharo)” “talk and usage of the singular number relatively to the substance” (Guninyekavachana Vyavaharah) and the use of different terms in respect of Brahman—terms which are not synonymous, and which yet converge towards the One Supreme Lord—are all linguistic patterns with which humanity is obliged to get on and to which it has become habituated as a result of age-long education and educative adjustment to the demands of physical and non-physical environment. The patterns and their validity and pragmatic functioning are all grounded on VISESHA—the peculiar power and potency inherent in all objects which bridges the gulf between identity and difference.

There is another important question to be discussed is VISESHA (that peculiar power and potency) different from the VISESHI (objects or entities affected by the former) or not different? If the former, that difference itself should be referred to another difference and infinite and endless regress will be the fallacy committed. If the latter, the distinction between “Visheshā” and the objects or entities affected by it would be unintelligible and impossible. The correct view is to regard “Viseshā” itself as the essential and fundamental nature of the entities and objects affected by it. Then again, it is on account of the inscrutable characteristic



of "Visesha" that there is the usage in language that "Visesha" affects objects. If so, if a given "Visesha" is explained by another "Visesha" the old fallacy of infinite regress would occur. Madhva replies that the fallacy will not touch his argument, and the commentator makes the matter perfectly clear. According to Brahma Tarka from which Madhva has cited stanzas in support of his view, VISESHA (peculiar power and potency etc.) is SUI GENERIS, SELF-SUPPORTING and SELF-EXPLANATORY. Attempts to explain it in terms of something else are foredoomed to failure. It reveals its face in everything—in every object and phenomenon, but it could not be explained in terms of anything other than itself. It is VISESHA (peculiar power and potency etc.) and its validity is guaranteed by itself. Its metaphysical credit is quite sound and intact. There is no fallacy in such a view. In dealing with ultimate concepts in any science or a system of philosophy, attempts to explain them in terms of something other than themselves must fail. Every ultimate concept is *sui generis*, *self-supporting* and *self-explanatory*. Does not the Absolutist glory in his estimate that inscrutability is an ornament to his doctrine of "Avidya"? All attempts at analysis of the notion of "Avidya" are vain. It is somehow there projecting the cosmic illusion,—phantasmagoria of existence. If one's logical and metaphysical conscience can be lulled into slumber at the time of the hypostatisation and glorification of the doctrine of Avidya, brows need not be knit or wrinkled at the time of Madhva expounding his doctrine of VISESHA (peculiar power) potency, etc.) which has to explain itself and others. Though analogies do not and cannot run on all fours it is yet permissible to mention some in support of the position taken up by Madhva. Whether it is regarded as a "form of perception" or a reality Time gnaws into all phenomena as all are obliged to be in time, and while explaining other phenomena in so far as they are described to be temporal, it also explains itself. No attempt is made to explain Time in terms of something other than itself. Similar remarks would apply to Space as well. Time-Space, Space-time, reduction of Space to Time and time to Space, *et hoc* are simply tantalizing trumperies of modern Science. Relativity-Explanations have not in any manner invalidated the metaphysical doctrines. There is, therefore, nothing illogical in Madhva's attempt to meet all criticism and opposition in respect of the ultimate category in his system of speculation by maintaining that VISESHA (peculiar power, potency etc.) is *sui generis*, *self-sufficient* and *self-explanatory*.

After giving an explanation of the nature of VISESHA (peculiar power, potency etc.) Madhva proceeds to cite passages from the Sruti in criticism of the four schools of thought mentioned earlier—(namely Brahman is Nirguna—attributeless. 2. Attributes differ from one another and from Brahman. 3. Difference-cum-identity is the relation between Brahman and Attributes. 4. And

attributes are of two kinds—those that constitute the essential nature of Brahman and those that are different). The passage “*Ekameva-Advaitiyam*” emphasizes identity between Brahman and Its Attributes. Difference and difference-cum-identity are rejected. “*Nehananasti - kinchana - mrityossamritu - mapnoti - yaihananeva-pasyati*”. The text means that the Attributes do not differ from Brahman. Nor do they differ from one another. If any one sees difference, hell-fire, is his lot after death. “*Yathodakam . . . . . tanevanuvidhavati*” Those that see difference between Brahman and His Attributes and difference from one another of the Attributes themselves gravitate along the downward path as rapidly as rain-drops falling on the top of a mountain. Madhva maintains that if the doctrine of Nirguna-Brahman (attributeless Absolute) were true, the terms used in the text should have been different. If the Sruti contemplated denial of all attributes, then the text would have run “*Nehasthi Kinchana*” (There is nothing in Brahman) and “*Dharman-pasyan*”. (if he should see attributes he would gravitate along the downward path.) The terms “*Nana*” and “*Prithak*” would surely be redundant and superfluous if the Sruti contemplated a denial of the attributes of Brahman. No such denial is contemplated. Brahman is endowed with an Infinite number of Infinite Attributes. But the attributes are not different from Brahman. Nor are they different from one another. Difference is not the relation between Brahman and Its attributes. Nor is the relation correctly described to be difference-cum-identity. Identity of Supreme Lord Narayana and His attributes is the only correct view of the sacred texts. The Sruti text in question also indicates the existence and functioning of VISESHA. (peculiar power and potency etc.) The passage speaks of Infinite number of Infinite Attributes of Brahman. Difference between Brahman and Attributes is denied, and difference between any two Brahmic attributes is also denied. And yet to render intelligible the subject-predicate relation in all propositions about the Attributes, Brahman and their relation with Brahman and with one another, VISESHA (peculiar power and potency etc.) is the only agency that can be helpful.

Space is everywhere. Space is spatially ubiquitous. Time is eternal. Time is at all times. Brahman is Svatantra—independent or self-dependent. In all such instances it is VISESHA (peculiar power or potency etc.) that guarantees the uniqueness and ultimateness of the categories, not merely, but propositional usage based on subject-predicate difference.

At this stage the Absolutist advances the usual objection that he has no quarrel with Brahman being spoken of as endowed with attributes. But the attributes are all unreal, due to influence of Maya. (Ignorance of the nature of Brahman) If the Sruti passages state that Brahman is endowed with attributes, the interpretation is that the said attributes are all illusory. The Absolutistic thesis that Brahman is attributeless stands intact.

Madhva replies that the Sruti texts emphasise that only knowledge of Brahman to the effect that He is endowed with Infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes will free one from recurring cycles of births and deaths. Illusory knowledge or knowledge of illusory stuff cannot be the means of spiritual advancement or salvation. If Brahman were indeed devoid of all attributes, it becomes obligatory on the part of an aspirant to enquire why should Brahman be spoken of at all as endowed with them. Surely it is a needlessly cumbersome circumlocutory procedure for the sacred texts to speak of the attributes of Brahman and then suggest that the said attributes of Brahman are illusory or are of only a lesser degree of reality. Why not argue the other way and maintain that Brahman is as a matter of fact endowed with an Infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes, and that such a denial may be interpreted as denial of attributes with which we are familiar on the finite human level or attributes that are ugly and undivine and so on? There is absolutely nothing illogical or strained about this interpretation.

Final liberation or Salvation from the ills of existence can be secured only by living a life of devotion, and strenuous spiritual endeavour. Will spiritual endeavour be readily forthcoming if the goal to be reached as a result of it be an Absolute that is devoid of all attributes? Can the Absolute be an object of devotion, prayer and worship? Can it be approached in times of spiritual crises or shipwrecks? Will the Absolute answer the prayers of the afflicted? No. It is on the other hand the Supreme Narayana—the lord of the Universe full of Infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes—who is to be approached for salvation and freedom from the ills of existence. The Supremacy and Majesty of Sri Narayana should be understood adequately and realised. The understanding and realisation will be proportionate to the spiritual equipment of an aspirant and there are any number of grades of the said equipment and grades of aspirants. If the Ultimate Reality is an Absolute devoid of all attributes, it cannot answer the prayers of the afflicted and an Attributeless Absolute is as good as a Mysterious Nullity. Knowledge of something which is illusory—of a lower degree of reality—cannot lead an aspirant to the goal of self-realisation, and God realisation. Madhva's Devotional Theism cannot countenance the Absolute of Monistic Metaphysics. In fact, metaphysical speculation, according to Madhva untrammelled by prejudices and prepossessions will lead one on to the goal of a Merciful Sympathetic God Devotional surrender to Whom of the most cherished and precious possessions and gifts of life including the personality of an aspirant is counselled as the safest and the best means of escape from the ills of existence. It is a matter of common knowledge that the homage of devotion and of devotional surrender can never be paid unless one is perfectly fully acquainted with the nature of the object of his devotion or the person to whom

devotional offerings are made. No one will ever think of worshipping a setting sun and linking his destinies with one about to sink below the horizon. It is a permanent Mid-Day sun radiating warmth, and life that is wanted. Tropical souls need not fight shy of the Mid-Day Sun. Sri Narayana is the most Illustrious and Brilliant Mid-Day Sun. Metaphors may not carry conviction in matters of philosophy, but so long as philosophy has to deal with language, it cannot avoid the use of figures of speech. The Majesty and the Greatness of Sri Narayana is to be realised and understood to the best of one's ability. Permanent and abiding attachment, respect reverence and similar bonds are impossible unless the Greatness and Majesty of Sri Vishnu are realised and understood. There is the sacred scripture which reveals the nature of Brahman. The study of scriptural texts and constant contemplation of the truths properly learnt from the sacred texts would gradually implant in the minds of genuine aspirants an image of the Deity—Sri Narayana according to Madhva. In the onward march of spiritual progress, when a pilgrim happens to have made sufficient headway, he is sure to be blessed by the Almighty Lord with a kind, and sympathetic Guru—Spiritual preceptor—who will understand the needs and requirements of his disciple. The Guru is the only reliable guide. He has no axe to grind—spiritual or secular. It is God who in His Infinite Wisdom chooses to bring two persons together as (Guru and Sishya) Teacher and Pupil. The cowl does not make the monk. The discovery of a real Guru is the most difficult task before an aspirant. But he need not lose heart. He has only to wait in a state of prayerful expectancy and in due time, he will see his spiritual preceptor. The latter would teach him the various methods of contemplation of God and courageous practising of such methods will bring about the purification of the somatic and psychical make-up of the aspirant and prepare him as it were for his standing face to face with Sri Narayana—the Creator, Protector and Destroyer of the Cosmos. The veil of ignorance is rent asunder and the true devotee—the Bhakta—is then privileged to enjoy the inherent bliss which is his nature. During the time of his existence on earth and during many lives led in conformity with him Karma, he was like one from whom his heritage had been snatched away. When, after strenuous spiritual endeavour he stands face to face with the Almighty Lord Sri-Narayana, he enjoys his own inherent and innate bliss ever in devotional contemplation of the Glory, Greatness, and Majesty of Sri Vishnu, and then, his Spiritual heritage becomes restored unto him.

None of these steps and stages, would mean sense in a system of speculation which exalts the Attributeless Absolute and deposes the Deity of Religion. Madhva sets his face resolutely against any apotheosis of the Attributeless Absolute. A Merciful God who will lend a helping hand to aspirants is what Madhva maintains to have been unanimously proclaimed by sacred texts.

What then is Mukti or Final liberation or release? The end or the termination of the cycles of births and deaths is perhaps the most important feature of final liberation. Absence of births and deaths is another way of describing it. It is however only a negative description. In positive terms Mukti or final liberation is enjoyment of the inherent, innate bliss of the subject without any tinge of pain, evil and misery. Admixture of the later makes the joys of life sorrow-shot. The Mukta or the released spirit comes face to face with the Almighty Lord—Sri Narayana. The Mukta or the liberated Subject enjoys a perpetual perception of the presence of Providence of Paramatman the Supreme Lord—Sri Narayana. A liberated soul is not idle. He is not a lotus-eater. He engages himself in all sorts of activity. But every form of activity is devotional worship of the Almighty Lord. The stock of the past Karma is exhausted. The karmic lumber has been set fire to. At the command of the Almighty Lord, released spirits undertake soul-healing and soul-saving missions. A Free-Spirit may be commanded by the Lord to incarnate himself on earth, to educate the ignorant, and proclaim among misguided and erring persons the message of hope and spiritual healing. The released souls may undertake some such work and it is a mistake to suppose that Madhva's conception of Mukti or final release or liberation involves inactivity after emancipation.

The means of attainment of release is knowledge that Sri Vishnu is endowed with an Infinite number of Infinite Excellent attributes. Knowledge naturally engenders Devotion. With the help of Guru, Devotion leads on Spiritual practices and endeavour. An aspirant then stands face to face with the Infinite.

The liberated souls *qua* liberated form a fraternity. But there is bound to be difference between any two of them, in the matter of the enjoyment of their innate and inherent bliss. Madhva's Radical Pluralism must appear in the state of release as well. Released souls are not jumbled and jammed into a mass of colorless homogeneity. Each retains and must retain its independence. Each released self enjoys its own inherent and innate bliss. The bliss of each Mukta—released soul—is different from that of his neighbour. The released souls do not usurp the qualities of God.

Released souls are under the direction, control and guidance of the Supreme Lord—Sri Narayana. Such control does not neutralise or adulterate their bliss in state of release. On the contrary a realisation that even in the state of release that involves freedom from all control and bondage, free souls are under the sway of the Almighty Lord will only enhance the enjoyment of the bliss. Service in Heaven was deprecated only by Satan, but not by any serious-minded Philosopher. Carrying out the commands of the Almighty even in the state of release, will only enhance the spiritual tone of the bliss enjoyed in the said state.

There is no absolute equality among the released souls either. *Qua* liberated from the recurring cycles of births and deaths free spirits *resemble* one another. They all differ in the matter of the enjoyment of innate and inherent bliss. If in the transaction of the ordinary secular concerns of life, perfect equality and democracy are mere shadows, they cannot determine matters after termination of the recurring cycles of births and deaths. Post-final-release Democracy is a laughable idea. Annihilation of difference in the state of release may be easy of achievement by strokes of pen and shafts of words, and if the discussion is to proceed on the basis of texts or reason aided by revelation or revealed texts, Madhva is certain that in the enjoyment of the inherent, innate bliss, released souls are bound to differ from one another. There is *no mystical swooning into the Absolute* after release from the bonds of existence in finite lives, nor is there any merging of the individuality and personality of the selves into the Absolute. The pre-release destinies of the selves are different. So are their post-release destinies.

The Sruti text "Amritasya-asha-setuh" definitely lays down the doctrine that the Supreme Lord—Sri Narayana—is the prop or the support of the confraternity of released souls. They are as much under the sway of the Lord as those that are yet struggling on the level of finite evil-ridden existence. A "Taittireeyaka" and a "Brihadaranyaka" text refer to the necessary and inevitable inequality in the bliss enjoyed by released souls. With a view to striking popular imagination, one may speak of the bliss enjoyed by a particular released class as being hundred times more than that enjoyed by another. It is permissible to argue that the difference may be something, we at the finite stage of existence must be unable to understand. Even in the pre-release state, enjoyment of bliss is a vague expression. Bliss may be enjoyed by contemplation of Art. Religious devotion leads on to bliss. Service and sacrifice imply concomitant bliss. Qualitative differences will have to be admitted as it is impossible to reduce bliss enjoyed by following various interests in life to uniform, monotonous type and to quantitative measurement. Whether the bliss enjoyed in the state of final liberation can be squeezed into the quantitative and qualitative moulds or strait-jackets, it stands to reason that it is safe to suspend judgment as the verdicts of finite life are not applicable to the state of release and to the bliss enjoyed in it.

The Supreme Lord—Sri Narayana—is the Most Exalted and the Most Powerful. He controls the entire cosmos of sentient and non-sentient creation, released and unreleased souls, and their destinies. The selves even after release from bondage of evil-ridden existence are subordinate to the Lord and glory in such subordination which should not be confused with the subordination with which one is familiar in finite life. Subordination of Thought, Word and Deed, of Intellect, Emotion, and Volition of the released souls to

the Almighty Lord is itself the most exalted type of spiritual freedom one can hope to enjoy.

An analogy from the sphere of spiritualised love may not be superfluous or out of order. When two parties sufficiently sexed and sufficiently spiritual to lift their mutual relation and love from the gross flesh-level to the heights of spiritual companionship of personalities, mutual adjustment, surrender of persistent prejudices and predilections, and subordination of the passing moods and tastes to the larger and wider purpose of companionship of personalities, are inevitable and reciprocal subordination is never felt as a deadening weight, but felt as freedom in one another's service and companionship, and light as a radiant rose petal. Persons conversant with the psychology and literature of spiritualised erotics or erotic spiritualism can readily visualise the state of companionship of personalities one of the significant constituent elements of which is the conscious or unconscious subordination of the will of the parties to one another. If that is so, on the plane of finite life, *a fortiori*, there could be absolutely nothing inconsistent, illogical or *infra dig*, in the subordination of the released souls to the Supreme Lord—Sri Narayana—who is the unequalled and unrivalled controller of the destinies of the cosmos, of released and unreleased souls (*mukta*—*amukta*—*prapancha*). Objections taken by some modern critics to Madhva's doctrine of subordination of the released souls to the Supreme Lord owe their origin to a confusion between two distinct connotations of subordination. If such misguided critics who have neither the patience nor the intellectual equipment to understand the language of Madhva and his commentators, will for a time forget the bureaucratic tyranny which they exercise and the subordination of their poor victims to themselves, and if they will further be philosophic enough not to import into the state of release their notions of subordination and superiority developed during their official careers and secular transactions, they will not feel any difficulty in realising that the subordination to the Supreme Lord—Sri Narayan—of the released souls is the highest form of freedom spiritually perfect. There is harmony so complete between the actions of the released souls and Divine Will that it baffles understanding. The attunement between the life of the released souls and Divine Will is so exquisitely perfect that subordination of the former to the latter is really the most exalted spiritual freedom enjoyed by the released souls. When it is seen that Sri Narayana is the controller even of the released spirits, His supremacy is unrivalled and unchallenged. Such supremacy is incompatible and inconsistent with evil and imperfection. The third epithet in the benedictory stanza, therefore, rightly emphasizes that the Supreme Lord—Sri Narayana—is not merely free from even the slightest tinge of evil and imperfection but is endowed with an infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes. The fundamental and cardinal doctrine of Madhva's Monotheism insists on the unrivalled and unchallenged supremacy of Lord Narayana—Sri Vishnu—consort

of Mahalakshmi. By means of the three important and significant epithets used in the benedictory opening stanza of the work "Vishnu-Tattva-Vinirnaya", Madhva establishes his doctrines of Theism, Realism and Radical pluralism. The nature of the supreme Reality is to be proclaimed only by Sruti or the sacred texts. No amount of reason, reflection, and ratiocination would ever establish the existence and nature of the Lord on a firm basis. The existence of god can be denied by means of counter process of reason, reflection and ratiocination. Sruti is the only go. This traditional reliance on sacred texts for demonstrating the existence of God is indicated by the first epithet "sadagamaika—vijnyeya." Realism, Radical Pluralism and allied doctrine are indicated by the second epithet "samatita-kshara-aksharam." The third one indicates the unrivalled and unchallenged supremacy of Lord Sri Narayana as the controller of the destinies of the cosmos of released and unreleased souls. (Mukta-amukta-prapancha) Unless Reality of the world is guaranteed, there is no meaning in describing Deity as the creator of the Universe. Blowing of soap bubbles or the playing of conjuring tricks would not be the characteristic feature of the Almighty Lord. The Universe, the cosmos, of sentient and non-sentient creation has exactly the same degree of reality as the Supreme Lord. Overlordship of the Supreme Lord Narayana implies reality of the material universe or of matter and the reality of selves or finite souls, erring struggling pilgrims wending their way towards the kingdom of God. Spiritualisation of the life led here and final emancipation from the trammels of finite existence will be possible only by the Grace of the Almighty which can be secured only by uninterrupted and unswerving practice of devotional and meditative approaches to the Lord. Not selfish seeking and storing, not the sanctimonious saintliness of the hypocrite and the humbug (the Mithyachara and the Dharmachadma) but sacrifice and service to God's creatures are the best forms of worshipping the Supreme Lord Sri Narayana. Madhva concludes the work as usual with salutations to the Deity who is his favourite. The stanza runs thus :

"Svatantraya-akhilesaya-nirdoshagunarupine"

"Preyase-me-supurnaya-namo-narayanaya-te."

Every term used is significant. Sri Narayana is the only one who is independent. All else is dependent on Him. He is the Lord of everything, of men and gods, of sentient and non-sentient creation. He is free from even the slightest and faintest tinge of evil. His is not the nervous mechanism in flesh and blood. He is ever of the fundamental cosmic quintessence. His personality is to be understood, contemplated and thought of in terms of an Infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes, between which and the Lord there reigns supreme identity but no difference. He is the favourite Deity (of Madhva—according to the letter of the text) and He is ever Full.



"Salutations to Thee! Oh. Lord Narayana." is the concluding Prayer of the Acharya.

### SUMMARY.

1. This is the most important of Madhva's smaller works. (the Prakaranas) It contains an exhaustive refutation of Monistic Absolutism and the opening section establishes the reliability and self-validity of the sacred texts. The doctrine is established that the sacred texts cannot be ascribed to any known agency as their author.
2. The very act of cognition inevitably involves the apprehension of the validity and reliability of the said act. Except in special instances like perceptual illusions, knowledge is self-valid. (svatah-pramana). The eternity of the letters of the alphabet (of the sacred texts) is demonstrated.
3. Radical Pluralism is established by a careful and thoroughgoing analysis of the concept of "difference" (Bheda) that is basic and foundational of Reality.
4. The most significant and important contribution of Madhva is that in the light of the nine illustrative instances contained in the Upanishad, it will be more rational to split up the text not as "Tattvamasi" but as A-TAT-TVAMASI" and the conclusion is arrived at that Upanishadic import is only Difference between the Finite and the Infinite (Jiva and Brahman).
5. Upanishadic texts cited by the Absolutist as supporting the unreality of the Universe are all re-interpreted and shown to support the reality of the Universe.
6. Madhva has taken care to establish that even the state of final release or liberation reveals difference among the free souls, and difference between Brahman and the Free souls.
7. Identity between the Infinite and the Finite (Brahman and Jiva) advocated by the Absolutist is shown to be unwarranted by the Pramanas—pratyaksha, Anumana and Sruti.
8. Doctrines of *Adhyasa*, *Eka-Jiva-Vada*, *Nana-Jiva-Vada* and other relevant theories of the Absolutist are criticised elaborately and effectively.
9. The Reality of the Universe is shown to be the only account or doctrine that has the unanimous support of the Pramanas.
10. Madhva has demonstrated that on the Absolutistic world-view distinctions between bond and free souls, finite and Infinite etc. cannot stand, and that the doctrine of degrees of reality is a remedy worse than the disease it is intended to cure.



## CHAPTER X.

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### KARMA-NIRNAYA

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(Synthesis between Ritual and Philosophy.)

Challenged by certain contemporary Pandits to exhibit his proficiency in the ritualistic literature, Madhva wrote, tradition has it, a work named "KARMA-NIRNAYA" in which he has explained the meaning and significance of certain hymns, supplying missing links in metrical arrangements, etc., and maintaining the thesis that a synthesis has to be effected between Rituals and Philosophy in the light of which Rituals are to be regarded as purificatory prolegomena to God-realisation, and that the names of minor sacrificial deities refer to the Supreme Lord, in virtue of Divine Immanence and control exercised by the Lord. A Thesis like this necessarily rests on Brahman being viewed as full of infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes, and demands an emphatic and authoritative repudiation of the doctrine that Brahman is an Attributeless Absolute. In the earlier part of the work, Madhva criticises and repudiates the doctrine of an Attributeless Absolute, and explains in the later, the import of a collection of sacrificial hymns.

No doubt the nature of Rituals and Ritualism (Karma) had been already dealt with in detail by Jaimini, in the "Purvameemamsa" but the treatment had been admittedly narrow and circumscribed. The synthesis between Ritual and Philosophy had not been thought of by Jaimini. Withdrawal of interest from the objects of sense, Knowledge of the nature of Isvara, Devotional surrender to Him, had not been emphasized by Jaimini. Nor had he exhibited how all the hymns chanted in various sacrificial functions containing the names of particular deities like, Indra, Agni, etc., refer to the Supreme Overlord, Sri Narayana, as without His animating grace, they become inactive and and functionless. Above all, the outlook and vision of the "Purva-meemamsaka" did not rise above the conception of some enjoyment in Heaven as the fruit of the performance of sacrifices and rituals, but, the real goal of genuine metaphysical endeavour is attainment of knowledge of Isvara or realisation of His Majesty and Glory by means of steadfast adherence to spiritual discipline, and by means of a perfect purification of the minds. Madhva commenced the present work, in order to improve upon Jaimini's philosophy of life

and effect as it were a synthesis between Ritual and Philosophy. There is no taboo on the former. Rituals, however, are not to be practised for their own sake or in anticipation of reward in the shape of enjoyment in heaven. They have to be pursued as religious disciplines and purificatory preliminaries without which the mind can never become an effective weapon for realising the Supreme Being. The Rituals work in the interests of Philosophy and philosophic vision.

Seven Soma-sacrifices are mentioned—1. Agnishtoma, 2. Atyagnishtoma, 3. Uktham, 4. Shodasi, 5. Atiratra, 6. Aptoryama and 7. Vajapeya. The hymns chosen by Madhva for elucidation relate to “SHODASI.” The hymns are known as “Mahanamnee.” Why? The terms Indra, etc., used in the hymns are pregnant with deep significance as they refer to the Supreme Brahman. Brahman is the Supreme Being, and the Supremest Reality. Terms in sacrificial hymns that refer to the Supreme Brahman through those of other gods, are harmonised in a grand synthesis which brings out in clear and bold relief the Glory and Majesty of the Supreme Lord—Narayana. The significance of the term “Mahanamnee,” applied to the hymns in question is the point of departure for a full dress metaphysical discussion. The Supremacy of Brahman is grounded on the fullness of Infinite Number of Infinite Excellent Attributes of Brahman. That is the cardinal and central Thesis of Madhva’s Pluralistic Mono-Theism. To establish it, Madhva anticipates the usual objections that are urged against it by Monistic Absolutists and refutes them.

The contention of the Absolutist amounts in effect to a repudiation of the attributes of Brahman. Brahman or the Absolute is devoid of all attributes. How is its supremacy to be based on attributes? The Sruti emphatically declares that Brahman is devoid of all attributes and determinations. (“Kevalo Nirgunascha.”) There are no authorities supporting the view that Brahman is endowed with attributes. (Saguna) The procedure is strange and futile which seeks to establish the supremacy of Brahman on the Fullness of Attributes which is an absurd and impossible notion as the Absolute or Brahman is devoid of attributes. On the other hand, the Brahmic Supremacy has to be grounded only on an Absolutistic basis, namely, Oneness of all Existence. All is Brahman. Brahman is the only Reality. All else is illusionistic phenomena. As the core of Reality and Existence Brahman is Supreme.

Madhva urges that the contention of the Absolutist summed up in the previous paragraph is baseless. There are well known Sruti Texts which proclaim in an unmistakable and unequivocal manner the doctrine that Brahman is Full of an Infinite number of Infinite attributes. (Satyam — Jnyanamanantam-Brahma-Yassarvajnyah-sarvavit-etc-etc). There are no doubt texts that state that the

Absolute is devoid of all attributes. There is then an apparant conflict between two sets of texts, one proclaiming the Fullness of Brahmic Attributes and the other repudiating the possession of attributes by the Absolute. How the apparent conflict is to be terminated has been elaborately discussed elsewhere, but the Texts that have the support of other *Pramanas*-sources or guarantors of valid knowledge-are more powerful than those that have no such support, and the latter should be made to surrender their surface interpretation, and should be reinterpreted in conformity with the import of the former. The texts that proclaim the Fullness of Divine Attributes have the support of other *Pramanas* as well, like inference.

The following is the inferential process. The cosmic phenomena of organised and unorganised matter and spirit, of the "starry heavens above and the moral law within" *qua* effects challenge the determination of and point in the direction of an Intelligent First Cause. He is the Creator. He is Brahman. There is the Sruti Text which proclaims that Brahman is the Cause of the Origin, sustenance, and destruction of the Universe. ("Yatova-imani-Bhutani-jayante-" etc.) If Brahman is to be regarded as the Creator of the Cosmos, the preserver and Destroyer, when the time comes, His Intelligence should be indeed Omniscience. In the execution of small affairs of mundane life action involves prior knowledge, a mental rehearsal of the pros and cons of a projected course of conduct, and it requires no special proof, that Brahman should be Omniscient Omnipotent etc., in the light of his Creatorship of the Cosmos. He is the Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer of all. He is all powerful. His plans are inscrutable. His projects never fail. And so on. These are some of the Attributes which finite human beings can understand, but, Brahman is endowed with an Infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes the nature of which must for ever remain a mysery to finite human intelligence. Cosmic phenomena logically presuppose and indicate a Creator. His creatorship is proclaimed by the sacred texts and inferentially demonstrated. In virtue of the undisputed Creatorship and Omniscience of Brahman, He is Supreme, Sri Narayana, Consort of Maha-Lakshmi. The absolutistic doctrine that Brahman is Attributeless is thus repudiated.

The Bhagavata Puran amaintains the same view. Brahman is full of attributes as He is the Creator. ("Kartritvat-Sagunam-Brahma, Etc.,") The use of the Term "Sagunam Brahma" i.e., Brahman with Attributes, does not imply that there is a Brahman without them. (Nirguna-Brahman.) The correct interpretation is that Brahman is endowed with or is full of Infinite number of Infinite Attributes.

How is this to be reconciled with the statement expressed in the Sruti "Eko-devah-sarvabhuteshu-goodhah.....Kevalo Nirgunascha." that Brahman is Attributeless? The real and

natural interpretation of the text is that the term "Nirguna" means devoid of or free from the three gunas, *Satva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*. The term "Kevala" which precedes the term "Nirguna" in the said text, means that Brahman is not imprisoned in any nervous mechanism unlike finite beings subjected to a series of births and deaths. It is contact with the Gunas, that is responsible for births and deaths, and as Brahman is free from even the slightest tinge or taint of the Gunas, He is the uncreated Creator of Cosmos.

The text of the Sruti itself affords striking demonstration of the untenability of the Absolutist's interpretation of the term "Nirguna" as devoid of all attributes. How could Brahman be devoid of all Attributes? The same text which is believed to affirm the Attributelessness of Brahman, explicitly states that Brahman is One, Unequalled and Unrivalled, Full of Attributes, Immanent in all creation and so on. Are not Immanence, Unequalledness, Uniqueness, Oneness, etc. attributes? Can the Sruti be so contradictory as that? Can it blow hot and cold in the same breath? Can it first affirm some attributes, like Oneness, Immanence, etc. and then, in the same breath or next breath deny the existence of the same attributes affirmed earlier? The sacred texts cannot be so irresponsible and contradictory as that. It is on the other hand only those who are anxious to measure everything with the Absolutistic foot-rule, or tape that are irresponsible and involve themselves in contradictions. If the laws of thought are to be respected at all, it is clear that in the same text, the same attributes cannot be first affirmed and then denied. Affirmation and denial should relate to two distinct and different sets of attributes. Then alone can the sacred text mean sense. Oneness, Uniqueness, Immanence, etc. are the attributes affirmed. On the other hand those that are denied are "Satva" "Rajas" and "Tamas". It is only by adherence to an interpretation like that is it possible to save the sacred text from degenerating into senseless jargon. The interpretation essayed by the Absolutist reduced the sacred texts to the level of contradictory and mutually incompatible statements. What is the fun of first stating that Brahman, is One, Immanent, affirming the attributes, Oneness, Uniqueness, and Immanence and then denying the existence of all attributes? If the sacred texts mean metaphysical business, they cannot talk of attributes of Brahman and then proceed to deny them. If the sacredness of the texts is to be respected and maintained, the attributes affirmed cannot be those that are subsequently denied. Affirmation and denial will be relevant only in respect of two distinct and different sets of attributes, if the Sruti is a body of sacred texts revealing the nature of the Supreme Reality.

There is no such entity as "Nirvisesha". i.e. devoid of all attributes, determinations and qualities. The term "Visesha" is here the same as "Guna" which is not restricted to one of the twenty four qualities of substances like, form or shape, configuration smell,

taste, etc. admitted by or in "Nyaya-Vaisesika" but is intended to apply to determination in general. The Monist seeks to establish that Brahman is devoid of all determinations.

Madhva urges the following objections against the said view. (1.) The term "Nirvisesha" means devoid of all determination. Absence of determination is its connotation. The question which the Monist or the Absolutist is bound to answer is whether Brahman is qualified in descriptive terms by the absence of determination. To be more specific, is the negation or absence of determination affirmed or denied in respect of Brahman? It cannot be negated or denied. Negation of the "negation of determinations" will amount to an affirmation of the determinations, a conclusion that will cut the throat of Absolutism. Determinations are naturally expected in Brahman. There are denied by the Absolutist. But what about the denial itself? The denial itself has to be denied as an absolutistic doctrine. That means determinations of Brahman are there undenied. (2) If on the other hand, the negation of determination is sought to be affirmed in respect of Brahman, the latter becomes determined *qua* qualified by the absence of determination. For Brahman to be determined as devoid of all determinations is itself a determination! There is no escape from determination of Brahman even if it is desired. Not desirable even if possible.

Sooner or later an interpretational settlement should be reached. There are some texts which proclaim Brahman to be devoid of all determinations. There are others which affirm Brahmic determinations. Inferential arguments can cut either way. There are inferences establishing the determinationlessness of the Absolute. There are inferences too which establish the counter thesis. In a conflict like this, the logical course is to see which interpretation has the strongest support from the Pramanas. Logic abhors a determinationless entity. Our sense-awareness repudiates it. The purified and practised perceptions of highly evolved souls like the yogis, and refined realisations of spiritual saints have rejected it. When faced with a mass of concurrent testimony, in support of Brahman with excellent determinations, texts which deny determinations should be reinterpreted as denying the existence of determinations *tainted by finitude*, failure and fallacy. There is nothing illogical or unphilosophical in the course suggested by Madhva. Violence can be with impurity in the shape of slight alterations of interpretation of texts, but the wholesale metaphysical slaughter of a large number of texts which unequivocally proclaim that Brahman is full of Excellent Determinations is philosophically, cognisable and actionable *per se*.

The familiar doctrines are that Brahman is as a matter of fact devoid of all attributes and determinations, but, on account of the influence of "Maya" It appears to be determined as Creator,

of the cosmos, etc. and texts that speak of determinations refer only to determinations that are *mere appearance*. The absolutistic texts emphasize the real determinationlessness of Brahman which appears to be affected by determinations owing to the part played by "Maya".

Madhva contends that this easy-going relegation of determinations to the realm of appearance with the irresponsibility of lotus-eaters may be a convenient doctrine circulated for esoteric consumption. It is not one which after due demonstration has been elevated to the rank of a proved hypothesis. Before the dogmatisms are accepted that some texts of the sruti refer to determinations of Brahman which are unreal, illusory, or which have only a lesser degree of reality and so forth, and that the texts relied on by the absolutist refer only to the determinationlessness from the standpoint of a higher degree of reality, a careful analysis is necessary. The proposition itself that Brahman has, possess or is endowed with determinations which are unreal, illusory or of a lesser degree of reality, (Brahma Mithya-viseshatvat) cannot be venture-somely expressed without a contradiction. The term "Mithya" will have to mean "Asat". When an incompatibility is pointed out between texts which proclaim that Brahman is full of excellent determinations, and the absolutistic doctrine of determinationlessness, it is hardly an answer to contend that determinations are "Mithya." It means "non-existent." How is that a reply to the charge of incompatibility? Let the doctrine of degrees of reality be established first on an independent footing of reason and revelation, before it is pressed into service. Until that is done, the assertion that Brahman has determinations of a lower degree of reality involves a contradiction. It is tantamount to the assertain that *something non-existent exists*.

When thus cornered, the Absolutist has a stock-reply ready at his fingers' end almost. "We do not mean" he may be imagined to retort, "non-existent by the term "Mithya", but, only, "anirvachaniya"—i.e., neither "sat" nor "asat" with emphasis on the uncharacterisability of it. The determinations of Brahman will be characterisable neither as "sat" nor as "asat".

Madhva's reply is that "anirvachaniya" itself is a pseudo-concept. Why? The *pramanas* do not guarantee the existence of that notion. Whatever is "sat" is not "asat." Whatever is the latter is not the former. *Pratyaksha*, or sense-awareness does not guarantee the existence of anything which is neither "sat" nor "asat." The Agama or the sacred text is not a guarantee either because it is capable of a different interpretation altogether. The term "Anirvachaniya" or "Anirvachya" used in sacred texts means "wonderful." Philosophy is said to have its origin



in wonder. Brahman is truly wonderful. Neither sense-awareness nor sacred texts can give any guarantee in support of the existence of a dubious *tertium quid* like "*Anirvachaniya*."

Inference is equally helpless. The doctrine has passed the stage of doubt, debate, and dubiousness that an inferential argument, or simply inference can be possible only on the basis of a previous relevant sense-awareness, without which no inference is possible. If that wonderful *tertium quid* is not accessible, to sense-awareness, inference cannot catch it either. Even the inferential demonstration of God's existence involves a prior sense-awareness of the inevitable concomitance between effects and intelligent agents who bring them about.

If an inference is to be enunciated as a proved law, it is obligatory to point to positive and negative instances corroborative of the intended generalisation. Corroborative instances cannot be pointed out as sense-awareness does not guarantee the existence of this dubious "*anirvachaniya*". Just as one may demonstratively point to an object and say "that is Blue" in satisfaction of a colour-quest as it were, the Absolutist *cannot* demonstratively point to anything and say "that is *Anirvachaniya*" neither "Sat" nor "Asat" — (neither existent nor non-existent.) It is pointless to contend that post-illusion experience that a rope appeared as a snake, would support the absolutistic view. A psychological analysis of illusions leads only to one conclusion that certain data actually existent and sensed are erroneously interpreted. Of the actual existence and the sensing of data there is no denying. Post-illusion experiences only demonstrate the absence of an object in a context where it is erroneously believed to be. The snake that was observed on the excitation of sensory apparatus by a rope is just as good and as real as an ice-land snake. It is simply non-existent. The term "*Mithya*" applied to such instances means only non-existent. There is no other intelligible or logical sense in which it could be used. When the Absolutist contends that sense-awareness itself is the guarantee of the existence of "*Anirvachaniya*" (neither "Sat nor Asat.") his contention demonstrates that the object or entry entering into the interpretational continuum is simply non-existent then and there. It plainly means that the "snake" and the "silver" wrongly associated with rope and shell respectively are non-existent. They are "Asat". The concept of "neither sat nor asat" is a pseudo-concept. The terms, "*Mithya*" "*Anirvachaniya*" and similar terms will have to mean only "non-existent." There is no other intelligible logical sense in which it can be used.

There is obviously no "Agama" or sacred text which compels the use of the term "*Anirvachaniya*" in the contradiction-riddled significance hugged fondly to the bosom by the Absolutist.

The silver seen in shell is illusory. Because it is later stultified. On the ground of its stultification is the illusoriness decided. The negative corroborative instance is Brahman, which is neither illusory nor stultified. Let the "anirvachaniya" be proved by means of an Inference like that. That is the substance of an Absolutistic contention.

Madhva replies that the very conclusion sought to be established is riddled with contradictions. What is the meaning of the term "Anirvachaniya"? If its grammatical structure be any guide, the term means "that which cannot be described." In the transaction of the affairs of daily life, none will suddenly burst into an audience with an exclamation that "X is indescribable". On account perhaps of the richness of the notion, or the complexity of its characteristics, X may not be capable of being squeezed into the strait-jacket of linguistic expressions, and, if knowledge of X possessed by a certain individual is intimate enough to warrant the conclusion that it is indescribable, it is determined and described *qua* indescribable. Its successful description and its indescribability are incompatible with one another. An attempt would have been made at some description. Pragmatic interest should have demanded it. There should be partial acquaintance with the object. Intellectual curiosity to render the acquaintance full and perfect should be there. Absolute indescribability is a myth. Relative indescribability accommodates describability. The absolute indescribability insisted on by the Absolutist involves him in a contradiction as even *qua* "indescribable," X becomes described. It is concealing within itself the familiar *reductio* of Mute person loudly proclaiming "I am a Mute."

Does the term "Anirvachaniya" then mean that which is neither "Sat" nor "Asat" (Sadasad-vilakshana.) Such an interpretation again involves a contradiction. What is not "sat" must be "asat" and vice-versa. The "sadasad-vilakshana." is a pseudo-concept.

X (a jar,) contends an observer, is different from Y, (a cloth) and different surely from "mare's nest." Y is "sat". Mare's nest is "asat". X is different from both!! Has not something been pointed out which is a first-rate "sadasad-vilakshana"?

Yes. Madhva's answer is at that rate every object in the world is "sadasad-vilakshana." But from this notion to the pet doctrine of the Absolutist is indeed a far, far cry. There are countless objects structurally and functionally different from one another. Every one of them is an existent—a sat. Each differs from its neighbour which is equally a sat—an existent. It is therefore "Sadvilakshana" different from an existent. It is clear it is also different from the "asat", like the mare's nest, round square, and so forth. Every existent is in this sense different both from the

existent and the non-existent. This is also the fundamental metaphysical doctrine of Madhva's radical realism and Pluralism. But this is not what the absolutist desires to maintain. Should he do so, all controversy will be at an end, and Monists, and Pluralists, Idealists, and Realists, will find themselves in the same camp. A cheap truce like that or cessation of metaphysical hostilities is the bane of intellectual life.

The absolutist desires to maintain that "sadasadvilakshana" means just "illusory".—neither existent nor non-existent. It is this concept that is riddled with contradiction. The realistic and Pluralistic interpretation of the term is sane and sound. The Absolutist wants to interpret the term as "indescribable either as Sat or as "asat." It is absurd, because, it is not supported by the *Pramanas*.

A little calm reflection and patient analysis will suffice to lay bare the contradiction involved in the Pseudo-concept of "sadasadvilakshana". There is a well-known and universally accepted grammatical (and interpretational) rule that two negatives not merely yield an affirmative, but, reinforce the contemplated import in clearness and in convincingness. As a preliminary perhaps to arriving at the wonderful concept of "Sadasadvilakshana", the Absolutist concentrates attention on the term "Asat" and the next step is its denial, namely, "ASADVILAKSHANA". If the absolutist or anybody else should state that a given X is different from and not "asat" the inevitable outcome of it is that it should be "SAT". There is a logical inevitability about it. The further step in the onward march to the goal of "Sadasadvilakshana", should be denial of the SAT, which has been affirmed with logical inevitability. The moment the step is taken as it has to be, to reach the "Sadasadvilakshana" the Absolutist or anybody else who takes this step will find himself in a contradiction. The same will be the result if a start is made with the "SAT". Starting from the "SAT", you deny it and reach the "ASAT". In the next step again, you will have to deny the "ASAT" to reach the concept of "SADASAD-VILAKSHANA. The process is right through riddled with contradiction. The contention that the process of intellectual apprehension of the "Sadasadvilakshana" is not thus successively spread in time, is pointless, because, even granting everything that the Absolutist demands, there remain an unridable element of contradiction on account of the refusal of the "Sat" and the "asat" to coalesce into a sum-total of content to give birth to the "Sadasadvilakshana."

The point is this. (1) In the first place, if "Asat" is negated, "Sat" would be the logical outcome. There is no other go. "Asat" is a compound, composed of a negative indicator and "sat," When this compound is subsequently denied, the denial affects only the negative indicator, leaving quite intact the original "SAT".

(2) From another angle of vision, it is possible to give the following interpretation. In the subsequent negation not merely the negative indicator but, the entire compound "Asat". (i.e. the negative indicator and the "SAT" tightly clasped in one another's grammatical grip) is negated. In that case the logical outcome will be EXIT-ONE "Asat" and ENTER-ANOTHER "ASAT".

Anyway, either "SAT" or another "Asat" would be the logical outcome of denying a given "Asat". Even so, the logical outcome of denying a given "SAT" would be "ASAT" or another "SAT". Under no circumstances would it be possible to get an entity which is neither existent nor non-existent, (neither "Sat" nor "Asat"). The concept or notion of "Sadasad-vilakshana" or "Anirvachaniya" is riddled with contradictions. The double negative is everywhere used to make assurance doubly sure.

Madhva next proceeds to analyse the actual import conveyed by the term "Sadasad-vilakshana". The term "Vilakshana" ordinarily means "different" and "Vilakshanya" difference". Will this do? If this import be rendered elastic enough to admit of an intelligible relation, then four alternatives are possible, none of which could be sustained. (1) Does this relation admit of characterisation as "difference"? (2) Is it "Abheda"—identity"? (3) Is it "identity-shot" difference"? or "difference-shot" identity,—Bheda-abheda? (4) Or is it something different from Bheda-abheda?

The relation cannot be described as "Bheda"—difference. According to the Absolutist, there is no existent other than Brahman or the Absolute. If the term in question is to mean anything it should be that silver seen in shell is different from Brahman. This conclusion will contradict the central doctrine of Absolutism that there is no difference at all. The usual contention can be anticipated easily. Difference which is as real as the Absolute is denied, but, there is difference of a lower degree of reality. Let it be used in the present context. Madhva replies that before an argument like that is made use of, the Absolutist should make clear what he means by the term "Vyavaharika". Does it mean according to Absolutistic tradition "Anirvachaniya" neither "Sat." nor "asat." If that pseudo-concept is first known to have any logical standing, then, it can be used. Its status itself is dubious. If it is said that the object is to affirm general "Difference", the obviously final reply is that a generic concept of difference with two species of higher and lower degrees of reality is yet to be shown to have logical life.

If "Vyavaharika" on the other hand is taken to mean object or a conventional arrangement holding good under conditions of human existence, the difference is as good as real. There is no

universal law that whichever is existent is beyond conventional arrangement. Even the highest and the truest existent is an object spoken of in conventional human concerns. If the term "Vyavaharika" is thus restricted to conventional values of life, a generic concept of "Vyavaharika" which will apply to perceptual illusions, and normal perceptions alike is yet to be discovered.

/ Nor can Absolute identity be the intended significance. No violence can be done to the observed difference between Brahman—the only *Sat*—existent—and the cosmos, which is admitted to be "*Sad-vilakshana*." How can there be identity between something which is existent and something which is not?

It should carefully be noted that there is no manner of inconsistency in Madhva's criticism of the first and the second alternatives. The Absolutist *cannot admit any difference anywhere* to be real. Madhva's criticism of the first alternative is based on the Absolutistic doctrine. Nor can the Absolutist affirm any downright identity right through facts, and fictions, existents and non-existents. There is a standing incompatibility between life with its countless knocks against stubborn realities and metaphysical kite-flying.

The third alternative is equally unacceptable to the Absolutist. Degrees of reality will still be an open problem for debate. Identity-shot difference and difference-shot identity cannot belong to the same order of reality.

Having ever a warm corner for identity the Absolutist is sure to accord only a step-motherly treatment to difference. Anyhow, the "Wholehogger" absolutist cannot admit identity-shot difference and difference-shot identity unless he agreed to a compromise, and compromises all the world over are only indicative of a surrender of one's original claims made in a flamboyant manner.

Should there be absolute identity between Brahman and the "*Anirvachaniya*" of orders of reality antagonistic to one another, there arises a linguistic difficulty. The absolute identity between the two, which is a metaphysical doctrine creates linguistic difficulties the moment the doctrine is attempted to be translated into language. The general usage adopted by the absolutist is to the effect that the cosmos of a lesser degree of reality is super-imposed on the One Reality of Brahman. Or Brahman has manifested itself as the cosmos. The appearance of cosmos is due to the energising of the Absolute. All this is empty Jargon. If Absolute identity is to be affirmed between the Universe and Brahman, the two can never be gripped into a propositional subject-predicate relation. If identity between X and Y were a fact, they cannot be linked into subject-predicate relation.

The proposition if proclaimed by a fiat, would assert only bare identity like A is A. If Brahman or the Absolute is to be signified by a bare identity scriptural terms that are used in respect of it will be redundant as they will not be able to denote or connote anything new.

This criticism urged by Madhva adversely affects the "Akhandartha" doctrine, namely, that different scriptural terms describing the nature of Brahman point in the direction of the one Existent, pure Brahman or the Attributeless Absolute, as redundancy is impossible to be got rid of. But an attempt is sometimes made to verse and Brahman, the two can never be gripped into a proposition the doctrine of the charge of redundancy of expressions. The Absolutist contends that though the different terms and expressions have only the Attributeless Absolute as their object yet, there is no redundancy as each term like "Satyam" "Jnyanam" etc., is intended to negate "Asatyam" "Ajnyanam" -etc., superimposed on Brahman. All talk of redundancy is at an end when it is seen that each term excludes some suggested misapprehension of the nature of Brahman.

Madhva refutes the contention thus—Granting that such endless exclusions of suggested misinterpretations of the nature of Brahman are in order, further investigation is obligatory. A person studies scripture in the prescribed manner or otherwise becomes acquainted with the term "Brahman" used frequently in metaphysical debates and texts. Now, if in respect of Brahman thus vaguely known a more clear and distinct knowledge is possible to be gained by learning that the terms like "Satyam"—Truth—and "Jnyanam" knowledge—exclude Untruth and Ignorance and so forth, surely, the clarification so obtained lays the axe direct to the root of the magnificent tree of "The Akhandartha" doctrine according to which there is nothing to be gained, nothing to be lost, and nothing to be clarified, as scriptural terms and texts proclaim only the Attributeless Brahman, or Absolute as the fundamental and foundational Reality. The Absolutist contends that there is something to be excluded. (vyavartya). Well and Good. What is that? Some suggested erroneous account of the nature of Brahman. After the elimination of the erroneous view Brahman should be naturally qualified by the said elimination. Otherwise, Why should one worry himself about the elimination at all? After the elimination of the suggested error, Brahman partially and imperfectly known becomes clearly known. This is the true state of affairs. If the Absolutist were to admit this, his doctrine of "Akhandartha" that the scriptural texts proclaim the existence of pure, Attributeless, Absolute would have taken wings!

If, on the contrary, it is contended that the exclusion of suggested Untruth, Ignorance, etc., does not clarify knowledge

about Brahman possessed by an enquirer, then, all thought-requirements are fulfilled and all thought-needs satisfied, by the use of the term "Brahman" alone. Other terms like "Satyam" "Jnyanam" etc., need not be used at all when it is expressly admitted that using them and bringing about an exclusion of the opposites indicated by them do not in any manner qualitatively improve the knowledge possessed by an investigator about the nature of Brahman. The admission of absence of any qualitative improvement of the nature of knowledge about Brahman and the use of terms clamorously claimed to exclude suggestions of alien and unbefitting characteristics in respect of Brahman are incompatible with one another. The Attributeless Absolute is ever there. Its nature *qua* existent is already got at. In fact there is even nothing to get at, strictly speaking. When such is the Absolutistic Doctrine where is the need for the use of terms like "Satyam-Jnyanam?"

The old, stock-argument that "Viseshas" or determinations are all illusory, of a lower order of Reality and so on, cannot stand scrutiny. The illusoriness of determinations cannot so easily be taken for granted. What exactly is meant by "Illusoriness" itself remains to be settled. Whatever the settlement it cannot mean that pseudo-concept of "Anirvachaniya"—(neither Sat nor "Asat".) It is easy to recall that the Absolutist advanced a Syllogistic or Inferential argument that determinations like the "Creator-ship" of the cosmos etc., were all Unreal, and that the Absolute is devoid of all determinations. It should be understood clearly for purposes of debate, the "Illusoriness" is not a fact until established and demonstrated. There is no illustrative or corroborative instance supporting the inference. Because, "Illusoriness" (Sadasadvilakshana). is pseudo-concept. There is a vicious and illogical reciprocity between the Inferential process and illusoriness.

If, on the other hand, difference among the illusory determinations be accepted, an endless regress will ensue. How? The difference itself admitted cannot be real. It is illusory. To account for the difference there should be some agency, that brings about the difference. That agency cannot be real. If it were Monism would be gone.

Or, there will be a circular reasoning. The pseudo-concept of "Anirvachaniya" neither "Sat nor asat" is established by Inference. If the concept is proved to be really sound, then, through its instrumentality, determinations of Brahman can be demonstrated to be illusory. If the determinations are thus demonstrated to be illusory creatorship of the cosmos etc., will be proved to be illusory. Then the Absolute will have been proved to be Attributeless. There is thus circular reasoning in which

inferentially established illusoriness, illusoriness of the determinations of Brahman, and Attributelessness of the Absolute are all involved.

The fourth alternative will have to be automatically rejected. Unless and until the nature of difference from "Sat" and "Asat" is made clear, it is impossible to arrive at the notion of something which is different from "identity-shot difference" and "Difference-shot identity". The Absolutist will have to be told that before he ventures to bamboozle the lay and philosophical public with the exhibition of a gigantic superstructure into which difference, identity, difference from both, and others enter as constituent elements, he should convince truth-seekers that the foundations laid by him are sure. The most important foundation is the nature of difference from "Sat and Asat". Philosophy and Common sense, are aware only of the position that what is not "SAT" is "ASAT" and so on. The "Sadasadvilakshana" something which is neither "SAT" nor "ASAT" is a mysterious entity. It is neither fish, flesh, nor good red-herring.

Having thus shown, that the interpretation of the term "Sadvilakshana" is riddled with inconsistencies, and contradictions. Madhva proceeds to analyse the import of the other term "Asadvilakshana". Three constituents are involved, namely, the negative indicator, the "Sat", and difference from the "Asat". The negative indicator has usually three meanings, Abhava, (non-existence) Anyatva, (difference) and Virodha, (contradiction, conflict, or incompatibility.) Let us try the first. The compound is "Asadvilakshana." "Sat" is existent. "Asat" is non-existent. "Asadvilkshana" is different from non-existent, which is existent itself. This is exactly what is repudiated by the Absolutist. (b) There is again trouble in the fixation of the import of the term "Asat". Does the Absolutist understand by the term "Sat" The Only Real Reality of "Paramarthika" and by the term "A-Sat" absolute non-existent like a mare's nest? At one extreme the ASAT is incapable of any determination. It cannot be determined even as different from the Sat. At the other extreme, Brahman is incapable of any determination. When the determinationlessness or incapability of any determination of "ASAT" (like Mare's nest) and SAT (Brahman) stares one in the face the import of "Asadvilakshana" something different from this dubious "ASAT" must stand a *fortiori* far removed from logical considerations, and philosophic acceptance of it must be unthinkable. If, on the other hand, "SAT" should be taken to mean existent, and "ASAT" non-existent it is just what the Absolutist desires to establish as the property of the cosmos or cosmic show, and then, "Asadvilakshana" becomes a concept crowned with contradiction. For, the conclusion sought to be established by the Absolutist is reached with the compound "ASAT" "SAT" meaning existent and "Asat" an illusion. Should a further



step be taken to arrive at difference from the conclusion so formulated a contradiction is inevitable. On this interpretation, in fact, the term "Vilakshana" is superfluous and if added, involves the Absolutist in a contradiction. If the Absolutist still persists in the addition of the term "VILAKSHANA" the position will be just the opposite of what is nearest his heart's desire. The following are the steps—"SAT" means existent. (2) "ASAT" means non-existent. (3) That which is different (Vilakshana) from non-existent is existent itself, as first-rate reality. The illusoriness of the Universe does stand repudiated instead of its being established. (c) If the negative indicator means contradiction, conflict, or incompatibility "SAT" and "ASAT" will be governed strictly by the law of contradiction or Non-Contradiction. Undisturbed Uniformity of interpretation of "SAT" should be maintained. The two "SAT" and "ASAT" will be contradictory of one another. "Vilakshana" will mean "different". Of a pair of contradictories if one is denied the other is IPSO FACTO affirmed. If "ASAT" is denied in the total import of the compound "ASAD-Vilakshana", the "SAT" will stand affirmed. The Universe will be a "SAT" a real existent as much real as Brahman or the Absolute Itself. It is evident, in the light of the aforesaid analysis, that the logical status of the notion of "ASAT" itself is extremely dubious, whatever may be the meaning that is adopted of the negative indicator. (1).

Madhva sums up the discussion thus. At the opening of the present treatise, Madhva pointed out that the names of the deities apparently independent appearing in sacrificial hymns refer as a matter of fact to Sri Narayana. This doctrine elicited the Absolutistic protest that Brahman is Attributeless. Madhva replied that the *Pramanas* are all against such a view. Sense-awareness cannot catch glimpses of the Absolute. Revelation and Reason demonstrate that the Supreme Lord is the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the cosmos. He is full of Infinite number of Infinite attributes which are Excellent. By way of replying to the contention that the Attributes, Qualities, of Brahman are all illusory (and assigned to a lower or inferior order of reality,) Madhva analysed carefully the notion of Degrees of Reality, and the concept of illusoriness, "Sadasad-vilakshana" exposed their logical untenability and concluded that Sri Narayana, the Supreme Lord is Full of an Infinite Number of Infinite Excellent Attributes. (ATONANTAGUNO-BHAGAVAN NARAYANA-ITI-SIDDHAM). The sacrificial hymns in question refer to Lord Sri Narayana, for the attributes mentioned therein cannot belong to other minor gods and deities.

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(1) While the author of "Khandana-Khanda-Khadya" enthusiastically maintains that the Universe is strictly unknowable and uncharacterisable.—"Anirvachaniya" or "Sadasad-vilakshana,"—Madhva and his followers contend that the concept is a mysterious nondescript, a *tertium quid* which has no metaphysical status.

## II.

The Prabhakara school of Purvameemamsa contends that the grammatical units coalesce into a sentence, and terms into a proposition and indicate something to be achieved and secured. In other words, some activity, something inseparably associated with such activity are indicated by words, and sentences, terms, and propositions. Where does Brahman come in, in this argument? Brahman is already there, an entity securely, grounded and established and no activity would interfere with Brahman in any manner. The linguistic mechanism, secular and spiritual, is intended to fulfil only that function. Brahman being foundational Entity not in any manner affected by the activity of finite man, cannot be the subject-matter of scriptural texts and sentences. The implication of this contention is that scriptural texts only sing the glory of sacrifices by which Purvameemamsa swears, and of the mysterious efficacy of "APURVA" which establishes as it were a link between a sacrificial act done here and the heavenly reward to be enjoyed hereafter.

Madhva argues that the contention of the Meemamsaka cannot be accepted. In the onward march of progress, objects and values, physical and psychical entities, are knit together in a colossal cosmic structure, and they are apprehended gradually by means of a process of education. Successful life which consists in efficient adjustment to the somatic and psychical environment is grounded on education. To a beginner all is new. To an expert there is nothing new under the sun. To the former all is ( "Karya" ) to be achieved and assimilated. To the latter all is ( "Siddha" ) achieved and assimilated. There is absolutely no antagonism or opposition between the two as imagined by Meemamsakas.

The verbal form which conveys commandments, and injunctions in scripture, and orders and instructions in secular concerns, essentially signifies an assessment of the value of a course of projected action or an object or system of objects, relations etc., in terms of hedonistic standards. Of course, that is not the hedonism of the moment which clings to pursuit of pleasure that is immediate and striking, oblivious of the deeper interest of existence, and oblivious alike of the heroisms of higher hedonism, which is prepared to mortify the flesh for the sake of the spirit. Wherever we find linguistic expressions or verbs indicating commands, precepts, etc., we should be perfectly justified in urging the interpretation that a verb means that the pursuit in question is inseparably linked with an interest acquired. In fact there is nothing of moment in life that is not intimately linked up with hedonistic evaluation. The contention the Meemamsaka that the verb connotes "Karyata" achievability by means of necessary and adequate effort is too illogical and in fact baseless. The verb, on the contrary, connotes, "ISHTASADHANATA"

directly or indirectly promoting the hedonistic interests or the pragmatic interests of a subject. It is easy to see that the latter includes the former. But not vice-versa. In a proposition like "SWALLOW POISON", the verb undoubtedly indicates achievability by means of putting forth effort, but, the act itself is so patently injurious to the well-being of the subject concerned, that the command, instruction, or suggestion is forthwith rejected.

The verb, as a matter of fact indicates only "ISHTASADHANATA" namely that a particular course of action, if pursued intelligently, will lead to the promotion of the pragmatic interests of a subject. Emotional values are thus inseparably linked with Cognitive and Volitional ones. The verb in all normal instances fulfils the function of conveying to the subject concerned, the import that pursuit of a projected plan of procedure will lead to the advancement of his interests. This is the primary and foremost function. After this essential and fundamental function has been once fulfilled, the verb should be taken to become FUNCTUS OFFICIO, and should not be saddled with a fresh task of connoting activity or achievability by means of activity. The latter procedure may be found some circumlocutory justification, if the notion of activity is not made clear. As a matter of fact, however, the connotation of pursuit of Pragmatic Values, involves activity and achievability after effort and activity. [The latter need not be specially mentioned. The former should be. In a word "ISHTASADHANATA—INCLUDES KARYATA" i.e. the natural, unstrained, indication conveyed by the verb is a reward in the shape of satisfaction of hedonistic values. Activity, Achievability, effort, endeavour, plan, procedure and all the rest of it are implied as inevitable concomitants.

Madhva proceeds further and remarks that if, the Purvameemamsaka still clings to ("KARYATA") the view that the verb indicates activity and not ("ISHTASADHANATA")—promotion of happiness—he should state the appropriate *Pramana*, the guarantee of such a view. He cannot mention language or "sabda," itself as a *Pramana*. That is exactly the subject-matter of the present discussion. If he should cite language as a *Pramana* he would have pre-judged the entire case.

Nor is it possible to seek the aid of inference. No corroborative or illustrative instances can be offered. Whether the instances are chosen at random or after deep deliberation, they reveal on analysis the prominent characteristic of the verb connoting "means for the promotion of happiness." From no illustrative or corroborative instance can this element be eliminated. In other words, instances in which the verb connotes *only* activity or achievability after activity, without reference to hedonistic satisfaction, are not to be found anywhere in experience, and, inference therefore must fail of its purpose.

Nor can "ARTHAPATTI" be useful. Stout Devadatta, while *starving during the day* goes strong like Johny Walker. The observed maintenance of Devadatta's stoutness, and strength intact, indicates there should be a cause; and that is Devadatta *eating a sumptuous meal after night fall!* At the risk of a necessary torture of expression, one may render "ARTHAPATTI" into "otherwise-- inexplicability-of-an-observed fact" advancing a given explanation. That is to say, Devadatta's stoutness cannot be explained otherwise than by taking as proved that he devours a meal at night. No doubt this is a variety of inference itself, as shown by Madhva elsewhere (2) and when it is argued that inference is powerless to support the doctrine of the "Purvameemamsaka". "ARTHAPATTI" will not achieve any better success. Still, the impossibility of urging "ARTHAPATTI" as a *Pramana* to bolster up the Meemamsic view that the verb connotes activity or achievability but not hedonistic satisfaction or means of such satisfaction, is emphasized by Madhva to make assurance doubly sure. In the example of Devadatta the observed stoutness and strength of the person cannot be explained in any other way than by taking as proved his eating at nights. In other terms the observed conditions of Devadatta's daily growth even without a meal during the day are a stumbling-block to the acceptance of any other explanation than certainty of a heavy night meal swallowed by Devadatta. There is no such stumbling-block in the present instance. All endeavour and effort, activity, etc., could be explained by the fact that anticipations however vague and nebulous, of hedonistic joy are the motive forces, while the goal is concretisation of that happiness. There is no activity without the indispensable and inevitable concomitant of hedonistic satisfaction. The species of inference known as "ARTHAPATTI" does not establish the Meemamsaka doctrine.

How does the Meemamsaka make sure that all words, language-units converge unmistakably in the direction of "Karya" some activity, achievability and so forth? If he should state that actual experience is his guide, the obvious reply according to Madhva is that language converges towards the indication and connotation of things, values, relations, once established and those that have nothing to do with the "activity"—"achievability"—of the Meemamsaka. Madhva's view is also grounded on experience to which the Meemamsaka appeals. When further, the Meemamsaka rejoins that even where there is no explicit reference to any "Karya" (activity)

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(2) "Arthapatti" is subsumed by Madhva under Inference. It is really proceeding from the known to the un-known. In the familiar instance you proceed from the known and observed fact of X continuing hale and healthy without taking food during the day, to the unknown and un-observed fact of his consuming a meal at night. It involves an indirect demonstration. To explain the observed health of X his night meal must be a certainly, as we know he does not eat during the daytime. Assume the night meal is not a fact. Then the observed health of X becomes unaccountable. See Chapter on "Pramanalakshana" (Chap. 2.)

the term *should be understood* to exist, Madhva retorts, that in cases where there is reference to such activity, the term even if it exists *should be deleted*. As a matter of fact language is definitely seen to convey or signify countless reactions other than activity.

When the significance of an established order or a traditionally hallowed scheme of things is gradually apprehended, language indicates objects, things, relations, values, etc., that are already there. (Siddha). They are *not* brought *de novo into existence* by the activity of any individual or a class, when they are apprehended. In well-known instances, one may speak of an entirely novel construction or an original discovery or invention, but it must have been in existence in some potential or embryonic form. The genius of a person, or inspiration, or plodding effort of an investigator drags to the surface what had been all along lying idle, dormant, and unnoticed. Language keeps pace with human progress and advancement. New terms are coined to suit new notions, and language gets enriched. That is the truth of the matter. Intellectual apprehension of this established order no doubt involves exercise of selective attention and effort on the part of a pupil or a beginner. Soon he adjusts himself perfectly to the environment and gains control over the linguistic mechanism. It would be ritualistic dichardism of the most unmitigated type to emphasize "activity" at every turn.

The psychological motive of the Meemamsaka is clear. A sacrifice or a complicated ritualistic performance is the result of "activity." But on that ground, he cannot be permitted to trespass into realms where he is least wanted. His little sacrifice is made, and achieved by his activity, but, a generalisation from meagre data that all language indicates only activity and that Brahman not being so, does not exist, and is not indicated by terms like "Brahman", "Deva" etc. is strictly untenable. The modern scientist intoxicated by the so-called victories he has gained over the forces of nature, may as well argue that because God does not lend Himself to laboratory treatment, He does not exist at all. The argument that if God exists, He should be bottled up in Leyden-Jars made and manufactured by human effort (Karya) carries its own condemnation with it.

A little reflection is sufficient to enable one to see that the Meemamsic apotheosis of "Karya" is based on special pleading. All special pleadings suffer from narrowness. The Purvameemsaka has a congenital incapacity to look beyond his own nose. His rituals and sacrifices are his only concern. They are done, achieved, commenced and concluded. Why not Brahman?

The only answer is that Brahman is not at the beck and call of the Meemamsaka or anybody else for the matter of that.

He is ever Immanent in the Cosmos Established from Eternity to Eternity (Siddha). That is merely a doctrine. His Immanence should be realised actively by spiritual aspirants, who should come face to face with Him. His Grace is the supreme reward for which aspirants toil.

His grace is not to be had for the merest asking for it. The Supreme Lord—Narayana— knows who are fit to receive His Grace. It should be the spiritual ambition of every mortal that His Grace may be sooner or later earned. By devotional worship a person becomes eligible after a career of strenuous purification of mind and body, for earning divine grace. How is it possible to worship. One whose nature and characteristics are shrouded in mystery? The sacred texts are the only sources from which an enquirer can learn something about the nature and characteristics of the Supreme Being. Sense-awareness cannot reveal the nature of God. Inference is unable to reveal the nature of God. Inference will cut both ways. If the existence of god can be inferentially established it can be demolished by means of a counter-inference.

Sacred texts reveal and proclaim the nature of the Supreme Creator of the Cosmos, its Preserver and Destroyer. Learning something about the nature and characteristics of the Divine Ruler of the Universe, an aspirant concentrates his attention on prayerful and Devotional worship of Him. In the fulness of time, spiritual efforts bear fruit. Divine Grace is showered on him. He becomes free from the ills of recurring cycles of births and deaths. In a word, he gains freedom from Karmic Bondage,.

Spiritual progress is slow and by degrees. There are inevitable stages. Language of the sacred text is the only source of knowledge about the Supreme Being. The Meemamsaka has no right to demand that language be restricted to something which is the outcome of or connected with activity, in a narrow ritualistic sense.

To the vast majority of mankind, language is an effective weapon through the instrumentality of which meaning of external reality is grasped. That reality however is not brought into existence *de novo* by persons. When external reality itself with its well-ordered schemes of men and things, systems of organised and unorganised matter and spirit, is not the creation or the mental construction of any one the Supreme Overlord of the Cosmos, Whose nature and Characteristics are proclaimed by scriptural texts, can never be ("KARYA") made, manufactured or patented by human intellect in any laboratory, physical or metaphysical Language, secular and spiritual, relates to and expresses an order of external reality existing independently of the linguistic or any

other activity of human beings. There is nothing illogical or untenable in the scriptural texts and hymns like the "Mahanamnee" under discussion proclaiming the Infinite Excellent Characteristics of the Supreme Lord devotional contemplation of which gradually purifies the mind of its passions, and prejudices, and eventually prepares an individual for standing face to face with the Supreme Creator of the Cosmos. Madhva winds up this portion of the discussion thus—"Atassidharthe— - pramanyasiddhescha - Siddham - Mahagunatvam - Vishnoh." As proper thought exercised over the grammatical and logical functions of language, would convince anyone that language, secular and scriptural refers to an established order of reality, hymns used in sacrifices and rituals sing the Glory of the Supreme Lord Narayana who is endowed with an Infinite number of Infinite Excellent attributes and Who is the Author of Reality

### III

The rest of the work is devoted to an interpretation of the sacrificial hymns into the details of which it is impossible to enter. The details are too technical and do not easily lend themselves to exposition in an alien tongue. (3)

The philosophical significance of the work "Karma Nirnaya" is quite obvious. Rituals and Religious rites have their own place in a scheme of things. Madhva does not condemn them. It will indeed be very difficult to justify the performance of Rituals in the Absolutistic scheme. Absolutism requires no rituals. It is laboured special pleading to contend that even in the system of Absolutism rituals have their place. Yes. They have. But, they have only a lesser degree of reality. Granting that *somehow*, Absolutism can also successfully accommodate ritualism, Madhva maintains that a Theism or Mono-Theism can do justice to every aspect of religion and philosophy in a more efficient and logical manner than absolutism or Monistic Absolutism.

Rituals involve rigorous discipline. Participation in them promotes the spirit of corporate existence and disciplined life. Rituals however according to Madhva are not ends in themselves. They should not be performed in lively expectations of rosy romance with heavenly houries. Ritualistic performances done in expectation of rewards, to be reaped here or hereafter, mark a fall from the ideal. Expectation or anticipation of any reward renders ritualism rotten.

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(3) For the full text of "Karma-Nirnaya"—a very hard nut to crack—see pp. 250—258. Vol-1. "Sarvamula." The Philosophical essence of the work is thus summed up by Madhva. "Bhagavad-Bhakti-Jnyanavairagya-poorvakam-cha-karma-kartavyam." Rituals, our duties secular and spiritual have to be performed in a spirit of devotional dedication of the outcome to the Lord and in a spirit of detachment, or non-attachment.

On the other hand, rituals, when and if performed have to be gone through in a spirit of devotional dedication of the outcome to the Supreme Lord. Slaughtering of an animal, burning of incense, smashing of cocoanuts are not the essentials or the fundamentals of ritualism. It is the spirit that counts. Not merely the performance of rituals, but, every activity and all actions that can be ethically and spiritually evaluated should be pursued with a clear consciousness that they are under the close surveillance of the Supreme Lord.

Sanctimonious simulacrum of saintliness may elicit the applause, homage, and the patronage which they deserve, from unthinking folk and bamboozled superiors respectively but, it will not hoodwink the Cosmic Censor. Towards the conclusion of "Karma Nirnaya" Madhva emphasizes that human actions secular and spiritual should be performed, should be dedicated to the Divine Ruler of the Cosmos.

Some may feel an urge in the direction of political work. Others may feel inclined to devote their time and energies to humanitarian enterprises. Yet others may respond to the call or message of the forest and the siren voices of cloistered seclusion. Whatever the field of activity chosen, and whatever the sphere of special work, our duties will have to be discharged in a spirit of devotional and prayerful dedication of all we do to the Supreme Being. Not even for a single moment can a conscious agent remain passive. Apparently passive, one is esoterically evolving in the inmost corners of his heart schemes for self-advancement, self-aggrandisement and self-glorification. Or it may be schemes for self-purification and self-sacrifice are projected. Such differences environmental, temperamental, cogenital, and situational do matter but our duties, secular and spiritual should have to be performed in a spirit of devotional dedication of the consequences of our acts not merely, but of the most precious possessions in life to the Divine Overlord of the Cosmos—Sri Narayana,—full of an Infinite Number of Infinite Excellent Attributes. That is the quintessence of the message intended to be conveyed by Madhva in his work "Karma Nirnaya."

### SUMMARY.

1. Challenged by some contemporary Pandits to exhibit his proficiency in the Ritualistic portion of the sacred texts, Madhva wrote "Karma Nirnaya" in which certain complicated sacrificial hymns known as the "Mahanamnee" are explained.
2. In the opening portion of the work, the view of the Monistic Absolutist that Brahman is Attributeless in controverted and refuted.



3. The doctrine of the Prabhakara school of Purvameemamsa that the linguistic mechanism has fundamental reference to some activity (Karya) is repudiated by Madhva who maintains that the mechanism of language has fundamental reference to an established order of reality (Siddha) independent of activity.
4. Madhva's Thesis maintained in opposition to the Meemamsaka is helpful in establishing the doctrine that the nature of Brahman is to be reliably learnt only from scripture.
5. Rituals have to be performed in a spirit of devotional dedication of the outcome or the result or effect to the Supreme Being.

#### REFERENCES.

1. KARMA—NIRNAYA. By Madhva.
2. Commentary on (1) by Jaya Tirtha.
3. Commentary on (2) by Srinivasa Tirtha.



## CHAPTER XI.

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### CONTROVERSIAL LITERATURE

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#### MADHVA

The ten Prakaranas, the doctrines and arguments embodied in which were expounded and explained in the previous chapters, form as it were a textual pivot round which has centred a mass of controversial literature a brief account of which is given in the present chapter, without any claim being made for exhaustiveness, or completeness. Students and specialists may well go to the original Sanskrit sources, if they want to cultivate intimate acquaintance with the workings of thought of the intellectual giants, juxtaposition with whom of contemporary writers makes the latter perfect pigmies. Keeping in mind the fact that the present exposition of the doctrines of Madhva, and of the arguments advanced by subsequent controversialists to maintain intact the edifice of Radical Realism, Pluralism and Theism, is intended for the benefit of students of Philosophy, who may not be in a position to make use of the original Sanskrit texts, I shall mention briefly, yet, consistently with the requirements of the exposition on hand, the controversial works written by Madhva and his champions from time to time, just hinting at the nature of the main and fundamental thesis maintained by them.

#### ANUVYAKHYANA

By far the most important and fighting work of Madhva is the "ANUVYAKHYANA", written in the form of easy and rapidly flowing verses in Sanskrit. It interprets the "Sutras" of Badarayana, in accordance with the Realism, Pluralism and Theism of Madhva. In the necessary contexts, problems of Psychology, Ethics, Theory of Knowledge, and general Metaphysics are discussed and the views of the Monistic Absolutist are criticised. The Theistic and Pluralistic interpretations of the Vedanta Sutras, are harmonised with the Upanishadic texts as well. The latter are discussed in the former. Interpretational harmony between the two should be secured. Sankara and Ramanuja harmonised them in their own way. Madhva achieves the harmonisation in his own way. The discussion of the meaning of the Vedanta Sutras is full of quotations from the Sruti, Smriti, Puranas, etc., and the work runs roughly to 2,000 stanzas, which are crisp, terse, pithy, flowing, and mostly cast in the "Anushtup" metre. Following the general plan of the Sutras, Madhva maintains that

the different terms used in the scriptural texts to denote other gods, in a general manner as creators of this or that fraction of reality and so forth, do, as a matter of fact, refer to the Supreme Overlord of the Universe, Sri Narayana, Who is said to be the object of meditation and contemplation by aspirants and seekers after metaphysical Truth, and Whose definition is given in the second Sutra, as the Author of Creation, Preservation, and Destruction of the Cosmos. The interpretational harmony which emphasizes the truth that the Foundational and fundamental Reality proclaimed by the Upanishads, the Reality that is responsible for the creation, preservation and destruction of the Cosmos, is Lord Narayana, Consort of Mahalakshmi, is technically known as "Samanvaya." The first Adhyaya or chapter of the Sutras is known as "Samanvayadhyaya." In the second chapter, other systems of thought like the Sankhya, Buddhism, Jainism, etc., are criticised. Madhva's criticism does not proceed along the groove in which those of other Bhashyakaras had and, in his criticism of Sankhya especially, he has chalked out for himself a comparatively new path. In commenting on the third chapter of the Sutras known as the "Sadhnadhyaya", Madhva has brought out the spiritual significance of mastering the means of realising the Majesty of the Almighty. An aspirant should learn from a reliable, kind, and sympathetic preceptor—Guru—the nature of Brahman and the secrets of spiritual practices and discipline. He should then calmly contemplate and dwell on the truths learnt by him. By gradual stages, he should practise the discipline, purify himself and then he is sure to be blessed with a beautiful vision of God. In the fourth chapter, the nature of final liberation from the recurring cycles of births and deaths—MUKTI—is described and discussed. The four chapters of the Vedanta Sutras are respectively known as the 1—SAMANVAYA, 2—AVIRODHA, 3—SADHANA, and 4—PHALA Adhyayas. In the controversial treatise of "ANUVYAKHYANA" Madhva has maintained the Realistic, Pluralistic, and Theistic interpretation of the Sutras, and refuted rival theories and doctrines.

## 2—NYAYA-SUDHA

The works of Madhva are all very concise, and the language used by the Acharya is very terse. But for the commentaries written on them by Jaya Tirtha, Madhva's works will try the patience of even the apotheosis of patience among men. No wonder ignorant critics unable to make out the significance of the all too brief sentences of Madhva hide their inferiority complexes in the judgment that there is nothing useful in them! Thank God that Madhva is not a candidate for any Degree Examinations over the destinies of which the ignorant critics preside in the capacity of examiners! They would then surely plough the Acharya as his language would be unintelligible to them.

The "ANUVYAKHYANA" read without the help of a qualified Pandit and of Jaya Tirtha's commentary on it will not be intelligible at all. No doubt a mere perusal of the text may produce an impression, which however is hardly sufficient. "NYAYA-SUDHA" is a first rate classic, a superb controversial treatise, and an illuminating commentary on the "Anu-Vyakhyana". It is known in orthodox pandit circles simply as "SUDHA". It is as voluminous as the "Valmiki Ramayana" and runs to about 24,000 Granthas (Grantha being a thirty-two letter unit). The views and criticisms contained in the "BHAMATI" of Vachaspathi Misra are quoted and refuted in it.

### 3—VAADAVALI

An independent work contributed by Jaya-Tirtha to the mass of controversial literature is known as "Vaadavali". The Illusionistic doctrine with all its usual paraphernalia is refuted in detail. The well-known syllogistic argument intended to establish the unreality of the Universe—"Vimatam. (visvam) Mithya, Drisyatvat, Jadatvat, Paricchinnatvat, Suktirajatavat", is analysed and refuted in minute details, and the reality of the universe is established. The almost world-old suspicion that the senses deceive the subject, being only appearance-intercepting, is shattered to pieces, and sense-knowledge is vindicated as fit to reveal the characteristics of objects as they are. Sense-awareness functioning under normal conditions is puissant enough to overthrow the inference that the universe is illusory. Discussing the relative strength of Sense-awareness and Inference, Jaya Tirtha maintains that syllogistic argument is unable to overthrow normally conditioned sense-awareness, which guarantees the reality of the Universe. Ratiocination and Inference cannot be allowed to run riot. "Pratyaksha - virodhena-praptamarnavasthasya-pratyaksha-virodha akshamatvat." An inferential argument, observes Jaya-Tirtha, which is *in extremis* lightning-struck as it were on account of its conflict with sense-awareness, is utterly powerless to deprive the universe of its inalienable birthright of reality. Sruti texts believed to support the Monistic interpretation are re-interpreted. The concept of "Avidya" is criticised at length. The views in "Chitsukhi" and "Vivarana" are criticised.

### 4—BHEDOJJIVANA

Vyasa Raja is undoubtedly the most successful and powerful controversialist after Jaya Tirtha. Tradition has it that he enjoyed the patronage of Krishna Deva Raya of the never-to-be forgotten Empire of Vijayanagar, who daily received from his Guru counsel secular and spiritual. Vyasaraja was regarded by Krishnadeva Raya as the guardian saint or the guardian angel of his Empire. Krishnadeva Raya gave his Guru a precious-stones'-shower-bath. (Ratnabhisheka.)

Vyasaraaja was the unrivalled Monarch of controversialists who courageously and consistently championed the cause of a Renaissance of Realism and vindicated the power and prestige of Pluralistic Theism. The "Bhedojjeevana" is a short work, and as the name suggests it is intended to resuscitate "BHEDA" (Difference) stifled by the Monist. That the doctrine of Difference (BHEDA) is guaranteed by the three Pramanas, Pratyaksha, Anumana, and Agama (sense-awareness, Inference and sacred text) is the cardinal conclusion of the work. Within a short compass, the author has covered the entire ground of Monistic Literature pushed into contemporary prominence, and maintained that the Universe is grounded on "Difference", Diversity" and "Disparity." More than a dozen Syllogisms have been coined by the Acharya which demonstrate that there are countless finite selves, spiritual entities, each encased in a nervous mechanism and working out its destiny in accordance with the inscrutable operations of the Karmic Law.

#### 5—NYAYAMRITA

In the vindication of Madhva's Realism and the philosophic power and prestige of Pluralistic Theism, Vyasaraaja had to deal with Monists as well as the Nyaya-Vaiseshikas. "Nyayamrita" is an elaborate controversial treatise containing four sections or chapters known as "Paricchedas." 1. The First Pariccheda is devoted to a demonstration of the doctrine of Reality of the Universe, and to an exhaustive and effective repudiation of the illusionistic doctrine. The doctrine of Degrees of Reality is argumentatively rejected. The topic dealt with is the vindication of Madhva's realistic metaphysic together with a discussion of concomitant and auxiliary problems. (Saparikara-Jagat-Satyatva-sadhanam.) 2. In the course of the second Pariccheda, the Monistic doctrine of "Akhandartha" is discussed and refuted. Difference is established to be fundamental and foundational of Reality. The doctrine of an Attributeless Absolute is rejected and the thesis established that Brahman—Sri Narayana—is full of an Infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes. 3. The Third Pariccheda is devoted to a critical exposition of the part played by the means of realising the Infinite-Brahman. 4. In the fourth, (the concluding) Pariccheda the author has explained the realistic doctrine of "Mukti" or final liberation of struggling aspirants from the recurring cycles of births and deaths, and criticised in an acute and penetrating manner the Absolutistic conception of Liberation as realisation of Oneness with Brahman. Advaitic works, like "Tatvapradipta" "Panchapadika", "Vivarana" are referred to in the appropriate contexts and the Monistic views contained in them are critically discussed and refuted. Vyasaraaja throughout adopts a vigorous, controversial style, and his arguments are rigorously logical. Of course, anything even in the nature of slight justice

cannot be done to Vyasaraja's marvellous powers of presentation and arresting argumentation, in this section of my work which is intended to sum up the controversial literature in a bibliographical manner.

### 6—TATPARYA-CHANDRIKA

"Tatparya-Chandrika" is a controversial work devoted by Vyasaraja to demonstrating that perfect attunement reigns only between Madhva's Realism and Pluralistic Theism, and the Aphorisms of Vyasa (Vedanta Sutas) and that other systems of metaphysics are not so attuned. Two phases are discernible in the work—destructive and constructive. The former is evident in the author's criticisms of the interpretations of the Vedanta Sutas by Sankara, Ramanuja, Vachaspathimisra (in Bhamati) and others. The latter is to be seen in his attempt at harmonisation of the utterances contained in the works of Madhva and his commentators. For instance, Vyasaraja explains points that are obscure, in Madhva's 1-Bhashya, 2-Anu-Bhashya, 3-Nyayavivarana, and Jaya Tirtha's 4-Tatvaparakasika, and 5-Nyaya-sudha, secures the desired interpretational harmonisation, and refutes rival hypotheses and interpretations. Vyasaraja sums up the scope and objective of the work thus—"Sutrc-Bhashyc-Anubhashyecha -sannyayavivritau-tatha-Teekasu-chayadaspashatm -taccha -spashtekarishyate —Pratisutram -prakesyete - ghatana-aghatane-maya-Svceyanyapakshayoh - samyak-vidamkurvantu-soorayah." The work is a commentary on "Tatvaparakasika" which is itself one on Madhva's Bhashya. It terminates at the end of the second chapter of the Sutas. It was completed by the tenth pontifical successor of Vyasaraja. The complete part has not yet been printed.

### 7—TARKA-TANDAVA

While ever ready to press into service the doctrines of "Nyaya-Vaiseshika" in its refutation of Monistic Idealism, or Absolutism, the school of Madhva has its own quarrels with the views of "Nyaya-Vaiseshika" which are refuted in a convincing controversial manner in his work "Tarka-Tandava", only parts of which have so far been published. Tradition records that while contemporary scholars of Nyaya-vaiseshika sang the praise of Vyasaraja aloud and unstintedly when he refuted Monistic Idealism in his "Nyayamrita", they became greatly incensed with the "Tarka-Tandava" directed against them, and commenced abusing the Yogi. Vyasaraja however knew only victory.

In the treatment of important problems like "Pramanya" (reliability and validity), "Veda-Apaurusheyatva" (Veda considered to be without human origin, or known and ascertainable authorship), "Isvara-Guna", the qualities of the Supreme Overlord of the Cosmos, and others, Madhva's school differs from the

"Nyaya-Vaiseshika" and Vyasaraja vindicates the views of Madhva and exposes the fallacies in the "Nyaya-Vaiseshika" doctrines. It was not quite to be expected that the voluble logician would accept defeat so readily even from a powerful adversary like Vyasaraja, and he kept on murmuring and shouting—"Nyayamritarjita-keertih-vinashta-Tarka-tandave." "The fame earned by Vyasaraja by means of his work "Nyayamrita", was lost when he wrote "Tarka-Tandava". "Nyayamrita", "Tatparya-Chandrika", and "Tarka-Tandava" are collectively known as "Vyasa-Traya."

### NYAYAMRITA AND AFTER

Vysaraja's "Nyamrita" proved to be a veritable apple of discord. It was a splendid attempt to focus controversial attention and open fire in a concentrated way on the works of Monists, and the challenge thrown by Vyasaraja was taken up by Madhusudana Sarasvathi, who in his masterly treatise "Advaita-Sidhi" quoted the "ipsissima verba" of "Nyayamrita" and replied to the arguments contained in the latter. Even to-day "Advaita-Siddhi" stands as a supreme and monumental attempt at maintenance intact of the magnificent Monistic edifice on the solid foundations laid by masterminds like Sankara.

### 8—NYAYAMRITA-TARANGINI

Vyasaramacharya (known simply as Ramacharya) along with a friend of his went to Madhusudana Sarasvati, *incognito*, studied the "Advaita-Siddhi" line by line under its very author (that is the traditional account) and at the termination of his studies presented Madhusudana Sarasvati, his Guru, with a copy of "Nyayamrita-Tarangini" a scathing and searching criticism of "Advaita-Siddhi." The friend wrote another criticism of "Advaita-Siddhi" known as "Nyayamrita-Kantakoddhara."

Brahmananda Sarasvati did not brook criticism of "Advaita-Siddhi", in the "Nyayamrita-Tarangini". He attacked the latter in his work "GURU-CHANDRIKA" (known as "Guru-Brahmanandiyam"). "Guru-Chandrika" criticises the "Tarangini" quoting wherever necessary the *ipsissima verba* of the latter.

### 9—NYAYAMRITA-TARANGINI-SAURABHA

Vanamali-Misra in his invincible treatise, terse, technical and telling, known as "Nyayamrita-Tarangini-Saurabha," criticises the "Guru-Chandrika" quoting the *ipsissima verba* of the latter, and exhibits unbroken continuity of thought among his own work and two of its immediate predecessors—"Nyayamrita" and "Tarangini." The work is known among the Pandit circles by its shorter name "Vanamalimisriya", after its author. In the decision of many of the disputed points, Vanamali-Misra remarks that after

all the arguments advanced by Vyasaraja in "Nyayamrita" have not been properly answered in the "Advaita-Siddhi" and the "Guru-Chandrika" and that a great deal of fire and fury could have been avoided if the parties to debate had made it a point to understand the arguments of one another. Vanamali-Misra points out that in several contexts like the one in the opening portion of his work relating to the need of the "Vipratipatti-Vakya", the position of the author of the "Nyayamrita" is quite impregnable and unchallengeable, and that the "Tarangini" presents in a masterly manner and unexpurgated case in support of Pluralistic Theism and Radical Realism of Madhva.

It is said that criticisms have been written of the "Tarangini-Saurabha" but, I have not come across any written in the usual orthodox manner of debate quoting the very words of the work criticised and offering replies. I am not aware of any controversial work in which the "Saurabha" has been quoted and criticised. Another work "Nyayaratnakara" sums up step by step the arguments contained in the five works, Nyayamrita, Tarangini, Advaita-Siddhi, Brahmanandiya (Guru-Chandrika) and the Saurabha, or Vanamalimisriya. Another work "Pancha-Granthi" proceeding on the same lines has been attributed to the authorship of a great Dvaitic Pandit named Anaiyappacharya.

#### 10—YUKTIMALLIKA

Vadiraja Tirtha, a disciple of Vyasaraja has written an elaborate criticism of Monistic Absolutism in his "Yuktimallika", in verses. Monistic doctrines are criticised, and fine analogies are drawn from Nature and Life in illustration of the difference that there is between the Finite and the Infinite.

#### 11—NYAYAMRITAAMODA

A keen controversialist and an enthusiastic champion of the renaissance of the reign of Realism, and the philosophical prestige of Pluralistic Theism was Vijayindra Tirtha, contemporary, critic and companion of Appayya Dikshita, the monarch of Post-Sankaraitic Monism. According to tradition, Vijayindra is believed to have written ONE HUNDRED AND FOUR WORKS (104), some of which are scathing and searching criticisms of those of Appayya Dikshita. Vijayindra was a disciple and pupil of Vyasaraja. The latter, it would seem, directed the former to undertake a philosophic mission, and sent him to South India, where the influence of Appayya Dikshita was at its zenith, to controvert and repudiate the criticisms of the Dvaita Vedanta by him. There is no doubt that Vijayindra fulfilled the mission entrusted to him gloriously.

"Nyayamritaamoda" is a commentary on Vyasaraja's "Nyayamrita". Side by side with an elucidation of difficult points,



obscure and stiff passages in his master's work, Vijayindra has attempted an exhaustive refutation of the leading tenets of Monistic Idealism or Absolutistic Monism. Fragments of the work only have reached me in a crumbling condition.

### 12—NYAYAMAUKTIKA MAALA

"Nyayamauktika-Maala" is a commentary on Vyasaraja's "Tatparya-chandrika". Appayya Dikshita's "Sivarkamanideepika", "Nyayarakshamni" and some other contemporary controversial works are referred to. Passages from them are quoted at length, and the views and doctrines embodied in them refuted. In a closely reasoned and controversial manner, Vijayindra maintains that the interpretation of the "Vedanta Sutras", by Madhva and his followers, is the only one that is logically and perfectly attuned to the letter and spirit of the aphorisms, and that either violence is done to the attunement or it is totally destroyed in other interpretative attempts and performances. About a hundred pages of this work have been copied. "Sarvatantra-svatantrena-Vijayindrakhya -Yogina -Tanyate -Brahma -meemamsa -Nyaya -mauktika-malika," "Parokte-dooshya-evamsah-mitaissabdaih-anoodiyate-Doshhyatecha-sa-evamsah-siddantascha-samarthyate."

### 13—YUKTI-RATNAKARA

Commenting on his master's "Tarka-Tandava", Vijayindra wrote a voluminous work but none the less luminous known as "Yukti-ratnakara", in which he has, controverted several intricate Nyaya-Vaiseshika doctrines and established the Dvaitic views, of "Pramanya", "Apaurusheyatva", "Varnanittiyatva", etc. In respect of this fighting treatise, Vijayindra's disciple Raghavendra in his commentary on "Tarka-Tandava", remarks— "Gurupadakritappyasti—vyakhya-sa-attyanta-vistara", etc. In view of the voluminousness of "Yuktiratnakara", and its stiffness, Raghavendra says, he wrote a simpler commentary for the benefit of all. It is thus clear that the "Yuktiratnakara" should have been intended for first rate specialists in Dvaita Vedanta, and Nyaya-Vaiseshika, and not for the common run of pandits, and never at any rate and on any account for the pinchbeck philosophers of modernest university brand, who depend upon English translations of Sanskrit works to write accounts of "Indian Philosophy." Attempts are being made to get the work copied and gradually transferred from the palm-leaf to the glazed page. There is no use venturing a prophetic utterance as to when it will be transferred to the printed page. If the realistic view of the cosmos is to be maintained, then an alliance with Nyayavaiseshika is indispensable but the alliance does not mean a blind adherence to their doctrines, nor the status only of an insignificant camp follower. Madhva and his commentators have clearly indicated

the topics in the treatment of which one should be ready to part company from the "Nyaya-Vaisesika". In the "Yuktiratna-kara", Vijayindra vindicates the independence of the Pluralistic Theism of Madhva and repudiates the extravagant claims of the "Nyaya-Vaisesika" for philosophic world-domain.

#### 14—UPASAMHARA—VIJAYA

In reply to Appayya Dikshita's "Upakrama-Parakrama", Vijayindra has written "Upasamhara Vijaya". If in the determination of the exact import of vedic passages rounded off into contexts, and self-determined into universes of discourses it is seen that Upakrama or the commencement of a passage makes mention of a particular god, or an idea or some ritualistic detail, and towards the end or the conclusion, a different think is indicated, how is this apparent conflict to be solved? Be it remembered that the Vedas being apaurusheya, (not ascribable to any known agency as their author, unlike human utterances and efforts, riddled with contradictions and arrested by failures,) there cannot be any real contradiction or conflict in the meaning conveyed by the sacred texts. Appayya Dikshita champions the view that, in the event of such conflicts being perceived, the proper procedure is to adhere to the meaning indicated in the beginning of the passage, and make Upasamhara or the conclusion of the passage surrender its surface interpretation, in conformity with the former.

On the other hand, Vijayindra maintains that there is no need to be arrested and tyrannised over by the beginning of the passage, and if justice is to be done to the import of the passage as a totality, one should wait till he reaches the conclusion of the passage. The commencement and the conclusion will be then mentally rehearsed as it were, as candidates for partnership in interpretational harmony. Should there be a persisting element of conflict or incompatibility between the two, the conclusion is certainly more powerful, and the commencement should be made to surrender its surface interpretation. The Upasamhara (conclusion), is Prabala (strong.) The Upakrama (commencement) is Durbala (weak.) The weak will have to surrender its surface interpretation in conformity with that of the strong. By means of an acute, accurate and arresting analysis of several Adhikaranas of the Purvameemamsa like the "Vedopakrama-adhikarana", "Asvapratiagraheshtya-dhikarana", "Aktadhikarana" and others, Vijayindra establishes that, in all of them, the interpretation of the Upasamhara has proved victorious and that the surface interpretation of the Upakrama (commencement) had to be surrendered in conformity with that of the former. The opening portions of the Upasamhara-Vijaya are being copied. Vijayindra states the scope of his work thus—"Gurupaadokta-sannyayairupakramaparakramam — Nirakrityopasamhara-vijayosau-prakasyate."

## 15—MADHVA-TANTRA-MUKHA-BHUSHANA (KANTAKODDHARA)

In reply to Appayya Dikshita's "Madhva-Tantra-Mukha-Mardana", Vijayindra wrote "Madhva-Tantra-Mukha-Bhushana" or Madhva-Adhva-Kantakoddhara" which is also known as "Sanmarga-Deepika." Discussing the significance of the first five Vedanta Sutras, Vijayindra points out that there is a perfect and pleasant attunement only between Madhva's Pluralistic Theism and the Sutras, and arraigns the advaitic attunement of the aphorisms, attempted by Appayya Dikshita. Vijayindra contends that if an object can be of such a nature as to be investigated, known, marked and inwardly digested, and if the object is also capable of a full logical definition, it would be absurd to maintain that the said object can be the attributeless Absolute. To wriggle out of an obviously inconvenient situation, the Absolutist has to maintain that while the attributeless Absolute is the truth of the matter, a Brahman with attributes is to be admitted for purposes of meditation or for the satisfaction of faint hearts. It is clear that the Brahman with attributes, and the Absolute without any attributes, cannot both be of the same degree of reality. In reply to all such contentions, Vijayindra demonstrates in an argumentative manner that the Vedanta Sutras do not proclaim Brahman with attributes to be of a lesser degree of reality, but proclaim Lord Sri Narayana as the author, preserver, and destroyer of the Cosmos. Why not the Monists or the Absolutists be whole-hoggers in metaphysics? Why should they be so resourceless and withal so helpless as to resort to a duality of standpoints (Paramarthika and Vyavaharika), duality of Deity and the Absolute (Saguna, and Nirguna-Brahmans), and other dualities and even Pluralities from which no escape is possible? It is no answer to state that the duality is itself an appearance or of lesser degree of reality. Nobody has given such a *carte blanche* to the Absolutist as to enable him to write off the reality of things which is their inalienable and undeniable birth-right. The contention that only a duality is admitted and not a dualism is pointless, as the demonstration of the existence of a stage in which duality is got rid of is yet to be. Madhva's position is vindicated by Vijayindra, who maintains that the author of the Vedanta Sutras has taught the world Theism, and not Absolutism. The Finite is never identical with the Infinite. Aspirants will have to endeavour to earn Grace of God.

## 16—PARA-TATVA-PRAKASIKĀ

In refutation of Appayya Dikshita's "Siva-Tatva-Viveka" and "Siva Karnamrita" in which the theological thesis is vigorously supported that Lord Siva, the consort of Parvati is the Supreme Overlord of the Universe, Vijayindra emphasizes that texts, scriptural and secular

all converge towards the clearest view that Sri Narayana, Consort of Mahalakshmi, is the Overlord of the Cosmos. "Para-Tatva-Prakasa" is devoted to a minute and reasoned discussion of theological literature, and Vijayindra Tirtha, wherever possible correlates theological conclusions with metaphysical truths. It may perhaps seem that such theological discussions and controversies have no immediate benefits in the shape of material rewards and advantages, but the said discussions and controversies have an unmistakable historical value. Moreover, for purposes of devotional concentration of one's attention, an aspirant should make perfectly clear to himself the nature of the Deity of his choice. A plunge in theological literature becomes inevitable. A cheap cosmopolitanism is no solver of difficulties. Two powerful antagonists, each tenaciously clinging to his own view, have undertaken a critical survey of theological literature and Dikshita and Vijayindra have indicated their own conclusions. A student of theology may easily see for himself after a perusal of the arguments advanced respectively by Dikshita and Vijayindra, the nature of the Overlord of the Universe. It should be carefully noted in this connection that Vijayindra was by no means a hater of God Siva. Nothing of the kind. A practical Yogi that he was, Vijayindra's heart must have ruled out all traces of anger, hatred, and other evil emotions. The point of the thesis maintained by Vijayindra is that in the hierarchy of Vedic and Vedantic Gods, unchallenged Supremacy belongs to Lord Narayana, Consort of Mahalakshmi, and it is He who controls the destinies of the Cosmos, of gods and men. It may be mentioned that in the Mutt of Sri Vyasaraja, Vijayindra's master, a special worship is even to-day held, on Sivaratri the night of Lord Siva, who when pleased gives one unbounded knowledge, and those critics who want to make out that contributions to theological literature by followers of Madhva have been responsible for disharmony do not know what they talk about.

#### 17—PISHTAPASU-MEEMAMSA

It is a well-known fact that the followers of Sankara and Ramanuja sacrifice innocent animals in flesh and blood in connection with vedic rites. (Pasu-Yagas.) On the contrary, the followers of Madhva substitute a flour-made animal in the place of the one in flesh and blood. In vindication of the latter, Vijayindra has written a brilliant work named "Pishtapasu-Meemamsa," in which the Acharya condemns the sacrifice of animals in no uncertain or equivocal terms. Vijayindra's arguments centre round not merely considerations of sympathy and kindness to animals, but round those of the qualifications of persons that may be appointed to various sacrificial functions. The texts clearly lay down the qualifications of those who may be appointed to officiate at the sacrificial rites, and in this degenerate

Kali-Yuga, when merely a show is run of a civilisation that is spiritually decadent, it would be absolutely impossible to secure the services of Ritviks, sacrificial functionaries, who satisfy adequately the required conditions. Sacrifices performed with the help of degenerate functionaries are no better than downright slaughter of animals. It is just intellectual honesty if one will frankly acknowledge the decadence of spirituality and substitute a flour-made animal in sacrifices. 2. The Purva-Meemamsa allows substitution when a prescribed thing is not to be had. If the genuine Soma plant is not to be had, a substitute is suggested and recommended. 3. Moreover, there is a text which mentions that a person is to propitiate the gods he worships by offering oblations of the food he himself eats. As far as Brahmins are concerned, flesh-eating is to be ruled out and hence sacrificial offering should be in the nature of the food eaten by them. Flour-made animals are then proper substitutes. That is the substance of Vijayindra's arguments.

#### 18—MEEMAMSA-NAYA-KAUMUDI

To an unfounded charge levelled by Appayya Dikshita that Madhva and his followers have flung to the four winds the canons of Purva Meemamsa, Vijayindra has replied giving an array of facts and contexts in which adherence by Madhva and his followers to the principles of Purva-Meemamsa is complete and devoted. The Acharya had unrivalled proficiency in Purva Meemamsic literature available in his days. "Meemamsa-Naya-Kaumudi" is an independent treatise on Purva Meemamsa intended to render clear the views, principles, and doctrines of the Bhatta, and the Prabhakara schools. "Bhatta-Prabhakaraprokta-vartmana- gantumicchata- Lokanam- margabodhaya- tanyate- naya-kaumudee." That indicates the scope of the work. It is said that Vijayindra while acknowledging the authority of the Purva Meemamsa Sutras of Jaimini, because he was a Rishi whose utterances are entitled to unquestioned acceptance, refused to admit the soundness and reasonableness of the interpretation of the Sutras attempted by Sabaraswamin in his Bhashya, and gave his own interpretation of some of the stiff sutras, throwing overboard the commentary of Sabaraswamin. It is said that such a course is followed in "Upasamhara-Vijaya." But, in the fragments of the work that are with me, I do not see any such procedure. It is also said that in the later portions of the "Meemamsa-Naya-kaumudi" the Bhashya of Sabara is criticised. I have not yet been able to go through the text which is not copied fully. It is necessary to note that Madhva relied on a work known as "Brahma-Tarka" abridged into about 5,000 stanzas from an elaborate one, which appears to have dealt with the principles of Nyaya-Vaisheshika and those of Purva Meemamsa critically. Presumably Vijayindra's criticisms of Sabara-Bhashya are from the standpoint of the conclusions indicated in

"Brahma Tarka," stanzas from which are quoted in Madhva's works.

### 19—BHEDA-VIDYA-VILASA

From a few pages available of this controversial work, it is seen that on the lines suggested by "Bhedojjivana" of his Master,—Vyasaraaja—Vijayindra wrote this as a complete and systematic vindication of the thesis that difference is foundational of the Cosmos. Reality is rooted in difference, diversity, and disparity. Pramanas are mentioned in support of the thesis, and syllogisms intended to maintain identity are refuted. The five-fold difference, 1—Difference between the finite and the Infinite, 2—Difference between one finite self and another, 3—Difference between the sentient and the non-sentient, animate and the inanimate, 4—Difference between one inanimate object and another, and 5—Difference between the inanimate and the Infinite, is maintained in an argumentative, controversial manner.

### 20—ADVAITA-KAALANALA

Gathering the threads of controversy scattered in various works, Vijayindra is said to have written this treatise "Advaita-Kaalanala" as more or less a final reply to the contentions of the Monists, and as an unexpurgated case for Radical Realism, and Pluralistic Theism.

### 21—CHANDAMARUTA

Vanamalimisra, the author of "Taragini-Saurabha," has written a controversial work named "Chandamaruta" in which the conclusions of Absolutism are refuted. I have not been so far able to identify the advaitic original to which it is a reply. From stray statements like "Vivaranaanumana-parishkara-iti-tanna", and others, it appears that the original advaitic work may be one written as an amplification of "Chitsukhi" and "Vivarana". While the controversial works modelled on the "Nyayamrita" plan run to four sections (paricchadas), "Chandamaruta" has only TWO paricchadas. At the end of the first paricchada, portions of which are missing from the manuscript with me, the following stanza occurs—"Maya-vadyanghripadhva-msyutthapito - vanamalina - Yaschandamarutastasya- Paricchadoyamadimah."

### OTHER WORKS

While the above-mentioned account of the controversial works is sure to give disinterested and impartial students of philosophy an idea of the mass of literature that there is lying

to be studied and investigated, it is by no means possible to exhaust all of them or even draw up a complete list of the works. Others like Raghunatha Tirtha, Satyanatha Tirtha, Kesavacharya. Trivikrama-pandithacharya, just to mention a few names, have from time to time written expository and controversial works unrivalled for brilliance and systematic treatment. The list of controversial works mentioned is unimpeachable evidence which would prove that Madhva's philosophy is an independent metaphysical system, and writers of "Indian Philosophy" who make the remark that Madhva's system belongs more to the religious than to the philosophical movement only hide their colossal ignorance under the convenient cloak of dogmatisms which at the present day are as plenty as blackberries.

### SUMMARY

1. Sri Vyasaraja is mentioned as the prince of controversialists. His works are enumerated and summaries given.

2. Jaya-Tirtha's controversial work is touched upon.

3. Nyayamrita, Advaita-siddhi, Tarangini, Guru-chandrika, and the Tarangini-saurabha form a controversial series of unsurpassed excellence.

4. Vijayindra Tirtha is the most important and powerful controversialist, whose contribution to the Renaissance of Realism in Indian Philosophy is almost unique and unrivalled. He was a contemporary of Appayya Dikshita, the champion of Monism. Appayya Dikshita's attacks on Madhva and his philosophy were immediately repulsed and refuted by Vijayindra.

5. The remark that Madhva's system belongs more to the religious history of Indian thought than to the philosophical found in "Indian Philosophy" is engendered by mere ignorance of Dvaita works, masquerading under the garb of Omniscience.



## CHAPTER XII

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### GENERAL ESTIMATE AND REPLY TO CRITICS

In the course of the eleven previous chapters, an exposition of Madhva's works destructive and constructive was attempted with an eye on conformity with the letter and spirit of the texts and the commentaries of Jayatirtha thereon, without which the exact significance of the former could never have been understood by any one, as also summaries of important controversial works in a bibliographical manner, and it is time a general estimate of the Acharya's system of philosophy was undertaken, and ill-conceived criticisms directed against it answered. (1) It is well that at the very commencement of the general estimate, one indicated the criteria on which it is based, and in the light of which evaluatory judgments are to be passed on the doctrines of Madhva.

#### I.

In the first place, the value of a system of philosophy is to be judged on the basis of its inner consistency and freedom from contradiction. Philosophical system-building is an attempt at rational explanation of experience in its widest and the most cosmopolitan connotation. It is common knowledge that a system of philosophy or a body of doctrine is worked out from certain first principles the truth of which does no violence either to the laws of thought or to facts of life, in a manner that would commend itself to rational acceptance. If the validity of the first principles be challenged, the system is also challenged, but that sort of an attack can be delivered against any system by any one. A sympathetic appreciation of the first principles, fundamental and foundational categories, of a system of thought is necessary. A critic is at liberty to bring the construction of the system from the first principles, before the bar of reason. The foremost question that has to be considered is whether the construction of Madhva's Radical Realism and Pluralistic Theism has proceeded on consistent lines. If a critic should find that heavy and clumsy steps have been taken in the onward march of the evolution of a body of doctrine, he has every right to find fault with the system for those heavy and clumsy steps which would lead only to metaphysical morass. Consistency is by no means the hobgoblin of little minds. It is the guardian angel, the fascinating fairy of great minds as well.

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(1) An attempt to answer some criticisms of Madhva's system of philosophy has been made by Mr. C. R. Krishna Rao, Sub-Judge, Narasapur West Godavari, in his work "Madhva's life and Doctrine." It contains a brief yet excellent account of the Acharya's life and doctrines.



## II.

Consistency, and logical loyalty are at best abstract concepts. Logic is not the be-all and end-all of life. Life is more than Logic. Satisfyingness is a more fundamental pragmatic criterion. The value or adequacy of a system of philosophy has to be determined by reference to its inherent ability to satisfy the deepest demands of Intellect, Emotion and Will, and its conformity with the requirements of the ideals of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. The Pragmatic criterion has no reference whatever to the slovenly pragmatism of the Bread-and-butter type, or the pragmatism of the "Ku-Klux-Klan." It is enlightened, rationalised, and spiritualised Pragmatism lifted out of its gross mundane environments into the regions of religious values. If the cognitive, emotive and the volitional needs of a rational individual or society or a community can be satisfied by means of a theoretical adherence to a particular school of philosophy and a practical regulation of life and conduct in accordance with its dictates, and precepts, it should be clear that the value of that school of metaphysics should indeed be high in the intellectual markets of the world. The satisfyingness mentioned as a criterion is not connected with lulling into peace of hideous hedonistic values erupting endlessly, but with the spiritual peace and calm of the soul.

## III.

Another criterion is the actual success in life, as determined by the conditions of existence and scientific and industrial advancement. The so-called Prussian Militarism is often attributed to the philosophy of Might being Right preached by Nietzsche. There is however another type of philosophy as well. It is said that Germany's contribution to pure thought and philosophy was most significant and marked when the country was being crushed under the Napoleonic campaigns. Industrial inferiority, political subordination, may have paved the way for the advent of a system of philosophy by the study and contemplation of which one may take consolation. I do not propose to enter into any, elaborate consideration or discussion of what interaction there is, has been, and will be, between the political, and industrial developments and the philosophic thought in India, and it seems to me that while the country had been passing through violent political storms, there had always reigned a metaphysical and philosophic calm in India, as the indigenous systems of speculation, whatever their differences, admit that the world is too much with us, that tenacious clinging to the pleasures of life is

a form of spiritual suicide, and that consequent on the realisation of the evanescence of the pleasures of life, a genuine spiritual aspirant should concentrate his devotional attention on the Supreme Reality with a view to realising his inherent bliss now beclouded by ignorance.

This criterion is not likely to be of any very great value because, the Indian systems unanimously emphasize the fact that the present life has to be led in a spirit of preparation for the next. There is no end to the series of sense-satisfactions day in and day out. The more one satisfies the cravings of the senses, the more insistent and poignant do they develop to be. The best adjustment is the control of the senses. Control may not mean torture or mortification, as it is always succeeded by threatening reactions. Cautious and rational indulgence in sense-pleasures is not detrimental to spiritual welfare.

This criterion has been alluded to not because of its intrinsic value, but, of the charge that has often been made that Indian asceticism is responsible for the political, and economic subordination of the country and its inhabitants. A system of philosophy has *prima facie* to be rejected if it has nothing to offer more exalted, more valuable, and more abiding, than mere satisfaction of the sense-needs, and the means of attaining the former. Of course, so long as one lives, moves, and has his beings amidst mundane surroundings, activity has to be directed towards perfection of the conditions of existence. It may be that such beneficent constructive activity is arrested by the counter-activity of interested parties. There is absolutely no use blaming a system of philosophy or a body of doctrine which postulates the evanescence and worthlessness of mundane values and constructs the doctrinal superstructure on the foundations of a rational disregard of the sense-pleasures, and sense-values, the Fair Maid of Ireland after which the common run of humanity chooses to run, for the economic and political conditions obtaining in the land of its origin and evolution. You may jeer at a person because, he refuses to evaluate the pleasures of life in the same manner as you do, but, if he is one whose foundational and fundamental outlook on life, men, and things differs from yours, he is sure to treat your jeers with the contempt which they so richly deserve. That you have managed Magnetism and Electricity very well, that you are able to fly round the world in a few hours, and that you have invented a chemical preparation that would destroy whole towns in a trice, may mean absolute nothing to one who is prepared for anything at any time, and who concentrates his energies on the acquisition

of spiritual wealth. (2) We shall see at the proper context how this criterion works.

#### IV.

Traditional accounts of Indian philosophy begin with a discussion of the *Pramanas*. From one point of view, the term means "authority" and "guarantee" and from another "source" or "means" of valid knowledge. Madhva maintains that the sacred texts, the *Sruti* are "*Svatah-Pramana*," valid in their own right, and that their validity is not in need of any guarantee other than the texts themselves. Sacred texts are self-valid. Madhva, his champions and commentators hold that the *Sruti* texts are not traceable to any known authorship. Should there be any such authorship, their validity stands one step removed. Their validity has to depend on the veracity of their authors. The view that God Himself may be considered author of the sacred texts is not countenanced. The validity of the texts is then only indirectly established because, they have been composed by God on Whose veracity the validity of the texts will have to depend. The nature of God, the Supreme Cosmic Ruler, the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the Cosmos has to be proclaimed and learnt only from the *Sruti* and not from any other source. To a vital extent knowledge of God depends on the texts. The texts depend on God for their very life. That is a vicious procedure. Madhva and his commentators maintain in opposition to the *Nyaya-Vaisheshika*, that the sacred texts, unlike the secular ones, cannot be traced to the authorship of anybody, not even God. They are "*Apaurusheya*." (3).

They are "*Svatah-Pramana*." They are self-valid or valid in their own right. The motive of this view is clear. Sense-awareness is absolutely helpless and incompetent to give one knowledge about God. The existence of God may be inferentially demonstrated, but a given inference can always be confronted with a counter-process. Indecision is the outcome. Only scriptural texts proclaim the nature of Brahman. That is the highest truth for which

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(2) The attitude of absolute unconcern and non-attachment to the values of life is expressed in the familiar stanza. . . . "Chalantu-Girayo-milantavaridhayah-Adharottaramastu-jagat-ka-hanirveetaragasya." Let mountains move, let oceans mingle with one another and inundate the world. Let the world be topsy-turvey. One who had cultivated the spirit of *Vairagya* will feel as if nothing is lost by such occurrences. A sense of something lost is unknown to him.

(3) See "*Anuvyakhyana*"—1—1—1. P. 3. "*Kalpya-gauravadoshenapumvakyam-jnyapakam-na-tat*." Vyasaraja's "*Tarkatandava*" contains an elaborate survey of the problem of the authorship of the sacred texts. The view that God may be regarded to be the author of the texts is rejected. "See "*Tarkatandava*"—*Apaurusheyatva Vada*. References, unless otherwise stated, are to publications of Madhva Vilas Book Depot—Kumbakonam.

spiritual aspirants are prepared to sacrifice anything. The Source from which one learns the Highest Truth, and its guarantee should be perfectly free from all error, and taint. The validity of the texts should not be made dependent on something else. Derivative validity connotes incompetence to proclaim the nature of God. The sacred texts are thus self-valid. (Svatah-pramana.)

Such a position is unknown to European Philosophy. It is unprofitable to condemn the special privilege enjoyed by the sacred texts from the stand-point of European Philosophy, nor is it profitable to contend that the sacred texts of one community are as good as those of another. The contention that they are only indicates a spirit of tolerance towards other systems of philosophy and other religions.

There are, however, two problems of outstanding significance in connection with the topic of Pramanas which deserve prominent attention. In addition to Sruti, Madhva admits two other pramanas, Pratyaksha (sense-awareness) and Anumana (Inference). While the Sruti retains pre-eminence in matters that are inaccessible to the other two, its pre-eminence is not absolute. Should there be a conflict between Sruti and Sense-awareness, naturally the former should be modified by the latter when the Sruti undertakes excursions into realms with which it has no concern. Should there be a situational difficulty in the shape of your servant making off with a good deal of cash after having forged your signature on a cheque, you will not make an appeal to Sruti. While respecting the sacrosanctity of the sacred texts within relevant limits, Madhva makes no bones about showing the sacred texts their proper place. An appeal to them will lie only in certain exceptional instances to deal with which the other Pramanas would be clearly helpless.

Barring those exceptional instances, all other cases of human transactions are covered by Pratyaksha (sense-awareness) and Anumana (Inference) and of the two, the former is more powerful. "Upajivya" is that which affords the necessary support, protection and guarantee. "Upajivaka" is that which is supported. Sense-awareness is "Upajivya" which supports the other Pramanas. It is therefore the most powerful *qua* supporting the others. It is significant to note that Madhva makes no fetish of the sacred texts. Diamond may be a valuable substance. On that account no one would permit himself to be cut by it. Sruti is doubtless valuable, but, no one would like a radical repudiation of our experience on the ground of Sruti.

The consolidated experience of the ages, of persons of diverse views, professions, and performances guarantees the reality of the Cosmos. If this reality is sought to be denied by the Absolutist on the strength of scriptural texts, Madhva cuts it short by maintaining that the scriptural texts, cannot alienate the birthright

of reality of the Cosmos. Sense-awareness retains its pre-eminence. Our awareness is so vivid, clear, distinct and unstultified by a clearer more vivid and distinct awareness, of our own limitations and finitude, that it is impossible to maintain that the Absolute has manifested itself as so many finite selves and so forth. This conviction can never be repudiated by scriptural texts. In this exaltation of sense-awareness (Pratyaksha) Madhva's scrupulous adherence to the requirements of the rational thinking consideration of things is evident. Feelings of devotional adherence to the authority of the sacred texts should be tempered by reason and critical reflection. It will thus be clear that while the Absolutist makes an appeal to the sacred texts in order to deny the reality of the Universe, Madhva maintains that the appeal savours too much of a sanctimonious awe, as the sacred texts are quite powerless to function outside their jurisdiction, and that the reality of the Universe which is its inalienable birthright cannot be written off by the stroke of a pen dipped in sentimental sacerdotalism, or scripturalism.

In addition to the tempering of excessive fondness for appeal to scripture, Madhva maintains that sense-awareness (Pratyaksha) is quite capable of giving the subject knowledge of external reality as it is. Not merely it is capable of that, but, is an efficient means of knowledge of external reality. "Pratyaksha" is "Paramarthika-grahi." Sense-awareness leads the subject on to a knowledge of external reality, which has the highest degree of reality of the Absolutist. In European Philosophy, Paramenides doubted the ability of sense-organs to give the subject correct knowledge. He condemned them as being misleading and treacherous. Madhva maintains that "Pratyaksha" sense-perception does not deceive the subject. Not merely does it not deceive the subject, but a sense-organ is just designed by nature to enable the subject or a sentient creature efficiently to *know* and adjust itself to its environment.

If metaphysical investigation is started by one with an expression of grave doubt whether the sense-organs are able to give us or lead us to knowledge of external reality as it is, there is no knowing when the doubt will be set at rest, or if it will be set at rest at all. The inquiry is bound to be doubt-shot and suspicion-permeated. There is no way out of it. Metaphysical investigation is to be commenced with a deep-rooted conviction that the senses are perfectly able to do their duty. *They reveal Reality as it is.*

True, illusions arise. Data of sense are wrongly interpreted. In that case, illusions readily get explained on the basis of some disturbance in the sensory structure, external factors like distance, obscuring medium like a fog, etc., or on the basis of a wrong

interpretation. The reality of a set of stimuli impinging on the organism to be interpreted is never challenged and repudiated. If normal sense-experience is to be invalidated, one should have a clearer and more distinct, hence, more powerful sensory experience, or a sacred text. The latter again will have to remain within the bounds of rationality. By no amount of ratiocination will it be possible to alienate the reality of the Cosmos guaranteed by sense-awareness. "Aṭo-na-tarkamatrata-eva-drishṭasya-bhrantitvam-Kalpyam." (Tatva-Nirnaya—P. 6. Sarvamuḷa).

Controversial writers like Vyasaraja, Vanamali-Misra and others maintain that an ordinary object like a Jar or a particle of dust possesses the same degree of reality as the Supreme Brahman. After the acquirement of the necessary spiritual qualifications and after the required spiritual discipline is gone through, and after an aspirant prepares himself to come face to face with the Infinite, he is bound to get as clear and distinct a knowledge of the Supreme Lord of the Universe as his inherent right and qualifications may entitle him.

## V

In the handling of the problem of the Pramanas, the opening survey of the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge, Madhva is obliged to join issue with the Absolutists, and impartial judgment may not find anything illogical or irrational in the conclusions arrived at by Madhva. A survey of the controversial literature indicates that the chief plank of the Absolutist in Indian Philosophy is bound to be the sacred text. An argument from mere transitoriness and evanescence will never lie in the direction of demonstration of the unreality or illusoriness of anything. To all ilusionistic systems, wherever found, Madhva's reply is that one should have a firm faith and conviction that the channels of communication with external reality are not traps spread for us by designing devils. Instead they are weapons for efficient adjustment to surroundings. Scepticism is the easiest philosophy of life when coupled with irresponsibility of thought and action. Reduction of experience to a series of passing sensations *a la* Hume, and a school of Buddhists is easy enough. But restoration of faith in its reality is not so easy. Dogmatisms do not determine the destinies of the problems of here and hereafter. If one advances a statement that the sensory channels of communication are treacherous and deceptive, you can meet it by advancing another statement that they never deceive us, and, it would be more rational to admit their ability and capacity to give us knowledge of external reality *as it is*. As Indian Absolutism largely relies on scriptural texts, Madhva was obliged to settle the relative superiority and inferiority of the Pramanas. Of course, Agama or the sacred text retains supremacy. But not always and in all matters. That is a position to which leading commentators and authors

like Vachaspati Misra(4) have agreed. A hundred sacred texts notwithstanding their sacredness will never be able to bring about the zoological conversion of a donkey of a laundress into a Derby Race horse. Doubtless there are passages in the sacred texts that appear to proclaim the unreality of the Universe, but they are not in a position to invalidate and alienate the reality of external objects and the Cosmos as a whole as that reality is the very birthright of objects be they ever so insignificant. Madhva, therefore, felt obliged to assign and show scripture its proper place. It is an authority and guarantor of valid knowledge, and an important source of knowledge concerning the Almighty Creator of the Cosmos. On that account it cannot be allowed to trespass into realms with which it has no concern. With a view to establishing the radical realism that is nearest Madhva's heart's desire, he formulates the doctrine that "Pratyaksha" is more powerful than the sacred text. The doctrine that the verdict of the sacred texts is inadmissible should it be antagonistic to the consolidated rational experience of humanity guaranteed by sensory channels of communication has a negative tinge about it. A more positive doctrine should be enunciated.

That is why Madhva has elaborately argued in Tatvanirnaya and elsewhere,(5) that sense awareness or sense-knowledge is quite competent to grasp the highest reality and that the reality possessed by a given object, X, or Y, or Z is of the same degree as the reality possessed by the Supreme Being. Finite objects perish. Brahman is eternal. On that ground it is absurd to argue that the Latter alone is real and not the former. Nor is it correct to argue that the reality of the former is to be assigned a lower degree as if the reality of an object however small and insignificant, can be written off by means of the fiat of the absolutist or any other denominational philosopher, or metaphysician. Reality is the undeniable and inalienable birth-right of every object, idea, concept, value, *et hoc*... It is apprehended by sense-organs, or Sakshi as the case may be.

It cannot be otherwise. It is agreed to on all hands that till the moment of final realisation, or coming face to face with the Absolute, or realising the fundamental identity between the Finite and the Infinite now obscured by ignorance, in whatever way one may choose to put the matter, an angelic aspirant and a tarnished tramp are obliged to come into contact with external reality and carry on practice of spiritual feats, and execution of sorry, secular

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(4) Bhamati—"Nahyagamah-sahasramapi-ghatam-patayitumeesate." Page 4. Bombay Edition. Even a thousand scriptural texts cannot convert a pot into a cloth!

(5) See "Tattvodyota"—P. 3. The author of "Nyayamrita" argues that sense-perception or sense-awareness is quite competent to grasp the highest degree of Reality. Pratyaksha is "Paramarthika-satva-grahi." P. 140 et seq.

schemes only through the instrumentality of sensory structure, and if philosophy should commence its inquiry after a postulation of inherent incapacity of the sense organs to apprehend reality as it is and if the postulate is to be left unchallenged, one may bid good-bye to all rational thought. One postulate is as good as another. If the postulate of the treacherousness of the sense organs is to be respected and left unquestioned, then, why not extend the same indulgence to the postulate that the sense organs are perfectly reliable guides? On the contrary, it stands to reason that the latter postulate is more reliable. That is exactly what Madhva says. The Acharya does not give any *carte blanche* to sense-knowledge. It is confined to a grasp of its own adequate subject-matter or object-matter. Dharma and Adharma, Isvara, Brahman, that are not accessible to sense-perception, are known by means of the sacred texts. The latter are intended to fulfil a special purpose. Acceptance of their authority does not mean that they should be allowed to develop into dictators. It is in this manner that Madhva effects a synthesis between sense-perception and scripture, one acting as a salutary check on the excesses of the other. This synthesis is quite consistent with the requirements alike of rationality or reason and revelation. An animal is none the worse for a particular type of its christening by others as a preliminary to its being hanged. But here the animal simply refuses to be christened and hanged so summarily. That on account of some mal-adjustment between the sensory channels of communication, and the stimuli emanating from external reality, or a disturbance of the rapprochement between the two perceptual illusions arise would be hardly an adequate ground for a condemnation *in toto* of all sense-awareness. On the contrary, sense-awareness happens to be the eternal and unsullied source of everything, of every relevant factor or set of factors that would be required for a valid Inference and knowledge from linguistic media, secular and sacred. As the author of the Nyayamrita strikingly puts it, "Tadeha-pratyaksham-lingabaddhaapekshita-sarvagraheeti-katham-nopajeevyam—" (P. 105).

If the genuine relationship between a word, term, and its import is to be grasped, sense-awareness has to be appealed to. The linguistic mechanism, unless it be in the realm of fiction, deals with actualities, which are grasped by sensory awareness. The correct and legitimate functioning of the linguistic mechanism is firmly grounded on sense-awareness. The medium is secular and sacred. One is not at liberty to discard certain portions of the latter as being inconvenient and unfavourable to absolutistic doctrinaires. Secular and spiritual words have significance simply because, they are addressed to a being or community or society which can appreciate its significance, emotively and volitionally re-act to them. Otherwise, one would be helpless as to why secular and sacred terms



should be interpreted in any particular manner. All rational transactions of humanity through the instrumentality of the linguistic mechanism are thrown back on sense-awareness.

The same is the case with Inference. Inference is not hanging in the air. Nor is it functioning *in vacuo*. The Universal that is apprehended by Inference has existence only in a series of particulars. Without the latter, one is not entitled to speak of the former. Generalisation, Explanation, Induction would involve an examination of a number of relevant particulars, before generalisation, and the latter can never be formulated without the aid of sense-awareness. The relation between Fact and Theory, Law and Instance, the general and the particular, that is so fundamental to Inference is to be perceived by sense-awareness. Even so, the fixation of the connotation of terms, awareness of meaning and convention, grammatical structure of words and terms, their logical function, coalescence of parts of speech into a sentence, of sentences into more comprehensive units, and so forth are all the work of perception—by means of the sensory channels of communication. The fundamental requirements of verbal knowledge and the Inferential have to be supplied by sensory awareness. *Qua* thus feeding and supporting the Inferential and verbal knowledge, sense-perception is to be viewed as “Upajivya” that which supports, and hence more powerful than Inference and Language, which are “Upajivaka” those that are supported.

That sense-awareness is quite capable of grasping the fundamental reality of the Cosmos is argued in this manner. The contention of the Absolutist is to the effect that all cosmic phenomena and objects are to be viewed as subjects of a negation which takes the form—“X-Y-Z are not, were not, and will never be” and “they are not here, there anywhere”. Sense-awareness is properly functioning and it grasps the reality of X Y and Z. If the reality of an object is grasped in respect of the present, there is every reason to maintain that it is what it is having reached the present from the past, and will continue to be what it is in future as well. The negation mentioned by the Absolutist is invalidated in respect of the present. It is entirely a needless question to ask if time is one and homogeneous, and if the past, present and the future, are mere conventional divisions, or if parts or fractions of time are real. If time is a form of perception, the form is fundamental and foundational. Madhva and his commentators maintain that Pratyaksha, sense-awareness, grasping as it does the reality of objects in respect of a given point of time, nullifies the negation pointed out by the absolutist intended to cover past, present and the future. The author of the *Nyaya-mrita* writes—“Svakale-hi-astitam-grihnan-sakshatkarastrikalagam-pratishedham-nirundhano-grihnatyevaatyabadhyatam.” The *Sakhsat* kara, sensory-awareness, grasping as it does the reality of

objects, arrests, nullifies and repudiates the negation of objects, here, there, and everywhere, and a negation now, then, and in future as well. The negation which envelops in one sweep all time and all place or space is really nullified to that here and now, objects are apprehended as they are. As remarked before, illusions are explicable in the light of the normal rapprochement between sense-organ and objects being disturbed.

Madhva, his commentators and champions have constructed their Realistic Metaphysic on the basis of the doctrine that senses are not treacherous normally constituted that they are, and that they are instrumental in bringing the subject and the object into the contact known as knowledge, or into the contact which engenders knowledge, and that subjects apprehend objects, relations, meaning, etc., *as they are*. Pratyaksha, or sense-awareness is more powerful than Inference and sacred text. The former is more powerful as the supporter of the latter, and also in its own inherent right. It is quite competent to grasp the nature of reality *as it is*.

It is clear that Madhva has done a distinct service to the philosophic world by emphasizing the fact that there is no use in the absolutistic endeavour to stifle thought by means of pressure from the scripture. Scripture is all right only in the matter of throwing light on the nature of the Infinite. By means of a waving of the magic wand of Scripture one cannot rid the Cosmos of its reality. Nor is Scripture to be repudiated. It has inestimable value when confined to its legitimate sphere. Sense-awareness gives no knowledge about the nature of the Supreme Lord of the Cosmos. Inference is always dubious. It cuts both ways. If one contends that the Supreme Lord should be inferentially argued to exist, another clever debater is sure to advance the counter-argument that God does not exist and that all phenomena can be accounted for by reference to matter and energy. Resort will have to be made to the sacred texts which alone are capable of revealing the nature of God.

Madhva's doctrine is "Pramanya" is "svatah." "Apramanya" is "Paratah." Granted the operation of the requirements of normality, knowledge is self-valid. It is *sui generis*. (6) It is its own standard and its own guarantee. The validity is no doubt obscured and arrested under abnormal conditions. An abnormality is just a disturbance of normality. If the normal conditions of knowledge are disturbed, either by factors like distance, obscuring medium and such others, or by an upsetting of the mental equilibrium, the self-validity of knowledge no doubt suffers.

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(6) H. A. Prichard sums up the position beautifully. "Knowledge is *sui generis*. Knowledge is simply knowledge and any attempt to state it in terms of something else must end in describing something which is not knowledge." (P. 245. Kant's Theory of Knowledge). See also "Anuvyakhyana" page 3.

But the exception brought to light by the operation of abnormal conditions only proves the general rule. *Exceptio probat regulam*. Madhva observes—"Pratyakshavaccha-pramanyam-svataa-evaagamasya - hi - Anavasthanyatha - hi - syadapramanyam - tathanyatah." (Anuvyakhyana). This portion of the general estimate of Madhva's thought may be concluded with the following propositions. (1) Sacred texts retain supremacy only in their special field of revealing the nature of Brahman or the Supreme Overlord of the Cosmos. (2) Should there be a conflict between the texts and "Pratyaksha" the latter is to be taken as more powerful. (3) Sense-awareness is more powerful because, it is the supporter of Anumana and texts. (Sabdanumana-upajivya). (4) Senses are quite competent to grasp "Paramarthika" reality. Senses are quite trustworthy but never treacherous under normal conditions.

## VI

An appreciation of Madhva's treatment of the problem of the Pramanas paves the way for an understanding of the Radical Realism championed by the Acharya. Time was when the Universals were the only Reals. In modern European systems, Naive Realism, Enlightened Realism, Scientific Realism, and a multi-brand Realism are in brief the order of the day. But a perusal of the arguments advanced by Madhva in his "Tattvodyota" and "Tattva-Nirnaya" (chapters 7 and 8) would convince impartial readers that Madhva's Realism cannot be squeezed into the strait-jackets of any of the European-brand Realisms, though of course, points of resemblance between the Realism of the Acharya and those of others may be perceived by comparative study. I desire to designate the Acharya's doctrine as *Radical or Revolutionary Realism or Rational Realism*. Provided the general trend of Madhva's arguments is appreciated, christening of his doctrines in a particular stereotyped manner is a matter of unconcern or minor importance. Whether the universals are the only reals, whether ideas have monopolised the name, whether there are no reals other than particulars, meanings and relations, are questions which need not find an echo in this context, because the term Realism has value only as contracted with Idealism and that too an absolute Idealism. That is the doctrine championed and advocated by Sankara and his adherents, and, naturally, Madhva should have directed his attention to a refutation of the Absolute Idealism of his predecessors. A great deal of confusion and misunderstanding will be cleared if at the outset the precise and exact connotation of the term "Realism" which is adopted by Madhva is settled. Be it understood then, that the term "Realism" is used in opposition to "Absolute Idealism." Controversies, monographs, and symposia published in the West relating to the antagonism between Realism and Idealism contain a startling quantity of verbiage, and one would lose his way amidst a maze of names. Neo-Realism, Creative-Realism, Bolshevik-Realism may soon be current coin in

contemporary discussions, but he who runs may see that the conclusions are precisely where they had been left by master-minds like Plato and Aristotle. No doubt in some instances attempts have been made to correlate scientific discoveries with metaphysical doctrines, but, in my judgment, the attempts have not been successful. The doctrine of Relativity given shape with a view to explaining some observed anomalies in the movements of the perihelion of Mercury would seem to have invaded every province and branch of knowledge. One may not be surprised if at any time a monograph is contributed to contemporary metaphysical literature on the reaction between Relativity and the Romance of Romeo and Rosa (for the sake of alliteration—let Juliet be dropped out of the bargain). It would be idle to expect that Madhva's doctrines may be fitted or dovetailed into a relativity-structure. One may correlate Madhva's doctrines with those of Descartes, or Aristotle, (7) but I propose to leave the European philosophers alone, in this estimate, and assess the value of Madhva's metaphysical system in the light of its avowed antagonism to the Absolute Idealism of Sankara. Without any doubt, or verbal quibbling, let it be understood for purposes of this chapter that *Madhva's Realism* is the radical opposite of *Sankara's Idealism*.

Whatever the fundamental connotation of the latter is denied or repudiated by the former. The most important metaphysical doctrine advocated by Sankara and supported by his followers and later amplified by his commentators is that the universe of organised and unorganised matter and spirit is *mere appearance*, and it would vanish at the dawn of true knowledge. Madhva's task was to repudiate the said view.

## VII.

Madhva has established in his "Anuvyakhyana" elaborately the reality of the Universe. He writes—"Satvam-chasya-anubhutitah-Anubhooti - virodhena - mithyatve - ma - na - kaachana—Ateetaa-nagatau - kalavapinassakshi - gocharau - tatsambandhitaya - satvamapi - drishtasya - sakshigam—" (P. 190). Philosophy should take its stand on the bed-rock of rational human experience. It is on the analogy of dream-phenomena that the illusoriness of the universe is sought to be demonstrated by the Absolutist. Analogies are notorious. But then, it is not even a plausible analogy. There is no doubt about the reality of dream-phenomena. A scientific investigation of dream-phenomena recently carried out in the West, demonstrates the existence of a realistic foundation for them. Two lines of argument are indicated. (1) In the first place,

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(7) Comparison of Madhva's system of philosophy with European and American realistic systems has been deliberately abandoned, as such a comparison is considered to be an intrusion. Readers of the exposition of Madhva's doctrines can discern points of resemblance between Western and Eastern Realisms.

one may argue that after the sensory contact with external reality is, as it were, switched off, the self falls back upon the inexhaustible storehouse of imagery and bizarre, and outlandish experiences results. All have a realistic residuum in the shape of stimuli to which dream-phenomena are re-actions. The stimuli are wrongly interpreted. Their interpretation does not coalesce into the order of things with which we are confronted in waking life. Stimuli physical, psychical, organic, intra-organic, etc., have been identified and about their reality there is no manner of doubt. The outlandishness of interpretation is due to the cutting off of contact with reality and waking life with its countless social, moral, and other inhibitions. When the contact is switched off and when the inhibiting factors are lying moribund, outlandish imagery results. Incompatibility with a realised order is later brought home to the individual. Dream-phenomena have thus a realistic residuum or back-ground. Or as Madhva argues elsewhere (in the Sutra Bhashya), dream-phenomena even in their outlandishness may remind one of the majesty of God who is leading the fatigued subject across the fairy lands of dream or punishing the truant who had managed to hoodwink his fellowmen after the commission of hideous crimes. If, from some such point of view as this, reality is also the characteristic of dream-phenomena, the illusoriness of the universe cannot be established on the basis of the said analogy.

(2) It is also possible to argue that there is a marked contrast between the waking and the dream states, and that while the latter is seen to be later denied and repudiated, the former is not. Experience (anubhuti) establishes the reality of the universe. The only unreality admitted by Madhva is the absolutely contradictory, like a square hole. Our experience, the eternal witness of the self (sakshi) would be quite adequate to grasp the reality of the universe. The past and the future fall within the iron grip of experience. Just as the present is real, so was the past real and the future will be real. The past, which is now so called, was once present, and the future is bound to be present in the fulness of time. If, therefore, the reality of the present be granted reality of time and space, of spatio-temporal distinctions and divisions etc., logically follows. There is no reason why the reality of the present should be doubted. In the case of perceptual errors real data are wrongly interpreted. Or there is some distortion in the medium of communication. Anyhow, a normally constituted and efficiently functioning sensory mechanism is quite adequate to grasp the reality of the universe, and of the objects in it. Another important point to note is that as against the Absolutist who seeks to maintain that the Universe is negated in respect of a given point of time and space, present, past and the future, here, there and everywhere, it is quite sufficient if Madhva showed that the present perception (pratyaksha) grasps the reality of the universe. It does. The reality is demonstrated in the reality of

the reactions elicited by the phenomena of the universe from the subject. An Othello-like person who is only too ready to suspect is doomed to destruction. Reality is stamped on all phenomena and facts of the universe. Reality is the birthright of the Cosmos. The senses are adequate to grasp the said reality. If they were not, they would not have been designed by Nature with a view to an efficient adjustment of the subject with the environment. In a given moment of time, and in respect of a point of space, and in respect of a given object, our sense-perception is quite competent to function and give us knowledge of reality or a fraction of reality *as it is*, and the same line of reasoning will have to be extended to the past and the future as well. That is so. The past certainly is now designated as such, and it was once the present. The future will also be coming into prominence in the fulness of time. Sense-perception will effectively deal with the past and the future as it does with the present. If anyone should doubt the adequacy or ability of perception to grasp the nature of reality *as it is*, the *onus probandi* lies on him. Excluding abnormal instances in which the sense-object rapprochement is disturbed, *pratyaksha*, or sense-perception is quite efficient to yield knowledge of reality *as it is*. Abnormality is not an event of daily occurrence. Otherwise it will cease to be abnormal and become normal.

Lord Haldane(8) has elaborately argued that knowledge is foundational. One can commence metaphysical inquiry with the hypothetical first man. One can imaginatively go on regressing to witness the opening ceremony of the Cosmos. One would there stumble across knowledge. Knowledge is basic. Madhva certainly accepts this, but, he would add that the foundational and basic knowledge involves and implies the existence of something that is not knowledge *but* which is *object* of such knowledge. The distinction between knowledge and its appropriate object which is ultimate, fundamental and irreducible, is bound to be perceived in respect of the foundational and basic knowledge itself. Knowledge and its object which is not knowledge are also basic and foundational. Knowledge is real. Its object is real. The relation known as the knower-known-relation is real.

Dr. Johnson was not after all so unphilosophical as he is represented to have been when he violently refuted Idealism. But then, any sensation, knowledge, or idea, inevitably points to the existence of something which is neither sensation, nor knowledge, nor idea. It is that something which is indeed the substratum of Realism. The same line of argument is indicated in the language of Madhva used in "Tatvodyota" and "Tatva Nirnaya." In

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(8) See Haldane's "Reign of Relativity."—PP—200 and 189.

the former, the Acharya writes—"Nacha-pratyaksha-siddham-anyena - kenapi - badhyam - drishtam - nacha - jagatpratyakshasya-apatutve - kimchin - manam - nacha - jagatojnyanajanyatve-kimchinmanam." The reality of the universe grasped and guaranteed by sense-perception is never stultified, denied or repudiated under normal conditions. That is called a normal and efficient perception. (Patu-pratyaksha). Erroneous perceptions like the moon being seen as a disc and similar illusions are easily accountable as being due to disturbances of normality. (apatu-pratyaksha). The European critic cannot be allowed to describe this as a crude realism, until he explains the nature of the scientific realism, and proclaims the criteria by the application of which scientific realism is to be marked off from the crude. Conclusions, crude and scientific, have to be formed on the basis of the data collected by means of the senses which are the only connecting links between a subject and his environment. What then is the fun of condemning the verdicts of the sense-organs as illusory, unreal, and untrustworthy and so forth? A more philosophical procedure is to place credence in the knowledge yielded by the sensory channels of communication with reality that is external to the subject. That is exactly what Madhva has done. Madhva maintains in the sentences quoted above that a normally constituted and normally functioning sense-organ gives valid and reliable knowledge of Reality as it is.

In his "Tatva-Nirnaya" as well, Madhva argues the same point with a wealth of illuminating detail. . . . . "Satyatvamdristhyaiva-sidhyati"—"Natu-bodha-nivartyata." Waking phenomena resemble the imagery of dream-worlds in being under the control and overlordship of the Supreme Isvara. There is no such thing as repudiation or stultification by knowledge. X had a terrible or a pleasant dream. He wants to narrate the whole of it to a psychoanalyst or psychiatrist. Of course all sorts of outlandish experiences would have been his. They do not fit in with facts of waking life. Nor with the psychical and physical environment in which his lot has been cast. That he had certain experiences is not denied. Waking life tells him that the experiences he had in dreams do not fit in with the present. He had them in dreams. They are based on a realistic foundation. A comparison between the dream and waking life demonstrates the reality of the latter. Both are under the control of the Supreme Lord. Both are seen and understood by Him. He is not a victim of or slave to any illusions.

Or, waking and dreaming may be contrasted with one another. In that case, the experiences of the latter do not fit in with those of the former. The experiences of waking life do demonstrate that they have a fixity of purpose, an order, and a systematisation which do not belong to dream-life. Approaching a study of dream and waking existences from the stand-points of comparison

and contrast it is seen that the reality of waking life is fully vindicated. If Madhva's elaborate arguments are to be reduced to their fundamental quintessentials, it will be seen that the Acharya stakes his all on rational human experience. Our sense-perceptions, and the eternal witness in every one of us would demonstrate without a doubt the reality of the universe, of time and space. Perception is quite adequate to grasp the reality of the universe, when it functions normally and happens to have been normally constituted. If the structural and functional normality of perception is disturbed or dislocated, errors result, and illusions and other abnormalities. It is altogether a false and inaccurate world-view to argue the illusoriness of the universe, on the basis of a few distorted and abnormal perceptions giving rise to illusions. The arguments indicated here are reinforced, amplified, and the doctrine of reality of the universe is vindicated systematically in the controversial treatises a list of which has been prepared in an earlier chapter. The general procedure followed in those works is this. Traditional philosophical discussions have all proceeded on the lines of the *Pramanas*, authorities and guarantors and sources of valid knowledge. Controversialists owing allegiance to Madhva have argued thus—(1) In the first place, *Pratyaksha*, sense-perception does not demonstrate the unreality of the universe. *Patu-pratyaksha*, normally constituted and normally functioning sense-perception grasps the reality of the universe.

Sense-organs are quite capable of yielding for the benefit of the subject knowledge of reality *as it is*. What Kant and the Absolutists argued are forms of perception are to Madhva foundational and fundamental realities. The eternal witness, (of course so long as life lasts), the I-grasps the reality of time, space, and a spatial and temporal order. Madhva writes in his "*Anu-Vyakhyana*" "*Sakshisiddhasya - na - kvapi - badhyatvam - tadadoshatah*" "*Sarvakaleshvabadhyatvam-sakshinaiva-prateeyate.*" (P. 176. *Sarva Mula*, Vol. I). If metaphysical investigation is to be started with a doubt whether the sense-organs are able to grasp the nature of reality *as it is*, one would find himself confronted at the termination of the inquiry with a greater mass of doubt against which he will be obliged to knock his head. Investigation has to be commenced, therefore with a firm conviction that the best should be made of the resources placed at our disposal, and that the sensory channels of communication lead on to knowledge and not to a *cul-de-sac*. As pointed out before, perceptual illusions are explained as being due to a disturbance of the normal state of affairs.

(2) It would be impossible to establish the unreality of the universe on the basis of Inference. (*Anumana*). Inferential arguments have to be grounded on prior perceptions of some definite description. If one argues that all phenomena are unreal because



they are perishable, the counter-thesis can always be established that because, they are perishable, they are real. It is absurd to argue that because something is perishable, it is unreal. Reality and evanescence are perfectly compatible with one another. The Absolutist can cite only two illustrative instances, dream-phenomena, and the silver-appearance of a piece of shell, or the rope-appearing as a snake. Dream-phenomena are real. That is one line of argument. If one should persist in saying that they are unreal, Madhva emphasizes the contrast between waking and dreaming. Dream experiences are seen not to fit in the subsequent waking life, but the latter itself is not demonstrated to be a misfit in reference to something else. That at the dawn of true knowledge, the waking life will be seen to be no better than dreams, is only music of the distant drum.

The illustrative instances cited are not of great help. The illusions of silver-appearance and snake-appearance can easily be explained as being due to a misinterpretation of sensory data. No one can question the reality of the sensory data themselves. They are as real as the Absolute of the Absolutists. Only they are erroneously interpreted. It is seen subsequently when the factors that disturb the normality of the sense-object rapprochement are got rid of by a closer scrutiny, that there had occurred an error of interpretation. An analysis of perceptual illusions is bound to demonstrate the existence of a realistic residuum in all of them, and the analogy, at any rate is hardly adequate to deprive the universe of its inalienable birthright of reality. Unless two reals are admitted illusions cannot be accounted for. Piece of shell is a reality. Silver is a reality. If the former is seen as the latter, the only legitimate explanation is an error of interpretation. Illusions do not occur in the realm of the absolutely non-existent and contradictory. No one has ever been subject to an illusion that the son of a barren woman adorned with wreathes of flowers grown in empty space led to the altar the Fair Maid of Ireland. Nor is a round square mistaken for an oblong triangle. The very possibility of occasional illusions has to be explained on the ground of an unsustainable juxtaposition of two reals brought about by an error of judgment, or an interpretative mishap. About the reality of the data there can be no manner of doubt. It is idle to contend that all this is only a psychological analysis. Yes, but, it is surely news, that metaphysical investigation can repudiate or run counter to psychological analysis. Reason and ratiocination do not disturb the reality of the universe. Let it be noted that the objects of the universe and the universe itself are perishable, and the destruction will be when the Lord wills it. But because, they are so destroyed, it does not mean that they are unreal. They are definite-boundaried spatio-temporal point-events. They are realities as real as the Absolute.

(3) Following the traditional methods of controversy, Madhva has also cited the relevant scriptural texts that establish the reality of the universe in opposition to the illusionism of the Absolutists. For the purpose of strengthening his own view, Madhva has reinterpreted the scriptural texts which seem to lend support to the doctrine of illusion. For instance, in texts like "Ekameva-adviteeyam" etc., only the unchallenged supremacy of the Overlord of the Universe is emphasized "Adviteeyam" should mean "without an equal." It cannot mean that there exists nought else. Nor could it mean that the Cosmos is an illusory appearance, and that the Absolute is the only reality. Such re-interpretations have been fully set forth in the exposition of "Tatvanirnava" and elsewhere. (9).

## VIII

Demonstration of the reality of the Universe requires a criticism of Sankara's doctrine of "Adhyasa." The doctrine of the Absolutists so charmingly developed in the opening portion of the Bhashya of Sankara is criticised by Madhva at some length in his "Tatvanirnaya" and the arguments have been set forth fully in the course of the exposition in the Eighth Chapter. What is the value of the criticism? That transactions of daily life are due to an erroneous ascription of the qualities of Atman, to Anatman, and vice-versa, is the cardinal contention put forward by Sankara and Madhva answers that the erroneous ascription is nowhere in evidence. The qualities that are usually associated with the inanimate creation are never erroneously attributed to the animate. Even the most abnormal minds, huddled up for observation in a clinic for psychopaths and lunatics, do not confirm the view, that they imagine they are inanimate. Normal minds cannot *a fortiori* be affected by any erroneous ascription of the qualities of the inanimate to the animate.

The Universe contends the Absolutist is a huge and colossal appearance due to the ascription erroneously of the qualities of unreal to the real. (Satyanrita-mithunikarana in the language of Sankara) and this is a magnificent castle in the air. How does any one know that this is all due to the erroneous ascription? It cannot be through the ordinary means of sense-awareness. It gives no evidence of any error while functioning normally. Nor is

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(9) See Jayatirtha's "Vaadavali" P. 67. If it is said that Brahman is one only *without a second*, the second sought to be excluded can only be possible candidate for Brahmic supremacy. The term "Advitiya" cannot deprive the universe of its inalienable birth-right of reality. Vishnudasacharya in his "Vadaratnavali" expresses the idea graphically thus—"Yathachola-nripassamrat-adviteeyosti-bhupatih" "Iti-tattulyanripati nivananaparam-vachah-Natu- tatputra-tanmitra-kalatradi-nivaranam." If it is said that a Chola King is so powerful that he is without a second, the existence of his equals and *a fortiori* of his superiors would be denied, but not the existence of his friends, sons, wives and others.

any inference possible. Scriptural texts are capable of different interpretations, and if they are blatantly in contradiction with the verdicts of rational human experience, they have to be thrown overboard.

The Absolute is involved in this gigantic error. That the Absolute itself is seen erroneously (as must be held,) as the phantasmagoria of metempsychosis, or in whatever terminology the Absolutistic doctrine may be couched and expressed, by X Y Z and so forth is hardly rational. One is bound to investigate why (1) the Absolute ever lent itself to this process of victimisation, why (2) it should degrade itself into appearance of plurality and multiplicity, and above all why (3) the Absolute should practise a deception on itself and its miniature reflections, the finite selves as to Its Reality, Status, etc. It would be out of order to seek to stifle all discussion by the promulgation of an Ordinance that the "Why" of things can never be answered. In that case, there is absolutely no reason why a Dualism of Mind, and Matter and the Pluralism of God, Matter and Finite selves cannot be admitted. In his "Tatva-Nirnaya" Madhva sets his face resolutely against "Adhyasa". He emphatically declares, "Nachatmani-anatmabhramah-kvapi-drishyah," etc. No one ever mistakes the animate for the inanimate, and the self is never mistaken for the not-self. Where then is Adhyasa? Times without number, Madhva has explained that occasional perceptual errors do not invalidate sensory-awareness. Errors and illusions are due to exceptional situations and mal-adjustments. They only prove the general validity of sense-knowledge.

An Absolute Idealism they write *con amore* can never be conclusively disproved and repudiated. True. Because, the game is not worth the candle. But could it be conclusively proved and demonstrated in any accepted sense of "proof" and "demonstration" that Idealism—Absolute—is the only fashionable philosophy of life? Madhva argues that knowledge cannot be a superimposition. It stands for a definite relation between the subject and the object, the Knower and the Known. In illusions, perceived data are wrongly interpreted. Where does the error creep in? The error touches the object. Rope is seen as snake. Shell is seen as silver. Apart from all quibble, the snake is simply not there. Nor is the silver there. Snakes may be and are elsewhere. So is silver. Madhva, therefore, is perfectly correct in maintaining that sense-knowledge is accurate in all normal circumstances. In abnormal instances, data are erroneously interpreted. A given X is seen as something else Y. Between the X and Y there are some obvious resemblances. There is a residuum of realism in illusions as well. Why should a piece of shell not be mistaken as a Knight? Why should a rope not be mistaken as a political agitator? Such illusions are unknown. Even illusions obey laws. The Atma is never mistaken as the Anatma, even in the most abnormal of mal-adjustments between sense-organs and the environment.

And then whoever mistakes the Anatma, the inanimate as the Atma, the animate? Madhva has argued at length in a rigorously methodical manner that the logical conclusion of "Adhyasa" would be a materialism from which there would be no escape. Bradley is said to have constructed a magnificent philosophy on "somehow." In these days, when the bringing of Indian philosophy within the focus of Western civilised thought is insisted upon, there is no reason why one should not maintain that Bradley had been long long ago anticipated in India, and answered as well.

It should carefully be noted that Sankara never gives any evidence in support of "Adhyasa." He says that the mistaken or erroneous transference of the qualities of the Atman to the Anatman, and those of the latter to the former, and the mistaking of the one as the other are natural, (naisargika) beginningless, (anadi) and Sankara further maintains that "Adhyasa" affects scriptural texts and injunctions as well. Varna is Adhyasta. Asrama is Adhyasta. There is Karana-adhyasa. There is Karya-adhyasa. There is a myriad-faced Adhyasa. Well and good. But what is the logical evidence afforded?

If all this is so easily described as the outcome of "Adhyasa" Madhva is perfectly entitled to demand scientific evidence in support of it. None is forthcoming. Only illusions and dream-phenomena have been cited *ad nauseam* by writers on Absolutism. A little calm reflection would suffice to convince unbiassed minds, that both have substantial realistic foundations, implications and developments. It is illogical to argue that because, the sense-object rapprochement is disturbed in some extreme and abnormal cases, senses are to be condemned *in toto* as untrustworthy. It is a blatantly illogical procedure.

Time and Space are the warp and woof of cosmic phenomena, objects, events, etc. Time is experienced to be a reality by the "Sakshi" the witness—I felt by every individual. No one even in the most abnormal conditions ever feels that he is Time itself or Space itself. The connotation of the terms "Atma" and "Anatma" will have to be fixed down and settled first. On any view, the qualities belonging to the latter are never erroneously transferred to the former. *Res Cogitans* is never mistaken as *Res Extensa*. Scriptural texts afford no evidence. They cut either way. They can be interpreted either in support or repudiation of the doctrine of "Adhyasa." Sense-perception does not support erroneous transference of the qualities of the material to the non-material. Inference must fail as it has to rest on prior perceptions. Madhva appears to be perfectly correct in his criticisms of "Adhyasa.." The animate self is never mistaken for the inanimate. If so, how can the former be a superimposition on the latter? As the substratum of erroneous superimposition is bound to be a reality, the conclusion is that the only reality is matter!!! The nemesis of Absolutism is materialism.

Granting for the sake of argument that the Absolutistic doctrine may *somehow* be admitted, the further question arises if that doctrine is in any way capable of supplying the needed dynamic moral and spiritual force? That all the transactions of the secular and the spiritual world are based on an erroneous transference of the qualities of the animate and the inanimate to one another, is hardly a dynamic motive force for healthy constructive activity. Knowing that the entire scheme of religion, reason, revelation, etc., is grounded on error, one may not care for conformity with it, as non-conformity is as good as conformity. From the arguments advanced in "Tatvanirnaya" it can readily be seen that "Adhyasa" cannot be demonstrated to rest on the basis of reason. Granting that it can somehow be argued to be an acceptable doctrine, its practical value is doubtful.

( In the "Adhyasa Bhashya" of Sankara, and in the commentaries thereon, the existence of error or erroneous transference of attributes, features, etc., is dogmatically asserted to be "Naisargika" natural and existing there from time immemorial. This is surely no proof. In all normally constituted perceptions, "Atma" and "Anatma" are grasped in their irreducible and inalienable individuality. They are so diverse that the one is never mistaken for the other. If the entire cosmic scheme is held to be grounded on this error, something more than dogmatism and other-than dogmatism would be needed as proof. So, when the Absolutist delivers the verdict that the entire body of texts, scriptural and quasi-scriptural forsooth, relate to error-ridden data, one is tempted to exclaim *Credat Judaeus Apella*. Do not the scriptures proclaim the nature of the Supreme Brahman for purposes of worship and the Attributeless Absolute for purposes of metaphysics? And if these too have to come under the devastating logic and dreadful dialectic contained in the doctrine of "Adhyasa,"—they will have to—one will be justified in crying halt to the riotous procedure of the Absolutistic Metaphysic. Madhva has done that.) The knowledge or awareness, however secured of "Adhyasa" cannot but be enveloped in the error on which the doctrine is grounded.) The intellect itself that is employed to give logical status to the doctrine should be similarly enveloped. The reactions of the aspirants and the indifferents to a perception of the value and significance of the doctrine are similarly enveloped in error. The effort put forth by the aspirant is and must be similarly enveloped and shrouded in error. There is no other go. If the scriptural injunctions are error-ridden, *a fortiori* non-scriptural matters cannot escape the influence of the error. If out of all this metaphysical king-carnival of error, misapprehension, reactionary beclouding *et hoc*, one is asked to believe pure, pristine, knowledge about the fundamental and foundational identity between the Finite and Infinite will be realised, all that can be observed is that too great a demand is made on the

philosophical credulity of humanity. The repudiation of the doctrine of Adhyasa is just a negative way of affirming the reality of the universe.

## IX

Unity-mongering is the bane of philosophy. Persons are not wanting who claim that it is the realisation of one-ness that is most difficult. Difference meets the eye everywhere and there is no difficulty in perceiving and understanding it. The obvious reply to them is that a vague apprehension of unity that destroys all distinctions and differences is the characteristic mark of infantile awareness. The world appears to infantile consciousness as a "big, booming and buzzing, confusion." Marking of and realisation of differences, light and shade, perception of minute lines, and formation in a landscape are due to development of the infantile into adult awareness. This however is mere tit for tat for which Madhva has no liking. Reality is rooted in difference, diversity, and distinctions. Difference in endowment and equipment, training and temperament, ability and achievement, ambitions and attainments and other differences are only too painfully real. Philosophy cannot repudiate the experience of humanity. When and if attempted, such a repudiation should be based on overwhelming evidence. Madhva contends that philosophy being a rational unification and systematisation of experience will have to be constructed on the solid foundations of the consolidated experiences of mankind and the special experiences of the seers and mystics. Neither the one nor the other type of experience would warrant the repudiation of the difference and diversity noticed in experience. It is as it should be. Difference does not so easily permit itself to be written off or annihilated by a mere stroke of the pen of the Absolutist or by waving of the Absolutistic Magic Wand. Difference is foundational. All the Pramanas deliver a unanimous verdict that difference and diversity are real, as real as the Absolute of the Absolutist and the Supreme Brahman of the Pluralistic Theist.

Madhva enunciates the doctrine that "Bheda", difference is "Dharmisvaruupa." The position has been argued at considerable length in "Tatva-Nirnaya" and elsewhere, (10) and there is no need to repeat here the arguments advanced there. In the perception of an object, relation, value concept, etc., difference is perceived. Relations are external if that sort of terminology is to be employed. But, the relations, whatever they are, the objects related, difference among them, their individuality are all grasped in an electric-flash-like manner in one and the same act of perception. If difference is not thus perceived, the question has to be discussed when and where it has been lurking and if it makes its

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(10) See Anuvyakhya. P. 30. "Svarupam-vastuno-bhedah" "Kovirodhahsvaruupena-griheeto-bheda-evatu."

appearance suddenly at some particular stage of evolution of humanity and the evolution of the Cosmos, like a Jack in the Box? Such a view savours of sickly sentimentalism. Difference need not come from anywhere else. It is of the essence of the object itself. Difference is of the very essential and fundamental form of the objects themselves.) A discussion as to what constitutes "essence" is unnecessary in the present context. Structural essence, functional essence, and many other essences may be distinguished. In fact in whatever manner, "Essence" may be interpreted, it is apprehended along with difference of that object from others. "Essence," "Difference," "Individuality" are all apprehended in an electric-flash-like manner, and at the moment of the actual apprehension, there is hardly any time for linguistic expressions to be chiselled and polished for academic consumption. It is idle to contend that the Absolutist who maintains that all difference is illusory has no difficulties in demonstrating his doctrine. Granting that perception of difference between X and Y, Y and Z is illusory, the illusion has got to be accounted for. In cases and instances of perceptual illusions, sensory data are misinterpreted on account of there being a disturbance of the sense-situational rapprochement. What is the disturbance which is responsible for the perception of an illusion in the shape of difference between X and Y? The Absolutist is not able to identify and mention any disturbing factors. Even then, there never occurs an illusion, or illusory experience without the reality of two entities being previously granted. Shell is a reality. Silver is a reality. When a piece of the former is mistaken for the latter, responsibility lies on the shoulders of the subject who in his eagerness, or avarice perceives silver where there is none. Sensory data themselves are not to blame. Thus, what are the two reals of which one is mistaken for the other? If two reals are to be admitted, then Monistic Idealism is cast to the four winds. (11).

The only other alternative is to admit that perception is quite capable of grasping reality, and difference. One may be assumed to be familiar with the stock argument advanced by writers on European Philosophy that a subject is never directly aware of objects of external reality and that the latter are inferentially understood to exist in the light of his subjective experiences which alone are directly apprehended by the subject. Madhva contends there is no need to enlist the services of any inferential process in accounting for the fact of knowledge. "Sakshi" or the I—awareness in every individual, is quite capable of grasping an external order of material objects and individuals, etc., etc., without the aid of inference directly and immediately. The very notion of the I—(Sakshi) involves a perception directly of an

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(11) "Bhranti-kalpitatve-cha-jagatah-satyam-jagaddvayamapekshitam." "Tatvanirnaya" P. 15. Unless two reals are admitted there are no illusions.

external order of reality, of which the embodied I—is one. The mere utterance or subjective awareness of the I—involves a direct awareness of an external order of reality, and difference of the I—from it, and countless other I-s, linked up in a social system. Difference is thus interwoven in all awareness of the states of subjective experience.

Madhva's pluralistic Universe is grounded on difference. The difference may not be misinterpreted or misrepresented to be any conflict or antagonism. United existence for the achievement of a common end is not excluded by difference. On the contrary, difference just emphasizes individuality and independence. If the vicissitudes of the development of perception of individuality, and of awareness of personal identity be traced genetically, it will be readily realised that in the comparatively early stages of childish or juvenile awareness, there is irrefutable evidence to show that difference from the material environment of the I—is realised, and difference between any two of the individualised and rounded off objects is equally well realised. It is no good to contend that all this is only a psychological analysis, because, even the absolutist, or the Monistic Idealist cannot afford to ignore the value and validity of psychological analysis.

On the reflective level nicer shades of distinctions and subtleties of difference are perceived. Purposive and pragmatic considerations now get the upper hand, and when difference of one and the same object from countless others is there, its difference from any one of them or more is affirmed in accordance with the purpose and interests of the persons who affirm it and of those for whose sake it is affirmed. It follows that differences lie there in a submerged condition. They are potential, lying just to be drawn out recognised, and emphasized. "Padarthasvaruupatvat-bhedasya" "Bhedastu-svaruupadarsana-eva-siddhah" "Asya-bhedaititu-padarthasya-svaruupamiti-vat." In those pithy and aphoristic observations, Madhva has maintained the thesis that difference is perceived at the moment of the perception of the object itself. If not, there would never be any chance or occasion when its perception would be in order. That difference is a mental construction is hardly a sustainable plea. The mind or the subject, or the percipient will never perceive any difference if there had been none. One grasps difference simply because difference is the foundation on which cosmic order rests. Even in the comparatively simple exclamations like "How charming," "Stuff and nonsense," etc., difference is the central object of attention. European logicians are never tired of stressing the obvious fact, with a needless array of paraphernalia, that an infantile cry is a logical judgment which is the unit of all thought. The same cry indicates "difference" which is the warp and woof of the cosmos. An analysis of "doubt" "similarity," etc., will demonstrate that "difference" is first perceived, and then one may inquire if aspects



of resemblance could be emphasized. There is no awareness in which difference does not figure.

Even though an adroit attempt may be made to repudiate other "differences," difference of a subject from countless other subjects and the material environment cannot be repudiated. Awareness involves difference. Waking consciousness, they say is a continuous affirmation, a judgment. Waking consciousness is a continuous awareness of difference. To be conscious is to perceive difference. Madhva is careful to point out that the perception of difference may not be accurate, clear and distinct, in embryonic stages. That cannot be helped. Even in the vaguest and the crudest type of awareness or consciousness difference is an important element. Consciousness or awareness is of something other than itself. We never speak even in the wildest of our metaphysical fights of just awareness. The question is inevitable—what is the object the awareness of which is emphasized? Difference is an unfailing and ever-present element in all awareness. Unity of purpose, of interest etc., has significance only because the parties or subjects are different. Common bonds of interest and purpose, do not militate against the radical pluralism of Madhva. The unity may be set in difference. The latter is the brilliant background without which the former cannot shine at all. Difference extends to all realms of activity and fields of knowledge. By means of a fidgety fiat, one may endeavour to repudiate all difference. But, in any theory of knowledge, there is difference between the valid, and the invalid and their respective criteria will have to be distinguished from one another. It is idle to contend that it is a distinction without a difference. Should there be no difference between the criteria, one may give the go-by to the distinction and difference between valid and invalid knowledge. In Ethics again, difference among the moral and the immoral, and their criteria is emphasized sharply. The difference between the Finite and the Infinite is still the dominant and live issue in metaphysical discussions. Religion and Theology are grounded on the difference between Finite man, helpless and struggling, and praying and a God or Gods, answering prayers, or believed to answer them. Activities, values, judgments, criticisms, constructions, Intellect, Emotion, and Volition are all firmly grounded on the rock of difference, diversity, and disparity. Waking consciousness is one, continuous and homogeneous affirmation of difference, diversity, and disparity. The dream-life is permeated by difference. The riotous and unbridled play of imagery witnessed in dream-life is grounded on difference. No one dreams that he is a rock. Even then, there is the awareness of a transformation of something into something else. Difference is not annihilated in dream-life. Of course, during the time of deep, profound, dreamless sleep, sensory contact with external reality is switched off, and even the inner-sense, the mind

or the Antahkarana (12) is given the rest that it is so badly in need of. From such deep sleep, to Monism as the only philosophy of life, is indeed a far cry. Sleep is a blank. It is a blank that has a profound economical value. Bio-chemical wear and tear had been in waking life. Nervous tissues should be rehabilitated, repaired and reconstructed. The Infinite, Supreme Lord Narayana is the One Source of all life and Energy. The Upanishadic theory of sleep is put picturesquely by Madhva to the effect that the Finite self, fatigued by the feverish flights after the concerns of life, is fondly folded in an embrace by Sri "Prajnya Murti," which is just a reconstructive tonic. The requisite energy for the next day's work is imparted by the embrace of the Finite with the Supreme. Eliminating linguistic imagery, the metaphysical point to be noted is that according to Madhva, waking, dreams, and dreamless sleep offer evidence in support of difference, diversity and disparity.

The Monistic Idealists speak of a fourth state, *Turiya*, and another beyond-the-fourth—*Turiyaateeta*, which again are no exceptions to the general rule. It is contended that all awareness of difference vanishes from them. But, Madhva maintains that in Yogic contemplation of the inherent spiritual powers, nature of the finite, bliss, etc., there is ever present the consciousness of the Immanent and Transcendental Power, the Supreme Narayana. It is easy to see that only introspective testimony can be had about experiences of individuals rising to those rare stages of spiritual advancement. Introspective testimony may not have scientific value of the laboratory type. Madhva contends that Yogic and meditative practices are all intended for the purification of the subject as a preliminary to self-realisation and coming face to face with the Infinite. Unless there is the awareness that without the Grace of the Lord our efforts will not be crowned with success, Yogic meditations are valueless and they may not be any better than the Occultism and the Black Art practised by select sects all the world over. If Yoga is not to degenerate into meaningless, and even aggressive Occultism, it is to be admitted that the practices are to be gone through not because, they confer on individuals some extraordinary power by means of which one can work wonders, but because they contribute to a purification of the spirit, after which the genuine aspirant realises his own inherent bliss and sees something of the grandeur and majesty of the Supreme Lord Narayana in Whose Presence, he is ushered in, in the fullness of time. If one is to sift, examine and evaluate, carefully the evidence of the data collected from the waking,

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.. (12) Indian Psychology recognises subtle distinctions among Manas, Buddhi, Ahankara, and Chitta. Mind is the inner sense-organ. The Sankhya admits mind as a separate sense-organ. See "Sankhya-Karika": "Ubhayat-makamatra-manah," etc. Karika 27. Madhva contends that awareness of difference persists in waking, dream and dreamless sleep.

dream, sleep, the fourth, and the beyond-the-fourth stages of existence, the conclusion is irresistible that the data amply demonstrate the metaphysical doctrine advocated by Madhva that difference is the basic, solid foundation on which the Cosmos and Cosmic values are resting. While it is not all difficult to hug the fond illusionistic hypothesis to the bosom that difference, diversity, and distinctions are illusory, a thinking mind is sure to be disconcerted at the thought that a mischievous Spirit is practising a Colossal deception on X, Y and Z. The tragi-comical aspect of the illusionistic hypothesis or doctrine becomes brilliant when it is contemplated that X, Y, Z, and countless others who day in and day out, put forth plenty of effort, plan, conspire, and do things with an amazing air of perfection, independence and all the rest of it, do not realise that their labour is confined to an unreal world, or a world of a lower degree of Reality the nearest approach to which is the dream-universe. The metaphysically sophisticated and the unsophisticated alike, are victims of this illusion. How again an illusionistic endeavour happens to be causally connected with an non-illusionistic outcome is a mystery on the facts produced by the Absolutist. Yet, people are not wanting who urge the defence that reality of a lower degree is admitted in respect of the world, and that the illusionistic hypothesis relates to an evolved spirit and so forth. That this is hardly a logical plea is clear. The illusionistic doctrine requires that the fundamental unreality of the cosmos and the cosmic phenomena should be affirmed in respect of past, present and the future. That is not to be. The unrepudiated and unsullied experience of humanity—the “Sakshi” of every individual, grasps the reality of time, of the present, and the past and the future too the former of which was present and the latter of which will be ushered into the present in due time. “Satvamapi-drishṭāśya-sakshigam.” (13). Not merely the reality of the phenomena, but, difference is grasped directly and immediately by the “Sakshi.” Difference is not something superimposed. It is not something erroneously attributed to cosmic phenomena. It is not something mistaken for something else on the analogy of a piece of shell being mistaken as silver. It is not finally an illusion. Positively speaking it is of the essential and fundamental form of the objects themselves as they are. There is no reality without difference, and no difference without reality. *They are together from eternity to eternity.*

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(13) “Anuvyakhyana,” P. 30. Time (present, past and the future) is grasped by the “Sakshi”—the Inner I—witness. Madhva maintains that the reality of Time is directly apprehended by the self. Eddington considers consciousness to be a disreputable witness in such matters, and leaving the guidance of consciousness aside, he finds in *Entropy* a kind of sign-post for time. Whether we rely on the guidance of consciousness or not, Madhva’s contention that Time is a reality remains intact. See “The Mathematical Gazette” Vol. XV. No. 212 (March—1931). P. 318—for an elaboration of Eddington’s arguments.

## X

Casting one's eye casually anywhere, difference is what one notes. Unity is there no doubt. That does not annihilate difference. Nor is the latter relegated to the limbo of the unreal and the illusory. It is as real and unrepudiated as the unity itself. Unity is just individuality. One individual differs from others. There are countless individuals, animate and inanimate. In a striking passage of his "Tatvanirnaya" the Acharya says—"nacha-ghatad - vailakshanyameva - patadvailakshanyam (14). Madhva's Radical Pluralism will have to be broad-based on the individuality of objects and things, however small they may be and however insignificant, according to unenlightened interests. Madhva suggests a careful analysis of inanimate creation. Though grouped under the convenient label "Inanimate" by a linguistic fiat, it reveals marvellous differences which cannot be annihilated even by a scientific fiat. Matter may be a generic name, but the material universe contains countless individuals. That all this is *mere appearance has been repudiated*. The progressive interests of civilised humanity have individualised inanimate creation. The individualisation is *not* a mental construction. Nor is it a boon conferred on objects. The individuality is there. It has been brought to the surface, emphasized, and recognised by man with varied interests. Inanimate X fulfils function different from that of Y, another inanimate. Z, a third inanimate satisfies a different interest other than those served by X and Y. The structures they reveal, the functions they fulfill and the pragmatic interests of humanity emphasize the individuality and independence of material objects of one another. The scientist may or may not care to stop with the electron. But it has an individuality of behaviour defiant of the scientific skill of man. That certain such electrons should have conspired together to produce a Bernard Shaw and other electrons conspire to produce a Negro, indicate only one conclusion that they retain their individuality and difference from one another. The task of the Absolutist is easy. With a supercilious disdain of facts and experience, with bureaucratic disregard for the independence and individuality of others and with the self-complacency of those that might have assisted the Absolute in its downward career of degradation into the appearance of Cosmos, or of those that might have kept company with the *elan vital* in the process through thick and thin of its solidification or crystallisation into the Cosmic phenomena, the Absolutist would contend that all difference is *mere appearance*, but, why should it be there actually as it is and not in any other way? If objects are to be easily disposed of as "mere appearance" whatever its meaning, appearance appears to obey certain laws, and reveal uniformities of behaviour. Why should there be method in the madness of the behaviour of appearance? Of course, the "why" of things can never

be known. If the Absolutist is not in a position to explain satisfactorily the pluralisation of the Absolute and its vicissitudes, then, where is philosophical disability or logical untenability if Madhva should argue that difference is grasped when the objects themselves are perceived? The very utterance of the term, "object" signifies "difference." Whatever may be the stock arguments advanced by European Absolutists, the Indian Absolutist argues, did argue, and will continue to argue on the analogy of the appearance of silver in a piece of shell, and that of snake in rope. The unsoundness of the analogy has been exposed times without number. Madhva has argued elaborately that *no illusionistic experience can ever be possible unless two reals are postulated*. That is surely nemesis. One who repudiates all reality has to admit the existence of two reals if illusionistic experiences are to be accounted for. Inanimate creation is thus full of objects, which reveal characteristic features of their own. They are irreducible to one another. Type differs from type, class from class, genus from genus, and species from species. It is no argument against their reality to affirm that the objects are all perishable. Yes, they are. But one is yet to learn that perishability is unreality. If like the Absolutist one should propose his own criteria by means of which the real from the unreal is to be marked off and distinguished, the Pluralist is at perfect reality to formulate his own criteria. *Perishability is not the criterion of unreality, nor imperishability that of reality.* (Jada and Jada).

## XI

Difference between the animate and the inanimate is marked. The knock-out blow administered by Madhva on the head of the doctrine of "Adhyasa" places difference between the animate and the inanimate on unassailable foundations. "Atma" can never be mistaken for "Anatma." Nor is the latter ever mistaken for the former. Inanimate forces of nature reveal remarkable destructive features. Natural phenomena like thunder and lightning are no respectors of persons. Some of the most efficient and distinguished of the latter may be crushed by the former. Trite as it may seem the extraordinary and unmanageable force of nature's phenomena is there as a permanent reminder of the insignificance of man in creation.

On the other hand, nature's forces have been subdued and made to function in the interests of man. One may argue that God has placed in the hands of man power sufficient enough to conquer some of the forces of nature. Others are there defying man. The latter will surely remind humble persons that God is great. The former are reminders of God's generosity and His solicitude for the welfare of mankind. There is the philosophical obligation on the part of the Absolutist to explain how the One Reality of the Absolute, pluralised itself into the animate and

inanimate creation. That the Pluralisation is *mere appearance* is an unproved assertion and can be met by the counter assertion that it is a *reality*. If appearance is to be maintained Two Reals are involved in the bargain.

If those Two Reals are further contended to be *mere appearance* again, then Two other Reals will have to be admitted to justify the latter. And so on; there would result an infinite regress. It is common experience that the genius and ingenuity of man have contributed to a remarkable conquest over the forces of nature that are inanimate. On the other hand some of the latter continue still to be invincible causing havoc and destruction to the cherished possessions of mankind. Evidence supplied by the two sets of facts is conclusive in support of the ineradicable and irreducible difference that there is between the animate and the inanimate. (Jiva and Jada.)

## XII

That the inanimate creation is different from the Supreme Self Who is the Creator, Preserver and the Destroyer of the cosmos needs no very elaborate justification or demonstration. The author of the Vedanta Sutas has given a definite and unchallengeable answer. The Brahman that is to be known is the Creator (15) of the Universe. Should there be an identity between the two, talk of creator-ship would be wild. The Absolutist seeks to wriggle out of an admittedly inconvenient and uncomfortable metaphysical corner, by contending that the Brahman whose definition is attempted in the second Sutra is the "Saguna-Brahman" of a lower degree of reality and not the "Nirguna-Brahman"—the Attributeless Absolute. A discussion of the problem whether the Absolutistic doctrine is attuned to the letter and spirit of the Vedanta Aphorisms, should be postponed to a different context, but, it is clear, if external considerations, and metaphysical predilections are not imported into the transaction, the definition of Brahman given by the author of the Sutas should be taken to be final. Difference then is demonstrated on the strength of the Aphorism "Janmadyasya-yatah." If Brahman is the Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer of the Cosmos, the latter cannot but be different from the former. In the latter one perceives a jumble of animate and the inanimate creations. It was pointed out that the difference between the animate and the inanimate was based or may be based on the control which the former exercises on the latter, and the disregard evinced by the latter for the safety of the former. Brahman, the Supreme Overlord of the Cosmos Creates, Preserves and Destroys the entire Cosmos composed of the animate and the inanimate. *A fortiori*, Brahman cannot but be held

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(15) "Janmadyasya-Yatah." Vedanta Sutra 1-2. Vijayindra Tirtha maintains that the difference between Saguna Brahman and the Nirguna Brahman is yet an unproved or undemonstrated assumption. See "Madhvadhikar-Kantakoddhara" known as "Kantakoddhara" opening section.

to be different from the inanimate creation. Otherwise Brahmic Creatorship will be meaningless. (Jada and Isa.)

### XIII

Finite selves differ from one another. Philosophy should satisfy the requirements of abstract thought, logical consistency, not merely, but, should also satisfy the deepest demands of morality and religion. Life is full of inequality, inconsistency, contradictions, and conflicts. Difference in environment and equipment stares one in the face. Ability and achievement conflict with one another. With very little or absolutely no ability whatever, one develops in a trice to be a prize boy of the bureaucracy, a popular idol, a political magnate, or a cinema star. While others with real ability are denied a hearing, the windbag makes considerable headway. Parnell's hermit was not the only one whom doubts of a particular type assailed. Others are bound to be similarly assailed. A career pronounced to be virtuous according to accepted standards of morality is blasted, while one admittedly immoral triumphs. This very difference has led the Absolutist to consider morality as *mere appearance*. That is not so easy. Difference there is. It has got to be explained. There is no use blaming the Divine Creator of the Cosmos for difference, and inequality. The Divine Creator as the nearest approach to some agency in human institutions, can be likened to an impartial judge who administers certain laws in the making of which he doubtless had no hand. Personal interests do not enter into the administration of laws. It is to rid a system of philosophy of the absurdity of making the Deity responsible for differences and inequality in creation that the doctrine of Karma has been formulated. Karma is "anadi" beginningless in time. So is the spirit. At any point of time, the present existence is to be considered the outcome of the past actions of an individual. The present in like manner paves the way for the future. Each rational and responsible individual has perfect liberty to make or mar his or her fortune. God delegates the necessary freedom without His Own Freedom being compromised in any manner or to any degree. That freedom has to be postulated. It renders intelligible moral responsibility, a doctrine of morality and its translation into practice. All careers are thus determined by the law of Karma the sway of which is supreme and inexorable.

In the fullness of time, when the individual realises his own inner-spiritual bliss and qualifies himself to stand face to face with the Divine Creator of the Cosmos, he attains freedom from all Karmic bondage and enslavement. The stock of his Karma good and bad is burnt up and potentiality for future lives is destroyed altogether. (16) Madhva puts the matter in the course of a devotional hymn, beautifully thus—"Bhinnakaramasaya-pranisam-prerakam" (17) The Supreme Lord animates the endeavours of a!

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(16) "Jnyanagnidagdhakarmanam"—the Gita has it. (4-19).

(17) "Dvadasastotra"—Chap. 8—stanza 3.

who differ in their careers and destinies according to the laws of Karma. Difference between any two free, knowing, feeling and willing individuals is the foundational fact of life. Annihilation of this difference is mere moonshine. It would suffice in this context to emphasize some unassailable considerations in support of mutual difference between any two of the selves. The question of their origin is unthinkable as selves are postulated to have no beginning in time. If they had they would be obliged to start the race of life with a "tabula rasa." There is no evidence for that. To cut the Gordian knot it is postulated that the selves are beginningless in time, "Anadi." Their inclinations differ, their tendencies and their careers. There is neither simultaneous cosmic enmeshment nor simultaneous release. Each individual is to work out his own destiny. Activity in X does not mean its fructification in Y. Assailing X with stimuli does not mean responses in Y. Madhva founds his pluralistic universe on the observed and unrepudiated facts of life and experience. That the facts are in the grip of relativity and constant change with changing conditions is obvious. That the difference among the finite selves may be due to the mischievous machinations of Upadhi is an Absolutistic objection which has been answered fully in the work "Upadhi-khandana." The "Bhedojjivana" of Vyasaraja mentioned earlier, contains several highly technical syllogisms intended to demonstrate the plurality of selves. They are not empirical selves as one may be inclined to contend. They are *real selves, as real as the Absolute itself*. The "Vaadaavali" of Jayatirtha also contains syllogisms of complicated logical technique in support of the plurality of selves. (Jiva and Jiva.) (18).

#### XIV

Perhaps the most important is the difference established by Madhva between finite selves and the Supreme Paramatman. Leaving minor ones, let us concentrate attention on the main arguments, which if dispassionately considered will be seen entirely to satisfy the demands of the genuine logical and metaphysical spirit of investigation.

Madhva argues that the author of the Vedanta Sūtras supports *not identity, but only difference between the Finite and the Infinite*. Ignorant critics of Madhva have said that the Dualism between the Finite (jiva) and the Infinite (Ivara) does not find any support in the Vedanta Sūtras, as also his Pluralistic universe. If prejudice is shed a bit, it will be seen that the Vedanta Sūtras amply support the radical difference that there is between the

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(18) "Vaadaavali"—Vimato-Bhedah-paramarthikah" etc. "Bhedojjivana" P. 20-et seq. Syllogisms like "Sarvanimanamsi-sparsanadhikarana-dravyatva sakshadvapyajatimadvyatiriktani-dravyatvat, etc. (Bombay—Nirnayasagar Press Edition) establish the plurality of selves.



Finite and the Infinite. In the second Sutra 'Janmadyasya-yatah' difference between the Finite and the Infinite was established. The first Sutra proclaimed the need that there is for undertaking metaphysical quest after the Ultimate Reality Brahman, and naturally, no quest can be undertaken if the object of it remains unknown. Intelligent quest must mean that the person pursuing it should be aware of the nature of the object he is in search of. Otherwise his endeavours will be vain. The Vedanta does not speak of any idle quest after will-o-the-wisp. The nature of Brahman is described in the second sutra in the shape of a definition. That is Brahman from which the world of matter and spirit, organised and unorganised,—revealing wonderful and marvellous variety, richness and complexity,—derives its origin, etc. The term "Adi" includes, Sthiti, (preservation) Nasa, (destruction) Niyati, (general control with a place for everything and everything in its place). Jnyanam, (knowledge, vision, inspiration) Aavriti, (obscuration) Bandha, (bondage, or cosmic imprisonment) and Moksha, (final freedom from the imprisonment). The author of the eightfold determination of the vicissitudes of the cosmos and cosmic constituents is Brahman, the Infinite, the Supreme Lord.

Madhva maintains that this very definition establishes on a sound and secure basis difference between the finite and the Infinite. The former can never be the author of cosmic determinations. Even the cleverest and the most efficient of human beings do not succeed in their efforts and endeavours. Failure is writ large on the careers of the finite. Failure and finitude are invariable concomitants. The marvellous discoveries of the present and the previous centuries in positive sciences do not confer Omniscience, and Omnipotence on man. Finite beings can never be authors of cosmic destinies. The author of the Vedanta Sutra unlike modern book makers—and writers on "Indian philosophy who go on padding words in a lapidary and namby-pamby style, achieved maximum effect by using minimum number of terms. In the second Sutra he achieved a double purpose, or two purposes. He conveyed to thinking minds an adequate definition, adequate enough for purposes of meditation, worship and concentration not merely, but, established difference between the Finite and the Infinite. However much the modern mentality may argue to its satisfaction, authorship of the eight determinations of the vicissitudes of the Cosmos, should form the essential constituent of any attempted definition of the Infinite. Finite man is struck with the majesty of existence. If Brahman is to be devotionally thought of and meditated upon, the essential and fundamental feature or characteristic of Brahman which would strike one prominently is the authorship of the Cosmos, and cosmic determinations.

That the finite can never be the author of it all is obvious. Its ability and achievements belie any such claim that may be advanced on its behalf. Madhva writes in his "Anuvyakhyana," "Atojeevaikyamapi-sa-nirachakre-jagadguruh — nahi-janmadihetutvam-jeevasya-jagato-bhavet. (19)" No one even in the wildest of his frenzied or unfrenzied moments ever contends that he is the author of the Cosmic evolution. No doubt creatorship in the sense of parenthood is a common characteristic of animal and human kingdoms. That is hardly sufficient to aid one in a metaphysical quest. It is puerile to contend that Madhva is simply transferring the distinction of the finite and the Infinite and the difference between the two observed in life to the philosophical plane. What if? There is no ordinance issued by any metaphysical dictator that life's values, distinctions, and differences observed in actual experience should not exist on the philosophical plane as well. Even if someone's fiat has been issued and an ordinance proclaimed, rational minds will boldly reject them. Philosophy is only an intellectual and rational attempt to interpret experience and render intelligible the facts, contradictions, discrepancies, and occurrences inconsistent with faith in the governance of the cosmos being under the care and guidance of a Divine Ruler, and certainly it is a poor philosophical attempt which seeks to account for all by condemning them or characterising them as illusions, and unrealities. The attempt is no more valuable than the essay on "Snakes in Iceland."

A live, robust, and dynamic philosophy can be constructed only on the solid and substantial foundations of reality of life, and its phenomena. It has been contended *ad nauseam* that the Absolutist also grants a degree of reality to life and its phenomena and that would suffice for all practical purposes. The contention is devoid of logical value and force, because, the lower degree of reality granted to life and its phenomena with metaphysical miserliness and grudgingness is only dependent on a colossal error—Adhyasa—and Varna, Asrama, Karya, Karana, every thing is under the grip of that relentless "Adhyasa," is in brief, erroneous appearance. The concessional reality granted to the universe is damned, with faint praise. Madhva would have none of it.

Persons who contend that the observed reality of the universe and the differences and distinctions on which reality is grounded, cannot be transferred to the philosophic plane pre-judge the whole case. How do they know that on the other side of life, or on the plane of philosophy from which they pretend to speak, distinctions do not matter? What are the Pramanas on the basis of which such a criticism is passed? The Absolutist is not able to point to a single Pramana in support of his doctrine of illusionism of differences and distinctions.

The Sakshi—the witness in each and every knowing feeling, and willing mechanism,—grasps only the fact of utter helplessness when confronted with the mystery of cosmic existence. Even the most egoistic, egocentric self-complacent, and concealed members of humanity will not arrogate to themselves the authorship of the “Starry heavens above, and the moral law within” which would appear to have inspired an illustrious European thinker with awe, wonder and reverence. The evidence luminous, clear and convincing afforded by the Sakshi supports an unexpurgated case for an unbridgeable gulf that there yawns between the finite and the Infinite. Madhva maintains that by giving the particular definition of Brahman which he has, in terms of authorship of eight determinations of the vicissitudes of the cosmos, over which the finite beings cannot have even the slightest control the author of the Vedanta Sutras has pronounced a final verdict in favour of difference and dualism between the finite (Jiva) and the Infinite (Isvara).

This conclusion stated in clearest language is further repeated and corroborated in a subsequent context of the Sutras where in the light of the control of the cosmos by the Supreme Lord, and in the light of the radical contrast between the finite and the Infinite, identity between the two is shown to be unsustainable as a philosophical doctrine or explanation of the relation between them. Madhva observes—“Sastragamyā—paresaanat-bhedah-svatmana-eeeyate — anubhuutivirodhena-Kathamekatvamuchyate—” (Anuvyakhyaṇa, 2—3) (20). Conclusions of European philosophy may not stand between us and those of the Vedanta. The Absolutist and the Pluralist agree that in the last analysis an appeal is to be made to the sacred texts for an understanding of the nature of Brahman. Brahman is described in different terms in different contexts. It is the duty of an eager and earnest inquirer to investigate the definitions and descriptions and determine for himself, the acceptability or otherwise of a given world-view, whether it be of the Monistic or the pluralistic brand. The Texts declare that Brahman is the Supreme Being and in addition to other characteristics, the authorship of the Cosmic creation, preservership of it and destroyership as well, are prominently emphasized. They do not belong to the finite. Experiences of the latter are irrefutable evidence. That this evidence is irrefutable is obvious. If it is to be brushed aside a stronger testimony should be pointed out. That will have to be done by the Absolutist. He will readily cite the sacred texts that appear to proclaim identity between the finite and the Infinite. This move, and the only one open to the Absolutist, was anticipated by Madhva who makes it obligatory upon inquirers to evaluate the relative claims of the passages that proclaim identity and those that emphasize difference, for final

acceptance. Arguments have been elaborately advanced in the "Tatvanirnaya" which need not be repeated here.

In passages that proclaim identity between the finite and Infinite, it should be understood either that in reference to the finite its identity with the Infinite is emphasized, or that in reference to the Infinite its identity with the finite is proclaimed. There is a difference between the two modes of expressing the identity. The subject-predicate relation will be altered. X is identical with Y. The finite is identical with Infinite. Or the subject and the predicate may change places. Whatever the way in which we may put it, the statements conflict with testimony which is more powerful. Let us analyse the proposition X is Y, i.e., the finite is the Infinite or identical with the Infinite. This flatly contradicts the experience of the finite. "Sakshi" or the witness would never countenance it. Cribbed, cabined, and confined, even the most eminent of men and women, whatever the standard form which their eminence is recognised and proclaimed, have not yet gone to the extent of claiming Omniscience for themselves and the creatorship of the cosmos. They may do so at some future date when scientific advancement reaches the next stage of perfection. When finite is made the subject of the proposition, the "sakshi" experience becomes a more powerful Pramana, because, there is no use appealing to scripture when the start is made with the finite as the subject. The Upajivya-Pramana, or the source, guarantee or the means of valid knowledge in respect of the finite is its own experience,—sakshi—and as the passages of scripture are in conflict with the testimony of the finite, those passages which emphasize identity between the two should be made to surrender their surface-interpretation.

If on the other hand, you look at the statement from the side of the Infinite, the proposition would be—Infinite is identical with the finite. The parties to the controversy have agreed that where a start is made with the Infinite appeal should be made to the appropriate Pramana that is at home as it were with everything concerning the Infinite. Scripture will be appealed to. Scripture reveals two sets of passages one proclaiming identity and the other difference. The latter are the more powerful—the Upajivya-Pramana. Identity between the finite and Infinite is not a matter of experience. A study of the Sruti texts would have already engendered in the minds of investigators a correct idea of Omniscience, and Omnipotence of Brahman indicated in passages like "Yassarvajnyah-sarvavit," etc. There is nothing to warrant that Divine Omniscience could suffer any diminution or obscuration. If identity were a true tale, there is no agency that could prevent the finite enjoying the fruits of Omniscience, etc., in virtue of its identity with the Infinite. As that is not so, the passages that declare Brahman to be Omniscient etc., are certainly more powerful as establishing an undeniable and unrepudiated fact.

The situation is this. Passages proclaiming identity between the finite and the Infinite are faced with a conflict with the experience of the finite and a conflict with scriptural texts that proclaim difference between the two. In the light of these conflicts they should be made to surrender their surface-interpretation. There is of course the eternal objection that preference may be given to passages proclaiming identity in the light of which the texts that emphasize difference between the finite and the Infinite may be made to surrender their surface-interpretation. The reply to this objection would be that passages proclaiming identity vitiated that they are on account of conflict with experience cannot have precedence and preference while those emphasizing difference can have them as they are supported and corroborated by experience and scripture. There are thus two significant objections to preference being granted to identity-texts, as they are designated throughout discussions in "Tatvanirnaya" and elsewhere. In the first place, they flatly contradict experience. Secondly, they flatly contradict scriptural texts which proclaim that Brahman is Omniscient, Omnipotent, etc. Vitiated by two contradictions, the identity-texts cannot be given preference to and precedence over the difference-texts. Let alone the objection that if identity between the finite and the Infinite were a true tale, in philosophy, the latter will have to submit itself to the countless intellectual, emotional and volitional disabilities, handicaps, and failures, and will have to submit to the degradation of finitisation. There is a far more powerful objection that if identity were a true tale, the finite should be perfectly able to feel, here and now, the exhilarating effects of Omniscience and Omnipotence. There is absolutely nothing to arrest or prevent the realisation of such exhilarating tonic effects of Omniscience, etc. If there is any agency that is indeed successful to prevent the realisation the nature of that agency will have to be investigated. It is hardly playing the game of philosophy squarely if one should contend that *ignorance* arrests or prevents the realisation by the finite here and now, of Infinitude. That *Ignorance* again according to the Absolutist is certainly illusory or of a lower degree of reality. Is it indeed so powerful as to arrest omniscience and omnipotence? If it is contended that it touches only the finite, Pluralism will be the outcome as finite, Infinite and Ignorance will have to be admitted as realities of the same degree or order. Looked at from any angle of vision or point of view, the propositions "Finite is identical with the Infinite" and "Infinite is identical with the finite" crumble at the touch of logical and philosophical analysis. If the Bradleyan SOMEHOW, can come in handy to deal with metaphysical exigencies and troublesome situations, there is nothing to prevent the same SOMEHOW being pressed into service to have the Pluralistic Universe of Madhva defended and vindicated. The conclusions developed in the "Tatvanirnaya" are there in different settings in Madhva's commentary on the sutras in the

form of Sanskrit verses—the “Anuvyakhyana.” Texts and traditions, reason and logic, support difference between the finite and the Infinite. (Jiva and Isvara.) (21)

(Perhaps the most important line of reasoning adopted by Madhva relates to the fixation of the comparative strength and weakness of the scriptural passages proclaiming respectively difference and identity between the finite and the Infinite. The fixation is not arbitrary but is in accordance with the accepted canons and principles of interpretation. No one can dogmatise as to why the texts should contain passages emphasizing two such radically opposed views as difference and identity between Jiva and Isvara. Scripture having been placed on a very high pedestal by the parties to the controversy, its status should be vindicated. Scripture will not talk nonsense nor utter any gibberish. Its infallibility is postulated by Monists and Pluralists. In maintaining difference between the finite and the Infinite to be the view or the doctrine of the Upanishads, Madhva relies on the law that in the event of one being confronted with texts that seem to emphasize opposed and irreconcilable views, preference is to be given to that body of texts the import of which finds support and reinforcement in the facts of life and corroboration by the evidence of the other sources and guarantors of valid knowledge—the *Pramanas*. Reliance on a law of interpretation like that is unexceptionable. Madhva rejects the contention that identity being a new doctrine, texts proclaiming it should have preference and not those that emphasize difference which is already known and noted in life. A new-fangled notion may have a fascination for certain types of minds, but, even then the fascination will die out if the notion is developed in contravention of experience, and in express contradiction with other sources and guarantors of valid knowledge. Craze for novelty is no substitute for reason. One may as well argue that oneness of existence being the mark of comparatively infantile awareness without any ability or capacity to mark off distinctions, differences, light and shade and so forth, the sacred texts will be quite justified in emphasizing difference between the finite and the Infinite as the highest type of metaphysical knowledge for purposes of devotion, worship and concentration. The die-hardism of prejudices is well known. One is emphatically not philosophical if he approaches the texts with a preconceived notion that Monism is the only fashionable philosophy of life or world-view. Other world-views, and other systems of thought are perfectly in order. Taking the issue between Monism and Pluralism to be a live one, Madhva argues that the latter world-view has in addition to scriptural sanction the support of another source and guarantor of valid knowledge, namely, experience, and as such it is entitled to

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(21) See “*Tattvanirnaya*”—P. 5. “*Atrachopajeevyatvena-pramanaprabalyatbheda-eva-tatparyam-yuktam.*”

acceptance as a philosophy of life, as a dynamic doctrine and motive force for moral conduct.

## XV

It will be quite evident from the paragraphs sketched above, that Madhva has argued in favour of difference between (1) Jada, and Jada, (one inanimate differs from another inanimate,) (2) Jada, and Jiva, (inanimate differs from the animate,) (3) Jada, and Isvara. (Inanimate differs from Isvara-Deity.) (4) Jiva and Jiva, (one animate self differs from another animate,) and (5) Jiva, and Isvara, (the finite self differs from the Supreme,) and the doctrine emphasizes "PANCHA-BHEDA," (five-fold difference,) on which the Cosmos is firmly grounded. Difference is five-fold. But there are only three entities admitted to be fundamental and foundational in Madhva's Pluralistic Universe, namely, Isvara, Jiva and Jada, (God, finite self, and matter.)

## XVI

Madhva boldly stormed as it were the stronghold of the Absolutist in scripture. The latter relies, relied, and will continue to rely on the scriptural text "Tattvamasi" for establishing the doctrine of Monistic Absolutism. Madhva has suggested an alternative interpretation which deserves the most careful consideration. It will be plain to students of "Tatvanirnaya," that Madhva suggests the splitting up as "ATAT-TVAMASI", making the text mean—"Thou are *not-that*". There is absolutely no use condemning in a summary verdict, that the splitting up is absurd. The scriptural text "TATTVAMASI" does not stand alone. Its import has got to be determined in reference to the context and all the attendant and concomitant circumstances. The text is found along with illustrative instances which should be taken without a dispute to have been intended for an elucidation of its import, not for its obscurity. There lies an intellectual obligation on the part of disinterested students of philosophy that this alternative splitting up of the expression suggested by Madhva should be carefully scrutinised. Here are the illustrations:—(1) A bird tied to a spot by means of a string, wanders here and there after which it returns to the original spot. (2) Juices of several fruits of different trees are mixed and each fruit-juice is not then tasted in its individuality. (3) Different rivers mingle into the Ocean where they lie, their individuality not being recognised and identified. (4) Vegetable and animal creation bereft of the life force supplied by the Supreme Being perish. (5) The Power that there is even within the microscopic seed of a tree that later spreads out its branches far and wide is not visible to the naked eye. (6) Salt dissolved in water while lying there is not perceived. (7) Leave a person from some locality, blindfolded in a forest and direct him to proceed to his

place in a particular direction. (8) At the time of demise, when speech gets absorbed in mind, mind in breath, and breath in inherent light of the self, and that light in the Supreme, the individual is not aware of his surroundings, etc. (9) An alleged thief is asked to grasp a red hot piece of iron. If he is really guilty he is burnt, and if he is not really guilty he is not.

Not one of the nine instances can be claimed to support identity between the finite and the Infinite. That the finite selves after a career of earthly existence return to their original home in the Infinite is the striking point of the first illustration. It does not countenance identity between the finite and the Infinite. The illustration of the mixture of juices will not help identity because, the mixture undergoes qualitative and quantitative changes which establish differences between the juices. The examples of Rivers and the Ocean tells the same tale. After evaporation of sea-water, formation of clouds, and rains, rivers rise, and into the sea they discharge themselves. *Only difference* is meant here between rivers and the sea. Rivers may come and rivers may go but the Ocean goes on for ever. The Infinite ever remains the same. Finite beings come from the Infinite and reach the latter. Such a career is a mark of finitude. The Infinite has no such careers and vicissitudes. That existents derive their life from the Infinite, and the Infinite (not grasped by the naked eye) that is immanent even in tiny seeds, is the Cause of the huge trees are emphasized by the fourth and the fifth illustrations. Examples of salt-water, blindfolded person and death do not support the doctrine of identity. Salt and water are not identical with one another. The blindfolded person and the country or place he wants to reach are surely not identical with one another. The example of death does not establish identity. That the vital forces are surrendered to some other more powerful and inexorable agency is the only conclusion that the illustration can throw light on. The last example tells the same tale. Madhva therefore is fully justified in suggesting that the nine illustrations mentioned in the sacred texts are *all confirmatory of difference between the finite and the Infinite* and that if identity is accepted to be the conclusion of the said sacred text, the illustrative instances degenerate into mere verbiage and stand outlandishly out of contextual import and oddly out of place. This may not be a matter which could be easily decided by a majority vote one way or the other. If the illustrative instances mean anything at all, then difference between the finite and the Infinite is the only doctrine which they are capable of illustrating and elucidating in their own natural and unstrained significance.

While all the nine instances contain references to difference between the finite and the Infinite, the *seventh*, that of the blindfolded person, is peculiarly and particularly appropriate to



present the doctrine of difference in all its clearness and brilliance. A person is kidnapped from his own place, blindfolded and left alone in a deserted distant tract. Then the folds are removed from his eyes. He is instructed to proceed in a particular direction, and should he do so, he is told he would reach his native place. (1) In the first place, the need for a Guru or a sympathetic preceptor who alone will indicate the ways and means of spiritual welfare is emphasized. There is no need for a Guru on the Absolutistic doctrine. Bondage in the shape of metempsychosis is unreal. Identity between the finite and the Infinite is already there; where is the need to find a spiritual preceptor for the riddance of a bondage that is unreal? It is no logical or philosophical retort that reality of a lower degree is recognised in respect of bondage. Even in the state of bondage, the identity is there, and if the Absolute is to be the Only Reality, the latter cannot but share the sorrows and joys of the finite, since, *SOMEHOW*, it has finitised itself. The scattering of the Absolute into countless centres of experience, *a la* the scattering of light is a mystery which Absolutism is unable to explain, and the Pluralisation or the finitisation of the ELAN VITAL, the Absolute of the Bergsonian Weltaanshaung is also another mystery. The folds over the eyes of the individual concerned have to be removed by the kindness of a friend. That is Divine Grace in philosophical parlance. Instruction has to be given as to which is the route to be taken by him to reach his home. The individual has to assimilate the instruction and translate it into practical politics. He has to put forth voluntary effort, move, struggle, strive, and after making inquiries on the way, *not* to test the veracity of the kind preceptor who can always be trusted to have uttered the truth to his disciple, *but to make sure if he has walked* along the right path indicated by the Guru, he has to reach his home in the fulness of time. (2) Secondly, the fullest emphasis is laid on individual effort, endeavour, and energy. (3) The sacredness of individual liberty is recognised and above all freedom of the individual is vindicated. (4) It is so essential for spiritualised existence, and moral life. All this can be possible *only* on the doctrine of difference between the finite and the Infinite. The illustration of the blindfolded person could have sense only if it had been intended to throw light on the doctrine of difference between the finite and the Infinite and not identity. Similar justification of the other illustrative instances and their special appositeness to throw light on the doctrine of difference could be readily seen in the "Tatvanirnaya." In this portion of the discussion, it would be sufficient if it is remarked that Madhva's attempt to split up the expression into "A-TAT-TVA-MASI"—Thou art "NOT-THAT," a splitting up, which has the fullest grammatical sanction and validity, deserves careful consideration and scrutiny in the light of the nine illustrative instances. Be it noted that Madhva's splitting up is not totally mainly or exclusively grounded on grammatical sanction or absence of any breach of

grammatical rules, which is after all secondary, but it is grounded on the more important and fundamental consideration of the appositeness and appropriateness of the illustrative instances. It would be quite obvious that Madhva did leave the beaten track of the Upanishadic interpretation and with an eye on appropriateness of the expressions used, and on a genuine commensurateness of thought and language, suggested an alternative interpretation that does justice, full justice, to all the requirements of thought, language, morality, freedom of the will, and the sacredness of individuality. In this section on a general estimate of the works of the Acharya, I feel I should exercise the greatest care and caution in apportioning praise and blame, and I am not attempting anything beyond observing that the alternative interpretation suggested by Madhva consequent on the splitting up of the expression into "A-TAT-TVAMASI—" deserves the most careful consideration. (22)

## XVII

That Madhva did not expect any complete abandonment of the usual and familiar splitting up into "TAT-TVAMASI" "Thou art That"—is quite evident from his adhering to it and advancing the interpretation that even according to the usual splitting up difference between the finite and the Infinite is the doctrine of the Upanishads. God and man are not so hopelessly separated from one another. They resemble one another. Otherwise devotion, concentration, and worship on the part of the finite, and Grace, guidance, and sympathy on the part of the Infinite would be unintelligible. The Immanent Infinite is spoken of as identical with the finite, in virtue of this Immanence or to have it pushed into the focus of prominence. If two persons are so closely and intimately associated with one another, one is justified in giving free play to linguistic embellishment and saying that the two are identical with one another, emphasizing the identity of interests and outlook. Even so, the Infinite which is the Immanent Cosmic Overlord is so intimate and closely connected with the finite that by means of a flourish of language the two are said to be identical with one another. In a word the expression "Tatvamasi"—"Thou Art That"—is intended to emphasize the divine in man. It is only by that sort of a striking reminder about the spiritual divinity and destiny of the finite that the latter may be whipped into spiritual activity. That the exalted destiny of the finite has been temporarily arrested and that by a career of consistent moral and spiritual endeavour the exalted destiny can be worked out and realised should be placed before the finite. The latter is to be flattered and cajoled a little. There is not only no danger in that sort of cajoling and coaxing, but

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(22) Madhva's suggestion that the famous Monistic text has to be split into Atat-Tvamasi—i.e. Thou art not—That—is a metaphysical or interpretational *tour de force*. It deserves patient and dispassionate consideration.

there is positive advantage. A rather dull and backward pupil may be kindled into constructive activity if he is flattered, cajoled and coaxed a bit, and if it is said that the reputation and prestige of the college or school depends on his work and so forth. He is sure to be reinvigorated into activity. The finite has lost its way. It is struggling and blundering. If a sympathetic teacher tells the finite that its destiny is really a very noble and exalted one and that it should not languish in recurring cycles of births and deaths, but should try and get back to its home elsewhere, it will be whipped into spiritual activity. It is in order to render dynamic and kindle into activity the spiritual potentiality of the finite that it is said to be identical with the Infinite. *Actual identity is not to be thought of*, in view of the countless contradictions that arise. Even if the usual splitting up of the expression is retained, the import establishes identity, not actually, but only by way of linguistic exaggeration. The exaggeration is permissible *qua* linguistic ornamentation as in rhetorical flourishes and figures of speech, and should not be interpreted too literally as a literal interpretation involves contradictions and conflicts with established facts of experience and doctrines of philosophy (23).

### XVIII

In his "Tatvanirnaya" Madhva has elaborately sketched arguments in favour of the relative strength of the scriptural passages that proclaim difference between the finite and the Infinite in the light of which those that emphasize identity between the two should be made to surrender their surface interpretation. It was also argued in a previous section that the famous scriptural text of "Tatvamasi" ("Thou Art That") on which the Absolutist relies for support should be made to surrender its literal interpretation as it is in conflict with the "Upajivya-Pramana," namely, the source and the guarantee of valid knowledge that is an inevitable prop or support. The meaning is this. X, Y, or Z is first understood to exist by means of a Pramana, source, means and a guarantee of knowledge. When once its existence has been grasped in a general manner, detailed examination of it and ascertainment of its characteristic features would follow. The latter involve something like specialisation. The Pramana, the source, means, the guarantee by means of which the individual self is known is one's own Sakshi—the inner witness—the I—associate—which can never be disowned or repudiated. The witness testifies to the finite self feeling every moment of its life

(23) See "Chandamaruta" of Vanamalimisra. "Tat-sahacharyat-tadvyapadesah." 2. "Tadasritatvat-tadvyapadesah." 3. "Tajjatvat-tadvyapadesah." 4. "Tadadheenatvat-tadvyapadesah." 5. "Tat-sadrisyat-tadvyapadesah." If X and Y are invariably seen together, if one is the prop and support of the other, if one owes its origin to the other, if one is dependent on the other, and if one closely resembles the other, X and Y can be said to be identical with one another as a rhetorical flourish or linguistic embellishment. P. 38.

See also "Nyayamrita." 2nd Pariccheda—Pp. 594-96.

cribbed, cabined, and confined, and testifies too to a feeling of helplessness in the face of failures concomitant with even the best planned and most efficiently executed projects. Any statement scriptural or non-scriptural that is in conflict with the verdicts of the witness—the Sakshi—should be surrendered to have room made for others that are *not* in conflict with the verdicts of the Sakshi. The “Dharmi-grahaka-pramana, or mana,” is thus supreme. The means, source, and guarantee of anything connected with the finite self is the Sakshi. It is that witness which brings home as it were the multifarious experiences.

On the contrary the nature of the Supreme Lord and His existence have got to be demonstrated only by means of scriptural texts. The Supreme Power is first understood as Omniscient, Omnipotent, Author of the determinations of the Cosmos like Creation, Preservation, Destruction, etc., and the texts that proclaim the characteristics of the Supreme Being are certainly more powerful than others that proclaim identity between the finite and the Infinite as an after-thought. From the stand-point of the sources, scripture is the only source that reveals the existence and the qualities of the Supreme Being. That source which guarantees the existence of the Being-Supreme is *ipso facto* stronger than others. The “Dharmi-grahaka-pramana”, the source that reveals first the existence and nature of the Infinite is the Sruti text like “Yassarvajnyah-sarvavit—”, etc. Any text that conflicts with this should be made to surrender its surface interpretation. The identity-text flatly contradicts this, as there can be no identity between the finite and the Infinite, the former being ignorant, powerless, and subordinate, and the latter Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Independent, etc.

The contention is useless that the “Tatvamasi” text itself can be considered to be supremely strong and without a rival. All that the text does is to affirm identity between the finite and the Infinite. The latter should have been already proved to exist. Then only can identity be predicated of it with the finite. A text that only predicates something of X should be dependent on that which proves the existence of that X, as without existence predication of something in respect of it should be out of the question. That Pramana which first proves or demonstrates the existence of an entity is more powerful than another which predicates something of it. Predication must obviously depend on existence. In respect of the finite self its existence is vividly demonstrated by the Sakshi-I. It is “Dharmi-grahaka-pramana,” i.e., source that demonstrates the existence of the finite. All other vicissitudes must depend upon existence. Existence is the prop-the substratum. That Pramana which demonstrates that existence of an entity is its “Upajivya-pramana.” The predication of identity between the finite and the Infinite conflicts with the “Upajivya”—the Sakshi which testifies only to a

radical difference between the two. In view of its conflict with a life-giving source, the "Tatvamasi" text should be made to surrender its surface interpretation.

In respect of Brahman or the Infinite, the life-source or "Upajivya," the pramana that proves the existence of Brahman is a text like "Yassarvajnyah-sarvavit," etc. Anything that is in conflict with the life-source should be made to surrender its interpretation that may appear to be natural on the surface of it. "Tatvamasi" text affirms identity between Brahman and Jiva, the Infinite and the finite. But the identity conflicts with the life-source which proclaims Brahman to be Omniscient and the finite is anything but Omniscient. How can there be any talk of identity between the two? There are only two ways of expressing the identity. From the side of the finite, one can say the finite is identical with the Infinite. From the side of the Infinite one can say that Infinite is identical with the finite. These are the only two ways in which the import of the identity text "Tatvamasi" can be expressed. The former conflicts with the life-source proving the existence of the finite, namely, Sakshi. The latter flatly contradicts the life-source proving the existence of the Infinite, or the source which demonstrates its existence—a text like "Yassarvajnyah," etc. In view of this conflict, the "Tatvamasi" text should be made to surrender its surface interpretation. Either the expression can be split up into "Atatvamasi" meaning "Thou art *not*—*That*" on the basis of the special appropriateness and appositeness of it to the nine illustrative instances cited in the Upanishadic text in question, or, it can be interpreted as containing a rhetorical device of an exaggeration intended to emphasize the divine in man and kindle into activity the dormant spiritual forces in the finite. This is the conclusion emphasized by Madhva. No doubt it is a revolutionary one, but, the revolutionary character of a conclusion may not mean a *prima facie* condemnation of it. Madhva or any other Acharya or system-builder for the matter of that is under no obligations to run into the metaphysical rut of his predecessors. He is at perfect liberty to suggest any re-interpretation of the scriptural texts he likes. The duty of modern critics is to see if the re-interpretation suggested by Madhva is in conformity with the general canons of interpretation, laws of thought, conventions of metaphysical debate and controversy, and above all the deepest demands of religion, morality and spiritual values and the moulding of conduct in the light of them. It has been shown that there is no grammatical or textual incongruity or maladjustment in the splitting up suggested by Madhva as "Atatvamasi." As the ethical implications of Madhva's Pluralistic Theism are worked out in some detail in the succeeding sections, it may be seen that identity between the finite and the Infinite is not calculated to satisfy the deepest demands of morality and religion better than difference between the two. The Pluralistic

world-view is as much entitled to a careful consideration by spiritual aspirants and seekers after truth, as Monistic Absolutism, and there is nothing in Madhva's suggested re-interpretation of the "Tatvamasi Text" that is either illogical or otherwise inappropriate, which would render the Pluralistic world-view less fashionable in or acceptable to the circle of civilised philosophers.

## XIX

Finite individuals, countless in countless forms and orders of existence, plant, animal, and human caught into the vortex and the whirlpool of life will have to realise sooner or later that the world and the values of the world are too much with them, and endeavour to enjoy their own inherent spiritual bliss temporarily obscured by the encrustations of ignorance, and the cumulative effects of their Karma—acts done in earlier lives. Freedom from the cycle of births and deaths, from the phantasmagoria of metempsychosis can be obtained only through the Grace of the Supreme Lord Narayana. In his "Tatvanirnaya" Madhva has explained clearly that "Moksha" release from the bondage of existence is the goal or should be the goal of the spiritual effort and endeavour of an aspirant. The Sruti is quite unequivocal in stating or proclaiming that freedom from evil-ridden existence can come only through the Grace of the Supreme Being. "Yame-vaisha-vrinute" etc., says the Katha Upanishad. This is not a matter that can be argued out to the satisfaction of the fastidious critical conscience of the modern man or his scientific mentality. God cannot be experimented upon in a laboratory and His Grace cannot be converted into tabloids and sold at the European and American markets under a seal of "guarantee of purity" et hoc. Trite as it may seem it is a profound philosophical truth that one has to approach a kind and sympathetic spiritual preceptor who will teach his pupils the way to freedom from the ills that flesh and spirit are heirs to. The knowledge that freedom that is final and unadulterated, can be secured only through the instrumentality of Divine Grace, can come only from a perusal of scriptural texts

Unless reality is granted, reality of the fullest degree, and qualitatively the highest, to the state of existence here, riddled with inequalities and incompatibilities, there is no meaning whatever in any endeavour and effort being put forth, for the riddance of them all. Reality of bondage should be a precondition of all effort at its riddance. If the usual absolutistic contention is urged that all cosmic phenomena including bondage are all illusory and mere appearance, then, there is the philosophical obligation to explain the appearance. It has been argued by Madhva that illusions indicate the existence of *two realities*. If bondage were unreal, illusory appearance, the absolutist will have to admit two reals to account for the said illusion. In instances of nightmare, one suffers from something that is wrongly attributed by himself

to himself. Even there a psycho-analyst can spot out the physiological and psychological factors responsible for it. It cannot be contended that bondage has not been understood in the proper spirit, and that it is not real. If it is not real, why should it be there? Why not there be perfect happiness, freedom and success to all without difference and distinctions? Are not all individuals only fractions, or sparks of the same, one and the same Absolute? Sight of a mere rope throws the unwary into paroxysms of fear simply because, the serpent has been seen and experienced by them as an awe-inspiring reality. Otherwise, there will be no particular types of reactions evoked by a given set of stimuli. On the same analogy, if bondage and imprisonment in life and enmeshment by its standards and values were to be unreal, and if they cause trepidation and philosophical fear, that is because, they must have been experienced as realities. That is the only sensible solution of the problem. If bondage had not been previously experienced as an evil, and if it had not then aroused identifiable and definite reactions of fear, worry, trouble and uncomfortableness, the illusion itself cannot arise and in the absolutistic attempt to reduce bondage to illusory stuff, one is unconsciously admitting *two reals*. Madhva maintains in his "Anuvyakhyana" that bondage is real, perfectly and poignantly real. "Mithyatvamapi-bandhasya-napratyaksha-virodhatah." (1—1—1). Bondage within the cosmic meshes is real. In order to rid oneself of it, inquiry into the nature of Brahman should be undertaken. The inquiry is in the nature of a careful, precise examination of the import of the texts. They are the Upanishads, the Brahmasutras, and the Gita. Inquiry will bring home to the minds of individuals, the genuine aspirants, the Adhikaris, those that are eligible for embarking on the quest after the Infinite, the nature of Brahman, the Supreme Being. Knowledge of the nature of Brahman will help devotional concentration of attention on Brahman and contemplation of the excellent attributes of the Supreme Being. Such a pure, and practised devotional concentration of attention on the nature of Brahman in the fullness of time, will enable one to secure Divine Grace. Divine Grace will guarantee final emancipation from the ills of existence, from the ills of recurring cycles of births and deaths. Madhva remarks in his "Anuvyakhyana" "Jignyasottha-Jnyana-jattatprasadadeva-mucchyate." One is freed from bondage only by Divine Grace secured through devotional contemplation and meditation rendered possible by a correct knowledge of the nature of the Supreme Brahman, after an inquiry into the texts, that proclaim it. (1—1—1).

The Acharya further continues in his "Anuvyakhyana"—  
 "Ato - Yathartha - bandhasya-vina - Vishnuprasadatah - anivrit-testadartham-hi-jignyasatra-vidheeyate." (1—1—1). Bondage is real. Its riddance is impossible without Divine Grace. Divine

Grace cannot be secured without devotional, prayerful and worshipful concentration of the attention of aspirants or the Supreme Being. Such a concentration will not be practical politics unless one knew exactly the nature and characteristics of the Supreme Lord, and an investigation of the nature of Brahman as embodied in the sacred texts will give one knowledge of the characteristics and nature of Brahman. The Sruti and the Sutras proclaim with one voice that Brahman or the Supreme Being is to be understood as the Author of an eight-fold determination of the vicissitudes of the cosmos. Equipped with that knowledge, one has to concentrate devotional attention on Him. He will be pleased in due time with the devotion of aspirants, and shower His Grace on them. There is nought else for the attainment of which one would strive after he obtains Grace of the Supreme Being—Sri Narayana.(24).

## XX

The Third Chapter of the Brahma Sutras is known as "Sadhanadhyaya"—a chapter devoted to an explanation of the nature of the means one is to adopt for securing the Grace of the Almighty. Madhva sums up the position thus—"Tasmadanantamahatmyagunapoorno - janardanah—Bhaktya-paramayaradhyaiti-paadārtha-iyate" "Vairagyato-bhaktidardhyam-tenopasayadabhavet-aaparokshyam-tato-vishnoriti-padakramobhavet." Sri Narayana, the Supreme Being is endowed with an Infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes. He should be worshipped and prayed to with deep, unsullied, concentrated and undivided devotion. One should realise the evanescence and the spiritual unsatisfyingness of life, its standards and values, and this realisation will develop a mentality and outlook of detachment from them. *Spiritual sangfroid* is the result. It is known as "Vairagya." It is not *sangfroid* to spiritual values, but to material ones. After a pretty long period of cultured and rational cultivation of spiritual *sangfroid*, devotion to the Supreme Being deepens. A deepened devotion leads on to worship, concentration, contemplation and intensive practising of the presence of the Infinite. Consistent, and courageous adherence to the practising brings an aspirant face to face with the Infinite. The finite self will then enjoy its own unalloyed spiritual bliss in the presence of the Infinite.

Worship of the Supreme Being is of two types. "Sopasana cha-dvididha-sastrabhayasasvarupinee — Dhyana-roopaparachaivatadangam-dharanadikam." Metaphysical quest after the Ultimate Reality, a pilgrim's progress right through the mass of scriptural literature is one type of worship. One has to equip himself properly for that task. He should study the relevant texts under a fit and proper preceptor. He should attentively assimilate the

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(24) See "Anuvyakhyana", p. 1. "Jignyasottha-jnyana-jattatprassaa-dadeva-muchyate."



teaching of the sacred texts. He should discuss the truths learnt with his fellow-students and others with a view to the fixation of them firmly in one's mind. He will have to teach them to his pupils should opportunities arise. There is no reference in this type of study to any verbal wrangle or dry-as-dust discussions. Critical study of the texts is intended primarily and fundamentally for a clarification of spiritual matters. The study is another form of worshipping the Divine. One may not be an obscurantist and keep all his knowledge to himself. He has an obligation to make available the knowledge possessed by him to others less fortunate and intellectually less blessed. He has to enable them to tread the path of virtue and spiritual safety. A sympathetic teacher will understand the difficulties of his pupils and teach them according to the receptive faculties of the latter. In cases of dubious and controversial matter, he should teach the pupils a safe course bereft of danger. Philosophic debates, discussions and discourses are to be viewed as indirect forms of worshipping the Supreme Being.

The second type is contemplation. If the import of the texts has been correctly understood and grasped by aspirants, they will not rest content with the textual information possessed by them. In the spiritual voyage towards the Infinite, there is no resting on one's oars. That Brahman is Omnipotent, Omnipresent had been learnt from the texts. Mere verbal knowledge and information would never suffice. The Immanence of the Infinite should be realised as a spiritual fact of one's experience, subjective, immediate and intimate. A transition from textual information to practising of the presence of the Infinite is inevitably bound to occur sooner or later. The Immanent presence of the Infinite is to be intimately and immediately realised as an item of an aspirant's own personal experience. Rome was not built in a day. Spiritual experiences cannot be had in a day. One has to devote several lives to devotional concentration. Yogic practices come in quite handy here. Through the instrumentality of yogic discipline, psycho-physical impurities are got rid of. The body should be made fit first. An aspirant's mind and body should be sterilised as it were of all traces of evil. Uninterrupted and steadfast practice of Yoga would free an aspirant from impurities in thought, word and deed. He is then fit to come face to face with the Infinite. It should be noted that in any given existence according to the inclinations and interests of the subject, preference may be given to one or the other of the two types of worshipping the Supreme Being. It is easy to see that Yogic practices have no attraction for the majority of mankind. Only a microscopic minority would seem to care anything for them. That is as it should

be. The majority of common rut of humanity are too much engrossed with the values of life and material advantages.(25).

It is only in the full effulgence and radiance of spiritual light that one would see the utter worthlessness of such trumpery as world's goods. It is to be expected that a conviction of the utter valuelessness of material things would never dawn at all in some minds. In others it may dawn comparatively earlier. Such are lucky. They are few and far between. As the Gita beautifully puts it, perhaps one in a thousand strives at all for coming face to face with the Infinite. Though one may practise Yogic discipline and secure some supernatural powers to work miracles, there is no guarantee he would enjoy the unique privilege of standing face to face with the Infinite. As the Gita emphasizes "Bahoonam - janmanamante - - Jnyanavan - mam - prapadyate." One would realise the Majesty and Greatness of the Infinite only after countless lives of spiritual activity, effort and endeavour.

Performance of Yogic practices, submission to spiritual discipline, and readiness to sacrifice pleasures of the flesh, would have significance, according to Madhva only on the world-view of Pluralistic Theism. If spiritual endeavour and effort are to be viewed as gripped by a cosmic illusion, it is not clear why such effort and endeavour should be put forth at all. They have significance only on the doctrine of Pluralistic Theism, and the Radical Realism of Madhva. *There has been a fall somewhere sometime.* At this time of existence and evolutionary progress it is idle to query why there should have been any fall at all from Paradise. Fall or no fall, experience has to be taken as it is, interpreted and dovetailed into a philosophical system. To put an end to all needless discussions, finite selves are postulated to have no origin-in time. ("Anadi") "Karma" the inexorable Law of Cause and Effect transferred from the physical to the moral and spiritual realm, holds sway. If the Pluralistic Universe be just an illusion or mere appearance it becomes obligatory to explain the appearance satisfactorily. There can be no appearance unless two reals are admitted which shatter the illusionistic doctrine to pieces. If bondage were unreal, there is absolutely no meaning in effort and endeavour being put forth.

A Pluralistic Universe, on the other hand amply justifies all effort and endeavour. The apparently endless cycle of births and deaths must appear to be sickening sooner or later. According to the unfolding of events determined by the Law of Karma, in some one existence, the genuine Adhikari, the aspirant eligible to come face to face with the Infinite is sure to feel that the world had been too much with him and direct his attention Godward. He has to cultivate the spirit of Vairagya, of non-attachment to

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(25) See "Anuvyakhyana", pp. 46 and 48 for further discussion of the topic contained in Section XX.

objects and values of the world. He would study texts, discuss metaphysical problems, and understand the nature of Brahman, and thus equipped and impressed he would address himself to the task of riddance being permanently secured of the evil of births and deaths. Teaching of "Sadhanas"—means of securing salvation—self-realisation—or coming face to face with the Infinite—can be relevant, and logical only if the present spiritual disabilities from which an aspirant is suffering are real. Translation of the means into strenuous and steadfast practice should be effected without delay and there is no dogmatising on the exact duration of the period of pursuing Yogic practices and submitting to Yogic discipline. It will necessarily be a long period, and would be determined by the stock of the previous Karma of the individual. Should there be a huge stock, it will have to be exhausted only in the fulness of time. When Yogic practices progress to an advanced plane, the stock of the past Karma may be burnt up comparatively quickly.

There is a classification of Karma into two kinds. One is known as "Prarabdha-karma" i.e., Karma which serves as a potentiality for future lives. The lives have to be lived and the stock of Karma exhausted. The other type of Karma does not serve as potentiality for future lives. The latter is got rid of by knowledge of the Supreme Majesty and Greatness of the Lord. Madhva says—"Prarabdhakarmanonyasya-jnyanadeva-parikshyah." (26). By consistent practising of the methods of spiritual discipline, an aspirant purifies his psycho-physical frame and becomes in due course fit to come face to face with the Infinite and earn His Grace.

## XXI

The Supreme Lord should *not* be worshipped as something *which He is not*. The Absolutist believes that Brahman or the Absolute is "Upadana-Karana" the material cause of the cosmos. The problem has passed the stage of controversy and whatever the minor doctrinal variations among the different writers owing allegiance to Absolutism, or Monism, it is agreed that Brahman *somehow* manifests itself as the cosmic show or appearance. As the orthodox Absolutist puts it—"San-ghata-iti-sattanuvadhat-Brahma-vivartah-prapanchah." Even in ordinary statements like there is the Jar, a cloth is, and so on, some kind of existence is shot through, and existence in the genuine sense of the term is the property only of the Absolute. Whenever there appears to be something existent, the only conclusion is that Brahman *somehow* manifests itself, and hence it is to be viewed as the material cause of the cosmos.

Madhva rejects this doctrine and maintains that Brahman is to be worshipped and meditated upon only as the Author of the eight

determinations already explained, and as the "Nimittakarana" of the Cosmos. The Supreme Being Sri Narayana is to be meditated upon as the Author of the Cosmos and cosmic determinations. The Upanishadic texts (like "Yato-va-imani-bhootani-jayante-yenajatani-jeevanti.....etc.") describe and define Brahman in terms of the authorship of the Cosmos, Cosmic determinations and vicissitudes. The author of the Vedanta Sutras followed suit. In the famous Sutra "Janmadyasya-yatah" he maintained that the definition of Brahman can be only in terms of His Authorship of the Cosmos.

Madhva argues that the author of the Vedanta Sutras has established beyond the shade of a shadow of doubt that Brahman is to be defined as the Creator, etc., of the Cosmos. Why do we define at all? A definition is intended to enable persons to see (by means of an understanding of the definition) difference between objects in the world. Brahman is defined as the Author of Creation, etc., of the Cosmos. The definition is not arbitrary, or based on mere ratiocination or word-chopping logic. It is based on sacred texts of unimpeachable validity. The Sruti says "that is Brahman from Whom all beings spring up, by Whom they are maintained," and so forth.

The definition at once excludes finite selves from the sphere of identity claimed between them and the Infinite. It is obvious that the former, the *finite selves do not create the Cosmos*...Anticipating perhaps an objection that there is some biological, or biochemical creatorship in finite selves, and hence the definition is too wide, Madhva has taken care to emphasize that the Authorship envelops the eight cosmic determinations mentioned. Arrogating as he does to himself wonderful powers of discovery and invention, finite man stands helpless in the face of extensive destructive natural phenomena like Earthquakes and floods. His control over the eight cosmic determinations is bound to be the merest myth. Difference between the finite and the Infinite is thus established by the author of the Vedanta Sutras himself, and if indeed identity between the two had been near his heart's desire, he would surely *not* have missed opportunities for affirming the said doctrine. If the entire Cosmos and cosmic determinations were the merest chimeras and illusions, there was no need for him to have defined Brahman as the Author of the eightfold determinations. One may expect a certain pandering to the taste of the multitude in modern works like novels and plays of Mr. G. B. Shaw and of others who make money by writing books of a particular pattern or patterns. The author of the Vedanta Sutras did not write for the benefit of or for catching the applause of a theatre-going audience. He wrote for serious minds, and genuine aspirants whom he would not deceive or victimise. In the appropriate context, He defined Brahman in a particular manner deliberately with a philosophic purpose in view. That

his purpose was first to emphasize difference between the finite and the Infinite is quite obvious. (2) His second purpose was to convey the doctrine to deserving and discerning minds that Brahman is *not* the Attributeless Absolute, (Nirguna-Brahman). The two philosophic purposes were achieved by Badarayana, in his definition of Brahman. Madhva observes in his "Anuvyakhyana" "Ato-Jeevaikyamapi-sa-nirachakre-jagadguruh" and again writes "Nirgunatvam-cha-tenaiva-nishiddham-prabhuna-svayam." (27). By means of the definition that Badarayana deliberately attempted in the second Sutra, he established difference between the finite and the Infinite not merely, but, maintained as well that the *Infinite is not the attributeless Absolute*. The Infinite is Sri Narayana full of an Infinite number of Infinite excellent attributes.

## XXII

If Brahman is to be regarded Author of the eight determinations, there is a significant problem to discuss. Life is full of inequalities. Some are born with the proverbial silver spoon in their mouths. Others get drenched in the sweat of their brows to earn a scanty living. Can this be the State of affairs in a world, the best of all possible worlds, the governance of which is under Divine Control and Guidance? The author of the Sutras had anticipated such objections and rendered an answer in the aphorism "Vaishamya-nairghrinye-na-sapekshatvat-tatha-hi-dar-sayati." (2—1—35) and the two succeeding Sutras. In his commentary on them, Madhva explains that the Supreme Being cannot be held responsible for the inequalities in opportunity and endowment which are discerned in the world, as they are the outcome of actions done by the individuals concerned in earlier lives. Then what about the *first* life prior to which there could not have been any operations of the law of Karma? The reply is that Karma is "Anadi" or beginningless in time. That is the only way of cutting the Gordian knot. Each individual makes or mars his own secular and spiritual destinies, and the Supreme Lord has delegated some freedom to individuals which rationalises ethical effort and moral endeavour. By such delegation, His own freedom, independence, Omnipotence, etc., do not suffer even in the least. The Supreme Being may be likened to an impartial judge who administers laws without personal considerations and motives, and that is the nearest analogical approach in life to make clear God's ways to man. If it is still contended that God cannot shake Himself free from responsibility for different lines of Karma pursued by different individuals, the only answer is

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(27) Madhva maintains that the Attributelessness of Brahman is not countenanced by the author of the "Vedanta Sutras." See "Anuvyakhyana." P. 5. If anything is devoid of all attributes it need not be known. There is no need to define it. As the author of the "Vedanta Sutras" has defined Brahman, the latter can never be attributeless.

that God's supremacy is in no way compromised by the inequality which is the result of actions done by the individuals themselves in earlier lives. Brahman is therefore to be worshipped and meditated upon as the Author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos, and not as the material cause of the Universe.(28).

### XXIII

Having thus determined for himself the nature of Brahman, the Supreme Being a genuine aspirant should devote his time to contemplation of that nature, meditation, and concentration of his attention on the Infinite number of Infinite Excellent attributes of the Supreme Lord—Narayana. The spiritual truths learnt by him from his preceptor should be repeatedly contemplated and deliberated upon. Continued deliberation on the truths learnt will not merely sharpen intellect, but make one's faith firm and well-grounded. Even gods are said to have devoted long and tedious years to learning spiritual truths and contemplating their excellence and grandeur with a view to modelling conduct according to them.

The Supreme Brahman is to be worshipped as "Atman" which is just another name for Lord Narayana. It does not mean the finite self. It means also the Lord, the Controller, the Master. Brahman is to be worshipped and contemplated as one's Lord and Master. "Svamee-me-Vishnurityeva-nityadopasyaman-jasa". (Anuvyakhyana, 4-1.) "Vishnu is my Lord. He is my master. I am his devoted servant." This should be the form of contemplation. Continued practice will engender a spiritual mentality. The highly evolved spirit will scrutinise every one of his actions to see if it is in accordance with divine commands and injunctions contained in the sacred texts.

Idolatry and Image worship are not countenanced by the Sutra-Kara and Madhva explains that one would be grievously mistaken if he should believe that a stone, or a metal image or idol is the Supreme Brahman. That would be a totally erroneous worship. If God is to be contemplated upon and worshipped as a piece of stone or metal, one would get proper reward only in the shape of stone when he prays for bread for this sort of false and error-ridden worship and contemplation. Worshipped after an erroneous pattern the Supreme Being will not be pleased with the worshipper who is foolish enough to identify Him with a stone or metal idol. On the other hand, the Lord Narayana is to be thought of, contemplated upon, and worshipped as the Supremest Reality, the only Independent

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(28) Vanamalimisra in his "Chandamaruta" sums up a section thus—  
 "Satyasya - prapanchasya - prakrityupadanakasya - utpatyadi - karta -  
 satyanantagunalayo-mumukshujnyeyah-siddhah." Brahman is *not* the  
 material cause of the Universe. P. 30.

Entity. Truly devout contemplation of the real nature of Brahman alone will lead to freedom from the bondage of evil, and evil-ridden existence. True worship alone will be the means of attainment of the *summum bonum*. Decorated idols and images of Gods are taken in processions, and people flock to witness them. That may be quite all right provided one realises that the image is *just a reminder* of the Infinite. It is just a symbol that would put one in memory of the Infinite. The image or the idol is *not* the Infinite. Madhva explains that the Infinite is to be thought of and meditated upon and worshipped as the Supreme Power Immanent in the Cosmos, and Immanent in the image as well. That is true worship, real and genuine worship. That alone will contribute to a realisation of the desired end. One would be guilty of an attempted degradation of the Supreme Being if he should be spiritually blind and not realise that Lord Narayana can never be identical with a piece of metal or stone which lends itself to all sorts of handling by professional priest-craft, and which betrays, helplessness to the extent of being tied down and carried in processions. It is obligatory on the part of seekers after truth to make strenuous effort and understand the real nature of the Infinite. The nature of the Supreme Being should be known accurately and there is scriptural aid for man. Scripture proclaims the nature of Brahman. It should be learnt. Brahman is defined to be the Author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos. That authorship should be clearly borne in mind, and it would then help meditation and worship. Idols and images are just symbols or reminders. Under no circumstances should one undertake devotional worship wrongly identifying an image and the Infinite with one another.

#### XXIV

How then is the Lord to be worshipped? He is to be worshipped, meditated upon, and prayed to, as Brahman, as One full of an Infinite number of Infinite, Excellent attributes. He is to be worshipped as the Supreme unrivalled, unequalled Author of the eight determinations of the cosmos. He is to be contemplated upon as the only Independent Agent. All others are dependent upon Him. *Dependence does not mean unreality*. X and Y may depend on Z. On that account, the former are *not less real* than the latter. Both are equally real with the same degree of reality. The Lord is to be worshipped as different from the finite. The danger of something being erroneously apprehended and of a translation of that erroneous apprehension into practice is obvious in secular matters. If one erroneously apprehends a bottle of poison as syrup and imbibes the contents thereof, he is sure to come to grief and even end his life if the poison is powerful and strong enough. When the consequences of acting on erroneous knowledge are so grave and fatal in matters secular, they must

be more so in matters spiritual. If god is to be wrongly understood and wrongly worshipped, He will not be pleased. One will have to discriminate between a common member of a so-called depressed class and a King. If within eyesight of the latter the former is treated with all royal honours, the latter is sure to be offended. (29). Nor is there any guarantee that the member of the depressed class himself will feel grateful and thankful to those who exalted him in the presence of royalty. He will feel embarrassed, as that sort of exaltation to which he agreed would surely put him out of court with the King. There is absolutely no use in adumbrating the contention that we should not transfer the distinctions with which we are familiar in life to the other world or heaven and so forth. Why not? If the activity pursued here and now is admitted to lead to certain consequences to be shared in another existence, there is no reason why the well-known and logically sustained distinctions perceived in this life may not apply elsewhere as well. "Anyatha-upasana" or wrong and erroneous worship of the Supreme Lord (as something which He is not,) as identical with the finite which He is not, as a Brahman of a lower degree of reality which He is not, is certain to involve one in Divine displeasure. Of course, the Supreme Lord Himself may not and does not care for such a wrong worship but the wrong and erroneous worship *qua* action will produce its own characteristic consequences which are bound to be unpleasant. An indispensable preliminary to all genuine and devotional worship is a correct and accurate knowledge of the nature and characteristics of the Supreme Lord. That knowledge is conveyed to humanity by the author of the Vedanta Sutra "Janmadyasya-yatah" in the shape of a definition of the Supreme Lord. The mystery of sheer existence will confront thinking minds, and the mystery of the existence of the cosmos is undoubtedly more deep. There must be an Intelligent, First Cause of all this. That is Brahman. He is the Supreme Lord Sri Narayana, the Consort of Maha-Lakshmi. Three important and significant lines of worship have been emphasized by Madhva. (1) In the first place, the Supreme Lord should *not* be identified with a stone or metal image, but should be worshipped and meditated upon as full of Infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes. (2) He is to be worshipped as *different from the finite*, and as the Author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos. (3) When the spiritual equipment of an aspirant becomes sufficiently powerful and serviceable he should worship Brahman as the Immanent Power in the Cosmos concentrating attention on Divine Immanence in respect of the innermost recess of one's heart as indicated in "Dahara-Vidya," i.e., the yogic meditation by an aspirant on the Supreme Being grasped and perceived in Its Immanence in the innermost recess of his heart. Perhaps one in a ten-thousand or hundred-thousand or in a million is fit

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(29) Chandalo-nripa-ityukte-nripaschandala-ityapi." "Anuvyakhyana"  
P. 66.



for consistent practice of "Dahara-Vidya". Madhva reiterates with emphasis the warning uttered by the author of the "Vedanta Sutra" that Brahman should *not* be worshipped wrongly and erroneously as something which It is not. Very grave and serious is the spiritual penalty attached to such erroneous worship.

## XXV

Meditation on the Supreme Lord leads one to eternal bliss. The finite selves (jivas) have their inherent bliss and light obscured by the consequences of their past Karma (actions done in previous lives) and the riddance of the obscuration is the negative aspect of final release (Mukti). Enjoyment of the inherent light and bliss is the positive aspect of it. The stock of Karma will have to be exhausted by cheerful and resigned submission to its consequences. Countless lives will thus have to be passed through. The advance is gradual and graduated. Many a life will abruptly reach the end of its span. Spiritual endeavour and the practice of Yoga are arrested. But the experience is there, and in the next birth perhaps, the individual finds congenial surroundings for the continuance of his spiritual career interrupted by the dissolution of nervous vestige earlier. Progress will have to be gradual, and step by step one has to advance, keeping safe to the points of vantage gained. In a transmigrating career, the individual carries with him the causal potentiality that accounts for successive births (till the obtainment of final release), in the shape of a subtle nervous mechanism known technically as "Linga-sarira". The term "Linga" technically means a cause. The causal potentiality of future lives will be inseparably associated with the self. The term "Linga-sarira" therefore means a subtle nervous mechanism which is the causal potentiality that effectuates in the fulness of time future lives. If the causal chain is to be maintained uninterrupted and intact, it should be assumed that the subtle nervous mechanism is *not* destroyed at the time of death or the dissolution of the visible nervous system that is gross and not subtle. The Good and Evil done by the individual keep him company in his journey into the realms unknown. The invisible nervous mechanism also must accompany him. Countless existences will have to be gone through. Distractions there will be. Lapses from the devotional practises will occur. An aspirant will have to brave difficulties, remove obstacles and without feeling disappointed and discouraged, should continue along the lines taught to him by his Gurus—spiritual preceptors, not the commercial-minded teachers and professors in modern educational institutions. Having learnt the methods of concentration of attention on the Supreme Lord and having understood the nature of the Lord indicated in the definition contained in the Sutra "Janmadyasya-yatah" an aspirant should commence devotional meditation. (Nididhyasana). At the time of the fructification of spiritual endeavour, the aspirant will come face to face with

the Immanent, Paramatma—the Supreme Overlord of the Universe. Divine Grace will be his. Causal potentiality of future lives will be destroyed. Obscuration of the essential inherent bliss of the individual will be got rid of. Unalloyed bliss will be enjoyed from that time to eternity, the individual ever being in the service of the Lord. Final release from the bondage of existence, from the recurring cycles of births and deaths is just the manifestation and enjoyment of the inherent bliss of the self, which in the stage of transmigration happens to lie concealed and obscured by Karmic folds.

Madhva maintains that even in the final state of release, released souls differ in the enjoyment of inherent bliss. Any possible objection can be met by emphasizing that inherent bliss is enjoyed by released souls, and in this they all agree. Final release means complete absence of even the slightest trace of evil, pain, and suffering. Madhva observes in his “Anuvyakhyana”—“Paramanandamapnoti - yatra - kamovaseeyate — na - Vishnu-sadrisam-daivam-na - mokhasadrisam - sukham - na-vedasadrisam-vakyam-na-varnomkarasammitah.” Supreme Bliss is enjoyed by released souls. (30).

Nor would it be a correct view to maintain that released souls, or free spirits lose themselves and their identity into the Absolute. The free spirits can and do take any form they please just to serve the Lord, to enjoy the inherent bliss from another angle of vision. They have bodies not of flesh and blood but of bliss, light and other spiritual material. Their bodies are made of pure, ~~in~~herent, spiritual stuff. (“Dehah-svaroopatmaka-evatesham.”)

One important point to note is that released souls or free spirits never attain to Omniscience and Omnipotence which are the characteristics of the Supreme Lord only, the One without a Second. The freed spirits have absolutely no power to create the Universe. None to destroy and preserve it. The eight determinations proceed only from the Supreme Lord Narayana. The author of the “Vedanta Sūtras” explicitly repudiated claims of free spirits to Divine Omnipotence, etc., in an aphorism which states that the free spirits have no control over determinations of the universe such as its creation, etc., “Jagad-vyapara-varjam.” Madhva writes: Srishtyadibhyo-anyan-vyaparanapnoti—” (Bhashya, 4, 4.)

Madhva cites a Sruti text in his “Tatvanirnaya” to emphasize the complete attunement and harmony between the life of a released spirit and the Will and Intelligence of the Lord. “Brahmamatyānukoolame-matirmuktau-bhaviṣyati.” Obscured and beclouded by ignorance, the intellect of the finite while in the state

of bondage, fails to grasp which particular course of action will commend itself to the Divine Lord. On the other hand, now that the veil of ignorance is rent asunder by spiritual light, the released souls or free spirits regulate their activities in the perfectest accord with Divine Will and Pleasure. Free spirits will find newer and fresher avenues of service to the Lord. The details cannot be imagined by finite intellect. Service is spirituality. Work is worship. The freed spirits devote their time and energies to the service of the Lord in countless ways into which we may not have any inkling from our condition of bondage, and cosmic imprisonment. In their capacity for service free spirits differ from one another as they do in the matter of enjoyment of their inherent bliss. Annihilation of individuality in the state of release is merest moonshine. The individuality of each self and every spirit is maintained intact. The Radical Realism and Pluralism that are noticed here and now, are to be found elsewhere as well in the state of release. The philosophic position of Madhva is this. If final release is to mean some kind of mystical swooning and losing one's individuality in the Absolute, metaphysical, moral, and spiritual games are not worth the candle. The finite and the Infinite can never be identical with one another. In actual life and experience in this life, and in this world one finds a Pluralistic Universe. There is no reason why the land of the released and free spirits may not be a Pluralistic Universe, purified, and perfected. Madhva's conception of Mukti or final release, or the Upanishadic conception of final release as explained and presented by the author of the "Vedanta Sūtras" unmistakably points in the direction of a Pluralistic Universe persisting in the state of release, a Pluralistic Universe purified, perfected and permeated by the spirit of ready service to the Lord.

Whether the free and released spirits take any interest in the affairs of the world they left behind is a highly speculative problem, and the Upanishadic passages seem to indicate that there is nothing incompatible or inconsistent with their evincing lively interest in mundane affairs. "Jakshan-kreedan-ramamanah," etc.... Sankalpadevasya-pitarassamuttsitante." (31). At grave moments of Cosmic crises, free spirits, by the command of the Supreme Lord may take birth on Earth and by example and percept, by word and deed, by the establishment of holy orders of teachers, by the building up of systems of philosophy, and in countless other ways render inestimable service to struggling humanity. Service of that type is the best and the most devoted form of worship of God. Birth on this planet does not obscure the inherent spiritual light of the free spirits who take care not to be imprisoned again in the Karmic chain. They simply work in the interests of erring, struggling members of humanity, and disappear when they think that their mission is fulfilled.

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(31) See "Chandogya" 8-12, and 8-2. Pp. 76 and 79. 166 Upanishads. N. S. Press, Bombay.

No one need be troubled by pointless doubts if free spirits die away their time, or if a heaven where there is nothing to be done, may or may not be worth striving for. Activity is the essence of free life. Activity takes the form of serving the Lord Supreme Narayana in countless ways the nature of which it would be impossible to imagine now and here. Such service to the Lord is not plodding of the finite level, nor is it hard work with sweat streaming from one's brow. The service is the highest and the purest form of pleasure enjoyed by free spirits. If one be a bit punctilious, such service yields to free spirits the purest bliss. Life as measured by hedonistic standards is a monstrous monotony. It consists of a series of satisfactions of the needs of the flesh. Marry, multiply, let the strongest live and the weakest perish. That is the motto of life. Self-aggrandisement, self-glorification, and belittling of others govern the life of the modern civilised man. Freedom from a series of such lives is certainly worth striving for. Released spirits enjoy that freedom.

## XXVI

Madhva has undertaken a searching critique of the conception of "Mukti" release, or final emancipation, of other schools of thought, in his "Anuvyakhyana." (1) The Jaina conception of final release is first criticised. According to the Jainas, the stock of Karma is exhausted by true Knowledge. The Jainas mention the analogy of the caged bird. When the bird is let off, it flies off. So does the self, the "Pudgala" as it is technically known. Up, up, and up still the spirit flies. That is the Jaina conception of "Moksha" final release. Madhva objects to this on the ground that an uninterrupted fight upwards will cause fatigue sooner or later. The Jainas do not admit the validity of scripture. On the plane of pure unaided reason, or ratiocination, it would be impossible to meet the objection. If final freedom or emancipation is expressed in terms of an upward flight, the latter just as any other flight would cause fatigue. The human spirit in quest of permanent freedom from the ills of existence jumps from the frying pan into fire. The Vedantic conception of final emancipation, on the other hand is not based on mere reason and ratiocination. Reason would establish anything in fact and a counter line of reasoning will demolish what was once enthusiastically established. A concept of such a high spiritual and philosophical significance as Mukti cannot be left to the tender mercies of vagrant logic and free-lance ratiocination. A solid foundation should be laid on which the concept of final emancipation should be grounded. The Jaina conception of Mukti has nothing about it that would kindle the spiritual and divine in man and convince him that striving for the attainment of it is indeed worth while. (2) The Buddhistic conception of release is no better. Entry into the Great Nothing is final emancipation according to Buddhists. (Maha-sunya). The Buddhists do not admit the existence of any

Atma, spirit or subject, or spiritual entity in the present existence. They are none either in the state of final release or emancipation. The Fontal Nullity, or the *Non Pareil Nullity* is uncharacterisable and indescribable. It is neither existent nor non-existent. (neither Sat nor Asat). It is Sunya (nullity with a capital N.) No moral and spiritual endeavour need be wasted on the attainment of this Nullity. (3) In his "Tatvodyota" Madhva maintained the thesis that there are some striking doctrinal resemblances between the Nihilism of Buddhism and the Absolutism or the Monistic Absolutism of the Advaita Vedanta. The Heaven of the latter is more or less the same as that of the former. There are striking points of resemblance between the two. Is there anything to be gained, anything to be enjoyed in absorption into the Absolute? Nothing. Nor is anything to be gained in a spiritual volatilisation into Fontal Nullity. The Sruti is quite clear and emphatic about the positive enjoyment experienced by free spirits or released souls. While the Buddhist who does not owe any allegiance to scriptural literature is to a certain extent justified in rejecting the account of Mukti to be found in it, the Absolutist who admits the authority and validity of the Scripture cannot so easily find any justification for his account of final emancipation as absorption into the Absolute. (4) The Sankhya and the Naiyayikas maintain that there is no positive enjoyment of happiness in the state of release. The description given of that state is mainly negative. There is no positive enjoyment of any bliss or happiness in that state according to them. The "Kaivalya" of the Sankhya is a neutral colorless state. The Nyaya-vaisheshikas describe it to be one in which twenty-one types of pain are got rid of. The neutral and colourless existence emphasized by the Sankhyas will not make any appeal to the minds of aspirants. While the Nyaya-vaisheshika description of Mukti as a state in which the twenty-one types of pain are terminated is better than that of the Sankhya, it falls short of the Vedantic conception of release as *both positive and negative*. The Sruti plainly maintains that not only there occurs an effective and complete riddance of all traces of pain, evil, and imperfection, in the state of emancipation but, there is positive enjoyment of the inherent spiritual bliss of the subject. There are also countless opportunities for serving the Supreme Lord with Whom the released spirits come face to face. The Sankhya and the Nyaya-Vaisheshika accounts of final liberation from finitude, are vitiated as they fail to do adequate justice to the positive characteristics of the state of final emancipation. Whoever with wits about him will endeavour to reach a state wherein absence of bliss is to be starting him in the face? The Mukti state according to the Sankhya and the Nyaya-vaisheshika is in the grip of an undesirable double agreement of *absence of pain and absence of joy*. Madhva contends that it is not a state which would supply the necessary dynamic motive power for healthy spiritual endeavour

and effort. Human reason cannot accept the state as final. Scripture is surely against it. Reason and Revelation look askance at the Sankhya and the Nyaya-Vaisheshika accounts of Mukti or final release. Madhva winds up the critique of the conceptions of final release entertained by other schools of thought thus—"Itthammatani - bhramajani - yasmat - Moksham - samuddesyamapi bhramena-vidurnasamyagyadapeeha-laukikah - sukham - mama-syaddhi - -sadeti - janate—" (Anuvyakhyana, 4—2). It is absurd to contend that in any description of final release as inevitably concomitant with absence of all traces of pain, evil, etc., and enjoyment of inherent, bliss, one is transferring distinctions and values of mundane existence to the other world, for Madhva bases his account of final emancipation on the Sruti texts which proclaim enjoyment of inherent spiritual bliss ever in the service of the Lord to be the characteristic of that state. The critics and opponents of Madhva should be asked to cite evidence to prove that distinctions and values of this life are transcended in the other beyond recognition. Relevant evidence is not forthcoming. On the contrary, it stands to reasons to maintain that bliss, and happiness are sure to be features essential of the state of release. Only the bliss and happiness are taintless there, whereas, they are tainted on this side of life. Taintlessness and unalloyedness are the characteristic features of the bliss and happiness enjoyed in the state of release by free spirits. They are inherent. Only they are obscured, beclouded and covered with deep encrustations in the state of bondage. Riddance of them is secured by spiritual practices, and by immaculate conduct in thought, word, and deed. The encrustations are removed, and inherent spiritual bliss and happiness are enjoyed by released spirits. There is nothing which is either transferred from one state to the other or is seen erupting into one's career like a Jack in the Box. The inherent spiritual bliss and happiness are there, but their free and uninterrupted enjoyment is rendered possible only in the state of final release or emancipation from the phantasmagoria of metempsychosis.

Now that an estimate of Madhva's doctrines has been attempted, it is time one indicated that the central doctrine of difference on which Madhva's Pluralistic Universe is grounded has the support of the canons of interpretation popularised by the Purvameemamsa. They are six. (1) Upakramopasamhara, (2) Abhyasa, (3) Apoorvata, (4) Phala, (5) Arthavada, and (6) Upapatti. In any determination of the exact meaning and significance of vedic and ritualistic texts, one should first look to the commencement of a particular context and its conclusion. Attention will have to be fixed on the exordium and the peroration. Repetition with a view to assurance being made doubly sure will have to be noted. The element of novelty, the fruit or the reward vouchsafed, and above all requirements of reason which will have to be fully satisfied, form the canons of interpretation. A doctrine

or an attempted interpretation is considerably strengthened if it should have the support of all the six canons. The strength is correspondingly lost or diminished if it should have only the support of some of the Six. There is also the question of relative inferiority and superiority among them. According to the Purvameemamsa, the commencement or the Upakarma of a vedic or a ritualistic context is more powerful than the conclusion or Upasamhara thereof. Should there be any incompatibility between the two, the commencement of the context will prevail and the conclusion will be made to surrender its *prima facie*, surface interpretation, and reinterpreted in the light of the commencement. Madhva disagrees with this view of the Purvameemamsakas, and maintains that of the six canons enumerated in the order noted, the succeeding one is more powerful than the preceding one. On the other hand, of the canons "Sruti, Linga, Vakya, Prakharana, Sthana and Samakhya" of the Meemamsakas, the preceding of any two is more powerful than the succeeding one. Madhva sums up the position thus— "Upakramadi - linganam - baleeyohyuttarottaram - Srutyadaupoorvapoovamcha-Brahmatarka-vinirnayat." (32)).

Vyasaraja explains that the doctrine of difference between the finite and the Infinite has the support and sanction of *all the six canons of interpretation*. The Atharvana text commences with the terms *Two Suparnas*, two birds or spirits. The passage concludes to the effect that the one attains to a very high and remarkable degree of resemblance with the other. Only approximation is emphasized, and there is not even a shade of a shadow of reference to identity between the two. The term "Anyā" which means "different" is repeated to have assurance rendered doubly sure. It is repeated thrice. There is an undoubted element of novelty in the conclusion asserted as difference between the finite and the Infinite is not known by any authority other than scripture which proclaims the nature of Brahman as the author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos. One may go on arguing interminably and pure, dry, rigorous reason will now establish difference, and now identity, and now identity-shot difference, and difference-shot identity on a different controversial occasion. Final appeal lies only to sacred texts. The reward vouchsafed is freedom from the alloyed virtues and vices of mundane existence. There is also laudation of difference. Reason is adduced in support of the difference thus : while one is said to eat the fruit, *sweet fruit*, peradventure of the forbidden tree, the other brilliantly

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(32) Appayya Dikshita in his "Upakramaparakrama" maintained the thesis that in the event of an apparent conflict between the commencement and conclusion of a vedic text, the latter should be made to surrender its surface interpretation in the light of the former. Vijayindra Tirtha in his "Upasamhara-vijaya" has splendidly argued contra, maintaining that it is the commencement that should be made to surrender its surface import in conformity with the conclusion. (Upasamhara). See "Anuvyakhyana" P. 61. Also the eleventh Chapter.

*shines without eating anything.* Of course, the latter is the Infinite, and the former finite.

In another Upanishadic passage, one finds the six canons fully satisfied. The commencement refers to "Antaryami"—the Immanent Supreme Being. The conclusion of the context emphasizes the existence of the Immanent Power. The doctrine is repeated twenty-one times. As the Immanence of the Supreme Power is not the object of everyday thoughts of man, there is an element of novelty. Unless one deeply speculates on the problems of here and hereafter, by means of a study of the sacred texts, one may not get any knowledge about the Immanent Power at all. The reward vouchsafed is knowledge of Brahman. That is certainly glorious and tempting enough to spiritual aspirants. The Arthavada may either be in the form of praise or blame commendation or condemnation of something. The penalty one will have to pay if he pretends to have possession of knowledge of the Immanent power without really having any, is the shattering of his head to atoms. Reason is also adduced. Though the Supreme Power is Immanent in Earth, etc., Earth does not know Him, etc. Vyasaraja maintains that in the two passages cited the doctrine of difference between the finite and the Infinite finds striking support of the six canons of interpretation. (Nyaya-mrita, 2-25. Pages 589-590.)

It may be recalled that according to the orthodox rules of debate or controversy a writer or a controversialist should not merely point to scriptural texts in support of his own position, but should also reinterpret those cited by his opponent in the light of the thesis maintained by the former. Vyasaraja has in conformity with the canons of orthodox debate, reinterpreted, on the lines indicated by Madhva, the famous passage commencing "Ekamevadvyteeyam", etc., on which the Absolutist relies for support of his doctrine of Monism. In the opening or at the commencement of the passage, there is reference to the Supreme Power One only without a Second. "Adviteeya" without a second means that there is no power to equal the Supreme Being, and *a fortiori* none to excel That. At the conclusion it is affirmed that the Supreme Power is Immanent in all. Nine times it is repeated that the finite and the Infinite are different from one another and certainly not identical. "THOU ART NOT—THAT. ATAT+TVAMASI." There is also the element of novelty as difference is not to be readily assimilated by those who have recourse to reason and ratiocination. Final appeal is to scripture alone. As God's existence is to be demonstrated only by scripture, the difference between God and His creations, difference between the finite and the Infinite is not grasped unless one undertakes a study of scripture. Freedom, eternal, and unalloyed is vouchsafed as reward. Difference is duly commended. Illustrative instances nine



in number like the bird tied by a string, etc., are mentioned in support of difference and the instances are strictly in accord with reason, commonsense, and the experience of rational beings. Thus the passage claimed by the Absolutist to be in support of Monism is reinterpreted and the thesis established that the finite and the Infinite radically differ from one another and that difference exists even in the final state of release or emancipation. Radical difference—difference in important, significant and material particulars—between the finite and the Infinite is thus established. (33)

## XXVIII

## CRITICISM

On the metaphysical plane, Madhva's dualism does not satisfy some. An unbridgeable gulf has been created by the Acharya between mind and matter. Is matter something like a rival set over and against the Deity? In that case does it not compromise Divine Greatness? Matter will have to be admitted either as not traceable to any origin or it should be said to have been created by God. Is that a *de novo* creation? Or is it mere manifestation, rendering explicit what is already implicit? Is Creation merely rendering kinetic what is potential? If so, the question of evil and imperfection is not solved. Can there be any evil and imperfection in this the best of all possible worlds created by an Omniscient, and Omnipotent Being? It cannot be. Evil is *not* dismissed by Madhva *as mere appearance*. It is admitted to be a reality. What is Evil from one angle of vision is just bondage from another. The latter is to be explained to be due to the Karma of each individual. The Deity cannot be accused of partiality, favouritism, etc. "Karma" is beginningless in time. Judging the system on the criterion of inner harmony or consistency, one is bound to feel that the existence of real Evil, suffering, and imperfections in a Cosmos created and controlled by God, An unequalled, All-perfect Being, has not been accounted for satisfactorily. There is also a real and serious difficulty if it is assumed that the cosmos has been already there, and God merely assisted its manifestation. Even then evil is there, in embryonic form. God anyhow aids or abets its manifestation. Madhva has not given any harmonised explanation of the relation between mind and matter on the one hand, and between real evil and imperfection in the world and Omniscience and Omnipotence, etc., of the Creator on the other. If Deity can afford to be so unconcerned and indifferent or unable as to allow Satan to steal a march over Himself, one may not be any the wiser spiritually by approaching the Deity with arms lifted in prayer.

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(33) Vanamalimisra writes in his "Chandamarutha", "Shadvīḍha-tāparya-lingapratipadito-bhedah-satya-eva." P. 43.

## XXIX

Madhva's doctrine of "Anyathakhyati" according to which it is sought to be maintained that in illusions something absolutely non-existent appears, as in the illustration of shell-piece being mistaken for silver, runs counter to modern investigations in psychology and epistemology. Why should Madhva be so anxious to maintain that in instances of illusion a totally non-existent something appears or flashes across awareness? On the contrary it is undoubtedly true that as far as the data are concerned, they are conveyed by means of adequate stimuli to respective sense organs. Sensory structures are normally functioning. But the sensed data are erroneously interpreted. Even in this erroneous interpretation anything is not interpreted to be anything else indiscriminately. There is a sure and certain method in madness. A piece of shell is not mistaken as an elephant! But only as silver. Even so, a rope is not mistaken as an building but as a snake. That is because out of the stock of imagery, images or sets of images that have the closest resemblance to the data sensed are woven as it were into the wrong interpretation. Or illusions may be caused by some element of abnormality in the sensory structures themselves, and in that case data sensed are distorted, and erroneous interpretation follows. It is not at all clear why Madhva should be at such considerable pains as to explain that a totally non-existent silver, not the silver sensed and experienced before in a previous situation or set of surroundings, enters into illusional situations. In maintaining a doctrine like that Madhva comes perilously and terribly near the Nihilism of Buddhism which he condemns and to which he equates Absolutism. That is perhaps Nemesis. When a leader of a school of philosophy or an intellectual movement vehemently denounces another, some tenet of the latter appears to be dogging the footsteps of the former with a vengeance as it were! That something totally non-existent enters into illusional situations is quite apposite to the Nihilism of the Buddhistic metaphysics, and momentariness of cognitions of its Theory of Knowledge. Modern psychology has placed the question of illusions on a definite basis. Normally speaking sense-organs function correctly and give knowledge of the world and its objects as they are. It is not admitted that the sense-organs are only intended to deceive the subject. They are useful weapons of understanding the nature and characteristics of external reality. In all normal situations sense-knowledge is correct, accurate, and reliable. However, abnormalities are bound to arise. It may be the rapprochement between sensory structures and objects is disturbed. It may be the sensory apparatus has been incapacitated congenitally as in the case of those born deaf and dumb and so on. In such unfortunate instances sense-knowledge is bound to be distorted. It may be some injury caused to the sense-organs by violent stimuli like thunder and lightning prevents the subject from grasping

the nature of external reality as it is. Too great distance, too intimate proximity, shock to sense-organs, mental distraction or preoccupation, obscurity and microscopicness of objects, may distort sense-knowledge or even render it totally impossible of achievement. Peripheral and central factors contribute to the distortion of normal sense-awareness. Madhva is not justified in trotting out a new bogey of a totally non-existent something appearing in illusionistic phenomena. A little careful analysis will convince anyone that previous experience and the stock of imagery play a prominent part in the shaping and the determination of illusions. Madhva is not justified in denying it. The contention that the silver which is elsewhere, and the snake that is elsewhere do not form part of the present situation is pointless, because, the images of silver and snake in the shape of previous experience of them are stored up somewhere in the limbo of the unconscious, and they form part and parcel of the percipient or the subject. The doctrine of illusions urged by Madhva appears to be due to a too deep and ineradicable realistic bias. The Acharya appears to argue that in accordance with his scheme of realism, he cannot tolerate the officiation of the very real silver present elsewhere at the ceremony of its illusionistic perception in a piece of shell by a subject, who after a minute examination of the piece exclaims,—“This is not silver—This never was silver, and will never be silver.” In reference to the “This”, the fraction of reality with which he comes into intellectual contact, it was never silver, never is, and never will be. That is settled. If so, wherefrom does the silver come? Madhva contends it is totally non-existent—asat. If the Acharya is to maintain intact his radical Realism, he comes in his endeavour perilously and terribly near Buddhism. That is Nemesis.

### XXX

Madhva does not appear to be justified in a classification of the selves into three water-tight compartments, as (1) Mukti-Yogyas, (2) Tamo-Yogyas, and (3) Nitya-samsaris. The doctrine has been elaborated in his work “Tatvasamkhyana” and elsewhere. (34) Madhva does little justice to the dignity of the self if he wants to condemn a class of selves as permanently consigned to hell-fires, and tortures, and of course as ineligible for heaven and enjoyment of bliss. Can a class of God’s creatures be consigned like that to eternal damnation? It reflects directly on the Omniscience and the Omnipotence of the Almighty Lord very adversely indeed. Can such a class exist in this best of all possible worlds? Anyhow it seems fair, just, and spiritually equitable if God allows his creatures freedom to work out their destinies. The Deity may not shut out a class eternally from heaven and heavenly bliss. Should this be done, God seems to be just like an ordinary blithering, blundering bureaucrat, and not an All-merciful Father to

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(34) See Madhva’s “Tatva-Viveka”.

whom one may lift his hands in prayer. The prayer is not answered and a class of His own creatures are to be destined for eternal damnation. It is hardly Divine. If any doctrine of eligibility is to be maintained, it becomes impossible to fix canons and conditions of eligibility. Above all, who is to be the judge of it? Everyone is certain to believe that he or she is eligible for the enjoyment of heavenly bliss and happiness. Who is to decide the question of eligibility or intelligibility? An element of arbitrariness rears its ugly head and no philosophic world-view can be grounded on arbitrariness. Modern conceptions of man and his essential spirituality, of democracy and equality, make it absolutely impossible for Madhva to urge his views as they savour of spiritual despotism.

### XXXI

Even in the final state of emancipation, Madhva maintains that there is difference between any two spirits in the matter of enjoying their inherent and fundamental bliss. Is Madhva's Radical Pluralism to be extended to the state of ultimate release from all bondage of evil-ridden existence? One would rather imagine that in the state of final emancipation at least, there may not be difference and inequality. Is it not sufficient that one should be worried and bothered by differences, discords, and disharmonies in this life? Should they pursue the subject relentlessly into the state of release as well? Such a state of affairs if true would point in the direction of the traditional South Indian saying being only too true that a person is not free from the mischief of Satan even if he went to Benares, the Holy place of Pilgrimage. When the stock of the previous "Karma" of each individual becomes exhausted at the time of attainment of final realisation or release, there can be nothing that would account for and justify difference, discord and disharmony. All these are due to the influence of Karma done by each individual in earlier lives. The unexhausted stock of Karma is the causal potentiality that forges future lives. When final release is obtained after a long, tedious, and weary series of lives and deaths from the influence of Karma, is it logical to maintain that difference, discord and disharmony will still continue when the causal potentiality has been destroyed? Difference not due to Karmic bondage is simply understandable. There can be none such. In release Karmic causal potentiality has been destroyed according to all accounts of that state. Wherefrom, then, does difference, etc., come?

Madhva has only transferred the distinctions noted in this existence to the state of release as well. The Acharya was obviously wrong in having done that. Further objections are inevitable. A state governed by difference, discord and disharmony can hardly be called one of final release or emancipation. The

very notions of "finality" and "emancipation" are inseparably linked up with a termination of all discord, etc. If the latter persisted, it would not be a state of release at all. It is obligatory on the part of a thinker to settle the criterion or criteria the application of which is to mark off the state of bondage from that of release. Otherwise one may not know at all which is the state of bondage and which of freedom. The existence and absence of discord, etc., may be well taken to be the criteria to mark off the states of bondage and release from one another. Other criteria appear to be pointless and unworkable. Madhva does violence to the only criteria available.

Further, if difference, discord, and disharmony are to persist even in the state of release, God cannot escape a prominent and pronounced share of responsibility. In His world there are differences and inequalities. To save Him from all responsibility thinkers have said that He can be likened to an impartial judge and that the discords, etc., are due to the Karma of the individuals. He does not create Karma. Karma, Self, and the Causal chain are all "anadi" beginningless in time. It should be evident without any elaborate proof being adduced, that in the state of release, God's jurisdiction should be complete and unchallenged. Though Omniscient and Omnipotent God tolerates the Law of Karma in the state of bondage of the individuals. In the state of final emancipation, He alone should be regarded as responsible for the persistence of difference, etc., and God's Divinity is very largely compromised if He is to be held responsible for the persistence of difference, etc., in the state of final emancipation. Madhva's Theism suffers if persistence of difference in the state of final emancipation be true.

### XXXII

Madhva admits a mysterious entity known as "Visesha." It is pressed into service in all cases of metaphysical emergencies. Madhva maintains that there is absolute identity between the various attributes of the Deity and the Deity Itself. If so, how is it that different language and different terms are used in secular and scriptural attempts at describing them? Madhva maintains that different linguistic expressions used to convey a special type of identity are permissible and the doctrine is known as that of "Savissha-abheda." Madhva has cited the following favourite stanza—"Bheda-heenetvaparyaya-sabdantara Niyamakah-visesho-namakathitah-sosti-vastushvaseshatah." Where genuine identity reigns, there is that Visesha in all things, which sanctions usage of different terms, which are by no means synonymous. Thus, though there is fundamental Identity between Brahman and Its Attributes, an Infinite Number of Infinite Excellent Attributes, the latter are spoken of as separate from one another and from Brahman. Language secular and scriptural has countless such

usages. How this usage is to be reconciled with the metaphysical doctrine of Identity between Brahman and Its Attributes is explained by Madhva in reference to "Visesha". One may be entitled to describe "Visesha" as the mysterious M<sup>rs</sup>. Harris of Madhva's Pluralistic Theism, and Radical Realism.

Similarly, "Visesha" is pressed into service in the elucidation of the relation between "difference" (Bheda), which is of the essential and fundamental form of objects, and the objects themselves. X differs from Y. When you say X, you also say "difference" whether you like it or not. Then how is one entitled to use expressions like "difference of X from Y" and so on? The answer is that though there is identity between the "difference" and X, Visesha sanctions such usages. Here is again an appeal to Mrs. Harris.

### XXXIII

#### PART—II

#### CRITICS ANSWERED (35)

While it is easy to see that no systems of thought or of speculation can be free from defects and drawbacks, as they are all attempts by the finite intellect of man, even though claims are made by the followers of denominational schools that the authors, founders, and champions of them are Omniscient, it is not so easy to maintain mental equipoise, notwithstanding loud protestations, and professions to the contrary, in criticising the philosophical attempts of those whose works couched that they are in terse, and yet telling terminology constitute a direct challenge to the intelligence of the modern professors, who are ready to philosophise and wax eloquent over this "ism" or that "ism" with the aid of translations in English. Fortunately or unfortunately, the works of Madhva are still a sealed book to those who cannot manage the original Sanskrit works without the aid of translations and expositions. Translations of controversial works, there are none. Nor are there any expositions. It is natural therefore, and nothing surprising, if erroneous notions about the Acharya's system

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(35) Criticisms of Madhva's doctrines contained in "Indian Philosophy"—Library of Philosophy, Edited by J. H. Muirhead, LL.D., George Allen and Unwin, Pp. 750-751, Vol. II—are refuted in detail. The author of "Indian Philosophy" criticises Madhva's system of philosophy from the standpoint of Absolutism or Monistic Idealism. I do not admit that Monism is the only fashionable or civilised philosophy of life. Pluralism is at least as respectable and rational a world-view as Monism if not more rational and respectable. Absolutism no doubt has been raised to metaphysical eminence (I do not say "bad eminence") but this is hardly a valid reason why one should be compelled to believe that there is no other rational world-view. Those that enjoy first-hand acquaintance with the works of Madhva will have no difficulty in seeing that the Acharya's system of philosophy forms a vital limb of Indian Metaphysics. I have endeavoured to demonstrate it. Other criticisms are also examined and refuted.

of thought are universally prevalent in India and outside it. Intellectual honesty and fairness would demand that one should refrain from criticising a doctrine or a school of philosophy if he had had no access to the original sources. But what matters? Has he not heard that Madhva talks of God and man, Finite, and the Infinite, and can he not concentrate his critical fire on the Acharya's views about them? I propose in the ensuing sections briefly to answer and repudiate some of the glaring and ill-founded criticisms and charges against the doctrines of the Acharya urged by those who to the best of my reading of the internal evidence of their own criticisms appear to have had no access to the original texts relating to the system of Madhva.

#### XXXIV

A criticism which has just to be mentioned only to be repudiated is to the effect that European and American savants in particular and Western scholars in general have not devoted as much time and energy to the philosophy of Madhva as they have done to the systems of Sankara and Ramanuja and indeed, if there should have been anything useful in the philosophy of Madhva, would they not have translated the standard works of the Acharya or written expositions of them?, queries a childish critic. The merest mentioning of this sapient comment constitutes its most effective repudiation. It is too late in the day to lay down or formulate the criterion seriously, namely, acceptability (of a system of philosophy) by the West. Acceptability by the West is not a criterion or guarantee of the logical value and philosophical soundness of a system of philosophy. Nor is non-acceptability a guarantee or criterion of the inherent unsoundness or logical vulnerability of it. Why did orientalists like Max Muller and Thibaut not study the works of Madhva is a query which may best be addressed to themselves, and a modern worker is under no obligations to enter into an analysis of the causes contributory to Madhva's works not being studied by Western scholars and the so-called researchers in our own Universities. Intellectual incapacity and indolence are the only causes which I am able to see and identify. Nobody is any the worse for the absence of translations of the Acharya's works from the pages of the Sacred Books of the East! Not certainly the Acharya.

There is another criticism going round that Madhva's system of philosophy belongs more to the religious history of India than to the philosophical. What exactly is the point of this criticism, the present writer has not been able to see, but does the author of the criticism seek to maintain that Madhva spent his days in organising denominational and religious sects, schools, and synods, or in the popularisation of a cult like Tantricism popular in another part of India? Does he mean that the Acharya spent his time in narrating folk-lore, religious tales and stories to his followers?

On the contrary, it will be evident from a perusal of the expositions of Madhva's works, in the previous chapters that he was as much a philosopher as his predecessors, in whatever sense the term may be used by critics of Madhva in regard to the latter. In his works, the Acharya has controverted the doctrines of Absolutism following strictly the orthodox and sastric methods of metaphysical debates. The Acharya wrote a commentary on the Sutras of Badarayana maintaining that Radical Realism and Pluralistic Theism are after the heart's desire of Vyasa. Madhva commented on the principal Upanishads. He wrote a commentary on the Gita. The principal Upanishads, the Sutras of Badarayana, and the Gita form *points d'appui* of all philosophical discussions and from a different angle of vision, they form points of departure for such discussions and debates. In consonance with the orthodox traditions, he commented on the three principal texts, and controverted the tenets and doctrines of Absolutism to which he is opposed.

Absolutism has not been criticised by Madhva mainly on considerations of religion or on the requirements of religion. The criticism has been based on the *Pramanas* admitted by the parties to the controversy. The doctrines of Absolutism have been criticised and shown to be against the sources and guarantors of valid knowledge, *Pratyaksha*, *Anumana*, and *Agama*. One is entitled to ask critics of Madhva whether such a procedure is philosophical or religious.

Further, look at the voluminous, (and by no means, less luminous on that account,) controversial literature summed up in a bibliographical manner in an earlier chapter, and will anyone have the temerity in the light of that literature to contend that the philosophy of Madhva belongs more to the religious history of India? Following strictly the orthodox methods of philosophical debate, Madhva and his commentators have attacked Absolutism from all points of vantage. Even then, when a writer on "Indian Philosophy" thinks it sufficient if he devoted say about twenty pages to the philosophy of Madhva under the plea that it belongs to the religious history of India, and that he is engaged only in the task of writing about the philosophic history, another is at perfect liberty to retort that as a reaction against Buddhism, the Absolutism of Sankara is also part of the religious and not of the philosophical development of Indian Thought. The criticism is pointless and at the most charitable interpretation it is only a clever device to conceal the writer's total absence of acquaintance with the works of Madhva and with the literature that has centred round them.

One is only to be slightly reminded of the vicissitudes of Dualism in European Philosophy, to be convinced that a Dualistic reaction against Monistic Absolutism is a genuine phase of philosophic progress and has nothing to do with religious development



The Early Greek thinkers maintained that water, fire, air, etc., were the constituent elements of the cosmos. Anaxagoras pushed into philosophical prominence the NOUS. The Atomists were Pluralists. They had nothing to do with religion. The Sophists were surely not Monistic Idealists. Socrates was surely a Realist and a Pluralist. The Platonic Idealism took everything before it by storm as it were, and left behind a residual Archetypal world. Plato did not succeed in bridging the gulf between the real and the Archetypal worlds. Aristotle was frankly a Realist and Pluralist. The Realistic corrective to Platonic Idealism emanated from Aristotle. He loved Plato no doubt, but, he loved Truth more. "*Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas.*" The Neo-platonic mysticism had a realistic and pluralistic basis. The father of modern European Philosophy Descartes set the ball rolling with a Dualism. Spinoza in his attempt to demolish the Cartesian Dualism ended with countless other dualisms. "Sub-specie temporis vs. sub-specie aeternitatis" "Substance vs. Attributes" etc. Leibnitz was a Radical Realist, and Pluralist *par excellence*. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume never succeeded in giving a cogent and systematic account of the "why" and the "wherefore" of sensations and ideas. The dogmatic slumber was over. Kant left the world a legacy of dualisms between Pure reason, and practical reason, Sensibility and Understanding, metaphysical deduction, and the transcendental deduction, appearance and the thing-in-itself, or appearances and things-in-themselves according to some. Hegel and post-Hegelians, Neo-Hegelians, are all realists and pluralists. Bergsonian Elan Vital had to be arrested by something else so that its solidification into the cosmos may be secured. Bradley never succeeded in bridging the gulf between appearance and reality. James openly repudiated Absolutism. Dewey does it. According to my reading of the history of Philosophy and its development in the old and the new worlds, there have been from time to time reactions against Absolutism, Monism, and Idealism. It would indicate nothing but the height of folly if one should dogmatise to the effect that reactions against Absolutism are all to be assigned to the development of the religious history and not to the philosophical.

Let one have his feet on the *terra firma* of historical data and facts. He will see, if he wants to, that Madhva reorganised a religious order, as Sankara and Ramanuja had done previously. Such reorganisation would naturally form part of the duty of ecclesiastical dignitaries. Popular religion as evident in ritualism was not the goal of any of the Acharyas. If the Indian Philosophic situation could be studied in the light of the rough parallel from European philosophy drawn in the previous paragraph, even a person who, for whatever reasons, happens to have developed a dislike for the dualism of Madhva, cannot but see that the system of philosophy advocated by the Acharya and championed by his commentators and successors forms a very vital part and a

genuinely systematic part of the organic totality of Indian Philosophy. Such summary disposals of a philosophy which has played a brilliant part in the Renaissance of Realism in India can only be due to complete absence of genuine acquaintance with the works of the Acharya and those of his commentators and champions. "There is nothing in Dualism," "There is nothing in Madhva's Realism" are not philosophical criticisms but uncultured claptrap. One may as well retort "There is nothing in Monism," "There is nothing in the Idealism of X-Y or Z." When claptrap counteracts claptrap it is a comedy, a cinema-show fit for the consumption-visual of the Absolute itself.

We are in the happy times of free thought and freer speech. We are also in the equally happy times that believe if a doctrine of philosophy is appreciated in Europe and America, and if a lecture happens to have been delivered on it before a sectional committee of the League of Nations, its value is enhanced, and it is then literally and figuratively forced down the throat of India! According to one line of free thought and free writing, Madhva's philosophy belongs more to the religious history. According to another line of freer thought and freest writing and speaking, the philosophy of the Acharya represents a vital part of Indian metaphysical body-politic. Who is to judge? I sketched summaries of the controversial works just to give an inkling into the vast mass of literature that is yet to be investigated. Even a cursory perusal of the eleventh chapter is bound to expose to the very hilt the intellectual criminality of those who pass judgments *ex cathedra* with an air of omniscience on the works of Madhva, when such judges are not in a position even to sum up accurately the literature on the subject. It is thus established that the remark that Madhva's Philosophy belongs more to the religious history of India is preposterous, as the Acharya's system of thought forms a vital limb of the body-politic of Indian meta-

### XXXV

Another charge against Madhva's Dualism is that it is not able to explain the relation between God and the world. Is this sapient criticism anything specially appropriate against Madhva's metaphysical endeavour? How did the entire army of thinkers European and Indian, from Thales to Russel, Whitehead, and Dewey, and from Yajnyavalkya to the book-makers of the present day attack the problem? Is it an adequate answer to say as some do that God is a Whole, a Totality? To Nietzsche all the Gods were dead. To yet others, if there were no God, it is necessary to create one. As a complete revenge against God having made man in His image, so many men have now-a-days made God in their own images. Madhva did nothing of the kind. Adhering scrupulously to the traditions of Indian Philosophy, he interpreted the sacred texts, and in all metaphysical matters based his conclusions on reason. It is admitted without dispute by Sankara and Madhva

those who maintain opposite conclusions, that as the procedure of reason is riotous, knowledge concerning God can be derived only from sacred texts. The texts give us knowledge of God. The texts proclaim that the Supreme Lord is the author of the eight determinations of the cosmos. The Authorship on account of its authoritativeness and convincingness was included by the author of the Vedanta Sutas, in his classic definition of Brahman. Where is philosophical unsoundness, where is logical untenability if Madhva explained the relation between God and the universe in terms of the Creator-created relation? Even the Absolutists do not seriously hold that Brahman Itself has manifested Itself in the evolution of the Cosmos. Such a doctrine will contradict the Sruti "Nirvikaram-nishkriyam" etc. The doctrine of Brahman evolving as the universe (Parinamyupadana) has been abandoned by the Absolutists themselves. They maintain the doctrine of Brahman appearing as the Cosmos somehow. They hold to the doctrine that Brahman the Only Reality, appears as the Cosmos and Cosmic multiplicity of a lesser degree of reality. (Vivarta-vada). There is surely an element of unintelligibility or mystery in Brahman being mistaken as the Cosmos and cosmic plurality. Influential Absolutistic writers have cited only the analogy of a rope appearing as a snake. The fault is neither that of the rope nor of the snake. The fault is to be traced to the percipient subject. Even he is not entirely to blame. Conditions of normal perception, and the perceptual rapprochement would seem to be clearly wanting. Analogies may not run on all fours. One is entitled to expect that analogy should apply at least in essential and fundamental particulars. Sensory data are wrongly interpreted in the snake-rope illusion. Brahman is not accessible in that manner. There should be some agent or subject different from and over against the rope-situation sensory data of which are erroneously interpreted as appearance of snake. According to the doctrine of Absolutism, however, there is a fundamental difference between illusions with which we ordinarily come across and the illusion of the Cosmos; the knowing, feeling, and willing, or in other words, the Illusioning subject himself is an appearance, of Brahman, or Brahman itself. If this be a satisfactory relation of the world and God, cannot Madhva's account based on the explicit and unequivocal language of the Upanishads and the Vedanta Sutas of the said relation expressed in terms of Creator and the Created pass muster and be accepted? It has been already pointed out by Madhva that nowhere it is possible to come across illusions unless one admits two reals. If one should contend that the cosmic illusion is a host in itself and deserves to be placed in a special category by itself, the *onus probandi* lies on the Absolutist himself. Till satisfactory proof is forthcoming, Madhva is entitled to maintain that the "Vivarta-Vada" remains metaphysically unsubstantiated. So far the Absolutist had failed satisfactorily to account for the relation between God and the world. What is the point

then, in accusing poor Madhva with an air of Omniscience of failure to have explained adequately the relation between God and the universe? It is no good to urge that the definition given by the author of the Vedanta Sūtras of Brahman relates only to the Brahman of a lower status, and not to the Absolute itself. In other words the definition refers only to the Saguna Brahman. Such a contention is absolutely pointless as the difference between Saguna, and the Nirguna-Brahmans, the qualitiful-lower-status-Brahman and the qualityless Absolute is merely an unsubstantiated and unproved doctrine as good philosophically as the opposite one of only one Brahman being regarded as the Creator of the Cosmos, with this difference, rather disconcerting to the Absolutist, that while the latter view has the sanction and support of the language of the Upanishads and the Vedanta Sūtras, the former has not. It will thus be seen that at the slightest touch of critical analysis the objection that Madhva has not adequately explained the relation between God and the Universe vanishes after the fashion of galvanised trivialities. To put the matter direct, if there could be nothing impossible in Brahman Somehow appearing as the Cosmos, appearing too as sentient fractions of the Cosmos who themselves are percipients of and victims of the said illusionistic appearance, there could be nothing impossible either in Madhva's explanation of the relation between God and the Universe, in terms of the Creator-created relation, an explanation grounded on the solid and substantial foundation of the explicit and unequivocal language of the Upanishads and the Vedanta Sūtras. (36)

### XXXVI

Another amusing charge is that all pluralistic systems of speculation owe their origin to the interference of religious prejudice with philosophical thinking. Madhva's pluralistic system is no exception to the rule. The charge is a colossal begging of the question. It yet remains to be demonstrated on the lines of orthodox debate conducted with an eye on the interpretation of the sacred texts, that Absolutism is the only fashionable philosophy of life. The charge that all pluralistic systems are aberrations due to the interference of religious prejudice with genuine philosophic speculation is an adroit legerdemain. Whatever may be the state of affairs in Europe and America, it is common knowledge that in India at least Six systems of thought are prominent at the present day, not to speak of others. The Nyaya claims that the genuine spirit of speculation is its own. The Vaisesika follows suit. The Sankhya is not a bit behind the Nyaya-vaisheshika in advancing claims of its own to the effect that genuine speculation is its monopoly.

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(36) The difficulty of adequately explaining the relation between God and the Universe is not peculiar to Madhva's system of thought. Madhva has got over the difficulty more efficiently and successfully than others. See Kantakodhara. The Attributeless Absolute is eternally inaccessible to the Pramāṇas. "Vedantanam-upakramadina-saguna-Brahma-paratvaavasayat-Pramanamatrasya-visishtartha-pratyayatva-svabhavyat."

Yoga presses similar claims on its behalf. The Purvameemamsa has a philosophy of its own submerged under its main concern with ritualism. The Vedanta, with its ramifications into Advaita, Visishtadvaita, and Dvaita claims that the spirit of genuine metaphysical speculation has been monopolised by it. There is absolutely no agency human or divine which would prevent Buddhism and Jainism from advancing a like claim.

It is a matter for wonder how anyone with a sense of the unbroken continuity of historical traditions in the evolution of "Indian Philosophy," can have the temerity to proclaim the dogmatism that the origin of Pluralistic systems is to be discerned in religious prejudice. There is no love lost between Sankhya and Religion. Religion and religious prejudice have not at all interfered with the speculative construction of the system of Sankhya which is Realistic and Pluralistic *par excellence*. Religion is not ritualism. The essence of religion is an attitude of dependence on God. The Sankhya system does not worry itself with any such dependence on God. Nor does Jainism for the matter of that. Yet, even though religious prejudice has not arrested their metaphysical speculation, they have built up Pluralistic and Realistic systems of thought. How has that been possible?

The truth of the matter seems to be this. Anything is good enough to belabour a particular animal with. The same animal may often be christened with a bad name as a preliminary to its being hanged. A system of philosophy is said to be pluralistic and its pluralism is explained as being due to the interference of religious prejudice with the spirit of genuine speculation. Then it is hanged!! It is time a protest was emphatically recorded against this intolerable bureaucracy of Absolutism in Indian Philosophy. Genuine speculation or the spirit of it is not the chartered monopoly of the Absolutist or Absolutism, and that wonderful genuine spirit of speculation may lead to the conclusion of Pluralism or Monism, Realism or Idealism, Nihilism or Illusionism, and the Pathological self-complacence which makes one believe that Pluralistic systems spring up the moment metaphysical speculation is gagged by religious prejudice is pathetic in the extreme. It is perfectly in the fitness of things to maintain that all Absolutistic systems owe their origin to the interference of the complete absence of religion with the spirit of genuine philosophic speculation. If the interfering factor is to be stated in positive terms it may be described to be hatred of religion! Otherwise, it is impossible to explain the origin of absolutistic systems. Bradley triumphantly proclaimed "Morality" to be mere appearance. Sankara maintained that the "Varnasrama-Dharma" is appearance—Adhyasta. One ignorant of the traditions of Indian Philosophy alone would venture to adumbrate a comment like that. Sankara

is justified, while Bradley is not. Sankara wants Religion, Morality, and similar values as preparatory to the realisation of the ultimate Oneness of Existence. In India religion is indispensable. It is simply attitude of devotional prayer or prayerful devotion to the Supreme Lord—the Author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos. Dualists and Pluralists claim that the Supreme Overlord is the highest, and the Most Exalted. Absolutists and Monists contend that the Lord who is worshipped is only the Saguna-Brahman, and that as a result of that worship one may expect to reach something more enduring and fundamental. Whatever may be the state of affairs in European Philosophy, in Indian thought, religion, religious zeal, and religious prejudice. if you please, *are by no means the monopoly of Pluralistic systems.* Monists systems and Absolutistic systems have their own religion, religious zeal and religious prejudices. That is inevitable.

The charge that Pluralistic systems owe their origin to the interference of religion with genuine philosophical speculation, is unsustainable and the attitude of a writer who appears to hold that Monistic Absolutism is the only fashionable philosophy or world-view is wrong lock, stock, and barrel. What is this wonderful genuine metaphysical speculation? It is systematic inquiry into the origin, constitution, and the destiny of the world, or the universe. Or it is Brahma-jignyasa, inquiry into the nature of Brahman. Both involve one another and are complementary. That inquiry can be undertaken irrespective of any considerations of religion. Religion or no religion, such an investigation is in order. It is bound to be undertaken by the thinking section of humanity. If it is not undertaken by humanity engrossed too deeply in the pursuit of mundane pleasures, let it not. Others are bound to be interested in investigations of the problems of Philosophy. What has religious prejudice to do with all this? It was pointed out that in India Monistic and Pluralistic systems have inseparable alliance with religion. The remark, therefore, that Pluralistic systems owe their origin to genuine metaphysical speculation being gagged by religious prejudice is pointless, and due to palpable confusion of thought.

May not one argue proceeding on similar lines, that the genuine spirit of religion and pure love of religion, were gagged by metaphysical prejudices, and predilections, and that the Absolutistic systems all owe their origin to the genuine spirit of religion having been gagged by metaphysical prejudices? There is absolutely nothing illogical or untenable in an argument like that. Critics do not succeed in silencing opposition by mutual retorts when they are all in the same boat. By all means criticise this or that school on genuine philosophical grounds. There is no universal law that (1) Absolutism is the only civilised or fashionable world view, nor is there any (2) that all pluralistic systems

are alien to genuine metaphysical speculation. The position of Madhva is that Religion and Metaphysics emphasize two aspects of the same problem. Religion and metaphysics reinforce one another. Metaphysics, according to Indian traditions, is just an inquiry into the nature of Brahman with a view to realisation of Divine Immanence. Religion is only the attitude of Devotional Prayer or Prayerful Devotion to Brahman. If this be borne in mind, there will be no difficulty, other than prejudice and ignorance, in realising that Madhva's Pluralistic Universe will readily accommodate Religion and Metaphysics, and do the fullest justice to the claims of both. In fact, such accommodation and justice are logically available only in Madhva's Pluralistic Universe.

### XXXVII

Madhva's Pluralistic Universe has been criticised by some on the ground that the Acharya relies for supporting it, more on the Epics, Puranas, and Smritis and the like, than on the Upanishads and the Sutras. The criticism is ill-informed. As explained in an earlier section, Madhva has developed his system of Madhva is that Religion and Metaphysics emphasize two aspects philosophy, on the basis of the three well-known textual points of departure, the Upanishads, the Brahma Sutras, and the Gita, known technically as "Prasthanatraya". It has also been pointed out that the scriptural texts proclaiming difference between the finite and the Infinite have the support of the six famous canons of interpretation laid down by the Purvamamamsa. (Shat-tatparyalingas.) I wonder what more the critics want. It goes without saying that each system-builder will choose his own convenient texts and will have to re-interpret texts that are not favourable to him. Madhva has indicated in the "Kathalakshana" how this is to be accomplished. (37). To a like criticism urged against Madhva by Appayya Dikshita, Vijayindra Tirtha has fully and convincingly replied. Appayya Dikshita certainly will not have been so ill-informed and ignorant as contemporary critics of Madhva. He has accused Madhva of having quoted in his works Sruti texts that could not be found in the known Srutis. Vijayindra Tirtha in replying cited instances from the works of Sankara, Ramanuja, and Srikantha of unknown and unidentified Sruti texts having been quoted. If one can tolerate a single unknown Sruti, there is no reason why more than one could not be accepted. Further, the authors of ritualistic works, like the Kalpa-Sutra-Karas, have cited only largely from the Khila-Sruti, i.e., Sruti texts which are in the nature of supplements to the regular stock of orthodox Srutis. Such citations are accepted without dispute by all. Then why not admit the texts cited by Madhva as well? Vijayindra Tirtha asks—"Do you say that there are no such supplemental Sruti texts at all? Or do you contend that

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(37) Vide discussion in Chapter IX.

those cited by Madhva are unreliable and unacceptable?" It cannot be the former obviously, as supplemental Srutis have been cited by others like the authors of the Kalpasutras. As you accept them, Madhva's citations as well have to be accepted. Nor could it be the latter. The contention that only the citations made by Madhva are unacceptable, and not those of the Kalpasutra-karas, is clearly prejudiced. Vijayindra Tirtha maintains that the intrinsic value and philosophical satisfyingness of Madhva's Pluralistic Universe will not suffer in any way by the adumbration of such criticisms. Either be a wholehogger and reject all citations from the Khila-texts, the supplemental Srutis. Or accept the validity of those cited by Madhva as well. There is no special reason why the citations of the Kalpasutra-karas should be accepted and those of Madhva rejected, other than prejudice!! The Absolutist has not been able to lay down criteria to mark off the Principal from the supplemental Srutis. Many of the latter are cited by the authors of the "Kalpa-sutras". It is too palpably absurd to contend that the supplemental sacred texts cited by Madhva alone should be rejected and not those cited by others. (38).

There is a well-known dictum that the truths proclaimed by the Veda and the Upanishads should be grounded on the corroborative testimony of the texts of the Puranas, and the Epics. "Itihasa-puranabhyam-vedam-samupabrimhayet." Madhva true to the traditions embodied in the dictum has quoted in his works authoritatively from the Epics and the Puranas.

That Madhva relies more on the Puranas is an expression of individual opinion as much entitled to respect as that of an uncritical schoolboy. The Acharya's interpretation of the Upanishads is there; there is his commentary on the Gita; and there is the vast mass of literature contributed by Madhva and his commentators centering round the "Vedanta Sutras". These authoritative works do support the Dualistic metaphysics and the Pluralistic Universe of Madhva. On the contrary, it is the Absolutist who cannot interpret the texts in favour of Absolutism. Identity between the finite and the Infinite is nowhere expressed or implied in the "Sutras". In the definition of Brahman contained in the second aphorism, there is absolutely no trace of any Monism. The Universe is definitely said to have been created by Brahman. Brahman is its preserver. Brahman would end it in due time. Monism must feel helpless to twist the second sutra and make it support an Absolutistic interpretation. It is not playing the game of philosophy if one should contend that the Brahman mentioned is only the Saguna-Brahman of a lower degree or

(38) To critics ancient and modern Vijayindra has given an effective answer. "Pathyamana-sruti-vyatirekena-khilasrutaya-eva-na-santi-iti-tvad bhiprayah-Kimva-asamadacharyodahritah - ta-na-santi-iti. Kalpasutrakarairanyabhashyakaraih - tathavidhasruteenamudahritatvat - Kalpasutravyakhyaatri-bhistatratara-khilakhilasrutivibhagasya-pradarsitatvat," etc. Kantakōd dhāra.



reality. The existence of the Attributeless Brahman will have to be demonstrated independently on the basis of philosophical arguments. Indian philosophical debates should proceed on *Pramanas*. No *Pramana* supports the existence of an Attributeless Brahman. Madhva has elaborately argued in his "Tatvanirnaya" and elsewhere, that identity between the finite and the Infinite has no sanction of the Upanishadic texts. The comment that it is not easy for Madhva to interpret the texts in the interests of his dualistic metaphysics in schoolboyish. It is of profound importance to note that in his commentary on the Sutra "Ekshaternasabdam" Sankara remarks that passages that trace the universe to the authorship of Brahman may be interpreted to refer to the "Prakriti" of the Sankhya—the Cosmic root! Yet, in the light of and on the strength of the term "Aikshata" in the texts, meaning intelligence on the part of the creator, the Sankhyan contention stands repudiated. If so, it will not be difficult for Madhva, and it has not been so in fact, to interpret the Sutras of Badarayana in favour of his dualistic metaphysics, in the light of and on the strength of the term "Brahman" which connotes fullness of attributes, and the second aphorism which proclaims the creation, etc., of the cosmos by Brahman. Neither the fullness of attributes nor the creatorship of the Cosmos has by any authority been considered to be the property of the finite. Difference between the finite and the Infinite is thus inevitable on the strength of the internal evidence supplied by the Sutras. Madhva's alleged placing of greater reliance on the Puranas than on the Upanishads, Sutras, and the Gita, and the remark of a critic that it is not easy for Madhva to interpret the latter in the interests of his dualistic metaphysics are matters merely of individual opinion formed on the basis of absolutely inadequate or incomplete acquaintance with the works of the Acharya and those of his commentators and champions. As in these days of decadent philosophical fairness and impartiality *tu quoque* arguments have their own value, one may as well contend with better reason,—that it is not easy for the Absolutists to interpret the Sutras, the Gita and the Upanishads, in the interests of their Monistic metaphysics.

### XXXVIII

A critic of Madhva observes that the fact of knowledge leads one to an organic conception of the world, but that it does not justify the division of the world into God, souls, and objects externally related to one another. One would naturally hesitate to halloo before he is out of the woods. What does the fact of knowledge prove? What is knowledge? Madhva has definitely stated in his "Tatvanirnaya" and "Anuvyakhyana" and others have repeated and reinforced the statement that knowledge

eternally implies, knower and known. (39). Reality is by no means mental construction. External relations are logically as valid as the internal ones. While one exclaims that senses deceive us, another believes that they do not. Senses are the gateways of knowledge. The critic forgets that according to the "Vedanta Sūtras" God creates the world, and it is absurd to divide the world into God, soul, etc. God is not a part of the world to be admitted into the division. On the other hand, the entire universe and many universes have been created by God. And Madhva will never allow that God is to be taken as part of the world. Madhva never divided the world like that and never included God as a member of the division. The critic should note that he is attributing to Madhva something which the Acharya never said. God—Vishnu—is Sarvottama, the Supremest, and He can never be a part of the world.

As to why God creates the world, we have no information. We cannot get any inkling into Divine Will and Pleasure. But the author of the "Vedanta Sūtras" has anticipated some of the objections urged by modern critics, in the aphorism, "Lokavattu-leela-kaivalyam", and answered that creation, destruction, etc., would all seem to be Divine Sport or Play. It does not mean any want or fulfilment thereof in God, and God's perfection, Omnipotence, and Omniscience are not in any way affected or compromised by such Play or Sporting.

One would like to know how the Absolutist explains the phenomenon of creation. How does he explain divine perfection? Until an answer is forthcoming there is nothing illogical in Madhva's account of the relation between God and the world which is the same as that contained in the "Vedanta Sūtras." How can God be regarded as supreme perfection on the Absolutistic view? If the Absolute be Supreme perfection or endowed with supreme perfection, how did it pluralise itself into finite creation riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies? *It is no answer that finite creation is mere appearance.* There can be no appearance anywhere according to Madhva unless TWO realities are admitted. "Satya-vastu-dvayam-vina-na-kvapi—etc." Knowledge is *sui generis*. It cannot be explained in terms of something else. Its character does not disturb the dualism of Madhva. Utter the term knowledge, you affirm thereby willy-nilly, knower and known. What is described by Lord Haldane to be foundational knowledge, has reference to something that is not knowledge and something that is known. There is thus no difficulty insuperable, in Madhva's account of the relation between God and the world. It transcends the Cartesian Dualism, in maintaining Knowledge

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(39) Anuvyakhyana" P. 61. "Na-jnyeya-jnyatri-heenamhi-jnyanam-nama-kvachitbhavet-jnyeya-jnyana-viheenascha - jnya-ityatranacha -prama-etc." "Nacha-jnyatri-jnyeya-rahitam-jnyanam-kvapi-drishtam." P. 17.

to be *sui generis* and in maintaining as well that the foundational knowledge has an inalienable reference to something which is not knowledge. Whatever may have been the subsequent manipulations made by the Absolutistic commentators and authors, the "Vedanta Sutras" are unequivocal and emphatic in the view that creation, destruction, etc., of the cosmos will have to be considered as Divine play and will not mean any loss of perfection, Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc., of the Deity.

### XXXIX

The same critic observes that "a dualism makes the independence of God impossible." One would have thought that the independence of God was quite safe on the view that the world is created by God, and that the finite is under the sway of the Infinite. God surely does not depend upon the finite for the working out of HIS DESTINY. On the other hand, the characteristic of finitude is dependence on God. The latter is "svatantra"—independent. The finite is "para-tantra"—dependent. It is news in the metaphysical world to be told that a dualism makes the independence of God impossible. Why? Dose the critic mean to suggest that the finite having been brought into existence, preserved and protected, straightway proceeds to wage war against God and undermine His Independence? Is the finite engaged in any conspiracy to undermine the authority of the Infinite? How does Monism or Absolutism guarantee the independence of God? If the Absolute is the only Reality, why should there be the multiplicity? *It is no answer that the latter is mere appearance.* Madhva's contention still stands unrepudiated that there can be no appearance unless one admits TWO realities. That is a conclusion hardly palatable to Monism or Absolutism. If it is philosophically possible to guarantee and maintain the independence of God on the Absolutistic hypothesis, it is not clear why there should suddenly crop up any impossibility of maintaining or explaining the said independence on a dualistic hypothesis. In his "Tatva samkhyana" Madhva has clearly explained that God's independence is His inalienable attribute. But then, the reality possessed by the finite, the para-tantra, the dependent is the same as that possessed by God. X and Y may be dependent upon Z, which is Independent. It does not follow that the former are any the less real than the latter. Dependence cannot be equated to appearance, and Independence to Reality. It has been argued by Madhva and the authors of many of the works mentioned in an earlier chapter that the reality possessed by finite creation is "Paramarthika"—of the same degree as reality possessed by the Absolute or Brahman

There is a confusion of thought displayed by the critic. Reality is not the same as substantiality. In the highest sense God

is the only substance—self-determined. Finite creation is other-determined. Well and good. If one agrees to apply the term “substance” *a la* Spinoza only to God, the finite may not be substance in that sense, but, the finite will nonetheless be as real as the Substance. Madhva urges that substantiality be kept separate from reality. It is not difficult to see that substantiality is equated to Independence. The equation between reality and substantiality is untenable. The dependent, and the Independent, the finite and the Infinite are equally real, or have the same degree of reality. Be it noted then, that God’s independence stands on the safest and the securest foundations according to Madhva’s dualism. Such a doctrine has the fullest support of the “Vedanta Sutras” which affirm the creatorship of God in reference to the cosmos. It is in terms of the creatorship of the Cosmos that the definition of Brahman is formulated by the author of the “Vedanta Sutras”. The universe does not in any manner limit the nature and the sway of Brahman. At any rate, the nature of the dependence of the world on God in Madhva’s Pluralistic Universe is certainly not more mysterious or incomprehensible than in the scheme of Absolutism.

The same difficulties and objections would be in order when an attempt is made in the Absolutistic Universe, or the Monistic Universe to render intelligible the relation between God or the Absolute and the appearance of the universe. The difference, though fundamental, between the Monistic and the Pluralistic Universes is just this—instead of appearance of the Universe, in the language of Absolutists, Madhva would substitute “reality.” If the Absolute is somehow related to the appearance of the universe, in the terminology of Absolutism, Brahman is co-eternal with the appearance. If Brahman is co-eternal with the appearance what is the relation between the two? It is an interesting exercise in the application of the “Intelligence Tests” if one is asked to substitute in the critical reflections on Madhva referred to, the term “Absolute” for Brahman, and “appearance of the world” for the world. The reflections will admirably apply sentence by sentence to Absolutism as well. That would show the real difficulty that there is in any world-view of explaining the relation between the world and God. A patronising and self-complacent attitude and the comment that one feels a difficulty specially in Madhva’s account of the relation between the world and God betray only a rank bias. A balanced critical mentality or evaluatory attitude, cannot exist side by side with such a rank bias.

## XL

Perhaps the most ill-informed criticism urged against Madhva’s Pluralistic Universe is that the theory of election is fraught with great danger to Ethical life. Madhva has suggested a three-fold division of humanity into “Mukti-yogas”, “Nitya-samsaris” and

"Tamo-Yogyas", those eligible for full and final emancipation from the ills of a series of births and deaths, those that are eternally doomed to life-series, going round and round in the phantasmagoria of metempsychosis, and those that are condemned to eternal damnation. He who has eyes to see will readily perceive that a doctrine like this is based on the theory of the three gunas which is the mainstay of the Sankhya thought. Analyse the conditions of society at any stage of its evolution. Observe the behaviour of humanity. You will find that three classes are noted. Some have their attention God-ward. Others have theirs Satan-ward. Yet others, direct theirs neither God-ward nor Satan-ward. Consider individuals X—Y—Z. From the data gathered from their life and behaviour one is entitled to judge whether or not they be eligible for realising an exalted spiritual destiny. That there are the three classes is a mere doctrine. After the cultivation of intimate acquaintance with it, individuals are free to make or mar their destiny. Suppose one reads an account of Madhva's doctrine of three types of spirits, why should he straightway imagine that he is doomed to eternal damnation and embark on a career of crime? He may as well soothe himself in the hope that he is perfectly eligible to come face to face with God, gird up his spiritual loins and win the race. The eligibility is to be determined by the sweet Will and Pleasure of the Lord and that it is so is mentioned definitely in the scriptural texts—like "Yamevaishavrinute-tena-labhyah." Where is the danger to Ethical life in Madhva's doctrine? On the contrary, a little dispassionate consideration will convince even the most consistent and determined critic of Madhva, that the three-fold division of humanity when rightly viewed is bound to act as a powerful incentive to beneficent, constructive moral and spiritual endeavour. The crux of the question is this. Spot out a random individual. According to Madhva, he is either eligible to secure final and complete emancipation, or obliged to revolve round and round in the cycles of births and deaths, or is destined to be consigned to eternal Hell. If one reads an account like this, why should he straightway conclude that he is not eligible to be finally and completely emancipated? He need not. He can as well make up his mind that he is bound to be fully and finally emancipated sooner or later, and commence moral and spiritual work in right earnest. Spiritual possibilities and potentialities are certainly admitted by Madhva, but neither science nor philosophy would guarantee that all possibilities and potentialities are bound to concretise into actualities. They may not.

The danger to Ethics on Absolutistic grounds is obvious. Does not the self which now works out its career, albeit on a plane of lower degree of reality, stand for a factual identity between itself and the Absolute? The factual identity maintained as the fundamental plank of Absolutism creates further difficulties.

The fall of man becomes inexplicable. It is pointless to contend that there has been no fall at all. If indeed there has not been a fall, and if the identity is the foundational fact, evil and imperfection, sin and failure cannot be explained at all. *It is not a valid argument that all is mere appearance.* Absolutism proves doubly deficient. It is not able to account for the appearance of finitisation and pluralisation of the One Fundamental Reality of the Absolute. Secondly, if the identity be factual, there is no need for a realisation of it. If it is urged that its mere factual existence will not philosophically suffice and that its realisation is the goal, factors that have proved successful to the extent of obscuring the identity will have to be admitted as realities. In the absence of the admission of those factors, it cannot be explained why the factual identity should have been obscured at all.

If the critic finds or sees no difficulty in maintaining that Absolutism is no danger to ethical life, Madhva's dualism and pluralism, he may see if he chooses to, are no danger too. Freedom is the property of the Absolute, the One Real. (The finite selves which are appearances can have only appearance of freedom. I wonder how the critic of Madhva believes that Absolutism guarantees freedom.) The Absolutistic scheme is predestinarian. Identity between the finite and the Infinite is foundational and factual from eternity to eternity. Why was freedom first lost and was the loss a preventable one? On the Absolutistic metaphysics Paradise could never have been lost! If Paradise was not or had not been lost, the question of Paradise Regained does not arise. Endeavour to realise something has no meaning. There was no loss. There could be no regaining or gaining something. Where then is the need for freedom and endeavour? Kettle may not malign the pot. That the Absolutistic scheme can never be libertarian is obvious. The finite has no reality, no destiny, no individuality, in fact nothing but appearance. Its reality is that of the Absolute. Its destiny is that of the Absolute. Its individuality is that of the Absolute. Yet, the Absolute is attributeless. Identity between the Absolute and the finite is factual and foundational. The identity is surely no gift from any external agent. There is no need for earning the good-will and grace of anybody. On the basis of such Absolutistic doctrines, I wonder how a libertarian scheme can be constructed, as against the predestinarian one of Madhva. The doctrine of "election" is intended only to whip dullards and sluggards into spiritual activity and the danger to ethical life scented by some critics in Madhva's theory is due to an obvious nervous apprehension psychopathological in origin.

## XLI

The critic proceeds to observe that "Individual effort loses point, since whether one believes oneself to be the elect or the

non-elect, one is bound to lapse into indifferentism and apathy." To put it very mildly, this charge against Madhva's doctrine of "election" must have been engendered only by a terrible confusion of thought. Granting that indifferentism and apathy would result if one believes himself to be one of the non-elect, how could they if one believed himself to be one of the elect? Apathy, indifferentism, defiance, tendencies to anti-social and anti-spiritual activity, would result inevitably on the Absolutistic doctrine. The King can do no wrong. The Absolute can do none either. The factual identity between the finite and the Absolute or the Infinite means that the former can do no wrong. On the Absolutistic doctrine, where is the individual effort that gains its point?

If a person believes himself to be one of the elect,—and there is absolutely nothing to prevent this belief except his own guilty conscience, Karmic Law and the Will of God about the precise courses of the latter two, finite beings can have no knowledge—he will not be apathetic or indifferent. He will gird up his spiritual loins, redouble his efforts and win in the end his rewards. Madhva exhorts everyone to believe by placing before humanity the division of society in question, that he may be elect and put forth moral and spiritual effort. Why should one be so lacking in self-confidence as not to believe that some exalted spiritual destiny is in store for him? No individual or community lacking in self-confidence can achieve anything really great and useful.

In Madhva's pluralistic universe there is at least this alternative that one is called upon to place firm faith in his spiritual destiny, work out his future, and be an architect of his own fate, but there is no such alternative in the Absolutistic scheme. Foundational identity between the finite and the infinite is factual. The destiny of identity is not one to be secured or worked out by anybody's effort. It is already there. If on this Absolutistic metaphysic, Madhva's critic manages to convince himself and others that individual effort gains its point, what difficulty could he possibly experience in seeing that individual effort is assigned the foremost place in Madhva's pluralistic universe, as God's Grace has to be earned by living a spotless life and dedicating one's powers and energy to serving the interests of God's creatures?

While identity with the Absolute is factual and shared by the finite at all times, God's Grace has to be won and secured. How can that be won without effort and endeavour? The fullest justification for individual effort can be found only in Madhva's Pluralistic Universe, as Divine Grace is to be won and secured without which self-realisation and the uninterrupted enjoyment of one's spiritual bliss in the state of final emancipation are impossible.

As a matter of democratic doctrine every American youth is entitled to occupy the White House if he works for the attainment of that position. There are surely others technically disqualified for the office. The democratic doctrine will serve as a powerful incentive to activity. If one has a chance for it, why not work for it? Of course analogies do not run on all fours. Roughly if one believes himself to be one of the elect, there is no reason why he will not put forth added vigour and endeavour to realise his spiritual ambition. If he does not believe himself to be one of the elect, he alone is to blame for it. Even then, he may believe himself to be one of those destined to a perpetual life in Samsara—transmigratory cycle. He will put forth effort and pray to God to make life one of service to his fellowmen. One thing is certain. No one will believe himself to be destined to be thrown in eternal Hell and let himself go on a career of unmitigated crime.

The critic of Madhva appears to have been carried away by juvenile fascination for a formal dilemma. If X is one of the elect, he will get salvation, and his effort is superfluous or needless. If X is not one of the elect, he will not get salvation and his effort is superfluous or needless, or "loses its point" in the language of the critic. In any case, his effort is useless or loses its point. Escape through the horns of this apparent dilemma and its complete refutation can be worked out by any college boy, and the arraignment of Madhva on the basis of this dilemma looks ridiculous.

The difficulty is this. We do not know what our destiny is. We have no knowledge of the direction in which our past Karma is driving us. Why should one postulate that he is destined for eternal damnation? No one would. Every individual is at perfect liberty to believe that he is one of the elect, mould, determine, and regulate his life accordingly. Madhva exhorts all to do that. In that delightful little work "Dvadasa Stotra" Madhva exhorts people to devote themselves to a pursuit of their duties, secular and spiritual, in a spirit of devotional submission to the Lord. "Kuru-bhunkshva-cha-karma-nijam-niyatam-haripadavinamradhiya-satatam, etc." (40) The eligibility for final emancipation is to be determined by the Supreme Lord. "Yamevaisha-vrinute-tena-labhyah."

Indifferentism and apathy are sure to spring up, sure as day succeeds night, only on the Absolutistic world-view. With a scripture-engendered knowledge that the finite is factually identical with the Absolute, and with the knowledge that morality and religion, doctrine and conduct, Deity and Devotee, are all in the realm of appearance, indifferentism and apathy cannot



but inevitably overtake one, and if notwithstanding such knowledge one can put forth effort to work out his destiny, there is no reason why one may not or will not put forth effort notwithstanding knowledge of Madhva's scheme of "election." On the contrary, as pointed out in the previous paragraphs, knowledge of the theory of election will act as a powerful incentive to the putting forth by an individual of the maximum of his spiritual effort.

The critic remarks "If we do not know what we are destined for, we may work on to purify ourselves." That is exactly the position of Madhva. The finite individuals do not know what they are destined for. The evolution and the unfolding of their destinies according to the operations of Karmic law, are strictly hidden from their view, and in the absence of a knowledge of their destinies, there is absolutely nothing to prevent them to work on to purify themselves. Madhva's doctrine is theoretical and is grounded on the doctrine of the Gunas manfully maintained by the Sankhya. The theory is not a dogmatism that X or Y or Z is or is not elect. The doctrine is emphasized only with a view to people being taught the acute need that there is for introspection and searchings of heart. The doctrine does not encourage self-complacency. It condemns metaphysical lotus-eating and acts as a powerful stimulus to honest and fearless work.

The critic of Madhva has a warm corner in his heart for Absolutism. Where is the need for any purification according to orthodox interpretations of Absolutism? Why should we work on to purify ourselves when dirt and impurities, metaphysical, of course are all mere appearance? Will any one work on for the removal of dirt that there is not? On the Philosophic bases of Absolutism, the alternative of our not knowing our destiny is disingenuous. Our destiny is already known. He who runs may read it writ large on the forehead of humanity. The destiny is there. It is factual identity between the finite and the Infinite. That the destiny is there is known to any one who dabbles in metaphysics. Even the merest tyro in philosophy knows what the destiny of humanity is according to Absolutism. The individual shares the Absolutism of the Absolute. Where is the need to work on with a view to purification? The critic makes the sapient remark "In the absence of knowledge we may at least have hope." By all means do. Madhva does not shatter anybody's hopes. On the other hand, the Acharya encourages and fosters hope in the exalted spiritual destiny of humanity.

## XLII

The critic makes the astounding remark that according to the theory of "election" and the predestinarian scheme of

thought championed by Madhva, "The moral character of God is much compromised, and the qualities of divine justice and divine love are emptied of all meaning and value." In the name of metaphysical goodness, why? Is the moral character of God maintained in all its integrity without being compromised on the Absolutistic world-view? Has God any character at all according to Absolutism?—let alone moral character. According to traditional methods of metaphysical debate, a critic is at perfect liberty to find fault with the system of his opponent, but, he is at the same time expected to offer something better. Granting for the sake of argument that the moral character of God in Madhva's philosophy is much compromised as alleged by the critic, is the moral character of God any the better in the Absolutistic scheme? Is the critic entitled at all to speak of the moral character of God? The moral character of God is the moral character of the finite. Is there any place for divine love and justice in the Absolutistic theory of non-election? That there is place *sub specie temporis* is no answer. Divine love and justice cannot but be mere mockeries on the Absolutistic world-view. That everything can be justified by pressing into service the duality of stand-points—*sub specie temporis* and *sub specie aeternitatis* and that other systems can be freely criticised would be seen to be vain hopes. No one is in need of any divine love or justice according to Absolutism. There is the fundamental and foundational identity between the finite and the Infinite. The identity is factual. That is the only fact. That is the only Reality. Let God reserve to himself his love and justice. Man is not in need of them at all. Man and God get lost in the Absolute. What is the intellectual or the metaphysical grace with which the critic can speak of the moral character of God being compromised on Madhva's view of election? Where is the place for the exercising of Divine Justice, when all inequalities, conflicts, incompatibilities, in experience are *mere appearance*? The Absolute does not worry itself with love, justice, grace, and so forth. One may not be surprised if the Absolute commences fiddling when the cosmos is caught up in roaring flames of destruction. *The latter is mere appearance*. And fiddling? It is amusing to see the critic slinging mud at the system of Madhva from the stand-point of Absolutism which can have nothing to do whatever with the character of God, and indeed much less with the moral character of God. There is absolutely no use quoting the names of Vachaspati Misra and Madhavacharya who wrote on all the important systems as instances of philosophic impartiality or mental detachment, for the two authors did owe definite and unmistakable allegiance to the Monistic Absolutism of Sankara. The critic of Madhva does the same. If there is any system of philosophy in which the moral character of God is highly com-

grace is not required. That these are wanted *sub specie temporis* is a metaphysical technique. According to Absolutism "God exists for himself first and foremost and not for us merely." What is the moral character of God on this doctrine? One may tell you *ad nauseam* that God is all, the Whole, the Totality, the Absolute. How is the moral character of God maintained and conserved on the Absolutistic view?

Have divine justice and love meaning on the Absolutistic view? Do they retain their meaning and value? The critic who in countless contexts quotes Bradley with admiration and approbation as maintaining that the Absolute cannot be God does ill to accuse Madhva and adumbrate the criticism that on the view of "election" divine love and justice become emptied of all meaning and value. It is impossible to dogmatise as to who is elect and who is not. It is the duty of every individual to work for the attainment of the exalted spiritual destiny with firm belief that he is one of the elect. He will be the recipient of divine love and justice if he should succeed in qualifying himself for them. Madhva's doctrine of "election" not only vindicates freedom of the will, but counsels sincere introspection and searchings of heart at every stage of evolution. In any given world-order or social-order no one need intoxicate himself with the auto-suggestion or belief that he is not one of the elect, and embark on a career of unmitigated sin, but, he is at perfect liberty to believe that he is one of the elect and work for final emancipation.

### XLIII

The critic queries with almost infantile naivete—"Is not God playing a practical joke on us, when he implants in us a desire for heaven while making us unfit for it"? The answer is in an emphatic negative. If X—Y—Z are unfit for heaven, you may take it, desire for heaven is never implanted in them. If there is genuine desire for heaven, you may believe the desire is concomitant with eligibility. Moreover, God does not make us fit or unfit for heaven. We ourselves have the necessary freedom to make or mar our spiritual destiny. The freedom is delegated one. (Datta-svatantrya.) Does the Absolute not play a more astonishingly practical joke on us by Pluralising itself or finitising itself into the phenomenal multiplicity? The *Elan vital* played a practical joke when it submitted itself to be arrested by matter. The Absolute played a practical joke when it intrigued with Maya or Avidya to cause cosmic illusions. Students of philosophy are obliged to come out by the same door as in they went. A decision is indispensable or inevitable as to which is the greater practical joke. Is the practical joke played by the Absolute metaphysically amusing or metaphysically more amusing? Or the one played by the "Elan"? Or the one played by God in Madhva's pluralistic universe? Or the practical joke played by

the Spinozistic Substance? Or by the Kantian Thing-in-itself? If the critic can convince himself that "SOMEHOW" the playing of practical jokes is not in the line of the Absolute, he may without difficulty convince himself that Madhva's God is innocent of playing practical jokes. Absolutism reveals a plentiful crop of practical jokes. The phenomenal finitisation or pluralisation is a practical joke of the Absolute. Distinctions and differences are a practical joke. The appearance of moral values and distinctions is a practical joke. Religion is a practical joke. God is a practical joke. Other practical jokes can easily be imagined. When so many practical jokes are admitted or have to be admitted by the Absolutist, is it philosophic criticism to make a flamboyant reference to the practical joke played by Madhva's God?

Jokes practical and theoretical on the other hand appear to be the monopoly of the Absolute itself. It is the only reality. The only Reality plays a practical joke by SOMEHOW being responsible for the appearance of multiplicity and plurality. How? That is an illegitimate question according to the Absolutist. He says it and we have to accept it. Madhva has laid down strictly a law that appearances wherever discerned involve TWO realities. Without an active part played by TWO realities, there can never be any appearance. There is no reason why the Cosmic illusion should be an exception to the general behaviour of illusions. The illusionism of Absolutism without the operation of TWO reals is another practical joke. If, on the other hand TWO reals are to be admitted Absolutism is gone. Degrees of reality are another practical joke. Does the Absolute not play a practical joke by making the finite selves sin and suffer in an illusionistic cosmos? Are not effort and endeavour practical jokes when sin and suffering for the riddance of which endeavour and effort are required are mere appearance? While Absolutism gives a veritable banquet of practical jokes, is the critic of Madhva justified in his attempts to make out that God plays a practical joke on man, if the doctrine of "election" be true?

Religious consciousness is a practical joke according to Absolutism. That you and I are real each in his own right is a practical joke played by the Absolute. The point of the practical joke is subtle indeed. That each individual believes himself to be real is a practical joke. That the Absolute has SOMEHOW engendered illusionistic appearance of the cosmos is another practical joke. That for the riddance of illusion and error endeavour and effort which cannot be real in their own right have to be put forth is another practical joke. Absolutism is only another name for practical jokes GALORE. Sin and suffering are practical jokes. Virtue and enjoyment are practical jokes. Is it philosophically just or fair to accuse Madhva's God of playing a practical joke

on men on the basis of the doctrine of "election" when Absolutism that is hugged to his heart by the critic is nothing but a network of practical jokes?

#### XLIV

The critic observes that "we cannot have a really useful ethics" "unless we are in a position to believe in the spiritual possibilities of everyone who bears the human form divine." That is metaphysical thoroughness with a vengeance. Does the critic mean to deny spiritual possibilities of those who bear animal forms? That cannot be. We cannot have a really useful ethics unless we are in a position to believe in the spiritual possibilities of every sentient being. What exactly does the critic mean to convey? Ethical systems all the world over have something actively to do with evaluation of conduct in the light of certain norms or standards. Any violation of standards is looked upon as reprehensible conduct. Has any Ethical system been devised with a view to making any society in any age an assembly of saints? And have Ethical systems been constructed with a view to metamorphosis of sinners, criminals, and those devoted to pursuit of anti-social activity into saints and paragons of moral perfection? Ethical systems have been constructed and doctrines laid down so that those who care for moral conduct may profit by them. They are not intended to be forced down the throat of everyone. According to Indian traditions championed by Madhva, his commentators and supporters, moral life is to be lived and regulated in accordance with certain injunctions and commandments contained in the Sruti and Smriti. "Srutissmriti-hareraajnye—etc." The Sruti and the Smriti texts are commands of God Almighty. The commands have to be obeyed by genuine aspirants. It is indeed news that Ethical systems have to be or have been as a matter of fact devised with a view to the realisation of the spiritual possibilities of everyone who bears the human form divine. The dumb driven creatures too have their own spiritual possibilities. They should be developed and realised. There should be ethicisation of the entire cosmos. Madhva rightly maintains that all ethical doctrines and systems can do would be to indicate the way along which pilgrims to the kingdom of God have to journey. Whether the indications will be grasped and turned to advantage will depend. Great religious teachers of the world have only indicated a way of spiritual progress. They have not carried aspirants on their shoulders. You can take a horse to the lake or pond. You can never make it drink or force a quantity of water down its throat. If any system of philosophy is inclined to maintain that the indications of a way or ways to be followed by aspirants may not be grasped and turned to advantage by some, you have no right to condemn the Ethical system, championed by that school.

It is perfectly clear that there can be a very useful system of ethics according to the doctrine of "election" explained by Madhva. As emphasized before, the finite intellect of man is helpless to envisage the exact destiny of individuals. It may be that a given individual is entitled to rise to very high and exalted spiritual levels. There is the ethical system advocated by Madhva. Life is to be spent in devotional worship of God and service to fellowmen. All our acts, thoughts, deeds, and even our most intimate and private plans and projects are scrutinised and watched by God and our acts are to be performed with the clearest awareness that we are under the surveillance of the Supreme Ruler of the Cosmos—Sri Narayana. Devotional worship will gradually burn up the stock of past Karma, and the individual will in fullness of time earn Divine Grace. Suppose a body of doctrine is placed before a number of human beings, before a social order or community. Some will be impressed by it. Some may be lukewarm towards it. Yet others are sure to be openly antagonistic to it. The individuals will understand the ethical system in question, fashion and mould their conduct according to their inherent ability and capacity for spiritual life, progress and advancement. It is absurd to expect that all who become acquainted with a body of ethical doctrines will translate it into practical politics. Whether one believes or not in the spiritual possibility of all who bear the human and the animal forms divine and devilish, it is possible to have a highly significant and useful system of ethics. Each religious head, or a system-builder is at perfect liberty to popularise and emphasize a body of ethical doctrines, and it is for aspirants to study and profit by it. That some are bound to look askance at a given ethical system is to be expected in the nature of things and their fitness. The existence of professional liars does not invalidate the commandment "Speak the Truth." (Satyam-vada.) That some are as a matter of fact inveterate and congenital liars does not lessen the value of a system of ethics which lays especial emphasis on truth-telling. Authors of ethical systems are not bound to believe in the spiritual possibilities of every Tom, Dick, and Harry, every one who bears the human form divine. Madhva's doctrine of "election" which only points to a division of society on the basis of the three Gunas of the Sankhyas, is perfectly compatible with a highly significant and very useful system of ethics. Each individual is at the fullest liberty to imagine that he is one of the elect and try for the realisation of an exalted destiny girding up his spiritual loins. Let alone useful ethics. There is hardly any need for ethics at all on the showing of Absolutism. Ethics or no ethics, effort or no effort, there is from eternity to eternity the factual and foundational identity between the finite and the Infinite, in the light of which it would be impossible to maintain the rationality of any useful system of ethics. Unless it is adequately explained how the Absolute thought it worth

while to finitise itself, pluralise itself and give rise **SOMEHOW** to appearance of the Cosmos, there can be no useful ethics whatever. Why should one try and sweat for freedom when bondage is illusory? Why should one endeavour for emancipation when enmeshment is illusory? It is no answer to contend that **SOMEHOW**, the factual, fundamental and foundational identity is obscured and it not fully realised or realised at all on the finite level of existence. In that case, it becomes obligatory on the part of a philosopher to explain the nature of the obscuration and the nature of that which obscures. In other words the nature of ignorance is to be made clear if there should be a really useful ethics at all. How can ignorance touch the Absolute? It is on account of the impossibility of ignorance in any manner touching the Absolute, Absolutism stands repudiated. Madhva beautifully puts it elsewhere "Ajnyanabhavadeva-tanmatamakhilamapini-rakritam—etc." (41). Absolutism is repudiated on this one supreme ground of the impossibility of ignorance affecting the Absolute. If the critic can console himself that **SOMEHOW**, there can be very useful ethics in an Absolutistic scheme, that notwithstanding fundamental identity between the finite and the Infinite, sin and suffering have to be experienced, and that endeavour has to be put forth for their riddance, all on a level of unreality and phenomenality, he can feel no manner of difficulty in realising that Madhva's doctrine of "election" is quite compatible with a very useful system of ethics. Of course, there is the predilection that Absolutism is the only fashionable or civilised philosophy of life. It would certainly prevent the critic from realising that any day, and on the basis of any evaluation, ethical theory and practice have better foundation in a Pluralistic universe than in an Absolutistic one. Not mere foundation, they have a better justification or vindication from the standpoint of Pluralistic Theism.

Pursuit of ethical ideals implies want. Translation of the ethical doctrines into conduct removes the want. That must be the truth of the matter. On the Absolutistic world-view, it is inconceivable how any want could be felt at all. The Absolute cannot feel the want. If it did, it would cease to be the Absolute. Is it felt by the finite selves? They are mere appearances of the Absolute. The question of their feeling any want cannot be taken up until the question of the origination of the appearance of finite selves has been fully dealt with. When the origination of the appearance and the finitisation of the Absolute have not been explained, it is absurd to speculate on the finite selves feeling any want and undergoing spiritual and ethical training for its riddance. Yet, the critic is convinced that there can be a very useful system of ethics according to Absolutism. Then

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(41) "Mayavada-Khandana," P. 2.

let him at least be charitable enough to admit that Madhva's doctrine of "election" need not cause despair in the minds of anybody, as every individual is free to journey along the road to spiritual advancement imagining and firmly believing that he is one of the elect and destined to be emancipated from the ills of cycles of births and deaths, and that it is perfectly consistent with a useful system of ethics. It is essential to emphasize that after all there are more powerful logical and metaphysical grounds for maintaining the impossibility of a really useful system of ethics in an Absolutistic universe, than in Madhva's Pluralistic Universe. Placid and pathetic self-complacency which makes one believe that difficulties in dovetailing a useful system of ethics with metaphysics are the special monopoly of Madhva's pluralistic universe can hardly be a substitute for reasoned philosophic criticism.

#### XLV

The critic continues to remark that "it is difficult to prove that there are eternal essences persisting in souls even when they are released." What is the sort of proof that the critic wants? Is it not equally difficult to "prove"—in fact more so—that the fundamental and foundational identity between the finite and the Infinite persists as a fact from eternity to eternity, persists even now when there is the appearance of bondage, and persists even after the destruction of the bondage? Let the critic note that no "proof" in the laboratory sense of the term can be adduced, but, Madhva maintains on the basis of certain texts that there is marked difference in the inherent spiritual bliss enjoyed by free spirits. The freed spirits constitute a confraternity devoting itself entirely to service of the Lord and contemplation of His Excellent Attributes. The freed spirits differ from one another in the enjoyment of their inherent spiritual bliss. Madhva's Radical Pluralism demands that differences should persist even in the state of final emancipation. There is no reason why differences should not persist. If it is merely a question of argument, arguments can be advanced on behalf of those who support the persistence of difference even in the state of release. Madhva founds the doctrine more on revelation than on ratiocination.

Is it on the contrary very easy to "prove" that all differences are annihilated in the state of final emancipation and that freed spirits lose their individuality,—I mean appearance-ridden individuality—in the Absolute. Do freed spirits continue as much and do they feel any sense of personal identity and individuality? Do they realise that they who toiled hard and strenuously had got their spiritual rewards in the shape of emancipation? According to Absolutism they cannot. It is indeed difficult to "prove" that the freed spirits merge into the Absolute. Persistence of



difference, which is just persistence of essences in the state of release maintained by Madhva's Pluralistic Theism, and the mystical swooning and merging into the Absolute of the freed spirits maintained by Absolutism *are in the same boat as far as "proof" is concerned*. Mukti or final emancipation has two aspects—negative and positive. Annihilation, full and complete of all potentialities of life-and-death-cycle is the negative or destructive task. The positive or the constructive achievement is the enjoyment of the inherent spiritual bliss and devotional contemplation of the Excellent Attributes of the Supreme Lord. while as far as the destructive aspect is concerned the freed spirits resemble one another, they differ in the matter of enjoyment of inherent spiritual bliss. Their essences differ. Madhva's radical Pluralism must extend to the state of release as well. (42)

#### XLVI

"The distinction between God and man" remarks the critic, "however great is not one of kind." Granting for the sake of argument that the distinction is only one of degree, how is this remark of the critic damaging to the philosophic prestige of Madhva's Pluralistic Universe? Whether one chooses to describe the distinction or more correctly difference between the finite and the Infinite, between man and God, as one of degree or of kind, the fact remains that the author of the Vedanta Sūtras maintained long long ago that the finite and the Infinite must differ from one another, as Brahman is the author of the eight cosmic determinations, and as the authorship can never be the property of the finite. As Madhva puts the matter admirably, the author of the Vedanta Sūtras rejected once for all identity between the finite and the Infinite, by deliberately defining the latter in the second aphorism as the author of the eight cosmic determinations. If he had wanted to affirm identity between the finite and the Infinite (Jiva and Brahman) he may have done so in any of the contexts. He has not only not done that, but, affirmed emphatically difference between the two. The difference is vital, fundamental, foundational and unriddable. What is the philosophic gain in quibbling over the fine hair-splitting distinctions between "kind" and "degree" higher and lower and so forth? That God and man differ only in degree was emphasized by the Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Atma was considered the genus, and Jivatma, and Paramatma species by the Nyaya-Vaisheshika!! The critic of Madhva has not succeeded in establishing or demonstrating that Absolutism is the only fashionable philosophy of life by emphasizing that there is only difference in degree between God and man! That

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(42) On the strength of the Sruti text—"Niranjanah-paramam-samyamupaiti" followers of Ramanuja contend that freed spirits do not differ from one another. Madhva maintains that there is difference in the enjoyment of inherent bliss by liberated spirits, relying on the "Taittiriya" text "Saishanandasya-meemamsa-bhayati." etc. (2-8.)

difference is foundational and fundamental is what Madhva maintains. Difference in degree in the present instance is so acute and poignant that identity between the two cannot be maintained as a serious metaphysical tenet. That the author of the Vedanta Sūtras refers only to Saguna-Brahman, Brahman of a lower degree of reality in the second Sūtra is a contention which is philosophically puerile and valueless. The difference between TWO Brahman, one with and the other without attributes is a philosophical fad not countenanced by the author of the Vedanta Sūtras. That is the verdict of Madhva. In the light of the definition of Brahman formulated by the author of the Vedanta Sūtras, God and Man, finite and the Infinite, Jiva and Brahman can never be identical with one another. "Ato-jivaikyamapi-sa-nirachakre-jagad-guruh, etc." (43). Philosophical sentimentalists and unity mongers may console themselves with the belief that there is only difference of degree between God and man. Be that as it may. The difference is foundational and fundamental. Up till now, authors and book makers who swear by Absolutism have not "proved" that the fundamental and foundational difference is ever to be removed, stultified or annihilated. Till such proof is forthcoming, one may be sure that the occupation of the champions of pluralistic Theism will not go, but will be guaranteed.

## XLVII

The critic winds up his dithyrambic denunciations of Madhva in the following terms: "In all this we are simply transferring the distinctions of experience to the kingdom of God." One gasps for breath. The town-planning expert of the Absolutist must have lent his helping hand in the construction of the kingdom of God, in such a way as to rule out of it all distinctions and differences. Has not the Absolutist in his scheme of metaphysics simply transferred the artificial unity or unities of experience to the kingdom of God? If there is no metaphysical sin in transferring unities of experience to the kingdom of God, there could be none either in a similar transference thither of differences and distinctions. But the texts of the Sruti on which alone Indian Absolutists and their opponents have to take their stand, have it that merriment and amusements are to be found in heaven or in the state of final emancipation. Emancipation is only from the ills of life-and-death cycle, and not from enjoyment and amusement, not from distinctions and differences. There is absolutely nothing unphilosophical if one extends the transference of distinctions of experience to the Kingdom of God a little further, and seeks to maintain that in Madhva's Pluralistic Universe, adequate provisions have been made in the state of final emancipation for cinemas, talkies, and music halls. Why not? The Sruti texts

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(43) "Anuvyakhyana" P. 5. See also P. 36. "Ato-Jeevesayorbhedah-Srutisamarthya-susthirah."

proclaim — “havu-havu-yetat-sama-gayannaste — jakshan-kridan-ramamanah-streebhirva-yanairva—etc., etc., etc.” (44). Is the finite to lose itself into the Infinite in the kingdom of God? Or is it to maintain its individuality? The Sutra “Jagad-vyapara-varjam” renders obligatory on the part of a genuine thinker to maintain that there persists difference in the state of release. There is difference between the freed spirits and the Supreme Lord. That difference has to be admitted. When one difference is admitted, there is no reason why another—difference among freed spirits—may not be admitted. The spiritual essence, the inherent capacity of each freed spirit to enjoy its spiritual bliss, the inherent capacity devotionally to love the Lord do differ from those of another freed spirit. If Radical pluralism is to be maintained intact, differences and distinctions must persist even in the state of release.

Neither reason nor revelation would support the view that the Kingdom of God does not tolerate distinctions of experience. While the distinctions and differences that fetter existence here are obscuring the nature of the Supreme Lord from finite minds, those that persist aid realisation by the finite of the nature of the Infinite. It may not after all be a profitable venture to speculate on the nature of the Kingdom of God from here. But how does one know that the distinctions of experience are bodily transferred? Madhva does not seek to maintain the dominance of the same values and standards in the Kingdom of God as those prevalent on earth. There is however no doubt that some distinctions do persist. Swooning of the finite into the Infinite or the Absolute is repudiated by Madhva. What, then, are freed spirits doing in the Kingdom of God? Freedom from the bondage of Karma and the birth-and-death-cycle creates countless opportunities, the nature of which it would be impossible to envisage from the level of existence familiar to finite life, for uninterrupted enjoyment of the inherent spiritual bliss of each freed spirit. The sort of enjoyment is not the be-all and end-all in the Kingdom of God. Devotional contemplation of the nature of the Supreme Lord is the main work in the state of release. The Greatness and Majesty of the Supreme Lord Narayana are revealed to free spirits in accordance with their inherent capacity for appreciation. Freedom from bondage is common to all released. All free spirits have got rid of the Karmic bondage. They can be regarded as equals as far as the riddance of Karmic bondage is concerned. They are however not equals in their inherent capacity to appreciate and devotionally to contemplate the Greatness and Majesty of the Supreme Lord. This distinction must persist in the state of release. This is not a distinction of experience now and here. It has reference only to the state of release.

To a certain extent the distinctions of experience are transferred to the state of release as well inasmuch as difference between any two freed spirits must exist in the matter of enjoyment of the inherent spiritual bliss. Other distinctions are there too quite characteristic of the state of release. (Distinctions that obtain here and now, in mundane existence are all shot through as it were by the Karmic effects.) Distinctions that hold sway in the Kingdom of God are free from Karmic tinge. That the Kingdom of God will be something totally different from the Kingdom of man is a pious hope. If the former is to be reached by means of effort and endeavour put forth in the latter, there is nothing illogical or unphilosophical in a doctrine which holds that some of the distinctions noted and observed here and now, in the Kingdom of man are there in the Kingdom of God as well. It may be assumed that the persisting distinctions do not bring down the Kingdom of God to the level of the Kingdom of man. That distinctions are bound to persist even in the Kingdom of God is all what could be stated when thinkers and philosophers continue to live, move, and have their being on earth, and continue mundane transactions. The details of differences and distinctions that are characteristic of the Kingdom of God must be apprehended only there and not elsewhere.

That there should be no distinctions in the Kingdom of God is a piece of speculative reasoning which can be well confronted with another equally valid and powerful, if not more, that distinctions are bound to persist even in the state of final emancipation. The critic of Madhva has not cared to enter into the details of doctrinal development. He has not cared to examine the texts and their interpretations. He is convinced and of course his conviction is shared by a large number of European writers on Indian philosophy and Western Pandits, that Monism is the only fashionable philosophy of life, and how can poor Madhva hope to have any thinking section of humanity as audience when he advocates the unfashionable Pluralistic Theism? Those who believe in Madhva's Pluralistic universe are at perfect liberty to argue that there is no reason to transfer the artificial unity we note in this world to the Kingdom of God. Seeing that some scientists are to-day coquetting with the electron, others with matter and energy, and yet others with the Neutron and similar fundamental concepts, one is not justified in arguing that everything will lose its individuality and get merged and lost into the Absolute. Neither reason nor revelation would support the view that in the Kingdom of God all distinctions of experience are repudiated and denied.

#### XLVIII

The same critic dogmatically asserts that Badarayana affirms a Monistic view of the world. (P. 442. "Indian Philosophy".)

and remarks that it is not easy for Madhva to interpret the authoritative texts of the Upanishads, the Gita, and the Sutas in the interests of his dualistic metaphysic. If the critic had cared to keep close to the traditions of the Advaita Vedanta, he would have seen that "Vivarta-Vada" is the orthodox view. Brahman appears as the universe. This is essential to Monism. Does the author of the Sutas anywhere use the term "Vivarta"? Does he make mention of degrees of reality? Does he speak of the oneness of the finite and the Infinite? Does he anywhere speak of the doctrine of "Adhyasa"? Does he anywhere state that there are TWO Brahman, the lower and the higher? The Saguna and the Nirguna? Without a critical consideration of any of these questions, the critic starts straightway with the dogmatism that the author of the "Vedanta Sutas" affirms a monistic view of life. The dogmatism is due to the predilection that monism is the only philosophy of life that is fashionable and civilised. If the critic of Madhva had considered a decent number of representative aphorisms, or doubtful aphorisms and examined the propriety of the monistic or the dualistic interpretation, he may have been entitled to a hearing. He does nothing of the kind, but, gives expression to a dogmatism. It is the easiest thing in the world to confront the critic's dogmatism with another that the author of the "Vedanta Sutas" affirms only a dualistic view. The line of reasoning that because Pandits in Europe and America believe that Monistic Idealism is the only fashionable philosophy of life, the highest in Indian Thought should also be a Monism is absurd. If Indian Philosophy is to be brought into and placed within the focus of Western Thought on condition that Monistic Idealism is to be viewed as the only fashionable philosophy of life, I for one doubt the wisdom of Indian Thought being pushed into a focus that way. On the other hand the author of the "Vedanta Sutas" as explained in some of the earlier paragraphs must have been a Pluralistic Theist. Madhva does not indulge in any dogmatisms. He takes his stand on the explicit and unequivocal language of the Sutas. Is there a shred of textual testimony to demonstrate that the author of the "Vedanta Sutas" was thinking only of a lower Brahman, when he in all seriousness defined Brahman as the author of the eight determinations of the cosmos? If so, let alone God playing any practical joke on man, the author of the Sutas must have played practical jokes on humanity. If the Sutas are dispassionately considered one by one, it will easily be seen that there is not even the slightest trace of the monistic world-view in them. Even the Absolutists have to admit that the Sutas refer only to the Suguna Brahman. They adumbrate a doctrine subsequently that the said Brahman is to be superseded by one of higher reality. Where is the evidence in the Sutas for the latter? The Nirguna-Brahman

is the Mrs. Harris of Indian Absolutism. The author of the "Vedanta Sutas" will have none of her.

If the author of the Sutas had held a Monistic or Absolutistic world view and clung to the doctrine of Nirguna Brahman, the Attributeless Absolute, he should have played a practical joke on humanity. He should have known that the Absolute is not accessible to contemplation, inquiry, philosophical search and investigation. Does the Absolutist mean to suggest that knowing all this full well, the author of the Sutas opened his work with a clarion call to humanity that investigation of the nature of Brahman should be undertaken by aspirants? Surely, this must have been a practical joke on humanity. The TWO opening Sutas are proof positive that their author must have been thinking only of a Pluralistic and Theistic world-view and not an Absolutistic one.

There is another inevitable line of argument which perhaps escaped the notice of the Absolutist. The Upanishads, and the Sutas are Pramanas, guarantors of valid knowledge. It is an inalienable characteristic of pramanas that they reveal to a subject or percipient some object or a system of objects possessing clearly and distinctly identifiable features. The Attributeless Absolute—The Nirguna Brahman—or the Nirvisesha-Brahman—cannot be revealed by any of the Pramanas. As the traditional Philosophical discussions will have to be conducted only on the basis of Pramanas, the Nirguna Brahman being inaccessible to them must stand for ever ruled out. Madhva, his commentators and champions do not deny that there are certain texts which appear to mean that Brahman is devoid of all determinations, and attributes. But the surface interpretation of them should be surrendered in the light of other texts which proclaim that Brahman is full of an Infinite number of Infinite Excellent Attributes, and in the light of the fact that Brahman is made known by the Pramana of Sruti. Accessibility to Pramanas is an invariable concomitant of philosophical acceptability. The Absolute not being accessible to Pramanas is philosophically unacceptable.

As Madhva maintains in his "Anuvyakhyana" Badarayana, (or whoever the author of the Sutas), does not countenance any Monism or Absolutism. He holds the doctrine of dualism of the finite and the Infinite. "Ato-jeevaikyamapi-sa-nirachakre-jagad-guruh." The Jagadguru, Badarayana has firmly repudiated identity between the finite and the Infinite, repudiated Monism, and Absolutism. It is obvious that the finite is not the author of the eight determinations of the cosmos. It is only in terms of that authorship the author of the Sutas has defined Brahman. It is

not a definition essayed in a class-room. It is deliberately formulated in the light of the sacred texts like "Yato-va-imani-bhuutani-jayante-yenajatani-jivanti," etc., (45) which affirm that Brahman is the author of the determinations of the cosmos. That this definition is diluted and watered down to suit metaphysical babes, and that Absolutism is there as the staple food for metaphysical adults and stalwarts are arguments which one may advance though vanquished. The burden of demonstrating that while defining Brahman in the way in which he has done, in terms of the authorship of the eight determinations of the cosmos, the author of the "Vedanta Sstras" had a mental reservation to the effect that the Brahman defined is a lower Brahman and that the higher Brahman or the Absolute is the only reality, lies on the Absolutist, and till the proof is actually forthcoming, one will be obliged to hold the opinion that Badarayana far from affirming a monistic world-view in the Sstras champions only Pluralistic Theism.

#### XLIX

A retired member of the I. C. S. (46) writing on Madhva in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* confines himself to two sectarian works "Madhva-Vijaya" and "Manimanjari" and to an account of them in English. For a publication that is avowedly known as "Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics," an account of Madhva's life, tours, etc., is absolutely needless, and the writer echoes the view that in his doctrine of eternal damnation, Madhva betrays influence of Christianity. Another critic of Madhva (47) while mentioning the opinion observes there is little evidence in support of it. It is however necessary to emphasize that the alleged missionary fervour of Madhva's faith is the merest figment of one's imagination. I am unable to see what the critic means by missionary fervour of Madhva's faith. One who knows anything about the traditions of Indian Philosophy knows that the schools of Vedanta, Dvaita, Advaita, and Visishtadvaita have nothing to do with any missionary endeavour of the type associated with Christian missions. The Dvaita knows no proselytisation.

Madhva has cited authorities for all his doctrines, and even assuming for the sake of argument that he derived some inspiration from Christian doctrines, it may not be *infra dig*, as it only shows readiness to assimilate the philosophy of others. In these

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(45) "Taittiriya," 3—1.

(46) As far as I am able to see, the doctrine of eternal Hell is quite indigenous in origin and based on the Sankhyan conception of Tamas. Zeller refuses to believe that Greek Philosophy could have been influenced by Oriental Thought. His arguments are set forth in the course of his first volume of "A History of Greek Philosophy" Pp. 70—73. *Mutatis mutandis* they would apply to the alleged influence of Christianity on Madhva's doctrine of eternal Hell.

(47) "Indian Philosophy"—Allen and Unwin—P. 738. Vol. II.

days when acute anxiety prevails for the pushing of Indian Philosophy into the focus of Western Thought, it may be some consolation to know that Madhva was cosmopolitan enough to assimilate one or two doctrines from some Christians, with whom perhaps he came into contact. Such thought-influences are inevitable, and while the theory of parallel developments of doctrines may very well be maintained, influences of Christianity on Madhva's Thought if detected need not be vehemently repudiated, as susceptibility to the influence of an alien doctrine exhibits only intellectual and cultural cosmopolitanism. Varahamihira, in his astrological works makes mention of the Yavanas or Yavanacharya from whom doubtless he assimilated many theories.

Students of Christianity and those of Madhva's works will readily see that the development of doctrines in the latter is strictly on the traditional lines of Indian Philosophy, and above all it should never be forgotten that Christianity is pre-eminently a religion, but Madhva's Dvaita is pre-eminently a system of metaphysics. Of course, there is the inevitable reaction between Religion and Metaphysics, but it requires no special proof that unlike Christianity, Madhva's Dvaita Vedanta concentrates attention on a constructive building up of a system of metaphysics. Madhva has shown in his works that reason and revelation support his system of metaphysics. In the light of the controversial literature cited in a previous chapter, it should be obvious even to the most uncompromising critic of Madhva that the Acharya has a prominent place in the ranks of builders of Indian philosophical systems. Influences of Christianity, if any, would be seen to be a minor matter not related in any relevant or intimate way to the general metaphysical system of Madhva, which reveals a connected and coherent autonomous development. It is absolutely astonishing that a contributor to the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics should have contented himself with writing a summary of Madhva's life and work depending on a poor performance of an English translation for his guidance.

Madhva's doctrine of eternal Hell owes its origin not to any influence of Christianity but to a sense of logical thoroughness, and to an application of the theory of Gunas to the values of the other world. If there should be an eternal Heaven, then why not an eternal Hell? Where is the evidence which proves that there is only an eternal Heaven and not an eternal Hell? Logical consistency requires that the admission of an eternal Heaven necessitates that of eternal Hell. One need not feel any despair on account of this doctrine. If X or Y falls a prey to despair on learning an account of eternal Hell, it only means the individual is troubled by a guilty conscience. There is nothing to prevent him from



believing that he has nothing to do with eternal Hell, which is reserved for other occupants or entrants, and working out his spiritual destiny with a firm conviction that heaven is his birth-right. Heaven and Hell that are eternal may be knocked on their heads. None would be any the worse for it. When once an eternal Heaven is admitted, eternal Hell also has to be. (48).

As argued elsewhere, the doctrine of the three Gunas emphasized by the Sankhyas indicates the existence of an eternal Hell corresponding to Tamas. Eligibility for permanent inhabitation of Eternal Hell cannot be determined by us at this finite level of existence or at any time. The determination of eligibility for eternal Heaven or eternal Hell is God's work. Of course there is no arbitrariness in God's decisions, as they are based on the Karma of individuals. The author of the "Vedanta Sutrās" has given a final and conclusive answer to the questions of modern critics in the "Vaishamya-nairghrinyadhikarana." Eternal Heaven corresponds to Satva, and eternal Hell to Tamas. I do not see any traces of influence of Christianity in Madhva's doctrine based on the Sankhyan theory of Gunas.

There is no evidence for the alleged "missionary fervour of Madhva's faith" either. (The Vedanta makes no converts and proselytisation is unknown to Madhva and his school. The missionary fervour is thus a figment of the morbid imagination of the critics of Madhva.) The running and maintenance of monasteries and canonical organisations would be readily seen to be the characteristic duties of the pontifical successors of Sankara, Ramanuja, and Madhva. No doubt it is traditionally believed that at the time of Madhva striking personalities and masses were admitted into the Vaishnava-fold of the Acharya, but this is far from proselytisation. The Acharya is said to have vanquished an opponent in metaphysical debate, and the latter became a disciple of his and embraced his religion and declared allegiance to Dualism. One who knows anything about Indian philosophical traditions will see that Madhva has not been influenced by Christianity.

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Some other comments that require repudiation are that Madhva's system of philosophy is pugilistic and that Madhva calls himself an incarnation of "Vayu," in order to dupe the

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(48) Prof. K. Sundararaman, undoubtedly one of the greatest authorities on "Advaita Vedanta", has argued that if one can believe in an eternal Heaven he can well believe in eternal Hell. The problem has, of course, no meaning or significance for those who have faith in the fundamental Oneness of Existence. See the Professor's brilliant work "The Vedanta—Its Doctrine of Divine Personality—Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam—Pp. 187—199.

gullible!! The Acharya may have told his disciples something about himself and no one is or can be compelled to believe that the Acharya was an incarnation. Attributing motives is a game at which anybody can play. Other Acharyas are still believed to be incarnations, and miracles are associated with all religious teachers. It is not a matter for argument. Either you believe that miracles may have been wrought or not. Madhva's claims are on a par with similar claims made by other religious teachers themselves or by their champions, and if the former are condemned, for whatever reason the latter do not escape condemnation.

The significance of the comment that Madhva's philosophy is pugilistic is not clear. Madhva was a clean fighter. All system builders and religious reformers must have been clean fighters. They should have discharged their very obvious duty of fighting against fraud and falsehood, humbug and hypocrisy. In that sense they were all pugilists. Does the critic of Madhva mean to imply that Sankara was not a pugilist? Students of Sankara's commentary on the Vedanta Sutras are bound to be familiar with the cutting and caustic language he uses in criticising opposing schools of thought. Was not Sankara a pugilist? Ramanuja was a cutting critic. Srikantha was one such. All the Acharyas were pugilists in their own good time. Madhva has no monopoly of pugilistic philosophy (49).

### PART III CONCLUSION

#### LI.

In the previous chapters, a running exposition of the TEN PRAKARANAS of Madhva was attempted and the relevant controversial literature summed up. In the present chapter a general estimate of the Acharya's system of thought was undertaken, and critics were answered. It is but proper that the scattered lines of the discussion are brought together in the concluding section.

The present monograph was undertaken mainly with a view to placing before the English-knowing public interested in the problems of philosophy in general and those of Indian Philosophy in particular, the arguments contained in the TEN works of Madhva in support of a Reign of Realism or more appropriately a Renaissance of a Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy, and of the philosophic prestige of Pluralistic Theism. It is too late in these days of modern civilised existence to contend that as

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(49) Sankara uses bitingly sarcastic language in his criticism of Buddhism. He writes: "Badhamevam-braveeshi-nirankusatvatte-tundasya" P. 471. Sankara Bhasya, Bombay Edition. "Sugatenaspashtee-kritam atmano-asambaddhapralapitvam" P. 479. Sankara was undoubtedly a pugilist.

Madhva's system of philosophy has not been translated by European and American Pandits, it has no value, and it is sheer waste of time (there cannot be a worse way of wasting time than embarking on such a quest) to inquire at this distance of time, why Thibaut and Max Muller did not turn their attention to Madhva's works. If they did not, they did not. There the matter must end. If some of the Indian pandits and writers on "Indian Philosophy" have dismissed the philosophical work of Madhva in about a dozen pages, when there is a vast and extensive mass of literature constructive and controversial to be carefully investigated, the inference is obvious that seeing they are obliged to depend on English translations of works on Indian Philosophy, they could not exercise their erudition on Madhva's system of thought as the works relating to it have not yet been done into English. Such an inference may wound the tender susceptibilities of many an Indian philosopher, but, it is nonetheless irresistible and inevitable. In the course of a running exposition of the works of the Acharya, it has been pointed out that Madhva stands sponsor to a Radical Realism, or Revolutionary Realism and Pluralistic Theism. Madhva's Pluralistic Universe has been constructed on the solid and substantial foundations of the sacred texts to which the final appeal lies and must lie in accordance with the age-long traditions of Indian Philosophy. Revelation and reason, texts and traditions, intellect and intuition, support the Pluralistic Universe of Madhva. Madhva played the game of philosophising squarely, honestly and fearlessly. He gave no quarter to his opponents in Metaphysics. Nor did he ask for any. His commentators and champions from Jayatirtha to Vijayindra continued his task and traditions, improving his system of thought constructively and destructively criticising the arguments of their opponents. The arguments that have been sketched in the works of the Acharya and those of his commentators have to be judged on their merits irrespective of the sentimental bias that Monistic Absolutism is the only fashionable philosophy of life, and irrespective too of the perverted judgment that Madhva's Pluralistic Universe could not be of any philosophical value as it has not received any attention at all from American and European Pandits.

## LII

Two criteria were pointed out at the commencement of the present chapter—(1) Inner consistency of the doctrines of a system, and (2) its metaphysical satisfyingness by the application of which the significance of a system of philosophy is to be judged. In the light of those criteria Madhva's Pluralistic Universe, it will be seen can survive all critical onslaughts. Madhva's Radical Realism and Pluralism are based on the Upanishads, the Vedanta Sutras and the Gita. Sri Narayana is the Supreme Reality. He controls and guides the destinies of the cosmos—of sentient and non-sentient

creation. Man is confronted with the sheer mystery of existence and the Author of all existence is the Supreme Lord Narayana. Creation is manifestation, and may not be *de novo* origination. Finite selves are there from time immemorial and beginningless in time. Madhva gives a regular cosmology contained in the sacred texts.

Finite selves are thrown in an environment adjustment to which is the law of life. They have to know the nature and characteristics of the sentient and non-sentient environment if adjustment is to be effective. Madhva maintains a realistic theory of knowledge in whatever sense the term may be understood, and whatever its vicissitudes in Western Thought. Sense-organs do not practise any deception on the subject. They make possible *knowledge of the objects as they are*. The contrast between objects "as they are" and "as they appear" is to Madhva an exception which can easily be explained on the psychological doctrine of illusions. Knowledge is always and under all normal circumstances knowledge of the objects as they are. The Sakshi-pratyaksha, the Ego-witness is quite capable of grasping the nature of Time, Space, and the characteristics of objects as they are.

Sense-knowledge is pressed into service for the accomplishment of secular tasks and for the satisfaction of the numerous demands of existence. The knowledge however of supersensible realities like Dharma and Adharma (moral and immoral conduct, or virtue and vice, etc.) and of God is to be had only by means of a study of the sacred texts. The Supreme Lord is the Author of the eight determinations of the cosmos. The Authorship has been the definition of Brahman. Our thoughts, words and deeds our innermost ideas, plans and projects worked out and entertained in absolute privacy are all scrutinised by the Supreme Lord but for Whose actuating and sustaining supply of energy, life would be impossible.

Such knowledge being a permanent precedent of all action is best conducive to moral conduct. "Sruti-smritee-harerajnye" etc. The nature of Dharma and Adharma is to be learnt from the sacred texts which are to be viewed as commands of the Supreme Lord. Life is to be interpreted and its value judged in terms of service rendered to one's fellowmen. A moral life lived gradually produces purity of thought, word and deed. (Citta-suddhi). The mind would then become in the truest sense of the expression a temple for God.

Purification of mind and mental dispositions is an indispensable preliminary to spiritual realisation. Devotional contemplation of the countless Excellences and Excellent Attributes of the Supreme Being is the only means leading to realisation. In the

stock of all Karma is burnt up and the spiritual aspirant is no more tormented by births and deaths. God's Grace is earned (Isvara-prasada) and a genuine aspirant stands face to face with the Supreme Lord of the Universe. In the state of final emancipation each freed spirit enjoys its own inherent bliss unalloyed by Karmic influences.

Doctrine and conduct are thus harmonised by Madhva. Knowledge works in the service of conduct. Madhva is obliged to maintain the reality of the universe, and reality of the environment objects, circumstances, and conditions, etc. Moral endeavour would lose all significance if there is nothing to be gained. Bondage or imprisonment in the phantasmagoria of metempsychosis is for Madhva real. Its riddance is the goal. Only effort and endeavour carefully planned and vigorously executed would bring about the riddance of bondage, imprisonment and enmeshment. Theory of knowledge, Ethical views, and Metaphysical tenets are interwoven by Madhva into a happy and harmonious synthesis. The cribbed, cabined and confined existence engenders dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs and the present world-order. It will not do to hug the illusion that all is mere appearance. Everything is real. Adjustment is the only go.

Dissatisfaction and discontent, secular and spiritual have to be got rid of by means of effort and endeavour in an environment i.e., the universe. Unless the environment is real stubbornly real, effort and endeavour have no meaning. An aspirant and the world are under the sway of the Supreme Lord. His Nature and Characteristics are to be learnt. Scripture proclaims the Supreme Lord to be the Author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos. Thus equipped and guided all along by a sympathetic and loving spiritual preceptor (Guru) a genuine aspirant proceeds along the rugged path of Yogic practices and discipline and in due time reaches the Kingdom of God. Reality of the universe theory of knowledge, Ethical system, general metaphysics, and the conception of God as the Supreme Reality and Author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos, and the conception of the state of final emancipation are all dovetailed into one another and carefully and elegantly fitted up by Madhva who with exquisite workmanship has constructed his Pluralistic Theism. Nothing is left to chance, and nothing to caprice. All doctrinal details are centripetally drawn to the definition of the Supreme Lord attempted by the author of the "Vedanta Sutas."

Starting from the said definition, one would see doctrine succeeds doctrine theory follows theory, with a magnificent and superb logic, until the system of Pluralistic Theism is exhibited to be the only rational world-view. Judged in the light of the criterion of logical consistency of system-building, Madhva's Pluralistic Universe will be seen to be the best possible of rational world-views. It is not suggested that there are no SOMEHOW'S in Madhva's

philosophical system-building. But where are the systems in the East or the West, ancient or modern, that have not felt compelled to wave the magic wand of *SOMEHOW*, to silence all opposition and criticism? Bradley made indeed a very free use of the said magic wand, and Indian Absolutists did the same. In his doctrine of "Visesha" in the Monism or unity between the Supreme Lord and His attributes, Madhva makes use of *SOMEHOW*, and I hope critics will have the sense and patience to realise that the kettle has no right to malign the pot. The sententious dogmatism that on the basis of a Dualism, God's independence is not intelligible can be met only with a parallel dogmatism that, on the hypothesis of Absolutism, the conception of Godhead itself is unintelligible not to speak of God's independence.

Madhva takes his stand on the solid bed-rock of experience. Philosophy is only a systematic rational interpretation of experience. No system of philosophy worth the name can afford to repudiate human experience. Human life and experience are seen to be riddled with contradictions, inconsistencies, and doubts of the type that assailed Parnell's hermit are bound to assail inquiring minds. Study of scripture and sacred texts has been enjoined on aspirants as obligatory. A preliminary study of literature secular and sacerdotalistic engenders vague notions about God, Creatorship of the world and so on. Vague notions should be rendered definite, clear and distinct. Inquiry is to be undertaken with a view to solving the problems of God, freedom, Immortality, etc. The author of the "Vedanta Sutas" rightly commences his work with an emphasis on the intellectual obligation that there rests on each rational being to undertake investigation into the nature of Brahman.

Madhva makes the definition of Brahman essayed by Badarayana the pivotal point round which his Radical Realism and Pluralistic Theism have centred. The first chapter of the sutras deals with the harmonisation of the sacred texts so as to exhibit the doctrine that Vishnu—Lord Narayana—is the Supreme Power and it is His glory that the sacred texts sing. Other gods and deities may have been spoken of here and there as being supreme, but their supremacy is derivative. It is God's gift to them. Other gods and deities are under the control and guidance of the Supreme Lord. The second chapter criticises certain schools of thought opposed to the Vedanta and Badarayana shows that they have merely apparent validity. They are not powerful enough to dethrone the Vedanta from the metaphysical eminence to which it has been justly and legitimately raised. The third chapter describes the means to be adopted for securing spiritual welfare. The fourth chapter deals with the nature and conception of final emancipation. The four chapters form a systematic whole, a superb metaphysical work of art.

Madhva's Radical Realism and Pluralistic Theism are based on the Sutras, and worked out in the strictest accordance with principles of system-building. It is Madhva's Pluralistic Theism that finds a perfect attunement with the letter and spirit of the Sutras. It is the Acharya's Radical Realism which faithfully brings out the cardinal conclusion of the Sutras. The author of the Vedanta Sutras does not mention or even hint at "Adhyasa"—the fundamental and foundational doctrine of Absolutism. He does not refer explicitly or implicitly to the doctrine of "Vivarta-Vada" without which Absolutism is on a par with Hamlet *minus* the Prince of Denmark. He does not anywhere affirm the doctrine of identity between the finite and the Infinite. Nor does he make any reference to TWO Brahman, one Saguna and the other Nirguna. Nor does he worry himself or his readers with the doctrine of degrees of reality (50)

In the light of the criterion of logical consistency and loyalty to the letter and spirit of the "Vedanta Sutras" Madhva's Radical Realism and Pluralistic Theism will satisfy even the most fastidious of critics provided the critical and evaluatory vision of the latter is not clouded by prejudice and predilection. A start is made by Madhva from rational human experience. The need is stressed for inquiry into the nature of Brahman being undertaken. Brahman is defined as the Author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos. Only then is it possible to maintain the conception of an Omnipotent, Omnipresent Being. Escape from the ills of cycles of births and deaths and enjoyment of inherent spiritual bliss are the goal. The goal can be reached only through the Grace of the Supreme Being. How to gain Divine Grace? The Supreme Lord is to be worshipped devoutly. Concentration of prayerful and devotional attention on the Supreme Lord is to be practised. The Supreme Lord is to be worshipped not in the shape of stone-or-metal idols, but, as the Immanent Power in the Cosmos. Blessed souls after patient and prolonged practising of meditation get visions of the Supreme Being and realise the Immanence of the Supreme Lord in the innermost recess of their hearts. Leading a moral and spotless life dedicated to the service of one's fellowmen is a preliminary to realisation of Divine Immanence. When an aspirant becomes one of God's chosen favourites, ("Yamevaisha-vrinute-tena-labhyah, etc.") and earns His Grace he has within his firm grasp the "Summum Bonum" of existence. Unbiased critical judgment will see nothing illogical or inconsistent in Madhva's Pluralistic Universe constructed in that manner.

### LIII

In the light of the criterion of spiritual satisfyingness, Madhva's doctrines of Radical Realism and Pluralistic Theism

(50) Vijayindra contends in his "Kantakodhara" that the doctrine of Two Brahman—one Saguna, and the other Nirguna, is a myth. "Saguna-Nirguna-Brahma-dvaidhyasya-advaitasiddhesha" p. 40.

are bound to make a very powerful appeal to thinking minds. Happiness, comfort, efficient adjustment, enrichment of life, heightening of hedonistic hue are the ends of rational and well-directed human endeavour. That these values concepts, and objects are transient and evanescent is quickly realised. Genuine aspirants embark on a quest after eternal values. Even the most carefully planned projects executed with skill and circumspection, develop the colossal failures. Life is full of contradictions and inequalities. God's ways to man are mysterious. More mysterious are man's ways to fellowmen. Such a state of affairs though perfectly and stubbornly real cannot be permanent and ultimate.

An inquirer will have to satisfy himself that the present world-order is only the outcome of the past Karma, individual and collective, and that eventually everything will be all right in God's creation. From the existence of misery, imperfection and evil in the world, one can see that life's goal is the riddance of them all. Man has to pray for light and guidance. Inquiring minds will be struck by the grandeur of sheer existence of the world. The mystery of existence points inevitably to some Supreme Being which is the Author of mystery. To the Author of Existence man has to turn for light and guidance.

The Absolutist tells us that there is but one existence and one Reality and that every finite centre of life and activity shares the reality of the Absolute. One day we shall all realise that we are the Absolute, and then there is to be no more of "Thee and Me." The centres of life and activity are all mere appearance. A view like this is hardly satisfying and hardly conducive to the putting forth of endeavour and effort. So long as secular activity is completely divorced from metaphysical speculation, one "ISM" is as good as another. It is preposterous to claim that the secularistic activities and the commercial exploitation so rampant in Europe and America have any direct relation with the Absolutism of Kant or the Idealism of Plato. The secular activities of Englishmen are not guided and determined by the Absolutism of Bradley. One need not worry about any "ISM"—Absolutism, Realism, Idealism, etc., etc.,—if life activities are to be summed up in "Marry-multiply-let the strongest live and the weakest die—" (exploit and make merry have to be added on.)

If, on the contrary, there is to be some intimate relation between doctrine and conduct, secular activity and spiritualistic hypotheses, Madhva would counsel that transactions of life be carried out with the full and firm feeling that finite human beings are under the control and guidance of the Supreme Lord. Madhva says—"Kuru - Bhunkshva-cha - karma - nijam - niyatam-haripada-vinamra-dhiya-satatam." (51) When the conviction deepens that everything is under the control of the Supreme Lord, a spiritual



aspirant regulates his conduct so as to secure the greatest possible attunement or harmony between the Will of God and his own doings. Of course, even released selves cannot fathom the depth of Divine Will. Much less is there any chance for aspirants successfully to fathom it. But spiritual aspirants all the world over, have intuitive perception of what is likely to commend itself to Divine Will and Pleasure, and model their conduct accordingly.

Account is to be rendered elsewhere of the life and activities pursued here. Liberty to act, knowledge to understand ourselves and the environment, responsiveness of emotions, are granted by God to finite beings. The gifts of God should be put to proper and legitimate use. If human activity is to be guided by an intense awareness of the Immanence of the Supreme Power from Whom finite beings get their intellect and intuition, discord and disharmony would disappear and Earth itself will then be Heaven or Paradise.

But as it is, experience furnishes us with countless examples of perversions and prostitutions of human faculties, and not unoften vice triumphs and vanquishes virtue. Even the stoutest of hearts are bound to falter in the face of such situations. A devotional and prayerful appeal to the Supreme Power is the only remedy. When assailed by doubts and difficulties in spiritual matters, one may adopt the downright anti-religious attitude of the "Charvakas" or pray to God for light and guidance. The former course is favoured by many. But the latter is not without its own attractions for a few. A genuine aspirant will say to himself—"I have done my best. I have acted in accordance with the dictates of my conscience and with the commandments in the sacred texts. I have acted in the belief that this course chosen by me may commend itself to the Supreme Lord who has given me, knowledge, feeling, and will. The rest is in God's hands." Such a conviction is confirmed by the experiences of many aspirants. On the contrary no one acts in the belief that he is the Absolute Itself working under certain well-known limitations, and that all will be well at the dawn of true knowledge. The Absolutistic doctrine is not made the dominant and dynamic motive of life by any of the metaphysically-minded.

#### LIV

Time was when Absolutism was believed to be a medico-gastronomical speciality intended for exclusive consumption by philosophical aristocrats and that Pluralism and Theism were thought to be tiny pills fit to be swallowed by the multitude! Life according to Madhva's doctrine is thorny path. As the "Katha" Upanishad significantly observes, the values of existence like

wealth, women, power, prestige, office and honour should never be allowed to tempt an aspirant away from his spiritual quest and career. Whatever the "ism" one may choose to cling to, rational experience does not convince anyone that he is already the Absolute. No secular democratisation is possible even though all living beings sustain their life by inhaling oxygen. No spiritual democratisation is possible either, even though all beings share the existence of and basic identity with the Absolute.

How is it possible to convince one that there are higher values than those that obtain now and here on which life is grounded? There could never be an end to argumentation and ratiocination. The Indian varieties of Absolutism and Pluralistic Theism are in agreement in so far as they both make an appeal to the sacred texts for establishing the existence of spiritual values. The interpretations of the texts attempted respectively by the champions of Absolutism and Pluralistic Theism have already been discussed at sufficient length. There is the operation of "SOMEHOW" in both systems. Both systems have strained the texts in emergencies. Both have concentrated attention on the letter and spirit of the sacred texts. An impartial and disinterested perusal of them may not produce the conviction that one is essentially and fundamentally the Absolute itself SOMEHOW appearing as the finite creation, animate and inanimate. An individual who may have pondered the Sutras like "Jagadvyapara Varjyam" and "Janmadyasya-yatah" which definitely and in unequivocal terms state that Brahman is the Author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos, and their import may not entertain the conviction seriously that he is an appearance, a shadow of the Absolute. If he should, he may continue to wonder till the termination of eternity why the appearances should there be at all, and how the said appearances are to realise their identity with Reality by putting forth spiritual effort and endeavour on the appearance-stage. It is difficult to believe that the Absolutistic doctrine can be a dynamic motive force for the spiritualisation of life.

Madhva's Pluralistic Theism on the other hand maintains on the strength of the sacred texts (like "Yamevaishavrinute-tena-labhyah," etc.) that a devoted aspirant will secure the Grace of God. Divine Grace would free him from the fetters of existence in a series of lives and deaths, and enable him to enjoy his own inherent spiritual bliss and happiness. Scepticism pedantic or philosophic, matter-of-fact or methodological is a poor substitute, for belief in God, in a Supreme Power controlling the destinies of the cosmos. One may lead a prosaic or romantic life working for the advancement of society. He may deify society as God. But society is not a God to which one may turn in times of spiritual crisis. It is a common spectacle that society betrays individuals and individuals betray society and society's interests

Deification of society, state, community, etc., does not save one's soul. God is to be known, understood and contemplated upon as the Supreme Power, the Author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos. ("Jagadudayadi-nimittatvena-avagatah.") A spiritually troubled and worried soul turns to Him for guidance. He is Immanent. His is the Invisible Hand that guides the Cosmos and Cosmic evolution. Prayerful and devotional contemplation of the Majesty of the Supreme Power is the means of securing His Grace. When Divine Grace is secured, there is nought else to strive for.

No doubt God's ways to mankind are mysterious. Divine Justice may sometimes seem to be a mere name, a philosophic pedantry. Eternal and Immutable are the Laws of God. One may seem to have violated them with impunity and to be getting on splendidly well in life; he may scoff and mock at those that have a firm faith in Divine control. Nemesis is bound to overtake those raised to bad eminence who tyrannising over and exploiting their fellowmen seem to be monuments of failure of Divine Justice. The Supreme Lord gives the sinners and evil doers a long, long rope. When the cup of their iniquities is full, they get what they deserve. It is a very crude form of inquiry to ask why the Almighty Lord or the Supreme Power should not put a stop to all sin, evil, and misery in His best of all possible worlds. Even the Supreme Lord is to bide His Time. When the Tamasic tendencies and Tamasic forces are in the ascendant, the Lord gives sinners, and evil doers a long rope so that Nemesis may overtake them surely and definitely. In mythologies we come across accounts of deities being vanquished and driven from their cosmic posts of duty by superior mischief-makers, and God does not intervene suddenly or precipitately. Evil doers have to add to their stock of sin sufficient quantities to merit the displeasure of God. (52). Divine Justice prevails and is vindicated in the long run. The temporary prosperity and aggressiveness of sinners come to a full stop. In the moral and spiritual dynamism of such a scheme, one should have firm and unshakable faith. It will have to be a faith stronger and more deep-rooted than the proverbial faith that is said to move mountains. Spiritual and moral mountains are more formidable than geological mountains. In the "Bhakti-Pada" of the "Anuvyakhyana" Madhva counsels spiritual aspirants to have such a firm faith in Divine Power on Which devotional and prayerful attention is to be concentrated: On a view like this, a struggling spiritual aspirant, provided he has the necessary faith, will overcome all stumbling blocks and obstacles, earn God's grace and enjoy his own inherent bliss and

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(52) Vijayindra Tirtha writes in his "Nyaya-Mauktika-Maala" thus—  
 "Svaparipaakakale - Paramesvaradveshaparaparyam - kopam - sampadayati-  
 Tadanantameva-narakadyanarthastatphaatma - bhtavateetyeva - sveekaryam"  
 P. 42.

happiness ever in the service of the Lord and His creatures. Judged in the light of the criterion of satisfyingness of the soul-needs, Madhva's Pluralistic Theism is seen to be distinctly better than Absolutism, according to which needs and satisfactions, aspirations and achievements, God and man, are all APPEARANCES of the ABSOLUTE.

## LV

To research and reconstruction, progress and perfection, effort and endeavour, Madhva's Pluralistic Theism is bound to act as a better and more powerful incentive any day than Absolutism or Monism. So long as metaphysical speculations and philosophical doctrines do not actively influence secular work, one need not worry himself about any "isms". If one says or claims that in his case, there is an intimate reaction between the two, it is worth while to consider whether Absolutism or Pluralistic Theism will act as compelling intellectual stimulus to healthy and beneficent constructive activity. The illusionistic doctrine which resolves God and man, finite and the Infinite, etc., into mere APPEARANCES OF THE ABSOLUTE can never be adequate stimulus to constructive activity which is also bound to be mere appearance. All activity, all constructive work, all progress will have to be viewed as love's labour lost. That they all find their own justification on the level of ("Vyavahara") empirical existence, is an old contention to which there is an old reply. The difference between empirical and transcendental is yet to be demonstrated. Madhva's Pluralistic Theism replies that the doctrine of degrees of reality is yet to be proved in the light of the Pramanas—(sources and guarantors of valid knowledge). The tiniest particle of sand on the sea-side is as real as the Absolute.

Suppose a new discovery is made and a new machine patented and so forth. Discoveries and inventions do as a matter of fact benefit their authors, advance their fame, and fill their coffers. Madhva would counsel them not to be intellect-intoxicated. The creative genius and intuitional inspiration that enabled them to make discoveries and conquests over Nature and natural forces are gifts to them from God to be used in the service of the Lord Supreme and His creatures. Finite human beings can never envisage the exact and precise manner in which God proposes to make them instruments for the working out of His Own Will and purposes. You invent a new model of locomotive which by means of its speed laughs at and scorns space. You will say to yourself that God gave you a gift of creative genius and that your invention is an offering you make to your Maker in return. Your offering is sure to please God and His creatures will be served by it too.

Your present success will act as a powerful incentive to further constructive research and investigation at the termination of which you will propitiate God with another devout offering in the shape of a new invention. If, on the other hand, one were to say to himself that he is MERELY AN APPEARANCE OF THE ABSOLUTE, it is difficult to see how such a feeling or conviction can act as a dynamic stimulus to constructive activity. It is pointless to contend that in realising the fundamental and foundational identity with the Absolute, needs and wants disappear, because the finite is at every turn overwhelmed with a poignant sense of its own helplessness, notwithstanding its foundational and fundamental identity with the Absolute.

If the entire cosmos has been all along a victim of appearances, snares and delusions, and will so continue to be till the dawn of genuine knowledge, or till the realisation of the foundational and fundamental identity between the finite and the Infinite, one is entitled to demand that the origin and circumstances of this victimisation be made clear, as the Absolute cannot disown a share of responsibility in the evolution or unfolding of the scenes of the metaphysical melodrama of cosmos and cosmic phenomena. Madhva's Pluralistic Theism is suffering under no such disabilities as Brahman and the world have the same degree of reality. Effort and endeavour in a real world dominated by real values have then maximum significance. The devout scientist will regard the fruition of his labours as a form of service to God and His creatures. The genuine scientist, the real Karma-Yogin knows no resting on his laurels or oars. Success in respect of a particular venture acts as a stepping stone to further and more brilliant results. It is obvious that there need not be any intimate relation between spiritual concerns and scientific pursuits. Should there be any intimate relation between a man's allegiance to a particular school or system of philosophy and his scientific and secular pursuits, the latter have incomparably better chances of dynamic progress and advantageous fruition on the basis of a Pluralistic Theism than on that of Absolutism.

#### LVI

Nothing but a deplorable inferiority complex is responsible for decadence of Indian Philosophy in recent times. Intellectual indolence and impatience with a study of Sanskrit texts have contributed not a little to the stagnation of Indian Philosophy. It is astonishing to see modern and modernised Indian men and women with university degrees expressing their doubts with bated breath whether an Indian doctrine like that of "Karma" or "Maya" would be accepted as valid and sound by Western

Pandits. Why should it? It requires no elaborate demonstration that a doctrine rejected by the critical intelligence of Western Pandits may yet be the soundest philosophically and the nervous apprehension and sanctimonious sentimentality that a particular doctrine may be viewed with disfavour in the West have been and are still the bane of Indian Philosophic advancement. Others are anxious to bring Indian thought within the focus of Western thought, and read into Indian texts consciously or unconsciously Western notions and doctrines. Such a procedure destroys the individuality of Indian Philosophy. While the various Indian Universities are in a measure to blame for not having given the study of Indian philosophy the same prominence as that assigned to other subjects, a greater share of the blame must rest on Indian scholars themselves.

Why should modern workers, researchers, and investigators content themselves with merely echoing the opinions of Western Pandits like Max Muller and Wilson, MacDonell and Keith, Gough and Garbe and others? If Thibaut expresses an opinion, it is his and you and I need not repeat it gramophone-like. If Madhva's system of philosophy has not been studied by Thibaut and if the Acharya's works have not been translated, by him or other Western Pandits, no one is any the worse for it. Most emphatically the Acharya is none the worse for his works not having found a place in the Sacred Books of the East series, or in any other emanating from the West.

By all means one has to turn to the West, to Europe and America, for light on Lino-type, and the Rotary Press, Railways and Radio. But for light on Philosophy, on discussions of the nature of hereafter, and of the problem of permanent spiritual peace one need not turn to those quarters. The present study of the ten important works of Madhva was projected and undertaken in that spirit and my aim has been to give some idea of the development of Madhva's Pluralistic Theism to such of those as may not be in a position to manage the original Sanskrit texts. Care has been taken to see that the letter and the spirit of the works of the Acharya and those of his commentators have been adhered to as loyally and faithfully as possible. The ideas and doctrines have been couched in a terminology that is current coin at the present day in the philosophical world. Ill-informed criticisms have been answered. A writer characterises Madhva's Philosophy as "fundamentally Monism" in the first volume of his work. In the second it develops into a "Dualism." Such erratic judgments have been examined and shown to be futile and faulty.

#### LVII.

Madhva's system cannot be lightly and thoughtlessly dismissed as belonging more to the religious history of Indian thought.

It is on a par with those of Ramanuja, Sankara, Srikantha and others. It represents an important and significant epoch in the history of Indian Philosophy. This has been argued in an earlier section. Appayya Dikshita, the most uncompromising opponent of the Dvaita of Madhva and a severe critic of his works admitted that there is undoubted philosophical value in Madhva's philosophy. He said Madhva's doctrine was, near to his heart even as those of Ramanuja and Srikantha. } "Anandatirthamuni-Lakshmanadesikendra-Srikanthayogi-padaveeradaveeyasieernah," etc. (53) In the light of this remark of Appayya Dikshita, the judgment that Madhva's system belongs more to the religious history of Indian thought is a ponderous puerility. If in any scheme of a history or account of Indian Philosophy you note that Madhva's system is dismissed in ten or twelve pages, the only inference is that the writer is blissfully ignorant of the works of the Acharya and those of his champions and commentators. The inference may wound the *amour propre* of some, but, it is nonetheless irresistible. The controversial literature summed up in an earlier chapter will convince any one that the philosophical issue MONISM vs. PLURALISM is still a live one in Indian thought, whatever the case, elsewhere.

#### LVIII.

Madhva has argued and established an unexpurgated case for Pluralistic Theism, and Radical Realism. The Sankhyas are realists and Pluralists. The Nyaya-Vaisesika is a Realism and Pluralism. Madhva is the unchallenged Monarch of Pluralistic Theism and Radical Realism in Indian Philosophy. Madhva successfully led a reaction against Monistic Idealism. He is the unrivalled monarch, more accurately, of a renaissance of the Reign of Realism and Pluralistic Theism in Indian philosophy. The works of Madhva and Jayatirtha, of Vyasaraja, Vadiraja, and Vijayindra, and others mentioned in an earlier chapter have firmly grounded Radical Realism and Pluralistic Theism on the rock of Ages. Madhva's system of philosophy forms a vital limb of the organic totality of Indian Philosophy and it has an inalienable right so to be viewed. It is not cargo to be jettisoned, but a First Class saloon passenger in the Ocean Liner of Indian Metaphysics.

For having founded on the strictest orthodox basis of the Pramanas, the means and guarantors of valid knowledge, the thesis—that Lord Narayana—the Consort of Mahalakshmi—is the Supreme Reality—and Author of the eight determinations of the Cosmos, for having established the reality of the Universe—the same degree

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(53) Appayya Dikshita's "Chaturmata-sara-sangraha." P. 98—Pandit R. Halasyanatha Sastri's Edition of Srikantha Bhashya with "Sivarkamani-deepika."

of reality as that which belongs to the Absolute—for having demonstrated that Reality is rooted in differences and diversities, for having argued that the different selves, finite spirits, (jivas) are the servants of the Lord carrying out according to the light vouchsafed to them Divine Will and working out His purposes—for having elucidated the view that finite selves have gradations of innate, essential, foundational and fundamental nature, and of their capacity to enjoy bliss and happiness in the state of emancipation, for having worked out the conception of Mukti or final emancipation or release, as the enjoyment of the inherent, and essential spiritual bliss, for having proclaimed that spotless devotion (Bhakti) is the means of gaining final, full, and complete emancipation from the phantasmagoria of metempsychosis, for having taken his stand on the three well-known Pramanas, in opposition to those who accept more or less, for having declared and maintained the doctrine that all sacred texts primarily and fundamentally sing only the glory of the Supreme Lord—Narayana—Consort of Mahalakshmi—and that Brahman is to be known only through the instrumentality of the sacred texts, as the riotous procedure of reason and ratiocination can never be checked—and above all for having carried on a clean and sportsmanlike fight against the forces of Monistic Idealism and Absolutism, Madhva, the illustrious commentator of his works, Jayatirtha—without a study of whose commentaries, Madhva's works can never be understood clearly and in full—controversialists and champions of the Acharya like Vyasaraaja and Vijayindra have their own places in the sun—places from which they can never be dislodged by sanctimonious saints, childish and chauvinistic critics, University and Government prize boys, bureaucratic book makers, and pinchbeck philosophers.

### SUMMARY

1. In the chapter on "General estimate and Reply to critics" an attempt has been made to assess the value of Madhva's philosophy in the light of certain criteria.
2. Madhva's Pluralistic Theism and Radical Realism are shown to satisfy the criterion of inner consistency of metaphysical system-building.
3. Madhva's system satisfies the criterion of satisfyingness of spiritual needs.
4. It satisfies the criterion of conduciveness to material progress and advancement, and conduciveness to the putting forth of effort and endeavour.
5. Absolutism is shown to be nonchalant to a satisfaction of the said criteria.



6. Madhva suggests that the famous Monistic Text "TAT-TWAMASI" may be split up and has to be split up as a matter of fact into ATAT-TWAM-ASI, the meaning being "Thou are not—THAT " Whether one agrees with Madhva or not, the suggestion requires disinterested and impartial discussion. It is pointed out that in the light of the nine illustrative instances, which unmistakably indicate "difference," Madhva's suggestion may be quite valid.
7. The doctrine of Difference is shown to be quite compatible with reason and texts.
8. Certain published criticisms of the doctrines of Madhva are answered.
9. Madhva's system is shown to be a vital and integral part of Indian Metaphysics.
- 10 It is shown to be supported by the Upanishads, Brahmasutras, and the Gita.
11. Madhva's place in the Sun is shown to be sure, safe and secure.



## ERRATA—CORRECTIONS

Readers are requested to note the following corrections:—

Page	Line	Corrections	Page	Line	Corrections
2	43	movements	224	43	to establish
24	34	disparate	230	17	Bhedadipratyayatvat
42	1	a fortiori	238n	1	ascribed to
72	32	debater	242	—	The order of the last four lines should be 1, 3, 2, 4
78	43	jurors	245	11	full stop after "tradition"
80	34	defeat	248	23	having reliability
84	28	degeneration	254	34	Vijnanya
88	5	concealing	262	14	line of activity
89	41	laws	262n	1	jnyapayitum
89n	4	Tatvodyota	263	24	Supposing
90	13	stubborn	263	33	Dvasuparna
90n	3	aeternitatis	264	13	Dvasuparna
95	30	rendered	265	36	can assert
95n	3	etc.	268	26	form part
96	21	concept is	268	36	puts forward
108	8	Omit "the" after "to be"	271	27	omit the interrogation mark
108	15	Drishtanta-asiddhi	272	39	same
125	1	causal	276	27	What
127	32	cannot	277	6	repetition
135	2	Absolute	281	23	win
137	48	or	282	36	Viseshya
138	28	whenever	291	16	Another
143	16	Omniscience	292	23	would
152	—	The order of the first five lines should be—2, 3, 4, 1, 5	292	41	and
153	44	differences	298	36	in the
156	18	accommodation	310	10	Paramartha
163	34	kshara	311	15	as involving asat. They involve non-existence.
164	37	Omit "And Conclusion"	317	23	experienced
169	7	into them	318	35	impartially
169	43	Supreme Being	318	42	why such
171	5	non-existence eternal	319	24	Mandadhikari
172	2	Dukkha	319	27	If it is
172	11	Dukkha	319	32	accentuate it in
172	13	Dukkha	319	40	becomes
182	23	Omit "But"	321	24	absolutists
182n	3	asiddheh	323	36	should begin "finite and the Infinite and"
183	13	arguments	325	14	Sa - Atma - Tatwamasi
183	15	appearance			Svetaketo into Sa - Atma - Atat - Twamasi-Svetaketo
184	5	nor	326	29	significant
187	21	characteristics	328	10	Cosmos
187	24	mean	329	43	do not realise
189n	—	anuma-viseshah	330	11	and rains
190	31	Pravritti	331	32	import
192	11	sadvilakshana	332	4	proximity
192	34	accommodate	332	12	full stop after "investigation". Omit "tree"
194	6	whatever	334	27	inevitability
199	29	quality-less	334	41	the bed
208	26	and Madhva	335	15	be a more
211	1	Jnyanam	336	5	covers
212	16	should be "natural sense and in reference to the"	340	16	between finite
223	10	full stop after "pre-eminent"	341n	2	Paramesvara
223	35	Eka			
223	40	Eka			
224	15	Only			
86					

Page	Line	Corrections	Page	Line	Corrections
347	13	full stop after "thief"— Add "Can he ?"	476	43	omit "7" after "context"
350	15	to the minds	480	28	determinate
351	36	ascertained time	481	31	scriptural
352	2	identity-doctrine	489	6	jnya
354	1	may in fact	490	17	impairing it (though...
354	41	potentiality	491	46	Dvasuparna
354	42	reflected	492	8	Dvasuparna
362	19	would be	492	18	Dvasuparna
365	43	samabhyah	493	9	Dvasuparna
366	28	live and die	500	47	then there is
366	34	which is	503	2	crises
368	18	of course	508	2	question
374	41	and help	509	19	as subjects
378	12	unfailingly	511	23	quotation mark after "Brahman"
380	26	dependence	511	25	quotation mark after "attributes"
381	2	omit "of"	511	25	quotation mark at the end
384	19	omit "etc."	513	3	Advitiyam
387	27	dog the footsteps of it	515	9	are to be
397	24	one self	515	33	Creator
400	22	waking life	516	27	on to
402	14	face of	517	36	Whether or not
403	41	of self	519	12	doctrines are
407	25	should open with "the datum"	522	28	omit "and" after "in- active"
407	27	should open with "a crayon"	523	10	Uktha
410	40	of knowledge	524	38	Purana
411	22	unmistakable	524	40	the Terms
413	35	pramana	526	40	with impunity
413	38	omit "as"	527	4	affected
414	2	determination	527	17	possesses
414	12	differentiationless	527	19	viseshavat
415	23	Ghata-abhava	528	19	cannot
416	18	go-by	528	36	or entity
419	14	inherent difference	529	11	no one
419	45	ascription	529	45	mare's nest
419	47	erected	530	39	there must
420	4	chaitanya	531	4	and the
420	27	Omit quotation mark	531	38	Add interrogation mark after "asat"
421	8	brought	533	—	omit line 11
422	32	piece of	533	36	erroneous
434	15	illusory or	537	43	contention of
441	17	full stop after "Moun- tain"	540	1	omit "should"
442	41	distant tree	541	12	omit full stop after "worship"
444	5	dimensions	550	12	Nyayamrita
445	9	reveal his	553	13	thing is
445	33	dukkha	569	4	so that
447	39	aaropita	578	44	residuum
447	47	full stop after "expe- rience"	599	15	example
448	37	not air...not fire	617	24	just to
449	12	durghatatvam	620	2	admit
453	39	one is	622	16	Prakarana
455	8	are those	627	32	causal
463	26	attempt	635	37	Europe
465	12	Difference in	638	—	Omit line 18
471	31	wherever	656	11	While
472	46	in a particular	664	16	adhikarana
474	6	omit quotation marks after "thinking"	667	38	Life
474	25	of effective	671	8	develop to be
1, 445,	}	Russell	671	33	relation
473, 633			672	11	to emotions
			673	3	cling
			673	15	the texts

## INDEX—INDIAN

### A

- "A", 366  
 Aakara, 196  
 Aaropita, 434, 438, 447  
 Aaropitatva, 408  
 Aavriti, 178, 280, 592  
 Aayatana, 342, 343  
  
 Abadhya, 436  
 Abhava, 168, 169, 170, 291, 315, 490  
 Abhavat, 88  
 Abheda, 293, 531  
 Abhranti, 313  
 Abhyasa, 64, 277, 278, 621  
  
 Acharya, 82, 146, 149, 179, 208, 325, 458, 489, 546, 548, 567, 575, 587, 604, 606, 626, 627, 630, 631, 632, 638, 641, 663, 666, 667, 679  
 Achetana, 171, 175, 177, 434  
 Achintya, 187  
  
 Adbhuta, 187  
 Adharma, 239, 240, 242, 244, 246, 251, 255, 256, 256n, 567, 667  
 Adhika, 394  
 Adhikara, 117  
 Adhikarana, 338  
 Adhikari, 45, 55, 117, 120, 122, 145, 148, 150, 163, 165, 240, 606, 609  
 Adhikya, 76  
 Adhishtana, 356, 398, 400, 413, 420, 428, 429, 434, 447  
 Adhishtana-chaitanya, 413  
 Adhyasa, 26n, 401, 404, 520, 577, 579, 581, 588, 593, 660, 670  
 Adhyayana-karma, 485  
 Adhyayana-vidhayaka, 485  
 Adi, 592  
 Advaita, 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 89, 205  
 Advaita-kaalanala, 557  
 Advaita-nishta, 231  
 Advaita-vada, 128, 148  
 Advaita-vedanta, 620  
 Adviteeyam, 577  
  
 Agama, 37, 39, 41, 64, 67, 69, 85, 86, 102, 151, 161, 180, 183, 185, 224, 228, 229, 233, 238, 242, 263, 265, 267, 270, 272, 273, 277, 279, 320, 323, 342, 417, 441, 443, 445, 482, 527, 528, 548, 565, 631.  
 Agama-pramanya, 265  
 Agnishtoma, 523  
  
 Aham, 368  
 Ahamkara, 176, 414, 438  
  
 Aikshata, 640  
 Aikya, 263, 271  
 Aikya-jnyana, 319  
  
 Aikyam, 116, 151, 153, 161, 162, 326  
 Aitadatmyam, 345  
  
 Ajnyana, 123, 124, 126, 127, 177, 411, 434, 435, 438, 438n, 445, 472, 474  
 Ajnyata, 139  
 Ajnyeya, 187  
  
 Akalahakara, 47  
 Akamsha, 250, 251  
 Akasa, 200, 253, 254, 255, 416  
 Akhanda, 207  
 Akhandartha, 210, 211, 215, 216, 293, 533, 548  
 Akhandartha-vada, 233  
 Akhandavritti, 341  
 Akshara, 163, 164, 495, 496, 501  
 Akshara-purusha, 163  
 Aktadhikarana, 555  
  
 Alpasaktitva, 140  
  
 Amsa, 460, 461  
 Amurtha, 186  
  
 Anadhyavasita, 99, 100, 101  
 Anadi, 396, 579, 590, 591, 609, 612, 628  
 Anaikantika, 98, 100, 101  
 Anaiyappacharya, 234, 551  
 Ananda, 504  
 Anaropita, 167  
 Anatma, 428, 578, 579, 580, 588  
 Anavastha, 125  
 Anda, 176  
 Anga, 72, 257, 319  
 Anima, 344, 345  
 Anirdishtapratyogika, 181  
 Anirvachaniya, 87, 88, 89n, 97, 98, 100, 106, 114, 182, 184, 186, 188, 189, 192, 198, 216, 220, 310, 312, 314, 318, 419, 527, 529, 534  
 Anirvachaniyatva, 101  
 Anirvachya, 527  
 Anitya, 252  
 Anityah, 175, 327, 459, 469  
 Anityatva, 418  
 Annayona-abhava, 291  
 Annayonasrayatva, 282  
 Anrita, 187  
 Antahkarana, 125, 413, 422, 585, 585n  
 Antahkarana-parinama, 422  
 Antaryami, 366, 367, 623  
 Anu-bhashya, 549, 610n  
 Anubhava, 271  
 Anubhuti, 572  
 Anucchitti-dharma, 372, 373  
 Anumana, 37, 39, 40, 85, 102, 143, 149, 183, 185, 189, 224, 233, 264, 277, 304, 309, 482, 491, 520, 548, 563, 575, 631  
 Anu-pramana, 37, 41

Anusandhana, 133, 136n, 137, 227, 228,  
453, 454, 466  
Anusandhatribheda, 453, 454  
Anusayi, 342  
Anuvada, 78  
Anuvadaka, 264, 270, 276, 492  
Anu-vyakhyana, 163n, 164n, 190n,  
204n, 210n, 256n, 262n, 545, 546, 547,  
562n, 569n, 570, 571, 575, 581n,  
586n, 593, 593n, 594, 594n, 597, 606,  
607n, 609n, 612, 612n, 613, 615, 615n,  
617, 619, 621, 622n, 640, 641n, 657n,  
661, 674  
Anvaya, 258  
Anyā, 622  
Anyatha-khyati, 625  
Anyatha-upasana, 615  
Anyatva, 535  
Anyonyasraya, 125, 408, 462  
Apadana, 338  
Apara, 205  
Apara-mukti, 370  
Apara-prameya, 206  
Aparoksha, 203  
Apatu, 441, 443  
Apatu-pratyaksha, 443, 444, 574  
Apaursheya, 33, 41, 229, 237, 238,  
242, 243, 248, 262, 562  
Apaursheyatva, 238, 238n, 239, 245,  
246, 247, 252, 552  
Apaursheya-vada, 41n  
Apaursheya-vakya, 239  
Apeeta, 341  
Api, 340  
Apita, 340  
Appayya-Dikshita, 497n, 551, 553,  
556, 558, 622n, 638, 678  
Apradhana, 222, 224  
Aprakasa, 198, 199  
Aparamana, 20, 21, 29, 160  
Aparamanya, 26n, 27, 30, 33, 250, 251,  
569  
Aparamata, 197  
Aprasiddha, 246  
Apratibuddha-bodhana, 78  
Apratisankhya-nirodha, 254  
Aprayojaka, 224  
Apta, 37, 212, 238  
Apta-vakya, 37  
Aptoryama, 523  
Apunaravritti, 257  
Apurva, 274, 537  
Apurvata, 64, 274, 275, 621  
Arjuna, 227  
Artha, 40, 164, 221  
Arthakriyakari, 314  
Arthapatti, 41, 188, 189, 243, 244, 539n  
Arthavada, 64, 257, 621, 623  
Asadharana, 429  
Asadhu, 54  
Asad-vilakshana, 88, 184, 191, 530, 535,  
536  
Asad-vilakshanatvat, 88  
Asambhavana, 443

Asamsrishta, 175, 176  
Asanga, 121  
Asat, 54, 60, 88, 93, 106, 183, 185, 187,  
189, 190, 192, 275, 310, 318, 434, 527,  
530, 534, 536  
Asatya, 188, 366  
Asatyam, 533  
Asiddha, 97  
Asiddha-vishaya, 476  
Asrama, 579, 593  
Asraya, 429, 434  
Asvaparakasa, 413  
Asvapratigraheshtyadhikarana, 553  
A-svatantra, 167, 168  
A-tarkya, 187  
A-tat, 325  
A-tat-Twamasi, 325, 326, 327, 349, 350,  
352, 520, 598, 600, 601, 601n, 604, 623,  
680  
Atatva, 318  
Atatvavedaka, 318, 348  
Atatvika-yogi-jnyana, 36  
Atharva, 63  
Atharvana, 622  
Atiratra, 523  
Atma, 189, 194, 195, 196, 198, 257, 267,  
293, 340, 345, 429, 578, 579, 580, 588,  
620, 656  
Atma-adhishtanaka, 447  
Atma-bheda, 445  
Atma-jnyana, 195, 196  
Atman, 98, 100, 120, 123, 126, 154, 202,  
397, 401, 404, 407, 409, 410, 414,  
426, 428, 447, 448, 450, 458, 459, 577,  
613  
Atmasraya, 411, 433, 438, 461  
Atmatvat, 104  
Atma-viseshaguna, 373  
Atyagnishtoma, 523  
Atyanta-abhava, 415  
Aupadhika, 128, 135, 228, 427  
Avagati, 187  
Avaidika, 319  
Avantara-tatparya, 279  
Avayava, 459  
Avedya, 154, 155  
Avedyatva, 154, 413  
Avidya, 126, 147, 185, 193, 322, 366, 371,  
395, 413, 420, 429, 495, 512, 547, 650  
Avirodha, 546  
Avyakrita-akasa, 175, 186  
Avyaktha, 164  
Ayathartha, 152  
Ayathartha-pratipadaka, 152  
Ayogi-jnyana, 36  
Ayogis, 37

## B

Badarayana, 8, 9, 11, 612, 640, 661, 669  
Baddha, 450  
Badha, 418

Badhaka-jnyana, 312

Badhya, 184, 189

Badhyatva, 191, 418

Bahu-jiva-vada, 426, 439

Balavat-pratyaksha, 440

Bandha, 178, 280, 592

Bhagavad-Gita, 163, 188

Bhagavata-purana, 524

Bhakti, 9, 10, 12, 679

Bhakti-pada, 674

Bhamati, 547, 566n

Bhashya, 9, 43, 164n, 549, 577, 617

Bhashyakara, 208

Bhaskara, 477

Bhatta, 5, 159

Bhava, 168, 169, 394

Bhava-rupa, 490

Bhavati, 223, 341

Bheda, 125, 127, 128, 161, 162, 192, 287, 293, 294, 296, 309, 316, 318, 367, 454, 482, 490, 520, 531, 548, 581, 629

Bheda-abheda, 293, 384, 477, 504, 509, 531

Bhedadi-pratyayatvat, 230

Bhedanubhava, 230

Beda-vada, 148

Bheda-vakya, 278

Bheda-vidya-vilasa, 557

Bhedojjeevana, 547, 548, 557, 591, 591n

Bhiksha, 322

Bhinna-anusandhana, 454

Bhoga, 466

Bhrama, 438, 447

Bhranti, 230, 313

Bhranti-kalpita, 254

Bhuma, 164

Bhutas, 176

Bijankura-nyaya, 437

Bimba, 427

Bodhana, 177

Bodhayana, 8, 11

Brahma, 176, 340, 497, 502

Brahma-jignyasa, 117, 122, 132, 150

Brahmameemamsa-sastra, 44

Brahmananda-sarasvati, 550

Brahmanandeeya, 551

Brahmanda-purana, 203, 248, 502, 503

Brahma-sutras, 163, 220, 340, 401, 606, 607

Brahma-tarka, 48, 71, 80, 81, 272, 556

Brahmavaivarta-purana, 429

Brihaspati, 188

Buddha, 244, 245

Buddhi, 164, 176, 585n

Buddhi-dosha, 250

Buddhi-sarupya, 379

Badhaka-iva, 443

## C

Chaitanya, 9, 420, 422, 423, 425, 436, 475

Chakraka, 125

Chandamaruta, 423n, 557, 602n, 613n, 624n

Chandogya, 326, 618n, 658n

Charvaka, 13, 239, 240, 241, 672

Chaturmata-sara-sangraha, 678n

Cheshta, 138

Chetana, 171, 172, 175, 197

Chitta, 585n

## D

Dahara-vidya, 615, 616

Daityas, 173

Datta-svatantrya, 650

Desatah, 199

Deva, 540,

Devadatta, 211, 214, 253, 348, 416, 454, 455, 463, 539

Devas 173

Dharma, 239, 241, 245, 246, 255, 256, 256n, 490, 567, 667

Dharmi, 283, 285, 286, 290, 294, 295, 296, 297, 300

Dharmi-grahaka-pramana, 603

Dharmi-svarupa, 287, 294, 296, 369, 419, 581

Dik, 254

Dikshita, 555

Dosha, 25, 28, 30, 40

Dravya, 506

Drik-vishaya, 194

Drishtanta, 106, 107, 108, 114, 300

Drishtanta-asiddhi, 108

Drishteh, 375

Drishti, 421

Drishti-srishti, 421, 422

Drisya, 86, 95, 105, 107, 110, 194, 197

Drisyatva, 413

Drisyatvat, 86, 95, 98, 100, 104, 109, 197

Dukkha, 172

Dukkha-asprishta, 172

Dukkha-samstha, 172

Dukkha-sprishta, 172

Duragama, 238

Durgata, 217

Dvadasa-stotra, 590n, 647, 647n, 671n

Dvaita, 7, 373, 393, 636, 662, 663, 678

Dva-suparna, 263, 264, 491, 492, 493

Dve-Brahmani, 264,

Dwaita, 148

## E

Eka, 223, 229, 361, 362  
 Eka-desa, 459  
 Eka-jiva, 231, 416, 446  
 Eka-jiva-ajnyana-parikalpita - vada,  
 386, 389  
 Eka-jiva-vada, 231, 232, 412n, 431,  
 439, 454, 520  
 Eka-jiva-vadins, 385  
 Ekata, 340  
 Eka-vijnyanena-sarva-vijnyanam, 360,  
 365  
 Ekebhava, 376  
 Eki-bhava, 229

## G

Gadadhara, 43  
 Ga-kara, 253  
 Gandhara, 337  
 Ganga, 330  
 Gangayam, 481  
 Gangayam-ghoshah, 211  
 Garuda, 496  
 Cauda-naityayika, 48, 73, 75  
 Gauda-pada, 231, 391n  
 Gaurava, 32

Ghata, 283, 485  
 Ghata-abhava, 415

Gita, 609, 631, 640, 660

Guna, 28, 30, 504, 506, 508, 510, 525,  
 648  
 Guna-sabda, 481  
 Guni, 508, 510  
 Guru, 333, 334, 515  
 Guru-chandrika, 551

## H

Harsha, 48, 53n, 54, 73, 83  
 Hetu, 95, 97, 101, 105, 107, 109, 114,  
 193, 198, 230

## I

Ikshati, 353

Indra, 496  
 Indriya, 40

Ishtasadhanata, 537, 538  
 Ishtasadhanata-jnyana, 259, 262  
 Iswara, 43, 270, 429, 464, 465, 467,  
 468, 478, 567, 597  
 Iswara-guna, 549  
 Iswara-jnyana, 34, 35, 36  
 Iswara-prasada, 668

Itaretaradhyasa, 402, 403  
 Iti, 363, 364

## J

Jada, 197, 198, 428, 588, 589, 598  
 Jadatva, 198, 199, 414  
 Jadatvat, 197  
 Jagad-guru, 661  
 Jagad-vyapara, 370  
 Jagad-vyapara-varjyam, 370, 673  
 Jaimini, 231, 522  
 Jaina, 619  
 Jalpa, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 61, 70,  
 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82  
 Jalpa-vitanda, 48, 73, 75  
 Janmadyasya-yatah, 589, 589n, 592, 675  
 Jati, 481  
 Jati-sabda, 481  
 Jaya-tirtha, 41n, 43, 80, 83, 165, 178,  
 234, 299, 521, 544n, 558, 559, 591,  
 678, 679  
 Jina, 244  
 Jiva, 43, 45, 123, 125, 131, 138, 140,  
 143, 146, 150, 342, 344, 438n, 464,  
 467, 468, 471, 474, 490, 492, 493, 589,  
 591, 597, 598, 604, 656, 679  
 Jiva-chaitanya, 420  
 Jivatma, 345, 656, 657  
 Jnya, 489  
 Jnyana, 20, 412, 486  
 Jnyana-karma-samucchaya, 431  
 Jnyanam, 533, 592  
 Jnyata, 486  
 Jnyatri, 486  
 Jnyeya, 483,  
 Jyotih, 178

## K

Kaivalya, 620  
 Kala, 200  
 Kalatah, 199  
 Kalatyayapadishta, 103  
 Kali-yuga, 4  
 Kalpaka, 397  
 Kalpasutra-kara, 638, 639  
 Kalpasutras, 639  
 Kantakodhdhara, 142n, 554, 589n, 635n,  
 670n  
 Karana, 222  
 Karana-adhyasa, 579  
 Karma, 17, 137, 172, 177, 322, 377, 388,  
 474, 476, 485, 506, 522, 609, 610, 612,  
 616, 624, 627, 628, 653, 658, 668, 676  
 Karma-nirnaya, 484n, 522, 542, 543  
 Karma-vyavastha, 476  
 Karshnayasena, 362  
 Karta, 267, 485  
 Kartritva, 141  
 Karya, 222, 257, 262, 267, 537, 544  
 Karya-adhyasa, 579  
 Karyata, 537, 539, 541  
 Karye-vyutpatti, 261, 262  
 Katha, 45, 47, 49, 51, 605  
 Katha-lakshana, 44  
 Kevala-pramana, 37, 42  
 Khandana-khandakhadya, 536n

Khandanas, 166  
Khila, 639  
Khila-sruti, 638  
Khyati, 311, 312

Kim, 371

Krishnadevaroya, 547  
Kriya, 481, 504  
Kriya-sabda, 481

Kshara, 163, 501  
Kshara-purusha, 163

## L

Laghava, 32  
Lakshana, 211, 213, 214, 215  
Lakshana-lakshana, 159n  
Lakshmi 178  
Lakshmi-jnyana, 35, 36

Linga, 616, 622  
Linga-sarira, 616

Lohena, 362

## M

"Ma", 393  
Madhusudana-sarasvati, 550  
Madhva, his—  
    Karma-nirnaya, 522-544  
    Katha-lakshana, 44-83  
    Mayavada-khandana, 149-165  
    Mithyatvanumana-khandana, 84-114  
    Pramana-lakshana, 13-43  
    Tatva-samkhyana, 166-178  
    Tatvodyota, 179-234  
    Upadhi-khandana, 115-148  
    Vishnu-tatva-vinirnaya, 235-521  
    Splitting of text into "ATAT-TWAM-ASI", 325-350  
    Equation between Advaitism and Buddhism, 205-210  
Madhva-adhva-kantakoddhara, 554, 589n,  
Madhva-tantra-mukha-bhushana, 554  
Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana, 554  
Madhva-vijaya, 662  
Madhva-vilasa-book-Depot, Kumbakonam, 562n  
Mahabharata, 236, 279, 347  
Maha-lakshmi, 381, 519, 546, 555, 615, 678, 679  
Maha-namnee, 542, 543  
Mahan-atma, 164  
Maha-tatparya, 279, 281  
Mahattatva, 176  
Maha-vakya, 210  
Mahima, 220  
Maitreyi, 371, 372  
Manas, 585n  
Manasa-jnyana, 445  
Mandadhikari, 319  
Mandagrahi, 441

Mandara-manjari, 95n, 99  
Mandukya-karika, 391n  
Mani-manjari, 662  
Manu, 236  
Martyadhamas, 173  
Maya, 355, 393  
Maya-matra, 393  
Maya-vada, 149  
Maya-vada-khandana, 149, 193, 654n  
Maya-vadi, 205, 206, 207

Meemamsaka 537, 539, 540, 541, 622  
Meemamsa-nayakaumudi, 556

Mithya, 84, 86, 87, 95, 96, 109, 183, 191, 195, 315, 527  
Mithyatva, 110, 198, 224, 418  
Mithyatvanumana-khandana, 86, 114n, 149, 184, 193, 220, 229  
Mithyopadhi, 431, 437

Moksha, 178, 279, 280, 281, 459, 592, 605

Mrit-pinda, 361  
Mrittika, 221, 363, 364

Mukhya-karana, 319  
Mukhyartha, 211  
Mukta, 179, 181, 224, 227, 228, 232, 233, 379, 435, 450, 516  
Mukta-amukta-prapancha, 234, 518, 519  
Muktatvat, 181  
Mukti, 146, 172, 173, 180, 181, 281, 370, 435, 487, 488, 490, 516, 548  
Mukti-yogyas, 172, 173, 178  
Muktyayogyas, 172  
Mula-Ramayana, 236  
Mumukshu, 150

## N

Nagarjuna-karika, 209  
Nairatmya-vada, 396, 397  
Naisargika, 579  
Naiyyayika, 28, 30, 42, 83, 298, 417  
Nana-jeeva-vada, 520  
Narada, 502  
Naras, 173  
Narayana, 164, 235, 499, 501, 503, 508, 510, 515, 516, 518, 519, 521, 524, 536, 541, 543, 555, 585, 605, 607, 611, 614, 615, 617, 653, 666, 667, 669, 678, 679  
Nasa, 592  
Neha-nana, 491  
Neti-neti, 293, 294, 295  
Nididhyasana, 616  
Nigrahasthana, 70, 76, 80n, 81  
Nimitta-karana, 342, 353, 354, 611  
Nimitta-nimitti-bhava, 438  
Nirdosha, 40  
Nirdoshartha, 40  
Nirdosha-upapatti, 40  
Nirguna, 504, 525, 670



Nirguna-Brahman, 211, 215, 524, 589,  
612, 635, 661  
Nirukta 263  
Nirvishesha, 525, 526  
Nishpratiyogika, 415  
Nitya, 175, 221, 464, 469  
Nitya-anitya, 175  
Nitya-samsaris, 173, 179, 626  
Nitya-sukhitva, 141, 142  
Niyama, 177  
Niyanta, 232  
Niyati 280, 366, 592  
Nivartaka, 436  
Nivarteta, 395  
  
Nyaya, 59, 635  
Nyaya-manjari, 53n  
Nyaya-mauktika-maala, 552, 674  
Nyayamrita, 26n, 210n, 500n, 548,  
550, 551, 558, 566n 567, 568, 602n  
Nyayamrita-amoda, 551  
Nyayamrita-Tarangini, 550  
Nyayamrita-Tarangini-Saurabha, 550  
Nyayarakshamani, 552  
Nyayaratnakara, 551  
Nyaya-sudha, 238n, 549  
Nyaya-sutra, 80n  
Nyaya-vaisheshika, 339, 504, 506, 526,  
552, 620, 621, 635, 656  
Nyaya-vivarana, 549

## P

Pada, 221, 480  
Padartha, 297  
Paksha, 113  
Pancha-bheda, 598  
Pancha-granthi, 551  
Pancha-padika, 548  
Pancha-ratra, 63, 236  
Para, 205  
Para-eva, 377  
Paramartha, 394  
Paramartha-sat, 316  
Paramarthaika, 90n, 182, 310, 447, 535,  
570, 642  
Paramarthaika-grahi, 564  
Paramarthaika-sat, 316  
Parama-samya 228  
Paramatma, 164, 327, 346, 656  
Paramopanishad, 347  
Parampara, 247  
Paratah, 250, 251  
Paratantra, 142, 215, 642  
Para-tatva-prakasa, 497n, 554  
Pare, 378  
Pare-avyaye, 377  
Pariccheda 480, 548  
Paricchinna, 199  
Pariksha, 442  
Pariksha-abhava, 443  
Pariksha-apravritti, 442  
Parinamyupadana, 634  
Paroksha, 425  
Parvati, 554  
Pasupatha, 63  
Pasu-yagas, 555

Pata, 283, 291  
Patu-pratyaksha, 443

Phala, 64, 72, 146, 147, 546, 621.

Pinda, 361, 362  
Pippalada-sruti, 237  
Pisachas, 173  
Pishta-pasu-meemamsa, 555  
Pitris, 173

Prabala, 553  
Prabandha, 46  
Prabhakara, 256, 556  
Prabhakaras, 42, 544  
Pracchanna-Bauddhas, 205  
Pradhana, 168, 221, 223, 224, 319, 393,  
401, 429  
Pradhana-Bhasha, 221  
Pradhanya, 223  
Pradhvamsa, 171  
Pradhvamsa-abhava, 169, 170  
Pragabhava, 169, 170  
Prajnya-Murti, 585  
Prakarana, 167  
Prakaranas, 520, 665  
Prakarana-samah, 105  
Prakasa, 199  
Prakriti, 177, 200, 366, 506, 640  
Pralaya, 185, 186, 497  
Pramana, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 29,  
39, 42, 43, 46, 49, 52, 61, 84, 86,  
102, 103, 143, 183, 200, 251, 305, 348,  
417, 492, 548, 602, 661  
Pramana-chaitanya, 413, 422  
Pramana-drishtatva, 105  
Pramana-drishtatvat, 106  
Pramana-lakshana, 95n, 539n  
Pramana-paddhati, 43  
Pramana-viruddhatvam, 109  
Pramanya, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33, 235,  
250, 252, 549, 569  
Pramanya-vada, 43  
Prama-sadhana, 42  
Pramata, 13, 14, 15, 197, 227  
Pramatri-chaitanya, 413, 422  
Pramatritva, 197  
Prameya, 14, 15, 205  
Prameya-chaitanya, 413, 422  
Prana, 335, 342, 346  
Prapancha, 392  
Praptandha-tamasah, 173, 175  
Prarabdha-karma, 136, 610  
Prasiddhi, 184, 247  
Prasnikha, 59, 77, 79  
Prasthanatraya, 638  
Prati-bhasika, 314  
Prati-bimba, 123, 427  
Pratijnya, 87, 94, 113  
Prati-karma-vyavastha, 422, 424  
Pratisankhya-nirodha, 254  
Pratishedha-samucchaya, 192  
Pratishta, 342  
Pratiti, 310, 311  
Pratitya-samutpada, 501  
Pratiyogi, 169, 170, 288, 300, 415, 491  
Prati-vadi, 56, 61, 62, 64, 69, 70  
Pratyabhijsya, 253

Pratyaksha, 37, 38, 39, 42, 67, 85, 86,  
143, 149, 151, 183, 185, 200, 264, 301,  
491, 548, 631  
Pravritti, 202  
Pravritti-prakara, 72  
Prayojana, 119, 120, 122, 145, 146, 148,  
163, 240

Purana, 175, 262, 639  
Purna, 379  
Purusha, 506  
Purushartha, 281  
Purushottama, 164, 226, 227  
Purvameemamsa, 256, 258, 259, 326,  
522, 544, 556, 621, 622, 636  
Purvameemamsaka, 261, 263, 274, 522,  
539, 540  
Purva-paksha, 46

## R

Raghavendra Swami, 83, 178  
Raghavendra Tirtha, 234, 521  
Rajas, 525  
Rakshasas, 173  
Ramanuja, 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 232,  
324, 545, 630, 632, 638, 656n, 678  
Ratnabhisheka, 547

Rijus, 36  
Rik, 63  
Rishis, 173  
Ritviks, 556

Rudra, 232

## S

Sabara, 556  
Sabdanumana-upajivya, 570  
Sabda-sabda, 485  
Sabhapati, 77  
Sada-abhava, 169, 171  
Sadagamah, 63, 236, 238  
Sadasadvilakshana, 90, 91, 93, 94, 185,  
186, 192, 310, 312, 316, 317, 434, 529,  
531, 535  
Sadasat, 192  
Sadhana, 107, 108, 110, 546, 610  
Sadhana-adhyaya, 607  
Sadhana-avyapaka, 110  
Sadharana, 429  
Sadhus, 54  
Sadhya, 100, 106, 107, 108, 110, 193  
Sadhya-vyapaka, 110  
Sadrisya, 223, 429  
Sad-vilakshana, 191, 530, 532  
Saguna, 159n  
Saguna-Brahma, 159n, 210, 321, 524,  
589, 635, 637, 639  
Saiva, 63  
Sakartrika, 267  
Sakshat, 355  
Sakshatkara, 568  
Sakshi, 42, 321, 323, 420, 442, 444, 572,  
579, 582, 586, 586n, 594, 595, 602, 603  
Sakshi-pratyaksha, 667  
Sakshyanubhava, 270, 271

Sakuni-sutra, 341  
Sakuni-sutra-prakarana, 342  
Sama, 63  
Samakhya, 622  
Samanvaya, 546  
Samanya, 506  
Samayi, 240  
Sambandha, 119, 120, 122, 147, 163  
Samhara, 280  
Samhriti, 177  
Samsara, 150, 172, 180, 187, 334, 469,  
647  
Samsarga, 481, 482  
Samsari, 225, 226  
Samsaya, 18, 442, 480  
Samskaravacchinna-chaitanya, 425  
Samslishta, 456  
Samsrishta, 175  
Samvriti, 207  
Samvriti-satya, 206  
Samyoga, 459  
Sankara, 2, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 24, 91, 231,  
324, 401, 402, 545, 577, 579, 580, 630,  
633, 638, 640, 649, 664, 665, 665n, 678  
Sanketa, 481  
Sankhya-karika, 176n, 585n  
Sankhyas, 130, 174n, 417, 506, 585n,  
620, 621, 635, 664, 678  
Sannikarsha, 40  
Sapaksha, 113  
Sarva, 223  
Sarva-abhava-jnyana, 356  
Sarvabhavanam, 394  
Sarva-aparokshavid, 203  
Sarvagata, 420, 464  
Sarvajana-pratyayavalambi, 47  
Sarvajnya, 121, 143  
Sarvajnyatva, 141, 355  
Sarvam-karshnayamasam, 362  
Sarvamuila, 164n, 174n, 178n, 542n,  
565  
Sarvasakti, 143  
Sarvasaktimattva, 141, 142  
Sarvaviijnanya, 356  
Sarvottama, 320, 641  
Sastra, 145, 151, 152, 157, 322  
Sat, 54, 60, 89, 90, 92, 106, 183, 185,  
186, 192, 310, 313, 315, 318, 434, 528,  
530, 532, 534, 535, 536  
Satam, 50  
Satsakti, 384  
Satta, 95  
Satta-abhava, 408  
Satva, 315, 525  
Satyam, 104, 127, 161, 187, 211, 396,  
427, 436, 533, 534  
Satyanritamithunikanara, 577  
Satyata, 95  
Savadhana, 47  
Savishesha, 293  
Savishesha-abheda, 293, 510, 628  
Shat-tatparyalinga, 638  
Shodasakalah, 377  
Shodasi, 523  
Siddha, 154, 155, 213, 258, 260, 262,  
537, 541

Siddha-sadhana, 416  
 Siddha-vishaya-anavastha, 476  
 Siddhe-vyutpatti, 261  
 Sishya, 515  
 Siva, 496, 497, 554  
 Siva-karnamrita, 554  
 Sivarka-manideepika, 552  
 Siva-tatva-viveka, 497n, 554

Skandha, 254

Smriti, 150, 151, 188, 304, 309, 652

Sprishtha-dukkha, 172

Srikantha, 638, 665, 678n  
 Srinivasa-tirtha, 135, 178, 234, 521, 544n  
 Srishti, 177, 421  
 Srishti-vakya, 365  
 Sritisamstha, 173, 175  
 Srutahana, 341  
 Sruti, 31, 32, 33, 34, 121, 143, 144, 145, 150, 151, 188, 214, 233, 255, 267, 269, 270, 273, 274, 304, 309, 317, 320, 464, 480, 481, 492, 562, 563, 603, 607, 611, 622, 652, 661

Sthana, 622

Sthira, 254

Sthiti, 177, 280, 592

Suddha, 435, 469  
 Suddha-Brahman, 471  
 Sukha-dukkha, 445  
 Sukti-rajata, 106, 107  
 Sunya, 207, 209, 254, 275, 291, 620  
 Sunya-vadi, 206, 207  
 Surya, 496  
 Sushupti, 414  
 Sutra, 8, 592, 607, 611, 612, 639, 640, 658, 660, 670, 673  
 Sutra-Bhashya, 572  
 Sutra-kara, 233, 613

Sva, 340, 341  
 Svabhava, 127  
 Svabhavika, 128, 135, 431  
 Svabhavika-bheda, 135  
 Svam, 341  
 Sva-prakasa, 154, 158, 198, 483  
 Sva-prakasatva, 154  
 Svartha-anischayaka, 442  
 Svarthanischayaka, 442  
 Svarupa, 135, 153, 191, 213, 367, 470, 507, 508  
 Svarupa-bheda, 137, 453  
 Svarupaikya, 134, 136, 137, 228, 379, 453  
 Svarupatva, 507  
 Svastha, 47  
 Svatah, 26, 31, 33, 247, 249, 251, 569  
 Svatah-pramana, 143, 144, 520, 562, 563  
 Svatah-pramanya, 251  
 Svatantra, 34, 168, 379, 642  
 Svatantra-kartritva, 141, 142  
 Svatantra-Tatva, 222  
 "Svatmanachottarayoh", 340

Sva-vishaya, 198  
 Svetaketu, 214, 215, 324, 326, 339, 350, 351

## T

Tadaikshata, 353  
 Tad-vijignyasasva, 498  
 Taittireeyaka, 517  
 Taittiriya, 236, 658n  
 Tajjalan, 352  
 Tamas, 174n, 185, 186, 525, 664  
 Tamo-yogyas, 173, 175, 626, 644  
 Tanmatras, 176  
 Tarangini, 550, 551, 558  
 Tarangini-saurabha, 558  
 Tarka, 61, 236, 237, 304, 306, 400  
 Tarka-Tandava, 20n, 27n, 41n, 43, 95n, 238n, 549, 550, 552  
 Tatparya, 279  
 Tatparya-chandrika, 549  
 Tatparya-linga, 63, 326  
 Tat-Twamasi, 212, 263, 264, 278, 321, 492, 494n, 601, 603, 605, 680.  
 Tatva, 167, 168  
 Tatva-Nirnaya, 53, 68, 75, 286n, 289n, 291n, 293n, 369n, 441n, 442n, 484n, 490n, 491n, 565, 566, 570, 573, 574, 578, 580, 581, 582n, 587n, 595, 596, 597n, 600, 602, 605, 617, 640, 641n  
 Tatva-nirnaya-vailomya, 76  
 Tatva-samkhyana, 166, 167, 178, 179, 280n, 626, 642  
 Tatva-viveka, 174n, 178n, 626n  
 Tatvika-yogi-jnyana, 36  
 Tatvodyota, 179, 205, 234, 566n, 570, 573, 620.

Tejas, 335, 346

Tooshneembhava, 76

Traikalika, 171

Traikalikanishedha, 418

Turiya, 585.

Turiya-ateeta, 585

## U

Udayana, 241

Uddalaka, 324, 326, 331

Ukthah, 523

Upadanakarana, 610

Upadhi, 110, 111, 113, 118, 123, 125, 127, 129, 131, 133, 136n, 138, 149, 168, 226, 407, 409, 428, 430, 436, 438, 450, 452, 456, 458, 460, 465, 468, 472, 474, 479, 591

Upadhi-khandana, 20n, 115, 117, 118, 168, 435n, 437n, 591

Upadhi-vyavastha, 476

Upajivaka, 201, 268, 269, 271, 272, 273, 301, 563, 568

Upajivya, 201, 268, 269, 271, 272,  
273, 301, 563, 568, 603, 604

Upajivya-prabalya, 268

Upajivya-pramana, 595, 602, 603

Upakrama, 553, 622

Upakrama-parakrama, 553, 622n

Upakramopasamhara, 64, 621

Upamana, 243

Upanishads, 262, 631, 634, 660, 680

Upapatti, 64, 621

Upa-samhara, 553, 622

Upasamhara-vijaya, 553, 622n

Upasana, 260

Utpatti, 280

Uttama-purusha, 164

Uttara-paksha, 46

## V

Vaadavali, 547, 577n, 591, 591n

Vacharambhana, 363, 364

Vacharambhana-matram, 364

Vacharambhana-sruti, 220, 221, 222,  
223

Vacharambhana-vakya, 365

Vachaspati-misra, 547, 566, 649

Vada, 48, 50, 51, 53, 55, 58, 60, 61, 62,  
64, 66, 69, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79, 82

Vada-vitanda, 48, 73

Vadi, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70

Vadi-rajā, 678

Vailakshanya, 93, 531

Vailomya, 76

Vairagya, 149, 607, 608

Vaiseshika, 252, 635

Vajapeya, 523

Vak, 335, 346

Vakya, 102, 480

Vakya-prabandha, 47

Vanamali-misra, 423n, 550, 551, 565,  
602n, 624n

Vanamali-misriya, 550

Varahamihira, 663

Varna-nityatva, 552

Varna-nityatva-vada, 252

Varnas, 175, 253, 255, 593

Varnasramadharmā, 636

Vastu, 200

Vastutah, 199

Vayu, 664

Veda, 203, 204, 221, 236, 237, 242, 243,  
248, 251, 255, 262

Veda-apaurusheyatva, 549

Veda-karta, 246

Vedanta, 3, 117, 177, 195, 257, 592,  
636, 662

Vedanta-sastra-vichara, 119

Vedanta-sutra, 370, 591, 611, 612n,  
615, 617, 618, 634, 635, 639, 641,  
643, 656, 657, 660, 661, 664, 666,  
668, 670

Vedavyasa, 174

Vedesa-tirtha, 234, 245, 341n

Vedesiya, 341

Vedopakrama-adhikarana, 553

Vichara, 46

Vidarana, 291

Vidhi, 257

Vidvan, 46

Vidwan, 47

Vidya-pariksha, 79

Vijayindra, 64n, 136n, 497n, 551, 555,  
557, 558, 622n, 638, 639, 666, 670n,  
674n, 678, 679

Vijnayana, 254, 313

Vijnayanamaya, 377

Vijnyanatma, 377

Vikalpa, 388

Vikara, 363

Vilakshana, 92, 531

Vimatah, 180

Vimatam, 86, 104, 109

Vipaksha, 101, 113, 193

Viparita-pramana, 110, 113

Viparita-samskara, 443

Viparita-samskara-abhava, 442

Viparita-samskara-bhava, 442

Vipratipatti-vakya, 551

Virodha, 42, 76, 535

Viruddha, 97, 101

Vishesha, 294, 298, 505, 506, 508, 510,  
512, 513, 525, 628, 629

Visheshana, 216, 218, 282

Visheshi, 511

Visheshya, 216, 282

Vishaya, 119, 120, 122, 145, 147, 148,  
161, 163, 196

Vishaya-anyathatva, 411

Vishaya-chaitanya, 422, 434

Vishnu, 165, 177, 232, 233, 233n, 234,  
279, 381, 394, 494, 495, 497, 498, 500,  
502, 515, 518, 613, 641

Vishnu-bhakti, 60

Vishnudasacharya, 577n

Vishnu-Tatva-Vinirnaya, 494, 519

Visishta, 217, 218, 219

Visishtadvaita, 7, 9, 662

Visishtadvaitin, 228

Visishtarthā, 215, 216

Vislishta, 456, 457

Visvatomukha, 208

Vitanda, 50, 53, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 71,  
73, 74, 79, 81, 82

Vivarana, 547, 548

Vivarta, 222n, 660

Vivarta-vada, 204n, 404, 634, 660, 670

Vritti, 420, 422

Vritti-jnyana, 414

Vyabhichara, 98

Vyasa, 231

Vyasa-smriti, 203, 204

Vyasaraḇa, 26n, 43, 99, 165, 178, 547,  
549, 550, 551, 555, 557, 565, 591, 678,  
679

Vyavahara, 675

Vyavaharika, 90n, 310, 314, 447, 531,  
532

Vyavaharika-satta, 94

Vyavaharika-satya, 206

Vyavartya, 533  
Vyavritti, 293  
Vyutpatti, 256, 260

**Y**

Yadi, 395  
Yajnya-valkya, 371, 372, 373, 633  
Yamuna, 330  
Yatha, 20

Yathartham, 17, 18, 19, 20  
Yathartha-vakta, 37  
Yavanacharya, 663

Yogi, 135, 136  
Yogi-jnyana, 36

Yukti, 204, 219, 275  
Yukti-mallika, 551  
Yukti-ratnakara, 552, 553.



# INDEX—EUROPEAN

## AUTHORS

### A

Alexander, 473  
Anaxagoras, 473, 632  
Aristotle (Aristotelian), 2, 6, 9, 473,  
571, 632

### B

Bergson (Bergsonian), 7, 9, 23, 24, 85,  
91, 115, 116, 250, 298, 473, 600, 632  
Berkeley, 473, 632  
Bosanquet, 85, 91, 95, 116, 124, 250,  
284, 287, 291, 298, 310, 390, 417n,  
473  
Bradley (Bradleyan), 14n, 34, 85, 91,  
116, 124, 137, 147, 250, 298, 303 385,  
473, 579, 632, 636, 637, 650, 669, 671

### C

Croce, 473

### D

Descartes, (Cartesian) 27, 32, 35, 112,  
298, 473, 571, 632, 641  
Dewey, 473, 632, 633

### E

Eddington, 586n  
Einstein, 307

### G

Garbe, 677  
Gentile, 473  
Gough, 677

### H

Haldane, 296, 573, 641  
Hegel, (Hegelian) 1, 6, 291, 473, 632  
Heracleitus, (Heraclitean) 1, 4, 84,  
116, 119  
Hume, 473, 632

### J

James, 1, 89, 118, 473, 632

### K

Kant, (Kantian) 1, 6, 16, 85, 95, 116,  
248n, 251, 287, 303, 306, 417, 444n,

473, 569n, 575, 632, 671  
Keith, 324n, 677

### L

Leibnitz, (Leibnitzian) 15, 632  
Locke, 473, 632

### M

Max Muller, 630, 666, 677  
MacDonell, 677  
McDougall, 40  
Mill, 299

### N

Nietzsche, 560, 633

### P

Parmenides, (Parmenidean) 84, 85,  
116, 250, 303, 417, 472, 564,  
Plato, 2, 6, 9, 85, 116, 250, 473, 571,  
632, 671  
Prichard, 248, 251, 444-n, 569-n  
Pringle-Pattison, 473

### R

Russell, 1, 445, 473, 633

### S

Santayana, 473  
Socrates, 473, 632,  
Spinoza, (Spinozistic) 85, 95, 116, 303,  
473, 632, 643  
Stout, 307, 444

### T

Thales, 633  
Thibaut, 630, 666, 677

### W

Ward, 4, 473  
Watson, 118-n, 452  
Whitehead, 473, 633  
Wilson, 677

### Z

Zeller, 662-n  
Zeno, 290

# INDEX—EUROPEAN

## TOPICS

### A

Absolute, (Absolutism, Absolutist, Absolutistic) 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 23, 24, 26, 31-33, 42, 86, 89-104, 106, 107, 112, 115-117, 121-128, 130-139, 141-149, 151-169, 175, 177, 178, 181-189, 191-193, 195, 196, 198-200, 203-211, 214-227, 229-231, 233, 235, 257, 265, 267-276, 278, 279, 281, 282, 285, 286, 291, 293, 295, 299, 300, 302, 303, 305-307, 309-316, 318-323, 337, 339, 340, 342, 344-348, 350, 352, 355, 356, 360-363, 365, 367-373, 376, 378-403, 406-435, 437-440, 442, 443, 445-472, 474-484, 486-495, 499, 500, 504, 508, 509, 512-515, 517, 520, 522-536, 542, 543, 545, 548, 551, 554, 557, 563-569, 571-573, 575-582, 586-591, 593, 594, 596, 598, 600, 602, 605, 606, 610, 612, 618, 620, 623, 624, 625, 629, 631, 632, 634-637, 639-662, 666, 669-673, 675, 676, 679.  
Art, (Black) 585

### B

Behaviourism, (New) 118n.

### C

Conceptual, (Conceptualists) 191, 196  
Cosmopolitanism, 12

### D

Dogmatisms, 2, 565, 660  
Dualism 1, 46, 124, 285, 390, 392, 403, 425, 447, 449, 461, 463, 464, 467, 469-474, 479, 490, 494, 578, 591, 594, 631, 633, 642, 664, 669, 677  
Dualism Cartesian, 632, 641  
Dualist, 46, 293, 352, 418, 465, 637  
Dualistic, 336, 424, 631, 660.

### E

Egoism, 328  
Elan, 23  
Empiricism, 13  
Esotericism, 13  
Ethical (Systems) 652ff  
Evolution, 296, 297

### H

Hedonism, 16ff  
Hedonistic, 280, 388, 468, 538, 539, 560, 671

### I

Idealism, (Idealists) 1, 2, 12, 249, 530, 573, 632, 633, 636, 671  
Idealism, Absolute or Monistic 2, 12, 147, 167, 325, 361, 396, 397, 479, 494, 552, 570, 571, 578, 582, 585, 629n, 632, 660, 678, 679  
Idealism, Ethical, 5, 24  
Idealism, Hegelian, 473  
Idealism, Neo-Platonic, 473  
Idealism, Platonic, 632, 671  
Idealism, Subjective, 390  
Idealistic, Theory of Knowledge, 387  
Illusionism, 25, 636, 651  
Intuition, (Philosophy of) 9

### M

Materialism, 403, 404, 579  
Monism, 1, 12, 36, 46, 72, 79, 94, 154, 163n, 177, 277, 278, 291, 293, 294, 309, 367, 384, 388, 390-394, 396, 402-404, 408-410, 423, 427, 435, 439, 449, 453-458, 461, 463, 465-474, 476-480, 490-492, 534, 558, 585, 623, 629n, 632, 633, 636, 659, 642, 659-661, 669, 675, 677, 678  
Monism, Absolute, 276, 318, 453  
Monism Absolutistic, 426, 452, 494, 552  
Monism Eleatic, 85  
Monism Materialistic, 425  
Monist, 90, 106, 137, 285, 295, 412, 418, 501 509, 526, 530, 548, 554, 557, 597  
Monist Absolutistic, 42, 95, 98, 153  
Monist Indian, 84  
Monist Orthodox, 85  
Monistic, 89, 141, 166, 268, 300, 389, 547, 550, 551, 594, 601-n, 637, 640, 662, 680  
Monotheism, 36, 394, 498-501, 518, 542  
Monotheism Pluralistic, 523  
Mystics, 473  
Mysticism, 104  
Mysticism Neo-Platonic, 632

### N

Nihilism, 24, 25, 290, 356, 396, 425, 426, 447, 480  
Nihilistic, 24, 396  
Nominalists, 191

O

Occultism, 585

P

Pantheistic, 166  
 Pluralism, 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 79, 167, 235, 365, 390, 425, 426, 450, 455, 463, 467, 545, 578, 597, 618, 629-n, 636, 645, 666, 672  
 Pluralism, Apparent 456,  
 Pluralism, Fundamental, 453,  
 Pluralism Radical, 284, 285, 291, 294-296, 298, 308, 429, 465, 505-508, 516, 519-521, 530, 627, 655, 658  
 Pluralism Realistic, 147  
 Pluralist, 2, 3, 103, 137, 144, 267, 287, 501, 588, 597, 632, 678  
 Pluralist, Radical, 293, 298  
 Pluralistic, 175, 213, 279, 299, 356, 361-363, 365, 369, 370, 373, 378, 385, 391, 394, 453, 466, 467, 530, 545, 546, 583, 591, 594, 596, 598, 605, 609, 618, 621, 636-639, 643, 646, 650, 654, 656, 657, 659, 661, 666, 668, 670  
 Polytheism, 500  
 Pragmatic, 505, 538, 560  
 Pragmatism, 560  
 Predestinarian, 648

R

Realism, 1, 2, 25, 113, 185, 235, 308, 390, 426, 519, 521, 549, 570-574, 636, 671  
 Realism, Bolshevik, 570  
 Realism, Creative, 570  
 Realism, Enlightened, 570  
 Realism, Multi-brand, 570  
 Realism, Naive, 570  
 Realism, Neo, 570  
 Realism, Pluralistic, 147, 365

Realism, Radical, 12, 284, 325, 530, 545, 551, 557, 559, 570, 609, 618, 626, 629, 631, 666, 669, 670, 678, 679  
 Realism, Rational, 27  
 Realism, Reign of, 665, 678  
 Realism, Relative, 325  
 Realism, Renaissance of, 548, 558, 633  
 Realism, Revolutionary, 666  
 Realism, Scientific, 570  
 Realism, Theistic, 494  
 Realist, 530  
 Realistic, 1, 2, 3, 279, 299, 356, 361-363, 365, 369, 391, 424, 546, 552, 636  
 Realistic, Neo, 2  
 Realistic, Theory of Knowledge, 25, 31  
 Relativity, 35  
 Religion, 166, 584, 636  
 Ritualism, 636

S

Scepticism, 565  
 Scripturalism, 564  
 Secularism, 359  
 Singularism, 3  
 Solipsism, 31, 43, 249, 251, 387  
 Spiritualism, 359

T

Theism, 167, 233, 235, 282, 519, 545, 554, 628  
 Theism, Pluralistic, 465, 494, 548, 549, 551, 553, 554, 557, 559, 604, 609, 629, 631, 654, 656, 657, 659, 662, 666, 668-670, 672, 673, 675-679  
 Theism, Dualistic and Realistic, 494  
 Theist (Pluralistic), 581, 660.  
 Theistic, 166, 545, 546, 661, 665  
 Theology, 584





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